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PAGE THEGENERA

ted. HoweverImmunlty IS

The AVALON HlLLENERALThe Game Players Magazine

The Avalon H ill GENERAL is dedicated to the presenta-tiOn of author itative articles on the strategy, tactics, andvariation of Avalon Hil l games of strategy. Historical articlesare included only insomuch as they provide useful back-ground information on current Avalon H ill titles . THEGENERAL is publishedbv the Avalon Hill Company solelyfor the cultural edification of the serious game aficionado, nthe hows of improving the game owner's proficiency of playand providing sewices not otherwise available to the AvalonHi ll game buff.Publication is bimonthly with mailingsmadeclosetothe end of February. April, June, August, October, andDecember. All editorial and general mail should besent tothe Avalon Hill Game Company. 4517 Harford Rd.,Baltimore, MD 21 214.One year subscrlptions are $7.50.Trlal subscrlptions of 4 tssues for $5.00are available. Atwo year subscription is only 512.00. Send checks ormoney orders only. Not responsible or cash ost in ransit.All subscript~ons ent via bulk permit. Airmail and 1s tclass deltvery must be prearranged with the subscrlptiondepartment at additional cost. Address changes must besubmitted to the subscrlption department 6 weeks inadvance to guarantee del ivery. No paid advertising of any

type IS accep , news of lrnportance to thewargaming c< winted free of charge and ssolictted.Articles from wm rf mr s are considered for publi cation atthe discretion of our editorial staff. Articles should etypewrit ten, double.spaced, and embrace the tenets of goodEnglish usage. There is no limit to word length. Accompany-ing examples and diagrams should be neatly done in black orred ink. Photographs should have capt ion and credit linewritten on back. Rejscted articles will be returned wheneverpossible.EOlTORi Donald J. GreenwooREGULARCONTRIBUTORS:J Angiolillo, R. Beyme, D.Burdick. S. Carus. R. Chiang, J Connolly. J Davis, R.Easton. R. Hamblen, T. Hazlen, T. Hilton. J. Jarvinen. R.Livermore. R. Medrow, A. Moon, T. OlesoiPlock. J. Pournelle. R. Reed, M. Saha, D. TuC. VaseyGRAPHICS: Jean Baer, Stephanie CzeLehman, Rodger MacGowan. Jim SkinnerEXCLUSIVE AGENTS: ARGENTINA; Sanoler uasangS.A.; Jose E. Uriburu 377; 1027, Buenos Aires: AUS-TRALIA; Jedko Games Ltd; 111 Beatrice St.; Cheltanham3192; Victoria; BELGIUM; CODACO SPRL; 1072Chaus-see de Ninove; 1000Bruxelles; FRANCE; Jeux Descartes;5, rue de la Baume; 75008 Paris; GREAT BRITAIN;Michaels Models; 648 High Rd.; N. Finchley N. 12 ONL;GREECE; American Book & News; 68 Syngrou Ave.;Athens 408; ITALY; Don. Alfredo Gentili; Tirrenia (Pisa);Via dei Lecci, 1; JAPAN; Post Hobby Co.; 1 -38 Yoyogi.Shibuya-ku; Tokyo; MALAYSIA/REPUBLIC OF SINGA-PORE; Wong International I I Sinar Bulan;Singapore 17; Rep. of SI UTH AFRICA;Gamma Games Ltd.; P.O. B a Town 8000;SWEDEN; Playground HB c/ jornbarrstigen3; S-222 38 LUND.

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lstions regardirrubiectsl can t,er games onl)in, OH 44052

valon Hill Philosophy Part 72Aside from being late again, this issue comesto you notable both for what is in t and for whatis not. In he way of newgamesyou'llfinal lyfindan advertisement for our BISMARCK game

which has been overdue since last July.Scheduled for release at ORIGINS 78 and longfeared lost by those of you who placed advanceorders last July, BISMARCK pulled off theassembly line and alongside the quay of ouradvance mail order customers about March20th. The game advertised in this issue is nowavailable and not just a figment of someone'shopeful promised deadline.The last statement is a prelude to what youwon't find advertized i n this issue. Yes, MAGICREALM is once again among the missing,having missed its umpteenth consecutivedeadline. This game has been a considerableembarrassment to us-having supposed to havemade its debut at ORIGINS 78, then GEN CON,then Christmas, then the Hobby Show, then lastmonth . Back at ORIGINS 78 we broke from along-standing policy of not accepting pre-publication orders wi th good intentions of filli ngadvance orders for this game and BISMARCKlast fall. It is now almost a ful l year afterour firstoptimistic deadline and a production modeldragon has yet to be slain. This misrepresenta-tion, albeit unintentional, to our loyal customersof promised delivery times should be a source ofconsiderable shame to our R & D Departmentand wil l hopefully result i n a cessation of anyadvance publication offers in the future. I'mbeyond making promises for MAGIC REALM atthis point, but hopefully GOOD LORD WILLING,it will be done by ORIGINS 79.Why have such seemingly interminabledelays come about? Obviously, the fault isprimarily that of the R& D Department, a lthoughsuch unpredictable factors as staff healthproblems and the blizzard of '79 played a part.Basically, however, i n the case of MAGICREALM the problem can be summed up asteething problems with a completely new andnovel game system, complicated by a "chrome"fetish by the designer who lost sight of hisoriginal parameters and constantly built on tothe existing system in an effort to out-D & DDD. Ican sympathize w ith the latter course havingcome down that road myself the past two yearswith the SL gamettes. Hopefully, these delayswill result in a better final product and, in thelong run, that is to everyone's advantage.For all that, MAGIC REALM has been smallpotatoes in Avalon Hill's stew of troubles latelycompared to the trials and tribulations we'vefaced with THE RISING SU N. Despite a year anda half of in-house development and one of themost comprehensive, beautiful & expensivemapboards produced o date, we are no closer topublishing this monster than we were in 1978.The details of th is sad state of affairs is perhapsbest explained by the project developer, FrankDavis.

"Most of us who play wargames haveoccasionally suffered the humiliating experi-ence of total defeat, and most of the time werecognize the playing errors which led to thisdefeat. Ironically, most of us who design thesegames usually assumeour effortsw ill always besuccessful. Well, after nine years of designingand developing games, I've suddenly made the

embarrassing discovery that I'm not infallibFor the past year I've been toiling on a gacalled THE RISING SUN. Originally designedLarry Pinsky, THE RISING S UN is an ambitioattempt to simulate the entire war in he PacTheater during World War I1 on a ratherdetaileoperational level. Thus, we knew from the stthat this project would be considerably hardthan Avalon Hill's popular but much simpVICTORY IN THE PACIFIC. As a matter of fawhen we first received the prototype here, tstaff people who reviewed it concluded thnothing short of a miracle would be requiredtur n i t into even a moderately enjoyable gamEven Larry admitted he had barely been ableplay-test even the shortest scenariosIt was at this point that I naivelytookovertresponsibility for developing the game (Deceber, 1977) . was fearless. At SPI wheI formerly worked, I had either designed developed eighteen games on topics rangifrom the Punic Wars to Wor ld War II. I expecTHE RISING SUN to be difficult but I wsupremely confident that I could take Larrybasic design and develop it in to a hel l of agamWit hin a week or two, however, Ibeganencoutering small problems such as the fact that i n prototype design each Game-Turn (whrepresented two weeks) had approximatefourteen Naval Movement Phases and seemto require an entire day to play (and here I uthe term "p1ay"extremely loosely; thegame whopelessly unplayable). Isoon discovered a hoof other problems(for example, the designer htried to use counters representing sma i grouof six aircraft and due to the overall playicounter limitations imposed on the game, tU.S. Player would not even be provided wenough counters to represent the carrcompliments after 1942) which eventuaconvinced me tha t the game required an almocomplete redesign.Now, to try to make a long and painfu l stobrief, and to emphasize the fact that I am ntrying to pin the blame on Larry Pinsky, I muadmit that my own arduous effort to redesiTHE RISING SUN was less than a complesuccess (much less).Imade a host of changesredesigned the counters (air, land, and navareresearched and corrected the Order of Apearance, changed heTurn Scale toone mondeveloped a new and simpler simultaneomovement system, added an interesting codbreaking and naval intelligence system, reducthe number of required tables from almostt hito six totally revamped all of the scenariochanged the game from top to bottom aeveryone who was familiar with these changconsidered the result a vast improvement ovthe origina l, unplayable monster. Unfortunateabout two months ago, I came to the srealization that these improvements weinsufficient. We definitely had a better, moelegant monster but it was still a terrifyingunplayable monsterAt that point, I decided to take a leave absence to consider the alternatives. I speseveral weeks wrestling with my conscienceknew Ihad created a Frankenstein and IdecidI could not allow Avalon Hill to release it on aunsuspecting public. When I inally returned

