consti 1: 2nd exam cases

8/9/2019 Consti 1: 2nd Exam Cases

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ART. VITHE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. LEGISLATIVE POWER (SEC 1)

1. PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER

The City of Davao v. The Regional Trial CourtG.R No. 127383FACTS:

GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, schedulingpublic bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994,amounting to the sum total of P 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequentlyreset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City.On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on threeparcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of thatsame year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/orDeclaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC.During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the LocalGovernment Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have alsowithdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by theLocal Government Code (LGC).

HELD:Reading together sec.133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxingpowers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of ―taxes, fees, and charges of any kind onthe National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs‖.However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxesgranted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in saidsection, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarilyfollows that its exemption has been withdrawn.Regarding P.D. 1446 which laid downrequisites for repeal on the laws grantingexemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental law in Sec. 33, particularly theamendatory second paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on thecompetency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. Thisplaces an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeallaws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the

amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored,have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory secondparagraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuousmeans employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to asubsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bearrelevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that ―any taxexemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Codeshall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.‖ The GSIS tax-exempt, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored

by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may becollected by the City of Davao.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October18, 2011

Congress enacted several laws relevant to Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM). First is the Republic Act (RA) 6734, the organic act that established the ARMMand scheduled the elections for the regional officials. Upon passing of the RA No. 9054, the

elections were moved to September 2001. The same law also requires that any amendmentto such law require 2/3 vote of the congress.

Another law, RA 9140, reset the elections to November 26 of the same year. RA 9333further moved the elections to August 2005 and established that elections be made everythree years after. Following RA 9333, next elections should transpire on 2011 but uponenactment of another law, RA 10153, it was moved to May 2013, to synchronize with thecountry‘s national and local elections.

Issue/s: WON RA 9333 and RA 10153 validly amended RA 9054 considering itssupermajority voting requirement

Held: No. In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.

As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule ofthe first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need thereforeexisted for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which itdid by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequentlaws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 – cannot be considered amendments to RA No.9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in agap in RA No. 9054 o r supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequentregular elections.

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, thesupermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law byrequiring more than what the Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of theConstitution provides that a ―majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to dobusiness.‖ In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House ofRepresentatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed toconduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generallysufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds(2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately,in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higherthan what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain theplenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. Thus, whilea supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the


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undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded.Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear andunmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom ofCongress,‖ the SC said.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units coveredby the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higherincome requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.

―The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was

well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including thosecovered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001,when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exemptthe municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, theHouse of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution toExempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the saidJoint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint ResolutionNo. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, whichagain failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filedin the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably votedupon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts ofboth Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in theCityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt therespondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and,by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptionsbeing embodied in the exemptionclauses.‖(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/04141101.php)

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from localsources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. ―While the Constitution mandates that the creation oflocal government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGCdespite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of theLGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitantnational growth.‖

2. PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWERa. Permitted delegation/power of subordinate legislation

ABAKADA vs Executive

On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act.Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining governmentfrom implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibitionquestioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6:―That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective

January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the followingconditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of theprevious year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds oneand one-half percent (1½%)‖

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VATrate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is

not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on thesale or exchange of goods and services which can‘t be included within the purview of tariffsunder the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payableupon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditionsprovided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that noguiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make therecommendation.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase theVAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary ofFinance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO

Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly,or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never bedelegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shalltake effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of itsenactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of itsexercise which determines the validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution(c) delegation to the people at large(d) delegation to local governments(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficientstandard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries

and specifies the public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment offacts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law iscontingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. Nodiscretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is thefact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALLconnotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and isinconsistent with the idea of discretion.


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Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon theexistence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot beevaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when thespecified conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of afact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of theprevious year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDPof the previous year exceeds one and 1½%. If either of these two instances has occurred,

the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to thePresident.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the twoconditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or evenher subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine anddeclare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Financebecomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has amuch broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collatestatistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid outby Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complexeconomy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to theexecution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the powerto tax but the mere implementation of the law.

KILOSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs. GARCIA

On June 26 1990, then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No.90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial busoperators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below theLTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.

