analytical report- opinion poll

8/11/2019 Analytical Report- Opinion Poll

1/84

1

THE LEBANESE

ASSOCIATION FOR

DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS -

OPINION POLL ON THE

ELECTORAL ISSUES INLEBANON

Analytical Report

August 2014


2/84

2

Research, development and executionConsultation and Research Institu te

IntroductionThe Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections

Support and follow upMarilene Karam

EditingAdi b NehmeDr. Ali Mrad

ProofreadingMohammad Hamdan

Project funded by EU All Rights reserved2014

This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication arethe sole responsibility of the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections and can in no way be taken to reflectthe views of the European Union.

ESCWA provided technical assistance to accomplish this study


3/84

3

Executive summary

In accordance with the its initial strategy, the Consortium for Civil Advocacy and Mobilisation

for Electoral Reform, led by the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE),

conducted an opinion poll to better understand what resonates with citizens, and inform activities

and messaging and determine policy recommendations and alternatives to ensure the democratic

health of desired change and appropriateness to local and regional context.

The Consultation and Research Institute (CRI) was commissioned to conduct the opinion poll.

The specific objectives of this poll are to detect the knowledge and perceptions of the

constituency in respect to the electoral process in Lebanon. The opinion poll aims at

investigating issues mainly pertaining to the electoral system in place, suggested reforms,

elections postponement as well as perceptions of state institutions, political elites, and other

issues such as security and political issues and socio-economic conditions.

In September 2013, CRI launched the preparation for the opinion poll pertaining to the electoral

behaviour and knowledge of Lebanese constituency. Based on findings from the brief desk

review and the discussions between CRI and LADE during a kick off meeting, CRI designed the

questionnaire in close collaboration with LADE who validated and approved the final version of

the questionnaire. The questionnaire comprised 52 questions which are covered in a maximum

duration of 30 minutes in a face-to-face interview. The first section of the questionnaire consistsof information about the respondent including age, education, activity, relationship to the

household, etc. The second section contains questions about the general perception of political

institutions and the political affiliation of respondents. The third section pertains to the previous

and expected electoral behaviour of respondents.

The final sample consisted of 9651 individuals distributed among 2433 households. The sample

is mainly composed of nuclear families, whereby for every 1000 heads of households, there are

852 spouses, 1957 children, and 64 parents.

The remainder of the report lays out the results of the questionnaire which tackles various facets

of electoral decision making and behavior with the sample of selected respondents, namely:

National priorities of respondents, Attitude towards political institutions, Sectarian identity and

political affiliation, Electoral decision-making, Knowledge of electoral system, Perspective on

reforms and General predictions. The analysis is based on a set of socio-economic variables

(explanatory variables), which were systematically used to explain all variables, extracted from

the questionnaires, and include the following: Gender, Age, Governorate, Education, Activity,

Income and Sect.


4/84

4

Below you can find few highlights from the report:

Priorities and trust in the state institutions:

It can also be concluded from the study that despite the security concerns and the socio-

economic burdens that have took over the top of the priority ladder for citizens, changing the

political elite remains one of the priorities for most of them. Most of the respondents have placed

this change process that can only be ensured through holding democratic and representative

elections, in their priority list right after daily livelihood issues. And the close percentages

between freedoms and changing the political elite mean that citizens view that the two issues are

related, one way or another.

The government and the parliament are the two least trusted institutions. Only 4% and 6% statedthat they completely trusted the government and the parliament respectively. Around 36% of

respondents trust the parliament to a certain extent and 58% do not trust it at all.

Political activism and electoral choices:

Regarding the Political Activism, more than a third of the respondents (35%) had no interest in

politics whatsoever, a rather sizeable share that reflects a general feeling of mistrust of politics

and politicians. Another quarter (22%) are generally interested in politics but do not favor any of

the current political parties. Finally 30% support certain political factions and 11% are officially

members in Lebanese political parties. In other words, almost 60% of survey respondents are

essentially independent.

Interestingly, the higher a respondents income, the more likely he/she is to choose a certain

political party. Indeed, 60% of people in the lowest income bracket trusted none of the political

parties versus only 33% of those in the highest income bracket.

Knowledge of Electoral System :

First, respondents were asked a question about the electoral system that is currently in force in

Lebanon, to which 62% gave a correct answer, namely: majoritarian. The results also showed

that women were less likely to answer correctly (54% versus 68% among men) and more likely

not to know the answer (28% versus 16% among males). Second, 10% of respondents claimedto be fully knowledgeable about proportional representation. Up to 47% stated their lack of

knowledge, whereas 43% declared that they are, to a certain extent, aware of the concept of a

proportional electoral system. Despite the severe weaknesses in the guarantees of voter secrecy

in Lebanon, most respondents seem to be satisfied that secrecy is in fact ensured. More than 40%

of respondents believe that voter secrecy is secured to a certain extent and more than 20% fully

trust it. Only 26% of respondents do not trust that voting is secret and 12% do not trust it at all.


5/84

5

Perspective on Reforms

When asked about the necessity of reforming the electoral system in place, around 77% of

respondents declared that reforms are needed whilst 23% did not perceive the need for electoral

reforms. While there are no gender differences in the perception for the need of reforms (76 and

77% of males and females respectively perceive the need for electoral reform), the elderly (65

and above) seem to be more reluctant toward electoral reform when compared to younger age

categories. In fact, around 80% of respondents aged between 35 and 64 are for electoral reform

as opposed to less than 70% of the elderly.

The most important reform, according to respondents, is the establishment of an independent

commission for the organization and supervision of elections which was rated of utmostimportance by the majority of respondents (60%). Similarly the facilitation of voting for those

who live far from their place governorate of registration as well as the voting in the district of

residence rather the district of registration are two reforms also judged extremely important by

57% of respondents. Reaching the assigned polling stations seems to be problematic for the

majority of respondents.

Inversely, the voting of armed forces and the introduction of a parliamentary women quota are

the two least important reforms, according to respondents. Only 37% of respondents considered

the establishment of a parliamentary women quota to be extremely important which is a small

share when compared to other reforms such as lowering the voting age to 18, which more than

50% of respondents consider to be important.

Finally, the most shocking finding is that senior citizens turned out to be significantly more

progressive than younger citizens when it comes to female representation. Thus, young and

middle aged respondents are less likely than senior respondents to consider the women quota to

be very important. In fact, in the overall rating of importance, the ratings of senior citizens and

youth are very similar, and the middle aged groups have the lower ratings (2.27), which still

confirms that young categories are not more progressive than seniors, as it would be expected

Although national priorities were scored somewhat similarly by all the groups, significant

differences were registered in terms of trust in political institutions. In fact, active voters tend to

register slightly higher trust ratings than the remaining groups. For instance, active voters seem

to trust more than the remaining groups in the parliament, government, army and security forces.

In contrast, non-voters (Disengaged and dissenters) systematically give the lowest ratings to

these institutions. This finding suggests that voting behavior is somehow correlated with the

level of trust in the national institutions.


6/84

6

Around three quarters of all respondents perceive a need for reforming the electoral system with

almost no intergroup differences. Around, half of the respondents declare themselves

unknowledgeable regarding the concept of proportional representation, indicating a drastic need

for additional awareness efforts. This share increases drastically among the three disengaged

categories with around 70% of disengaged non-voters and disengaged undecided declaring their

lack of knowledge on this subject.

Finally, all the constituency groups seem equally despondent regarding the prospects of change

following the next parliamentary elections. They also accord the same level of importance to

various reforms including a female quota, official pre-printed ballots and express the same level

of nuisance from negative electoral practices.

