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THE GENER Lvalon Rill hiUosophy art 9WHERE DO WE GO FR OM HERE?

It seems like just yesterday we were discussingPhilosophy No. 38. Time does f ly especiallywhen you're putt in g ou t a magazine l ike the newGEN ERA L. The improvements made in the lastfew months have more than quadrupled themanhours we need to p ut o ut an issue. And whensomething happens to throw the machinery outof whack (l ike the press lay-up which resulted inthe lateness of the M ay issue) we have t o r un lik ecrazy to catch up again. We realize that being latewith your magazine is an annoying habit we have,but it's a vicious circle which we have fallen into.When an issue comes out late it automaticallymakes the next one twice as diff icult to get outon t ime. However, we are of the opinion thatyou would rather wait a few extra weeks thansacrif ice the quality of the mag and wil l continueto operate on that premise. And unl ike othermagazines we wil l continue to maintain a print ingschedule rather than coming out with an issuewhen we can arrange it This has caused consider-able bad feeling in the past from people whoreceive their issue after or just prior to thecontest deadline. Therefore, let's go on record assaying tha t the GENE RA L is pasted up orprepared to print long before it usually goes t opress. Thus, we cannot foresee delays which maycrop up after i t leaves our editorial off ices andtherefore the con test entry deadline often doesn'tleave you enough t ime to take part in thecontest. When these mailing delays occur we areaware of the problem and automatically extendthe entry deadline. So take it in s t ride, and f i l lout the contests regardless of stated deadlinesif we were late we wil l accept your entry. Unti lwe can get into the age-old groove of experiencewith the new format we must seek your indul-gence i n such difficulties.

The results of our first Readers' Response werequ ite inter estin g and gave us several clues as t ohow to proceed wi th future ef forts . Unfortu-nately, many o f you p robab ly did no t take thetime to f i l l out the card properly. We receivedmany letters which praised the new GEN ER ALto the heavens and then proceeded to rateeverything with 9's and 10's. Remember, in oursystem the lower the number the more favorablethe response. Nevertheless, a random sample of200 responses was used to derive the fol low inginforma tion which w e w il l have to repeat at alater date for verification.The May issue was the f irst copy for 24% ofthe responses, alth oug h the average subscr iber hasbeen with us for 2.49 years. 94% indicated thatthey w ould resubscribe on the basis of the lastissue while 96% indicated that it was better thanthe preceding issue. Collectively, they rated theissue at 3.81 no t bad considering the numberof people who clearly misunderstood the ratingsystem. We will be repeating these questionsregularly to give us an indication of how we'redoing. We believe we can and wi l l imp rovetremendously in the m onths ahead, and a carefulwatch of these points should tel l us how we'redoing. O nly 41% are taking advantage of the 2for 1 deal whereby if they get a new subscriberfor the magazine, their subscription is extended

for free. It is unfortunate that there isn't morean attemp t to take advantage of this offer. I t wbe the last year in which it is made. We wi l l ing to take it on the chin this year and bethe bru nt of the cost of increasing the magazincirculat ion. However, we cannot be expected continue this give-away philosophy forever. Yhave 2 very good reasons to take advantage this offer; 1. it saves yo u mon ey, and 2. we reach the level of circulat ion we're striving fby the end o f the year, 1974 wi l l see a furthincrease t o 3 2 pages at no added cost.The undefeated feature art icle premise almowas upset last time, bu t the 'Waterloo C ampaigbeat off strong challenges by the Gygax aGross entries to come in f irst. Our new ratisystem gives 3 points for a f irst place vote, 2 fsecond and 1 for third. Given our random sampof 200 this means that 600 is a perfect scorewil l be interesting to see whether anyone can tthe 400 mark et alone 600. The results fVol. 10, No. 1 were:CAMPAIGN AT WATERLOO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ADVANCED BISMARCK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .D-DAY DEFENDED.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SERIES REPLAY PREVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EXPERIMENTAL PANZERBLITZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .THE REST OF THE ALPHABET.. .....................DESIGN ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AVALON HILL PHILOSOPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Gett ing on to the more common day quetions, we fou nd t ha t the average reader was 22years of age and a soph omore in college wh o hbeen active i n wargaming fo r 5.4 years and ow11.3 Avalon Hil l games. Only 38% of you plby mail but those who do average 7.8 gamesyear. Afrika Korps, Stalingrad and Bulge are tmost commonly pbmed games with Panzerbland D-Day close behind. Waterloo and Blitzkrishare a respectable th place in this respect withe other land bat t le t i t les and Luf twaf fe fol loing along wi th roughly 113 of the pbm pop ularof the others.On the average, you play 5.2 Avalon Hgames per month, 6.2 simulation games pmo nth and devote 23.3 hours to the art evemon th. 54% favored the intermediate com plexlevel as opposed to 38% who opted for tournment-style games. The land element was by fthe most popular game environment poll in68% of the vote com pared t o 27% fo r navgames. Strategic level games outpolled tacticand grand strategic types by 56%, 34% and 10respectively. The ballot ing on favorite periods wof special interest to us showing a few changwe didn't expect.

World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Modern 1Revolutionary 1Ancient 1Civ i lWar 1NuclearNapoleonic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .World War I .......................................Medieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The tabulat ion of Sect ion I l l of the Responheld special interest for those of us who work othe GENERAL. Your responses gave abovaverage ratings for al l 14 departments and wevery gratifying. We are no w proceeding on thassumption th at we are heading in the rigdirection and wil l judge accordingly. EspecialContinued on page

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Paee THE GENER L

by Scott Duncan and Lou Zocchi

LUFTWAFFE, although having been around for quite some tim e, has never beenthe subject of a major analysis. With this thought in mind, we approached noted wargamer Scott Duncan for his opinions. Aft er almost half a year o f concentrated stu dy,Sco tt sent us the article which follows. We think you ll agree with us that it is themost comprehensive, ye t not overly assuming, piece ye t done on this particular game.

For an historical touch we we nt straight to th e game s designer. Lou Zocch i has longfelt th at the lack of play balance in his game is due to the fact that the German sideis not h andicapped as it was in real life b y inept leadership. The fact that wargamersdo not make the same mistakes that Goering did, makes it very hard for the A - One of many American bombers which spread h a wmericans t o repeat their real life performance. It is Lou s historical presentation which over Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe.precedes Scott s study.

bomber averaged 33% of its bombs on target, After the fall of France. Udet told his coAlthough the loser of a war may have madebetter decisions than the victor, his conduct isalways the subject of closer scrutiny on theassumption that perhaps he could have changedthe outcome by making a better choice. While

there is no valid reason to suppose that theGermans made more mistakes than we did, it isdefinitely more interesting to contemplate theirchoices and ask what would have happenedif Most certainly our major blunders will neverreceive the degree of scrutiny we accord ouradversaries. If you think we didn't make any,you've forgotten about Roosevelt's decision tomake Hawaii into a Pacific bastion, Harris' deci-sion to bomb workers' homes instead of theirfactories which produced the weapons of war, orour own bullheadedness which sent unescortedbombers over Germany in broad daylight in themistaken notion that they could defend them-selves, despite British warnings and ample evi-dence to the contrary, etc.During my Luftwaffe research, I found thattwo key men made more than their share of baddecisions. Considering these bad judgements hasleft me wondering how the Germans managed tohold out as long as they did.The two men to whom refer are HermanGoering and his lesser known assistant, ErnstUdet. Neither man was qualified for the positionhe held and each penalized the Luftwaffe withfaulty judgements. Although Udet was far. morecompetent than the bumbling Goering, he wasovermatched by the responsibilities thrust uponhim. Unfortunately for him, the mistakes hemade were so enormous that even Goering beganto realize what was happening.GENERAGLUFTZEUGMEISTER Ernst UdetErnst Udet was selected by Goering for hisLuftwaffe post because his 62 victories during

WWI made him a national hero second only toVon Richthofen. He was a gay, reckless fighterpilot who thrived on challenge in the air. Duringthe twenties he was an acrobatic barnstormer andin the early thirties performed as a flying stuntman for the movies.Goering sent Udet t o discover if the Americanaviation industry had anything which wouldinterest the Luftwaffe. During his visit, Udet flewand fell in love with the Curtis Hell Diver whichcould dive vertically from great heights to dropheavy bombs with fantastic accuracy. Whereas theaccuracy of level bombers was abysmal, the dive

which was considered fantastic in those days.Udet persuaded Goering to buy two demon-stration machines but was unable to gain supportfor his ideas until after he accepted a Luftwaffeposition. Then he found himself competing withGeneral Wever, the first Chief of Staff, whowanted heavy strategic bombers; Goering, whowanted fast, twin-engined medium bombers, anda third faction who demanded a strong fighterarm.Udet accepted an appointment as a colonel andbecame "INSPECTOR OF FIGHTERS ANDDIVE BOMBERS" in February of 1936, to assurethat his dive-bombers were developed. WhenGeneral Wever was killed in an air crash on June3rd, 1936, several Luftwaffe leaders scrambled topromote their pet projects. Major Wolfram vonRichthofen, cousin of the famous ace, sent outdirective LC 2 No. 4017136 on June 9th, whichsaid, "Further development of the Ju 87 (divebomber) shall be discontinued" On June loth,Udet took over the technical office and saved hisbrainchild while Richthofen was sent to Spain asChief of Staff for the Condor Legion.Udet used his new position to lower heavybomber priorities while raising the priority of hisbeloved dive bombers. His passion for dive-bomb-ing was to become the Frankenstein monster thatwould return to destroy its creator.Udet's first major error was in June of 1938when he flew the He lOOA fighter to a newworld speed record. The Heinkel fighter hurtledalong at 394.4 mph which substantially outpacedthe 290 mph Me 109B C fighters it wasdesigned to [eplace. The He 100 was furtherrefined and improved until the standard produc-tion model was reaching speeds of 416 mph withthe same engine used by the Me 109. TheHeinkel fighter was cheaper to build, involvedfewer man hours in its construction and could fly550 miles while the Me 109 could not go muchbeyond 400. Since range became a crucial factorduring the Battle of Britain, Udet's rejection ofthe Heinkel fighter was a major blunder.During the months following its rejection, thefighter embarrassed and irritated Udet by estab-lishing new speed records. Finally Udet went toHeinkel and said "For God's sake, Heinkel, theMe 109 is and will be our standard fighter. I t justwon't look good if another fighter proves faster"Udet instructed Heinkel to stick to buildingbombers and leave fighter development to others.He 100 Fighters would have won the Battle ofBritain, but Udet valued his pride above betterweapons.