Continued on Pg 31 Column

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THEGENERAL PAGE

FIRST IMPRESSIONSII N INTRODUCTION TO SQU D LE DER PLUS ONE

By Bob MedrowBack in Volume 14, No. 5 of TAHG, an article of

mine subtitled An Introduction to Squad Leaderappeared. In that article 1 tried to give the readersome insights into the basic character of thisfascinating game of WWII tactical combat. In thefollowing pages I hope, this year, to give you oneperson's view of how the system stands after theaddition of the first SLgamette, CROSS OFI RON,known hereafter as COI. The inspiration for the firstarticle rested exclusively upon my playtestingexperience with SL. This article, too, draws uponplaytesting experience, but also has some otherroots: a year's additional experience with SL itself,the opportunities I've had to read what others havewritten, and the chances that have come along todiscuss various matters with a great many informedwargamers.This article covers three major points: thesignificant ways in which COI both changes andadds toSLin the area of the AFV rules; basic aspectsof the play of the armor game as it now stands; and alook at all eight of the COI scenarios. The majornonarmor related additions to the system will bedescribed as they appear in the scenarios. As wasSL, COI is a programmed instruction game, withnew rules being fed in with each new scenario. Inaddition to comments about the play of thescenarios, I'll attempt to relate a bit of how theyevolved since, and presumably as a result of, theblind playtest which I and others were involved in.Most of what follows should be intelligible tosomeone who is familiar with SL, but, as yet,doesn't know much about COI.A letter in Vol. 15, No. 3 commented upon the

playing times for the COIscenarios. In truth, theyare not short. In any game playing time is affectedby three principal considerations: the complexity ofthe rules; the amount of time required to execute thegame's routines and procedures; and the complexityof the play of the game. The more complex the rules,the more time one spends trying to find that elusivepiece of information you need. With familiarity, thistime cost goes down. COIdoes introduce some newtime-consuming routines as well. Finally, even ifrules complexity or game mechanics don't stretchthings out, complex play decisions can. Chess is theobvious example of a game where that's the case. Inwriting this article, one of my major hopes is thatyou, having read it, will be better able to identify andabsorb the added complications COIintroduces. Asecond hope is that the hard data given will help you

become more comfortable about the decisions thegame requires. After all, nobody needs to play agame in order to become frustrated.In looking at the basic aspects of play whenAFVs are involved there is, of necessity, discussionof probabilities. These numbers will not tell youwhat to do in every situation. Rather, I hope togiveyou some sort of broad feel for how the AFV gameplays.THE EVOLUTION OF RMORWhen you open up COI and look over itscontents your first impression is likely to be thatCOI is all about armor. The vast number of AFVcounters, representing the entire WWII range ofGerman and Soviet vehicles, is impossible to ignore.In truth, however, less than 35% of the COIrules isdevoted to AFV rules. Having said this, though, itmust be pointed out that this portion of the rules isby far the longest one with a common theme, andalmost all of these rules appear at the beginning ofthe rules. What follows now is a survey of how thearmor portion of the rules has changed form SL.and of the additional aspects of AFV reality that thesystem now encompasses.ChangesIn terms of length of rules, the AFV portion ofCOIis some 15% greater than that of SL. If you likethose bad news/good news stories, that laststatement might well be the bad news. The goodnews is that the basic nature of the AFV rules isunchanged.Figure I rmor Counters Past and Present

To see what has changed, let's first look, in Fig.1, at a pair of AFV counters, the MkIVF2 from SLand the STGlllG from COI. The latter counterdisplays two numbers below the movement pointsvalue, where the SL counter has none, and hasplaces for three MG factors, compared with two onthe MkIV. It's hardly a secret that the SL AFVswere pretty much middle-of-the-line vehicles. Sinceit is the intention of the series of gamettes to presentall of the armor of WWII, the rules must allow for

the range of armor arrangements that saw comWith separate TO KILL values for front, siderear hits, SL had a reasonable representation ofarmor distribution for the vehicles included therThe two numbers below the movement points vare the front and s idetrear armor DRMs (dicemodifiers). While S L does have armor DRMs apply uniformly to all TO KILL rolls. Of necesCOI expands upon this. For example, the GerJagdPzVI, as did many of the tank destroypossessed much heavier frontal armor, comparethat carried on its rear sides, than did a typical tAs a result its two DRMs are 5 and +I. Tlie guse of such a vehicle would be greatly distorted igame system were to be incapable of presenting sfacts.If you look carefully at the two numbers onSTGlll G you'll notice that the upper one has aaround it. This means that the DRM of any froshot TO KILL roll is increased by when the veis hull down. The boxes appear when the vehicquestion possessed turret and upper body arproportionally greater than that of the hull arupon which the normal DRMs are based.These numbers also perform the taskindicating the size of the vehicle. If one ofnumbers is on a circular white background, theHIT roll gets a + I DRM; if both values arprinted the DRM is 2. On the other side of thecoin, one or two numbers in red mean a TO DRM of -1 or -2, the latter modifier being resefor such behemoths as the Russian KV-IIA.

In reality, tank mounted MGs come in ttypes: hull mounted, turret mounted along sidemain armament, and mounted atop the turret iAA mount. SL lumped the first two types togetCOI separates them because separate turret cters are provided. No longer will you be ablchange the vehicle facing of an immobilized when you fire the main gun. Now there's a turrbe moved.These two changes in the counter informado not require you to forget much of what learned in SL. A careful look at the mechanicmovement, attack, and the interaction of AFVstheir environment shows that the SL structustill there. With the possible exception ofchanges introduced b y the appearance of tucounters. the alterations are those necessary in oto reflect the total range of WWII armor.Other changes appear in the areas of vehimmobilization, overruns by AFVs, the C

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P GE 4 THEGENER Exposure rules, and infantry Close Combat againstAFVs. These points will all be considered later on,in somedetail, when we take a look at how the rulesand dice rolls combine to dictate the probabilities ofsuccessor failure. With the exception of thechangesconcerning vehicle immobilization and CrewExposure, these changes were also dictated by therequirementthat the systemencompassan extreme-ly broad spectrum of AFVs.AdditionsHere is where the complexity reallyappears. Butone thing needs to be made clear. The source of thecomplexity is not in the structure of the rulesthemselves. Rather, it is the decision making thatarises from the rules that complicates things. Takenone at a time, the new play mechanics are rathersimple, logical extensions of the original system inthat they expand the things your cardboardwarriors can do and the number of factors thatinfluence performance. The burden this produces isobvious. As their potentials are expanded thequestion of what they should be doing gets harder toanswer. As the factors influencing performancebecome more numerous it gets harder to see howthings are likely to turn out. And all of that explainswhy, after a brief look at what s new, we turn tosome specifics of how things work.Figure 2 shows us two versions of the TO HITTable, the first being from S L and the second fromCOI The first addition to things is a pair of columnsto show what happensat longer ranges. Whileyou dbe hard put to get many shots away at over 39 hexesin the 20 scenarios now in existence, the clearintention behind the expansion beyond SL is toprovide an open-ended system covering everythingthat could occur.The division of the TO HIT DRMs into threecategories is for the purpose of organizing all of theeffects now present. GUN TYPE MODIFICA-TIONS are easily dealt with by noting that they do

nothing but reflect the effects, particularly at longrange, of the ordnance which existed during WWII.Under the heading of FIRER MODIFICA-TIONS, A through E are from SL with no changesin values. Of the others, H is self-explanatory. WithF, G and I we meet some of the new sources ofcomplexity. To illustrate, the mechanics ofIntensive Fire are simple: if you wish to add onemore shot to the normal rate of fire you may do so.The cost is a +2 TO HIT DRM and a reduction of2 in the Breakdown Number. The problem is thatyou now have a new option to consider. DeliberateImmobilization is a similar sort of thing. At a cost ofthe DRMs shown you may attempt to immobilizean enemy vehicle. Ifyou make the modified TO HITroll then required, you stop the brute without anyfurther dice rolling. However,you forego any chanceyou might have had of destroying the target. Theadded decision making is obvious. Modifier I is afascinating one. Having met John Hill this pastsummer, I imagine that he s quite pleased with thisone. As we shall see in the second major section, anumber of factors must be considered when tryingto decide whether or not your vehicles should bebuttoned up as they go into action. You ll find thatit s much easier to handle the matters raised in F andG.

Turning to the third category, TARGETMODIFICATIONS, entries J through L areoriginal S L considerations with no changes invalues. Of the other modifiers, Q has already beenmentioned in connection with the counters. M isavailable for situations in which the gun in questionbegins the game in position, and represents theopportunity which would then exist for the crew tohave bore-sighted one single hex. The eligibleweapons and other restrictions are logical andclearly stated.With N, and P we get, once more, into somethings that complicate play without themselvesbeing complicated. N deals with the situation in

which a weapon that needs to use theTO HITTabcontinues to fire at the same.target turn after turThe maximum allowable DRM, available for tthird turn of fire, is -2. There are various rules threstrict the availability of this advantage, twowhich are apt to increase the decision making timTo keep the advantage, or increase it if it is not y-2 the gun must fire at the same target in eaplayer turn s Defensive Fire Phase or Prep FPhase. In addition, even momentary movementthe target out of the firer s LOS eliminates aexisting advantage as does movement of firer tonew hex. For the firer, the opportunity to acqutargets complicated the decision making procebecause it now costs you something to switch targeand there can be an added disadvantage to movito a new hex. To list just one concern for the gwith the targets, there s the possibility that sendiacquired targets off on brief detours will increatheir survival probabilities. However, doing so malso cost valuable time.and P represent the penalties associated wfiring at targets you haven t had much of a lookThis sort of effect is certainly realistic, andparticularly like the way in which, practically,reflects a difference between open and brok

terrain. However, it must be admitted that this pieof realismis purchased at a definite cost. To applyyou must know when a vehicle is within your LOand that can mean making a lot of LOS checkWhen using this, try to exercise some commsense; otherwise, things can really drag.The two KILL Tables shown in Fig. 3 contamuch less that s new that hasn t already beconsidered. The expanded range of weapons isobvious requirement of the expanded scope of tgame system. Unlike the comparatively fewchangin dice rolls required on the TO HIT Table, the neKILL Table has a number of changes. Overahowever, such changes have little effect.

Figure 2: S Q U A D LEA D ER GA ME SYSTEM TO HIT TABLE EVOLUTION

TargetTO H IT T A B L E 33.3 A

Type/ Range HIT DETERM INAT ION DlCE ROLL MODIF IERS 33 31Firing during Defensive Fire Phase vs Moving target . . . . . . . . . . . . . .gun firing at target over 6 hexes a w a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .gun firing at target over 12 hexes a w a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tank firing ou t s ~d e overed A r c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tank firing during Advancing Fire Phase after pivotingwithin hex during Movement Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tank fir~ng u r ~ n g dvancing Fire Phase after moving to a new h e x . .S P Gu n / AT Gun firing during Advancing Fire Phase afterpivoting wit in hex during Movement Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Target 1s con cea l ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .S P Gu n , AT Gun firing during Defensive Fire Phase afterpivoting wit in hex during Defensive Fire Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Target is in adjacent h e x . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .

TO HIT TABLE 33.3 HIT DETERMINATION DlCE ROLL MODIFIERS 33 31Target TypeIRangeU in blda..

INF in woods

~ h c i i l ~ci3ge is in other

FIRER MODIFICATIONSTank firing outside Covered Arc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .rTank firing during Adv. Fire Phase after pivotingwithin hex during Movement Phase ...........................Tank firing during Adv. Fire Phase after moving to a new h e x . . SSP Gun/ AT Gun firing during Adv. Fire Phase afterpivoting within hex during Movement Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3SP Gun1 AT Gun firinn durinp, Defensive Fire Phase alter-pivoting within hex during Defensive Fire P h a x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4F. Intensive Fire (70.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

................. Deliberate Immobilization (66.2) (side target lacing) +3(66.21) (rear target facing) ............................ 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. C a~t u redOrdnance (90.13). +2.GUN TYPEMODIF ICA~ IONS TARGET MODIFICATIONS I. Buttoned Up(64.47) . .RangeIGunType L LL J Target is moving (Defensive Fire) +2 N. Target is acquired 69.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fire I

. . . . . .7-12 hexes K. Target is concealed.. +2 0 . Moving target using I or less MPs or MFs in firer s LOS +I..................................13-24 hexes . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 1 I L. Target is in adjacent h e x . . -2 P. Moving larget using 3 or less MPs in firer s LOS. . +I.......................... ...................25-39 hexes j I -2 M. Target is in bore-sighted hex (78.4). -2 Q . Target size (64.6). .per vehicular target counter40 hexes +4 1 -2

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THE GENER L P GE

Of the modifiers, Ban d C make the highgrou nd(specifically, a two level height advantage) impor-tant. Coupled with the ability of only somevehiclesto get hull down up on a hill, this addition candrastically alter the actu al value of certain vehiclesin some situations. D is a possibility whenever anunmodified 2 is rolled. When it happens, ithappens. This is a rule to be fatalistic about. Theeffects of range upon penetration are a welcomeaddition in that they further distinguish am ong theguns a t ve little cost of any sort.

One of the m ajor add itions to the AFV rules isthe appearance of separate counters for tankcommanders. Such a cou nter is displayed atop theturret whenever the vehicle is not buttoned up. It is,quite simply, one of my favorite new rules. The rulesgoverning their performance replace the S L CrewExposed rules of 34.8. As before, the comma nder isentitled to a +2 DRM when attacks against thevehicle are resolved on the Infantry Fire Table.Now, however, Morale Check results a re notignored; instead, failed MC s result in the loss of thecommander and prevent the vehicle and its crewfrom engaging in any activity for the balance of thatand the next player turn. In addition, all future TOHIT rolls suffer an extra +I DRM. KIA results nolonger cause the crew to un dergo a M C, with failurecausing abandonment and destruction of thevehicle. Now, the result is that th e vehicle mus t leavethe board, at its maximum speed, via the shortestpath th at leads it back to its own lines.

Figure 3: S Q U A D LEADER GA ME SYSTEM TO KILL TABLE EVOLUTIONAF V KILL TABLE 33.4 A SPECIAL

A P AMMUNITION H E AMMUNITIONTarget M M C / H M G 50ca1/20mm 37 50 75/76 37 50 75/76 105 20 150 H 6AFV FrontAFV Side I1AFV RearTruck, Jeep 10 I

N A . . s e e 5 1 . 4rn AF V KILL N U M B E R MODI F I ERS 33.41Halftracks 5 M4A4,T34, MklV 0Priest. . 2 M4M52, SU122, STG 111 IM-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 SU152, Brumbar 2A P AMMUNITION AFV KILL TABLE 33 .4n20LL 37H 75, 76LLATR 25L 25LL 40L 45LL 76* 85L 75LL 75Ht MMG 12.7 20 20L 37L 28LL 40 45L 50 50L 88* 75 75L 88L 105L 88LL lOOH 128L 150*TARGET t HMG 15 37* 37 47. 37LL 47 47L 57 57L 57LL 122* 76 76L 90L 152 lOOL l22L l5OL 1522AFVfront -2 -1 0 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 4 6 7 8 9 11 10 12 7 ,IFV sideIFV rearUnarmored*

must be within normal range 12.. .-.7mm or .50 cal HMG 15 = 14.5mm HMG ATR = anti-tank rifle 63.9) gunshields 4 uns -5*See 51.4 H E AMMUNITION SPECIAL WEAPONS PSK MCTarget 30+ 40 50+ 70+ 100+120+150+ P F PIAT BAZ ATM DC FTAFVfront ' 0 1 3 5 6 7 7 4 7 5I AFV sideAFV rearI Unarmored

............FV TO KILL MO D IF IERS E. Range Effects on Penetration 65.2) A P Ammunition OnlyA. As per individual target armor modifier G un Size1B. Height advantage vs close topped armor 77.3). I Range in hexes 1 2 3-6 7-12 13-24 25-39 40-59 60+. Height advantage vs open topped armor 77.3). -3 40mm or less -2 I 0 +I +2 +4 +6Critical Hit 68.2) AFV Rear -1 -3 -2 -1 0 +I t 2 +3

Clearly, having a commander out there in theopen has become a risky proposition. As if theab ovewasn't bad enough, Close Combat attacks nowprofit by a -1 DR M when thevehicle is not buttonedup. In most circumstances the only reasons forhaving the comm ander o ut in the open are to avoidthe +1 TO HIT DRM (33.31,I) and to give him thechance to use the AA MG if the vehicle is soequipped. However, not all tank commanders arejust ordina ry guys. Some of them possess morale andleadership ratings (from 8-1 through 10-3), just asdo the infan try leaders of SL. The morale rating isused in connection with IFT attacks, while thatleadership rating is applied t o T O HI T dice rolls,Overrun attacks and AA MG attacks. The ordinaryjoes come o ne per vehicle while the special ones areavailable as per the scenario OoB. I n scenarios youconstruct yourself German armor leaders averagearou nd 7% cheaper than thecorresponding infantryofficers while Russians are abo ut 4% more costly.One of the things 1 liked abo ut the S L systemfrom the start was the way in which, in a number ofsituations, an increased advantage could be ob-tained at an increased risk. As a player, I find thequestion of balancing gain against risk bothchallenging and entertaining. Here is another one ofthose situations, and I'm glad to see it. Collectively,such rules go a long way toward reflecting thecharacter of co mba t at this level.

T H E A R M O R G A M ENow that you've had a chance to learnsomething about the armo r portion of the SL+ OIsystem, or to see some things through my eyes, it'stime to take a look a t the numbers. As you mightsuppose, there would be no problem in gene rating a

tremendous mass of numbers about the kindsthings that can happen. My intention in following is to translate the dice rolls and thDR Ms in to information a bo ut results in some vbasic situations involving armo r.Guns and the AFVThe basic information required in orderdetermine the probability of success for any attthat requires use of both TO H IT and KILL drolls is given in Table 1. While a thorouunderstanding of how these numbers are obtainenot really required, a little knowledg e of probabinever hurt any wargamer, and has helped quifew.Most of the rolls made in the S L systemmade with two dice. Because the numbers usedthe system are the sum s of the spots, the probabties of the different o utcomes are sometimes harvisualize. The chan ce of rolling a 2 is 1 in 36,chance of rolling a 3 is 2 in 36, and so on up chances in 36 to roll a 7. After that the chances sfalling: the chance of an 8 is5 in 36, that of a9 is 36, and so o n, with a 12 once again having justchance in 36 Probably the most essential obsetion one could make about the first part of paragraph is that nothing in there says that if roll two ho nest dice 36 times you'll get 2 onctwice, and so on, with 12 coming up just once.dice don't rememb er. Each time they're rolledchances are the same. It wouldn't happen often,a pair of ones co uld come up on all of those 36 r

When someone talks about the probabilitysomething they're referring to the ratio of number of chances that som ething has of cominto the to tal num ber of possible outcomes. With

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P GEsided dice, each die can come up six different ways.With two dice there would then be six times six, or36, possible outcoTes. You could roll a 1 on onedi eand anything from I through 6 on the second. or a 2on one die and anything from 1 through 6 on thesecond, etc. The only combination of spots that willgive you a total of 2 is a 1 on each die. Thus, the Ichance in 36 mentioned above. The probability ofrollinga 1 s then0.02778 to five decimal places. Youcould roll a total of 7 with a 1and a 6, a 2 and a 5, a 3a n d a 4 a 4 a n d a 3 a 5 a n d a 2 o r a 6 a n d a 1,foratotal of six different ways. Thus, the probability ofrolling a 7 is 0.16667. From the definition ofprobability it should be clear that the sum of theprobabilities of all possible outcomes must totalone.

