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7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE 2 THEGENERA

TheThe Avalon

tlon of autho~, A,

Articles fror

he d~rcretion

ypewrttten, dc

ingllsh usage.

ng examples ar-A in * Pk,.,"

F YOU PLANlo SO w ~ t h o u l

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of our edit0

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~d dlagrams shln rnnh r rhn,t,.i

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OR : A Richa~

correspondenc

be marked In

he Avalon Hill

the serious gar

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? *"*LON WILL

4'NER,Game Players MagazineHall GENERAL 1s deducated to the presenta-

rotatwe artbcles on the strategy, tactics, and

....Y..u.. -galon Hi ll games of strategy. Hostor~cal rticles

are Included only insomuch as they prov~deuseful back-ground information on current Avalon H ~ l l ~tles. THE

GENERAL or published by ti Company solely

for the cultural edification of ne afic~onado,n

the hopes of improving the gi oflcoency of play

and prov id~n g ervices not otl le to the Avalon

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Publ~cat~onS b l-mo nt hl y ~ 8 t h a~l~ngsmadecloseto

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EDITOR: Donal

GRAPHICS: JMoores. Steve

Czech, Margaret Lenman

EDITORIALSTAFF: J Angtoltllo. R. Beyma. W Buchan-an. D Burdtck. S Carus. R Chtang. J Connolly. J. Davis.

R Easton. A. Gruen. R Hamblen. R. Harmon, T Haz1ett.T.

Hflton. J Jarv~nen,R. Ltvermore. R. Medrow . D. Mill er. T.

Oleson, G Phtlltes, L. Ptnsky. R. Plock, J Pournelle, R.

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1 Avalon Hill Philosophy Part 63

Our apologies for the extreme la teness of the

last issue. The availabi!ity of our new four color

press which enabled us to go into a four color

format in the first place was also the major

villain behind the delay of the August issue. It

takes awhile t o get accustomed to any new press

and thiso ne proved noexception, r esulting i n a 3

week delay in getting the magazine out. We'll

redouble our efforts tog et back on schedule wit h

this and following issues.

Progress often is accompanied by minor

inconveniences for a few. In this case, it has

brought about the technical end of a 14 year

tradition for the GENERAL . . . that of the free

opponents wanted ad. The combination of

increasing circulation and inclusion of the want

a d form on an insert rather than as a part of the

magazine itself has resulted in a response

bigger than our poor backcover can handle. To

reduce the amount of trivial adverts submitted

by those who do so just to use the form, rather

than due to any rea l need, we are immediately

implementing a token charge for the service.

Henceforth, no opponents wanted ad will be

accepted unless accompanied by a 25C token

fee. For sale, trade, or wanted to buy ads wi ll cost

$1.00. The money is, of course, secondary to the

primary purpose of weeding out insincere ads.

The cost to typeset these messages is far more

than any mere quarter can begin to offset. As

before, we retain the right to edit or discard

inappropriate ads. Ad purchases will not be

subject to refund.

We have more or less finalized our publishing

schedule for the coming year. The titles below

should round out our offerings up to and

including ORIGINS IV. All the titles discussed

below are scheduled for release next July.

The BISMARCK project, after a stormy

course, is finally sailing towards completionunde rthe guidance of that inveterate globetrott-

ing politic al analyst Jack Greene. BISMARCK is

really three games in one, covering the breakout

and pursuit of the German battleship Bismarck

and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in May of 1941.

Originally published in the early 1960's. this is

an intensive redesign of the same game. The

basic version is the original game with some

additional scenarios, air rules, changed order of

appearance, and other refinements. Played wi th

a screen separating tw o dentical search boards,

it should take anywhere from 3 0-9 0 minutes to

play and is an ideal "Beer & Pretzels" game,

wit h the added advantage that it should be quite

good at introducing a new player to the Hobby as

well.

The Intermediate Game is an upgunnedversion of the Basic Game with a wider scope for

tactical play, ammunition , off board movement,

Ultra, additional air rules, weather effects, and

more. Two players (or three if one plays with the

De Gaulle Free French scenario) should have a

great deal of enjoyment as well as getting a feel

for operations in the North Atlantic.

The Advanced Game goes all the way with

rules for shadowing (as well as breaking

shadowing contacts), accurate movement rates,

crew fatigue, major breakdowns at sea, towing,

increased daylight i n the northern latitudes,

destroyers, fuel, submarines, and the chance to

repair battle damage at sea. Going hand n hand

wit h th is is an Advanced Tactical Game played

on any 3' x 3' playing surface a la JUTLAND.

Rules cover damage to the Main Fire Contr

Director, Plot, Rudder, turrets, superstructur

hull, secondary, as well as rules for angle

shot, range, armor penetration (broken into 2

increments), and much more. BISMARCK w

allow one to pi t many might have beensagain

each other including the TIRPITZ, GRAZEPPELIN, SCHEER, NORTH CAROLINDUNKERQUE, etc.

BISMARCK wi ll be developed by the capab

Mick Uhl and should be ready for ORIGINS '7Those who are familiar with Jack's reviews

other people's games may be assured that

promises BISMARCK will be accurate in i

history (British authorities Andrew Smith an

Nathan Okun have contributed greatly to th

historical research), and well playtested. Th

Basic Game has been playtested on fo

continents! It has been purposely designed to

as flexible as possible so as to allow the player

select the type game he wants to play. What

more important the victims of Jack's pri

reviews may now smack their collective lipsancheck their ink supply in anticipation of swe

revenge.

TRIREME wil l bea actical level gameof nav

war in ancient times, when the Mediterranea

Sea was the center of the known world. Th

players control individua l multi- hex galleys an

triremes, maneuvering them as they sail an

row into position, then ram and melee to win h

naval battles that determined the fate

civilizations.

Individual triremes and galleys a

represented in detail. wi th each section of ea

multi-hex counter loaded down wit h the prop

soldier groups, archers and war engine

Combat is a matter of maneuvering and ram

ming i n the midst of vast floating melees, wiarchers and special engines adding com

plications.

Each player can handle up to ten vesse

easily, but the game system is simple enough

that players can add more if they wish. With

few vessels the players can accurately re-ena

sections of the great naval battles betwee

Persia, Greece, Rome, Carthage and others-o

they can combine games to recreate who

battles with hundreds of triremes. TRIREMdesigned by Richard Hamblen, will be exciti

either as a two-player, solitaire, or multi-play

game in much the same mold as WOODESHIPS & IRON MEN.

TALES OF THE OLD WEST is a role playiboard game of life and conflict in a typical tow

of the American frontier. For players who like

straight and simple sho w down, there are fa

and clean rules for gun battles, knife fights, a

even bar room braw ls. But the flavor and code

the old west is also captured as the vario

drifters, townsfolk, farmers, and troublemake

move through the dusty streets, each with h

ow n purposes, ambitions, and grudges.