Moreover, half of respondents considered that the postponement of the parliamentary elections is

unjustified versus only 12% who felt that it was. Out of all respondents that find justification for

the postponement of elections, 45% believe that the reasons are security issues, 31% blame it on

the lack of agreement between stakeholders responsible of the electoral law, 22% believe the

postponement of elections is due to international pressure and circumstances and 12% gave other

answers. Also, 36% of respondents expect a second postponement of parliamentary elections

and therefore another extension for the current parliament. Finally, almost half of respondents

expect the presidential elections to take place on time versus 19% who anticipate that

presidential elections will be postponed.

Conclusions:

The results of the survey and the profiling of the various groups of respondents portray a

constituency that is disillusioned with its political process and institutions. Levels of trust in all

branches of government are extremely low across the Lebanese population, indicating a seriously

damaged democratic process. Indeed, the only institution that continues to garner the trust of all

Lebanese factions is the Lebanese army, which is viewed as the last barrier before complete state

failure.

Despite the uniform lack of trust in and satisfaction with all the institutional foundations of the

political system, respondents seems to resort to different approaches in dealing with their

disenchantment. Around half of respondents are active voters who chose to remain engaged in

the process. These have a higher tendency to be male, active, and therefore invested in the social

connections that weave the sectarian and political fabric. Moreover, the same share of

respondents who indicated having voted in the previous elections (65%) has the intention to

participate in the next elections (66%), regardless of any reforms that may or may not take place.

You can find in the full report all the graphs and details of this study


7/84

7

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3

PART 1 - BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................ 12

SECTION 1 POLITICAL CONTEXT ................................................................................... 12

SECTION 2 - DESIGN OF TECHNICAL TOOLS ................................................................. 12

SAMPLING METHODS...................................................................................................... 12

QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN................................................................................................. 14

SECTION 3 - IMPLEMENTATION OF FIELDWORK ......................................................... 15

SECTION 4 - DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS ......................................................... 17

PART 2 - RESULTS AND FINDINGS OF THE POLL ............................................................. 19

SECTION 1 - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE........................................................ 19

CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS............................................................................... 19

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT SAMPLE........................................................... 21

SECTION 2 VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS ON CURRENT POLITICAL MATTERS ....... 23

NATIONAL PRIORITIES..................................................................................................... 23

ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS............................................................... 25

1) Trust in governmental and civil society institutions ................................................... 25

2) Satisfaction with local and national officials .............................................................. 28

3) Perception of deputy responsibilities .......................................................................... 30

POLITICAL AFFILIATION.................................................................................................. 32

1) Political Activism ....................................................................................................... 32

2) Trust in Political Factions to Effectively Serve the Public Interest ............................ 34

SECTION 3 ELECTORAL POSITIONING OF RESPONDENTS ...................................... 35

ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING...................................................................................... 35

1) Previous electoral behavior ........................................................................................ 35

2) Sources of Nuisance during the previous elections .................................................... 39

3) Intended Electoral Behavior ....................................................................................... 40

4) Criteria for selecting a candidate ................................................................................ 44


8/84

8

5) General Predictions..................................................................................................... 45

KNOWLEDGE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM............................................................................. 47

1) Electoral System ......................................................................................................... 47

2) Level of districting...................................................................................................... 47

3) Supervision of elections.............................................................................................. 49

4) Ballot Secrecy ............................................................................................................. 49

5) Proportional Representation ....................................................................................... 51

PERSPECTIVE ON REFORMS............................................................................................. 54

1) Proportional Electoral System .................................................................................... 55

2) Specific electoral reforms ........................................................................................... 59

3) Impact of electoral reforms ......................................................................................... 63

Section 4 - RESPONDENT PROFILING AND POSITIONS.................................................. 65

PROFILEOFRESPNDENTS ........................................................................................ 65

Group 1 - Active Voters ..................................................................................................... 65

Group 2 - PASSIVE Voters ............................................................................................... 66

Group 3 - Non-Voting Dissenters ...................................................................................... 66

Group 4 - Disengaged Non-Voters .................................................................................... 66

Group 5 - Active Undecided .............................................................................................. 67

Group 6 - DISENGAGED Undecided ............................................................................... 67

POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL VIEWS BY GROUP OF RESPONDENTS..................................... 69

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 75

ANNEXES .................................................................................................................................... 76


9/84

9

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Distribution of the Population in 1997 and 2004 ............................................................. 14Table 2 Expected and Actual distribution of the survey sample .................................................. 16

Table 3 Geographic distribution of the sample households .......................................................... 19

Table 4 Distribution of respondents by declared sectarian identity (percent) .............................. 22

Table 5 The importance of a list of concerns according to respondents ....................................... 24

Table 6 Level of Trust in Political Institutions ............................................................................. 26

Table 7 Age distribution of respondents who reported their distrust in the following institutions

....................................................................................................................................................... 27

Table 8 Level of satisfaction with the performance of some local and national authorities ........ 28

Table 9 Level of satisfaction with the deputy of the respondents electoral districts per political

affiliation ....................................................................................................................................... 29

Table 10 Level of satisfaction with the deputy of the respondents electoral districts per sect ... 30

Table 11 Political Activity per Sect .............................................................................................. 34

Table 12 Age distribution of participants in the former parliamentary elections ......................... 36

Table 13 Reasons behind the inability to vote .............................................................................. 39

Table 14 Sources of nuisance ....................................................................................................... 40

Table 15 Willingness to vote according to age ............................................................................. 41

Table 16 Willingness to vote according to sect ............................................................................ 42

Table 17 Main reasons behind the willingness to vote in the upcoming elections ....................... 43

Table 18 Main reasons behind the unwillingness to vote in the upcoming elections ................... 43

Table 19 Do you believe that the upcoming elections can change the political elite? ................. 45

Table 20 Trust in Ballot Secrecy per age category ....................................................................... 50

Table 21 Trust in Ballot Secrecy per educational attainment ....................................................... 50

Table 22 Knowledge of proportional representation according to educational attainment ......... 52

Table 23 Distribution of respondents that perceive themselves as knowledgeable but gave false

answers to the proportionality test ................................................................................................ 54

Table 24 Need for electoral reform according to age categories .................................................. 55

Table 25 Need for electoral reform according to governorate of residence ................................. 55

Table 26 Distribution of respondents by preferred Electoral System and Sect ............................ 57

Table 27 Distribution of respondents by preferred Electoral System and Governorate ............... 58Table 28 Rating of the importance of specific electoral reforms .................................................. 61

Table 29 Rating of importance of specific reforms by sect .......................................................... 62

Table 30 Level of Impact of possible Reforms ............................................................................. 63

Table 31 Distribution of respondents into six groups ................................................................... 65

Table 32 Profile of Respondents and positions..............................Error! Bookmark not defined.

Table 33 Factorial analysis of the criteria used to select candidates for parliamentary elections 73


10/84

10

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Age distribution of the sample compared to the results of CAS 2004 household survey

(percent) ........................................................................................................................................ 20

Figure 2 Educational achievement per gender in 2004 and 2014 ................................................. 20

Figure 3 Gender distribution of respondents who reported their distrust in the following

institutions ..................................................................................................................................... 27

Figure 4 Comparison between the level of satisfaction with own and other leaders .................... 29

Figure 5 Comparison between the duties of deputies and their expected achievements .............. 31

Figure 6 Distribution of respondents by level of political activism.............................................. 32

Figure 7 Political activity per level of income .............................................................................. 33Figure 8 Participation in former elections according to governorate of residence ....................... 37

Figure 9 Participation in former elections according to sect ........................................................ 38

Figure 10 Will you vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections? ............................................. 40

Figure 11 Respondents who voted in the previous elections and intend to vote in the next ones 41

Figure 12 Willingness to vote according to governorate of residence ......................................... 42

Figure 13 Rating of the criteria for choosing a candidate ............................................................. 44

Figure 14 Share of correct and false answers per sect .................................................................. 48

Figure 15 Knowledge of districting by level of political involvement ......................................... 49