To turn now to where the Table I entries comefrom, suppose that the required TO HIT roll is 8 orless and the KlLL roll required is 6 or less. Theprobability of rolling 8 or less is the sum of theprobabilities of rollinga 2, a 3 and so on, up through8, for a total of 0.72222. The probability of rolling6or less is 0.4 1667. To do any damage, of course, bothmust be rolled, so that the probability of a successfulshot is equal to the product of both probabilities,0.30093. In Table I, and all of the other Tables aswell, probabilities are expressed in percentages.Thus the probability of success is 30.093 roundedio 30.1 in Table I, reading down in column 8 andover in row 6.As would be expected from the discussionabove, an attack involving TO HIT and KlLL of,respectively, 6 and 8 will also be successful 30. I ofthe time. However, there is one difference in the twoattacks. The COIrules provide for the possibility ofimmobilization of a non-Hull Down armored targetwhenever it's fired at from side or rear. Under thesecondit ions there's a 50 chance of immobilization ifthe KlLL roll is exact1 v equal to the maximumKlLL number. Thus, in the first attack, a KlLL rollof 5 or less guarantees destruction of the target, anevent which Table I informs us occurs 20.1 of thetime, while a roll of 6 might just stop it. As areasonably informed guess I'd say that non-HullDown, rear or side shots occur no more than 50 ofthe time. Recalling that even a roll of 6 with suchanattack yields an immobilization only half of thetime, it seems likely that a shot that just stops theenemy will occur some 2 of the time, or once inevery 15 successful attacks. For the second attackthe actual frequency of immobilization in thismanner is about half of these values. Because thefrequency of this result will always be rather low,this is the only mention it will get. It does cause anoccasional scream of anguish, but if that sort ofrandom stroke really bothers you, neither S L norCOI is your kind of game.

If there's one thing that is certain about thisgame it is that the TO HIT and KlLL rolls will besubjected to DRMs. With respect to use of Table 1,first locate the proper column and row using theappropriate numbers from 33.3 and 33.4. Then tota lup separately all TO HIT DRMs and all KlLLDRMs. If the net TO HIT DR M is positive, move tothe left a number of columnsequal t o the DRM. Fora net negative DRM move to the right. Todetermine the effect of the KILL DRMs, move upfor a net positive DRM and down for a negativeone. To make sure you get that straight, here's anexample. Suppose a German King Tiger is taking afrontal shot with its 88LL gun at a stationary T-34/85 (+I frontal armor DRM), at the sameelevation in clear terrain and 25 hexes away. From33.3 and 33.4 the TO HIT and KILL numbers are 7and I I The only (and, thus, the net) TO HIT DRMis-2for the LLgun. On the KlLLroll the DRMsaredor the armor and I for range effect, giving a net

of +2. So, from column 7 and row I I we move twocolumns right and two rows up, finding that theattack will succeed 69.4 of the time.With Table 1 at hand the first thing I think weneed to look at is how all of these new considera-tions in COIaffec t the performance characteristicsof armor. In Table 2 the PzKwlVF2 is paired offagainst various Russian vehicles, beginning in thefirst column with the T34 as they both appeared inSL No firer modifications are used. The number tothe left of the slash is the probability of a successfulGerman frontal attack while that to the right is theprobability of Russian success. Other than poorerSoviet marksmanship at the longer ranges there isnothing different about the vehicles since, in gameterms, there is no difference between the German75mm gun and the Russian 76mm weapon.When we examine the first two columns togetherwe see some immediate consequences of the COIchanges. In each column the guns and armor (+0DRM) are the same for both vehicles. So, too, arethe results in the 7 to 24 hex range, but look at whatnow happens outside that range. The kill probabili-ties now rise much more steeply as the range isreduced below 7 hexes, making the short rangebattle much more lethal. On the other hand. theability to do damage at long range is sharply cut. Bythe way, a 0 ntry in thiso r any other Table meansa non-zero probability of less than 0.5 . A dashmeans that the situation cannot occur or theprobability is zero.The middle two columns reveal a very interest-ing picture of what the addition of a I armor DRMand a better gun (76L) will do for the T34. Thecombination makes the Russian tank the superiorvehicle all the way out to 40 hexes in thiscomparison. But in a tactical game pieces do notpossess anything like the same amount of absoluteworth they have in many higher level games. Thispoint is illustrated by comparing the last twocolumns. The vehicles are the same, but the lastcolumn supposes that the German tank is hulldownand possesses a -1 TO KILL modifier by virtue ofbeing two levels higher. The effects are startling.Superiority is reversed to a devastating extent,revealing once again that what you have may not beas important a s where you put it. Regrettably for theSoviets, reversal of the positions doesn't do nearlyas much for the Russians. Because of their lack ofsufficient gun depression, Russian tanks (andenclosed S P Guns) cannot be hull down ifthey wishto fire at a vehicle at a lower elevation. If theT34/76B has the height advantage it gains about10 because oft hat -1 DRM, but the PzKwlV losesnothing.

Before going on you should know that theprevious results, and all those that follow, neglectthe existence of critical hits. My justification for sodoing is based upon what I found when I calculatedthe contents of Table 2 taking critical hits intoaccount. Out to 24 hexes, the probabilities ofsuccess were no more than 1.05 times the values inTable 2. Beyond 24 hexes such hits becomerelatively more significant, but the differencebetween, say, a 2.3 chance of success and one of2.8 just doesn't excite me.One of the questions that I had about thevehicles presented in COIwas which grew faster, thearmor or the guns? As the war progressed bothgrew, but, looking at the numbers, it wasn't at allclear to me which grew faster. Over the years myreading in the period has left me with some definitefeelings about what had happened. To see how thegame system told it I paired off the PzKwIIIEagainst the T-70, the PzKwlVF2 against theT34/76A, and the PzKwVG against the JS-I.Unlike what was done to obtain the resultspreviously presented, I assumed a 50-30-20 distribu-tion of front, side and rear shots.The results agreed

with what I feel to be true. The earliest vehicles anoticeably less dangerous at all ranges than are tothers , while the heavies don't show much improvment relative to the mediums until you get obeyond the 24 hex range.Sometimes games set traps for the unwarWhether or not that's deliberate is, as they sabeyond the scope of this article. What I'm goinglook at now are the two topics of Intensive Fire aDeliberate Immobilization. From its earlier metion we know that lntensive Fire (hereafter IF) adone to the rate of fire at the cost of a +2 TO HDRM and a reduction by two of the breakdownumber of the firing piece of ordnance. The decisito use Intensive Fire should never be made lightlythe normal rate of fire (hereafter ROF) abreakdown number are 1 and 12, respectivetaking two shots under the IF option will leave ywith a broken down weapon 31 of the time, a16 of the time you won't even get that second shoff. The breakdown chance goes to 48 fornormal breakdown on 11 or 12. If the normal ROand breakdown number are 2 and 12, taking three shots under the IF option (if you can get theall off) will leave you without a functioning weap42 of the time. If the normal numbers are 2andthe weapon busts 62 of the time. Clearly, then, ymust be prepared to see the end of your weapwhen you try IF.Even when the situation is such that youwilling to gamble with the weapon, IF may bea bbargain in that trying that option may actually leto a reduced probability of a success. To show hothis can be, suppose that, after all DRMs, a normattack would have the probability of success showin column 7, row 5, of Table 1, i.e., 16.2 . Tprobability of success of each individual IF attawould lie in the same row and 2 columns to the leThe value there is 7.7 , less than one-half tprobability of success of a normal attack. You doneed to be a math genius to realize that trying twshots, each of which has less than one-half tchance of success of a single shot, isa bad idea,evif you escape the possibility of a gun breakdown

If one's looking for a rule of thumb, the simpleone is to avoid the use of IF unless it is absolutenecessary that you destroy a number of targets equto what your enhanced rate of fire would be with IHowever, for the person who wants to finetune hor her game, I offer Table. 3. The numbers in tfirst four columns tell you the largest net KlLL diroll a t which using IF gives you a probability success at least equal to that which you have winormal fire. As the Table shows, this number isfunction of the normal TO HIT roll. You'll note thtrying the IF option always gives you a better chanof success if the normal TO HIT roll is a 2. Iinteresting to note that if the normal ROF abreakdown number are 2 and I I, I F is never a goidea if all you have are two essential targeHowever, there are some situations where it workFor the case in the first column, if the normal THIT roll was 10 and the required KlLL roll was 8less, IF would give you a better chance of succeBut in neither this nor any other case is timprovement noteworthy.The last two columns of Table 3 considDeliberate Immobilization (hereafter Dl). Tabentries tell you when electing to try Dl gives youbetter chance of immobilizing the target thaoriginally, you had of destroying or immobilizingThese values can be determined quite easily froTable I. To determine whether or not a particulnormal, side attack could profitably be convertinto a Dl attempt we do the following. First, locathe normal attack in Table 1. Compare the numbyou find there with the bottom number in tcolumn three t o the left of the normal attack one. an example, suppose that the normal attack wou

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THE GENERAL PAGEbe in column 8, row 9, s o that it would have aprobability of success of60.2 . If youelect to try forDI, there's a +3 T O H I T D R M , but that's the onlyroll you need to make. Thus, all you need to d o isroll a 5, which happens 27.8 of the time, and that isthe number at the bot tom of column 5. Obviously,that would be a bad bargain. Looking up the 8column we see that the highest KILL number forwhich the value shown is less than 27.8 is 5, andthat corresponds to the value in Table 3.Personally, I a m much more inclined to use DIthan I a m to use IF. M y own rule of thumb is to,barring circumstances that require a try for a kill, g ofor a D I whenever 1have a sideshot and need to rolla 2 o r a 3 to kill. As you can see from my ownnumbers, that's conservative, but that sort of rule isthe only alternative I can see t o playing a game likeSL surrounded with charts and tables. If you'rewallowing in numbers and think that that lastsentence is totally inconsistent with what's going onhere, I can understand the feeling. However, theproper use of these numbers is t o help you developreasonable doctrines for your squa rewarriors. I, forone, derive little pleasure from looking u p numbersin a table during a game.The last thing we need to look at in connect ionwith guns and AFVs i s the matter of indirect H E fireattacks. Here we find the first place a t which thequestion of should you o r should you not bu t ton upyour tank expands the range of play decisions.Tw o things concerning this form of a t t ack havechanged from what they were in SL First of all, theInfantry Fire Table equivalents of the 70mmthrough 120mm guns have been shifted one columnto the right, thereby making them more lethal toeveryone. Incidentally, this is the only change in theIFT. COI also contains a completely altered andexpanded version of section 63, and one part of that ,63.39, modifies the S L routine for resolving indirectHE attacks. Th e Artillery Barrage vs VehiclesModifiers of 46.54 are still in use, bu t non-open-topAFVs with posi t ivearmor D RM s g e t to add them inas well. Unfortunately, 63.39 does not tell you whatto d o if the vehicle has different front and sidetreararmor D RM s . It has since been decided that thelesser of the two should be used so long a s it is s t i l lapositive D R M .