The players can "be" any of the tou

characters of the old west, and the game

isomorphic boards can be rearranged to for

any kind of settlement, from an isolated camp

a staid, sedate town.

Continued on Pg. 32. Col

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE

By Seth Carus

Organization

Accurate organizational information for thearmies of the Middle East is difficult to ob tain.Security restrictions prevent official sources fromproviding information and journalistic accountsare usually inaccurate and misleading. Only theanalysis of battles consistently provides accurate-information on the organization of the combat-ants. This analysis requires a detail and precisionrarely found in either official or journalistic

accounts . Even w hen it is possible to discern anorganizational pattern, the relatively small size ofthe armies involved insures the existence ofnumerous modifications of "normal" tables oforganization. While the data provided is asaccu rate as possible. 'educated guesses' were oftenmade, which may or may not be correct.

Israel1956: At this early date, virtually all field unitswere infantry form ation s. Of the 15 brigadesmobilized dur ing the Sinai Campa ign, eleven wereinfantry brigades. Of the oth er units. one was aparatroop unit and the remaining three werearmored brigades. The predominance of infantryunits was a result of doctrinal circumstance.Israel's top military leaders were all infantry

officers. with little idea of the utilization andeffectiveness of tanks. Nor was it easy to obtainarmored equipme nt; all tanks and halftracks hadto be bought fro m abro ad. With limited financialresources, Israel usually could only afford su rplusWorld W ar Tw o equipment. Even this was oftendifficult t o o btain: all the parties to the 1948 warwere subject to an arm s embargo imposed by themajor ar ms suppliers. Only after French officialsagreed t o aid Israel was it possible for them toobtain sizeable numbers of tanks; French AMX-13s and war-surplus Sherman s. Starting in 1954,this permitted Israel to expand the number ofarmored brigades from one to three.

Each infantry brigad e was organized into threeinfantry battalions, a scout company, and head-auarters a nd su ooort units . Everv infantrv brigade

also ha d one o r more a d d ~ t ~ o n a lombat unltsattached All possessed a t least one ar t~ l le ryb a t t a l ~ o n always w ~ t h 20mm mortars), possiblysuppor ted by field ar t~ l le ryb a t t a l ~ o n s q u ~ p p e dw ~ t h B r ~ t ~ s h5 pounders o r French 155mmh o w ~ t z e r sAttached t o th e five ~ n f a n t r y r ~ g a d e sdeployed In th e S l n a ~were tank companles,a d d ~ t ~ o n a l n f a n t r y ba t ta l~on s de tached fromother b r ~ g a d e s , nglneer b a t t a l ~ o n s , n anti-tank

unlt, and several companles of N A H A L T h eN A H A L are s p e c ~ a lroops mannlng strateg~callys ~ t e d ettlements In peacetime that act a s e k einfantry o r scouts In wartlme

None of th e armored b r ~ g a d e s ad exactly th esame organlzatlon Bas~ca l ly ,wo d ~ f f e r e n torma-tions were used T h e 7t h Armored B r ~ g a d e adtw o armored b a t t a l ~ o n s one w ~ t h hermans, th eo ther w ~ t hAMX-13s), tw o infantry b a t t a l ~ o n s(one mounted In halftracks, th e o ther In trucks), a

field ar t~ l le ryb a t t a l ~ o n , s well a s headquar te rsan d suppor t units The 37th B r ~ g a d e as s ~ m ~ l a r l yo r g a n ~ z e d , xcept tha t ~ t only ha d a company of

t h ~ r t e e nA M X - 1 3 s no t a b a t t a l ~ o n I n contrast,th e 27th B r ~ g a d e ad only four armored compan-les, o r g a n ~ z e d Into three "armored b a t t a l ~ o ncombat teams" an d a b a t t a l ~ o n of m o t o r ~ z e d~ n f a n t r y T h e "armored b a t t a l ~ o n ombat teams"were composed of a tank company , a company ofhalftrack-mounted Infantry,a reconnaissance unlt- -W:

mounted o n jeeps, engineers, an d a unit of selpropelled artillery. T h e brigade's four armorecompanies (with only a b o u t 50 tanks) used tankof three different types (A MX-13s, Sherman M k50s, and Sherman M k. 51s). Before enterincombat in th e 1956 war, th e brigade wa s severeweakened by th e loss of half it s tanks: on"armored battalion combat team" (with ShermaM k. 50s) an d a S h e r m a n M k. 5 1 company wer

attached t o o ther brigades. Thus this "armoredbrigade went into combat with only 25-30 tankWhile th e "armored battalion combat teamsconstituted well-balance combined arms unit

with a r m o r , infantry, and artillery, they possesselimited combat capabilities. With a n effectivstrength of only tw o companies, they were so weatha t th e brigade's sole infantry battalion waresponsible fo r its success. T he armored units werable to accomplish little. Only in th e pursuit thafollowed th e heavy fighting around Rafa di d themake a major contribution. With only limitecombat power, th e organization of these "armorebattalion combat teams" wa s to o complex fo r thinexperienced Israeli commanders.

In th e field, differences between th e organization of th e 7t h and 27th Brigades were no t asgreaas it might a p p e a r from th e above discussioBefore en te r ingcombat , th e commander of th e 7tBrigade reorganized his battalions into thre

1

m mortar 12-6pder 12-155mm towec

4th Infantry Brigade: An efficient infantry organition unsuited for desert operations. Limited deseexperiencein 1948gave Israeli military planners littunderstandingof the weaknessess of infantry in th

m El desert. The result was a heavy reliance upon infantwhich was only marginally usetulin heactualfighting

30 ca t 81mm mortarThts brigadepossessedthe only battalion-sized unitanti-tank artillery deployed by Israel in the Sinai.

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE 4 THE GErnRA

combat teams, each with tw o tank companies an d T h e typical a rmored brigade, similar t o th e T h e mechanized brigades were transitionaon e infantry company . T h e major difference here 1956 organization of th e 7t h Brigade, wa s units, coverted f rom infantry into a r m o r . As sucwa s tha t the combat teams were field expedients organized in to two tank battalions (each with 36 they seem t o have ha d n o standard organizationorganized o r reorganized t o meet temporary tanks), a mechanized infantry battalion, a m o r t a r T h e lo th B r i g a d e r H a r e l " ) is th e only mechanizebattlefield conditions. This flexibility set a pattern battalion (a dozen 120mm morta rs mounted o n unit about which much is known. It s single tantha t ha s been followed ever since. halftracks), a scout company (mounted on jeeps battalion possessed a b o u t 70 tanks. organized int

The single para t roop brigade of 1956 (the202nd Brigade) wa s organized much like th einfantry units. Attached to it were tw o companiesof N A H A L , a n AMX - I 3 company (o f 13 anks),an d several battalions of artillery.