leagues: "The war is over To hell with all oaircraft projects they'll no longer be neededImmediately thereafter, everything he touchewas cursed. He was ridiculed for his unsuccessfattempts to pioneer night fighter interceptiotechniques. His Stukas were so badly butchereduring the Battle of Britain that they had to bwithdrawn Goering began spiriting away Udetfew loyal staff members and intrigued against himuntil he succumbed to nervous exhaustion.When the Mk 108 thirty millimeter cannon wdemonstrated for him in 1941, he rejected saying "We don't need any aircraft weapons greater caliber than 20 mm. Our pilots acrack-shots and can destroy the heaviest bombewith 20mm cannon a t a distance of 65 feet." Hdecision appears contradictory since the prodution of the Mk 103 which fired the same calibshell, was authorized. The Mk 103 weighed 31pounds while the Mk 108 weighed only 12pounds. The Mk 103 fired 420 rounds per minutwhile the Mk 108 fired 650 rounds per minuteOnly 4 hits from a 30mm cannon shell werneeded to down a B-17.Udet's ELK plan was designed to eliminataircraft from production, which failed undeoperational circumstances while expanding th

Ju87 r (Udet s prized Stukas) in flight.

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THE GENER L Pa

Udet, the incompetent hero.

output of the few carefully selected models. Theplan flopped because Udet selected planes forprodu ction which were failures. The developmentof the Do 217 and He 177 heavy bombers wasgreatly delayed because they were required toDIVE-BOMB. At th at t ime, the technology formaking 20 tons of bomber as nimble as a fighterdid not exist. This requirement caused innumber-able delays and bo th .progra ms fell far behindschedule. He also ordered the Me 210 intoproduction as a replacement for the aging Me110, but the new plane was so defective that ithad t o be junked. In point of fact, a suitablereplacement for the Me 110 was never developedand it soldiered right up t o the end of the war asa night fighter.

In September 1941, Hitler berated Goering forLuftwaffe failures. Goering, in the presence ofState S ecretary M ilch, called Udet to his head-quarters and passed on all the complaints, withliberal embellishments. As Goering finished histirade, he made it perfectly clear that everydisapp ointm ent German y had since 193 6 was allUdet's fault. The He 177 bom bers caught fire tooeasily, they were behind scheduled production,the Me 210 program was a failure. the Battle ofBritain had been lost, and his Stukas could onlybe used against the Russians. Udet realized toolate that Goering had tied his hands with red tapeand was using him as a scape goat.

Heinkel 100D s. sister craft to the HE100A s whichUdet cancelled.

Udet solved his dilemma by blowing out hisbrains with a Colt revolver on November 17 th,1941. Goebbels pounced o n the event to launch apropaganda campaign which convinced Germanythat the heroic Udet died while testing out a newSECRET W EAPON. Udet was replaced by theloyal and hard working party member, HansJeschonnek. Unfortunately fo r Jeschonnek, hebecame Goering's next scape goat. His hard workto correct the errors he encountered was nullif iedby the incompetent Goering and he too com-mitted suicide when he realized his situation.

REICHMARSHALL HERMAN GOERINGHerman Goering was an ambitious, flamboyantegocentric whose arrogance was exceeded only byhis technical ignorance and propensity for baddecisions. He was such a liability that onewonders how he could become the commander ofanything.Goering emerged from WWI as the heroicleader of the Richthofen Geschwader with 22victories to his credit. During the chaotic years ofunrest which followed, he succumbed to thebrilliance of Hitler's oratory and becam e hisdisciple.Hitler needed t he highly decora ted hero to give

tone and class to his bid for German leadership.Goering was given command of Hitler's brownshirted Sturm abtelun g force. As their leader, heturned them from an undisciplined mob of raggedagitators into an effective army of ruthless assas-sins and mobsters.When Hitler too k over in 193 3, Goering wasgiven the Luftwaffe and ordered to make it theworld's most powerful air force. Goering believedthe job would take 10 years and planned accord-ingly. Four years before the master plan could becompleted, Hitler plunged Germany into WWII.Initial Luftwaffe successes against poorlytrained or equipped and heavily outnumberedenemy forces caused Goering and his staff toconclude that they could relegate aircraft devel-opme nt and production t o a very low priority.This, coupled with his continued interference onthe pretext that he was interpreting the wishesof the Fuhrer, did irreparable damage to aircraftprograms. His technical ignorance caused him tocancel many promising projects, some of whichhad been started by his insistance in the firstplace.To il lustrate this point, you may find itinteresting to know that by diligently searchingall radio frequencies, the Germans learned thatBritish fighters were remotely controlled o n VHFfrequencies from ground stations. They realizedthat the ground stations were obtaining theirinformation from a new radio location systemwhich was somehow connected t o the mysteriousantenn as along the English coastline.General Wolfgang Martini, Chief of Luftwaffecommunications, has assumed that Germany wasahead of the British in this field because of theirown Freya and Wurzburg systems. Freya wassuccessfully being used to spot ships moving inthe English channel and Wurzburg was directingflak batteries defending the Ruhr.Martini discovered that the entire length of theeast and south coasts were covered by radarstations which were giving the British advancedwarning of every raid. On August 1 5th, two daysafter the Germans had openly committed them-selves to d estroying the R.A.F., Goering droveanother nail into the Nazi coffin with thefollowing directive. It is dou btfu l wheth er there

is any point in continuing the attacks osites, in view of the fac t tha t n ot one oattacked has so far been put out of actionHis shortsightedness was directly resfor Luftwaffe losses suffered during the ebattle. However, Goering's standa rd soluunsatisfactory situatio ns was to blame When the Battle of Britain was not won days he predicted, Goering made a persoof each unit involved, t o tell the men pack of cowards they were. When GeneraOsterkamp, commander of Luftflotte 2the Inspector General that his pilots werpointlessly sacrificed by Goering's restrictwas busted to Major, and tol d that anyrevelations would result in his Court Marti

Herman Goering prior to the war.

In th e spring of 1942, the Germafrequency expert, Roosenstein, learned jam radar with DUPPEL. This seemed teffective means by which German bomberavoid detection during their nightly foraBritain. When Goering heard about it, pended fu rther experimentation because hthe British might learn of it. General Marordered to hide the files in his safe and of the word DUPPEL became a courtoffense. Goering's directive left the Gwithout an effective countermeasure wBritish used some thing similar to DuppelGerman radar during the battle of the RuhGoering promised Hitler that the belvon Paulis and his 6th Army holding Stacould be completely supplied by air. Theya minimum of 300 ton s per day to surthe Lu ftwaffe averaged only 100. This could have been averted if, on April 29thGoering had not cancelled all further dment of four engined bombers.With four engined bombers, th e Germ anhave smashed th e industri al complex esarmed the Russians who trapped von Paulifirst place. The heavies could have been into service as supply transports whetfactories were destroyed or not. But tmeasure of Goering's i nep titu de is not ga

his lack of equipment, but rather his ignor

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THE GENERALforces he commanded cost the Germans

When Guderian had the British army pinned

to le t the Luftwaffe end the matter . "Myaffe can d o it alone ," he bragged, in spite

The only creditable action Goering ever a t-

mind, his track record for

We don't have the space to recoun t each ofGoering's mistakes in detail. So let us end thestory by rela ting that Goering became moreremote from his responsibilities as the situationdeteriorated. He became addicted t o drugs as theend drew near and, in re trospect, i t appears thatthe rotund Reichmarshall helped the Allies morethan the Luftwaffe .

S ources .GERMAN COMBAT PLANES, WagnerWARPLANES OF THE TH IRD REICH, GreenTHE FOCKE-WULF 190, NowarraTHE MESSERSCHMITT 109, NowarraLUFTWAFFE DIARY. BekkerA HISTORY O F THE LUFTWA FFE, Killen Factory view of He1 15 s and He1 11 s under construc-WARPLANES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, tion. The two-engined bombers were G ermany s largestAIRCRAF T IN P ROF ILE, Green aircraftng thoughtnd otherwise.otally unsuitable or strategic bombing. Gow-

One is hard-pressed to find published material D-DAY comes close to this sort of planning in few mo nths for presentation here.

or historical commentaries andplaying LUFTW AFFE have been few and farand only one or two have presented