Table 4 shows the probability that a vehicle willsurvive one, two, o r three attacks from IFT-resolvedHE attacks. Practically speaking, threeat tacks is themost one would expect t o experience in a singleDefensive Fire Phase. As the rules now stand, thelowest possible modifier; that for non-armoredvehicles, is -3, s o that's where the Table starts. Itends with +5 because IFT-resolved attacks can neverdestroy anything with a greater total modifier. Th eobvious moral of the Table is don't put your headdown and charge through a Defenisive Fire Phaseartillery barrage unless there is something veryworthwhile o n the other side.

6 lr BD No. 12

Table 3. ~ n enax~rnum ILL a ~ c e olls or wnlcn arremortnr

Tbaidea.

caliber

Any vehicle commander riding with his head ou twould, of course, be at tacked by such H E fire with a+2 D R M , making his chances of being KIA'd a sgood a s those of the basic S P Gun . However, M Cresults must now also be considered. I th ink,therefore, that Table 5 makes interesting reading.The ordinary commanders have the morale level oftheir nationality's crew counter , while the specialones have values up t o 10, which accounts for therange of leader morales. In looking a t thesenumbers, remember that a failed M C means thevehicle loses its commander and canno t move o r firefor the balance of that and the following player turn.After that, if it's still a round , it gets a +I T O H I Tmarker, in addi t ion to the normal I for beingbuttoned up, for the balance of the game. Tha t ID R M for being but toned up will tempt you to keep

+45Table 4. r tss puv vrrnjr rtmr a r s r l z u r wll i aut r r r s virs r

Infantry Fi re Table.Commander Gun caliberMora le 1

6 : I I I7

1Table 5. Th e probability that a vehicle's commander will survive one, t a )r three attackresolved o n the Infantry Fire Table

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P GEthe commander out when he should be in. Resisttemptation, and accept the game's (and history's)verdict: button up when the artillery arrives.With these five Tables, and the words aroundthem, I've tried to give you a reasonably completelook at guns as they are used by and against AFVs.As I said earlier, generat ing numbers is no problem,and a line must be drawn somewhere. Table 1,however, supplies you all you need in order to workout things like the effectiveness of a 76L AT GUNversus your favorite AFV.

FVs versus infantryA detailed, tactical level game must, of necessity,provide rules to cover a wide variety of events.When I first read through the original playtestversion of the SL rules, that portion of them dealingwith the interaction of armor and infantry struck meas being the most complex part of the system. Thatbelief is still intact. Since then, I have also foundabundant evidence to support the belief that thisportion of the simulation generates the mostcomplex play decisions. In this connection, I havewitnessed, or had described t o me, some examplesof play that boggle the mind. After some twentyyears of playing these games, that's just not easilydone any more.This and the third, and final, section of theexamination-of-numbers portion of this article aredevoted to a look at this aspect of the system as itnow stands after the addition of COI. In theinterestof avoiding too many useless generalities, while atthe same time providinga basis for further study, noinfantry carried and used anti-tank weapons areconsidered. Thus, what we're about t o see is the bestcase for armor and the worst case for infantry. Asyou'll discover, if you haven't already done so, thatbest is sometimes rather poor, while that worst issometimes pretty good.Armor can go after infantry in two ways: it canshoot them up, or it can roll over them. We'llconsider the possibilities in that order.Looking first at the main armament, the attackresolution procedure is unchanged. The firer rolls tosee whether or not he hits; if he does, he rolls on theIFT to determine the outcome; if the outcome isneither a KIA nor a no effect, then various moralechecks must be made. The probabilities and /o r thepossible outcome ar e affected by distance to target,all of the DRMs of 33.31, the caliber of thearmament, the firepower factor modifiers of 10.3and 11.1, the morale of the troops present, thenumber of squads present, and the leadership andmorale values of any leaders present. To complicatethe general picture a bit further, we could also lookat what the AFV's MGs could do in the same turn tothe same target.Unless Avalon Hill were to go into the bookpublishing business, there's no way that all of thepossible combinations of situations could beconsidered. Thus, representative situations becomethe order of the day. Let's first take a look at whathappens when various guns and gun/ MG combina-tions fire at a single squad. As the title of Table 6states, the single infantry squad being fired at has amorale level of 7. However, the numbers for moralelevels 6 and 8 can be estimated quite accurately fromthe information in Table 6. One of the conclusionsreached in my previous article was that an increasein morale level from 7 to 8 produces abou t the sameresult as would the addition of a I terrain effectmodifier. Thus, to convert the values of Table 6 intothose for a squad with a morale level of 8, imaginethat the terrain modifiers run from -3 t o +2. Theopposite sort of thing happens for 6 level troops.For them, the row labels would be - I through +4.While not exact, this procedure is easily goodenough for all practical purposes.

Turning now to the column headings, four ofwhat I consider to be representative gun calibershave been chosen. The first three of them also showthe change in results when the main armament fire iscoupled with some MG fire at the same target. Forexample, 40mm/ 2 refers to attacks by a 40mm gunand a MG with a firepower factor of 2 on the sametarget. As per the rules, all MG fire from a vehicleagainst one target must be combined into oneattack, and is resolved separately from the gunattack. The MG firepower factors are typical for thebow and coaxial MGs of vehicles carrying the gunswith which they are listed.Parts (a), (b) and (c) of Table 6 consider net TOHIT rolls of, respectively, 9, 7 and 5 These valueswere chosen because 9 is, practically, about as goodas you should expect to d o most of the time. As thenumbers show, by the time you need to roll a 5 inorder to hit, the MGs are carrying most of the loadagainst all but well-covered troops. The value of theability to acquire targets is clear from the generaltrend of these numbers.Against fixed targets (e.g., a building) the AFVwill normally be able to select the range ofengagement. Because of the value of MG fire, evenagainst +2 cover, I prefer a range of 8 or less. Gettingthis close to enemy infantry has its own hazards,but if AFVs need to be used against such targets theyneed to close to within effective range.In developing a feel for the effectiveness of theAFV HE fire against infantry, there is oneobservation I find most useful. With a required TOHIT dice roll of 9, such fire is about as effective asthat of regular IFT attacks one column to the leftof the column the gun uses. In other words, thenecessity of having to make a 9 TO HIT roll comesclose to costing the weapon one column on the IFT .The basis for this observation is contained withinTable 7 In Table 6(a) the probability of success of a70-79mm gun goes from 63% down to 19%. Thefirepower facto r (hereafter FPF) equivalent to sucha gun is 12. If we now look at the FPF-of-8 columnof Table 7, we see values of 68% through 15%. Thisobservation should help you see what tha t extradiceroll does t o the weapon's effectiveness. For the samegun class the values in Table 6(b) yield an averagechance of success of 29% for the range of IFT terrainmodifier shown. The average value of the numbersin the FPF-of-6 column is 32%, showing that thenecessity of making a 7 TO HIT reduces the gun'strue effectiveness below that of a heavy MG. Wereyou to explore the numbers for other guns, generallysimilar results would emerge. To me the lesson theyteach is plainenough to ustify the earlier conclusionabout a range of 8.Before going on with the next topic, a few wordsare in order concerning Table 7. Because of thenumber of factors influencing the outcomes of mosttypes of attacks, obtaining a feel for what you canreally expect in a given situation is not particularlyeasy. In connection with attacks against infantrythat are resolved on the IFT, the information inTable 7 is basic. The successful player of the SLsystem needs to have a fair grasp of these numbers.Without such an insight into how things work,tactics will be haphazard. Intelligent tactics requirethat you know what you can reasonably expect fromyour troops, so that you will be able to organizetheir activities in the face of the obstacles beforethem.

This is the primary reason for two of the aboveobservations. The first of these dealt with the way inwhich the effect due to changes in troop moralecould be quickly seen by thinking of it as a DRM.The second dealt with a look at the effects of TOHIT rolls in terms of column shifts. tookingjust atTable 7, we also see that adding enough firepower toan a ttack to shift it one column to the right has justabout the same effect as a -1 DRM would have. For

example, the probability of success of a l2Fattack witha DR M of -2 is the sameas thatf oraFP F attack a t -1.Table 7 is also the basis for the discussion Overrun attacks. As mentioned previously, this tyof attack is another aspect of the rules thunderwent changes to reflect the broadened rangeAFVs now covered. In SL Overruns by AFVs resolved using a F PF of 16 if both main armameand MGs are functional; if either has malfunctionthe F PF falls to 8, the same value as that possessby armed halftracks. In COI all vehicles attack wa strength of 4, plus the FPFs of all MGs us(and/ or the inherent firepower of passengers in tcase of halftracks), plus half the FPF equivalentthe main gun. As before, halftracks must haveFPFattack strength from some source in order toable to Overrun at all. Ingoing through the differevehicles listed, the Overrun champ looks to be tJS-I, attacking with a FPF of 24.Overruns continue t o be possible inevery typeterrain that an AFV is capable of entering; howevCOI now penalizes such attacks in woods, smokewheatfields by reducing their strength by half. addition, the vehicle is immobilized if its Overrattack roll is I I or 12. That , coupled with tability of squads to execute a Defensive Fire Phaattack from covering terrain leaves me with tfeeling that only reckless folks try Overruns anything but clear terrain or, maybe, wheatfield

The obvious question to consider concernthese two forms of attack is which do you use. Tgun/MG combinations in Table 6 are such tvehicles having them would Overrun with strengof 8, 16 and 16, respectively. For the TO Hcondit ions of part (a), the first such vehicle (perhaa Russian T26s) would, in clear terrain, noticeably better making an Overrun attack. Omiddle vehicle would have equal chances of succeither way, while thethird would be better offfirinThe more lightly armed vehicles of the earlportion of the war will invariably do betOverrunning in clear terrain because that battack strength of 4 means so much more to theOnce the conditions are such that the TO HIT rrequired falls below 9, all AFVs do better Overruning.In finishing up this section it is necessary to taa look at the effects leaders have on the survichances of a squad stacked with them. The mattea complicated one and the decisions concerning locations of leaders can be among the most nervracking ones in the game. Some hings, however,stand out. The 8-1 leader is neutral as far assquad's chances of surviving, alive and unbrokgo. As with any leader, its presence in a hex withsquad increases the chance that the squad will destroyed. This follows from the fact that a squwould be made to undergo two morale checks duea single fire if the leader were to be broken as a resof such fire. If, then, an 8-1 is neutral , either a 7-0an 8-0 is a menace to the squad's wellbeing, whil9-1 o r better gives it an increased chance of survivOne good rule of thumb is that an improvement oin the morale level of a leader is worth, in termsthe increased chance of survival, about one-thirdwhat an improvement of 1 in both morale aleadership levels is worth.

