v

Contents

Notes on Contributors vi

Introduction 1 Roberto Merrill

Part I General Approaches

1 Neutrality and Political Liberalism 25 Richard J. Arneson

2 The Possibility and Desirability of Neutrality 44 Peter de Marneffe

3 Perfectionist Neutrality 57 Steven Wall

4 Expressive Neutrality 83 Kwame Anthony Appiah

5 Neutrality toward Non-controversial Conceptions of the Good Life 97

Ruwen Ogien

6 Consequential Neutrality Revivified 109 Simon Clarke

Part II Specific Issues

7 Neutrality and Liberal Pluralism 125 George Crowder

8 Perfectionism and Democracy 144 George Sher

9 Neutrality, Public Reason and Deliberative Democracy 159 Colin M. Macleod

10 A New Approach to Equality 178 Christine Sypnowich

Bibliography 210

Index 223

1

Introduction Roberto Merrill

The basic intuition supporting the ideal of political neutrality is that no exercise of political power can be legitimately justified solely by the reason that one way of life is intrinsically superior to all others. For a number of contemporary authors, this ideal of neutrality is the hall-mark of liberalism. I’ll start by (1) describing the contemporary history of political neutrality. I then (2) distinguish three kinds of neutrality: neutrality of consequences, of aims, and of justifications. Then I look at (3) the object of neutrality: the most common view is that neutrality concerns ‘conceptions of the good.’ But what does this expression include exactly? Next, (4) I examine the scope of neutrality: the term ‘state neutrality’ is the most common designation of its scope, but what exactly does it encompass? I then (5) turn to the question of the justifi-cation of neutrality. Next I (6) examine the possibility of a convergence between the ideal of political neutrality and political perfectionism. Finally I will present a (7) summary of the chapters.

1 Contemporary history of neutrality

According to Ronald Dworkin, a political theory which would not support the ideal of neutrality must be regarded as opposed to liberalism (1978: 127). And according to Charles Larmore, the central concept of liberalism is that of neutrality (1987: 42–3). Bruce Ackerman, who developed his own version of neutrality, also claims that this concept is the organizing principle of liberal thought (1980: 10). Although the ideal of neutrality is also endorsed by some republicans, including Pettit (1997, 1998), it is mostly within liberal theory that the debate on neutrality has been conducted in its contemporary form. It is generally agreed that the issue of neutrality emerged in the contemporary literature with the publication

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in 1971 of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (Raz, 1986: 117; Jones, 1989: 10; Waldron, 1993: 143; Wall & Klosko, 2003: 2). This shared view is some-what surprising because Rawls does not use the word neutrality in this book. Nevertheless, the idea of neutrality seems to be at the heart of his theory, though not explicitly. This is because it seems implicit in Rawls’s idea that the correct principles of justice are those that would be chosen in a hypothetical original position by individuals who are ignorant of their particular conceptions of a good life. Neutrality also seems anchored in Rawls’s development of the idea of the priority of the right over the good (Rawls, 1988; on this point, see Kymlicka, 1989: 885; Waldron, 1998).

If one were to situate the first use of the term neutrality in its explicit use within the contemporary debate on the justification of liberalism, it would be found in Robert Nozick (1974: 33). It is, however, with the now classic article by Ronald Dworkin, entitled ‘Liberalism’ (1978), that the role played by the ideal of neutrality within liberal theory is clearly first articulated and defended with vigor and precision. This article was important because other liberal authors followed Dworkin’s use and explication of this notion, such as Ackerman (1980), Nagel (1987), Larmore (1994), Rawls (1993), and Barry (1995), to cite some of the most persuasive advocates of neutrality.

Although the debate about the plausibility and desirability of neutrality started with critiques from ‘communitarian’ authors (see, for example Sandel, 1982; MacIntyre, 1988; Taylor, 1989), it was ultimately led by authors who consider themselves in one way or another liberal ‘perfec-tionists’ (see Raz, 1986; de Marneffe, 1990; Macedo, 1990; Galston, 1991; Hurka, 1995; Sher, 1997; Wall, 1998), who have formulated over the last years the most vigorous critiques of the ideal of neutrality.

2 Which neutrality? Consequences, aims and justifications

When philosophers say that the neutral state is one that does not favor any conception of good, this can mean at least three different things:

1. Neutrality of consequences: the state should do nothing that would have the effect – this effect being intentional or not – of favoring a conception of the good life.

2. Neutrality of aims: the state should do nothing with the aim of promoting a conception of the good life over others.

3. Neutrality of justifications: the justification of political principles or state policies should not be based on the superiority of a conception of the good life.

Introduction 3

These three different meanings of neutrality have led to numerous devel-opments; we present here the essential points of each of them (in partic-ular see Raz, 1986: 114–5; Larmore, 1987: 44; Waldron, 1993: 143–67; Kymlicka, 1989; Galston, 1991: 100–1; Rawls, 1993: 235–8; Sher, 1997: 22–3; Wall, 1998).

2.1 Neutrality of consequences

According to neutrality of consequences, political agents must do nothing which would have the effect of favoring a particular concep-tion of the good life. For example, laws enacted by Parliament must not allow that a hedonistic lifestyle is promoted at the expense of a lifestyle committed to Christian values. The point is that the consequences of state action must be the same for all lifestyles.

Neutrality of consequences can be stated in two different ways: either the state should not promote any conception of the good over others, or it must promote all equally.

According to the first version, because any policy will have different consequences on different conceptions of the good life, the state should abstain from promoting any conception of the good. According to the second version, neutrality of the consequences involves state policies that will affect equally all conceptions of the good life (this is the version endorsed by Montefiore, 1975: 5).

However, it is very difficult if not impossible to predict the conse-quences of a law on all conceptions of a good life. For example, to give everyone a right to free education does not mean that everyone will be able to benefit equally from it. Different people may benefit unequally just because their preferences and capabilities are different. Specifically, the resources that the state can distribute in its policies have, in every conception of the good, the value of the hierarchy of values specific to each of these concepts.

Even assuming, however, that it is possible for a policy to be neutral in its consequences, in the sense that it affects equally all conceptions of the good, this policy may be undesirable, because its implementation would require a degree of state interventionism that is incompatible with liberalism.

In sum, there is a consensus that neutrality of consequences is not a plausible interpretation of the ideal of neutrality, and even if possible, not desirable. But three important exceptions are Goodin and Reeve (1989: 193–210), Miller (1990: 72–97), and Simon Clarke, in this book. See also Wall (2001) for an instructive analysis of this almost unanimous rejection of neutrality of consequences.