On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of thePhilippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-boardincrease of eight and a half centavos (P.0085) per kilometre for all types of provincial buseswith a minimum-maximum fare range of 15% over and below the proposed basic perkilometre fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary,first class and premium class buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) per kilometre fare for airconbuses were sought. Later on, PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometre for ordinary buses. Although opposed, the LTRFB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase.

On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation andCommunications Pete Nicomedes Prado issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining thepolicy framework on the regulation of transport services. Relevant portions to this case are:

In determining public need, the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favorof the applicant. The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall bewith the oppositor(s).

Passenger fares shall also be deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service(normally third class passenger transport) for which the government will fix indicative or

reference fares. Operators of particular services may fix their own fares within a range 15%above and below the indicative or reference rate.

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulationpolicy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% ofthe prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefitof a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upwardadjustment of bus fares.On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition forlack of merit.

ISSUE: W/N the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set afare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) andminus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare withouthaving to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. YES

HELD: The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power offixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, islikewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve andperiodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative tothe operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles.

Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order toadapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. With this authority, an administrative bodyand in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling

in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence to provide.However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSCand LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transportoperator, or other public service.

In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to seta fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it istantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegaripotest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated.


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A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty inviolation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. This wouldleave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares everyhour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever theydeem it "necessary" to do so.

One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. Iftransport operators will be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalentto 20% over and above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice acommuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to

those of compounded bank interest rates.

The present administrative procedure, to our mind, already mirrors an orderly andsatisfactory arrangement for all parties involved. To do away with such a procedure andallow just one party, an interested party at that, to determine what the rate should be, willundermine the right of the other parties to due process. The purpose of a hearing isprecisely to determine what a just and reasonable rate is. Discarding such procedural andconstitutional right is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest.

Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape ofthe 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of thedeath penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of theconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court deniedboth motions.In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the deathpenalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACTDESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUTCAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THEREVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against himunder the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, beingviolative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under internationalcovenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise byrespondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegatedpowers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld theconstitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the deathpenalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection,as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitut ional, lethalinjection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply(than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No.8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice,Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as AmicusCuriae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray‘s arguments. The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to thepetition.Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not passconstitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c)being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue: 1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading orinhuman punishment?2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held: No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading andinhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to beused in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and theprocedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and itsimplementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, thecourt which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain andsuffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes inadministering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degradingor inhuman punishment.Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or alingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word asused in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, somethingmore than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to thedetails involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading orinhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details ofR.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise ofadministrative officials.Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix thetime and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the deathconvict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is

the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is enteredfifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded tothe court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there anyuncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date ofexecution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the lastsentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall becarried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the timethe judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice tothe exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, thedeath convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment


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imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executiveclemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possiblecomplications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained anduntested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This isunsubstantiated.First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required theexpertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to beadministered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States

wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death forthe convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requiresthat all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to theperformance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with theimplementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out theexecution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription againstcruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which iscalculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to theconvict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution doesnot mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which theConstitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, notthe necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning aspublic opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning fromthe evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may beimposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time ofthe commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant andto the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Thispenalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most seriouscrimes".Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming a t the Abolition of the Death Penalty wasadopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signednor ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark itslimits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. Itindicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A.No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under theauthority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible tomitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well asduring the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau ofCorrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficientto cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "allpersonnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to theperformance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served

by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes acriminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. Inthis sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by theadministrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer seriousflaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing inSection 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure.It was supposed to be confidential.The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum.The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on

the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for amode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice,the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear theimprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-makingauthority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibilityrenders the said paragraph invalid.4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional forbeing discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate byrespondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethalinjection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the RevisedPenal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659."SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Executionby lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next followingthe date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70)years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty ofreclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised PenalCode."Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as forbeing an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitionerinsists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended,without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended bysection 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon awoman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person overseventy years of age.While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant orwithin one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1)year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, andadds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised

Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. Thisaddition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutorybasis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but insteadremain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

NPC DAMA vs. NPC G.R. No. 156208September 26, 2006


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Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), wasapproved and signed into law by Gloria Arroyo on June 8, 2001 and it took effect on June26, 2001. The EPIRA law states that it will provide an orderly and transparent privatizationof assets and liabilities of the NPC. Under this law, a new National Power Board of Directorswas constituted with the new chairman and members.

The Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) promulgated the Implementing Rules andRegulations (IRR) of the EPIRA Law, pursuant to Section 77. The Restructuring Committeeproposed a new NPC Table of Organization which was approved by the NPB to serve asthe overall organizational framework for the realigned functions of the NPC mandated under

the EPIRA Law. They also reviewed the proposed 2002 NPC Restructuring Plan andassisted in the implementation of Phase I (Realignment), and recommended to the NPB forapproval the adoption of measures pertaining to the separation and hiring of NPCpersonnel.

The NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which provided for the Guidelines on theSeparation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPCTable of Organization. Under this, all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on 31January 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits. A memorandum circulated to allNPC officials and employees providing for a checklist of the documents required forsecuring clearances for the processing of separation benefits of all employees who shall beterminated under the Restructuring Plan.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPBResolutions. Since only 3 of the 9 members voted, petitioners conclude that the questionedResolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly constituted boardsince no quorum existed and that the resolution be void. Petitioners also argued that if everthere is abolition in their positions, it should require the endorsement of the JointCongressional Power Commission and the approval of the President of the Philippines. TheResolution will have an adverse effect on its employees and contrary to the mandate of theConstitution to promote full employment and security of tenure.

Respondent argued that while it is true that only 3 members of the NPB were not the actualsignatories but they were represented by their respective alternates. Respondents claim thatthe validity of such administrative practice whereby an authority is exercised by persons orsubordinates appointed by the responsible official has long been settled. Respondentsfurther contend that Section 48 of the EPIRA Law does not in any way prohibit any memberof the NPB from authorizing his representative to sign resolutions adopted by the Board.

Issue: Whether or not the implementation of the NPB Resolutions are void and withoutlegal effect since the votes casted were not from the actual signatories.

Ruling: The petition was granted. They lack the necessary number of votes for theiradoption.Since the votes were only casted by 3 out of 9 members favor of the adoption of the saidResolutions, it must not be considered in determining whether or not the necessary numberof votes was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may be validly enacted. It is therepresentatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and not thesecretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution. Thisviolates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ

their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC. Resolutions weredeclared void and without legal effect.

Review Center Associations vs. Executive SecretaryG.R. No. 180046

The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing BoardExaminations on June 11 and 12, 2006. Licensure applicants wrote to the PRC a report thathandwritten copies of the examinations were circulated during the examination period. Theexaminees were provided with a list of questions and answers of the exams. PRC admitted

the leakage and traced it to 2 Board of Nursing members. The results of the exams werereleased but the CA restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of thepassers.

President Arroyo replaced all the members of the PRC‘s Board of Nursing and ordered theexaminees to re-take the board exams. She issued EO 566 which authorized CHED tosupervise the establishment and operation of all review centers in the Philippines. CHED,through Chairman Carlito Puno, approved the CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of2006 (IRR).

The Review Center Association of the Philippines, petitioners, asked CHED to ―amend, ifnot withdraw‖ the IRR arguing that giving permits to operate a review center to HigherEducation Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations willeffectively abolish independent review centers.

Chairman Puno stated that if they will suspend the implementation of the IRR, it would beinconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. The petitioner‘s comments and suggestions wouldbe considered revisions to the IRR.

There was a dialogue between petitioners and CHED for the revisions and the RIRR wereapproved. Petitioner filed a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules andRegulations in amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from thecoverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centersto tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHED‘scoverage to public and private institutions of higher.

CHED issued a resolution that if they will exclude the operation of independent reviewcenters from the coverage of CHED would contradict the intention of EO 566. In the requestto clarify what is being meant by tie-up/ be integrated with an HEI, it just means to be in

partner with an HEI.

Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus praying for the annulment of theRIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional and the prohibition againstCHED from implementing the RIRR.

Issues:1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislativepower as it expands the CHED‘s jurisdiction¬¬¬. 2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive‘s rule-making power.