1967: T h e composi t ion of th e army changedradically in th e decade following th e Sinai

Campaign. T h e number of brigades wa s increasedto twenty-one: nine a r m o r e d , three mechanizedthree para t roop , an d six infantry. T h e increase inarmored /mechan ized brigades wa s partly accom-plished by th e conversion of existing infantrybrigades. T he loth Brigade ("Harel"), a n infantrybrigade in 1956, wa s mechanized in 1967. Thisconversion wa s accomplished by replacing one ofits infantry battalions with a tank battalion. Thistank battalion wa s equivalent in strength t o tw onormal tank battalions, indicating tha t eventuallyth e brigade wa s intended t o have tw o tankbattalions. A number of the addi t iona l tank

brigades an d al l th e para t roop brigades were newunits, formed after 1956. (The 202nd Para t roopBrigade wa s apparently broken u p t o create cadrefo r th e format ion of th e ne w para t roop brigades).

The organization of infantry an d para t roopforces differed little from 1956. The 55th Para-t r o o p Brigade is probably typical of such units. It sthree battalions were each organized into threerifle companies, a suppor t company , an d aheadquar te rs unit. T h e suppor t company

possessed a p la toon with 8 1 mm morta rs , a n d a tleast one more p la toon with medium machine-guns. T he brigade also ha d a s t rong scoutcompany provided with mechanized equipment .

The infantry brigades were suppor ted by tankcompanies a s in th e case of th e 16th ("Jerusalem")Infantry Brigade which ha d a company of 18Sherman Mk. 51s. Reportedly, al l th e infantrybrigades were provided with similar a rmoredunits.

a nd halftracks), an d (possibly) an engineercompany. Little effort wa s made t o ensure tha tboth tank battalions were provided th e same typeof tanks. T h e benefits of providing tanks withdiffering capabilities were felt t o offset logisticalproblems. One brigade ha d Sherman Mk. 5 IHVsa n d AMX- 13 s a n o t h e r ha d Centurions an dPattons, yet a third ha d Centurions an d Sher-mans. T h e four brigades with only on e type oftank wereequipped with Centurionsor Shermans.

five tank-companies : four with ~ h e r h a n s eacwith 14 tanks) an d one with Centurions (withdozen tanks). T h e remainder of it s forcecomprised tw o halftrack-mounted infantry battalions, a scout company (with AML-90 armorecars), a n engineer unit , and probably a 120mmm o r t a r battalion.

T h e o ther tw o mechanized brigades wer

considerably different. One, deployed a long th

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


THE GENERAL

Gaza Strip, had an AMX-13 battalion. ban:

it s halftracks, however, were taken away a nd gito para t roop units, converting it into a n infantryunit. T h e third mechanized unit was deployed inth e north, and wa s formed just prior t o th e 1967war.

****1973: The size of Israeli g round forces increasedonly marginally after 1967. In 1973, 24 brigadeswere mobilized, only slightly grea te r than th e 21mobilized in 1967. T h e porportion of armoredunits, however, increased significantly. Al l bu tfour of th e brigades mobilized in 1973 were

armored. T he non-armored brigades includedthree para t roop brigades a n d one infantry brigade

(the 1s t "Golani" Brigade). A variety of differentconsiderations led t o this increased reliance onarmor . Armored units possess much greatercombat power in thedeser t than comparably-sizedinfantry units. They also expose fewer soldiers t oenemy fire, thus suffering fewer casualties.Finally, Israeli superiority over A r a b forces wa sgreatest in tank forces, s o naturally they werestressed.

Organizations in 1973differed little from 1967.Those changes t h a t were made generally repre-sented relatively small evolutionary developmentsof existing structures. T h e most impor tan t of th e

changes wa s th e creation of combat divisions.Pr io r t o 1973, brigades were grouped fo r specificoperations during each w ar o n a temporary basis.

In 1956, tw o "Brigade Groups" were formed in th eSinai. Thev oossessed limited authority, with th e

higirc~ omnrarr" actually directing L I ~ F ctions ofth e brigades. T o rectify this, a number of divisions

were created o n a temporary basis just beofre th estart of th e 1967 war. In addition t o tw o o r threeinfantry armored a n d mechanized brigades,assigned units included engineer, artillery, andreconnaissance battalions. T h e 1973 divisions,fo rmed o n a permanent basis after 1967, usuallycon ta ined three armored brigades, a reconnais-

sance battalion (with a b o u t 25 tanks), a n artillerybrigade (with 36 155mm self-propelled howitzersa nd some anti-aircraft guns), probably a nengineer unit, a nd service an d suppor t fo rmat ions .O n occasion infantry o r para t roop units would betemporarily attached.

O n paper, th e organization of th e brigadesdiffered little f rom 1967. T he only significantchange wa s the adopt ion of medium tanks t oreplace th e jeep-mounted 106mm recoillness riflesin armored birgade reconnaissance companies.T he Israelis (like th e Germans of World W a r 11)

believe that reconnaissance units should also bestrong combat units, ab le t o fight a s well a s scout.Experience dur ing 1967 indicated tha t reconnais-sance units equipped only with jeeps and half-t racks were to o weak, consequently sufferingheavy casualties in combat . Therefore, tanks wereadded t o th e reconnaissance units. While thisimplies a loss of mobility, Israeli commandersbelieve that, effectively, g rea te r mobility ca n beachieved with slower bu t better-protected vehi-cles. Experience in 1973 seems t o suppor t thisbelief.

PAGE=

,,,, rlmored Btlymue: Tt,,, das the only armoredbrigade that was always maintained at full-strength(the others w ere reserve units mobilized when neededFor this reason, it was stronger than the other brigadeswith a total of about 100 tanks. Probably the moseffective unit then in the Middle East, the 7th Brigadwas largely responsible for the destruction of the,Egyptian 7th'lnfantry Division within 24 hours after thestart of hostilities, and was still able to spearhead thsubsequent advance to the Suez Canal.

Mattr "1 r l r c ,rink b r i g a u c ~ acked morta rbattalions, severely hampering efforts againsinfantry. S o m e sources also claim that manybrigades lacked infantry battalions. While thismay possibly be correct, these reports probablyoriginated due t o th e noticeable absence ofmechanized infantry dur ing th e first days of th ewar. At th e start of th e war, limited road capacityrestricted movement towards th e battle a reas toonly th e most impor tan t vehicles. This meant tha tt a n k s were usually sent t o th e front ahead ofsupporting infantry an d artillery. O n th e whole, itis p robab le tha t al l brigades ha d mechanizedinfantry units, bu t that they were not available alof th e time.