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2.2 Neutrality of aims

According to neutrality of aims, the state should do nothing with the intention of promoting a non-neutral conception of the good over others. This definition of neutrality is different from neutrality of conse-quences in that it focuses on the intentions of the state and not on the consequences of state policies. Neutrality of aims seems at first glance an achievable ideal. To understand why, consider an example: suppose that the state aims to establish an official state language, and must therefore choose one language among several available. This can be considered neutral in the sense that it does not intentionally favor one language over others, but it is motivated by a need for more effective state commu-nication. Although the purpose of the state can be considered neutral, the choice of a particular language would certainly have a non-neutral consequence, since all those who do not consider the chosen language as their preferred language will be disadvantaged compared to those by whom the chosen language is preferred one.

Despite this apparent plausibility, neutrality of aims seems to be open to the objection that it is difficult to know the real aims of the State (Sher, 1997: 23–5; see also Appiah in this book). Indeed, it’s difficult to know when the aims of the state are neutral or not, if one considers that these aims refer to the intentions of the state: how can we be sure we know the real intentions of the state? Thus, to return to our example, how to ensure that the purpose of the state is intentionally neutral? Because it is possible that the real motivation behind the mask of a neutral object such as ‘the need to establish a single official language to improve the effectiveness of state communication’ is in fact to hide the intention to promote a specific language to the detriment of other languages (on this difficulty, cf. Appiah, 2005: 91). One solution is to assume that the important thing is the reasons advanced by the state for any given policy, regardless of whether those reasons are the real intentions of the state. In this case, this objection regarding the difficulty of knowing the intentions would not be relevant, since reasons can be public and open to contestation (Waldron, 1993: 150–1). Two other criticisms are worth mentioning here: (a) it is not clear that it makes sense to refer to ‘the aims of the state’ given that the state is not a person with aims, but is composed of many different agents who have different aims from each other, and (b) it is not clear why motives of government officials are relevant to the evaluation of the policies they adopt – suppose that a law can be fully justified on neutral grounds but is adopted for non-neutral reasons: does that show that there is anything wrong with the law?

Introduction 5

2.3 Neutrality of justifications

Some authors seem to exclude that neutrality of aims is a plausible conception of neutrality for the reason mentioned. According to these authors, neutrality must be understood as neutrality of justifications. According to the neutrality of justifications, state policies cannot be justified by the judgment that one way of life is intrinsically superior to all others. Neutrality of justifications is the version of neutrality endorsed by most defenders of the ideal of neutrality.

Some authors do not seem to attach much importance to the distinc-tion between aims and justifications, speaking interchangeably of neutrality of aims or neutrality of justifications. Indeed, the distinction between neutrality of aims and justifications may seem unimportant to the extent that a neutral justification usually involves a neutral aim (Larmore, 1996: 126). It is understandable that neutrality of aims and justifications can be assimilated because both are based on reasons justi-fying state actions. However, as noted, it is quite possible that the state can have non-neutral aims while justifying his actions in a neutral way. And conversely, it is also possible to justify non-neutral government policies which have neutral aims. Therefore, we should not dismiss too quickly the differences between aims and justifications, if only because this distinction may be important to understand how the ideal of neutrality is not necessarily incompatible with perfectionism.

Let’s summarize the ideas concerning the three meanings of neutrality. Neutrality of consequences is almost always considered implausible or undesirable, contrary to neutrality of justifications, which is the concept of neutrality endorsed by many liberals. Even if neutrality of aims is most often associated with neutral justifications, however, there are important reasons to distinguish them clearly. Once one accepts the need to distinguish neutrality of aims from neutrality of justifications, it is possible, to save the plausibility of the ideal of neutrality, to consider it necessary to defend both versions of neutrality or consider that it is plausible and desirable to defend only one or the other. Under the first alternative, the more demanding version of neutrality implies both a defense of neutrality of aims and of justification. Under the second alternative, neutrality can be limited to neutrality of aims, or limited to neutrality of justifications.

2.4 The relations between aims and justifications

I will try to better explain how the distinction between neutrality aims and neutrality of justification is not a trivial distinction. In fact, it is

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worthwhile to insist on this point because this distinction may be important to understand how neutrality is not necessarily inconsistent with perfectionism. To develop this point, now consider this definition, an alternative to the one I proposed, the neutrality of justification:

The state should not aim to do anything to promote any non-neu-tral conception of the good, or give greater assistance to those who pursue it, unless a plausible neutral justification can be given for the state’s action (Wall, 2001: 391). See also Wall and Klosko (2003: 8).

This definition of neutrality of justification is curious because it informs us about the aims of neutrality, which is not considered a necessary condition for a legitimate policy. Indeed, according to this definition, the state can be legitimately non-neutral in its aims, provided that the justification of its aims is neutral. To return to our example, under this definition, the state can legitimately have the aim to protect those for whom French is a priority in their conception of the good at the expense of those for whom the Corsican or Breton language is a priority, if a neutral justification can be given for its non-neutral aim. However, if the state can legitimately pursue non-neutral aims, it simply means that the state can legitimately pursue ethical aims. Thus, the pursuit of perfec-tionist aims by the state is not illegitimate as long as a neutral justifica-tion for this perfectionist aim can be given. In other words, neutrality of justifications is not after all incompatible with political perfectionism since neutral justifications for state action are consistent with perfec-tionist state aims.

Similarly, it is also possible that neutral aims are compatible with perfectionist justifications of state actions. This second alternative can be illustrated as follows: the aim of the state can be neutral when it comes to satisfying a need as a neutral choice of an official language. But the justifying reason for this neutral policy might be non-neutral if it is justified by the superiority of a conception of the good. Beyond the question of whether these two possibilities can truly be legitimate alter-natives, and thus both be desirable conceptions of neutrality, it is impor-tant to distinguish these two types of neutrality because they do not necessarily go together and they do not seem reducible to one another.