Infantry versus FVsAs was true in SL barehanded infantry has tways in which to go after armor. During Defensive Fire Phase, squads and leaders in noopen terrain have a shot at immobilizing AFVs tmove through an adjacent hex. In the Close ComPhase, any infantry unit moving into the same hwith an AFV has a chance of destroying it. Btypes of attacks require that the units involved f

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THE GENERALpass a pre-AFV at tack mora l e check. to which a n yleader present may lend his leadership factor if hehimself has passed the test. Only the second form ofattack has undergone a n y changes from its originalSL form.In order to be successful in a Defensive FirePhase at tack, a t least o n e o f t h e uni tsat tacking mustroll 2, 3 o r less, o r 4 o r less, with the dice rolldependept upon the terrain in the hex occupied bythe unit. Each squad at tacks separately. Any leaderpresent may use his leadership factor to modify thedice roll of one at tack, including his own if he makesone, provided, of course, t ha t he has passed therequired morale check.Of all the numbers produced for this article,those in Table 8 were far and away the most time-consuming to obtain. However, the results a r eextremely interesting (and have been checkedcarefully). Because the factors influencing thesuccess of such at tacks a r e limited, Table 8 gives us avery complete picture of this type of at tack.Probabilities of success a r e given for one, two, o rthree squads at tacking, either by themselves o r withthe aid of a n y leader having a non-zero leadershipfactor. S q u a d mora l e levels of 6 7 a n d 8 a r econsidered, a s are the the three possible dice rollsrequired for success. In Table 8(a) the numberssuppose tha t the leader a t t acks separately, a s this ismore effective than if he were to aid a squad s at tack.Since a leader must always roll a 2 n a n at t ackfrom any type of terrain, this case (infantry in awheatfield) is the only one in which a leader shouldhimself at tack if t t I squad available.

T h e first thing to really strike me was the extentto which the results are independent of squadmorale. In addi t ion, compared with most of theevents in the S L system, the number of squadspresent has little effect. For a given required dice rollthe central factor in success is the caliber of theleadership. T o illustrate these facts, two entries inTable 8(b) are of value: the probability of success ofa stack containing a single, mora l e level 6 squada n d a 10-3 leader is equal to that of a stackcontaining three moral e level 8 squads a n d a 10-2leader. I can think of no other offensive situation inwhich two such stacks would have the same averageefficiency.Reading down in a n y of the columns of numbersquickly tells us tha t the leadership factor of a leaderis immensely more important than is his mora l elevel. This, by the way, is a rather generally validconclusion throughout the S L system.In the nature of things, the availability of such a nat tack is normal ly due to movement of the AFV.Earlier, in comment ing upon Overruns, 1said that Iconsidered them to be reasonable only againstt roops in the open or , perhaps, in wheatfields. InTables 7 a n d 8 you find the basis for such a belief.T h e other si tuat ion in which AFVs come adjacent t oinfantry is, of course, t ha t of simple vehicle

movement in which the vehicle s wish is to just passon by. In deciding whether o r not to give infantry ashot a t a vehicle by at tempt ing a n Overrun , thepotential gain for the side with the vehicle isapparent : the breaking o r destroying of the infantry.

PAGET h e decision about risking a vehicle durmovement can be considerably more difficultmake. A t least, however, Table 8 provides you,player, with a knowledge of the risks involved.Close C o m b a t Phase at tacks are possibleinfantry a n d / o r leaders w h o move into the hcontaining the AFV. Such movement requires tthe units first pass the morale check referredearlier. C O I still requires that a n y infantry friendto-the-AFV in the hex with the A F V a t the starthe Close Combat Phase must first be eliminabefore the A F V can be at tacked. An exceptionthis is made in the case of passengers aboardarmored halftrack. After a n at tackel has detmined how many of his units may advance intohex, some of them must be assigned to at tack ahostile infantry present. If this at tack eliminatesinfantry, o r if there were none present to begin wthe actual Close C o m b a t involving the AFVresolved.Here the changes appear. Prior to COItheabi lof a n A F V to defend itself against infantry wishto make such a n at tack rested upon the vehicability to shoot them u p dur ing the Defensive FPhase. Now, however, some German tanks coequipped with a roof-mounted grenade projectThis weapon, o r a manned AA MG, o r the rear-the-turret M G possessed by some Russian tanmight get a chance t o fire dur ing the Close CombPhase itself. T h e order of combat of all un(including the A F V if it has one of the aboweapons available) involved is established by rollthe dice for each of them. Terrain Effects Modifi

m u .

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PAGE 1 TH GENERAcan be subtracted from the attackers' dice rolls. Theorder of combat is from low roll through high roll.The grenade projector attackson the IFT, while anyeligible MGs use the Close combat Table, 20.3.As before, a successful attack requires that theattacking unit roll its FPF or less. Now, however,such rolls might benefit from a -I DRM againstopen-topped AFVs (including non-buttoned upAFVs)and an additional -I DRM if the vehicle hasno manned, functioning MGs.

The first thing that 1was curious about was theextent to which an AFV's newly acquired CloseCombat Phase defensive ability really helped. Thevalues in Table 9 were the result of this curiosity.Comparing the first two columns shows that theNahverteidgungswaffe, to give the weapon itsproper name, definitely reduces the chance of asuccessful attack. Results reported in the last threecolumns show that the rear turret MG is superior toeither of the AA MGs due to that -1 DRM theattacker receives because the vehicleis not buttonedup when the AA MG is available. From Table 9 it'sclear that this new Close Combat Phase defensiveability should not be counted on to add much to anAFV's chance of survival.

One of my local playtesters remarked that themost fearsome anti-tank weapon in the game is astack of 8-3-8s. Table 10shows that there certainlyisn't much room for improvement over that group.Their 89% success rate is formidable. Few of thenumbers in the Table are small enough to bringmuch gladness to a tanker's heart. All in all, thesenumbers should tell you quite clearly that havingunbroken enemy infantry along side of an AFV atthe start of the Advance Phase spells trouble.Enemy leaders just make the picture even darker.Leadereffectscan be seenfor 2,3and 4 FPF infantryunits, in the values.in Table 8. From our knowledgeof probability and the values in Table 8 it followsthat leader effects become less significant as theunit's FPF goes up.

Taken together, the messageof Tables 8 through10 is that an AFV must do its defending againstinfantry at a distance. I, for one, am pleased. In theSL article I stated that, in SL, infantry will alwayshave some claim to being queen of the battlefield,and that one needs to be able to appreciate theinteraction between the foot soldier and the ironbeast. Successful utilization of armor, when thereisany significantamount of infantry about, requirescooperation between armor and friendly infantry.As we have seen, unsupported armor is vulnerableto bare-handed infantry,and someof themwill havesomething besides their hands.In what you've just finished reading, I hopeyou've found some things that will be of use to youin directing your two dimensional troops. Manythings remain unexplored, but the basics of armorand armorlinfantry interactions are there. Goodluck, and, please, do me a favor: take care of Cpl.Medrow.

Number of unitsUnitmoraleUnit FPF

245

79

FOOTNOTES: C

Tablo 10 The probability of destroying an AFV by a CloseCombat Phase attack

27

1 2 2 2 3 4 3 5 67 9 I 213 18 2322 3 3632 43 5143 56 6751 67 7757 74 84

6 7

3 67 1 I 212 16 217 24 324 34 423 42 5235 49 Q

by Arnold

37

1 14 1719 26 3231 41 4944 57 6657 71 8166 81 8972 86 94

You thought SQUAD LEADER was complex?Hah CROSS OFIRONis here to prove you wrong,and provide the latest word in minutiae. PerhapsAvalon Hill should mint a special Iron Cross forevery wargamer who actually understands andremembers those hundred thousand words ofSLI COL.Before an inquisition is begun, I wish to confessmy various sins as one involvedin the nefarious plotto curdle your brains. True, I was only responsiblefor AFV and gun data, and then only in very latestages, but unfortunately accessories to a crimemust pay full penalty. Right now, somewhereinthisgreat land of ours, John Q Expert, self-appointedgenius, is scrutinizing and badmouthing the data inCOI. Indeed, if it weren't for the snail's pace of ourillustrious postal service, poor old 4517 HarfordRoad would have long since been buried in sacks ofsimilar mail, filling the entire hollow occupied bythe building, and perhapsgivingthe softballteam itsfirst stadium.