Figure 16 Trust in Ballot Secrecy per governorate of residence .................................................. 51

Figure 17 Knowledge of proportional representation according to political activity ................... 52

Figure 18 Correct and False answers to a test question about proportionality by Educational

Attainment..................................................................................................................................... 53

Figure 19 Correct and False answers to a test question about proportionality by level of political

activity........................................................................................................................................... 53

Figure 20 Preferred electoral system (%) ..................................................................................... 56

Figure 21 Distribution by sect of respondents in favor of proportional representation (PR) with

one electoral district ...................................................................................................................... 56

Figure 22 Distribution, by governorate of residence, of respondents in favor of proportional

representation with one electoral district ...................................................................................... 58

Figure 23 Distribution, educational attainment and levels of political activity, of respondents in

favor of proportional representation (regardless of types and sizes of districts) .......................... 59

Figure 24 Importance of a list of electoral reforms ...................................................................... 60

Figure 25 Rating of importance of the introduction of parliamentary female quota by governorate

of residence ................................................................................................................................... 62

Figure 26 Trust rating by group .................................................................................................... 69


11/84

11

Figure 27 Level of satisfaction with sectarian officials per group ................................................ 70

Figure 28 Perception of knowledge of proportional representation and the knowledge score of

respondents ................................................................................................................................... 72

Figure 29 Expectations of positive impact of next elections by group ......................................... 72

Figure 30 Factorial analysis of the criteria used to select candidates for parliamentary elections

per group of respondents ............................................................................................................... 74

LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex 3 Regression Results ......................................................................................................... 76


12/84

12

PART 1 - BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections(LADE) commissioned the Consultationand Research Institute (CRI) to conduct an opinion poll to detect the knowledge and

perceptions of the constituency in respect to the electoral process in Lebanon.

The opinion poll aims at investigating issues mainly pertaining to the electoral system in place,

suggested reforms, elections postponement as well as perceptions of state institutions, political

elites, and other issues such as security and political issues and socio-economic conditions.

In September 2013, CRI launched the preparation for the opinion poll pertaining to the electoral

behavior and knowledge of Lebanese constituency.

SECTION 1 POLITICAL CONTEXT

The survey, carried out during January 2014, took place amidst political uncertainty and

insecurity. The government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned on March 22nd

. Although

the President charged Mr. Tamam Salam with forming a new government on April 6 2013, the

new government was not born before February 15, 2014, leaving the country without a fully

functioning government for more than ten months. The survey was also conducted against a

backdrop of political tensions and insecurity characterized by insecurity. In November 2013, a

suicide bomb detonated outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut resulting in 26 casualties including

an Iranian official. A month later, another car bomb in Beirut killed Former Minister MohammedChatah on December 27, 2014. In January 2014, as the fieldwork was underway, attacks

escalated in various regions in the country including Beirut Southern Suburbs and the Bekaa

resulting in tens of casualties and injured people (Two car bombings in Beirut Southern Suburbs

during that month; a car bomb in Hermel killing 4 people; a rocket fired on Arsal and various

clashes in Tripoli).

SECTION 2 - DESIGN OF TECHNICAL TOOLS

SAMPLING METHODS

The representativeness of survey results and their accuracy are almost entirely dependent on the

adequacy of the sampling methodology. The absence of a sampling base in Lebanon necessitates

the development of a tailored one for every study. For the purpose of this study, CRI designed an

approach that takes into account the lack of access to the latest data from official sources.


13/84

13

The sample size, as defined in the terms of reference, is 2433 questionnaires.Since the study is

concerned with elections, nationality and age are important factors. The statistical unit will be

selected according to the following criteria:

- Lebanese households in their primary dwellings (Palestinian refugee camps are

excluded)

- Once primary demographic information is collected for all household members, one

member is randomly selected from among those eligible (Lebanese 18 and above)

The questionnaires were distributed by Governorate (also known as Mohafaza) based on the

household distribution by governorate published in 2004 by the Central Administration for

Statistics (CAS). Within each governorate the questionnaires were distributed by Caza following

the population distribution published by CAS in 19970F

1

. Within every Caza, the questionnaireswill be distributed by Circonscription Fonciere (CF) based on the CAS 1997 population

distribution. The determination of the number of questionnaires per CF follows the same logic of

the demographic weight of each CF in a caza, while satisfying the following two conditions:

- The number of questionnaires should not fall below 4 per CF in order to optimize

surveyor efforts and time;

- Achieving an acceptable coverage of densely populated areas vs. semi-deserted areas.

This approach results in the selection of a sample that is representative of households established

in Lebanon. In this regard, it is important to note that the sample is representative of resident

population and not registered population. It allows the generation of results that are statistically

representative at the governorate level.

In conclusion, CRI has opted for a sample based on the most recent household distribution which

is the Living Conditions of Households 2004 (CAS 2006). The results are highlighted in gray

in the following table.

1The CAS 2004 survey is limited only to the governorate level. Therefore the distribution of the sample on the caza

level is based on the CAS 1997 Living conditions published data, which is the most recent data available.


14/84

14

Table 1Distribution of the Population in 1997 and 2004

MPS-2004 LC-1997Sample

1997

Sam

20

Distribution of

Pop.

Distribution of

HH

Distribution of

Pop.

Distribution of

HH

Beirut 389,661 10.38% 101,695 11.56% 403,337 10.07% 93,090 11.06% 277 2Mount

Lebanon 1,501,282 39.99% 371,289 42.20% 1,507,559 37.64% 336,427 39.97% 999 10North

Lebanon 768,709 20.48% 162,344 18.45% 807,204 20.15% 147,088 17.48% 437 4Bekaa 471,137 12.55% 102,797 11.68% 539,448 13.47% 106,843 12.69% 317 2

outh

Lebanon 401,075 10.68% 89,423 10.16% 472,105 11.79% 95,120 11.30% 283 2

Nabatiyeh 221,920 5.91% 52,306 5.94% 275,372 6.88% 63,109 7.50% 187 1Lebanon 3,753,785 100% 879,854 100% 4,005,025 100% 841,677 100% 2500 25

At the Caza level, CRI relied on the distribution of the Living Conditions (CAS 1997).

Lebanon consists of 1643 CFs. 193 CFs were excluded because they are completely deserted,

hence 1448 populated CFs remains in the sampling base.

QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

The review of essential documents relevant to the concept and principles to be detected through

the survey, aimed at familiarizing the study team with these concepts in order to be able to betterdesign and develop the technical tools of the survey.

Based on findings of the brief desk review and the discussions between CRI and LADE during a

kick off meeting, CRI designed the questionnaire in close collaboration with LADE who

validated and approved the final version of the questionnaire. The questionnaire comprised 52

questions which are covered in duration of maximum 30 minutes in a face-to-face interview

(Refer to Annex 1 for the full questionnaire).

The first section of the questionnaire consists of information about the characteristics of the

household including age, education, activity, relationship to the household, etc. The secondsection contains questions about the general perception of political institutions and the political

affiliation of respondents. The third section pertains to the previous and expected electoral

behaviour of respondents.


15/84

15

SECTION 3 - IMPLEMENTATION OF FIELDWORK

Upon the completion of the technical tools, CRI trained 30 field surveyors to use thisquestionnaire properly in order to obtain the most accurate, relevant and complete responses

from the interviewees and to reduce any misinterpretations of the questions. A pilot test, which

consisted of the filling of around 50 questionnaires, was conducted to ensure that the questions

are well understood and solicit the desired information. Based on the results of the pilot survey,

the questionnaire was amended and finalized for the launching of the survey. The fieldwork was

conducted over a period of four weeks.

The expected and actual distribution of survey sample shows a respect of the initial distribution

by caza in almost all the regions. However, one discrepancy was found in Tripoli where the

initial expected sample was of 151 questionnaires whereas only 70 questionnaires were actuallycompleted. Security conditions are the main reasons behind the low response rate in this area.