In fact, the general trend equates these two types of neutrality. I’ll take now an example from Richard Arneson regarding the relation-ship between neutrality of aims and neutrality of justifications because I think he is among those who have contributed the most to high-light the differences that may exist between both types of neutrality. A

Introduction 7

government policy that is justified by the pursuit of a good (civil peace) but whose purpose is the promotion of a controversial conception of the good (Catholic religion) can satisfy neutrality of justifications (civil peace), but not neutrality of aims (Catholic religion). Conversely, a policy can satisfy neutrality of aims without satisfying neutrality of justi-fications, if for example it aims at religious tolerance, but justifies it by appealing to the truth of a peaceful religion. While this further compli-cates the picture, it is also instructive to remember that state actions are composed of aims and means of achieving these aims. But the aims, as the means, may be neutral or not. In addition, the justification of the means and the aims can be neutral or not. These options could be summarized this way:

1. The aims of the state are neutral. An example of a neutral aim: civil peace. The justification of the aims can be neutral or not. An example of a neutral justification: ‘peace allows for anyone to pursue its ends.’ An example of non-neutral justification: the Bible says: ‘Thou shalt not kill.’

2. The means that the state uses to achieve its aims may be neutral or not. An example of non-neutrality: the establishment of a state reli-gion like the one professed by peaceful Quakers. The justification of the means can be neutral or not. A neutral justification of the means is: Quakerism is a religion of the majority. Any religion could serve this purpose. Quakerism is a peaceful religion. In contrast, the justi-fication of the means is not neutral if, for example, it is justified this way: Quakerism is the only true religion.

The exact relationships between neutrality of aims and of justifications may seem difficult to define. But these difficulties can also suggest that neutrality is not necessarily opposed to political perfectionism, at least if one accepts that a plausible conception of neutrality does not neces-sarily imply neutrality of aims and of justifications.

3 Neutrality toward conceptions of the good life

Political neutrality is a normative requirement according to which certain normative considerations should not be included in the justi-fication of government policies. But what normative considerations are thus excluded by the requirement of neutrality? All authors partici-pating in the debate agree that these normative considerations concern the ‘good.’ It should be noted that the expression ‘conception of the

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good’ is not the only one used in the literature. In fact, they are very varied. Besides the most common expression ‘conceptions of the good’ (Ackerman, 1980: 11, 43 for definition), there is also ‘specific purposes’ (Jones, 1989: 9), ‘comprehensive doctrines’ (Rawls, 2001: 152), ‘substan-tial conceptions of the good’ (Barry, 1995: 139–45; Dworkin, 1978), ‘lifestyles’ (Kymlicka 1989: 886), ‘controversial conceptions of the good’ (Larmore, 1987: 53), or ‘ideals of the good life’ (Raz, 1986: 110).

In its most common sense, a conception of the good is a belief or set of normative beliefs about what is supposed to improve the life of a person or a group of people, these beliefs being more or less struc-tured in moral, religious, philosophical or other doctrines. However, as suggested by Sher (1997: 37–8), this definition seems too narrow and too broad at the same time. It is too narrow because some beliefs about what improves lives tend to be in reality beliefs about what is right, for example, certain religious beliefs. This definition is also too wide because some beliefs about what improves one’s life are not really conceptions of the good in a relevant sense. Indeed, some goods, such as ‘primary goods’ or ‘capabilities’ for example, are essential to all people. However, these are not generally regarded as what is meant by ‘a conception of the good’ which promotion by the state would be illegitimate. In fact, these are goods which everyone agrees should be promoted by the state. Thus, those philosophers who defend neutrality regarding conceptions of the good also defend the promotion of primary goods by the state. But if some liberals defend neutrality toward the good and at the same time endorse the promotion of certain primary goods, then this defini-tion of a conception of the good is too wide unless these liberal thinkers are inconsistent. In order to overcome these difficulties some neutralist liberals define the concept as a set of ‘controversial’ normative beliefs which improve someone’s life. A conception of the good in its broadest sense is therefore equivalent to a controversial normative belief about the good.

According to the liberal neutralist, neutrality towards conceptions of the good does not imply neutrality toward all goods, but only those goods which are not considered primary goods, and therefore are controversial (Waldron, 1993: 159). Perhaps a better way to capture the original idea is to say that neutrality excludes the reason for govern-ment policy that one way of life is inherently more worth living than others because government policies can be justified only by consid-erations of harm-prevention and fairness. The perfectionist, then, is someone who believes that judgments of this sort can justify govern-ment policy. However, especially after Rawls’s Political Liberalism , it is

Introduction 9

true that neutrality is typically defined in terms of controversial evalua-tive or metaphysical beliefs.

From the neutralist standpoint, the best way for the State to assist individuals to lead good lives is to ensure that it does not favor any specific conception of the good, ensuring only the protection of funda-mental interests common to all individuals, regardless of their concep-tions of the good. Although neutralists and perfectionists can agree on the fact that some primary goods are common to all conceptions of the good and in this sense can be called neutral, yet according to liberal perfectionists, the state may promote goods other than primary goods because the simple fact that a conception of the good is controversial is not a sufficient reason to abandon plans for its promotion by the state (Arneson, 2000).

4 The scope of neutrality

The most common phrase to describe the scope of neutrality is that of ‘state neutrality.’ But it is a term that can encompass many different entities. Here is a list of entities to which neutrality can be applied, ranging from the most abstract to most concrete: neutrality of justifi-cation; theories of justice; the constitution; legislative, executive and judicial branches of government; the public educational system; public media; reasoning and intentions of legislators when they design and pass laws; judicial verdicts in interpreting the constitution; delibera-tions of state officials; and the votes of citizens. Despite this diversity of entities involved in the convenient expression of ‘state neutrality,’ we should note that this expression refers primarily to two types of enti-ties: individuals and institutions. In terms of individuals affected by the requirement of neutrality, there is a consensus in the literature to consider that these are to be state officials and, in certain circumstances, common citizens, for example when they vote, although this depends on the political issues involved. But see Ruwen Ogien in this book for an extension of the neutrality requirement for ethical relationships.

Indeed, for some liberals, neutrality should apply only to policy deci-sions that directly affect what has become termed ‘the basic structure of society’ which includes the major constitutional issues and the most important matters relating to economic and social institutions. In this case, the scope of neutrality is called ‘narrow.’ For others, the require-ment of neutrality should instead apply to all policy decisions through which citizens exercise coercive power, which can of course be exer-cised in situations that are beyond the basic structure of society. In this

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case, the scope of neutrality is called ‘wide.’ The scope of state neutrality can thus be narrow or wide. We should note here that the question of the scope of neutrality of justifications has gradually transformed into a debate concerning the scope of ‘public justification’ or ‘public reason,’ following Rawls’s work on public reason (1993, 1997, 2001). I therefore consider the terms ‘neutrality’ and ‘public reason’ and ‘neutral reasons’ and ‘public reasons’ as synonymous, although this association may be criticized when the differences of these concepts are detailed (for these details, see for example de Marneffe, 2006a: 30).

