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THE GENERM

valon Hill Philosophy Part 4

974 WH AT WILL IT BRING???

This time the arrival of the new year bringsmore than the traditional good cheer of theyuletide season. A pall of recession hangs overthe nation with ever increasing certainty. Reportsof raw material shortages have been with us forover a year and relie f is not yet in sight. Add tothis the more widely public ized energy shortage,inflation, and a general lack of fai th in theeconomy and prospects for the coming year mustbe considered glum at best. The state of thenation is foreboding without doubt but beforeburying our heads in the sand let's take a realisticlook at events as they stand now and try t oappraise the situation.

Foremost in the minds of all printer s is thepaper shortage. A labor problem in the Canadianmills plus an attempt by the Japanese to trans-pl an t American forests overseas in risingquantities has caused a major shortage of cheappaper and cardboard, or chipboard as t iscommonly referred to in the trade, which hasexisted fo r over a year. The result has beenspiraling costs and the imposing of quota systemsby paper suppliers. This, i n turn, .has increasedthe price of printing across the board andthreatens to put more than one small printer outof business. Avalon Hill, being a major paperuser, has been caught in the crunch like everyoneelse. Fortunately however, the effects wil l notweigh so heavily on us as on others. Qualitypaper can still be had in sufficient quantity for aprice. Avalon Hill has never been a major user ofcheap paper. However, we do use tremendousamounts of chipboard which is needed for boxes,boards, and counters . The very fact that we are amajor user holds us in good stead. The papersuppliers tend to take care of their biggercustomers fi rs t so Avalon Hill' s position as theranking manufacturer of adult boardgames insuresthat we wi ll continue to receive an adequateallotment, albeit at a cost double and triple whatwe've paid in the past.

Paper is not the on ly raw material in shortsupply. Plastics, a by-product of petroleum, havebecome harder and harder to obtain. And with

gasoline rationing in the offing, plastics maybecome even more unobtainable than paper. As aresult we've been forced to cancel plans fo rproducing a compartmental Styrofoam tray tosolve the problem of unit counter storage.

A more serious prob lem is the gas shortageitself. Truckers have already organized nationwidestrikes against soaring diesel fuel prices. Thegovernment's mandatory speed limits for trucksisn't helping matters. Making trucks run undertheir cruising speed forces ine ffici ent use ofavailable supplies resulting in longer deliverytimes and demands for even more fuel. The resultis tremendous price increases in the truckingindustry which affects us coming and going. We

pay higher rates not on ly t o get the raw materialsto the factory bu t also to send finished games toour wholesalers.

Add to all of this a prediction for nationwiderecession and the picture takes on frighteningovertones. The Hobby and Toy Industriesreported a very 'slow' Christmas season, duemostly to the public's concern over the economy.Fortunately, a recession does not necessarilymean disaster for a game company. As moneytightens, people tend to hold their entertainmentdollar a bi t tighter. Games are excellent entertain-ment values in that they can be utilized over andover fo r countless hours of enjoyment. Theprospect of gas rationing keeping people home

also is a decided edge for the game and hobbyindustry. The future is not totally black.

But how will all of this affect Avalon Hill andwargaming in general? Of a certainty somethingmust be done to meet the specter of r ising costs.The usual antidote is to pass on rising costs tothe consumer. If you don't believe t check whatyou're paying for gas next time you fil l up.However, where people may not balk at paying60 a gallon for gasoline which they view as anecessity, many will refuse to buy a 12 or 1game. Therefore, we've taken an alternate routeto maintain our prices at the current level. We'llbe cutting the cost of manufacture by doingaway with surplus and unnecessary niceties suchas the plastic trays and outer box sleeves. Whilemaking little difference to the game player thesecuts will enable us to hold the prices steady inthe face of inflation for at least another year.

These changes wi ll go in effect w ith our springrelease. Eventual ly, all of t he bookcase games wil lbe stripped of their outer sleeve and given thenew packaging treatment. So if you want the'deluxe' sets t might be wise to fill yourbookcase collection now while they are stillavailable in their present form.

What other changes will there be? None of anyreal consequence to you. We've already cu t backon our advertising outlay to avoid selling moregames than we can produce. But, we shallcont inue t o publ ish new games as usual; in factwe may even pick up the pace a bit . As such, weforsee lit tl e diff icu lty in match ing 1973's salesan alltime high for Avalon Hil l. The spring releasewil l be previewed in the next issue and weguarantee you'll fi nd this land battle game toyour liking. especially the Campaign Game,which will have more than a few of you up allnight and into the morning. We will continue toupgrade the GENERAL and hopefully will see anincrease in pages to 34 sometime in the year.Now that's not so bad fo r a year of disaster is it ?

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Page 3 THE GENERh

ANZIOPortrait off

a a m e

ANZIO WAS THIS TRIP NECESSARY?

That was a familiar question during gasolinerationi ng in World War I1 trying to preventwasting precious resources fo r no good purpose.This, in my opinion, fair ly sums up not only theAnzio invasion, but the entire Italian Campaign. Icall it a blunder by the Allies, a waste of livesovercoming non-essential geographical barriersreminiscent of World War I, not only in theheroism of the men who died, but also in theobfuscation of the generals who sent them totheir deaths.

Most studen ts of World War I1 know th esequence of events w hich led the Allies to invadeItaly. I t began with the German pressure onRussia. still nearlv overwhelmine in 1942. and theinabil i ty of ~ i s s i a 's al lies - to distract thatpressure. Morocco seemed the only point wheresomething could be done. The North Africancampaign completed, the Allies evidently couldthink of nothing better than to follow theirnoses: proceeding to the next adjacent Axis-occupied land mass, regardless of whether someother plan might have made more strategic sense.Douglas Orgill, on page 10 of his interesting bookThe Gothic Line quo tes Montgomery's worryover the lack of strategic thinking behind theItalian campaign: "But he had been told of noplan, and therefore there was none. Montgomeryhad, in fact, already seen the flaw in Allied

thinking wh ich. cost the Allies thousands oflives in exchange for a few muddy miles of theAppenine mountains."

So began a series of errors and wasted oppor-tunit ies which may have prolonged the war formonths.

A The Invasion of Sicily

General Patton, with his characteristic bold-ness, wanted t he Am ericans to invade in thenorthwest near Palermo, placing the Germans andtheir increasingly w ar-weary Italian allies betweenthe tongs of a pincer, with the British landing inthe southeast . Boldness was not to be the themeof this part of the war, however, save a few

exceptions such as the imaginative seizure ofTaranto. Patton's plan was vetoed in favor of aninvasion in the southeast corner, which al lowedthe Germans to withdraw in good order along anarrowing front. But for Patton's typicalunauthorized probing to the northwest , and hislater risky amphibious assaults on the coast westof Messina, the Germans might have delayed theAllies another month in Sicily. Sir Basil LiddellHart, on page 440 of his indispensableHistory ofthe Second World War has this to say: If Pattonhad landed near Palermo on the north-west coast ,he would have been well on the way to theStraits of Messina all the enem y forces inSicily could have been trapped. In the event, theescape of the German divisions had far-reachingill effect on the Allies further moves."

German heavy tanks such as the Tiger I p~ ctu re d bove w r a rude shock to Allied tankers even though in short SUPP~Y.

B. T he failure to tra p the Germans in Sicily

Perhaps the greatest fruit of the North Africancampaign was the c apture of the best part of theAfrika Korps. Had these seasoned veterans beenable to withdraw, Rommel had "guaranteed"Hitler to repel any Allied invasion of southernEurop e. Even after rejecting Patton's plan to dashfor Messina, the Allies had another chance torepeat their Tunisian coup, and ignored i t . I twould have been on a smaller scale, but perhapswith equal, or greater consequences.

From the German viewpoint, the Sicilian cam-paign was a masterful delaying action, capped bya skillful withdrawal despite Allied naval and airsuperiori ty, Had the 60,000 German troops onthe island been isolated there, the invasion ofItaly could have been the dramatic success theAllies envisioned. Try playing Anzio without thefour German divisions involved, and see what Imean

This objective could've been accomplished hadthe Allies invaded the Italian "toe", ReggioCalabria, while engaging the Germans in centralSicily. I t is a moot question whether such a movewould have succeeded, but had it, German with-drawal from Sicily would've been impossible.

The "toe" is virtually an island, only 2 0 milesacross at the "joint", with rugged, easily heldterrain. If th e Allies could've held this peninsula,

not only would they have made Sicily anotherdisaster for the Germans, but they would've wona beachhead on the mainland. Turning again toLiddel Hart's book, page 446, he quo tesKesselring as saying "a secondary atta ck onCalabria would have enabled the Sicily landing tobe developed into an overwhelming Alliedvictory", and he goes on to note tha t theGermans had but two divisions to cover all ofsouthern Italy

C What next after Sicily?

When the Allies invaded in Salerno, they did soin the expectation that i t was a conservativeapproach, certain to win a beachhead- They

considered, and abandoned, a number of mdaring plans involving air-drops on Rome,north of Naples, perhaps together withamphibious assault just nor th of Naples. Saledidn't work o ut as planned, because the Germread their intentions, and had forces in vicinity which turned the landing into a very nthing. Had i t not been for other units menacthe German rear from Taranto and Calabria, invasion might well have been repulsed.

Why was Salerno obvious? Because it was nearest suitable point to the great port of Napwhich enjoyed air cover from Sicily.

A better course would have been to captSardinia and Corsica next. Neither island heavily defended. Althoug h no airbases cparable to Foggia were available, they couldbeen buil t . From islands not only could a mgreater part of the Italian coast be threatenbut the south of France as well . In the gameAnzio one of the great problems of the Germplayer is protecting the long seaward flanks. same is true in D-Day. The Allies dominated sea and much of the air, and could str ike at many places for the Germans to properly protthem all . I contend that the threat posed Allied control of all three of these islawould've tied down quite a few German divisiat minimal cost to the Allies. Then, an invaswith air cover could have been attempted by Allies, if desirable, at a far greater range of poalong the coast.