Following the inability of the first surveyors team to complete the assigned sample in Tripoli,

CRI expedited another team with additional time assigned. Unfortunately, the field conditions

were difficult and only 70 questionnaires could be filled. In this context, Tripoli is

underrepresented in this sample and results pertaining to this area must be carefully read (Refer

to table below).


16/84

16

Table 2Expected and Actual distribution of the survey sample

Mouhafaza Caza

Tot

al

CF

Empt

y CF

Totalnon-

empt

y CF

Total Pop

1997

%

Pop

1997

Expectedsample

distributi

on

Actual

sample

distributi

on

Beirut Beirut 13 1 12 403,338

100

% 289 292

Beirut Total 13 1 12 403,338

100

% 289 292

Bekaa

Baalbek 99 22 77 227,758 42% 124 117

Hermel 12 4 8 36,002 7% 19 20

Rachiaya 43 15 28 33,146 6% 19 21

West Bekaa 44 8 36 65,520 12% 35 36

Zahle 65 8 57 177,037 33% 95 95

TOTAL 263 57 206 539,463

100

% 292 289

MountLebanon

Aley 83 16 67 163,869 11% 116 121

Baabda 57 2 55 520,164 35% 364 371

Chouf 109 19 90 153,317 10% 107 100

El Metn 103 4 99 428,166 28% 300 296

Jubail 107 15 92 80,501 5% 56 64

Kasrouane 84 12 72 161,291 11% 113 113

TOTAL 543 68 475 1,507,308

100

% 1056 1065

NabatiyeBint Jubail 38 3 35 66,119 24% 36 40

Hasbaiya 23 3 20 31,003 11% 18 18


17/84

17

Marjaayoun 34 5 29 52,926 19% 28 28

Nabatiye 52 5 47 125,321 46% 69 73

TOTAL 147 16 131 275,369

100

% 151 159

North

Akkar 168 4 164 253,170 31% 145 145

Batroun 76 6 70 46,124 6% 26 26

Bcharre 24 1 23 21,242 3% 12 12

Koura 43 0 43 48,215 6% 28 27Minieh-

Danieh 63 10 53 118,681 15% 69 69

Tripoli 17 1 16 264,894 33% 151 70

Zgharta 52 5 47 55,129 7% 31 31

TOTAL 443 27 416 807,455

100

% 462 380

South

Jezzine 80 17 63 20,248 4% 12 12

Saida 79 7 72 250,898 53% 135 131

Sour 75 2 73 200,949 43% 108 105

TOTAL 234 26 208 472,095

100

% 255 248

GRAND TOTAL

164

3 195 1448 4,005,028 2505 2433

SECTION 4 - DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS

CRI developed a data entry program and data entry forms on Question software, which

includes built-in control procedures that minimize data entry errors. Experienced data entry

clerks coded and entered the questionnaires as soon as the first waves of completed

questionnaires arrived to CRI offices.


18/84

18

Upon the completion of data entry, the sets of data were cleaned through crosscheck of data for

possible inconsistencies. At this point, the final database is ready for generating results and

performing analysis. Primary statistical analysis was conducted through cross tabulations and

regressions. Only the significant results are shared in this report. A significant number of

questions required a 3-rating scale answer (i.e.: 1= Not satisfied; 2= Satisfied to a certain extent;

and 3= completely satisfied). The results of these questions were calculated in percentages of

each of the options (answers) in addition to a calculated rating. The rating is in fact the weighted

average of these results. It summarizes the information of three-modalities (percentage of each

modality) into one indicator (average rating, which is in fact the weighted average).

In addition, in view of assessing the statistical influence of a set of variables on different attitude,

knowledge, and behavioral questions a binary logistic regression was run testing the probability

of a certain dependent variable against a set of variables including: gender, age, income,participation in the labor force, education, sectarian belonging, governorate of residence, and

governorate of registration, political activity and political affiliation

log(p/1-p) = b0 + b1*GEN + b2*AGEGROUP + b3*INCOME + b4*ACTIVE +

b5*EDUCAT + b6*SECT + b7*GOVRES + b8*GOVREG+ b9*POLACT+

b10*PARTYCAT

The regression results were incorporated in each section as appropriate and regression tables

were included in the annex.


19/84

19

PART 2 - RESULTS AND FINDINGS OF THE POLL

The following section describes the characteristics of all the members composing the householdsthat were visited by the study team. These members form the basis of the sample of eligible

individuals from which the end-respondents were randomly drawn. All household members aged

18 and above and present at the time of the interview were considered eligible.

SECTION 1 - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS

The final sample consisted of 9651 individuals distributed among 2433 households, which is

translated into an average household size of 3.89 individuals (compared to a household size of

4.27 in 20042). The geographic distribution of the sample households is shown in the following

table.

Table 3Geographic distribution of the sample households

Governorate Number of

households

Average household

size

Beirut 296 4.23

Mount Lebanon 1060 3.71

North Lebanon 380 4.12

Bekaa 290 4.27South Lebanon 248 3.67

Nabatieh 159 3.6

Lebanon 2433 3.89

The sample is mainly composed of nuclear families, whereby for every 1000 heads of

households, there are 852 spouses, 1957 children, and 64 parents. Only 114 single-member

households were found, representing 4.7% of the total sample size. Finally, there were only 104

female-headed households, representing 9% of the sample, compared to 14% in 2004.

The sample is balanced in terms of age and gender. A comparison of the samples agedistribution with that of the household survey of 2004

3shows a decrease in the size of the under

25 age category which is compensated by an increase in the share of those between the ages of

25 and 34. This may be related to the fact that migration rates are highest in the 25-34 age

2Central Administration for Statistics, Ministry of Social Affairs, UNDP. 2006. Living Conditions of Households-

2004. Beirut: CAS.3Ibid.


20/84

20

category. The sample is relatively gender balanced with around 48% females versus 52% males.

This balance is more or less maintained throughout the age categories.

Figure 1 Age distribution of the sample compared to the results of CAS 2004 household

survey (percent)

Educational achievement is increasing while maintaining gender parity. A comparison of

educational achievement between the current survey and 2004 shows that gender parity remains

across all educational levels. However, significant gains in achievement are noted for both

genders with the share of primary education holders having dropped from 33% to 15% for males

and from 27% to 14% for females. In contrast, the share of university degree holders has

increased from around 12% to around 32% for both genders in the span of ten years.

Figure 2 Educational achievement per gender in 2004 and 2014


21/84

21

Males tend to get married later in life. Age of marriage is obviously increasing with 58% of

those 25-34 years of age remaining unmarried, compared to 49% in 2004. The difference does

not seem however related to a delayed age of marriage among females but rather among males.

Indeed, while the share of unmarried females age 25-34 increased from 40% to 44% in ten years,

the same share increased from 58% to 70% among males of the same age group.

Female activity rate is on the rise. Females are clearly more likely to join the labor force. Thus,

while 60% of females aged 15 and above declared themselves to be occupied with housework in

2004, the share dropped to 48% ten years later. Moreover, 26% of females currently work

compared to only 18% ten years ago. Finally, the share of female students has also increased

from 14% in 2004 to around 19% today.

The share of salaried employees is decreasing. The current survey reveals that the share of

salaried employees has dropped from 62% in 2004 to 52%, a decrease that is compensated by an

increase in the share of employers/self-employed from 34% in 2004 to 39%. This change is

normally accompanied by increasing poverty as a result of the loss of stable income and the

benefits that usually accompany formal employment. The distribution of employment between

the public and private sectors seems to be relatively stable with 86% of people working in the

private sector and 14% in the public sector.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT SAMPLE

In addition to the basic socio-economic profile which was generated for all household members,

a number of additional questions were asked of the sample of respondents selected in each

household (2433). For the results of all socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent

sample, refer to the annex.