One common reason often given for the refusal of the narrow concep-tion of neutrality is to highlight the idea that even when the basic structure is neutral, the state can still exercise with significant impact its non-neutral coercive power on individuals with regard to legislative decisions outside the basic structure (Solum, 1993). Since this use of the state non-neutral coercive power does not appear legitimate, it would justify the defense of a wide conception of public reason. But according to proponents of a narrow scope of neutrality, the main reason why neutrality should be limited to key policy issues is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to present neutral conclusive public reasons regarding nonessential political issues. The debate between advocates of neutrality in favor of a narrow or a wide view of neutrality is very dynamic, if we consider the debate about the scope of public reason as its natural exten-sion. Proponents of the wide view of neutrality or public reason include: Solum (1993), Greenawalt (1994), Quong (2004), Thompson (2003) and Schwartzman (2004). Proponents of a narrow conception of neutrality include the latest Rawls and many of the most important advocates of traditional neutrality. An interesting point to draw from this debate regarding the relationship between neutrality and perfectionism is that if neutral reasons should be limited to essential political questions of the basic structure, then this means that nonessential political decisions may legitimately be based on perfectionist reasons, which is a way to reconcile neutrality with perfectionism.

5 The justification of neutrality

We have seen that neutrality of aims and neutrality of justifications are considered the most plausible versions of neutrality. However, they must be justified in some way or another. There are three types of reasons used to justify neutrality: epistemological, moral, and pragmatic. These three types of reasons can then be arranged to establish four methodological variants justifying neutrality.

Introduction 11

5.1 Three types of reasons to justify neutrality

Several types of reasons justifying the need for neutrality have been proposed, which can be grouped into three: epistemological reasons, moral reasons, and pragmatic reasons. These three types of reasons mobilized to defend the ideal of neutrality can be seen as composing one large argument.

(a) Epistemological reasons

There are several epistemological reasons cited to defend the ideal of neutrality. For example, under the skeptical argument, it is very diffi-cult if not impossible to know what kinds of life are best, so the state should not promote specific conceptions of a good life. Another type of argument is that of reasonable disagreement (or reasonable pluralism), according to which the ideals of the good life are divergent and a source of reasonable disagreement, and thus legitimate. Therefore, the state must remain neutral. Another way of formulating the argument is to defend an ‘epistemic abstinence,’ according to which it is better not to justify policy decisions on perfectionist grounds, given our degree of uncertainty about what kinds of life are best.

(b) Moral reasons

Sometimes moral reasons are advanced to defend state neutrality. For example, according to the argument of autonomy, non-neutral policy decisions violate individual autonomy. This argument of autonomy is formulated essentially in two versions: Either it is the value of autonomy that grounds neutrality, or it is the capacity for autonomy. A second argument is that of the plurality of values, according to which, since values are plural and conflicting, the best political system is neutral between these values. A third argument is that of equal respect, according to which perfectionist policies do not treat all individuals with equal respect.

(c) Pragmatic reasons

A third reason given for the ideal of neutrality is of pragmatic or pruden-tial nature. In this type of pragmatic argument, the emphasis is placed on the idea that non-neutral government decisions pose unacceptable risks of oppression, instability and error. This argument of stability can be further decomposed into several others, such as the argument of futility, according to which perfectionists projects always fail. Or the argument of incompetence, according to which the state should be neutral on issues where it is likely to be mistaken.

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5.2 Four ways of justifying neutrality

There are four ways to arrange these three types of reasons, which are the four main methods to justify the ideal of neutrality: an ecumenical approach, two deductive variants, and a fourth which is a mix of the ecumenical method and the deductive (this taxonomy is proposed by Wall and Klosko, 2003: 11–13).

(a) Ecumenical justification

The first method that can be noted for the justification of neutrality uses the largest possible number of types of reasons: epistemological, moral, or pragmatic, without favoring any one in particular. This ecumen-ical approach seems to be endorsed by Bruce Ackerman, who justifies neutrality with a prudential argument according to which non-neutral authoritarian governments are not effective (1980: 363–4), an argument in moral epistemology according to which moral experimentalism is easier if the state is neutral (1980: 366), a moral argument according to which moral autonomy is possible only if the state is neutral (1980: 11, 368), and finally, another epistemological argument, skeptical in nature, that it is difficult or impossible to know what is good (1980: 368). One of the strongest criticisms against this ecumenical method is formulated by Jeremy Waldron, according to whom neutrality must be defended on particular grounds ‘because justifying it is part and parcel of the task of articulating it’ (Waldron, 1989: 69).

(b) Deductive justification from shared values

A second way to justify neutrality is deductively from shared values, in order to maintain the coherence of the notion of neutrality. This means that the need of coherence requires a commitment to neutrality because neutrality is entailed by our other values. Charles Larmore (1987: 4, 53), for example, uses this deductive method, from a minimalist morality common to all, to establish a neutral justification of neutrality. It is diffi-cult to see how exactly this justification can succeed without appeal to intrinsic values such as democratic equality, civic friendship, reciprocity, and mutual respect.

(c) Deductive justification from a conception of a good

The third method to justify neutrality is to deduce it from a particular conception of the good life. This neutrality is justified by invoking a moral value, like autonomy or utility. It is therefore an explicitly non-neutral justification of neutrality. Dworkin (2002, chapter 6) is among

Introduction 13

the most representative proponents of such a method. Dworkin rejects the hypothetical contractarian justification for the ideal of neutrality, and derives neutrality from a conception of the good life (the ‘challenge model of ethics’), certainly controversial, but according to Dworkin abstract enough to be neutral. The strongest criticism to this method is to recall that it does not seem an adequate response to the fact of pluralism (see Larmore, 1987: 47).

(d) Deductive and ecumenical justification from shared values

The fourth method used to justify neutrality is to combine elements of the deductive method from shared moral values, with elements of the ecumenical method. This is for example the method used by Rawls, according to whom neutrality must be understood as a variation of the principle of acceptability based on moral values shared in the public culture of liberal democracies (deductivist approach), as a requirement of a certain kind of moral ideal of treating others with respect. But Rawls also justifies neutrality with the idea of an overlapping consensus (ecumenical justification), also defending the idea of public reason primarily as necessary in order to ensure the stability of well-ordered society over time. It is a method that is vulnerable to both deductivist and ecumenical criticism.