1970 to be exact) , I f ind this a pleasant

Perhaps it is the sheer expanse of the gamenot a game you'd pull ou t Sunday

does not lend i tself to the normal,

define as "starting positions" save theines, certainly has no dependableof the most limited value in

using thean thi nk of exceptions on a very small

move behind a c i ty so the Americaning" the terrain) . However, for the most part ,analysis does not have at i ts

the beginning since the freedom of selection ofdefense and offense for both sides is highlyflexible and oc cupies lengthy discussion; STALIN-GRA D then came along with a further freedomof deployment and the naval games, by their verynature, brought even more initial unpredictability.LUFTW AFFE brings this all to a new height ofwell-calculated strategy by not allowing eitherside a true knowledge of the opponent's begin-ning placements until after all positions are set.The committal of American forces each quarterto specif ic targets which may not be changedduring the course of the quarter is an e lement ofplay totally unpreced ented in Avalon Hill gamingthe preplanning in 9 4 was not irrevocable inthe way American bomber missions are in LUFT-WAFFE. The timing of the release of thesemissions is quite free to compensate for thecommitta l to targets and the German player hasno idea of e i ther the targets or the t iming,making his job tougher than in mos t previousgames in which the objective was and has beenvery clear. Though there is a ow o Winsta tement for each version of LUFTWAFFE thereis no set order for achieving this end be it aneed to eliminate any 10 cities or every cityduring th e course of a full 10 quarters of play.Perhaps I overemphasize the situation and thestrategic possibilities of the game I do no tthink so. I am willing to admit that th e nature ofthe game demands that i t be played on acampaign level after a while since the Basic Gameor a m ere one qu arter version of Tourna ment/Advanced play soon fails to keep u p playinginterest. And for this reason, the game becomes alengthly battle, involving a complex records-keeping system. The game does not seem to meto be 'o ld ' enough yet to submit i t to toodetailed an analysis of move-by-move positionsand tactics. LUFTWAFFE's many variables withinjust a few well-defined rules for movement andcombat leave analysis of i t in much the sameshape as I imagine early Chess analysis founditself: no real standards yet developed out of playwith apparently every possibility a good one. Any"do this on the first move" p hilosophy seems tome to have to stand the test of time in play, andI am certa inly unable , even after a few mon ths ofanalysis , to lay dow n coordinates for p lacementof units and "sure" targets for bombing runs. Ido feel that a " think about th is before the firstmove" philosoph y is possible and it is just thisthat I have attempted to compile over the past

I feel that the most impo rtant consideration iswhe ther o r no t to p lay wi th the f reedom o findividual counters ra ther tha n mass typing ofsimilar units . Personally , the game seems to m e t odemand th at th is s tep be taken as soon as youhave a grip on the Basic Game and the funda-mental rules of movement and combat. If th ismetho d of play is delayed, the game bogs downand both Tournament and Advanced versionsmust suffer f indeed they are truly playable a ta l l as I could not p lay them with any enjoymentor realism without freeing all units from thedemand to act as one according to type. How-ever, the forbidding nature of the paperworkinvolved must surely dampen the spirits of any-one attempting such an individual accounting ofunits . LU FTWA FFE seems to me to be in tendedto last several sessions over several weeks of playonce the basics are grasped this is the truecampaign spirit in operation as a key element ofthe game rather than a mere outcome of the needto postpone play until more time is available orthe next PBM sheets arrive. But keeping track ofthe tu rns each unit m ust refuel or pass theRecovery Line is not conveniently or very visu-ally handled using paper and pencil (or evengrease pen and plastic sheets). Diagram A suggestsa pegboard arrangement which very visually in-dicates when each unit must land to refuel orpass back across the Recovery Lines from abombing mission. The initial outlay of materialsand time to prepare such boards is, I believe,more th an m ade up for by the ease with whichrecords are then kept and using a peg speciallymarked for each unit is as bad as having to huntfor counters , thus the use of rows for each unitand random selection of any peg to mark theturn for landing/recovery. Suggestions accom-panying the instructions indicate that the essenceof the game is to get to this stage of individua

T U R N S I Q U A R T E Ruaa

NJG2.NJG3.

D I A G R A M A

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TH GENER Laccounting as soon as possible. I find thispegboard arrangement a most useful method foranyone seriously interested in testing out LUFT-WAFFE's potential for effective campaign plan-ning and reaction to opposing planning. Manytactical and strategic concepts are truly foolish ifthey m ust be tied to operating all planes by type,so m y analysis will presuppos e coun ters beingfree to operate on thei r own even i f speci ficreference is not made to this rule during the restof this article.THE IMPORTANT STRATEGICCONSIDERATIONS

One of the subt lest of assumptions made in th edesign of LUFTW AFFE concerns the accuracy ofAmerican bombe rs: they are assumed to be 100%effective in destroying a target if they surviveanti-aircraft fire (which can, at most, eliminateone factor). Thus get t ing through to any targetwith two factors insures its elimination. Indeed, itis not too grave a risk to suppose that one lonefactor could eliminate a target since gettingthrough is really all that is required. For some,this may not be very realistic in a very funda-men tal sense since anti-+craft fire, even if no tsuccessful in destroying bombers, could unfavor-ably affect the accuracy of the mission, requiringseveral strikes for true elimination. However, thiswould probably only further the extreme com-plications involved in keeping records and while Ihave seen other games on the same topic usepartial elimination of targets, they were based onsingle raids of one d ay d uratio n in which no realneed existed to keep track of turns for landing,etc. As it stands LUFTWAFFE does offer a fairlysimple objective to the American due to thesimple need to "get through." Returning becomessomething of another issue

The rules specify that there is a penalty forfailure to land to refuel or pass the RecoveryLine by the deadline for a given unit. There isNO direct penalty for loss through combat. Thusthe implication strategically (barring the need tosave on uni ts from quarter to quarter) i s that i tmight be better in the long run to risk elimina-t ion through combat to get to a target than tofail to at tem pt th e target or fai l to get back onceyou make the target . That i s , don't be afraid togo into the dragon's mouth because eliminationof his cities or bombers is what the game is allabout Thus i t may be qui te sound to send a fewbombers at a target with less than completefighter protection if the target is truly necessarythe same might be t rue for the Germandefensive posture since on e obviously does NOTgo after returning bombers in th e Basic Game bu twi l l want to go after them in Tournament orAdvanced play in order to reduce the effectivequarter-toquarter st rength of the Americanforces.

Another important assumption made in therules which definitely colors the composition offighter groups is the "best vs best" requirementsin all fighter combat. It is quite easy to use asuperior unit (or a couple such units) to "shield"less effective fighters rather than concentratingthe best units in groups, leaving weaker fightertypes to fend for themselves. This fact is one ofthe major suggestions in the game itself but whatit does mean is that the individual accounting ofunits will have to be employed if such a ruling isto have a desirability as a tactical element.

Otherwise you'd be forced to ignore such integra-tion of weak and strong units or only havelimited use of such a tactic since the use of a fewstrong units w ith weaker ones would restrictother similar strong units from flying at othertimes while those which had flown were refuel-ing. This sort of mass typing provides a veryhandy m ethod for use by your opponent to"time" your ability to use units (providing a sortof f l u id bu t def in i t~ order-of-appearance time-table). The ruling resolves much possible argu-ment over what uni ts fight what uni ts whenunmatched types meet but i t does seem to me torequire accepting the burden of records-keepingin a big way.The Aerial Combat Table has provided thesource of one article specifically dealing with theanalysis and play of the game (LUFTWAFFEA B ATTLE O F WITS by D ennis Milbert). I don'tintend to repeat the whole basis for this Sept-Oct'71 article, bu t Dennis indicates that there is amaximized point of elimination of enemy factorsfor each type of uni t above which there i s no realincrease in the amount of destruction a singlefactor can produce (though more factors will ,naturally, result in more enemy losses in total).While the article is quite good and Dennispresents statistics with which I have no realquarrel , there are other considerations whichmight color the decisions being made by a givenplayer: th e gap betw een "poor," "average" and"good" luck with th e die. Diagram B illustratesDennis Milbert's article visually rather thansimply through figures: there is a leveling off ofthe number of factors each at tacking factor canbe expected to eliminate which occurs ap proximate-ly at 7 attacking factors. This is accurate f or theaverage but no te that with "Best Luck" th elevelling off begins at a higher level (roughly 11factors) and at "Worst Luck" there is a very hazystability achieved. But the significant fact whichthis graph illustrates is that there is a significantgap between the levels of Luck: well over a fullfactor's difference when the levelling off beginsand almost a full factor between adjacent levels.Certainly th e "average" overall equa tes veryclosely to the average luck levels, but it seems tome to be inst ruct ive to note that the overallaverage is derived from averaging widely separatedlevels of chance.

NO. OF ATTACKING F CTORSFW 19 DIAGRAM B

NO OF ATTACKING FACTORSFW 19 DI AGR AMPerhaps Diagram C will i l lustrate the kind ogap present as you climb the scale in numbers oattacking factors since it i l lustrates the severlwidening gap between best and worst luck iterms of the actual number of enemy factors yocan expect to eliminate at each level of attackinfactors Diagram B, remember, i s the number ofactors e ch at tacking factor can be expected eliminate while Diagram C i s the total numbeeliminated by summing up all enemy units elimnated by a given roll at a given total of attackinunits. Again, th e average luck e quals the overaaverage but the gap between lowest and higheclimbs very steadily from a couple factors more than 20 (tho ugh the pract ical level i s abou13-14). Again, over the course of a long game

you can count on averages to balance out , buspecific encounters often can temper such averaging and statistical rationing o f forces as Dennisuggests. The phrase "on the average" is the catcwe have all rolled several consecutive low ohigh numbers many t imes in play and they daverage out, but a few good rolls at key points oany gam e can make averages irrelevant becausthe game may not last long enough for averageto average outOverall, I would agree with Dennis in hassert ion that the use of the combat tablanalysis he gives will give you some point o

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Paae THE GENERALin an otherwise lengthy table. Hisof at t ri t ion is also useful but must beby the fact t ha t y o u are movingthese at t ri t ion at tempts. His statementit is quite hard to reduce a stack of 4factors given a decent fighter coverageto me to be more important than countingturns and factors to t ry t o reduce such a stacki t might take three or f o u r turns t o d o soby that time, the bombers could very easily

a t their targets. (Note, t oo , t ha t there ispreventing enemy fighters from attackingin the turn they are over a city sincehere is n o provision for anti-aircraft accidentallytheir own units o u t of the air.) T h eis tha t an air-combat situation is hardlyautomatic though planning can be a lot easierthe whole game using the Opt imum Combatand Kill Rate figures which Dennis gives fortype of unit. Dennis admits t o havingstatistical deviations as a part of the luckthe two previous diagrams illustrate tha tdeviations can be pret ty significant andunpleasant setbacks. I t becomes increas-clear tha t it is important t o concentrateforces whenever and wherever possible soyou come o u t of combat ahead. Couple thisthe most direct route requirements, how-and we come to an even more extensivetrategic/tactical issue.