It appears that a rmored brigades usuallydeployed three tank battalions. This wa s probably

achieved by rearranging al l of th e companies t ogive each battalion tw o tank companies and amechanized infantry company . It is definitelyknown tha t th e 7t h Armored Brigade di dsometh ing like this just before th e start ofhostilities. While mechanized infantry is oftenmentioned in battle accounts, there a re noreferences t o what ca n be identified as armoredbrigade mechanized infantry battalions. Finally, iis clearly evident that, in general, Israeli tankbattalions rarely ha d more than a b o u t 25 tanks(about th e strength of tw o companies). While it isuncertain tha t al l Israeli tank battalions werereorganized in this fashion, available evidencedoes seem to suppor t this theory.

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE 6 THEGENERAL

Post-1973: lsraeli g round forces changed enor-mously after the 1973 war. Unfortunately, it isimpossible to discover much a b o u t these changes.T h e size of th e military ha s clearly increased withth e creation of large numbers of new units. Largequantities of equ ipment have been obtained t oreplace ol d equipment , t o supplement existingequipment, a n d t o form ne w units. It is no t ye tpossible t o determine how th e equipment an dunits have been integrated into 1973 structures.Al l tha t is known with an y certainty is tha t a new

level of field organization, th e corps , has beenadded . The corps will assume operational controlof field forces, directly under th e contro l of th eChief of Staff. Previously, field units werecontrolled by Area Commands . T h e Area Com-mands , of which there a re three, a re

geographically-based, each covering roughly athird of Israel p roper , add ing the occupiedterritories to their a reas of responsibility. Inaddition t o controlling field forces, they ha d beenalso responsible fo r extensive administrativetasks. Presumably, lsraeli planners felt tha t Areacommanders could not effectively conduc t these

administrative tasks a n d a t th e same time contro lfield format ions . Therefore, a new, intermediate,level of command was added t o permit higherauthorities t o devote their attention m o r e fully

towards planning, logistics, an d admin is t ra t im

E ~ Yt1956:Egyptian ground forces were organized in tofive divisions ( four infantry a n d on e armored) ,supplemented by independent brigades an dbattalions. T h e lack of in format ion o n those unitsno t in th e S ina i makes it difficult t o discern apattern of divisional organizations. Whi!e tw odivisions were deployed in th e S ina i (the 3r dInfantry a nd th e 8 th Palestinian), they weredefinitely atypical. T h e 8 th Division was a second-line unit of Palestinians with attached NationalGuard forces. T h e National G u a r d wa s Egypt'sreserve force; limited training a n d poor equipment

made it largely irrelevant. T h e organization of th e3r d Division appears t o have been non-existent:Conta in ing roughly 20 battalion-sized units fromseven different brigades haphazard ly groupedtogether, this division wa s a c o m m a n d nightmare.Since th e 3r d Division wa s responsible fo r th edefense of th e most impor tan t invasion routesa long th e lsraeli border ( A b u Agheila an d El-Arish), it is unders tandab le that responses t oIsraeli attacks by this unit were uncoord ina ted a ndineffectual.

T h e typical Egyptian infantry brigade wasorganized in to three o r f o u r rifle battalions, ofapprox imate ly 70 0 men each, a battery of 25-pounder gun-howitzers (6 o r 8 tubes), an d a n anti-tank company with 17-pounders mounted o nmodified Valentine t a n k s (called 'Archer'by both

th e British a n d Egyptians). T h e rifle battalionswere organized into a headquar te rs company , four

a50 men

MTR

8-25 pder !-I8 Archer SPAT 40mm Bofors(? ) AA

57mm or 25-Bren 16 pder ATG carrlers

1stEgyptianArmoredBrig8de:Thefirst Egyptianunittotally equipped with Soviet equipment. Battalionstructures were Soviet, but the types and number of

...., ,,.npanies, a n d a s u p p o r t company . T h e

suppor t company was divided into a m o r t a rp la toon with 3-inch o r 81mm morta rs , a n anti-

tank platoon with British 6-pounder o r Soviet57mm anti-tank guns, a nd a carrier p la toon with25 Bren carriers.

T h e only armored brigade (o f th e three in th e

Egyptian army) committed t o Sinai wa s th e 1stArmored Brigade of tw o tank battalions, amechanized infantry battalion, a battalion of SU -10 0 assault guns, an d a n anti-aircraft battery. T h ebrigade probab ly wa s equipped with a b o u t 70 T-3 4 / 8 5 tanks a n d 18 SU-100 assault guns. T he onlyo ther armored unit in th e Sinai wa s th e 3r dArmored Battalion, attached t o th e 3r d InfantryDivision, with 52 Shermans, including 12specially-modified versions mount ing the turret ofth e A M X - 1 3 light tank .

****1967: Beginning in 1958, th e Egyptians began toa d o p t Soviet organizational patterns in a nextensive way, replacing th e British systempreviously used. Virtually al l Egyptian battalionan d brigade organizations were copied fromcomparab le Soviet units. This had a t least oneserious consequence for Egypt dur ing th e 1967fighting: a high proportion of tanks were allocatedt o th e infantry divisions, since every infantrybrigade was assigned a tank battalion. This meant

that th e five armored brigades ha d only a b o u t halfof al l Egyptian tanks deployed. F o r this reason,

Egypt could never concen t ra te a large number oth e available tanks, invariably allowing Israel t oachieve local superiority in tanks.

The Egyptians di d not strictly follow Soviedivisional organizations. Organizational d a t a oth e Egyptian divisions is very confusing, an d thonly reliable d a t a is fo r th e 7t h Infantry Divisionwhich defended th e coas ta l strip west of El-ArishIt is p robab ly not completely typical of the othedivisions, bu t since more da ta is available on thiunit t h a n an y other, th e examina t ion of itorganization is instructive. T h e division ha d threregular a r m y brigades and a National Guardbrigade. It wa s suppor ted by tw o artillerbrigades, each with 36 122mm guns. It is possibltha t each artillery brigade also containedbattalion of 12 multiple rocket launchers either thBM-24 (240mm) o r th e RM130(130mm). Directlattached t o t h e division were sixty tanks: abattalion of 30 Sralin tanks(probab1y including T10 s as well as JS-Ills) , a n d a b o u t 30 immobiledug-in, Shermans used a s static anti-tank guns. Inadd i t ion , th e 14thT a n k Brigade, with 100 T-54s oT-55s, wa s available t o s u p p or t th e division.