6 Neutrality and perfection: two complementary ideals?

The debate about the plausibility and desirability of political neutrality has become primarily a debate between liberals. This is surprising, for it may seem that the requirement of neutrality is endorsed by all the major competing political theories in Western democracies (Sher, 1997: 2). The debate among liberals is all the more surprising in that the ideal of neutrality seems well rooted in the history of liberalism. In fact, it seems that neutrality is a requirement that liberals have endorsed since at least Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). Another important lineage of neutrality is expressed through the harm principle. On the relationship between neutrality and perfectionism, and the harm principle, see the schematic but clear presentation by Wall (2008).

Yet, according to some liberals who reject the ideal of neutrality, to consider neutrality as a natural extension of tolerance is not well founded. According to these liberals, some state policies can legiti-mately be informed by a reasonable view of the good life, and not be as neutral as possible regarding all conceptions of the good life. It is

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in this sense that these authors endorse a ‘perfectionist’ conception of liberalism, according to which the state can legitimately promote one or more conceptions of the good that are objectively better than others. According to these liberals, a perfectionist conception of the principles and actions of the liberal state would be as natural as it is dominant in the history of liberalism. From the perfectionist perspective, it is a mistake to consider neutrality as an ideal in continuity with the ideal of tolerance. On the historical and theoretical foundations of liberalism, see for example Galston (1991), Raz (1986, 1988a: 1230), Hurka (1993: 159) and Chan (2000: 5–6). Liberal perfectionists believe that we should abandon the pursuit the neutrality ideal, which anyway will disap-pear, if it’s not already dead (Sher, 1997; Wall, 1998; Arneson, 2003; de Marneffe, 2006a).

The meaning of ‘perfectionism’ does not seem fixed in the contem-porary literature. But it helps to clarify its meaning if we consider two main senses of perfectionism: one ethical, and the other political. Ethical perfectionism is built from two main theses: one from meta-ethics, the other normative. According to the meta-ethical thesis, ethical and moral judgments are ultimately reducible to beliefs that may be true or false (and not, for example, to desires or subjective preferences). According to the normative theory of perfectionism, some ethical and moral lifestyles, that is to say certain ideals of the good life, can be judged objectively better than others. According to political perfectionism, the promotion by the State of certain ideals of the good life considered better than others can be a legitimate aim. The perfectionist political theory, however, must be divided (on this point cf. Appiah, 2005: 157) into two: (a) the State may legitimately advance the ideals of good life which (b) are based on a conception of the good more substantial than the satisfaction of desires whatsoever (subjectivism). In other words, the state can promote conceptions of the good without being perfectionist, when promoted conceptions of the good are subjectivist. On the opposition between perfectionism and subjectivism, see Sher’s analysis (1997: Chapter 8). The debate between liberals on the plausibility and desirability of neutrality and its relation-ship with perfectionism is very much alive (see, among a vast litera-ture, Appiah, 2010; Clarke, 2006; de Marneffe, 2006a; Weinstock, 2007; Ogien, 2007; Lecce, 2008).

The opposition seems strong between liberal neutralists and liberal perfectionists. However, this opposition must be qualified because, as we have suggested, it may be that the ideals of neutrality and perfection are actually consistent.

Introduction 15

6.1 An agreement on a non-controversial conception of the good

First, remember that some neutralists are not necessarily opposed to the promotion by the state of goods which are not primary goods, as long as they are not controversial (this seems to be the position by Larmore (1994) and Rawls (1993)). For example, if all citizens agree that the best possible life is a consumerist and hedonistic life spent mostly in malls, preferably by consuming hallucinogenic drugs and foods with high cholesterol, then the State may legitimately foster this type of life at the expense of others. However, this way of rendering complementary the ideal of neutrality and the ideal of perfection (assuming that this concep-tion of the good life can be considered perfectionist) does not seem very attractive. In addition, the possibility of an agreement among all citizens about the superiority of a conception of good, as good as it is, is empiri-cally very unlikely, given the diversity of lifestyles of liberal societies. However, there are at least three other ways, less trivial, and perhaps more desirable to defend the consistency of neutrality and perfection.

6.2 Neutrality of aims without neutrality of justification, and vice versa

A second way is the following: we can, as we have seen, distinguish at least two variants of neutrality: neutrality of aims, sometimes called legislation neutrality (de Marneffe, 1990, 1998) and neutrality of justifi-cations. According to the principle of neutrality of aims, the government should not restrict the freedom (or, more generally, limit the opportuni-ties or resources) of individuals in order to discourage lifestyles deemed worthless or degrading. And according to neutrality of justification, the government must act in accordance with a system of principles that can be justified without reference to any controversial conception of the good life. Neutrality of aims should be seen as a substantial principle for permissible government action, while neutrality of justification is an abstract principle justifying the substantive principles of permissible government action.

However, some authors, who advocate the ideal of neutrality, advo-cate neutrality of aims, but reject neutrality of justification. Thus, Dworkin, in his later writings (1995, 2002), justifies his liberal theory with a conception of the good which he names ‘the challenge model of ethics’ (Dworkin, 1995: 253–62) and endorses neutrality of aims, but not neutrality of justifications. Indeed, Dworkin’s argument in favor of neutrality of aims is that the social conditions enabling everyone to live better, at least according to the challenge model of ethics, will best be met if the government acts according to the principle of neutrality of

16 Roberto Merrill

aims. Therefore, Dworkin’s neutrality of aims is not justified by appealing to the more abstract principle of neutrality of justification, but based on a conception of the good. To sum it up, perfectionist liberalism can endorse liberal neutrality if these policies are appropriate means to realize a liberal conception of the good on the relationships between neutrality and perfectionism, see the article by Chen (1998). In this sense we can say that at least some form of neutrality (i.e. neutrality of aims) does not seem inconsistent with political perfectionism, when this neutrality does not imply neutrality of justification. Conversely, we should also remember that neutrality of justification does not imply neutrality of aims because a system of principles justified without reference to any particular conception of the good can be compatible with controversial government action which reduces the freedom of individuals. But we can also interpret Dworkin in an alternative but complementary way, such as the one proposed by Peter de Marneffe (see his chapter in this book, and 2006a), according to whom Dworkin rejects neutrality of justification as applied to liberal principles, but endorses neutrality of justification as applied to government policy. For Dworkin, the government should not adopt policies for non-neutral reasons because by observing this prin-ciple it will best promote good lives, according to Dworkin’s ‘challenge model’ of ethics. We can make here an analogy with John Stuart Mill’s argument for the harm principle: the government should observe the harm principle (which is similar in content to neutrality of justification as applied to legislation) because this will best foster the development and exercise of individuality and our other higher human capacities.