The sectarian distribution of the sample of respondents shows that the three largest

sectarian groups are Shiites (25%), Maronites (19%), and Sunnis (17%). Three categories

are assigned to Christian sects: one for Maronites, another for remaining Christian sects4

and thethird for Christians who refused to declare their sect. Also, four categories are allocated for

Muslims: one for Sunnis, another for Shiites, a third for the remaining Muslim sects5and the last

one for the Muslims who refused to declare their sect

4Catholic, Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian, Protestant, Syriac, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac

Catholic, Caledonian Catholic, Latin5Druze, Alaouite


22/84

22

These numbers however do not accurately reflect the sizes of these sects for two major reasons:

1. 81 questionnaires were not completed in Tripoli, which may increase the share of Sunnis

to 20%.

2. These sects may be increased by respondents who responded Muslim, Christian, or

refused to declare their sectarian identity.

Table 4 Distribution of respondents by declared sectarian identity (percent)SAMPLE (2433)

CHRISTIANS = 859 (35%) MUSLIMS = 1405 (58%)

UNDECLA

RED=169

(7%)

MARONITES=459 (19%)

OTHERCHRISTIA

N SECTS =

243 (10%)

UNSPECIFIE

DCHRISTIANS

= 157 (6%)

SUNNI

S = 408

(17%)

SHIITE

S = 608

(25%)

OTHERMUSLI

M

SECTS =133 (5%)

UNSPECIFIEDMUSLIMS =

256 (11%)

Females earn less than males. Income data was collected for the sample of selected

respondents. The results show that 43% earn less than 1.5 million LBP, an income that is hardly

sufficient for a decent standard of living. Females tend to be more present in the lower income

brackets, with 23% of them earning less than 1 million LBP per month, compared to 17% of

males. Moreover, while more than 12% of men earn more than 4 million LBP per month, only

7.7% of women earn as much.

The remainder of the report lays out the results of the questionnaire which tackles various facets

of electoral decision making and behavior with the sample of selected respondents (2433) 5F6,

namely:

National priorities of respondents

Attitude towards political institutions

Sectarian identity and political affiliation

Electoral decision-making

Knowledge of electoral system

Perspective on reforms

General predictions

6For each questionnaire topic, the complete set of explanatory/socio-demographic variables was crossed with the

variable of interest. However, only significant results were reported in the text.


23/84

23

The following analysis is based on a set of socio-economic variables (explanatory variables),

which were systematically used to explain all variables, extracted from the questionnaires, and

include the following (Refer to the annexes for more details):

- Gender

- Age

- Governorate

- Education

- Activity

- Income

-

Sect

SECTION 2 VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS ON CURRENT POLITICAL MATTERS

NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The respondents were asked to rate the extent of importance of a set of national, social, and

political concerns on a three-degree scale varying from secondary to important to very

important. It is noteworthy that most of the cited issues were deemed important by around three

quarters of the respondents which could potentially indicate a lack of satisfaction with most areas

of public life.

Stable security, job opportunities, health, education, electricity, and water are the key

issues of high importance to most respondents. More than 80% of respondents considered

these issues to be very important and only 1% consider these issues to be of secondary

importance.

On the contrary, the political participation of women ranks at the bottom of the

importance scale. Only 45% of respondents believe that the participation of women in Lebanesepolitical life is a very important concern. Up to 18% consider the issue to be secondary

knowing that this is the highest rate of secondary importance among all the other topic concerns

listed below (followed by corruption which drops to only 10% of respondents rating it as a

secondary concern). When examined through the gender perspective, more women tend to

consider their political participation as very important. Out of total female respondents, 58%

consider womens political participation of as very important compared to only 36% of men.


24/84

24

Issues such as transportation, political rights of persons with special needs, corruption, and

environment are concerns rank relatively lower on the importance scale. Less than 70% of

respondents consider those as very important concerns.

The ratings of females and males are very similar. Slight differences can be highlighted when

it comes to the political participation of women as above mentioned, corruption (74% of female

rate corruption as a very important concern versus only 62% of males) and education (86% of

female rate education as a very important concern versus only 80% of males).

Age is not a discriminating factor in the rating but in general elderly respondents are more

concerned about most issues when compared to youth7. It is noticed that the senior category

(76%) rates the change of the political elite as very important versus only 63% of youth. While

youth are mostly less concerned than seniors, they give higher ratings than seniors to issues such

as the political participation of women, education, electricity, and water as very important. In

fact, around 53% of youth categories rate political participation of women as very important

versus 45% of elderly. Around 87% of youth categories rate education as very important versus

80% of elderly.

Table 5 The importance of a list of concerns according to respondents

Subject Secondary ImportantVery

ImportantMean

Stable Security 1% 13% 86% 2.85

Health 1% 15% 84% 2.84

Job opportunities 1% 15% 84% 2.83

Education 1% 17% 82% 2.81

Electricity 1% 18% 81% 2.80

Water 1% 18% 80% 2.79

Pension 3% 19% 77% 2.74

Housing 2% 22% 76% 2.74

Economic growth 2% 22% 76% 2.74

Individual economic capacities 2% 23% 75% 2.72

Road network 2% 24% 74% 2.71

Freedoms 4% 25% 72% 2.68

Change of the political elite 7% 21% 72% 2.66

Transportation 3% 29% 68% 2.65

political rights of persons with 6% 28% 67% 2.61

7In order to facilitate analysis, age was regrouped into three categories: Young (below 25), middle-age (between

25 and 54 years) and senior (55 years and above).


25/84

25

special needs

Environment 5% 29% 65% 2.60

Corruption 10% 24% 66% 2.56Political participation of women 18% 37% 45% 2.27

ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

1) Trust in governmental and civil society institutions

The respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in a set of public institutions using the

following classification: do not trust at all, trust to certain extent, and completely trust

these institutions.

The Lebanese army is by far the most trusted institutionby the constituency.Around 70%of respondents have full trust in the Lebanese Armed Forces. The security forces rank next by a

large margin however, with only 36% of respondents declaring their full trust in them.

The government and the parliament are the two least trusted institutions . Only 4% and 6%

stated that they completely trusted the government and the parliament respectively. Around 36%

of respondents trust the parliament to a certain extent and 58% do not trust it at all. These rates

are clear indicators of the low trust of the Lebanese people in their government whereby both the

executive and legislative branches record the lowest levels of trust when compared to the army,

security forces, and judiciary.

Only a small share of respondents trusts non-governmental organizations (NGO) and

political parties. Around 12% of respondents fully trust NGOs and even less (6%) trust political

parties. In comparison, it is interesting to note that a larger share of respondents (20%) fully trust

syndicates and workers unions.

POINTS TO PIN

- Security is the top most concern for respondents whereas female participation ranks at the

bottom

- Priorities do not seem to be related to demographic variables except in terms of female

participation, corruption and education which are ranked slightly higher by women.


26/84

26

Table 6Level of Trust in Political Institutions

InstitutionDo not trust

at all

Trust to a

certain

extent

Completely

trustMean

Lebanese Army 7% 23% 70% 2.63

Security Forces 23% 41% 36% 2.13

Judiciary 37% 41% 22% 1.85

Orders /Syndicates

(Lawyers, engineers,

doctors, etc.)

37% 42% 21% 1.85

Workers unions (trade

unions) 39 41 20 1.80

Non-Governmental

Organizations50% 38% 12% 1.63

Parliament 58% 36% 6% 1.47

Political parties and

movements61% 34% 6% 1.45

Government8 68% 28% 4% 1.35

Males tend to systematically report less trust in institutions than females. While around

60% of males do not trust the parliament only 54% of females distrust it. The same applies for

the government (72% males versus 63% females) and most other institutions.