Winston Churchil l , in one of his books World War 11, Closing the Ring (page 154), taka ra ther different view: "Sardinia, so long thrforward in Staff argument as the al ternativethe assault on Italy, fel l into our hands nothing, as a mere bonus, on September 19, Corsica was taken by French tr oops a fortnilater. The Ital ian enterprise, to launch which had struggled so hard, had been vindicated beythe ho pes of i ts most ardent a nd persistadvocates." Of course, forem ost amon g thadvocates was Churchil l himself I think that could tur n his argument aroun d: perhapsSardinia and Corsica had been taken first , wh

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TH G N RhL aaeshould not have been hard, the Italian peninsulawould have been the bonus. Even Hitler wasdubious that the peninsula could be held. If theGermans had had t o worry about an air-supported invasion all along the French andItalian Riviera, o r the coast nor th of Rome,K e sselring's near-miraculous defense of thepeninsula might never have taken place.

D. The choice of Salerno

the best ratio between risk and reward. Of course,it seemed riskier t o invade further nor th , wherethe relatively small German air force in Italywould be unchallenged. T h e Germans learned t ofight pretty well without air support , howeverSuch a n invasion might have been repulsed, agreat victory and morale booster for the Axis. I tcan't be proven either way, but what did theGermans ih ink about i t? -Kesselring3s Chief ofStaff, General Westphal: "If the forces employed

Leaving aside the alternate strategy suggested at Salerno had been used instead n o r t h ofabove, in my opinion Salerno was not the ideal Rome the results would have been much morechoice. Strategy is the continual calculation of decisive here were only two German divisions

Llubliana Gap

in R o m e . n o others could have been brouu p quickly enough t o defend it. In conjunctwith the five Italian divisions stat ioned a t Roma combined sea and air landing would have takthe Italian capital inside 72 hours. Quite apfrom t h e political repercussions. this wohave resulted in cutting off a t one blowsupplies of t h e five German divisions retreatf rom Calabria would have brought all Itsou th of t h e line Rome-Pescara in to Alhands.", as quoted by Liddell Hart o n page 3of The Other Side o f the Hill This isinteresting book, long out of print, publishedlong after the war o n the basis of interviews wthe defeated soldiers themselves.

I t seems t o me that this is accurately reflecin t h e game as well. An invasion in the soprobably gets you o n the board, bu t then yhave t h e tor tuous slog u p the peninsula, crossriver af te r river, ridge after ridge, as the casualmount , of ten leaving the Allies so spent they jcan n o t attack, as game repeats history. O nother hand, a skillful and lucky invasion inRome area is about the only chance the Alhave t o capture most of the peninsula earlythe game. This is VICTORY, not a bloo

stalemate Another bold s t roke that never cat o pass.

E Anzio, the open road to R o m e

Col. Trevor Dupuy, o n pages 76-77 of thevolume of his The Military History of World WII sums u p the initial phase of the Anzio landt h i s w a y : " T h e B r i t i s h a n d Amerit roops . found little resistance in their exlently conducted landing, and were able t o pinland quickly. General Lucas now had t o makdifficult decision. One possibility was t o seRome itself. In that case, his three divisions, eif quickly reinforced, would be in danger of besmashed if Kesselring acted with his usual sand vigor. The other choice was t o adva

slowly, making sure tha t the beachead area wsecure, and that the units kept together so asbe able t o suppor t each o t h e r against

'expected German counter-at tack. Lucas chothe latter course of action."

Churchill pu t the situation more vividly whh e heatedly remarked that h e had thoughtAllies were flinging a tiger ashore a t Anzio, b u

' turned o u t t o be a beached whaleI t can not be proven whether such a drama

Allied move would have been another disaslike Arnhem, o r a stunning coup, like the Germairdrop o n the fortress o f Liege. It seems t othat the Germans so desperately engagedCassino, a mere fif ty miles south, might hpanicked with the Allies astride their commnications northward, permitt ing the Alliesburst forward like a flood in to the Liri Valseparating the two forces.

Instead, the beachhead was turned in to "tlargest prison camp in Europe," t o q u o t e HitlThe irony of the Italian campaign is tha t despAllied caution, the odds turned o u t t o b e as clas if they had really gambled.

There is another aspect of the Anzio landwhich I find interesting. This campaign is alwdefended because it tied u p German troops.American commander in Italy, General MClark, stresses this point in his memoiCalculated Risk I think that i t shows how easthe Allies lost sight of even this dubious stratwhen o n page 286, discussing Anzio, he says "W

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THE GENER Lwere fully aware that German divisions outside ofItaly might be dragged into our batt le, but wehoped they would not be." Then what was i t al labout? Marching on Vienna? Not hardly

Mortars were effectivel y utilozed in the mountains of I taly wherehigher caliber guns couldn t be posted. Here German troops man aheavy trench mortar of pre-war vintage.

Although I am convinced that Anzio wasmistaken both in conception and execution, Ithink i t only fair to quote the opinion of GeneralLucien Tmscott, who replaced General Lucaswhen he was relieved of the Anzio command for

lack of aggressiveness. From Truscott's memoirs,Command Missions: "I suppose that armchairstrategists will always labour under the delusionthat there was a ' f leeting opportu nity ' at Anzioduring which some Napoleonic figure would havecharged over the (Alban Hills), played havoc witht h e German l ine of Communications, andgalloped on into Rome. A ny such conceptbetrays lack of comprehension of the militaryproblems involved." He continues with a detailedexplanation of the difficulties which preventedthe Allies from advancing more than a few milesinshore. I t wou ld be impossible to dismiss, werenot the history of warfare replete with examplesof even greater obstacles successfully ignored. Isuppose that the British at Dunkirk should've justsurrendered

s the war drew on, theGermans,utili zed flak guns more andmore for ground defense. Here a 3.7cm fla k gun is being put in placeto deal with an expected American attack.

I have not seen mentioned a third course ofaction which the Allies could have followed inorder to exploit their surprise landing. During theAnzio operation, the Fifth Army t o the southwas exert ing i tself to the utmost to breach theGerman Winter Line. True, the P ontine Marsheslay to the south of Anzio, but they werepenetrated by Route Seven. Just fifty milesseparated t he t wo A llied armies. What might adaring Allied move southward towards Terracinahave accomplished? Surely it could not end ina greater disaster than the virtual annihilationwhich befell the Rangers who tr ied to takeCisterna after Lucas had "consolidated".

F The same results at far less cost

One can quarrel with any of the contentionsabove, but it seems to me that a broader criticismof the entire campaign can be made which is noteasily refuted.

This part of the war has been the subject ofdebate for nearly 30 years now. As the notes tothe game of Anzio point out , those who defendthe Allied strategy argue that invading Italy was

the only feasible way to t ie down many Germandivisions sorely needed elsewhere. A goodexample occurred not long after D-Day whenHitler personally transferred an infantry divisionfrom Pas de Calais to Italy. I won't join theargument, as it seems to me merely to disguisethe most important question: having invadedItaly, why was i t necessary to try to occupy i tcompletely?

It took the Allies over a year and a half tocover the 700 miles from Salerno to Bologna.The average length of the peninsula on thatjourney is only 10 0 miles. Not only is the frontnarrow, but the terrain is very difficult. A fewquotations give the flavor of the struggle:

Page 210 of Mark Clark's bo ok: "Kesselring

was a master of delaying tactics. His use ofartillery was highly effective in the mountainousregion throug h wh ich we had t o pass. Smallrear-guard detachm ents. dug in their machineguns on important hillsides while their riflemenon higher ground forced us to make wide,time-consuming envelopments almost every mileof the way. As we did so, the enemy art i l leryharassed ou r columns. O ften on e 88-mm. gu n..could deliver fire along an entire valley floor andmight not be knocked out for many hours. Mudadded to our woes, and with trucks mired down,soldiers and pack m ules had to move suppliesover rugged hills. Blown bridges and mines wereconstant problems; each hillside became a smallbu t difficult m ilitary prob em th at could b e

solved only by careful preparation and almost inev-itably by the spilling of blood."The Canadian Army at War official history of

the Canadian campaign in Sicily and Italy, 1943,page 104: "Central and Southern Italy offer littleopportunity for the manoeuvres of thrust andenvelopment so profi table in modern warfare.Areas suitable for cross-country movement oftanks are few and in almost every case over-looked by steeply rising mountains."

Fred Majdalany's Cassino Portrait of aBattle page 30: "Battl ing through these outpostsof the winter l ine.. cost the 5 th Army nearly16,000 casualties. It had given an ominous fore-taste of how useless machines can be whenclimate and terrain conspire to make them so. I tconsummated the pattern of f ighting in I taly: them o n o t o n o u s , h e a r t - b r e a k in g , e x ha u st in g ,seemingly pointless battle for on e great obstacleonly t o be faced immediately afterwards byanother. It had taken eight divisions six weeks toadvance seven miles at a cost of 16,000casualties."

The war was ending when the Allies finallyburst into the Po Valley. The German retreat inItaly was the mo st orderly of any fr ont ; a decisivebreak-through was never achieved.

Therefore, I argue that the same resultengaging the enemy could have been achievedas well or better, and at far less cost, by the plandescribed below.

First , i t ' s interest ing to note that the numof divisions in Italy was not great. ChesWilmot, in The Struggle for Europe gives thtable of divisions as of November, 1943:

206 Russia (German)50 France and the Low Countries30 Russia (Axis Allies)24 Balkans22 Italy18 Denmark and Norway

A r e f o r m i n g in Ge rm an y3 6 5

Twenty-two divisions is nothing to scoff but i t was only a small fraction of total Germstrength.