6.3 Neutrality limited to the basic structure of society

A third way, neither necessarily undesirable nor trivial, to render compatible the ideal of neutrality and the one of perfection, is to accept the promotion by the State of perfectionist conceptions of the good, provided that this promotion does not affect the essential political questions of the basic structure of society, such as major constitutional issues and key issues of economic and social justice. Indeed, in terms of non-core political issues, the state could legitimately advance certain controversial conceptions of the good, for example after a majority vote in favor of this promotion. Rawls’s idea of public reason is arguably a version of this kind of view.

6.4 Non-coercive perfectionism

There is, finally, a fourth way of defending a compatibility between neutrality and perfectionism, which is as follows: according to some

Introduction 17

liberal perfectionists, the promotion by the State of conceptions of the good should not be coercive. Indeed, non-coercive perfectionism appears to be compatible with neutrality, at least in neutrality of aims, according to which the government should not limit the freedom of individuals in order to discourage styles life considered worthless or degrading. In fact, neutrality is a device that filters the reasons that can be used to justify coercive decisions of the State. However, many state actions are not coercive in nature. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether neutrality should apply to all government decisions, or whether it should apply to only the coercive ones. This question is interesting because many believe that perfectionist state coercion is not an effective means of promoting perfectionist values. However, perfectionist non-coercive policies may be acceptable to those who defend neutrality by limiting its scope to the exercise of coercive political power (Wall & Klosko, 2003: 7). Therefore, this is another way to make complementary the ideal of neutrality and the perfectionist ideal. Non-coercive perfectionism seems consistent with neutrality of aims, because as we have seen, it is not necessarily an anti-perfectionist principle. Raz for example rejects anti-perfectionism, but endorses the principle of neutrality of aims, taking the view that the government should not be coercive in order to discourage worthless lifestyles (Raz, 1986: 110). The disagreement between Dworkin and Raz on neutrality, assuming it exists, concerns whether the government can discourage lifestyles deemed worthless by other means than coercion. On this point see for example the section of the article by Raz (1989b) on Dworkin.

7 Summary of the chapters

The book is divided in two parts. The first six chapters are about the theoretical foundations of political neutrality and its relations to perfec-tionism. The last four chapters are on specific issues related to political neutrality, such as liberal pluralist policies compatible with neutrality, democracy and perfectionism, public reason and deliberative democ-racy, and egalitarianism.

In Chapter 1, on ‘Neutrality and Political Liberalism,’ Richard Arneson explores the close relation between the doctrine of neutrality on the good and the ideal of political liberalism as formulated by John Rawls. Arneson starts by recalling that the core of the latter is a norm of polit-ical legitimacy: a morally legitimate state does not impose on people or coerce them except when the imposition is justifiable by appeal to principles that no one can reasonably reject. Political liberalism holds

18 Roberto Merrill

that in order to satisfy the liberal legitimacy norm, a theory of justice suitable for a modern diverse democracy must refrain from taking sides in controversies concerning metaphysical fundamentals or conceptions of what is good. Political liberalism does not rule out basing state poli-cies on views about what is good or worthwhile in human life so long as these are uncontroversial. Nor does it rule out paternalistic restriction of individual liberty when such paternalism is justifiable by appeal to prin-ciples that are not reasonably rejectable. But if reasonable people could disagree about whether the recreational use of drugs such as heroin and cocaine is inimical to the good life, or whether a culture oriented around shopping-mall consumption is inferior to one that promotes significant achievement by all, political liberalism condemns the use of public policy to discourage hard drug usage and materialistic consump-tion even if it is demonstrable that doing so would bring about more human well-being fairly distributed across persons. Arneson’s chapter, after reviewing some of the main arguments for political liberalism and neutrality, rejects most of them.

In Chapter 2, on ‘The Possibility and Desirability of Neutrality,’ Peter de Marneffe starts by recalling that ‘once upon a time’ Ronald Dworkin argued that a liberal government ought to be as neutral as possible in its policies toward different conceptions of the good life. Critics argued that this kind of neutrality is impossible or, if possible, undesirable. De Marneffe explains why neutrality is both possible and arguably desirable. The principle of neutrality, as he understands it, prohibits the govern-ment from limiting individual liberty in ways that cannot be fully justi-fied by neutral reasons alone. Government neutrality is possible, then, since it is possible for the government to adopt only policies that can be fully justified by neutral reasons. Finally, according to de Marneffe, government neutrality is arguably desirable since any limitation of liberty that cannot be fully justified by neutral reasons alone is arguably unjustifiable.

In Chapter 3, on ‘Perfectionist Neutrality,’ Steven Wall articulates a principle of state neutrality that is broadly compatible with a perfec-tionist approach to politics. Wall appeals to the thesis of value pluralism to do so. The basic idea is the following: perfectionists, who also accept the thesis of value pluralism, must allow that there exist a plurality of equally or incommensurably valuable ideals of the good life. Perfectionists believe that it is permissible for the state to favor good ideals over bad ones; but this belief is consistent with the belief that the state should be neutral among ideals of equal or incommensurable value. According to Wall, perfectionism and state neutrality are consistent so long as the

Introduction 19

state neutrality in question is restricted to ideals that are of equal or incommensurable value – or ideals that are equally worthwhile.

In Chapter 4, on ‘Expressive Neutrality,’ Kwame Anthony Appiah, presents a different normative justification for state neutrality which he calls ‘minimalist’ and is based on the harm principle put forward by John Stuart Mill. He starts by recalling that neutrality has long been said to be a liberal ideal, but it has turned out to be quite hard to say what it consists in and why it’s a good idea. Appiah proposes his way of under-standing the appeal of talk of neutrality to liberals: this appeal depends on the fact that it is expressive as well as instrumental. He believes that one of the instincts behind the talk of neutrality is that a neutral state expressed equal respect for its citizens; this means that it doesn’t distin-guish among social identities as such; and this requires that people of every identity must have reason to think that a state policy that disad-vantages them was not motivated by the fact that it was people of their identity that were being disadvantaged. Appiah suggests a way to under-stand how this is cashed out in practice. The principle of State Neutrality is standardly justified either by facts (the sociological fact of pluralism in modern societies, the epistemological fact that our conceptions of the good are controversial by nature) or by norms and values (the norm of equal respect, the value of a particular conception of the good life).