The problem of how t o concentrate force yetthe most direct route, and still not give awaytoo soon is perhaps the essencethe American planning. T h e solution to thistwo decisions: whether t o hit denselyareas o r not and in either case, where t ofrom concentrated formations so as tothe protect ion of a large group for asas possible. Fortunately, t he rules d o NOTthat you start f rom the point behind aRecovery Line which insures the shortestt o a target. The rules d o indicate tha t f romsquare t o target hex you d o not spendmore turns in the process than necessary anddo not interpret this to mean tha t you can beto start a t a specific spot by the finalthis often gives the American player achoice of a spot f rom which h e mayfrom mass formation to specific targets.D indicates particularly good centraltoward which large groups of bombers mayand from there break-off to specific targetsnot giving away exact locations. T h e selec-of these jumping-off points has been madeas an example of the concept and not asa t t empt t o provide some sort of complete listsuch points. The numbered hexes are thefrom which the various aircraft factoriesthe circles can be hit within the next turn.numbers in t he hex refer to the number ofit takes t o reach the particular dispersion

Obviously, the opportuni t ies for such uncom-positioning are greater where the concen-of targets is correspondingly greater. It isthis precise reason that while there is bet teri.e., more bases nearby for possiblelocations, there is a far bet ter chance ofenemy forces offguard. The problem ofwith such protection is part of anotherploy I will mention later; however, formoment it is sufficient t o note tha t there arenumbers of targets in less denselyareas (about 1 along the Italian Front

DIAGRAM E

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Pagealone). German fighter protection will have toexpend some time in these areas, spreading themthinner than the wealth of bases near CentralGermany and the Netherlands Border otherwisesuggests. Of course, when the objective is theentire reduction of cities under German con trol,the targets open up drastically. In either event, i tis a good idea to stagger attacks on more thanone front and at tempt to get the German playerto run back and forth, parrying thrusts intowidely separated areas at t ime intervals whichmaximize the t ime i t takes to get from one sideof the board to another. This is the essence oftheAmerican plans since he is limited by time andby route: he has no chance to refuel and mustfollow a tight course once he starts out. However,this does not mean that fairly lengthy missionsare out of the question since it is possible tobegin on on e fr ont a nd travel with a very largegroup of bombers which d rop off along the way,ending up near an opposite front. The use of thiswith shuttle raids begins to give the Americanextended flexibility in his missions since missions,in play without shuttle missions, consist ofreturns t o the same Recovery Line from whichthe mission began. Otherwise, too many missionswill span too lengthy a distance his front-to-fron t mission tec hnique is merely a variation tobe employed t o pu t German defenses off-balancesince the apparent st rength at o ne front becomesoffset by the actual targets at another.Sneak raids fulfill yet another Americanoption, that being the tying down of Germandefenses by the use of a threat. In fact, as withall military threats, the shuttle raid is probablymore valuable before it is launched than it isonce begun, as it is not subject to analysis untilthis time. German defenses can only guess at thereal strength of the raid - f indeed there is onein actuality. The situation is similar to the entryof the American forces in BULGE or the secondAllied invasion in D-DAY: the effect is height-ened by delaying them past the expected arrivaltime. In LUFTWAFFE, the arrival time is totallyunknown leaving the German player with aproblem which, while it is not totally a surprisedue to the requirements for ann ouncement wi thintwo turns of the raid, does not give the Germanplayer as sound a timetable as in the land games.As with other elements of each quarter of play,the sneak (and shu ttle) raids become a morevaluable tool when used during longer gamessince they may be varied in strength and timingeach quarter. In fact, the key to success in theTournament and Advanced games seems to me tolie very much in the variations upon a soundstrategy which bo th players can develop sinceit is as much the German's ability to confuseAmerican plans by variation of the defenseswhich the latter must expect to face.As mentioned earlier, the concentration ofGerman bases on the Western Front seems formi-dable. Indeed, it could be if the American refusesto exercise the important opt ion to at tack thesebases, thereby depriving the German of the use ofthese bases and c utting off possible refuelingspots and staging areas. The important fact is thatthe German is lured into the area and then thebases are eliminated or the bases are eliminated,suggesting an attack on aircraft factories, andpulling fighter support from an intended area ofreal attack. The fortunate element in all this isthat the "most direct route" is not followed inthese attacks. Thus it is possible t o bypass suchtargets in an apparen t thrust at deeper factories

or bases and then turn back upon the bypassedbases or make right angle moves from missionsheaded in oth er directions to cut-off su pport.from defending fighters. The possibilities arefairly extensive but the point is that such attacksare quite effective and a mou nt to harrassment ofGerman resources in a manner perhaps even moredevastating than expected.Diagram E reveals something fairly surprising:

there are very few bases actually n ea r thecentral German targets of the Oschersleben areaThere are large numbers of bases surrounding thisarea but few really in the area in comparison tothe concentrations along the Western and North-ern/Sou thern approaches an attack coming,from the Italian Front requires a long flightwhich will allow German fighters to shift theirpositions from the more concentrated areas.However, a sacrifice mission aimed in this direc-tion with the express purpose of drawing fightersfrom the West may give an American player avast oppo rtunity t o destroy MANY bases, layingopen the Western Front to later attack againstaircraft factories. This merely illustrates thevariety of strategic possibilities the American hasin a seemingly limited game of getting to a targetand eliminating it . Though the Basic Game islitt le else but a good practice for the moreadvanced versions, i t does provide opportu nitiesto try out a variety of ideas in many games.GERMAN RESPONSES

I have spe nt a good deal of space emphasizingAmerican chances to the extent tha t some maythink there is no real play going for the Germansave to hang in there as best he can. However,the German player does have the best of it as thevictory conditions are expan ded saving ONEci ty does not seem to be too hard though i tbecomes harder when one enters the game think-ing that ONE city is no difficult task simplybecause that becomes the goal and many sacri-fices are allowed to pass thinking that there islots of time left. In fact, the fact that theresponsibility for action lies with the American isone of the greater problems for tke German sincehe can permit himself to sit back in someinstances. This attitude is, of course, damagingsince the German defensive chances have manyvariables which will serve to confuse Americanefforts just as effectively as the many Americanploys. Fo r example, th e simple decision to hitAmerican Missions early or at a more delayedmoment (or, in more advanced play, even aftertargets have been hit in an effort to deprive theAmerican of units for later quarters) will begin tothrow the American's rhythm off significantlyand make i t harder for him to plan just when tobreak from format ion t o go to speci fic targets orassault airbases.

Diagram F indicates the limits that bomberscan reach after set numbers of turns no mat terwhere the y leave from. It is perhap s as enlighten-ing as Diagram E in what it reveals since it showshow far away various targets are in terms of airtime from each major front. Note that the ItalianFront offers the Am erican no real targets unt i l hehas gone at least 4 turns in the ai r and at that hehas but 2 bases Most Italian targets lie withinthe five turn band. T he Western Fron t is hardlymore promising since it offers but 2 targetswithin 3 turns and adds but five more on thenext. Percentage-wise the bands break down as in

Diagram G - note that most ai rbases are just topposi te, appearing (along the Western Front) the early turn bands rather than near the greatenumber of targets. But it is the Baltic Frowhere many targets lie open to the Americanhence a strong sneak raid can be devastating. Tfigures after each front 's identification on Dgram G indicate how many targets there aTOTALLY within 6 turns of each front .Note that the Bal t ic Front i s THE molucrative in terms of pure number of targeaccessible to American attacks and it has retively few bases near the beginning hexes. course the total for the Bal t ic Front includmany targets also in the Western Front whethere are more bases for defense - but a largnumber of targets are present early in tmovement on this front than for ny other froLimit ing the number of turns to 3 and notmakes this apparent since the Italian Front hNO TARGETS within this distance and t

Western Front has but 2. But the Bal t ic Frohas a full 17 targets within the first three turof movement Expanding to four turns gives tWestern Front up to 7 targets wi th for tItalian Front while the Balt ic Fr ont e xpand s 26 Thus there i s sufficient hidden threat in tBal t ic Front to warrant careful considerat ion defense jl this area. In fact, the major targareas are inaccessible to the Western Front (anvery distant from any Italian at tack) before thfi fth and sixth turns - yet they are wi thin 3at most turns of the Balt ic Front . Fortunatefor the German defense, only one raid pquarter may be launched (but bombers may moin any direction fro m their jumping-off point).It would seem to be the best German course the Basic Game to make EVERY effor t t o reathe bombers and stop them as soon as possiblIn m ore advanced play, tearing away a t fightsupport will have its effect in later quarters

DI GR M G TURN B NDS

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THE GENERC

DIAGRAM F

play even if it does leave some successful Ameri-can missions early in play. The ONE city rulecannot become a crutch for weak movement butis a comfort in trying to wear away Americanfighter forces when this may allow bombers toget through. During this time, protect the basesso that you are not alternately cut short by aclever American who seeks to stop your fighterforce early.

The introduction of jets and school units doesNOT alter any major elements of planning,however, alteration of the concepts implied byfiguring the number of targets within a certainturn radius is very drastically changed in Ad-vanced play since all cities are targets and theseare very heavily concentrated in the WesternFront. But the objectives and methods are stillthe same no matter what version of the game youplay I merely encourage the longer versionsbecause of the variety they allow in using manyindividual plans from quarter to quarter.