8The survey was conducted during the period of resignation of the Government of Najib Mikati in March 2013


27/84

27

Figure 3Gender distribution of respondents who reported their distrust in the following

institutions

There are few age differences in the level of trust in political institutions with the exception

of the government which receives a significantly lower amount of trust from the youth. In fact,

70% of young respondents do not trust the government compared to 60% of senior respondents.

Table 7Age distribution of respondents who reported their distrust in the following

institutions

Institution Young

(Below

25)

Middle-

aged (25

to 54)

Senior

(55 &

above)

Total

Parliament 59% 59% 54% 58%

Government 70% 70% 60% 68%

Judiciary 40% 38% 31% 37%

Lebanese Army 8% 7% 5% 7%

Security forces 24% 24% 17% 23%

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) 47% 50% 49% 50%

Political parties and movements 63% 61% 59% 61%

Syndicates/Orders (Lawyers, engineers,doctors, etc.)

38% 37% 34% 37%

Workers unions (Trade unions) 40% 40% 36% 39%


28/84

28

2) Satisfaction with local and national officials

Respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with the performance of local and nationalauthorities on a three-leveled scale: 1) not satisfied; 2) satisfied to a certain extent; and 3)

completely satisfied.

Low levels of satisfaction were recorded for all local and national authorities and leaders

with the highest satisfaction being recorded at the local level. The most trusted among the listed

authorities are the mayors of ones own electoral district who only received a 27% level of

satisfaction. In comparison, the political leaders and the elected deputies have very low levels of

satisfaction with only 14% and 9% of totally satisfied respondents respectively.

Respondents are more satisfied with the performance of their religious leaders than theirpolitical leaders and deputies. While a small share of respondents are fully satisfied with their

political leaders and deputies, more than 20% of respondents fully trust their religious leaders.

As expected, more than 60% of respondents are dissatisfied with the religious leaders of other

communities.

Table 8Level of satisfaction with the performance of some local and national authorities

Not

satisfied

Satisfied to

a certain

extent

Completely

satisfied

Mean

Mayor (mokhtar) at your district of

registration 27% 46% 27% 2.0Religious leaders of your sect 43% 36% 21% 1.78

Municipal council at your place of

residence40% 44% 16%

1.76

Municipal council at your district of

registration42% 44% 14%

1.73

Political leaders of your sect 50% 36% 14% 1.64

Deputies of your district of registration 53% 39% 9% 1.56

Religious leaders of other sects 63% 31% 6% 1.43

Political leaders of other sects 72% 24% 4% 1.32

It is worth noting that satisfaction is always higher with the leaders of ones own sect

whether political or religious. In fact, the satisfaction of respondents with the leaders of their

own sects is systematically around 30 points higher for both political and religious leaders.


29/84

29

Figure 4Comparison between the level of satisfaction with own and other leaders

Higher education and increased political involvement are associated with higher levels ofsatisfaction with deputies. University graduates are more likely to be satisfied (59%) with their

deputies than those with primary education (51%). Moreover, members of political parties are

twice more likely to be satisfied with their deputies as opposed to those disinterested in politics

in general. This result is confirmed by the fact that respondents who believe that March 8

coalition or March 14 coalition are capable of achievements are more likely to be satisfied with

their deputies when compared to respondents who trust none of these coalitions

Table 9Level of satisfaction with the deputy of the respondents electoral districts per

political affiliation

8March

14March None

Not satisfied 44% 48% 61%

Satisfied to a certainextent 44% 43% 34%

Completely satisfied 13% 10% 5%

In terms of sect, Maronites are three times more likely to be satisfied with their deputies than

respondents of undeclared religion. Residents of North Lebanon are twice less likely to be

satisfied with their deputies in comparison with Beirut residents. Inversely, residents of South

Lebanon are more likely to be satisfied than those residing in Beirut. Finally, females are slightly

more likely to be satisfied with their deputies than males. (Refer to annex for regression results)


30/84

30

Table 10Level of satisfaction with the deputyof the respondents electoral districts per

sect9

Sect MeanMaronite 1.67

Shiite 1.64

Christian 1.61

Muslim 1.54

Undeclared 1.4

Sunni 1.35

3) Perception of deputy responsibilities

More than half of respondents consider that the responsibilities of a deputy include theprovision of job opportunities and the acceleration and facilitation of paperwork. While

most respondents (more than 90%) are aware of the key duties of deputies such as the

promulgation of a new electoral law and a civil status law, they do not seem to be aware that the

provision of job opportunities for their constituencies and the expedition of official paperwork

fall outside the realm of parliamentary responsibilities. This is an indicator that these actions are

not perceived as aspects of clientelism or nepotism.

A shocking gap is noted between the duties of deputies according to respondents and the

expected achievements of deputies with regards to these duties. In fact, while more three

quarters of respondents believe that a deputy is responsible for enacting laws pertaining toelections, civil status and retirement plans, less than 20% of respondents expect any

achievements in those regards. This, in conjunction with the high priority placed by respondents

on many of these issues, explains the low trust and satisfaction levels obtained in the previous

section.

9Christian includes all Christian sects except for the Maronites, who are represented in a standalone category, as

well as those who declared to be Christians but did not specify their sect. Muslim includes all Muslims other than

Sunnis and Shiites, and those who declared to be Muslim.


31/84

31

Figure 5 Comparison between the duties of deputies and their expected achievements

POINTS TO PIN

- The Lebanese armed forces received the highest trust ratings while the parliament and the

government received dismally low ratings.

- Low levels of trust in and satisfaction with political leaders indicate a major democratic

dysfunction.

- Satisfaction with own sect leaders is systematically higher than with the leaders of other

sects, a clear indicator of sectarianism.

- A wide gap exists between the broad mandate of deputies and the expectations that

respondents have of any achievements in the duties assigned to their representatives.


32/84

32

POLITICAL AFFILIATION

1) Political Activism

The first noteworthy observation is that more than a third of the respondents (35%) had no

interest in politics whatsoever, a rather sizeable share that reflects a general feeling of

mistrust of politics and politicians. Another quarter (22%) follows politics but does not lean

toward any of the current political parties. Finally 30% support certain political factions and 11%

are card carrying members in Lebanese political parties. In other words, almost 60% of survey

respondents are essentially independent.

Figure 6Distribution of respondents by level of political activism

The share of women who are disinterested in politics is significantly higher than that of

men (44% versus 29%).Inversely, while 13% of men are political party members only 8% of

women belong to political parties. However, this 60/40 male-female ratio is not duly reflected in

the leaderships of Lebanese political parties which are significantly more heavily skewed toward

males.

Not surprisingly, the young are much less likely to be interested in politics . Almost half of

those under 25 years of age reported having no interest in politics, a share that drops to a third in

all the remaining age groups. Moreover, the share of political party members increases steadily

from 7% in the under 25 age category to peak at 19% in the 55-64 age group.

Income is also a factor that increases political involvement10

. Thus, while 45% of low-income

individuals are disinterested in politics, the share drops to 30% among high-income groups. The

share of those who follow politics without supporting one party or another also decreases as one

moves up the income ladder. In contrast, high-income respondents are twice more likely to

support certain political factions as low-income respondents. Finally, it worth noting that the

contrast is sharpest between the lowest income group (less than 1 million LBP) and the other two

income groups.

10In order to facilitate analysis, income was regrouped into three categories: Low income (under 1 million LBP),

middle income (1 million LBP through 4million LBP) and high income (more than 4 million LBP).


33/84

33

Figure 7Political activity per level of income

The highest share of political party members was found in the Bekaa (31%). In contrast,

North Lebanon registers one of the lowest shares of party members (3%) and the highest share of

supporters (53%). Finally, Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Nabatiyeh all registered higher than

average shares of respondents who were disinterested in politics (around 40%).