In Chapter 5, on ‘Neutrality Toward Non-controversial Conceptions of the Good Life,’ Ruwen Ogien aims to show that it is both possible and desirable that the state remains neutral toward non-controversial conceptions of the good life (insofar as such ideals are conceivable), as it is possible and desirable that it remains neutral toward controversial conceptions of the good life. Ogien presents three arguments to this effect. First, coercive or non-coercive interference of the state to promote non-controversial conceptions of the good life is self-defeating, because one’s life goes better if one freely chooses it, even if one chooses badly. Second, coercive or non-coercive interference of the state to promote non-controversial conceptions of the good life is irrational because people naturally and inevitably aim at the best for themselves. Finally, coercive or non-coercive interference of the state to promote non-controversial conceptions of the good life is ruled out by the Harm principle.

In Chapter 6, on ‘Consequential Neutrality Revivified,’ Simon Clarke starts by recalling that liberal neutrality requires that, given the diver-sity of conceptions of the good held by people, the state should be in some sense neutral between these conceptions of the good. Just what that sense is has been a matter of debate but it seems generally accepted that neutrality is a property of the justifications for government action

20 Roberto Merrill

and not of the consequences of such action. Simon Clarke argues that justificatory neutrality cannot be sufficient for neutrality and defends in a convincing way a conception of consequential neutrality.

In Chapter 7, on ‘Neutrality and Liberal Pluralism,’ George Crowder defends a qualified version of neutrality compatible with liberal pluralism. Liberal pluralists – that is, those who defend liberalism on the basis of Berlin’s idea of value pluralism – are somewhat wary of the idea of state neutrality, but they can support that ideal in a moderate or qualified form. They are wary of neutrality because, like other value pluralists, they tend to see all political systems in terms of the values those systems express. Any political arrangement will express some ranking of values. This view amounts to no more than an orthodoxy in the wake of the communitarian critiques of liberalism in the 1980s. On the other hand, as Crowder defends, pluralists needn’t abandon the ideal of neutrality altogether; they can accept neutrality in a qualified sense, equivalent to an aspiration to accommodate as wide a range of legitimate concep-tions of the good as possible. This fits with the liberal-pluralist ideal of a society in which people can pursue a wide diversity of goods, which in turn suggests a wide range of ways of life – provided that these are them-selves open to diverse interpretations, made possible by special atten-tion to the capacity of all citizens for personal autonomy.

In Chapter 8, on ‘Perfectionism and Democracy,’ George Sher seeks to answer the following question: whether a certain familiar anti-dem-ocratic argument applies with special force when democracies allow themselves to act for perfectionist reasons. More specifically, the paper asks whether the notorious fact that citizens and their representatives vary widely in intelligence, knowledge, judgment, integrity, and motiva-tion tells more heavily against democratic attempts to promote perfec-tionist values than it does against democratic decisions of other sorts. The paper’s conclusions are, first, that the former sorts of democratic decisions are no less suspect than the latter and, second, that the force of the argument is unclear in both cases.

In Chapter 9, on ‘Neutrality, Public Reason and Deliberative Democracy,’ Colin M. Macleod explores whether certain classic construals of liberal neutrality (e.g., justificatory neutrality) properly capture the distinc-tion between public and non-public reasons (i.e., between reasons that citizens can justifiably present to each other in the course of delibera-tion about what policies and institutional arrangements to adopt and reasons/considerations that are not politically salient for the purposes of deliberation). Macleod argues that standard depictions of neutrality (especially those that emphasize the importance of comprehensive

Introduction 21

anti-perfectionism) do not capture the relevant distinction, partly because some eligible public reasons are, at least mildly, perfectionist. Citizens and public officials may legitimately appeal to non-neutral reasons in advancing eligible justifications for the policies they seek to implement. A second theme of the paper concerns how much work a feasible conception of public reason can be expected to do in resolving contentious issues in diverse democratic communities. Macleod argues that many theorists of public reason implicitly suppose that a doctrine of public reason has a much greater capacity to resolve disputes about public policy in a determinate fashion than it really does. A plausible doctrine of public reason filters out some considerations as irrelevant to processes of political justification, but the eligible reasons are typi-cally not sufficient to resolve contentious issues. As a result, according to Macleod, a theory of public reason is not as central to securing legiti-mate democratic outcomes as it is often thought by its proponents.

In Chapter 10, on ‘A New Approach to Equality,’ Christine Sypnowich explores the relation between neutrality, perfectionism and equality by defending that ‘egalitarian perfectionism’ is a robust political philosophy that can avoid the weaknesses of theories of equality, on the one hand, and theories of the good life, on the other. According to Sypnowich, ultimately, the answer to the question, ‘equality of what?’ is flourishing, since whatever our policies, it is flourishing, or wellbeing, that we hope will be made more equal. Flourishing is not, however, the focus of most egalitarian theories. Most egalitarians instead posit goods, income or resources, the instruments of flourishing, not flourishing itself. The idea of flourishing presupposes that we can delineate, more or less objec-tively, what counts as a good life as opposed to a bad life, in order to promote the former and discourage the latter. But most egalitarians are neutralists, insistent that individuals should be free to choose how to live and that political theories which delineate what counts as living well are illiberal.

Sypnowich argues for a perfectionist account of equality, an account which has historical antecedents from Morris to Beveridge, and which draws on the similar, though less perfectionist, views of Amartya Sen and Gerald Cohen. She addresses the problem of individual respon-sibility that besets egalitarianism as well as the obvious objection to perfectionism, that it is paternalistic.

I would like to thank Peter de Marneffe and John Bates for helpful comments.

223

Index

Ackerman, B., 1, 2, 8, 12, 43n. 1, 78n. 2, 175n. 3

Appiah, K. A., 4, 14, 19, 181Aristotle, 126Arneson, R., 6, 9, 14, 17–18, 56n.