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Ruling: EO 566 and CHED Memorandum Order No. 30 are declared void andunconstitutional. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR expand the CHED‘s coverage underRA 7722. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of reviewcenters and similar entities. CHED‘s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and privateinstitutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions.

The review center under EO 566 covers the operation or conduct of review classes orcourses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure

examinations given by the PRC. A review center is not an institution of higher learning ascontemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put itunder the jurisdiction of the CHED.

The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely exercising her executive power toensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The exercise of the President‘s residual powersunder this provision requires legislation. There is no law granting the President the power toamend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through anExecutive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power. The President has noinherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.

b. Tests for permissible/valid delegation

People vs Dacuycuy

GR No. 45127 May 5, 1989

several pubic school officials of Leyte were charged for violation of RA 4670 (Magna Cartafor public school teachers).These officials motioned to quash the charges against them for(1)lack of jurisdiction (2) unconstitutionality of Section 32. This motion was denied for lack ofmerit. The private respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of First Instance ofLeyte.They added to the grounds of unconsttutionality of Section 32 the following reasons:(1) it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment (2) it constitutes an undue delegation oflegislative power, for the duration of penalty of the imprisonment is left to the discretion ofthe court. Judge Dacuycuy, the respondent judge denied the motion saying that RA 4670particularly Section 32 is valid and constitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 is constitutional

HELD: NO. Section 32 is unconstitutional since it provides an indeterminable period of

imprisonment. Too much discretion was left by the legislature to the court, making it unduedelegation of power of the legislature. Section 32 did not pass the test of sufficient standard.If section 32 will be allowed, it will violate not just the rules of separation of powers but alsothe delegability of legislative powers.

Nota Bene: The charge against the public school officials will still be remanded to themunicipal court where it was first filed. RA 4670 ontains a separability clause in Section 34. Although Sec 32 was declared unconstitutional, other parts are still valid.

Emmanuel Pelaez Vs. Auditor-General (1965)

This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunctioninstituted byEmmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,against the AuditorGeneral, to restrain him, as well as his representatives andagents, from passing in audit anyexpenditure of public funds in implementation of the EOs issued by the President creating33 municipalities and/or any disbursementby said municipalities.

In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative CodeissuedExecutive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three(33)municipalities.Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the groundthatsaid Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 andconstitutes

an undue delegation of legislative power.When RA 2370 (The Barrio Charter) provides thatbarrios may "not be created ortheir boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of thevoters in theareas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipalityormunicipalities.Section 68 of RAC, which said EOs are based, provides that the Presidentmaydefine or divide the boundary or boundaries of any province, sub-province,municipality,municipal district XXX as the public welfare may require provided, thatthe authorization ofthe Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained.Petitioner argues that the Presidentunder the new law cannot create a barrio, howmuch more of a municipality which iscomposed of several barrios.Respondent answered that a new municipality can be createdwithout creating newbarrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of thenewmunicipality. This answer however overlooks on the main import of thepetitionersargument, which questions the President‘s authority to createmunicipalities.Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalitiesunderthis section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relyinguponMunicipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan.

ISSUE: WON the President has the legislative authority to issue the EOscreatingmunicipalities.

DECISION: The Court declared the EOs null and void. The Auditor Generalpermanentlyrestrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds inimplementationof said EOs or any disbursement by the created municipalities.

RATIO: The Court said that the respondent‘s ar gument based on Cardona vs.Binangonanis untenable because the case do not involve a creation of municipality butatransfer of municipality. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentiallyLegislative in nature. Itis strictly a legislative function. The power to fix such commonboundary, in order toavoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities,

may partake of an administrative nature in the adoption of means and ways to carry intoeffect the law creating said municipalities.Although

Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the detailsin the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violationof the principle of separation of powers, that said law:(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out orimplemented by the delegate .(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable— towhich the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Without the


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aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, butworse, to adopt measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act ofCongress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks andbalances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.The Court said that Section 68 of the RAC does not meet these well settled requirements fora valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does notenunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. It can be noted that

the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of themunicipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress . A better proof of the factthat the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functionscan hardly be given

BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY476 SCRA 188 November 25 2005

In 1994, Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted intolaw. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntaryblood donation and by regulating blood banks in our country, and was approved by thePresident Fidel V. Ramos on the same year . On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9,Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law waspromulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).

Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, ―Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - Allcommercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after theeffectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.‖

Section 23. ―Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of allcommercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period oftwo (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719.‖ The decision to extend shall be based on theresult of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.‖

In 1994, petitioners are operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517,entitled ―An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and theEstablishment andOperation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.‖ The law, which was enactedon June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood

banks and blood processing laboratories, wherein their licensed had expired in the year1998. They then filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtassailing the constitutionality and validity of the of the said Act and its Implementing Rulesand Regulations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 ――Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - Allcommercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two years after the effectivityof this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two years by the Secretary,‖ constitutesundue delegation of legislative powers.

HELD: No. According to Article VI, Sec 1 of the Phillipine Constitution ―The legislative powershall be vested in the congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a senate and ahouse of representative, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision oninitiative and referendum.‖ The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No.7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. in which the Secretary did not gobeyond the powers granted to him. Therefore, there is no undue delegation of legislativepowers since the congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority topromulgate rules and regulations so long that the delegating law be complete in itself, andhas a fix standard.

Here, the RA No. 7719 law is complete in itself and has a fixed standard. The provision isclear that the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to protect the health of the peopleand has mandated several measures to attain this objective. Also, the law has sufficientlyprovided a distinct standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out itsprovisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply ofblood through voluntary blood donation.

TATAD VS. SECRETARY281 SCRA 330 1997

FACTS: In 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other thanthose dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit themarket without any government interference. In 1971, the country was driven to its kneesby a crippling oil crisis. It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the

business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining,storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and otherrefined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the market prices ofpetroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and toregulate the operations and trade practices of the industry.

In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oilindustry. It enacted R.A. No. 8180 entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Actof 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchaseany quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease orown and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil oruse the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department ofEnergy, wherein the president Fidel V. Ramos affirmed.

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act

Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes." First, section 15 ofR.A. No. 8180 ―Act deregulating the downstream oil industry and for other purposes‖constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary ofEnergy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide theExecutive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstreamoil industry.

Section 15 of R.A 8180 states that ―Implementation of Full Deregulation. - Pursuant toSection 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the Departmen of Energy (DOE) shall, uponapproval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry notlater than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when


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the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and whenthe exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementationof the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated andthe following laws are deemed repealed‖

ISSUE: Did Sec. 15 of R.A 8180 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation ofpower for allowing DOE implement the R.A 8180?

HELD: NO, Sec. 15 of R.A 8180 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on unduedelegation of power. To determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative

power, there are two kinds of test to be done; the completeness test and the sufficientstandard test. First, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.The Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the endof March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end ofMarch 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for anypurported reason. Second, Section 15 of R.A 8180 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President; he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of c rude oiland petroleumproducts in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of thepeso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

B. COMPOSITION, QUALIFICATIONS, TERM, ELECTION (Sec 2-9)

THE SENATE

PIMENTEL, JR VS COMELEC G.R. No. 126394. April 24, 1998

Petitioner filed a case against Elec tion board of canvassers and pertinent personsresponsible in the tally of votes during the senatorial; election in 1995. There werediscrepancy between the Provincial Certificate of Canvas for Ilocos Norte and its supportingStatement of Votes per precinct or municipality for the province as shown bellow:Candidate Votes appearing in the Votes appearing in the Increase

Statement of Votes Provincial Certificateof Canvas

Enrile 65,343 95,343 30,000Drilon 48,726 78,726 30,000Mitra 42,959 62,959 20,000

Comelec ordered investigation on the matter. Petitioner contends that the discrepancies in aviolation of Section 27b of RA 6646. COMELEX resolved to file criminal and administrativecases against respondents. However, COMELEC reversed its decision and dismissed thecomplaint for lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to prosecute criminalcase.Petitioner then filed for certiorari which the Solicitor General also manifests a mot ionfavoring petitioner which was held by the Supreme Court as unnecessary. COMELECcontends that Section 27b gives a remedy to the erring official only when such officialrefuses to correct his act will he be prosecuted. Respondent did not deny the error incanvassing but claim honest mistake or simple error.