First the excuses. When originally created, theAFV data had to fit into now defunct to kill'tables,and a spectrum of modifiers already in use. Onlylater, at the last minute, was the'to kill'table revisedto account for such details asgun muzzlevelocityorshell weight, as opposed to strictly going by the borediameter in millimetersand barrel length in calibers.The thing armor buffsalwaysexaminefirst is theAFV armor, which in CROSSOFIRONappears as'to kill' die roll modifiers(DRMs). Due to the aboveexcuse, a sliding scale was created: 5-8mm armorwas a -5 DRM, 9-13mm was -4, 14-19mm -3.20-29mm -2 30-43mm -1, 44-62mm 0, 63-87mm +I,88-112mm +2, 13-142mm +3, 143-184mm +4, and185mmor larger was a +5.Thickness wasdivided bythe cosine of the slope angle for "true" thickness orbias, where 0 meansa vertical angle. In retrospect asliding scale and only a -5 to +5 range was perhapstoo simplistic, but only a very few buffshave enoughdata to judge this issue for themselves. And thoseare surely aware that thicknessesvary so much, overall parts of the vehicle, that simple rules andprocedures always present complex interpretativeproblems.The 'to hit' DRMs naturally represent vehiclesize, which is primarily based on the height of thesilhouette, those vehicles 66" or lower rated +2,67-89" a +I, 90-109" no modifier, and 110"or higher a-1. Especially massive vehiclesgot an extra -1, forpure bulk and target area.On the other hand, few fanatics of WWII armorlook deeply into mobility evaluations. The listedroad speed for a vehicle is of very little help, and the"cross country" speed given in many sources is atbest statistics from a proving ground, at worst theauthor's own estimate cooked up by a littlenumerical juggling and guesstimation. Personally, lactually prefer the latter to the former, as anyonefamiliar with AFV design, proving, and acceptanceprocedures can understand However, I like to do

ROSS OF IRONHendrick

my own, and used a rather simple formula for Csince the movement system itself was basicsimple:(R13.7) m+401G)where R is the road speed in mph, H is the enghorsepower, W the vehicle weight in tons, and Gground pressure on the tracks in pounds per squinch. The net result emphasizes the H/ W ratio athus going over solid ground cross-country, wsoft ground cross-country coming in second, aroad speed taking a weak third.Wheeled vehicles ust used road speeddivided1.45, as the special MP cost tables representedspecial problems of cross-country movement. Tis slightly unrealistic, as it does ignore suspenscharacteristics, transmissions, etc. However, omust draw the line somewhere, and in 99% ofcases consideration of these extra factors wouldinfluence the MP value. Or rather, shouldn't, inopinion.There is sure to be hue and cry over the "to ktables, as Russian 76mm and German 75mm guappear similar. But then remember, the game walso include American 75mm's and 76mm's in lagamettes, etc. Furthermore, you can't kill until yhit, and in hitting the Russians are at a very serio

disadvantage. A Russian 76L will only hit 57%often as a German 75L gun, given an eqdistribution of game ranges (with someemphasiscloser ranges due to the densely packed terrfound in SL/ COI). If the Germansare able to hothe fight at longer ranges for a significant periodtime, the Russians will suffer much worse thanj57% In short, the overall probability of gettingother guy must be examined, not just one or ttables that only compose a piece of the proceduSince armor DRMs appear to distingubetween front and side AFV protection, it may seredundant to have front, side and rear "to knumbers on the firing tables. Again, this is perhabecause of the existing SLsystem. However,thersome point to separate side considerations. Suphigh velocity shot gets lesser advantages on sshots, compared to relatively larger rounds traving at slower speeds, due to the increased probabty that a big heavy round that fails to penetratemdo "fatal" damage to wheels, tracks, turret riperiscope, etc. Furthermore, the side of a tapresents a greater area in the first place.On the other hand, some weapons, especiallythe 25-57mm range, fare poorly in the side armsweepstakes, a few having no improvement atThis represents the relatively lower rate of fcompared to lighter guns (which sometimes maup in luck from volume what they lack in physipower), and a light (three to six pound) shcompared to the 75-90mm guns (with 15 topound shells). The 25-57mm weapons were pecuarly anti-tank "can openers", and were alreabecoming obsolete in 1943.Although some marnal improvement for greater target area may

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P GEappropriate, the numerics of the dice system aren'tsensitive enough to show every minor variation.A few have commented on the spare fuel tankscarried on the outside rear deck or sides of manyRussian AFVs. Given the mania for trivia of thissort in S L I C O I some are surprised that therewasn't a rule for this too However, think some, andcredit Ivan Ivanovich, tank commander, for thesame. Once a vehicle has driven a few score miles,the spare tanks can be emptied into the main fueltank, keeping it full, while eliminating danger ofexternal fire. Given the Russian propensity forrunning their tanks nearly into the ground beforerefueling, rearming, and refitting, it is fair to assumethat most of the time those external tanks wereempty.For those interested, the main sources of AFVdata were G E R M A N T A N K S O F W W I I by F.M.von Senger and Etterlin, and R U S S I A N T A N K S1900-1970 by John Milsom. Among the host ofAFV books. these are the most 'scholarlv' in theEnglish language (in that the authors recognize theirlimitations, among other things). Additionalsources are naturally useful, and a great many wereused. The casual reader, however, must be wary ofthe "popular" war history books, often published inserial form, that include tidbits of hard data, oftenbadly scrambled and hopelessly interpreted. Accu-rate data for gun penetration is hard to find, anddetails on shell characteristics impossible. If anyonehas ballistic coefficients for WWll ammo types, thisauthor would be greatly indebted for the informa-tion. With that, plus muzzle velocity, shell weight,and bore diameter, one can use ballistics tables forfairly accurate penetration computation. Lackingall that, this author used a "short cut" formula usedby the US Navy in WWII, which runs as follows:(2.2591 lo5) (d) (w/d3) 0.75407 (v) 1.50814to yield penetration in inches, where d is borediameter in inches, w the weight of the shell inpounds, and v the final velocity in feet per second.Ballistics is a complex field, and before consideringthe above equation useful, one is urged to get acouple good texts, to appreciate the many limita-tions and inaccuracies involved in the above.Picking Nits Sowing DiscordThe first edition (Origins IV Special Edition) ofCOI was rushed, and some technicalities escapedattention. For those who can't get enough trivia,harken to the following changes which, for the mostpart, have made their appearance in the 2nd-Edition.The German 251 11 W "rocket" halftrack CANcarry the normal tro bp complement of a SPW 25 1.The six rockets were hung on the outside of thevehicle, in external frames, and used as a one-shot-only proposition. Conceivably, the internal capacityof the vehicle could be sacrificed for another sixreload rounds (procedure similar to Maultier), butjudging from photographic evidence, if heavy firingwas contemplated an ammo carrier accompaniedthe halftrack, with rounds passed forward asneeded.Rule 75.83 regarding wide tracks in bogsprobably came about when one of those mail sacksfell on someone's head at 4517 Harford Road,rattling things a bit. The problem is this: wide tracksmean nothing per se, it's the ground pressure (totaltank weight over total track area) that makes thedifference. Wider tracks increase the area, andreduce the ground pressure, but that is the ONLYreason why wide tracks are more desirable. Lowground pressure is helpful in any type of softground, including bog, mud, deep snow, etc. Thefamous T-34/76 had a ground pressure of 9.1 to10.2, the increase in later models as morea rmor andbetter guns increased weight faster than the trackarea (a frequent tendency in later models of any

version AFV). If one takes 10.2 psi as the upper limitfor rule 75.83 effects, a great many vehicles qualify.The list should not include T-34/85 tanks, as if itdoes, just about every tank in the world would alsoqualifyAnother major simplification is the interpreta-tion of red MP values and related breakdownpossibilities when 2/3rds of the listed speed isexceeded. Actually, the original AFV data didn'tuse 2/3rds, but instead a specific value for eachvehicle. For those loving such trivia, the originalfigures were:

BT-5 or BT-7M: at 18-22 MP breakdown 812,after that decrease by MP.BT-7-2: at 17-22 MP breakdown B12, after thatdecrease by MP.PzKw V D: at 11-15 MP breakdown B12, afterthat decrease by I MP.PzKw V1 B and Jagd Pz VI: at 8-12 MPbreakdown B12, after that decrease by MP.The T-35-2 should have 12 MP according to mycalculations, with B12 breakdown at 8-12 MP, anddecrease by I /MP after that. However, theseancient relics probably had serious engine prob-lems, like old Aunt Lizzie's car, so 10 MP with 7-10MP for B12 breakdown, as given in the game, is notunreasonable.Speaking of speeds, my figures for the KV seriesare slightly different from those in COI. I arrived at13 MP for the KV-I, KV-IA, KV-IC, and KV-8,while only MP for the KV-IIA. All speeds arebased on horsepower/weight ratios, ground press-ure, and maximum road speed, in that order ofpriority. Suspension characteristics are ignored,which accounts for disparity in views on the KV (orany other vehicle). However, things like suspensionquality are difficult non-mathematical judgementsimpossible to make from dry facts and figures. Forexample, the game also ignores the poor quality ofthe PzKw 111 or IV suspensions, or the tendency ofPzKw V and VI types to get junk stuck between theirinterleaved road wheels. One can also go into the

quality of transmissions, gearboxes, and muchmore, until matters become so complex one mightas well just roll a die toestablish thecur rent MP of avehicle. In fact, random reduction of listed gamespeeds for all vehicles is not a bad idea, to take intoaccount equipment in bad repair. This should bedone on a vehicle by vehicle basis (suggest rolling a

single die, reducing the result by two, and thesubtracting the result from the original MP of thvehicle).Finally, it is worth remembering that the hudown armor bonus (64.35)is printed on the countePersonally, I prefer writing up a file card for eavehicle type, giving all data from the counter anrules, for handy reference, especially when tvehicle is buried under CE, turret facing, targacquisition, and/ or passenger counters