I argue that after the capture of the great pof Naples, and the air bases near Foggia, valuable for raids on Polesti, the Allies should have tried to press northward at so great a coApart from the chimera of an advance throuthe Ljubljana Gap to Vienna, the psychologicaimpor tant prize of Rome, and airbases nearersouthern Germany, I taly above Cassino was little value to the Allies. Moreover, winningfreed the Germans from the necessity of guardthe long seaward flanks, and shortened thsupply line while lengthening t ha t of th e AllThe more of I taly which Germany held, the mtroops would be t ied down containing populace and the partisans.

River lines played a major role in the Italian Campaign. Theaction often stalemated behind rivers for months until the Alliesgained strength for another offensive. Patrols, such as the onepictured above, were an extremely hazardous undertaking.

I do not say that the Allies should've adopa "sitzkreig" policy. They could've k ept presson the Germans w ith small-scale at tacks alongm a i n f r o n t , a n d m o r e im p o r t a nt l y, wcommando ra ids , perhaps even secondinvasions, all along the more than1 milesNazi-held coast from the Pyrenees to Peloponnesus. On page 1 36 of Wilmot 's b ook,mentions Churchill 's belief that no invasionsouthern France was necessary, because "German divisions in this area could be pindown by the mere threat of invasion. . Whone notes that Germany stat ioned 4 2 divisionthe Balkans and Scandinavia in late 1943, i t be seen tha t thre ats may t ie up troop seffectively as trading life for life, maybe more

One could argue that the Germans might hwill ingly shortened their f lanks by withdrawinthe Gothic Line. Apart from the fact that Hiseldom willingly retreated, had this been exception he originally contemplated, so mthe better. If by this strategy the ground paidin blood could have been won by making i t r ifor the G ermans to hold, f ine

In sum, I argue that those 7 00 bloody mwere not strategically importan t t o victoryWorld War 11. If their conquest served no usepurpose, then truly, this tr ip was not necessa

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THE GENER L

A L L I E D S T R AT E G Y

IN ANZIO

ANZIO was discontinued several years ago dueto poor sales. The cries of anguish from the hardcore have still not died down. It was, in manyrespects, the ultimate wargame but suffered fromrules which were packed with ambiguities, a superrealistic mapboard which left doubts as to exactlywhat was in each hex, poor playing aides, andsub-par packaging. The game itself, when cleanedup, remains one o f the ultimate experiences inland battle games.

Tom Oleson stands out as the one gamerwhose infatuation with the title knows nobounds. Upon hearing that the game was beingdiscontinued, Tom sent us a standing order forwhatever games were left. He now provides uswith the official rule interpretations for ANZIOand is our recognized expert on the game. It isdoubtful whether even Dave Williams, the game soriginal designer, has explored the many possibili-ties of this unique game as much as our presentauthor.

One of the few unusual features of Anzio

which has become fairly common is the variableOrder of Battle (OoB). A n aspect of this whichremains m o r e developed in Anzio than almostany other game, however, is the ex ten t t o whichthe actions of one side ( the Allies) influence thestrength of t h e other.

But first, let's compare their strengths. Apartfrom the difficulty of the terrain, one of thereasons the Allies moved so slowly in Italy, wastha t they never were greatly superior in numberst o t h e Germans, al though they did enjoydominance of the sea and air. This is well reflectedin t h e game. The Axis OoB included theequivalent of over 57 divisions, vs. t h e equivalentof less than 4 0 divisions for the Allies, of which1 5 represent the Italian army as of earlySeptember, 1943. Of course, the Germanadvantage here is illusory, no t so m u c h becauseusually n o t all of these 57 divisions are available,b u t because the typical Allied unit is stronger.

A n o t h e r c o m p a r i s o n is more revealing.Including all Italians, and replacement stepsavailable a t the start , the Axis OoB includes 2 2 4steps, vs. 228 for the Allies, counting the Axisdivisions with regimental counters in theirdivisional configuration. F o r those unfamiliarwith t h e Step ~ e d u c t i o n able of Anzio 111, a"step" is the unit by which casualties are 'taken,although units equal in steps may b e unequal incombat factors.

Be t h a t as i t may, the point is valid bywhatever comparison is chosen: t h e Allies mayn o t be able t o count o n much, if any, numerical

advantage.The first key t o Allied victory in Anzio is t o

realize t h a t you can weaken your enemy. How?Some examples:1. Presume t h a t the Germans d o get a firstinvasion reaction. At the very minimum, thisrepresents an increment of 786 steplweeks. How'stha t again? Well, if you had an ext ra WehrmachtPanzer division (5 steps) for 10 weeks, tha twould be 5 0 steplweeks. S o 786 steplweeks is alot .2. Chances are the Germans will get more; themaximum is 2 1 31 step/weeks. In this calculation,I am not forgetting tha t most of these units entert h e game later, anyway. I am only counting theextra weeks, basis arrival in September, 1943.

3 But don't the Allies get "The Big Red One" Naples is of great value t o the Allies. Throuinfantry division, among others, t o balance the

German reaction? True, and the to ta l is 488steplweeks. So if the Germans get a first invasionreaction, i t represents 162% t o 4 3 7 % of theAllied reaction.

Each invasion area in Anzio has a certainprobability tha t there will be a German reaction,but more of tha t later.

T h e first invasion reaction is not the onlyinstance where the Germans can benefi t by Allieddecisions. If the Allies invade for the secondtime, t h e Germans also get reinforcements. Atypical second invasion, in the spring of 1944,would represent over 1600 steplweeks for theGermans, and this t ime the Allies get n ocompensations.

The timing of the second invasion also

influences the German OoB. Depending on hovrearly i t may b e before the third week o fFebruary, 1943, several strong divisions will delaytheir departure. Allied proximity t o Rome,Naples, etc., also plays a role. The to ta l effect isenormous, as the chart shows.

The lower red line shows the monthly ratio ofAllied t o German strength if the Germans havegotten the best reaction possible, using certainprobable assumptions as t o when these will occur.Note t h a t the Germans are stronger than theAllies throughout the entire game

The upper red line shows the oppositeextreme: n o first invasion reaction, and n os e c o n d i n v a s i o n , and all o ther reactionsminimized.

Obviously, a comparison chart of a typicalgame would fall somewhere in between the twored lines. The point is clear, nonetheless: theAllied player can d o a great deal t o shift the oddsin his favor.

The first step is deciding where t o invade. Thisis an interesting question, and has sparked themost a t ten t ion in articles about Anzio. Whetherbecause the invasion force must be small, as a tRimini, o r ?he proximity of defenders, as a tGenoa, several areas are obviously uninteresting,except for a second invasion. There are severalothers marginally wor th a try, such as Livorno o rCivitavecchia, just for the novelty, even thoughthe odds are against them. Then, too , initialGerman dispositions are an impor tan t factor.

this great p o r t units of all nationalities m

arrive, thus saving the non-US/British forcesseveral t u r n delay they would otherwise sufferdisembarking a t Taran to o r Messina. Moreoverthe Germans fail t o garrison Naples, o r what cbe even worse, garrison i t so lightly tha t an Alla t tack may receive "bonus" movement fromAutomatic Victory, a n invasion here is attractiNot the least of Naples attractions is t h e ' q ubuild-up permitted.

When choosing among the various beaches, i timpor tan t t o weigh carefully the probabil i tyGerman reaction. For example, is hfondragotha t much bet te r than Salerno tha t i t justifie100% increase in the probabil i ty of a reactio

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Paae 7 THE GENERAOf course, avoiding a German reaction is not

the only objective. Foremost is winning a securelodgement, and i t is also of great importance t oinvade far enough nor th t o prevent the Germansfrom stalling the Allied drive, as they didhistorically.

To me, t h e best bets are Rome, and t h eTermoli/Pescara area, always coupled, of course,with t h e South End options.

1. Although risky, a Rome invasion is the bestchance, shor t of German inepti tude, for quickAllied capture of the peninsula south of the ArnoRiver.

Moreover, t h e Allies have 113 chance t h a t theGermans will n o t get ny reaction, while they

lw ys get m o r e than six extra divisions a t Rome.This is t h e very best combination of circum-stances for t h e Allies, even bet te r than t h e t o pred line o n t h e "Balance of Forces" chart.

Presuming optional stacking is used, let'sexamine i n more detail the invasion force. SinceU S divisions count 4 points, all divisions areBritish ( 3 points). The to ta l is 1 9 points.

with them first before moving o n Rome. This is agamble for b o t h sides. The two valuablecommando units probably will be lost , and thiscan hur t in a second invasion. I feel the sacrificeis worthwhile if they hold their ground, but ifthe Germans are lucky, they may achieve anAVII situation. The second Automatic Victoryalternative awards bonus movement in certaincircumstances, and i t could be enough t o carrythem northward for a second combat south of

Rome. Bamng this, their si tuation on the AlliedSeptember 111 turn can be vulnerable: not onlywill their f ron t be very wide along the SaccoRiver, bu t by concentrat ing enough of their unitsnor th of Gaeta to smash the commandos, theymust defend lightly elsewhere, perhaps creatingAutomatic Victory situations for the Allies.

I t is impor tan t t o p u t the stronger commandounit nearer the coast, since i t is theoreticallypossible for the Germans t o get AutomaticVictory b o t h on the weaker commando unit andt h e brigade which is discussed below, permitt ingone of the other southern units, using StrategicMovement, t o pass thru their suppressed zones-of-control all the way t o Anzio, if they can moveu p the coast road. If they have t o go inland, it's

t o o far.