ISSUE: Whether respondent can be held liable for tampering election results under Section27b of RA6646?

Ruling: Yes. Section 27b of RA 6646 states that: ― Any member of the board of electioninspectors or board of canvassers who tampers increases or decreases the votes receivedby a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses offer properverification and hearing to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.‖ The ―or‖is disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from the otherthings enumerated. Therefore said official can be prosecuted for said tampering.

Is the senate/the house of congress a continuing body?

Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

The Senate is investigating pertinent government purchases of two parcels of land, knownas Buenavista and Tambobong estates. Apparently the senate found quite irregularity of thegovernment‘s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sumof Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted toPhp20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate soughtto determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at theexpense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, wasone of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of theinvestigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom

he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceedspertaining to Ernest Burt.Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and wascommitted to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answersthe questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the SupremeCourt questioning the validity of his detention. the petitioner contented that the power maybe abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prisonfor life.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for aterm beyond its period of legislative session?

RULING: YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a termbeyond its period of legislative session. The senate is a continuing body and which does notcease to exist upon periodical dissolution of the Congress.

Garcillano vs. The House of RepresentativesG.R. No. 170338 (Dec. 23, 2008)

The case involves the ―Hello Garci‖ scandal in which Garcillano was allegedly told by thenpresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to manipulate the 2004 elections results in her favor.The investigation to this scandal started on June 8, 2005, with a privilege speech deliveredby then Minority Floor Leader Francis Escudero. The hearings were however suspendedindefinitely on August 3, 2005.In her privilege speech 2 years later (Aug. 28, 2007), Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagorecommended the continuation of hearings on the said scandal. Co-petitioners Santiago


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Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance ofa Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction, praying for the barring of the Senate f romconducting the inquiry. Petitioners argued that the current Senate has no authority tocontinue the legislative inquiry on the ―Garci tapes‖ because the Senate is not a continuingbody.

Issue: Whether or not the current Senate has the authority to continue with the inquiry onthe ―Hello Garci‖ scandal.

Held: No. The Court ruled that the Senate has no authority to continue the said inquiry

without its duly published Rules of Procedure, as required whenever the terms of theprevious (half) set of Senators expire. This is in accordance with Sec. 21, Article VI of the1987 Constitution. This is because the Senate is considered a non-continuing body, whichmeans that each business each set of Senators have is non-binding to the next set, unlessthe rulings of procedure of each are duly published.In this case, the previous set of Senators was not able to publish its Rules of Procedureregarding the inquiry of the ―Hello Garci‖ scandal (as it was suspended indefinitely, and wasnot finished by them). Therefore, they (the present set of Senators) should not be allowed tocontinue the inquiry regarding the said scandal, as they do not have the authority to do so.

League of cities, supra

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

1. DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE: APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVEDISTRICTS

Mariano vs. COMELECG.R. No. 118577 (March 7, 1995)

The Congress enacts R.A. 7854, which will make Makati a highly urbanized city. Theprovisions of this law also include the addition of one legislative district into the city,effectively giving the City of Makati two legislative districts. Petitioners assailed the said law,as it is in violation of Sections 5(3) and 7, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. Petitionerscontended that (1) enactment of the law alters or restarts the ―three term limit‖ of the electedofficials, in violation of Section 7, Art VI, and (2) the current population of Makati was450,000, thus it should only have one district pursuant to Section 5(3), Art. VI of the 1987Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7854 is unconstitutional.

Held: No. In response to the first contention of petitioners, the Court held that suchcontention lacks merit. This is because the petitioners only raised this contention out of fearthat the incumbent officials (i.e. Mayor Binay) will run for re-election, which is not an actualissue in this case at bar. Thus, there was no ground to this contention as to make theprovisions of R.A. 7854 in violation of Sec. 7, Art. VI.On the other hand, the Court held, in response to the second contention, that the provisionof Sec. 5(3), Art. VI merely states that each city with at least 250,000 is entitled to at least

one representative. The provision of this section pertains to the city population, not therequired district population.