Active people are more likely to be interested in politics than inactive people. Indeed, while

43% of inactive people reported having no interest in politics, the share drops to 32% among the

active.

Maronites have the highest share of respondents who support a political party while those

of undeclared religious affiliation are the most likely to be disinterested in politics.


34/84

34

Table 11Political Activity per Sect11

Muslim Christian Sunni Maronite Shiite Undeclared Total

Political party member 13% 14% 9% 8% 11% 10% 11%

Supportive of certain political party 14% 32% 33% 49% 28% 9% 30%

Active in civil society,

interested in politics, independent 2% 1% 2% 1% 3% 6% 2%

Interested in politics, independent 28% 20% 22% 12% 27% 20% 22%

Not interested in politics 43% 33% 33% 30% 30% 55% 35%

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

2) Trust in Political Factions to Effectively Serve the Public Interest

When asked about the political party that is most capable of achievements for the public

good, 47% of the respondents trusted none of the political parties in that regard . The

remaining half of the sample was somewhat equally divided between the two major political

alliances (8th

and 14th

of March)12

.

No differences were noted in terms of socio-economic profile. In fact, there are no real

differences in the likelihood of supporting one coalition of the other among people of different

genders, age, educational backgrounds, income levels, or participation in the labor force.

Interestingly, the higher a respondents income, the more likely he/she is to choose a certain

political party. Indeed, 60% of people in the lowest income bracket trusted none of the political

parties versus only 33% of those in the highest income bracket.

Trust in the achievement capabilities of political factions differs significantly by

governorate. Thus, the governorates with the highest share of disheartened respondents who

have low faith in the abilities of any factions are the South, Mount Lebanon, and Beirut.

Moreover, regression results indicate that residing in the governorates of South Lebanon or

Nabatiyeh increases the likelihood of trusting March 8, with a similar but less pronounced effect

in the governorates of Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon. It is worth noting that the

questionnaires that were not filled in Tripoli due to the security situation may have skewed the

11Christian includes all Christian sects except for the Maronites, who are represented in a standalone category,

as well as those who declared to be Christians but did not specify their sect. Muslim includes all Muslims other

than Sunnis and Shiites, and those who declared to be Muslim.12

These results were adjusted taking into account the missing questionnaires in Tripoli due to the security

situation (70 out of 151 were completed).


35/84

35

sample away from March 14 in the governorate of North Lebanon (Refer to annex for regression

results).

SECTION 3 ELECTORAL POSITIONING OF RESPONDENTS

ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING

1) Previous electoral behavior

Around 65% of respondents reported having voted in the previous parliamentary elections

in Lebanon whereas 35% did not vote. More precisely, out of those who had not voted, 12%

chose not to vote, 17% were not able to vote and 6% reported they were not interested in the

elections.

Compared to females, a slightly higher share of males participated in the previous

elections. Around 68% of male respondents reported to have voted in the previous parliamentary

elections versus 60% for females. Similar shares of females and males declared they were not

interested in elections (7% and 5% respectively).

Most young respondents were not able to vote in the former elections (72%). This is

generally due to them being below 21 years, the legal voting age, at the time of the previous

elections. Most of middle-aged and senior respondents (more than 70%) participated in the

elections and a similar share of non-interest in elections, around 5% is reported across the

different age categories13.

13In order to facilitate analysis, age was regrouped into three categories: Young (below25), middle-age (between

25 and 54 years) and senior (55 years and above).

POINTS TO PIN

- Around half do not trust any of the political factions in achieving results in the public interest,

a finding that is in line with the fact that more than half of the Lebanese population, are

either disinterested in politics or neutral regarding the political factions.

- Being young, poor, inactive, female, and of undeclared religion is more likely to be associated

with no or little interest in politics.


36/84

36

Table 12Age distribution of participants in the former parliamentary elections

Did you vote in the previous elections? Young Middle-aged Senior

Yes 14% 73% 74%

No, I decided not to vote 9% 14% 10%

No, I was not able to vote 72% 8% 10%

No, I am not interested in elections 5% 5% 6%

Total 100% 100% 100%

The share of participation in elections of Beirut and Mount Lebanon residents is relatively

low. Around 80% of respondents residing in Nabatiyeh and North Lebanon voted during the

former parliamentary elections compared to only 56% in Mount Lebanon and 61% in Beirut.

Also, 10% and 7% in Mount Lebanon and Beirut reported to be disinterested in politics which

are the two highest shares among governorates. Interestingly, although respondents living in

Mount Lebanon are less likely to have voted than those who live in Beirut, respondents

registered in Mount Lebanon are more likely to have voted when compared to those registered in

Beirut and so are those registered in the North (Refer to annex for regression results).


37/84

37

Figure 8Participation in former elections according to governorate of

residence

The highest abstention rate was found among those who refused to declare their religion. In

fact, 34% of respondents of undeclared religion did not vote in the previous election. More

precisely, 25% of respondents of undeclared religions chose not to vote in the former elections

and 9% declared not to be interested in elections in general. The refusal to declare ones religion

seems to be an indicator of aversion to the current political/sectarian parties, which is translated

into abstention from voting.

Sunni and Shiite respondents registered the highest participation rates in previouselections. Around 70% of Sunnis and Shiites voted during the last elections, compared to 63% of


38/84

38

Maronites, Christians and Muslims14

. Inversely, 17% of Christians refrained from voting which

is the highest share among sects, followed by 14% of Muslims.

Figure 9Participation in former elections according to sect

Quite expectedly, political activity increases the likelihood of participating in elections. In

fact, those interested in politics are twice likely to have voted in the previous elections when

compared to those who are disinterested in politics. The odds increase to fivefold and sevenfold

in the cases of political supporters and party members respectively.

Out of all respondents who were not able to vote during previous elections, 65% declared

they were below 21 years of age and therefore not allowed to vote. Most of the remaining

respondents reported to have been outside the country (10%), to be enrolled in the armed forces

(9%), or had their names missing from the registration records (5%).

14Christian includes all Christian sects except for the Maronites, who are represented in a standalone category,

as well as those who declared to be Christians but did not specify their sect. Muslim includes all Muslims other

than Sunnis and Shiites and those who declared to be Muslim.


39/84

39

Table 13Reasons behind the inability to voteIn case you were not able to vote in the

previous elections, what is the main

reason behind the inability to vote %

I was below the voting age (21 years old) 65

I was abroad 10

I was arrested for investigation 1

I was enrolled in the armed forces 9

I was sick and hospitalized (or at home) 4

Difficulty to vote due to special needs 3

Long distance between the voting stationand the place of residence 3

My name was missing from the registrationrecords 5

Other 1

Total 100

2) Sources of Nuisance during the previous elections

Respondents were asked to rate the level of nuisance caused by a set of practices during the

previous parliamentary elections.

Vote buying was considered of extreme nuisance to most respondents (2.63). Also, more

than 60% of respondents admitted to be very bothered by voter intimidation at polling stations.

Almost a similar share of respondents reported being very upset with the difficulty of access to

polling stations of people with special needs.

Inversely, at the bottom of the rating scale, only 35% of respondents declared to be very

bothered by the small number of women candidates in the previous parliamentary

elections. Expectedly, 48% of female respondents expressed extreme nuisance with the small

number of women candidates versus only of 27% of males. In the same context, 38% of

respondents are very upset by the electoral program lacking concern with women issues (53% offemales versus only 29% of males).