T h e regular a r m y brigades were organized likSoviet regiments. Each ha d three battalions oinfantry, a tank battalion with 30 T-34/85 tanksa n d a variety of suppor t units. Little is actuallyknown of th e suppor t units, bu t a reasonedconjecture ca n ,b e made based o n types o

equipment cap tured an d typical Soviet uniorganizations: Each brigade probably ha d a

, --..>.~*,,. 7 . W ~ y ~,?'>' - +

' . 7 . - ' S ,

;.',tj,'ri:l.j:. 9 . : '" ' . . ". . 1 . 2 . '.. ., , '

967 : . ' : : . .:.;i$,k. ., .. ii,:.,.,;,Gj,f$ (approx 12C.. :.. .. .. .. (150 AFV)

7th Egyptian Infantry Divisiontant co astal road leading fro m Gaza to El-Arish, the7tDivision was the larges t single Egyptian unit deployein 1967. Fortified i n a series of stronp po ints along thI 1 road, the division had no mobile reserves (the 14t

I I I I I Armored Brigade assigned to this division wa

16 b 7 h 4 9detached and sent south just prior to the war)Consequently, i t was impossible to organize an

100-~55 Nat~onal uard 36-122mm HOW 36-122mm HOW counterattacks against the daorganized, weak Israetank orouos that oenetrated al l the wav throuoh th

NOTE. The 14th Bde. wasdetached just before the war a @j

30-TI 15-Sherm ea.

dlv1si6n (50 miles) twelve hours afier hos?ilitiesstarted. These massive penetrations disorganized thdlvislon, leading to its total dislntegratlon. Aboutquarter of i ts men were k ~l le d r wounded in intenf inh t lnn and rnnzt n f the rect were ran t l i red

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


THE GENERAL PAGE

mortar battery with six 120mm mortars, an anti-tank battery with 85mm anti-tank guns, an anti-

aircraft unit, a scout company, and service and

support troops. Some infantry brigades also had

an anti-tank missile platoon equipped with the

Schmel(betterknown by its Western code-names:

AT-I, 'Snapper'). Each of the brigade's three

infantry battalions were organized into three

companies, supported by an anti-tank platoon

(probably with 57mm anti-tank guns or 107mm

recoilless guns), a mortar platoon with 82mm

mortars, and an anti-aircraft battery with heavy

machineguns. Each infantry company probably

had some 82mm recoilless anti-tank guns.

The Egyptians stationed two armored divi-

sions in the Sinai. One of these, the Shazli Force

(named for and commanded by the general who

led all Egyptian forces in 1973),consisted ofonly a

single armored brigade, a motorized infantry

brigade, and an artillery brigade. Its total tank

strength was about 120. In contrast, the other

armored division, the 4th Division, possessed two

tank brigades, a motorized infantry brigade, an

artillery brigade, plus a full complement of

support units. Among the support units was an

anti-aircraft battalion equipped with the ZSU-57-

2, a self-propelled 57mm anti-aircraft weapon.

With over 200 tanks, the 4th Armored Division

was the most powerful offensive unit in the

Egyptian Army. The tank brigades were organized

into three tank battalions along with support

units. Each of the tank battalions had about 30

tanks (divided into three ten-tank companies), and

the brigade had about95 tanks (the tanks from the

battalions plus a few assigned to other units).****1973: The few organizational changes made

between 1967and 1973were aimed at strengthen-

ing already existing structures. The most import-

ant of these improvements was the introduction of

a new command level, the Army; the Soviet-

equivalent of the western corps. Egyptian ground

forces were grouped into three armies: the Second

and Third directed operations along the Suez

Canal; the First Army was simply a group of

miscellaneous units commanded directly by the

General Staff. The three armies commanded

Egypt's ten divisions (twoarmored, three mechan-

ized, and five infantry), numerous independent

brigades (including about twelve independent

artillery brigades, two tank brigades with T-62

tanks, seven mechanized infantry brigades, and

other units), and a variety of independent

battalions (including 25 to 27 commando battali-

ons).

The organization of the armored divisions(the

4th and 21st) differed little from that in 1967.The

only important changes were in equipment, the

Soviets having provided more modern systems.

With about 230 T-55 tanks and at least 70artillery

pieces, the armored divisionswere(on paper) well-

organized, potent units.

The mechanized division wasa newformation,

added after 1967. This type of unit was similar to

the armored division, differing only in the

proportion of tank and mechanized brigades.

lnstead of two tank brigades and one mechanized

1967 Egyptian Armored Brigade: Another Soviestyle formation relying upon Soviet equipmenTheoretically potent units. Poor deployment, intensivair strikes, and inferior Soviet equipment, howeveled to the complete destruction of all five of Egypt'armored brigades.

brigade, the mechanized division had two me-chanized brigades and one tank brigade. The

mechanized brigades were organized like the 1967

infantry brigades mounted on armored personnel

carriers with more modern equipment. With

about 150 tanks supported by BRDM-I Sagger

carriers, the mechanized divisions could operate

effectively in offensive and defensive situations.

The 1973infantry divisions were substantially

different from the 1967divisions, though organi-

zation was only slightly changed. Unlike the 1967

divisions, which had little effective anti-tank

capability, the 1973divisionswere multi-arm anti-

tank units equipped with every anti-tank weapon

available: tanks, assault guns, anti-tank guns,

anti-tank missiles, and anti-tank rocket launchers.

Each division possessed tank battalions (totalling

about 100T-55's) attached to the infantrv brigades

and an assault 'guns battalion of 18-SU>~O'S

attached to the division. Attached to each brigade

was a battery of six 85mm anti-tank guns and to

each battalion an anti-tank platoon with 107mm

recoilless guns. Each infantry platoon (of which

there would be about 80in a division) isbelieved to

have contained an anti-tank squad with about a

dozen men. In addition to a three-man section

with one Sagger anti-tank missile launcher, the

anti-tank squads were equipped with RPG-7anti-

tank rocket launchers. Probably 82mm recoillesguns werealso assigned to these units, although no

firm evidence supports this belief. Finally, each

rifle squad contained one or two RPG-7 launch

ers, and all its riflemen could carry anti-tank

grenades. The divisional engineer battalion could

also support anti-tank operations by layin

minefields. With at least 270 major and hundred

of smaller anti-tank weapons, the Egyptian 197

infantry division was the most effective anti-tank

formation ever deployed.