A. T h e Key Attack

I believe tha t the Alban Hills at Frascati aret h e most impor tan t position. History showedthey domina te the beaches, and i t works t h a tway i n t h e game, too. Moreover, if the Germansretain o r recapture this position, they outflankRome from the south. Therefore, a t tack th isposition a t 3-1, using one regiment of 82ndPara., t h e Ariete armored division, and all th reeof t h e 3-4-12 infantry divisions (see map). Oneof these divisions stays p u t o n t h e Appian Way

next t o German 2nd Para, as does one of the twojust south of Frascati. The other divisionadvances if possible.

B. The 2nd Para Problem

The big German division a t Practica i s themajor problem for a Rome invasion. Someplayers t r y a 1-1 attack, and maybe that 's agood idea, but then you can't get 3-1 o nFrascati. T h e 1-2 attack I suggest gives you 113chance of surrounding the unit . Even if youretreat , i t still will have a hard time breaking out .Take any losses from the 82nd Para. regimentwhich advances south o n the Appian Way fromRome t o join the British 5 t h in t h e attack. Ifnecessary, retreat the 5 t h just o n e hex south, t oguard the Anzio por t .

C The Southern Flank

Here is t h e greatest danger. Presuming t h a t the1 6 t h Panzer is in the south , i t and the strongH e r m a n Goering and 1 5 t h Panzergrenadierdivisions, and the Nebelwerfer brigade, add u p t o20 attack factors threatening Anzio. I used t oguard t h e southern approaches with commandoso n the hill a t H 4 8 unt i l a sharp-eyed opponentpointed o u t t o me t h a t I was crossing a swamphex-side advancing up the Mussolini Canal acrossthe Appian Way I suggest a daring use o f thetwo available commando units ( the third is partof 82nd Para.) t o block the two main Naples/Rome roads, forcing the German units t o deal

The last l ink in the southern flank defense ist o stat ion one brigade on the Appian Way dueeast of Anzio (G48). This serves two purposes:blocking a Strategic Movement thru an AutomaticVictory ( type I) t o the south, and defendingagainst a second combat af te r an AutomaticVictory ( type 11 . In the la t te r case, if theGermans get u p this far they obviously are stillstrong, and can probably crush this lone brigade,too. If so, they advance first i n t o the ZOC of oneo r two infantry divisions just south of Frascati,and they should s top right there. Whateverhappens, i t surely won't be dull

D. The Northern Flank

Even if the Germans get the maximum possiblereaction, only the Panzer division stat ioned inFlorence can move down the Via Cassia in timet o counter-at tack o n the first turn. Together withthe 3rd Panzergrenadier, the to ta l is 8 a t tackfactors. One of the nice things about Anzio istha t there is n o stereotyped way t o handle manyproblems, including th is one. One approach is t ostack the remaining brigade plus one regiment ofthe 82nd together with an Italian division. Thiscould be just nor th of Rome, o r in the northern-most Rome hex. In the la t te r case, presumablythe German forces might lose some strengthsmashing thru the northernmost Italian unit i n t oRome. The Allies might even decide t o pull backbehind the Tiber River, which bisects Rome. Iprefer, again, a bolder disposition: send thebrigade towards Civitavecchia,and also move o u tof Rome t o the northeast with the one remainingregiment of the 82nd. I reason t h a t the bigger theAllied beach-head is, the more opportunityavailable during t h e third week of September.True, the two German divisions will get a secondand perhaps even a third combat, b u t one badroll will s top them. I f t h e Germans don't get areaction, they will be powerless o n the northernflank. Of course, it is vital t o t ry t o hold on t o a tleast one Rome hex, t o deny the Germans airsuperiority by September 111. Here again, this isgreatly facilitated by holding Frascati.

E. R o m e

Although t h e Rome invasion can be mawithout a paradrop o n Rome (which wourelease another commando unit t o solidify tsouthern blockade), i t seems t o m e m u c h bet t

t o d o so. Not only does i t enable Frascati t o surrounded, but more impor tan t , t h e entiItalian Army defects t o the Allies. T h e Germacan destroy most of tbese uni t s on their tu rh , bdoing so costs them strength, and delays therush t o Rome. Moreover, i t is n o t a t all unliketha t one o r two Italian units will surviveattack the German Rome perimeter f rom the reas the Allies t ry t o break out .

Again I want t o stress t h a t t h e Rominvasion is risky and demanding, b u t especiallythe Germans fail t o get a reaction, a vedramatic advance is a good possibility for tAllies.

2. Many German players, if they are faced ban experienced opponent , make a R o m e invasifoolhardy by stationing 1 6 t h Panzer a t Anziosomewhere nearby. In that case, and presumi1 6 t h Panzer is n o t o n the Adriatic, I recommeTermoli. In fact , all things considered, I ra te thinvasion site No. 1, for the following reasons:

1. Only 116 chance of a first invasion reactio2. Rome garrison doesn't en te r t h e game.3. Very wide perimeter.4 Hard for the Germans t o mass f o r a counte

attack.5. Excellent communications o n interior line6. P o o r G e r m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s alon

secondary roads.7. A posit ion well n o r t h of the Cassino Lin

Pescara is actually n o r t h of Rome.8. German air superiori ty likely t o be sho

lived.

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THE GENERAL Paae9 Quick link-up with the South End Options.The Allies may use the same units as a t Rome,

except delete 4 regimentslbrigades and add theU.S. 4 5 t h Infantry Division.

a r r ~ f ~ c ~ a l i v evere On the oth r h a n d . ~f thw de ~de on a

The Port

It can be Termoli, Ortona, or Pescara. Thelatter two have 113 greater capacity. I preferOrtona. If you choose it, try to secure the HighAppenine hill at S43 on September 111. This highground, as at Frascati, commands the port.Without it the port is not secure.

Invulnerable Positions

weak unit in Anzio can invite disaster, butnot if it can not be hit, or only at bad odds, or isbacked up by a strong unit, as in the case of thatbrigade along the Appian Way east of Anzio.Barring a bizarre placement of 16 th Panzer, agood part of the Termoli perimeter can not behit'on Sep tem ber 11. A single com man do brigadecan hold route 16 along the Adriatic, and caneven gain a bridgehead north of the TordinoRiver. single comm ando unit can also take thekey hill at S40. Unless 16th Panzer is aroundAvezzano, a single brigade can hold the "joint"between the northern and southern parts of thebeach-head (U43). If the position can beattacked, use a division.

The Weak Link

If 16t h Panzer is near Rome, i t and possiblyFrascati may be able t o at tac k a unit 'a t T42.They will have to attack across the Pescara River,2-1 with air support. Use the strong comm andounit here. This attack could sever the link withthe northern units, but they can withdraw by sea.I t should pose no threat to the port . This at tackcould weaken the Germans by 4 to 6 steps, inwhich case not only these units, but their sector,could be extre mely vulnerable. It is possible for16th Panzer t o touch this unit from the south,but it would have to soak off against U43,gaining nothing.

Defending the Port

One of the reasons I prefer Ortona, is thatbo th the 15th Panzergrenadier and HermanGoering can attack th e hill just west of Vasto: 13atta ck factors. With air, it would be 2-1 againstan infantry division, again a risky attack if a fiveor six results. The remaining defensive positionswest of Termoli are shown on the map.

Threat to Foggia

It is not th at unusual t o invade at Termoli, butmany Allied players plan a restricted beach-head,holding behind the r ivers to the sou th (Fortore)and n orth (Sangro). I prefer to throw a strongbridge-head so uth of the Fortore, on th e road toFoggia. T oo risky? I say no, for two reasons:

1. It is the Germans who should be worried

about defending, especially on September 11.What are the Allies afraid of? It is very hard forthe Germans to counter-at tack in a reallythreatening way at this stage, so why not make iteven harder by making the perimeter so long theunits they would need t o at tack must defendinstead. Remember th at a reaction is unlikely,and even if there is one, useless until September111.

2. It 's not enough just t o establish a beach-head, the Allies must then break out of it, gainair superiori ty, and l ink with the South End.River lines which they can saunter acrossSeptember I1 may be heavily defended September111. This invasion boasts a.perimeter wider thanany o ther: well over 20 hex-sides Th e Germans

need a bou t 11 units just t o hold it. This wperimeter, as at Rome, makes it very hard for Germans to spare the 7 units needed to seal the So uth End.

Passing on to the next phase, let's presuthat the initial Allied invasion, whether at RoTermoli , or elsewhere, has succeeded. mention ed, ideally, the Germ ans would be unato defend the peninsula, so that the Spring 1air strike could break the Gothic Line. Suppohowever, that the Germans have been able throw a fort line across the peninsula, perhjust north of Rome along the CivitavecchAscoli, the last feasible line below the northpart of the map. What plan should the Allfollow then? Can they win a war of attritiplugging away at the fort line with a flow-odds attacks weekly, bleeding the Germwhite? Perhaps, if they understand the arithminvolved.

Counting the Naples and Rome bonuses, six steps at start, and Polish replacements, Allies get 211 steps during the game. On average, the Germans get 110. This means 9more for the Allies. Therefore, they must suffer twice the German casualties in thattacks, or it is thqy who are suffering attriti

There is no shortage of doubled or even triplpositions for the German defenders in AnzTherefore, Allied casualties will usually doubled. Let's analyze the ratio of th e attackelosses to that of the defender at al l ten odallowed:

ey Ratio

From this we see that at unmultiplied odanything above a 1-2 attac k favors the AlliThe tw o "soak-off' ' type attac ks favor tGermans. Therefore, the Allies shouldn't watheir rare chances to at tack in the open

Where the Germans have a terrain beneobviously the loss ratio doubles, so that at 1the Allies lose 2.8 steps/l .O German step nfavorable. At 2-1 it is still not favorable, bu3-1 at tack o n a doubled posit ion shows a raof 1.25/1 good for the Allies. Unfortu nate3-1 atta cks on doubled positions are rare.