Fundamentally, I would have to give the edgein a longer game to the German since intelligentplay will make it hard for him to not manage onecity left by the end of play. However, it is by nomeans as cut-and-dried an affair as many shorterarticles have suggested, I do not feel that theGerman player cannot hope to do anything butwin as one writer has suggested Perhaps theBasic Game, again, is fairly easily predicted givenaverage luck with die mlls and average play (atleast matched play on both sides). As I havestated, no other Avalon Hill game offers the kindof play LUFTWAFFE presents perhaps alimited number of people appreciate this offering.I am hoping that the number of people in thiscategory increase if only because it will meanfurther attempts to reproduce a truly "campaign"game which is more than a loose conglomerationof ideal design plots which characterized manyamateur inventions in this direction many yearsago.

A.H Philosophy ontinued from pageencouraging to us were the ratings for stratearticles and the Series Replay concept, an indition that you approve wholeheartedly of odecision to concentrate on bringing back"art" of playing games well and not just playfor the sake of playing. Only the Game DesColumn, Philosophy, and RBG show any signall of being unhealthy appendages. With a ratof 5 considered average even these mustconsidered healthy additions to the magaziSTRATEGY A RTICLES . . .2OISCOUNT COUPONS. 2SERIES R E PL A Y CONCEPT 2QUESTION BOX 2OPPONENTS WA N T E D 3V A R I A N T ARTICLES 3HISTORICAL ARTICLES 3INCILTRATOR S REPORT 3CONTESTS.. 3L E T E R S . . . 3READER S BUYERS G U I D E . . 4DESIGN ANALYSIS .4

HILOSOPHY 4

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THE GENERM

Harley An to n continues the CAMPAIGN ATWATERLOO series with the second part o f hisWATERLOO analysis This mon th Harley takes aclose look at the individual pieces o f t h e gameand relates the best uses for each type N e x t t imeHarley will conclude his treatment o f WATER-LOO with a s tudy o f t h e mapboard

PART V THE TACTICAL GAMET h e Pieces of Waterloo

There are 3 keys to victory through tacticalsuperiority in Avalon Hill s Waterloo. T h e firstand by far the most impor tan t of these is t oknow your pieces and their capabilities. T h esecond is t o know the mapboard. The last is arealization of the major tactical techniques of theera and successfully translating them into gameturns that will insure tactical success.

less than 3 6 factors a 6-4 can hold the square.Naturally, if the French player leaves 42+ factorsin the above area (and a smart one will) Stein-metz must stay a t AA27 until the heights areabandoned. A particularly effective switch ofSteinmetz is t o allow your opponent t o infiltratethe woods a t BB23 (a multi-turn project) in ana t tempt t o hit the doubled 6-4 at AA25 from 3squares, thus obtaining 3-1 odds. If your oppo-nent achieves BB23 with a stack of units and atthe same time falls below the 42 factor level inthe DD22-DD30 area Steinmetz should bequickly switched t o AA25. This will completelyblunt your opponents infiltration drive and costhim several turns as he backs o u t of the forest.As soon as the heights are abandoned Steinmetzshould be positioned a t W3 1, o r more commonly,a t S31. W31 is the op t ion that should be taken ifyou have stalled your opponent s Nivelles driveand at the same time are still strong enough tofight as you back down off the heights. Stein-metz a t W3 1 combined with judicious delay alongthe 228-32 line will anchor the PAA right.Meanwhile, a strong infantry force at R30-T32(with a t least 2 6-4 s a t S31) can be used t o costthe French player ex t reme casualties as hea t tempts t o cross the Genappe river. Later, ifyour retreat toward Mont. St. Jean is hurried,keep Steinmetz in the center of your force. Ifyou have been more fortunate and can effect avigorous retreat and your numbers are approxi-mately equivalent t o the French, let Steinmetzanchor the PAA left a t K35 and form a linefrom IK35 t o Braine La Leude. For a last ditchstand Steinmetz can be very effective a t A45because of the wooded terrain o n either side. Oneof the major mistakes of the novice PAA playeris t o let Steinmetz lead his counter attacks.Steinmetz should never counterattack unless it isunavoidable. A 7-4 or 6-4 will usually d o as wello r better due t o the stacking rules, and anytimeSteinmetz is used in an a t tack he becomes anau tomat ic target for the French player o n hisfollowing turn. The only exception t o this rule iswhen you can counterattack and leave Steinmetzin a doubled position.The Imperial Guard Artillery suffers greatlydue to the 15 factor stacking rule, combined withthe French lacking a 7-4. Despite this limitationit can be used to great offensive advantage inseveral ways. It can best be utilized with a 6-4for infiltration and with a 2-6 and 5-4 for straightoffensive combat. Using the Imperial Guard in itsattack formation with 2 squares t o work from,the French player can assemble 28 factors (4-1on a 7-4) and a 2-6 soak off. After the attack heideally, will have four 5-4 s and the ImperialGuard t o repulse a counterattack. Although in-filtration is a mediocre tactic a t best, there is aright way t o go about i t if it becomes necessary(see below for cases of necessity). The primary

THE 8-4 sThe two 8-4 s are the largest pieces in WATER-LOO. Steinmetz is much more valuable t o thePAA than his French counterpart . T h e reason forhis great value is his ability t o hold a doubledposition. When he is doubled , the maximum odds

a French player can achieve are the number ofsquares available minus one. F o r this reason hecan make squares like AA27, S31 o r T39 impreg-nable from frontal assault, barring low oddsattack. Holding key positions of this na ture untilthey are flanked instead of letting them fallfrontally can often buy the difference in gameturns between victory and defeat. A 2-1 o n a unitthe size of Steinmetz is rarely a t tempted forseveral reasons. A loss of 3 2 factors in an A-Elimresult will cost the French player the game.Whereas the loss of Steinmetz would only dam-age, not destroy, PAA chances. Secondly, whywould the French player a t tack Steinmetz a t 2-1when the usual alternative of 3-1 on a doubled6-4 usually presents itself in an extended linesituation? Third, even when a 3-1 is impossible,2-1 is much more economically attained o n adoubled 6-4 and can be achieved from twosquares. Finally, the French player will havedifficulty avenging a 16 factor exchange withou tlosing a valuable 6-4 o r even more valuablecavalry units.As the strongest PAA unit, Steinmetz shoulda lways-be kept near the center of the PAA lines.There he can stop gaps as they arise by using theexcellent PAA interior line road network and canavoid being cut off by a victorious enemy flankthrust. He should always be moved to AA27 onthe 9AM/16th turn and should stay there untilone of two things happens. If the French leaveless than 42 factors in the DD 22-DD 3 0 area hecan be replaced by a 7-4. Once t h e area is bled t o

STEINMETZThe Key t o P Defense

NOTE: Should the French occupy B E 2 3 on their nexturn, leaving less than 42 factors in a position to hit AA27Steinmetz and Jagow should switch positions.

The Ste inme tz Opt ionsIf the French are causing trouble at Nivelles S31 or R 2 7 ithe more likely position for Steinmetz. 3-1 proofing theGenappe River.

When the heights have fallen W31 is an excellent posit iofor Steinmetz. Given four 1 6 s for delay on 229 230. 231Y 3 2 and X33, the western flank can be held here for fivturns.maxim is t o use the largest pieces possibleavoid being cut-up piecemeal. Infiltration throuthe woods between Nivelles and Q u a t r e Bshould never be tried unless your o p p o n e n talready reeling and you are a t tempt ing t o buhis defensive perimeter. However, infil trationan 8-4, 6-4 stack at V22-U23, o r CC22-BBcombined with continued pressure elsewhere wcause the PAA player to retreat if hand

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TH G N Rhskillfully. The Imperial Guard can of ten be usedin conjunction with a 15 o r more factor cavalrythrust down the Tilly corridor. It can furnishgood infantry support for the lighter units bu t itslimitations must be recognized. Its object shouldbe t o break the cavalry o u t in to the plainsbetween the Thil and LaLasne Rivers. After thisit should never head for Waterloo unless theGenappe River has already fallen t o frontalassault. Due t o its defensive for t i tude it can be ofinvaluable aid in flanking and breaking theGenappe line by moving along any one square0 - 2 8 , 0 - 2 7 , P-26. After he establishes this breakhe should join the main force o n the road t oMont. St. Jean. The Imperial Guard can also beused excellently along the line U-Z 18 if the Tillydrive is aborted. He can mop up 1-6's and unlessthe PAA player was foolish enough t o waste 2 4factors in the corridor the Imperial Guard canstop cold any thoughts of counterattack.

T h e PAA .laj/cr is blessed with 5 units with acombat factor of seven. Since these units areunique t o the PAA side they can a t least cause aproblem for the French player t o consider whenhe attacks at odds tha t may call fo r an exchange.Almost any exchange he makes will hur t him insome way. A t best these units can be tenaciousdefenders and can furnish a sharp cutting edge t oa PAA offensive. In the final stages of a gamethey are especially good in the la t te r capacity.O n defense the 7-4 is a t its best in a doubledposition in which the enemy can achieve only 3squares against it nd must soak off from 2 ofthose 3 squares. Once supported o n its flanks inthis manner (i.e., 7-4 at S31 and 6-4's a t S-32and R-31) 3-1 becomes impossible. Excepting thisone rare case a 7-4 should never be tied t o adefensive position but should instead act as acounterattack/defense bulwark force. When thePAA defend the Quatre-Bras, Bors DeMetz corri-dors, sooner or later he must stop delaying andstand t o fight. This stand should always beinitiated with 6-4's because early in the gameonly 7-4's are available. They should be thrownin to counterattacks t o replace a 6-4 lost o rthrown back o n the previous turn. Combinedwith three 6-4's and the inevitable 1 factorsoak-off the 7-4 yields 5-1 odds on a French 5-4with no possible exchange and an ultra strongdefensive position facing the French. (i.e., 2 2 4 ,Y24 counterattack a 5-4 a t 2 2 3 leaving 13 and12 facing the French). If you are still strong a tthis counterattack juncture it might be wise t ouse four 6-4's t o go after a French 6-4 a t 4-1 andt o conserve your 7-4's fo r later attacks.One major fact t o remember is tha t 6-4's arealmost equivalent t o 7-4's o n defense so 7-4'sshould not be tied d o w n when 6-4's are available.Two 7-4's stacked with a 1-4 o r 1-6 whichdisappears in the soak-off will leave the French atough problem t o counter o n their followingturn . There are several ways not t o use the 7-4's.he first o f these is don't send them t o Tilly.Likewise, keep them o n the Braine Le Comptelank only as long as necessary and not one turnonger. The only exception t o this rule is whenour opponent 's Nivelles drive consists of 36-41actors. In this case three 7-4's and several 1-6'scan delay him indefinitely. (7-4's at U42, T41 ,3 9 and 1-6's down row 36.) Note tha t the 7-4'should never be more than 4 squares from theoad t o Mont. St. Jean in case a French break-

through necessitates a rapid fallback. Always tryto avoid meeting the French 4-4's in open terrainwhere they can be effectively used in 1-2 attacks.