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, andMINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondent.G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010

This case is about the declaration of R.A. 9591, creating a legislative district for City ofMalolos, Bulacan. It was alleged that such R.A. violates the minimum population

requirement stated in the constitution. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan wasrepresented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Actthrough House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, MalolosCity had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to MayorDomingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the populationof Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimumpopulation threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, ―An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,Bulacan‖ is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least250,000 actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for beingviolative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinanceappended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, RegionalDirector Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, wasdeclared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority toissue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared officialby the Nat‘l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether thedocument have been declared official by the NSCB.The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifyingofficer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, theCertification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, theMalolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August1, 2010.It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislativereappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO,Petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and itsCommissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N.


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TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL,Respondents.G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010

The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibitionunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared asunconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled ―An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First(1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and TherebyCreating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.‖Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-

Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioneddistricts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of176,383 population count.Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standardwith a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that ifpopulation is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first,error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition underRule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question theconstitutionality of R.A. 9716.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null andvoid, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional

requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.RULING: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinctionbetween a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) ofthe Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing wasmentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must firstbe satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled totwo additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance,other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factorswere mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

2. THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM

Republic Act No. 7941 “An act providing for the election of party-list representativesthrough the party list system and appropriating funds therefor”

Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147589 & 147613 June 25, 2003

The Comelec, in compliance to the directions issued by the Court last 2001,conducted hearings and qualified the list of party-list organizations according to the eight-point guideline provided by the Supreme Court. The Comelec was refrained fromproclaiming the winner until they have fully complied with the directions. The Comelec thensubmitted its compliance reports in 3 sets, declaring 44 organizations as qualified party-listsorganizations. The OSG then recommended for BUHAY and COCOFED to be included inthe list of qualified party-lists. The Comelec‘s contention was that BUHAY was a mereextension of El Shaddai and that COCOFED was an adjunct of the government. It was

stated in the by-laws of COCOFED that The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority,an administrative agency of the government, shall be a member of their National Board‘.This amounts to participation of the government in the affairs of this group.

Issues:There were 2 issues raised in this case as follows:

1. Whether BUHAY and COCOFED should be qualified2. Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were disqualified for havingfailed to meet the eight-point guideline of the Court should be deducted for the ‗total votescast for the party-list system‘ during said elections

Held:On the first issue, the Court concurred with the OSG‘s recommendation that

BUHAY and COCOFED should be included in the list of qualified party-list organizations.Comelec‘s report on BUHAY was not supported with substantial evidence and was merelyanchored on speculations. Further, the bylaws of COCOFED making the chairman of thePhilippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of their board has already been deletedas early as May 1998. Hence, a total of 46 qualified party-list groups has been declared bythe Court.

On the second issue, Sec. 10 of RA 7941, which governs the party-list elections,clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, sectoral organization or a coalition notentitled to be voted for shall not be counted. Therefore the total votes cast for the 46qualified party-list participants served as the basis for computing the two-percent thresholdfor victory and number of seats the winners are entitled to.

a. Who may participate in the party-list election

Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELECG.R. No. 147589 & 147613June 26, 2001

On March 26, 2011, the Comelec issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 where itapproved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections.On April 10, 2011 Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC for the deletionof some of the organizations in the list it issued. Subsequently, Bayan Muna-Youth andBayan Muna filed the similar cases challenging the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.Dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party andBayan Muna filed a petition in the Supreme Court. They seek the disqualification of these

party-lists arguing mainly that they do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.The Court consolidated the two petitions herein.

Issues:There were 4 issues raised in this case as follows:

1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. Morespecifically, is there no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw?2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‗marginalized andunderrepresented‘ sectors ang organizations.


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4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgatingthe Omnibus Resolution No 3785.

Held:On the first issue, the Court deemed it proper that the petitioners brought such

challenge in the Court. Note that the petitioners filed the case before the Comelec but thelatter failed to act on it. Further, the case was one that is of public interest and with extremeurgency for it potentially involves the composition of 20% of the House of Representatives.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that political parties may participate in the party-listelections. Sections 7 and 8, Article IX of the Constitution provides that political parties maybe registered under the party-list system. Further, Sec 2 of RA 7941 also provides for ―aparty-list system registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations thereof,xxx‖ and Sec 3 expressly s tates that a ―party‖ is either a political party or a sectoral party ora coalition of parties.