So how can attr i t ion pay? By the fact that Germans must counter-atta ck t o hold a fortifline. The Allies usually attack fort lines at 1-sometim es 2-1. Let's stud y the results at boodds:

Series of 2-1 attacks, and German countattacks at 1-4 or 1-2 only when requirobviously. Allied casualty percentage: 2-1, 1164% of Germans 2-1, 1-4 169%.

In both cases, attrition favors the AlliAlthough the Germans do not suffer terrapenalties counter-attacking o ut of fo rts, a glaat t he table above shows tha t the ir loss ratiounfavorable. It 's interesting that they do better1-4, although tha t would often leave thedangerously weak for the coming Allied turn.

In a series of 1-1 attac ks and counter-attacas above, Allied casualties vs. Germ ans are 20and 207%, respectively.

Conclusion: slight advantage to the Germans.

So attr i t ion can pay, not so much from Alliat tacks, but obligatory German counter-at tac

There is another aspect t o this question. As blue l ine on the chart shows, the rat io

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THE GENER LGerman/Allied replacements swings from a highof 1-1 during the Winter to a low of lessthanl/3 -l during the Summer. Here again, Iwant to stress that so much of this analysis ispredicated on the law of averages, which shouldhave plenty of time to work out in this longgame

The months when the Germans are likely toget less than half Allied replacements are just atthe start, March/August 1944, and FebruarylApril

1945. Therefore, these are the periods whenattrition will be most painful for them (see blueline on the chart).

Fortuna tely for the Allies, these periodscoincide with the two air strikes which are theirmost potent weapon. To win, the Allied playernot only must make maximum use of the airstrikes, but coordinate them properly with thesecond invasion.

As explained, just in terms of OoB, the Alliesdo a favor to the Germans by invading a secondtime. Should they do it then? If an invasion atRome or on the Adriatic should succeed, asecond invasion might not be necessary to dowhat the historical Anzio invasion did: crack theCassino Line. In any case, the Allies shouldalways pose the thre t of ar. invasion to tie upGerman troops along the coastal flanks. Try todo this with units that are building-up, or that,from Naples, could either invade or reach thefront to attack in any one turn. Otherwise, bothAllies and Germans may suffer from withdrawals.Try to make this a handicap only for theGermans.

If a second invasion is necessary, how should itbe done? Of course, if the Germans are so foolishas to leave Genoa open, station very weak unitsalong the coast, or some other blunder, why passup such an opening? Usually, this won't happen.In that case, there's no question in my mind thatthe second invasion should be timed to profitfrom the April/May air strike.

Advantages1. German replacements at low ebb.2. Ratio of Allied to Axis forces favorable,

especially if the invasion can be timed not tooccur until units such as Herman Goering, 2 ndPara., and several Panzer divisions have left.

Because of the Random Invasion Rule, it isimpossible to say exactly when the secondinvasion can take place, but there are 3 basicpossibilities:

1 During the air strike not too likely, but ifpossible, then any German coastal defense unitswould probably be smashed.

2. After the strike not my preference, butcircumstances might make it necessary. In thatcase, leave the air strike to late May, and invadeas soon thereafter as permitted. That way,considering the paucity of German summerreplacements, the units hit during the air strike,will not be back to full strength.

3. If possible, I prefer to invade before the airstrike, but as near to it as possible, say lateFebruary or early March, if permitted. This is adifficult time for the Germans, as they can notyet be sure that the invasion could not coincidewith the air strike, so they have to worry aboutboth. Moreover, it usually takes a week or two toposition their units for a counter-attack. There-fore, they may only have a few weeks to attemptto repel the second invasion before the air strikecan "rescue" it. If the second invasion succeedsin February or March, 1944, then the Germans

have a longer line to defend during the strike.This is very important, as the Allies should try toattack every possible unit then. This is also anargument for a more northerly first invasion, asthe southern fort lines are shorter.

So much for when, how about where?Obviously, this depends on the position at thetime, but in general, the Allies should invade asfar north as possible, especi lly if the Germans

have been able to hold them in mid-peninsula. Itis tempting to execute a close flanking move-ment, as was done at Anzio, with poor initialresults. The more pressing problem is the GothicLine and the Po Valley it guards.

The second air strike is probably too late tobreak the Gothic Line and still have time tocapture northern Italy. Of course, after thesecond invasion, unless most of the units didn'treact in, there is no reason not to invaderepeatedly. None, that is, except that theGermans may crush it If the second invasion canprecede the Spring, 1944, air strike by onlyabout a month, it has an excellent chance tosucceed, so this is the ideal time to try tooutflank the Gothic Line. If the Spring, 1945,strike finds the Germans still holding this line,the Allies will haye to be very lucky to win, allthe more so since this is not the final defensiveposition available. Therefore, as outlined above,whether by a successful first invasion in Rome orTermoli, or a second invasion at Genoa, Livorno,or Rimini, the Allies must break the Gothic Linein 1944.

GERMAN STRATEGYIN ANZIO

Rommel or Kesselring?

Late summer, 1943. The Kursk attack hasfailed, and the Russians roll forward in theUkraine. Dozens of divisions are tied down in theBalkans and Western Europe. The problem: howto defend Italy from Allied invasion. Depleted bytheir losses in North Africa and Sicily, fewGerman units are available. The best of thesemust hold down the industrial North. Due to thegreat length of the Italian coastline, much of itcan not be defended. Moreover, Sicily showedthat the war-weary Italian army and populace arepotentially more hostile than friendly.

Two brilliant German generals ponder theproblem. Their solutions:

Rommel hold at the narrow northern necknot only to shorten the front and its flanks, butthe lines of communication as well.

Kesselring abandon only the barren southernthird of the peninsula, holding fast in thedifficult terrain between Naples and Rome.

We know what happened in history, but whatis the best plan for the game?

Many of the basic considerations shaping Alliedstrategy, such as comparison of forces andreplacements, obviously must be weighed by theGermans as well. The first question is whichinvasion area to deny to the Allies.

Historically, the Germans correctly deducedthat Allied thinking would lead them to Salerno,because of its proximity both to Naples and toair cover from Sicily. Only their slender resourcesprevented this sound deduction from giving thema great victory. How about your opponent? Doeshe have a favorite beach? Is he conservative, or a

gambler? Is he new to the game, therefore likelyto prefer Salerno or perhaps Termoli? Then youcould put Nebelwerfer and two regiments ofHerman Goering at Naples, one regiment atVesuvio, and 16th Panzer just south of Vasto onthe Adriatic. Or to really rule out Salerno, put16th Panzer on Route 7 just south of Avellino.Not only a good spot for Salerno, but also withinattacking radius of Termoli and Rome.

In no circumstances would I put less than tworegiments at Naples. Only one unit there iseasy mark for the Allies.

On the other hand, suppose you have a wilyopponent who could give you a lot of trouble atRome. Then you put all the Naples garrison atNaples itself, in order not to slow yourself downexiting Vesuvio. There are many places for 16thPanzer

1. Anzio spoils Rome and is 12 movementfactors f rom, S42 near Ortona, presuming otherunits get Automatic Victory on the Italian atTivoli.

2. Avezzano can hit Rome even if theNaples roads are cut; can reach the Adriatic atseveral places, and also nearly as far south asPompei.

3 Vasto spoils a Termoli invasion, but canalso attack as far west as Tivoli.There is also another way to look at invasions:

where would you lik the Allies to invadeGrosseto or Rimini, of course, but let's beserious I would say Mondragone. Why?

1. Twice the chance of a First InvasionReaction compared with Salerno.

2. You can still hold at Cassino or just northof it.

3. Good chance to counter-attack.4. Good chance Allies won't immediately

capture the port they need (Naples).Therefore, to tempt the Allies, you might leave

only two regiments at Naples, say six defensefactors, perhaps just nough to draw an Alliedattack, but too much for them to be certain ofsuccess. A bit risky if they are lucky, admittedly,but you have 113 chance of reaction, whichsurely does make the game more fun for theGermans

Next, to me the most interesting phase of thegame for the Germans: trying to hurl the Alliesback into the sea. First you have a toughdecision: whether to try to block the unitscoming from Taranto and Messina. You have todivert seven units that are desperately neededelsewhere. They could be Nembo, 26th Panzer,three regiments from either the Naples or theFoggia garrison, and both regiments of 29thPanzergrenadier. Why the strong Panzer divisioninstead of another regiment? Because thatregiment from Naples or Foggia probably can hitthe beach-head September 11; 26th Panzer can'tT o relieve the unnecessarily strong forcesblocking the South End, immediately. rush south-ward as many of the four Viterbo replacements,plus any other replacements or weak units assoon as you get them. Nothing frustrates anAllied player like cooling his heels at Taranto orMessina with big divisions of Canadians, Indians,etc., while the Germans hold Y60, Y62, Y64,073, 472, S71, and U70 with schlock

This tactic of sealing off the South End isobviously artificial, but how else to handle it?The Germans can not advance into the toe andheel. If the Allies should attack from off theboard and retreat, perhaps as an inverted counter,the Germans can't follow. So allowing the

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THE GENER LGermans to seal off these edges at a high priceseems the best solution. Although I disagree,some players feel the Germans have an edge inAnzio. There are two logical ways to handicapthe German player with regard to the South End.

1. Allow entry ex-Taranto as far up the boardas Y5 1, which would be geographically feasible ifthere had been room for the toe and heel on thegame board. This would make it virtuallyimpossible to seal off Taranto, therefore nearly

guaranteeing Allied capture of Italy south ofCassino.