16, 78n. 1, 99, 107nn. 4, 6, 10, 176nn. 10, 12, 178, 187, 190, 201n. 3, 205n. 45, 206nn. 53, 61–62, 207n. 68

autonomy, 11, 12, 20, 42, 67–70, 81n. 28, 94, 98, 101, 105, 107, 125, 126, 132, 133–135, 137, 140, 169–170, 176nn. 13, 14, 187, 192, 194–200, 208

Barry, B., 2, 8, 110, 11, 120nn. 7–9, 207n. 78

Berlin, I., 20, 78n. 3, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 135, 136, 141nn. 1–2

burdens of judgment, 80n. 20Burger, W., Chief Justice, 92, 95n. 5,

96nn. 12, 14

civil peace, 7civility, 161coercion, 17, 33, 35, 69, 91, 136,

193–194, 198–199, 207n. 85, 208n. 103

compensation, 81n. 29, 92, 94, 185, 189, 199, 212

conceptions of the good, 1, 3, 7–9, 13, 14, 16–20, 27, 30, 36, 41, 42, 43n. 3, 58, 65, 71, 97–107, 109–112, 116–119, 120nn. 5, 11, 125, 128, 133, 135–137, 139–140, 141n. 5, 146, 149, 161, 166, 169, 175n. 3, 176n. 12, 183, 193

constitutional essentials, 35, 79n. 12, 164–165, 204n. 29

contractualism, 56n. 13

de Marneffe, 2, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18

democracy, 20, 35, 47, 49, 91, 144–158, 159–177

Dworkin, R., 1, 2, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 43n. 1, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 55nn. 2, 4, 56n. 9, 78n. 2, 99, 100, 107nn. 5, 7, 111, 120n. 12, 121nn. 13, 15, 125, 129, 160, 175nn. 2, 3, 176n. 12, 183, 189, 191, 193, 198, 204n. 31, 206nn. 60, 61, 207n. 78, 208n. 92

equality, 12, 21, 49, 86, 117, 126, 127, 138, 178–201

excellence, 49, 55, 56n. 8, 144, 145, 156, 205n. 45

Feinberg, J., 107n. 1freedom of expression, 50, 136

Galston, W., 2, 3, 14, 140, 179, 202n. 8Gaus, G., 120n. 3, 121n. 18Greenawalt, K., 10

Haksar, V., 201n. 5Hurka, T., 2, 14, 78n. 1, 111, 120n.

10, 179, 192, 194, 195, 202n. 9, 205nn. 40, 49, 206n. 63

impartiality, 51, 207n. 78integrity, 20, 144, 154, 156

Kant, I., 41, 102–104, 130, 160Klosko, G., 2, 6, 12, 17, 107n. 4Kymlicka, W., 2, 3, 8, 109, 120n. 2,

121n. 14, 141n. 8

Larmore, C., 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 12, 13, 15, 43nn. 1, 9, 78n. 2, 79n. 13, 80nn. 19, 20, 107n. 2, 110, 120n. 6, 121n. 14, 126, 128–129, 135, 175n. 3

liberal legitimacy, 18, 35

224 Index

liberty principle, 53, 55, 56n. 13Locke, J., 13, 27, 130, 136, 160, 183

Macedo, S., 2, 6Mill, J. S., 16, 19, 107n. 17, 116, 119,

130, 135, 136, 149, 150, 157n. 3, 160, 181, 190, 194, 198, 206n. 66

Nagel, T., 2, 43n. 3, 87, 88, 90, 91, 96nn. 7, 8

neutrality, passimof aim, 2, 4–7, 15–17, 26, 33, 79n.

12, 83of consequences, 2, 3consequential neutrality, 19,

109–120, 121n. 14, 175n. 3of effect, 26, 79n. 11, 197expressive, 19, 83–96foundational principle of, 44–45history of, 1–2justification of, 10, 12of justification, 2, 5–7, 10, 15–16,

26, 32, 112neutral justification of, 7, 12procedural neutrality, 79n. 13scope of, 9–10

Nozick, R., 2, 43n. 4

original position, 2, 177n. 18, 183

paternalism, 18, 74, 75, 179, 181, 192, 193, 198, 200

perfectionism, passimAristotelian, 161complementary with neutrality,

13–17ethical, 14liberal, 130, 131, 137political, 1, 6, 7, 14, 16state, 197weak, 176n. 13

pluralism, passimfact of, 13, 19, 90reasonable, 11, 34, 80n. 16, 128,

135, 161, 162, 163, 165, 167, 171, 172, 176n. 5

value, 18, 20, 57, 58, 60–65, 70, 73, 77, 78n. 3, 80nn. 20, 21, 126–130, 140, 193

political liberalism, 8, 17, 25–43, 48, 55n. 6, 56n. 8, 80n. 20, 120n. 5, 129, 131

public reason, 10, 13, 16, 20–21, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41, 43nn. 7, 9, 48, 49, 50, 56n. 10, 86, 159–175, 176nn. 9, 15, 177n. 18, 204n. 29

Rawls, J., 2, 3, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 25, 33, 35, 40, 48–50, 54, 55, 71, 74, 78, 79n. 12, 80nn. 16, 20, 81n. 31, 110, 12, 118, 120n. 5, 125, 128–131, 135, 152, 161, 164, 165, 166, 171–175, 175nn. 1, 2, 4, 176nn. 6, 15, 177n. 18, 182–184, 189, 198, 201n. 5, 204nn. 29, 38

Raz, J., 2, 3, 8, 14, 17, 43n. 1, 65, 74, 75, 78, 79nn. 8, 14, 82n. 41, 105, 106, 109, 118, 131, 179, 193, 196, 202n. 6

reasonable disagreement, 11, 64, 80, 125, 126, 128, 129, 135, 136, 140, 165

respect, 11, 12, 13, 19, 42, 46, 69, 70, 71, 75, 81nn. 31, 36, 85, 86–94, 99, 132, 133, 170, 183, 186, 189–192

Scanlon, T., 53, 55n. 5, 56n. 13, 196, 204n. 36

Sher, G., 2, 3, 4, 8, 13, 14, 20, 56n. 16, 179, 184, 193, 194, 195

skepticism, 27, 51

toleration, 13, 37, 39, 41, 87, 116, 129

veil of ignorance, 183

Waldron, J., 2, 3, 4, 8, 12, 42Wall, S., 2, 3, 6, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18,

111, 120n. 11, 121n. 14, 176n. 13, 193

Weinstock, D., 14, 107n. 9, 176n. 10