THE 6-4 s 1The 6-4's are the backbone of the PAA army.Because of their preponderance they make their 7French counterparts doubly valuable for exchangepurposes. The Allies must protect their 6-4's. Astack of two 6-4's should never be placed suchtha t the French player can gain 3 squares on it.Perponcher and possibly one or two other 6-4'sshould be sent t o Nivelles early in the game t ocounter major French thrusts in tha t area. Bysending Prussian 6-4's t o Nivelles, Picton andCompany can be routed t o Quatre Bras. Onemajor reason 6's are valuable a t Nivelles is due t otheir ability t o clog the forest corridors a tAA35-AA38. A 6-4 is the smallest allied unitwhich cannot be attacked at 3-1 from one square(or from 2 squares, when doubled). A 7 or 8 inthe same position is much more vulnerable t o 1-2attacks. Further use of a 7 or 8 is a waste offactors which violates a basic principle of warbest summarized by the phrase economy of

force, and best demonstrated by odds of 29-10when the 7-4 could have been used t o replace a6-4 had adequate forethought been shown. F o rthis reason it is wise t o send 6-4's t o Nivelles andshuffle 7-4's t o Quatre Bras unless one wishesearly counterattacks against a weak French Nivel-les thrust. O n the first turn of the game a 6-4 a tCC21 and a 1-6 at EE19 illustrates the manner inwhich the PAA can turn the 15 factor stackinglimit t o their advantage. One of the major uses ofthe 6-4's is the Funnel principle. By stationingdelay units at CC17 and DD20 and putting a 6-4a t BB20, 7 squares of terrain can be defended a ta cost of only 2 factors. A fur ther corollary ofthis principle would involve a configuration oftwo 6-4's a t AA17 and AA19 and delay units a tCC15 and CC19. By studying these examples, acompetent PAA player can use them all over theboard. By combining them wiih terrain evenmore advantages accrue (no te in my last examplea to ta l of 9 squares are covered if n o enemy unitsstarted the turn on the Ligne River.) As the PAAforces are slowly driven back, 6-4's can be usedt o stop-gap such positions as W36, T41 , U42,W31-Y31, R29, P30 and many others. When thePmssian IV corps arrives it can hold the LaLasneRiver from T35 t o L36 while the main bulk ofthe army can take a stand a t L37-L40-J42.Finally, if only a few turns remain in the gamethe PAA o n rare occassions may gain a time-limitvictory by keeping the major portion of remain-ing PAA units t o guard 39 and by detaching acouple of 6-4's t o guard the road t o Brusselsalong A and B45. The enemy would have t owaste 2 or 3 turns in flanking t o obtain goododds and if 3 turns were remaining in the gamethen this uneven split of guarding factors mightprovide the difference.The French 6-4's along with the 8-4 shouldalways be the vanguard of the French attack. The6-4's are the units tha t should infil trate whennecessary. Naturally they should always b e usedt o feed exchanges with PAA 6-4's wheneverpossible. Late in the game if the French playerhas 6-4's remaining he can hur t the PAA playerby sending a couple through the E48 corridorand down t o A46 in conjunction with the mainFrench drive which should be aimed a t Waterlooitself. One major flaw which seems t o be ex-

tremely prevalent even among expert Waterloplayers is the use of a 6-4, 5-4, 4-4 stack. Whithis may be an acceptable marching stackleaves n o room for soak-off o n an a t tack and th4-4 is easy meat for a PAA counterattack.

THE 5-4 sThe 5-4's are the mainstay of the FrencArmy. Whenever possible exchange of two 5-4

for a PAA 6-4 o r 7-4 should be avoided f oobvious reasons. An exchange of two 5-4's f othe PAA 8-4 would be of some advantagexpecially early in the game o r when movinfrom a position of strength late in the gameMost proponents of French strategy in Waterloargue for massive 2-1's using the 5-4's early in thgame. I feel t h s t o be a tragic misuse of factorEarly deployment of 5-4's t o V22 can be proitable if weak PAA Tilly forces have been driveback and if it is combined with a drive in thBors De Metz corridor. The I Corps 5-4's shoulcome t o T T 1 8 and UU17 o n turn 1 and proceeup t o the foo t of the Quatre Bras heights asholding force which can be shuttled f rom thCC26 area t o the Bors De Metz corridornecessary. The standard 8-4, 5-4, 2-6 stack (described earlier) can be supplemented by a 6-45-4, 2-6, 2-6 attack stack, b u t this is no t desirablin most cases because a 2-6 would be leextremely vulnerable t o resulting PAA counteattacks. A 2 square attack of five 5-4's and a 2-or three 5-4's, two 6-4's and a 2-6 are usually thmost desirable.The PAA player is blessed with only six 5-4's3 of which come o n late in the game. F odefensive purposes a 5-4 is useless by itself anvulnerable in a stack because t h e competenFrench player will a t tack it . I t can achievlimited value by being placed with another 5-when the French player has only 1 square o rsquares doubled t o attack from. They can thus bused for short periods in the place of a 6-4 o7-4. The best use of the 5-4's is in counterattackfor exchange purposes against French 5-4's o2-6, 3-6 cavalry stacks.

THE 4-4 s and 4-6 sOf all the pieces of Waterloo the French 4-4seem to be the least useful. They are t o o smafor offensive operations and t o o large t o be useas soak-offs. Their best use is f o r exchanges aneven then they rarely furnish an equal exchangunless a valuable 2-6 is expended as well.Early in the game the French 4-4's shoulproceed t o the CC24-26 area. F r o m there , tw

4-4's make a good 1-2 gamble against the 8-4 aAA27 o r the three 4-4's can be shuttled tNivelles if tha t drive needs a boost. Later in thgame 4-4's can b e used a t 1-2 against undouble7-4's and this is their greatest appeal. An echange of three 4-4's fo r 2 PAJA 6-4's shounever be ignored.

The French 4-6 o n the o ther hand is a gooshock weapon due t o its mobility. I usuallerroneously classify the French 4-6's and 3-6's aheavy cavalry and the French 2-6's as lighcavalry. Although this is obviously no t historially accurate i t leads t o a be t te r fundamentaunderstanding of Napoleonic cavalry tactics. ThFrench 4-6 is always best used in conjunctiowith 3-6's as discussed below.

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TH G N RMThe PAA 4-6 should always be headed t o V44where it can combine with the lone English 4-4t o hold the Nivelles branch of the Somme River.These units can effectively police the PAA farright with little loss. Even if the center falls, the4-6 can usually escape t o Mont. St. Jean by wayof the Plains near Hal and the 4-4 can retreatunder protection of the Somme River and by itsweakness and distance f rom the front become t o ocostly for the French t o chase. If defectionoccurs Cooke should be the first removed if he isthus cut off.

The three Prussian 4-4's are usually best em-ployed holding the Tilly corridor o n the PAA farleft. Used in conjunction with rivers and delayunits they can form a testy maze for the Frenchto wade through. In addition, a 1-2 surroundedon 15 French factors by t w o 4-4's can often turnthe tide of the game. If the French d o n o t pursuea Tilly drive, the 4-4's can rejoin the remainderOf the PAA army a t Mont. St. Jean. Like Cookethey should be removed 1st in case of defectionif by-passed by the French drive. A counterattackdrive a t low odds toward Tilly is a gooddesperation ploy t o buy time when tha t becomesmore impor tan t than factors.

THE 3-6's LT h e 3-6's are the French heavy cavalry. Theyshould be used with the 4-6 in raids down theTilly corridor or the Braine LeCompte-Hal road.By early placement of these units in the Charleroiarea these forces can threaten X24 by 1PM/16.By using the narrow 2 1 2 corridor, 3-6's caninfil trate the Tilly area by turn 4. I don't favorthis strategy as the masses of rivers o n the farFrench right rob the 3-6's o f their major weapon;mobility. The more ordinary Tilly drive shouldhave the objective of breaking ( w i t h i ts mobility,

n o t combat factors) the Dyle River between N24and Wavre and then making a dash over the openterrain to A39. Even when unsuccessful thismaneuver draws large PAA commitments off themain front, t o counte r it. One word of caution:this maneuver is no t dangerous if supported by5-4's or the 8-4 as far as N24. Once there, thelarge units flank the Genappe river and thecavalry must be withdrawn in time t o avoid beingtrapped by the IV Corps if it is n o t immediatelysuccessful. The 3-6's should b e used as soak-offsonly when no other alternative is available. Inshort, effective heavy cavalry tactics, consisting ofoverwhelming delay forces, going o n raids t oex tend fronts and draw off factors, and alwaysretreating t o fight again when confronted b yforce can spell the difference between victory anddefeat.