2. Allow Allied units of whatever nationalityto enter any opened port. Some Allied playersfind it highly unrealistic that some of theirstrongest units are made unusable by what theyconsider a German "gimmick."

I do not suggest either alternative for equalplayers. Personally, I play with a complete map,using toe and heel extensions drawn up by afriend, but this article isn't inte nded to discussvariants.

Many German players, especially if confrontedwith a cautious invasion below the Cassino Line,prefer not to counter-attack vigorously. Theyconserve strength, and don't risk the loss of units.This way all of their units may be at fullstrength, so tha t they can retain their ersatzcounters rather than using them to build up. I

,concede this is the smarter strategy. But what theheck, it's only a game, so enjoy it Nothing beatsoutdoing Kesselring and pushing the Allies backto Sicily. Moreover, it is a natural mini-game.Many people put off by the potential length ofAnzio don't realize how many games reach anatural resolution in a few months. Unless anaggressive German player is also very careful,failure to crush the invasion after a spiritedattempt may leave him weak to the point ofdiscouragement Conversely, few Allied playershave the will to continue if they lose their firstinvasion. If your life depended on it, as theGermans' did, obviously you wouldn't let it all

hang out quite that far. But with a game, it canbe fun now and then One of the nice thingsabout Anzio is that it lends itself to manydifferent strategies on both sides.

It is impossible to recommend in detail how toattack the beach-head, since the possible disposi-tions are myriad, but here are some general ideas:

1. Don't presume tha t you have to go over tothe defensive because you didn't get a reaction. Ihave seen a good German player crush a Romeinvasion by a good Allied player, when theGerman got no reaction, and, of course, theAllies did.

2 Go for the high ground: Frascati at Rome,the High Appenines above Ortona, the tripledposition just west of Termoli, etc. If you still

hold these positions by the time you haveregrouped to attack, you may be able to seize theinitiative by threatening the port.

3. Keep air superiority as long as possible.4. Don't be afraid to build forts around a

beach-head, but only if you feel you really have achance to crush the Allies. Several years ago at aconvention at St. John's University in Queens,kibbitzers were puzzled seeing several fortsscattered seemingly at random near Rome, anddepleted armies facing each other at a shortCassino Line. The Allies had been forced backout at Rome, with the forts an indispensibleGerman tool.

5. Know when you have'had it. If your unitsare just too weak, break off your attack. This is a

very difficult decision for the German player, asit is so tempting to try just one more turn

6. Maybe you can gain that one more turn bypulling back from the South End, delaying byusing river lines. You only need 4 units to coverthe entire front for a turn, along the line of theVolturno and the Fo rtore. Moreover, since theSouth End units can not use Strategic Movementfirst turn on the board, by pulling back justbeyond their range, you can hold the front even

with ersatz counters.Proceeding to the next phase of the game,suppose that you failed to repulse the Allies, butyou can build a line about where the Germansunder Kesselring first did. Later on, I willexamine a rather unorthodox strategy based onRommel's ideas. For the moment, presume youare a student of Kesselring.

The question of fo rt lines is a study in itself,but here are some general considerations:

1. Don't presume the shortest line, as shownon the map, is always best. It may lack someimportant characteristics. Moreover, the shortestline may not be as economical as another linewith more favorable terrain.

2. You hope tha t your first line will last untilthe 1944 Air Strike, so don't p ut a fort right infront of a river, or in some other vulnerable spotwhen the Allies finally push you out.

3. You may also have t o cope with aninvasion. Can your seaward forts be surroundedor easily out flanked? Would adjusting the line abit improve your posi tion via-a-vis an invasionsite, or make it easier for rear guard units to sealoff such a beach?

4. You have to reinforce. Venafro can be partof the shortest possible line, but it is difficult toreinforce and to retreat from.

5. Take full advantage of tripled positions andHigh Appenines.

6. Communications are important, especially inbad weather. Try to have a good road net justbehind you, and bad lateral communications for

the Allies. If you can move units faster than theycan, you frustrate their attempts to get goododds. There is always considerable movement onboth sides parallel to the fort line.

7. Don't put a fort where it can be bypassed.Examples are the hill northeast of Formia, andV32.

8. Don't put all the regiments of one divisionin the same fort. If one or two regiments are lost,you can rebuild the entire division from just theone left.

Another aspect of this period is coastaldefense.

1. Try to fill the several small zonescompletely. The Allies can't beat this I have seengames ended because the Allied first and secondinvasion was repulsed, and the Germans gotenough units to completely fill every invasionzone

2. If you can't completely fill a zone withweak units, don't leave them near the beach atall. Try to have at least 6 defense factors (3doubled).

3. You can't hold everything. Remember youget a good reaction Love those Tiger andPanther tanks

4. If you can hold strong points, you have achance to crush the second invasion, which isnearly as good as crushing the first, and almost aslikely to cause the Allies to pack it in. Examplesare the hills southwest of Valmontone, Frascati,the hill east of Civitavecchia, and those northwest

of Grossetto, and overlooking Livorno, Timini,and Genoa.

5. Genoa can be a very good place for asecond invasion. It's original garrison, 94thinfantry, leaves for the front October 111, 1943,with the 334th not taking over until November11. This leaves a brief op portuni ty to invadethere. True, it is disadvantageous for the Alliesfrom the standpoint of its effect on the GermanOoB, nor is there any Air Strike to help out,butthe Allies are very likely to do it (with portcounters) if you let them. Therefore, be sure tohave 1 or preferably 2 units there on time. I havelost more than one game by being a turn latedoing this.

December I, 1943, the 334th also goes to thefront, without any replacement at Genoa untilSeptember, 1944, and the replacement is tooweak. Therefore, for most of the game, I recom-mend closing off the two Genoa beach hexes.

6. When Spring, 1944, rolls around, you arevulnerable to the Air Strike. If the Allies havenot yet invaded, and unless you are prepared togamble that they no longer can, I would concedethe whole coastline to the Allies. With the unitssaved by not defending Rome, etc., you probablycan close the four beaches north of Siena. This

requires 1 4 units, 12 if you concede Cecina.7 Even earlier I would favor these northern

areas. It isn't all bad if the Allies invade at Anzio,for example. The reinforcements help. But if theAllies can get into Livorno, or another northernbeach, in late February or early March, exertyourself to the utmost to crush or minimize thebeach-head before the April Air Strike, or youmay be the April Fool.

Moving on, presume that the combination ofAir Strike and invasion has broken your southernline, and you are pulling back to the Gothic Line.There are still plenty of rivers, mountains, andHigh Appenines. Don't be eager to counter-attackif you can pull back t o the next river. It drovethe Allies frantic in the war; it can in the game,

too. There are 14 rivers between Ortona andBologna.The West coast is more vulnerable, as it is

relatively open terrain. Concentrate your strengthhere. If you feel a counter-attack is worthwhile,do it here. Try not to defend undoubled morethan absolutely necessary.

The Allies will try to lengthen your front toforce a pull-back in order to straighten it. Howlong a front can you tolerate? It's not so much aquestion of hexes, but of strength-per-position. Ifthe Allies are able to get good odds at severalpositions, pull back.

Remember that after six weeks you may bevulnerable, all the more so if you have alreadygotten most of the Second Invasion Reaction. Soagain you must garrison the flanks, with priorityto your main line, and the far North.

Your key objective: still be in the Gothic Linein Spring, 1945. If you have done this, you haveprobably won.

In automobile racing, the contest is often wonor lost in the curves. A few feet gained brakinglate, . entering the turn, can yield surprisingdistance accelerating up the straight. So it is inAnzio: t he initial struggle for position in 1943has great effect on the whole game. If theGermans keep the Allies away from the GothicLine in 1944, they ace far ahead.

Or are they?Rommel thought otherwise. He commanded

the strong North Italy garrison in the summer of1943, and he wrote off the peninsula to the

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south. Hitler never liked t o retreat , even whenadvisable, bu t even he had t o agree with theDesert Fox that withdrawal would be wise whenthe Allies invaded. Kesselring, the southern com-mander, had other ideas. His unexpected successwas all Hitler needed t o encourage him t o holdfast. History acquit ted Kesselring, and mostGerman-side Anzio players follow his plan. I t wasright for history, bu t perhaps for the game,Rommel 's analysis deserves further study.

As we have seen, of ten the Allies invade farenough south t o permit the first German Line t obe built across the narrowest part of thepeninsula just south of Cassino, as historically itwas (see map). Presume that instead the first lineis far north. I t could be either side of Firenze.The Germans then withdraw northward as forcedt o by the Allies.

Disadvantages:1. The Allies take the peninsula before the

game is half over.2. They get their Rome replacements sooner

than otherwise, in all probability.3. There will be little scope or need for a

second invasion, so the Germans will n o t get thetremendous reinforcement it represents.

There are several compensatingadvantages:1. T h e Germans d o not have t o defend t h e

long flanks. There are 2 4 invadable hexes, n o tcounting those reachable by commandos, alongthe west coast f rom just south of Livorno t oGaeta, and o n the east coast f rom the FogliaRiver t o Vasto. T o hold the key positions behind

these beaches requires the equivalent of 3divisions or more. The problem is acute if thesecond invasion and 1 9 4 4 Air Strike coincide. Asdiscussed, either t h e beaches are left open, o rmore units are exposed to air attack. O n theother hand, if the Germans d o n o t t ry to holdthe peninsula, a line between the Cecina and theFoglia Rivers in the North requires the defense ofonly 12 hexes against the invasion, an area tha tw o u l d have t o be defended anyway. As

mentioned, it might be feasible t o occupy allthese hexes with weak units.2. Depending on the pace of the Allied

advance, and the location of the first Germanline, certain German reinforcement may reacti n t o the game sooner than otherwise.