40/84

40

Table 14Sources of nuisance

Not bothered

Bothered to a

certain extent

Very

bothered

Rating

Vote buying 11% 16% 73% 2.63

Attempts to intimidate voters at the entrance of voting stations 12% 26% 62% 2.5

Difficulty of voting for people with special needs 11% 33% 56% 2.44

Lack of financial transparency in general 16% 30% 55% 2.39

Disparities in the electoral expenses between candidates 17% 33% 51% 2.34

Photos of candidates on streets and in public spaces 21% 26% 53% 2.32

Access of all voters to voting stations 17% 35% 48% 2.31Disparities in time and space of candidates in media 20% 36% 44% 2.25

Sectarian and gender distribution of voting stations 21% 36% 44% 2.23

Poor performance of media during elections 20% 39% 41% 2.21

Absence of women issues in electoral programs 24% 38% 38% 2.15

Limited number of female candidate 26% 39% 35% 2.09

3) Intended Electoral Behavior

More than 55% of respondents have the intention to vote in the upcoming parliamentary

elections as opposed to 29% who are not willing to vote and 16% are still undecided.

Figure 10 Will you vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections?

The share of those who voted in the previous elections and those who intend to vote in the

next elections is similar. Changing voting trends or behaviors have not been detected in the

comparison of previous behaviors and future intentions. Around 65% of respondents voted in theprevious elections and have the intention to vote in the upcoming ones, indicating that there is a

stable long-term trend that is likely to continue if no drastic reforms are introduced.


41/84

41

Figure 11Respondents who voted in the previous elections and intend to vote in the nextones

Young respondents are less willing to vote than those of older age categories. Respondents

below the age of 25 are less willing to vote in the upcoming elections and have the highest share

of undecided respondents. In this age cateogry, 44% have the intention to vote in the nextelections which is the lowest share when compared to other age categories. The highest share of

those willing to vote (59%) are within the categories of respondents between 35 and 44 years as

well as 55-64 years old.

Table 15Willingness to vote according to age

Under

25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64

65 and

above

Yes 44% 57% 59% 57% 59% 57%

No 37% 26% 30% 29% 25% 25%

Did not yet decided19% 16% 12% 15% 16% 18%

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Respondents of undeclared religion are those who seem less likely to vote when compared

to respondents of declared sects. Muslims, who refused to declare their sects, have a low

willingness to vote.

Sectarian belonging and political activism are positively associated with the intention to

vote. In fact, declaring ones religion makes a respondent twice more likely to vote in the nextelections. Thus, only 30% of respondents of undeclared religion have the intention to vote

compared to 66% of sunni and around 60% of Maronite, Shiites and Christians. Interestingly,

although they were not more likely to have voted in the last elections, Maronites are more likely

to vote in the next elections indicating an increased interest in elections. Moreover, political

supporters and party members are four times and six times more likely to vote in the next


42/84

42

elections than disinterested respondents which is similar to the results of electoral behavior in the

previous elections.

Table 16 Willingness to vote according to sect

Muslim Christian Sunni Maronite Shiite Undeclared

Yes 40% 58% 66% 61% 61% 30%

No 36% 28% 24% 24% 26% 47%

Did not yet

decide

24% 14% 10% 15% 13% 23%

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Residents of North of Lebanon and the Bekaa are the constituency that is the most willing

to vote in the upcoming elections whereas Mount Lebanon residents are least willing to

vote. Around 75% of North Lebanon residents and 70% of Bekaa residents have the inention to

vote in the upcoming elections, possibly because they are more likely to live closer to their place

of registration. In contrast, only 46% of residents of Mount Lebanon and around 55% of

residents of Beirut and South Lebanon.

Figure 12Willingness to vote according to governorate of residence

When asked about the reasons behind their decision to vote in the upcoming elections, 48% of

respondents cited their desire to support a certain party or movement. Around 17% cited that

elections are an opportunity for democratic change as a main reason to vote and 14% believe that

participation in the elections is a duty.


43/84

43

Table 17Main reasons behind the willingness to vote in the upcoming electionsIn case you are willing to vote, what is the main

reason for that? %

In support of the political party I am affiliated to orbelong to

48

In return to services previously provided by thecandidate

5

In opposition to a certain party 5

Participation in election is a duty 14

Elections boycott is useless 5

In order avoid more negative consequences 4

Elections are a mean for change 17Other 2

Total 100

Conversely, among those who are not willing to vote in the next elections, 30% admitted they

will not vote because they believe that elections will not change anything in the current situation

of the country and 18% declared that they are not represented by any of the candidates to the

parliamentary elections and therefore are not willing to vote for any of them. Also, other main

reasons for respondents to abstain from voting is their oppostion to the current political system

(12%) as well as the fact that there is no electoral competition in their district.

Table 18Main reasons behind the unwillingness to vote in the upcoming elections

Reasons %

Elections will not change anything 30

Not represented by any of the candidates 18

In oppostion to the current political

system 12

No electoral competition in the district 10

Elections are rigged 9

For the same reasons I was not able to

vote in previous elections 8In opposition to the current electoral law 5

Other 4

Not interested in elections/politics 3

Lack of trust in candidates 1

Total 100


44/84

44

4) Criteria for selecting a candidate

The electoral program of a candidate and the trust in his/her capacity and performance as adeputy are the two main criteria for choosing and voting for a candidate, which is rather

surprising in view of the rarity of electoral programs. According to respondents, other key

criteria for choosing a candidate include the educational attainment of candidates whereby 60%

of respondents rated this criterion as extremely important. Similarly, 60% of respondents believe

that the capacity of a candidate to provide development services to the electoral district is an

extremely important criterion in the selection of candidates.

Figure 13Rating of the criteria for choosing a candidate


45/84

45

5) General Predictions

Half of respondents believe that the parliamentary elections will not make a change in the ruling

political elite, versus only 11% of respondents who believe that they will.

Table 19Do you believe that the upcoming elections can change the political elite?

Answer %

Yes 11

Yes, in condition of electoralreforms 23

No 50

I dont know 17Total 100

Moreover, half of respondents considered that the postponement of the parliamentary

elections is unjustified versus only 12% who felt that it was. Out of all respondents that find

justification for the deferral of elections, 45% believe that the reasons are security issues, 31%

blame it on the lack of agreement between stakeholders responsible of the electoral law, 22%

believe the rescheduling of elections is due to international pressure and circumstances and 12%

gave other answers.

Also, 36% of respondents expect a second postponement of parliamentary election and therefore

an extension for the current parliament. Finally, almost half of respondents expect the

presidential elections to take place on time versus 19% who anticipate that presidential elections

will be postponed.


46/84

46

POINTS TO PIN

- Around 65% of respondents reported having voted in the previous parliamentaryelections. The lowest share of participation in previous elections was registered by

residents of Beirut and Mount Lebanon. The same share of respondents (66%)

intends to vote in the next elections.

- Vote buying was considered of extreme nuisance to most respondents. Inversely,

the least source of nuisance was reported to be the small number of women

candidates in the previous parliamentary elections

- Residents of North of Lebanon and the Bekaa are the constituency that is the most

willing to vote in the upcoming elections whereas Mount Lebanon residents are the

least willing to vote.


47/84

47

KNOWLEDGE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM

1) Electoral System

Respondents were asked a question about the electoral system that is currently in force in

Lebanon, to which 62% gave a correct answer, namely: majoritarian. The results also showed

that women were less likely to answer correctly (54% versus 68% among men) and more likely

not to know the answer (28% versus 16% among males). In terms of age, the youngest and oldest

age brackets were less likely to answer correctly (50% compared to an average of 60%).

Quite expectedly, the likelihood of correct answers is doubled between the primary and

university education(Refer to regression results in annex). Indeed, the share of those who did

not know the answer decreased from 30% among those with a primary education to 18% among

university degree holders.

Beirut and Mount Lebanon displayed the lowest shares of correct answers (around 50%),

while the Bekaa had the highest share of correct answers (88%). Indeed, residents of the North,

the South and Nabatiyeh are two to three times more likely to have correct answers than Beirut

residents. Strikingly, respondents in the Bekaa are seven times more l

analytical report- opinion poll

Documents