T H E 2-6's and 2-4'sThe use of the Frenc.. j's can be summarizedin the word soak-off. They are the only soak-offunit which the French can really afford t o lose.Because they appear in large numbers a few canbe used t o aid the heavy cavalry on raids as longas the main fronts are left with adequate soak-offunits. These units have a few other uses dealingwith protection of the main body of t h e Frencharmy. If it breaks through t o Waterloo with mostof the remaining PAA units in the Mont. St. Jeanarea the French player may delay with 2-6's

behind his main force as it crushes all remainingdefenses and moves off the board to victory. The2-6's can also be used t o guard French flanksearly in the game in front of the main line. Theyshould be positioned in such a way tha t the PAAmust expose 2 large units t o kill them.The PAA 2-6's are extremely valuable as acounte ra t tack force against infiltration. (Com-bined of course with a few larger units preferably

5-4's and 4-4's) and against a Braine LeComptedrive (combined with a 7-4, Cooke, and the Cav.Batts). On the other hand, the PAA 2-4's are theleast useful PAA unit. Their best use is fo rsoak-off and delay when 1-4's and 1-6's areunavailable. Usually these units can be gatheredin to a stack which can absorb exchange lossesnear the end of the game. This t y p e of stackshould n o t expose itself early in t h e gamebecause a turn of for tune might make the 2-4'svaluable as delay units.

THE 1-4's and 1-6's fdCI have saved the mdst impor tan t PAA units 'tilllast. Proper use of these units fo r delay-screening

is the key t o PAA victory and will b e discussedin detail below. However, there are o ther intrinsicadvantages which can be listed here. T h e majorsecondary advantage of the 1-6's and 1-4's is tha tthe PAA player can always lose 1 factor o nsoak-offs as compared t o the French 2. Thisyields the additional advantage of leaving thePAA player with a large stack t o await counter-attacks. One should use the 1-6's and 1-4's in alltypes of delay operations with the exception ofattempting t o delay across large open terraincorridors such as M35-542 and V41-048 . Thist y p e of delay would needlessly dissipate valuableunits when a fall back would be preferable. Neverexpose large stacks of 1-6's t o enemy at tack asthis is equivalent to cutting an artery........................Continued f r o m page 2phalanx army was impossible; a t tempt ing i t any-way he lost the war. Armies a t tempt ing "impass-able" obstacles have sometimes found them im-passable indeed.

The point is tha t the game rules suggest tha tan a t tack in t h e old style, throwing armor againstwell-defended rivers and canals in the face of asupplied and vigorous defense might have suc-ceeded and even have been superior t o Guder-ian's nearly bloodless victories. In m y judgment, agame design which produces tha t result has someexplaining to do.

For all m y objections t o the simulation aspectsof France, 1 9 4 0 I re tu rn t o where I began. Thisessay, although critical, is none the less a "ravereview." Although the designers have failed t oovercome many problems of simulation, theyhave given us a very good game. They have alsodesigned a building block on which future simula-tions may be based; and they have done it whileproviding impor tan t new contributions t o t h e artof gaming. France, 1 9 4 0 is well wor th t h e moneyrequired t o buy it and the time it takes t o masterit.

DV NCEDby Mike Shefler

K R I E G S P I E L , despite an excellent overall saappeal, is o f t en criticized b y t h e hard corpso n e o f Avalon Hill's worst games. Th e reason fi ts lack o f popularity a mo n g wargame fanaticsn o t hard to pinpoint . T h e very simplic i ty whimakes i t such a good beginners game standsin bad stead as far as the hard corpsconcerned, despite t h e innovative ma tr ix C RMr. Shefler proposes so me changes, includiso me a men d men ts to th e C R T , wh ich ma y maso me o f y o u change yo u r min d .

Many people have expressed their dissatisfation with Kriegspiel because of its lackcomplexity and realism, so here is an a t t e m p tmake t h e game more interesting, challenging, arealistic. First, I have tried introducing a stereduction system in which t h e second stepwritten in o n t h e back of the unit. New matrit y p e CRTs have been thoughtfully providedthe a u t h o r t o take this in to account. I n theCRTs I have a t tempted t o preserve t h e differecharacteristics of t h e various offensive and defesive strategies available t o the players tha t apresent in the AH CRTs (and which, I might adare missing in the only o ther Kriegspiel CRrevision I have seen No. 7 . 3 of the GeneraT o adapt them to PBM use, I suggest usingMitchell Wein's excellent method as described op. 7 of No. 7 . 4 of the General. I have alsincluded some revisions t o t h e rules o n prisoneand nuclear weapons t o make them more realtic, and I have introduced some new opt ionrules. The rules and CRTs I propose follow:

STEP REDUCTION: On the back of each unwrite in the a t tack and movement factors of tunit's second step along with its corps, typcolor, and identifying number. A t tack factorthe second step is 5 of the unit's basic AF, whit h e movement factor is reduced by one. Whcalled o n by t h e CRT t o lose a step, simply flthe unit over (if it is already flipped over, iteliminated instead). If more t h a n one unitinvolved, then all such units are affected. However, they may instead elect t o eliminate uni( f rom any of those involved in the attack) wia t least as many combat factors as would habeen lost by step reduction. F o r instance, if tw4-4's attack a n 8-5 and the attacking units mulose a step, they could remove one of t h e 4-4'instead of turning them b o t h over. When t hCRT calls fo r elimination, all such units must beliminated, regardless of which step t h e y are iThese rules lead to o r suggest several changesother rules:

A. Retreats after combat Units fo rcedretreat after combat are still eliminated if forcto retreat off the board, i n t o sea o r o thnon-permissible squares, i n t o enemy zonescontrol, o r o n t o or through other units. Howevethey may choose t o retreat one square less thathe specified number a t the cos t o f losing a s tinstead (this does n o t apply t o un i ts conductinan invasion). Thus, if a sur rounded uni t is forcet o retreat one square, i t m a y forgo retreat aninstead remain where it is and lose a step. If

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ABM Interception ChartKR PEGSB IEL THEOR Ywere forced to retreat two squares, or if it werealready in its second step, then of course itwould be eliminated anyway.B. Fortificatio ns Units flipped over tomake a fort are not reduced in step (they may beturned rightside up again if you decide to destroythe fort). For convenience in keeping track ofwhich units have been reduced and whichhaven't, I suggest that units which have beenreduced in strength not be p ermitted t o makeforts. Any unit may occupy a fort.C Replacements Replacements must bebrought in at full s t re ng th .~ hu s, n 8-6 whichhad been reduced to a 4-5 and then eliminatedmust be brought in as an 8-6 at a cost of 8replacement factors.PRISON ERS The POW camp may be locatedanywhere in your home country on a noncitysquare. If you capture your enemy's POW facilitythen your prisoners re-enter the game from th tsquare, at their second step. Prisoners can escapefrom an ungarrisoned POW camp without outsidehelp using the prisoner escape chart. However, if

you roll the die for a prison break and it isunsuccessful, you must remove one of the prison-ers to the dead pile. If there is an enemy unit onhis POW camp, then you r units cannot escape bythemselves. Otherwise, use the following table.Prisoners which escape do so at the beginning oftheir turn and enter the game at their secondstep.Prisoner Escape Chart

Number of prisoners Die roll necessaryin POW camp to release prisoners

NUCLEAR WEAPONS When you captureone of your opponent's launching sites, thecapturing unit takes custody of the nuclearweapons stored there. You do NOT immediatelytransfer them to your launching site, the captur-ing unit must do so. It can transfer the capturedrockets to another unit by moving adjacent to it.To avoid unnecessary bookkeeping, no partialtransfer of nuclear weapons between units isallowed. If the unit which is holding the capturednuclear weapons is itself destroyed, the weapons

it was carrying are also destroyed. If the unitsurrenders in battle, then it must also surrenderthe weapons to one of the attacking units, whichmay next turn carry these nuclear weapons backto their launching site. Captured nuclear weaponscannot be fired until the turn after they havebeen moved to their launching site.Here are some optional rules which may be ofinterest to the wargamer who goes all-out forcomplexity.

Tactical Nuclear WeaponsBlack 3-4's and Red 4-4's which are no t specialforces carry one short range tactical nuclearweapon (TNW) apiece. These TNW's have a rangeof three squares but may not be fired at a targetwhich is in the zone of control of one of yourunits. They are fired after the movement portionof the turn. A die roll of 5 or means that allunits in the target square are eliminated and if itis a city square, it may not be used for supply orreplacement purposes for one turn. A roll of 3 or4 means all snits in the target lose one step andno movement is allowed through that square forone turn. A roll of 1 or 2 means the attack hasno effect. Fortifications are protected enoughfrom TNW's so that a roll of 1, 2, 5 or has noeffect, while a roll of or 4 has the same effectsas above. Each unit carrying TNW's may fire onlyonce during the entire game, and if eliminatedbefore they can fire, they lose the ability to doso, even if brought in again later in the game. Tomake up for the advantage that Red has underthis rule (9 TNW's to 3 for Black), try startingboth Red and Black with 14 units and/or givingBlack one additional ICBM and two additionalrockets in his initial nuclear inventory.

ABM systemEach side accumulates, beginning with the firstturn and provided his capital city is unoccupiedby enemy units, four ABM's per turn. When anuclear attack is launched by your opponent, hespecifies only one target square. You may try tointercept his missiles before they reach theirtarget(s) by using as many ABM's per nuclearattack as you wish, up to the number you haveaccumulated. ABM's may not be used againstTNW's. Use the following chart to determine ifthe missile is intercepted (if not, then the attackwas successful).

Number of ABM's Die roll necessintercepting to intercept1-34-6 7-9 I 210-12 ,2,13+. .1,2,3,4

ABM's, like Airpow er fac tors , can never captured and can be used even if your capicity is captured. However, they can never be usto attack enemy units or positions. They are onused to intercept incoming missiles.