3 Even presuming that the Allies eventuallyopen a por t n o r t h of Rome, many Allied unitscan only enter the game via Naples and/or theSouth End. If the front line is south of Romeinto S p r ~ n gof 1944, these units probably canreach it o n their first tu rn in the game. But forthem t o reach the Nor th will t ake two t o threeturns, n o t forgett ing that they can not useStrategic Movement the first turn, o r whenentering combat. Conversely, German reinforce-ments and replacementsjust have a short haul.

I t may even be possible for the Germans t odelay the Allies while retreating t h e length ofItaly, even wi thout a fort line, so tha t they havenot reached t h e Gothic Line by the first AirStrike. Let's presume not. Presume the Goth icLine is broken in the Spring of 1944. Aren't theGermans then in deep trouble, not having all thatdistance in which t o retreat? Perhaps not. Perhapsit is only necessary to have enough space betweenthe first and second lines so tha t :

1. The momentum of Allied advance duringthe 1944 Strike can not penetrate b o t h lines.

2. Should the second line n o t be done , theGermans can delay enough turns so tha t i tsconstruction is finished. The best way t o analyzethis consideration is t o examine in detail thedefensive positions available in the North (seemap).

A. This line can be used with line B justnorth. Since the Germans have only 13 forts, Bcan n o t be completed until A is part ly destroyed.About two months delay will be needed. With alittle luck, and the shelter of the Arno River, itshould be possible, al though not certain.

B. Virtually identical t o t h e historical GothicLine, this is more economical one for t shorter,with virtually no invasion threat . It can serve asthe first or second line.

C. In the Spring of 1945, when it was obviousthat the Allies would burst in to the Po Valley,the Germans planned to fall back approximatelyto this line as a last-ditch posit ion in Italy. Thewar ended first. I t can serve as a second linetogether with A, in case the German player fearsA and B are t o o close. Af te r A falls to the 1944Strike, there is ample time t o retire t o C, and tofinish its construction. Alternatively, B and C canbe combined, total 13 forts. In this case, withthe defense line for most of 1 9 4 4 onward, theGermans have maximum use of their Nor th Italygarrison, and there is little scope for partisanactivity behind their lines.

D. This strategy should also permit theconstruction of a final redoubt, if the Alliesbreak the second line the first week of April,1945. They have but three more turns to captureVicenza, among other cities required. This l inemight make tha t impossible. Alternatively, if t h e

THE GENER Lfirst t w o lines are A B, then C could b efinal redoubt.

It 's obvious tha t if this strategy is followmany months will be devoted t o World Wat y p e attr i t ion along the for t lines, a warattr i t ion which I d o not believe the Allieswin, especially given their longer supply lines.

I have mentioned the historical basis forstrategy. As applied t o the game, if line C inPo Valley is the second line, t h e n the Germ

concede Genoa and much of Nor th Italy t oAllies during 1944. Historically, the Germnever would have done this willingly, becausethe industrial potential of tha t area, and becait could have exposed southern France beforeAllies invaded there. Therefore, if this suggesstrategy works, Anzio the game fails t o refhistory.

Anzio came before the trend towards levelvictory, which can be as frustrating as theytheoretically logical. Perhaps this is regrettabbecause it is a game tha t lends itself t o ttechnique. There can be a difference betwplaying a game for a narrow win just withinrules, and playing for fun, o r t o satisfy levelsvictory a t least mentally. T o p u t it another wthere is more glory being Kesselring t hRommel, in this part icular campaign.

Personally, I can n o t resist the tempta t ionhang o n t o as much of the m a p for as long acan, and the chance t o throw those Tigers aPanthers against a second invasion Be tha t asmay, I d o think that "The Rommel Plan" shon o t be dismissed.

ANZIO TACTICS

No o n e should fool himself tha t wargamcome anywhere near t o reflecting real war. Jut o cite two areas, morale and logistics, wargamhave never made more than a gesture towatheir simulation. One aspect of war tha t is rathw e l l reflected in games, however, is tconsequences of a blunder or miscalculation. Fgames exceed Anzio in this respect. Why?

1. T h e three types of Automat ic Victory (of rom Game 11, t w o from Game 111).

2. T h e unusual SRT.3. T h e terrain.4. The impor tanceof ports t o Allied logistics5. T h e multiple invasions.6 The varying capabilities of t h e units.7. T h e way in which units can b e destroy

o r rebuilt f rom a cadre.This is n o t an exhaustive list, b u t i t serves

make this point: failure t o always keep in mit h e unique rules configuration of Anzio may let o a blunder with consequences very realisindeed T o examine this, let's discuss Anztactics in detail. Here are some do's and don'

1 Defending in adjacent hexes is of tnecessary, bu t i t can be dangerous, just asStalingrad. If y o u push back o n e unit , whengaging the second o n the flank, t h e first groof attackers can advance for a second combwith the second defender, now surrounded.

2. Ersatz and other weak units can be veuseful t o hold parts of t h e f ront , I F y o u carefucalculate what the enemy can d o t o them. Thisessential, because otherwise y o u might open tway t o an Automat ic Victory which courupture y o u r entire front.

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THE GENERAL Paae3 If you on ly have a unit worth one step to

defend at some point , remember that only a 4-1is needed to obtain AV-I. If you stacked thatweak unit with an inverted counter worth a step,although the defense factor wouldn't change, a6-1 would become the minimum for AV-I.

4 The German regimental counters are ofgreat importance, al l the more so since you canrebuild th- -?tire division from just one counter.

taking place.15. It can be very dangerous to leave weak

units unstacked, especially if they are near thefront. Probably the worst disposition is a weakunit right behind a stronger one, since the enemymay get second combat on the weak unit .

16. The Allied port is vulnerable as long as theGermans can reach it with Strategic Movement.Sometimes i t is tempting to hold part of thefront w ith brigades t o concentrate against anothersector. Be sure the Germans can't get AutomaticVictory on that brigade. They might send a

Therefore, you have to be really desperate, orcareless, to expose all the regiments of a givendivision to destruction on the same turn Dividethose regiments among several stacks or attacks,that way yo u don 't risk losing an entire division.

5. Both sides have an ample supply ofbrigades and regiments. When you attack, tryalways to include one or more. Do the same ineach defensive position likely to be attacked. It ismuch more convenient to rebuild these units thana division.

6. Units withdrawn can still be useful whilebuilding up. Germans can use them t o fill up thesmall invasion zones like Pescara, Terracina, orGenoa. Allies can build up in Naples or Sicily, sothat the units involved pose an invasion threat.

7. I t is often hard t o spare big units from thefront l ine to build u p. A good t ime to do so iswhen the front is fluid, with units advancing andwithdrawing, therefore sufficiently distant fromthe enemy to build up.

8 For the Germans, i t is obviously better tobuild up by regiments rather th an pull a wholedivision out of the l ine, so try not to takecasualties in divisions which you can't breakdown.

9. An exception to that suggestion concernsunits slated to leave the game. Even though youeventually must make up the deficit if theywithdraw understrength, i t is better to depletethem first. Every "step/weekm counts; as NathanBedford Forrest said, "Get there first with themost men " Fo r this campaign, it 's have the mostmen stay the longest . This applies to both sides.

10. As Germans, don't waste armored replace-ments on infantry, unless imperative. Rememberthat the Herman Goering division is armor, buttwo of its regiments can be built up withinfantry.

11. You can't always take casualties withregiments or brigades. When a division is involved,try not to take mo re than a step or two,

otherwise i t takes too long to rebuild, andbecomes cumbersome stacking, because it still hasfull point value.

12. Th e Allies often make 1-1 or 2-1attacks , which can lead to horrendo us losses. It israrely advisable to attac k if a six couldcost youan entire unit .

13. Remember that the same units that at tackthen have to defend, so try not to leave them soweakened by their at tack losses that they arethen vulnerable.

14. One of the unavoidable nuisances of war-gaming is to calculate exact odds. Some peopleplay that y ou can' t look at the hidden countersin a stack, but I dislike that because I likewargames not memory tests. If you trouble to

accurately assess your enemy's dispositions, youmay arrange your stacks so that some key enemyunit is just t oo dist ant to achieve good odds. Thisimplies an unrealistic level of intelligence, but itis a useful tactic, particularly if a fierce struggle is

sacrificial raider behind your lines to desyour port , etc.

17. Don't forget t he delay in crossing riverHigh A ppenine. Sometimes one unit at a pasbridge can stal l the enemy for one turn ovesurprisingly broad front. This can also be usfor the Allies if they are hard-pressed inbeach-head. Sure, the Germans can pu t a unitthe r iver to cross next t ime, but exposing a that way may not be feasible for them, so

undefended river becomes part of your line.18. Wargaming is full of anomalies, as we

to express one of mankind's most compendeavors with pieces of paper and cardboOne of the most glaring in Anzio is the fact you can cross a river faster by attackin g a behind it than you can just wading acrunopposed So be careful holding river lines wweak units , IF they can be hit s trongly. many weak units in Anzio can be put t o guse only if it is done with care.

19. I t is common for b oth sides to be strapfor units to hold quiet sectors, so don't sacriItalians by including them unnecessarily combats. Leave them for those quiet sectors.

20. There are special units in Anzio wuseful capabilities:

a) On bo th sides there are certain units whhave a high combat value in relat ion to thstacking cost. Prime examples are the GerPanthers and Tigers.

b) The Allied commando s are very usinvading.

C) The Part isans can pull any numb er of dtricks on the Germans, especially when the Ainvade, late in the game or have an Air Strike.

d) The mounta in t roops, wi th the i r emobil i ty in rough terrain and High Appenine, their extra strength at tacking through HAppenine hex-sides. Someti mes they ca n be vimportant . There are 3 mountain units which U.S. or British, and therefore can invade. In awhere rough terrain is close to the invasion zthese units can be very useful.