On the third issue, the Court ruled that parties or organizations that will participatein the party-list elections must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system. As laiddown in the Constitution and RA 7941, party-lists shall be filled by election from the labor,peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such othersectors as provided by law except religious sector. The intent of the Constitution is clear andthat is to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who haveless in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under theparty-list system will prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretionwhen it failed to apply the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. The Court cannotaccept the submissions of the Comelec that the party-list system, without qualification, isopen to all on the grounds cited above.

The case was remanded to the Comelec, which was directed to conduct summaryevidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants subject to theguidelines ordered by the Court.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, andtrans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public

respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttresstheir denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It alsostated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considerednuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the ROC. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion byusing religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment ofreligion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional

rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well asconstituted violations of the Philippines‘ international obligations against discriminationbased on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete andgenuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validlydismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is notamong the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner madeuntruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actualverification reports by COMELEC‘s field personnel.

Issue:WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for theproposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to saidsectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may beregistered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFWLabor Party v. Commission on Elections, ―the enumeration of marginalized and under -represented sectors is not exclusive‖. The crucial element is not whether a sector isspecifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with therequirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that ―[n]o law shall be made respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the f ree exercise thereof.‖ At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is ―government neutrality in religious matters.‖ Clearly,―governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.‖We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELECto utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted thatgovernment action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or whyspecial protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to

justify its position that petitioner‘s admission into the party-list system would be so harmfulas to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC‘s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws

flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as―any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,defies, or disregards decency or morality,‖ the remedies for which are a prosecution underthe Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicialproceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs tobe emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanketinvocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings anda judicial determination of liability or culpability.


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As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmentalinterest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. Thedenial of Ang Ladlad‘s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement ofdislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial publicinterest.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its SecretaryGeneral George “FGBF George” Duldulao, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. [G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registerednational, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list systemthrough its resolution, denying also the latter‘s motion for reconsideration, in accordancewith Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-ListSystem Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprioor upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice andhearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalitionon any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least twoper centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) precedingelections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did notparticipate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing amongothers the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack ofmerit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of SenateBill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:Political Law

(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.(2) Whether or not PGBI‘s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:Political Law(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,it cannot sustain PGBI‘s delisting from the roster of registered national, reg ional or sectoralparties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain,clear and unmistakable language of the law which p rovides for two (2) separate reasons fordelisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8)of RA 7941, as PGBI‘s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO thereforesimply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner‘s right to due process was not violated for [it]was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELECresolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to beheard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explainone‘s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. Therequirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity toexplain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of noticeand hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI wasnot denied due process.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. Thedoctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettlethings which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippineswhich provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form apart of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country tofollow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrineof stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined

and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant ina particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC‘s] judicial system from thedoctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessaryviolence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law ingeneral. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of anerroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling caselaw.

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELECResolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registeredand manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.The petitioners were included, but the COMELEC disqualified them from the May 2013party-list race for various reasons.52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the SupremeCourt (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections(Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in itsassailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, amongothers, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a ―marginalized andunderrepresented sector,‖ their nominees do not come from a ―marginalized and


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underrepresented sector,‖ and/or some of the organizations or groups are not trulyrepresentative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying someof the petitioners‘ application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accr editation of therest. They also lamented the poll body‘s ―denial‖ to accord them due process in theevaluation proceedings.The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio wastasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quoprior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include theirnames in the printing of official ballots.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifyingthe said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang BagongBayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to theCOMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned someprinciples established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties ororganizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need toorganize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any ―marginalized and

underrepresented‖ sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under theparty-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate inparty-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under theparty-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linkedto a political party through a coalition.4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be ―marginalized and underrepresented‖ orlacking in ―well-defined political constituencies.‖ It is enough that their principal advocacypertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are―marginalized and underrepresented‖ include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. Thesectors that lack ―wel

consti 1: 2nd exam cases

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