The 1973 infantry divisions represented an

Egyptian solution to the threat posed by Israe

tank forces. Recognizing that their tankers coul

not hope to equal their Israeli counterparts, th

Egyptians needed another method of effectivel

countering lsraeli tanks. To accomplish this, th

Egyptians made use of their strongest asset: thability of their infantry to defend fortified or stati

positions. In every war fought against Israe

Egyptian infantry had fought effectively from

fortified positions, often against overwhelmin

odds. The classic case was the defenseof Giradi, i

1967, which had to be retaken several times b

Israeli troops. The excellent performance of th

Egyptian infantry in 1973confirmed these expec

tatio--

I" i Xrapprax 20001

probably attached

I I 1 I I I I

- - - - - - - - - -

I 1 1967 Egyptian Infantry Brigade: A Soviet-stylorganization, totally equipped with Russian equipment, this type of unit was poorly suited to face Israe

6-82mm MTR. 6-107mm RGtank units. With only marginally more anti-tancaoability than the 1956 b r i ~ a d e nd lacking thmobility ihat the Archers and Br en carriers gave thearlier unit, this formation was a failure. Its equipmenwas insufficient to deal with the more powerful Israetank forces. Combined with poor training and badoctrine, the result was total d~saster.--

as v -....-@p44*,#=*if;*48

@ 2 ~ ~ - ~ s(approx 2500)

j ~ $ $ ? *

I Ik%,;p; FyrOx)-Ee-*8--- - 6-85mm ATG 30-T55

b6-120mm mortar 6122mm HOW

1973 Egyptian Infantry Brigade: Based on Sovieorganizations with important Egyptian modificationsThe most important was the addition of the platoonlevel anti-tank sections. These sections appear to havbeen formed around three-men Sagger teams (e ywit h a gunner, assistant gunner, and an RPG-equippeinfantryman). The remaining men in the section werequipped with the RPG-7, except i n all ikelihood sommanning an82mm E-10 recoillessgun. Theaddition othese sections transformed the infantry brigades int'.ank destroying formations, relying upon virtually!very av ailable anti-tank weapon in he Soviet arsena

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


THEGENERAAGE 8

18-24-57mm AA 36-122mm HOW 2-GSP br~dgelayers18-152mm HO W MLG mlnelavers

973 1cgyptiaii M I I I I ~ . II a u u i r i u ~ ~u LIIG ulyailiL ~ I I I I U

vehicles, tank brigades taken from tank or mechanizdivisions were also attached. It seems likely thatseparate tank battalion was attached at the divisiolevel, in addition to those in he brigades, but this is ncertain. Nor is i t certain how the SU-100s weattached: either in companies of 6 attached to thbrigades or in a battalion of 18attachedto thedivisioNothino is knownof the reconnaissance battalion. It

3-11 ~ ( 8 ) likelv that theenaineer battalioncontained mine40 land clear) and amphibious- special

I973Egyptian Tank Division: A large, well-organizedunit. The superiority of Israeli tanks and tank unitslimited Egyptian tank and mechanized units to supportof the infantry divisions. Attempts to use the tankdiv~sion ffensively ended rn complete defeat, makrngpossible the successful lsraeli canal crossing. Theremnants were destroyed i n ferocious counterattacksagainst the lsraeli corridor to the canal crossing site

( aMTR l071nn?> 6 - ,p ~ l

1973 Egyptian Mechanized Brigade: Hardly mosuccessful than the tank division, the mechanrzebrigades were best used in support of the foot infantr(in fact their BRDM-1Sagger carriers were attacheto the foot infantry brigades at the start of the warAttempts to usethemoffensively ended in disaster. Th

main problem was not equipment, training, or moralall were of high quality. The problem began with theemployment. Most lsraeli forces in the Sinai were tanunits. Attempts to make Soviet-style mechanizinfantry attacks against the Israeli tank units wefutile.

Post-1973: No substantial changes in unit organi- fo r three armored divisions (a n increase of one Centurions), nine m e c h ~..d brigades (probab

zation have been made since th e 1973 war. T he over pre-1973 plans) an d tw o mechanized divi- with no tanks, bu t provided with anti-tanonly change of significance has been th e conver- sions. Brigadestrength no w totals 16( inc lud ingan missiles), a nd on e infantry brigade, Jordan iasion of th e armored division tank brigades from independent infantry brigade). With a n e s t i m a t e d ground forces are considerably stronger tha

th e T-55 t o th e m o r e modern T-62. Besides this, sin k brigadc ' ich with about 90 P a t t o n s o r during th e 1967 o r 1973 wamost units retain th e same organization a n dequipment used in th e 1973 war.

JordanThrough 1970; th e Jordan ians copied British

organization, a l though shor tages of manpoweran d equipment often m a d e J o r d a n i a n unitssmaller than their British models. T h e 1967organization of th e 27th Infantry Brigade (sta-tioned in Jerusa lem) wa s probab ly typical of thesi x o ther infantry brigades fielded dur ing that war :three infantry battalions (each of a b o u t 500 men),a m o r t a r company with 120mm morta rs , a n dprobab ly reconnaissance, anti-tank, an d suppor ti n i t s . T h e 27th also ha d a n attached engineercompany , bu t it seems unlikely tha t al l th e infantrbbrigades ha d engineers. A batialion of eighteen 25:

pounder gun-howitzers wa s a t tached to thebrigade. It is likely t h a t al l J o r d a n i a n brigadeswere suppor ted b y a t t a c h e d artillery battalions ofcomvarab le size. Each of th e brigade's infantrbbattalions wa s organized into three rifle compan-

ies, suppor ted by a weapons company equippedwith 3-inch morta rs and jeep-mounted 106mmrecoilless rifles.

T h e tw o armored brigades deployed in 1967(the 40th and 60th) were identically organized.Each ha d tw o tank battalions with 44 M-48 tanks,a mechanized infantry battalion mounted in M.

113 armored personnel carriers, an d a n artillerqbattalion with 12 t o 18 M-52 105mm self-propelled howitzers.

After 1967, th e brigades were grouped intodivisions. With th e creation of a number of newbrigades, it wa s possible t o fill-out five divisions.Beginning in 1973, in th e midst of th e expans ionprogram, plans were laid t o mechanize al l infantryunits. Press reports indicate that by mid-1976 thcJ o r d a n i a n s completed a reorganization providing

(approx 2000)

Jordanian 40thArmored Brigade: A powerfulunit,asstrong as any opposrng lsraelr format~onAfter somesuccessful f~ghts,he u n ~ t as destroyed due to Israel1arrstrrkes and poor log~strcs,most of the tanks srmplyran out of gas

4 4 4 4 8 ea 50-MI13 APC 12-18-M52 SPAI

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


THE GENERAL PAGE

d to the fight~ng<rap11fnr r~c n n ~ a r ~ d

Little information isavailable on the organiza-tion or the 1967 Syrian ground forces. All that isreally known is that the infantry brigades contain-ed a battalion of T-34/85 tanks. PresumablySyrian units were organized like Egyptian units(which, of course, means like Soviet units).Unfortunately, there is too little data available topermit any degree of reliability to be attached tosuch a guess.