Don't risk any of these units in a dangersituation, if you are making use of their specapabilities. If an ordinary infantry or armounit could serve just as well, use it.

2 1. If y ou have to choose between cap turinposit ion or destroying an enemy divisionwould have t o be a very important posiindeed t o dissuade me from doing the lat ter.

22. Anzio is a game which is tremendouinfluenced by the temperament of th e playerwould probably be more fun to watch flowgrow than for two very cautious players to pAnzio. Know your o ppone nt. Don't be t imFew games reward intelligent daring and aggsiveness or penalize timidity, more than AnTenacity also pays. Most players are ready to if an invasion aborts, or they lose a key divior two. That's ali right, but you could still hwon the game. If you are determined to win,Anzio Campaign Gam e is aptly named. Itentire campaign, and there will be many bat

23. Someone once wrote abou t Stalingrad if you are losing, at tack al l along the front atbest odds available, rather than just give up. Whave you got to lose? There is a similar despemanuever in Anzio that has a much better chato succeed. I have never seen a situatio n wthe Germans could use this , al though in ththere is no reason why not. I have seen the Aturn near-defeat into victory more than oalways in a beach-head situation. If the Germ

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are pressing you back t o the sea, of ten t o d o sothey must leave a t least one point weakly held,sometimes just with an ersatz counter. Hit tha tone point with every uni t tha t can be stackedagainst i t , even if by so doing you leave yourf ront wide open You have a good chance to getenough ext ra movement by AV-I1 so tha t youcan redeploy right back again t o defensepositions. Moreover, in such a situation you canadvance right i n t o enemy ZOC, perhaps forcing

their withdrawal next time.Isn't th i s a very gimmicky move? The move is,

the results are not . One of the most unrealisticaspects of m a n y wargames old and new is theirlack of comprehensive Automatic Victory rulestha t prevent one weak unit from performing arole i t never would be expected t o in realwarfare. I don' t say tha t weak units aren't used,b u t they never could d o what they can inStalingrad, for example. The net result ofsi tuations such as tha t described above is t oprevent the use of weak units in an unrealisticway, and t h a t is realistic.

24. As discussed above, the ability t o advanceafter combat in to attacking positions can b e apoten t weapon, but you d o not have t o attack

just because you advance. It 's awfully temptingt o keep rolling, bu t if t h e odds no longer favoryou , think twice before you press your luck. Jus tyour advance may be problem enough for theenemy.

If I may be permitted a personal word, I own1 5 0 wargames, and 10% of them are copies ofAnzio, about five of which are in continual use.After scores of Anzio games, I can honestly sayt h a t n o two have ever been t h e same; I learnedsomething new from each one, and am still trulystart led by the batt les tha t develop. So this list o ftactical t ips should grow in the years t o come.

BREAKING PAR Continued from page6

"intelligence.") Or, you may have your ownmethod , o ther than t h e card illustrated. In anyevent, separate the airplanes f rom tha t tangle o nthe ACC if you want t o know them as entities.

P R for CC aircraft

two seater FOKIe4 38ALBIclFOKld7a 88 . V K l c l 3

P FA L I d l 2 828

If you're using the PAR factor t o make newsituations, you can use it as a handicap o r as ameans of making a fairly even (within 10 points)match. If you use i t in recon, bombing, strafing, o rspott ing missions, t ry t o give the defending playera t least a PAR-10 m a r g n over t h e aggressor. Sure,you can draw u p situations where your opponentgets a n inferior airplane (as of ten happened in reallife look a t Richtfiofen's body-count list), b u tdon' t t ry t o claim a victory when you wereshooting 3 0 over PAR

THE GENERflL

BEHIND THE LUFTWAFFE AERIAL COMBAT TABLE

Lou Zocchi is probably the father o f modernair warfare games as we know them today. Thegroundwork he laid in designing earlier nowout o f print air games was the major factor inour publication o f LUFTWAFFE. Lou takes overthe Design Analysis chores this month to giveyou an in-depth view o f what goes into a CombatResults Table; a study made more interesting bythe application o f tactical doctrine to a strategiclevel game.

GAME DESIGN CREDITS: A L I E N SPACE,BATTLE O F BRITAIN, FLYING TIGERS,H A R D TA C K , LUFTWAFFE, MINUTEMAN,TWELVE O'CLOCK HIGH.

Although aerial combat results table in theLuftwaffe game appears t o be a collection ofrandomly selected numbers, i t is the essence of anumber of related studies. O n page 3 of t h edesigners notes, I explained tha t the table showswhat happens when an aircraft fires one burst.When fighting superior opponents, players sub-tract points from the die roll t o simulate thedifficulty an inferior plane has trying t o achieve agood shooting position. When fighting an inferioraircraft , the shooting position is more easilyattained b u t this does not increase the number ofbullets fired during a single burst . So you get thefull value of each die roll, b u t add nothing t o the

rolled numbers, even though you had t o deductfrom them when shooting f rom an inferior plane.T o understand where those CRT numbers

come from, let's look a t where and how damageis inflicted and how much damage a plane suffersbefore destruction.

According t o "RIFLES MACHINE GUNS","A MODERN HANDBOOK ON INFANTRYA N D A I R C R A F T A R M S " , " G E R M A NMILITARY AIRCRAFT O F THE SECONDWORLD WAR", and other sources, the machine-guns mounted in aircraft wings average one roundin six o n target when firing a t a relativelystat ionary, 2 5 square meters target a t 2 0 0 meters.

A t least 5 rounds o u t of 6 miss their markduring a typical burst. Since the parameter aboveassumes tha t the target is relatively stat ionary, (asi tuation rarely encountered during air t o aircombat) you can see tha t allowing 116th of allbullets fired t o hit o n t h e combat results tablewould be overly generous. But even the single

bullet which hi t s is n o t always effective. Tfollowing information shows tha t m u c h depenupon where those bullets go.

Generally speaking, bullets str ike t h e bodyan aircraft in direct proportion t o the amount surface exposed during the attack. F r o m head othe engine presents the largest and easiest targarea while the wings are the smallest. Attackif rom behind puts few rounds i n t o the engine bmany i n t o the body. Attacking from abovealmost the same as attacking f rom below becaumost o f the rounds hi t t h e wings and a smallnumber go through the body. A side a t tacauses more body hits than wing hits. The sizethe target affects the number of h i t s taken anthe design of t h e plane determines in larmeasure the number of h i t s i t can survive.

A number of private and military studiindicate t h a t damage can be classified i n t o thrcategories:

CATEGORY includes pilot and gunncabins, controls and vital equipment in wings anfuselage. This is generally est imated t o be 2/3rdof t h e wing fuselage area of the plane. Whestruck b y a 5 0 caliber bullet, every twelfpenetrat ion (8 ) generally causes damage. Oninstance of damage in this area has a 16% chanof killing o r injuring nearby crew members and2% chance of start ing a fire.

CATEGORY II includes the oil and gas tank

They average 1/3rd of the wing fuselage area othe plane and are generally damaged by everthird (33%) 5 0 caliber bullet which penetrateEach instance of damage causes fuel loss and 50of the time will start fires.

CATEGORY is the engine o r engines of t hplane. One o u t of 3 penetrat ions (33%) causcritical damage. Such damage could s top enginand 16% of the time will start fires.

Explosions are most likely when category I1 o111 areas are damaged. One case in six causes aexplosion in category I1 while only o n e case ifif ty (2%) aauses an explosion in category 111.

T o provide a be t te r understanding of t hinformation expressed in t h e former statementI've restated t h e facts in a graphic format whicfollows.

There are many recorded instances whendamaged aircraft has been able t o cont inucombat effectively. There are even a few recorde

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THE GENERALinstances where a burning aircraft has been ableto continue combat. I can find no instanceswhere an aircraft has continued combat afterexploding. I t there fore seemed logical to assumethat the si tuation which required the leastnumber of bullets to achieve an explosion wouldbe th e safest example upon w hich a f ire powerchart could be calculated. Since the smallestnumber of 50 caliber bullets which can cause anexplosion is 10 8 in category 11, the num ber 108became very significant because it also causedfires in category 111.

Because the formulas given in standard casesassumed that the damaging bullets were all 50caliber, the firepower of every aircraft in thegame had t o be translated in to something whichwould equate their true destructive abilities, asexpressed in 5 0 caliber bullets. Since a 30 caliberbullet is only 31 5t h~ he size of a 50 caliberbullet, i t is only 3 15 th ~ s effective when only i tsoutside diameter is considered. 100 thir ty caliberbullets cause about the same amount of damageas 60 fifty caliber bullets. A 20mm shell is theequivalent of 1% fifty caliber rounds if only theoutside diameter is considered. However, thegreater mass, penetrating power and explosivenessof the 20mm shell enti t les i t to a higher rat ingthan i ts outside diameter indicates.

In a ddition to caliber sizes, the differing ratesof f ire for each weapon had to considered if atrue f irepower picture was to be obtained. An-other complication to be surmounted was thechange in weaponry as the war progressed.

Rapid fire weapons are best for fighter t ofighter combat because the shooter can p u t morebullets in to more spaces and increase his chancesfor hits. While a bomber may be held in thegunsights f o r one o r two seconds, the smaller,more maneuverable fighter moving a t twicebomber speeds is rarely held for more than asecond. During tha t second the 20mm cannonwould give you only 5 chances t o hit the target

while a 3 0 caliber machinegun would give you1 3 The R.A.F. defeated Luftwaffe fightersduring the Battle of Britain because their arma-ment was suited for fighter t o fighter combat.T h e R.A.F. fighters were spit t ing out 1 0 4 th i r tycaliber roun