You may use your accumulated airpower fators to transport units from one city to anoth(including captured enemy cities). This is donethe movement portion of your turn. Airpowfactors used for air transport may not be used fattack and are lost after use in this manner. Oairpower factor can transport up to two combfactors, thus to transport an 8-6 by air wourequire four airpower factors. You cannot tranport units into a captured enemy city in the tuof capture, nor can you transfer units direcinto enemy zones of control.I hope the above rules and suggested changto Kriegspiel will make it more attractive to thard-core wargamer, Kriegspiel is, in mopinion, one of Avalon Hill's best games as offers almost limitless opportunities for improvment and improvisation. It should appeal to tgame designing urge most wargamers have but aunable to satisfy (it 's too time-consuming design your own game from scratch I knoI've tried). I wou ld like to see more games whethe player can write his own optional ruinstead of being bound by a set of all-inclusipre-packaged rules.

A attackerD defenderr retreat opponent may retreat your unitsup to the specified number of squares)a advance you may advance your units upto the specified number of squares, but youmust stop in the first enemy controlled sq.)LS lose one step flip unit over, if alreadyover, eliminate it)E eliminatedNC no casualties either sideX exchange player with fewer total combatfactors removes all his units; other playerremoves at least that many combat factorsunits may voluntarily reduce themselves instep to account for the appropriate numberof attack factors).

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THE GENER L

Dr. Pournelle is a noted historian with severalpublished works to h is credit wh o has recentlyturned to game design as a spare time endeavorHis thoughts on confl ic t s imulation as portrayedin F RANCE, 1940 bring to l ight so me in terest ingdesign questions on the campaign. Dr. Pournellepresents a strong case for a revised C R T andTEC and in so doing takes our designer to taskfor so me o f the principles buil t in to the game.The questions Dr. Pournellt: raises on the designf F R A N C E , 1 9 4 0 are well worth th inking about.

the same time does no t unduly complicate things.The game is playable witho ut an air batt le staffalthough the post of Air Marshall as a subordi-nate player is fun , so tha t the game can beplayed by teams wi thou t artificial divisions ofresponsibility.Ano the r good feature of 1 9 4 0 is the handlingof armor/mechanized forces. By allowing them t omove after comba t the designer has given them aqualitative difference so tha t a rmor is no t justfast, stronger, infantry something lacking inmany strategic games. Like all good rules thedrmor/mechanized rule is simple and intuitivelyobvious once thought of. Whether it is enough togive a rmor of tha t period the role i t actuallyplayed is something else again; b u t the rule is agood one and rather realistic.A lot of research must have gone i n t o certainAvalon Hill's France, 1 9 4 0 is destined to aspects of 1940 . The decision t o use 10 km.become a classic game, I t has a t tempted a hexes was probably difficult, but unavoidable. As

campaign tha t defies simulation, t o produce a Dunnigan points o u t in the design notes, divisionvery playable and enjoyable game with different size pieces would have meant an unho ly numberorders of batt le to provide a variety of fascinating of units o n the board, while including the wholeproblems, Moreover, the ''point handicapping in France German border would have required a lotwhich a country may win while , i ts player of wasted space in which comba t would neverloses works well. As a game 1 9 4 0 belongs in take place. The resulting ratio of combat units t oevery collection, and it makes a good introduc- playing space is a good one.tion t o serious war-gaming fo r those just starting T h e game scale chosen requires corps units,out. except fo r the a rmor which is by divisions o r

I wholeheartedly recommend France 1940 . brigades. Given the stacking rules, armor/The recommendation is strongly stated because mechanized forces again have a qualitative differ-this article is quite critical o f many features of ence f rom the other pieces. Again, so far , so1940. The designers have made a bold a t tempt , good.but despite a number of fascinating gaming Come now the problems. Firs t , the Combatinnovations, they have not produced a very good Results Table has not had the same research assimulation of the German conquest of France. o the r parts o f the game. 1 agree with the systemWhether o r no t such a simulation can ever be in which increasing die numbers bring increasinglypackaged as a popular wargame is ano the r ques- favorable results; among o the r benefits this makestion, The Fall o f France was unique and due to it easier to incorporate terrain effects and otherfactors nearly impossible t o bring t o a games factors since you can add or subtract points t otable. Some games simply by-pass the problem by t h e number actually thrown. What comba t actu-beginning after the Sedan break-through and ally accomplishes is something else again. 1 d oplaying on f rom there an acceptable and n o t understand the logic of the involuntaryenjoyable alternative. France, 1 9 4 0 tries t o pro- counterattacks which domina te the CRT.duce a more general simulation of war o f the Worse, though, there are no possible results1940 era, and it is a good beginning. o the r than retreats o r eliminations. There is n oI believe certain modifications can bring it ''contact o r ''engaged, although given 1940'scloser t o a campaign simulation. t ime scale such results were very likely. AnThe best new feature o f 1 9 4 0 is the use o f engaged result with armor free to withdraw bu tairpower. By separating air units in to a movable infantry ''fixed fo r a move would have beenbu t grounded base and an invulnerable in-flight very realistic.componen t 1 9 4 0 has come very close t o the real In fact, the Bulge CRT modified for this gamecondit ions of aeria l combat fo r tha t era. Dog- would be more appropriate. In 1 9 4 0 the attack-fights are spectacular, b u t air supremacy was er's advantage is too great hat is, a l though itnever won by them in modern war. Air cover takes high odds to assure unit e l imination, attack-could drive enemy air forces away, o r exact ers are relatively safe f rom damage. T h e designheavy attr i t ion; and of course, if one side pursued notes state that in the 1940 time period thean improper air strategy as did the Germans in attacker had an advantage over the defender. Ithe Batt le of Britain, air superiority might eventu- cannot agree with that . During the Fall of Franceally be won in the sky. campaign it appeared tha t way, but th is was dueUsually, though, it was necessary t o destroy to Allied misunderstanding of what Liddell Hartenemy bases in order t o domina te the air. The called tank time ; it was n o t inherent in theA-H game incorporates this feature very well. I t military equipment available.adds a realistic dimension of aerial warfare and a t T h e reverse is probably true, in fact: WW 11

of ten took local superiority of 10-1 to achiedecisive results. Even on the corps unit scale 3-1 superiority was generally required to insuagainst losses, while in 1 94 0 an air-supp orted unmay attack at 1-3 odds in the certa in knowledgthat th e worst that can happen to i t is a re treaThe CRT is coupled with s tacking rules that first appear attractive, but on reflection see

inaccurate . They make sense on the technicgrounds of troops, t ime and the 10 km. hex; bthis throws open the problem of w h a t d o wsimulate? Sometimes i t is better to abstract oprinciples than to rigidly stick to real limits.

The CRT/stacking problem is a very knottone, because in 1940 the decisiveness of thPanzer thrusts of Guderian lay in producinparalysis after penetration, not in producindestruction of the enemy's forces in batt le . really eliminated battle. (Liddell Har t, Deterreor Defense p. 183) Now, how do we simulat h a t particularly since, at a later time in the waAllied a ttack s rarely succeeded unless th e attacing troops had a superiority of mo re th a n 5 t oaccompanied by domination of the a ir .

Thus, as s imulation, the CRT is wrong, for the actual campaign there were a lmost no batles , a t least not of the march up and knocdown varie ty; and when this k ind of equipmeactually engaged that way, the results were grimIn my judgment, 19 40 would also be a bettgame i f the CRT supplied were scrapped andnew one substi tu ted; but th is would, as Dunnignotes in his tex t , change th e game entire ly . cann ot be do ne in isolation, and careless changin the CRT will make 194 0 a worse gamalthough they might improve its realism.Th e second major defect in 194 0 is the T erraEffects Chart . France and the Low Countriwere ra ther well roaded, and given the 10 kmhexes i t is arguable that roads are n ot re levant. term s of strict unit-size realism, leaving roa ds othe map-board makes sense. In terms of abstracing the factors vita l to the campaign, i t may habeen a mistake.One major qualitative difference betweearmor and other units , including mechanized, wthat everything but armor was road-bound. I t wthe lack of tracked supply and support vehiclthat s lowed down t he Blitzkrieg of 1940 as i t wto s low down Patton years la ter .Secondly, armor was nearly useless in citf ights . The Germans quickly learned that takintheir tanks in t o house-to-house combat was drastic error; to c lear out a defended town yoneed infantry and art i l lery , both ra ther s low anboth confined to roads.Rivers , too, w ere more im portant, especially oa day-to-day t ime scale as 1940 uses, than thgame allows. Crossing rivers under fire, even wiair support , w as a tough job; and even undfended r ivers could and did s low down the tank19 40 would have been a better game if mothought had been given to th e terrain effects ; anin my judgment would have been improved some of the major road net had been addealthough the la t ter point is certa inly open debate .

Rules changes, even those suggested above, ano t the primary requirement for making 194 0better simulation or are they? As the designadmits , the Germans always win by the rules the game, even when the armored units astr ipped away from them. T he question is , wouthis be true of the real world?Design Analysis Continued o n page 2

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Paae 15 THE GENERAL

ERIES REPLAY

F11cr cint MIDM'A Y rriutle 175 uppearunt e In 9 J U N E 3964 t r i t l rc have auld that the A r n e ~ ~ c i i n~ l u y e r U SN M O V E S Fleet F ~ Er t ~ o t win agulnct a tornpe t en t o p ~ o t i o l t Our S E A R C H E S 6c 5c 4c 3~D i t ~ f f et 0147 lo pLit thzlr theory to l l ? tcrt S l G H T l N G S A cruiser an C 6the fotm o f u Serle, R rp la j t o n t e s t 7ht.~ t t l t , lded h j all