In 1973, the Syrian Army was organized into

units similar to those deployed by the Egyptians,but with a number of significantdifferences.First.

the Syrian infantry units did not have thc arrti-tank sections added to the infantry platoons ofEgyptian units. This considerably weakened theiranti-tank capabilities. The Syrian infantrydivisions were similar to their Egyptian counter-parts, with three major exceptions. First, theSyrian infantry divisions contained two infantrybrigades, one mechanized brigade, and a tankbrigade. Second, the Syrian units did not containthe extra tank battalion probably attached toEgyptian infantry divisions. Third, the organiza-tion of the Syrian mechanized brigades probablydiffered from Egyptian structures. Instead of

containing three mechanized battalions, theSyrian mechanized brigades only had two. While

Bl-nina Closea JoorsI

Of necessity, much of the information used in The best general work on the subjectdesigning the game is not 'authoritative'. For probably TH E I S R A E L I A R M Y by DiPANZERBLITZ and P A N Z E R L E A D E R , of- Horowitz and Edward Luttwak. It provid--ficial material 'was easily available. For A R A B - broad, balanced perspective of the full perISRAELI W A R S , much important, up-to-date covering many subjects ignored by other wrimaterial of a similar nature had to be guessed at. It also provides concise accounts of many olHopefully, these informed guesses (based on best important battles, There are three works usefulavailable information) are correct (or, at least, the 1956war. The first isan article by Bernard i .reasonably so), but it is possible that some of the in the July, 1957 issue of the Military Revie~information could be wildly erratic. For this While this might be difficult to obtain, it is i

reason, it is best to be cautious when dealing with excellent military history, written under diffic~the data presented herein. (The same is true ofany circumstances, and makes a good supplement fimaterial concerning the Middle East: even the second work. The second is Moshe Dayarsupposedly "authoritative official" sources can- D I A R Y O F TH E SINAI C A M P A I G N . Thand do-spout utter nonsense on this subject). book is one of the best military histories e-.Note: some of the information presented here written: concise, accurate and with little biascontradicts supposedly 'authoritative' sources. In provides a compelling picture of how the confhsuch cases the designer's data is based upon best unfolded to the view of the man commanding tlavailable information. In other words, those Israeli Army. A third work, less useful than tl"authoritative" sources are, quite simply, wrong. other two, but still of some value, is S 1 1

A large amount of basic research went into this Marshall's SINAI C A M P A I G N .game, covering several years of intensive work, There are few useful works on the 1961 wd

During this time, all possible sources available to The best of a poor lot is TH E T H I R D A R Athe designer were compared and analyzed. ISRAELI W A R by Edgar O'Ballance. WhiThrough such critical analysis, it was often generally comprehensive, the author makespossible to discover much of interest which was number of gross factual errors. Only two 0thnot read~lypparent. It is likely that more than a works are worth mentioning, primarily because

thousand hours of research, interviews, and the balanced perspective they give of one facetanalysis was devoted to the Arab-Israeli conflict. the war. These are Abdullah SchlieferS T h r .

Not all of the information was directly useful, but F A L L O F JERUSALEM (one of the fewit allensured that the presentation wasas factually satisfactory military histories of the Arab-Isracaccurate as humanly possible. conflict written by an Arab author available

During the designer's research on the Arab- English) and Abraham Rabinovich's excelleIsraeli conflict, several hundred different works T H E BATTLE F O R JERUSALEM. Bowere consulted, ranging from newspapers and contain lots of good data and complement eatperiodicals to books, hearings before Con- other in a very sati~factoryway.gressional committees and Department of Armypublications. Most of these sources added only For the 1973war the best single work is Chaismall bits of information that needed to be pieced Herzog's TH E W A R O F ATONEMENT. /...

together to form a relatively complete picture. excellent book, it is marred by a number ofFor this reason the bibliography is limited only irritating errors. Best ignored is the mediocre,

to those items of general interest giving the gamer unreliable and all-too-common TH E Y O M

a broad understanding of the military side of the K I P P U R W A R by the Sunday Times InsigArab-Israeli conflict. Team.

I

''1973 Syrian Infantry Dlvlslon: Dlrectly derlved fr

.'?he Sovtet Mo t o r ~ z ed ~ f l e tvlston Weak tn armo

this reduced the fighting power of the units, it almade them easier to command-no small cosideration for a country with few experiencsenior officers. Similarly organized mechanizbrigades were found in the two tank divisions

The Syrians had one singularly unique formtion. They had an anti-tank battalion, made upthree companies of BRDM Sagger carriers atwo companies of 107mm recoilless gu(probably 27 BRDMs and 18 107mmguns). Suan organization makesgood sense:the Saggersaeffective from 500 to 3000 meters; the recoilleguns are effectivefrom 0 to 1000meters. Thus t

'dead zone' of the Saggers is covered by trecoilless guns.0

1RUSSIAN

CAMPAIGN

PBM KITIn response to many requests for it, we've g

ahead and done another PBM Kit after stanumerous times: "never again". RUSSIAN C APAIGN is a good medium for postal play thoand is perhaps our best game for pbm.combination of double impulse moves andrelativelysmall number of turns makes it a deligh

play by mail.Each kit comes with full instructions for b

pbm in general and RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNparticular. A kit includes 4 pads-two eachRussian and German moves, and inclueverything necessary to record movement, comand retreats plus special functions like rail mment, sea movement, weather and replacementcomplete kit sells for $6.00 plus postage. A halfwith only two pads costs $3.00 plus postMaryland residents please add 5% sales tax.

I

THE GENERAL

BINDERS

These binders are ruggedly constructedattractive red leather finish vinyl, with gembossed logos of the TH E G E N E R A L andAvalon Hill Game Company located on the fand spine. Each binder measures 9" x 12"x IgUholds twelve (12) copies of TH E GENERSpring-steel retaining wires hold the issues firmplace, yet your magazines are not damaged inway, and can easily be removed from the bindeyour desire. The binders are available from AvaHill for $5 plus 750 postage. Maryland residplease add 5% state sales tax.

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE 10 THEGENERA

THE ARAB-ISRAELI W AR S

UNIT COMPOSITION CHARTS

This chart gives the players an idea of the

organization and composition of the unit counters.

Most counters represent actual TO&E organiaa-

tion. The main exceptions are the tank units. For the

Egyptian Army, a company consists of ten tanks, a

platoon contains three tanks. Three is too small and

ten i s too large for our gaming purposes. Much the

same i s true o f the Israeli units. For this reason, the

standard P A N Z E R B L I T Z J P A N Z E R L E A D E R

tank counter size was adopted (five tanks per un it

counter) which yielded great benefits from the

standpoint of 'overall simulation' results.