QSERIES 1

CROSS OF IRON SCENARIOSERIES 100 is a pad of ten new scenarios foC R O S S O F I R O N printed on the same indexstock and in the same style used for both S Q U A DL E A D E R and C R O S S O F I R O N . These scenarios were designed by COI playtester CourtneyAllen and playtested by members of his InteresGroup San Francisco playtest group. Afterwardsthey were retested by other regional groups of thCOI playtest team-most notably Jon Mishcon

Joe Suchar, and John Kenower who contributedgreatly to their final evolution. For thosedisdaining the "design your own" approach, hereis your chance to experience more C O l scenariowhich have been tested for balance and constitutetop quality playing aids. Now is the chance toemploy more of those special armor unitprovided with COlwhich don't seeaction inany othe official scenarios.The ten scenarios comprising SERIES 100 aretitled as follows: BLOCKING ACTION ATLlPKl (1941), SLAMMING OF THE DOOR(1941), BALD HILL (1941). THE PENETRATION OF ROSTOV (1942), NIGHT BATTLEAT NOROMARYEVKA (1943). BEACHHEADAT OZEREYKA BAY (1943), DISASTER ONTHE DNIEPER LOOP (1943). BLOCK BUSTING IN BOKRUlSK (1944). COUNTERATTACK ON THE VISTULA (1944). THEAGONY O F DOOM (1945).SERIES 100 is available by mail only fromAvalon Hill for $4.00 plus usual postage chargesMaryland residents please add 5 state sales tax

SO YOU W ANT TO WORK F OR AV ALO N HILL???We are constantly receiving resumes from Frankly, about the only way to demonstrate this tgamingenthusiasts whoseapparent vision of heaven us is through publication of your work elsewhereon earth is employment as an Avalon Hill game The G E N E R A L is in constant need of qualitdesigner/developer. Many HS seniors write us for material and this often turns out to be a majo

our recommendations as t o courses and colleges to proving ground for prospective applicants. Gettinprepare oneself for the lofty position of game your foot in the door around here to get a free lancdesigner. Well fellas, it's not that easy nor desirable. design published is even more difficult than getting Resumes mean very little to us and college job, so if you're going to be noticed among theducations not much more. The best advice we can crowd the G E N E R A L is a good place to start.give you is to seek another line of work, but if you Possession of other talents makes things easietruly have something against eating and mom of course. We ore looking for a good graphics artispromises to send you an occasional CARE package who can handle not only minor pasteup chores buthen maybe we can use you. Despite thegreat fringe major art assignments nd also possesses a keebenefits (low pay and long hours), openings in our R interest in the games themselves. The latter is a musD dept. are very rare and are not handed out on because the opportunity to play games for a living ithe basis of college degrees. Experience is the final after all, the major advantage of working for Avaloand only criteria. What positions we do have open Hill. If you are such a person, send samples of youwill be offered to those who have proven to us in the work (please no game ideas or prototypes) andpast that they have a firm command of the English (what the heck) a resume to Don Greenwood c/language and possess plenty of gaming savvy. Avalon Hill.

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PAGE 2 THEGENERAL

COUNTING DOWN THE SCEN RIOSAn Introduction to Squad Leader Plus One Part Two BY B O ~ edrow

THE SCENARIOSEach of the scenarios in COIcould profitably bestudied at considerable length. My purposes here,however, are fairly limited. rhop e to be able to giveyou some insights into the peculiarities of eachscenario by first examining the forces available toeach side and their objectives. In general, this will beaccompanied by a specific setup and a discussion ofwhat factors influence my thinking concerning howthings might begin. After that you can expect tolearn some things about how play could thenproceed. The last thing considered will be how thescenarios changed from the original playtest versionto what they are now. Mention will also be made ofsignificant new units or rules where it's mostappropriate.That last paragraph contains a pair of weaselwords, might and could . However, they reallybelong there. Most of the COI scenarios offer a richvariety of courses of action. In addition, havingdetermined a strategy for any tactical gamescenario, a player must be prepared to makeadjustments as the dice roll and his opponent acts.My comments will reflect this fact. Part of theattraction of the S system for me is that it requiresa considerable amount of player reaction andadjustment as a game proceeds.Most of what insights I have to offer wereacquired during the playtesting of COI. Locally,that involved games with and among a group ofinterested players. In addition to playing, we spentseveral Saturday afternoons discussing whatseemed to workand why. All together, I reported onthe results of 79 playings of the eight scenarios. Theprincipal players in this group were Tom Black,Bobby Carver, and Dave Quigley. Good playtestingrequires players who both are interested in playingunder playtest conditions and are competentplayers; this article gives me the chance toacknowledge their contributions.

Scenario 13-The Capture of Balta.This scenario finds us back in August of 1941,120 miles northwest of Odessa. Initially, theRussians hold the town of Balta, located just northof the point at which the Germans wish to build abridge across the Kodyma River. The German forceon the board at the start, aided by their turn 3reinforcements must, by the end of turn 10, insurethat no Russian unit occupies any of the road hexesmarked with a V on Figure 4, or any hex adjacent tothese hexes.The main strength of each side lies in its infantrysquads, of which each side has thirty, althoughtwelve of the German's do not arrive until turn 3.Brightening the German player's prospects, four ofhis initially available squads are 8-3-8s, who bringalong four demolition charges and two flamethrow-ers. Three others, carrying one demolition charge,appear as reinforcements. His joy is partiallybalanced by the fact that six of his squads areRumanians, at 3-4-7 each. As always, the Germanleadership is good, consisting of nine leaders,including two 9-2s and just one, an 8-0, witha zeroleadership factor. The Rumanians are led byCaptain Radiu who, at 7-0, probably wishes he wereelsewhere. To command his thirty squads, and fivecrews as well, the Russian player has about whatyou might expect: a 7-0, two 8-0s and a 9-1. The MGpicture is also what we've come to expect on the

eastern front: eighteen to four in favor of thGermans. In heavy weapons, the Soviets have 57LL AT gun and an 82mm mortar plus, on turn one module of lOOmm artillery support. Armor restricted to four T26S's (two of which don't arrivuntil turn 5 for the Russians and a STGIIIB forthAxis. Under miscellaneous, the Russians have thnecessary radio, one roadblock and ten entrenchments, while their opposition's assault engineehave unlimited smokemaking capacity. Thus, thconfrontation places the burden of attack upon thGermans, who are much the better equipped anled.The rules introduced in this scenario include thnew ones concerningarti llery and almost all of thosconcerned with armor. Everything in these rulepertinent to this scenario has already been dicussed. In addition, there is an optional infantrmovement rule, use of which eliminates the infantrroad bonus-except that a unit spending all of inormal MFs on a road gets to move an extra hex-and replaces it with something more elaboratUsing this option, any infantry unit can increase iMF by two at the expense of penalties concerninportage, Advancing Fire and Close CombCapabilities. This rule is, I feel, more consistent withe general level of sophistication of the system anI recommend its general use.Allied Troops, in this case Rumanians, alsbring along some rules. The rules surrounding theuse have the general effect of making leaders ansupport weapons of one nationality less useful tallied, but foreign, troops than are their own. Alsthe rallying morale level of these troops in thebroken state is one less than their normal value.

The last new rule introduced concerns a newtype of terrain, Marsh. In this scenario, hill 547 ithe southeast corner of the playing surface iconsidered to be not a hill, but a marsh. A marsh iscursed wheatfield; that is, it's like a wheatfielexcept that it's out of bounds to all vehicles an

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THE GENERAL PAGEaffects the movement, firepower and morale ofinfantry in it. Any nonroad hex adjacent to a marshbogs down a passing vehicle one time in six. Theother three hills on board 3 also vanish. The onenorth of the marsh becomes a wheatfield while theother two becomeclear terrain. Trees and a buildingon one of the hills are also ignored.Since the Russians set up first we ll considerthem first. The Russian player knows that the initialGerman force will be east of row H on board 3whilethe Rumanians will be on whole or half hexesalongthe north edge of board 4. Unfortunately, the use-fulness of this knowledge is reduced by Russiandeployment restrictions. These are illustrated by thesetup shown in Figure 4. Let s begin in the north.Restricted to hexes 4 through 7 on board 4 thisarrangement shows the entrenchments, each ofthem containing one squad, positioned toward thesouth edge of this limit. Their placement is vital tothe Russians survival because the German rein-forcements enter the north edge anywhere west ofrow H, and the units deployed in these entrench-ments are the principal force opposing their drivetoward the western victory hexes. Initially, onlyRussian infantry in an entrenchment can be presenton board 4. The setup rules require that each

entrenchment contain just one squad or crew, inaddition to any leaders one wishes to use. Here, inaddition to the squads, there s an 8-0 leader in W4.A number of factors must be weighed inconnection with the problem of where the board 4forces are to go. The two I consider most importantare the ability of these forces to inflictdamage on theattackers and their ability to survive once Axisforces have passed south of their original position.Part of the latter factor is the problem of rallyingbroken Russian units. Were the entrenchments tobe located at the northern limit of the band ofallowable hexes, the Russians could bring many ofthe pdssible entry hexes under normal range fire.Alas, as is the case with the setup shown, thosehedges in the northwest would still cause trouble forthe Russians. A careful look at ranges and lines-of-sight shows us that a good coverage of those pos-sible entry hexes requires a commitment of MGsthat the Russian player cannot really afford. Inaddition, the further north they start, the harder itbecomes to get the survivors back. A commonGerman tactic is to attempt to isolate, rather thankill, enemy squads by getting south of them andusing MGs to cover open ground hexes which theRussian squads would have to cross. On balance, I

prefer to position the Russians as shown, bewilling to trade a better chance at chewing upenemy as they appear for a bit more longevOccasionally this pays a bonus when the Germplayer loses valuable time by toogreat a concernsoftening up the defenders.To finish up the discussion of boardpositioning the entrenchments in adjacent hexeorder to ha