Most of the equipment used by both sides came

from outside arms suppliers (usually the Soviet

Union and United States, sometimes Great Britain

or France). This meant that all of the wars were

fought with only those weapons available at the

start. Another consequence of this dependence on

outside supply was that often both sides had the

same equipment. Bri tish equipment was used by

Egypt. Iraq, Israel, and Jordan; American equip-

ment by Israel and Jordan. Through captures,

Israeli troops often used the same equipment as

Egyptians, Iraqis, and Syrians. I n short, the

following chart represents an overview of the

weapons of the world as applied to the Middle East:

FOR UNIT DESCRIPTION

ABBREVIATIONS-

AAAPCARATATGAVLBHMGKGKMKPH

LMGMMG

Anti-aircraftArmored personnel carrierAutomatic rifleAnti-tankanti-tank gunArmored vehicle launched b~Heavy machinegunKilogram (2.2 pounds)Kilometer (0.62 miles)Kilometers-per-hour

Light machinegunMetersMachinegun

ridge

MKMM

MMGRGROFRPMRRSMGWWll

MarkMillimeters

Medium machinegunRecoilless gunRate-of-fireRounds-per-minuteRecoilless rifleSubmachinegunWorld War Two

COUNTRY ABBREVIATION-

Czechoslovakia

EgyptFranceIsraelItalyJordanPolandSoviet Union

SyriaUnited KingdomUnited States

NAME COMPOSlTlOl COMMENT:

Infantry 25-35 men, several LMG,

20-30 AR and SMG, 82mm

Metol bazooka or LAW

The composition and equipment of Israeli infantry and paratroop units have changed

considerably over the period 1956-1973. Initially, most infantry was equipped with rifles

and SMG's. By 1967, most had a mix of SMG and AR (the exact proportions varying from

unit t o nce need). Since 1973, all units are equipped wrnMachinegun

81mm mortar

about 20 men, about 6 k,$ 3-$ Attached to weapons compan~esn many infantry and paratroop units ( it is not known i fn q n n c **& *"> such units were ever attached ro the armored infantry units). I t I- nrnh-hle that with

Increasinguse of ARs, these unlts have now been ei~m~nated.-81mm mortars, about

30 men.

Israeli-produced mortars wi th a range of over 4600 meters and a maximum ROF of 20

rounds per minute. There is another version, probably for paratroop use, wi th a range of

onlv 4000 meters.

About 30 men, with SMG. S P ~Sue

s pu t together after 1967 to use the bridging equipment t o be used to crossthe

ed trom west Germany as part ot some arms deals transacted In tne early

with an effective range of 400 to 2000 meters can penetrate up to 500n

s 10 kg missile requires23.5 seconds to reach maximum range. There is

system has ever been used by Israel in combat, though Arab sources ha!

used some kind of AT missile in the early fighting during the 1973 war

~ E H I L J L A RA ND A I F ~ L ~ A F TNITSrn --NAME COMPOSITION WEIGHT SPEED RANGE CREW MG ORIGIN USE COMMENTS

3 M-113A 1APCs, 10.9

6 MG, 9 crew

'US M-113A 1 also used by Jorda

(since 1973). Saudia Arabia

(ordered 1975). and Kuwait

(ordered 1976) .

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


THEGENERAL PAGE

Scout 4 jeeps, 4 MG,

Jeep 12 crew

~viany uomm n n s lcenst

built in Israel. Effective

e: 1 oom, ROF: 5

.'."". Y""'" .."."., V ' .."& captured Soviet vehicles

1 - IS Extensively used in 1956 and

1967. Still used for security

oneratinns

4M-11341

APCs, 20 k ~ u ,

4-2" (52mm)

mortars, about

30 men

Each APC mounts 1-.50 cal

HMG, 2-.30 cal MMG, 2-.30

cal LMG, and 1 52mm mortar.

.. ." ..=....I. ...-.I...-tanks m o u n t ~ n ~ 75mm high velocity gun equal

75mm guns (3; ~npower to that mounted on

rounds each), 5 the German WWIIPanther.

120mm

Mortar

Israeli-producedversion of

Finnish weapon. Range:

6200mm; ROF: 10.

6 120mm mortars

mounted on M- 3

halftracks, about

40 me1 rn4 TOWanti-tank 1 Jordan, Kuwait, and $

m~ssileauncher- Arab~a lso obta~ned ..mounted on after 1973

M-113A 1APC's, . ,

about 35 TOW *

SSl 1 M 3 IS SS-11 also used by Saudia

Arabia.4 SS-11anti-tank

missile launchers

mounted onM3

halftracks, 12

crew

Sherman50 5 ShermanMk. 50 32? 40? 160 4-5 2-3 - IS Israeli modification of

tanks mounting Shermans obtained without

76mm guns (about effective armament. The 76mm

75 rounds each), guns were taken fromM-10's.

10-15MG. 20-25 Introduced prior to the 1956

crew. war.- -herman 51

Sherman

51HV

s Sherman Mk.

51HV tanksmounting 105mm

guns

ed Super Shermar;

rance supplied 100 ust

ore the start of the 1956

r, supplemented by others

ade in Israel prior to 1967.

240 4 2 IS IS Uses modified French 105mm

medium velocity gun. Intro-duced in about 1965 and used

until 1975. A highly efficient

modification.

'M-48A5Part

tanks mountins

105mm guns

(about 60 rounds

crew

Obtainec m West Germany,

the U.S. ana Jordan (captured).

Modified by replacing 90mm

gun with the British 105mm gun

used on M60A 1 and Centurion.

Also given a diesel engine (as use

on the M-60A 1 . The U S. began

similar conversion program after

197:

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PAGE 12 THEGENERA

5M-6-UA t anksm oun t i ng

1 0 5 m m guns

(63 roundseach) 1 0 MG, 2 0

I

5 centurion-

tanks,mount ing

105m m guns(66 roundseach), 1 0 MG20 c rew

Ubtatned In lt172,180 ava~ lab len

1973.300 m ore were bough t af terth e fighting. Also used b y Jordari( f r om 19741 an d Saudi Arabia(ordered i n 19751. R O F : 1 0 rpm;

j Obtained in 1959, equipped w i t h 2 0pd r . gun. 1 0 5 m m guns were obtaine

later. Whi le on l y 1 0 Centurions wer

lost in 1967, infer ior m ob i l i t y necestated th e development o f Pat fur ion.O f 1 0 0 0 Centurions acquired, 180f r o m th e Netherlands, 25 captured

f rom Jordan, an d ' . es t f r om Brit

entur ion

ranksame diesel engine a nd t ran miss icas used n t h e M - 4 W S and the1W-60A1. Isra eli tankers call i t hebes t tank i n he Midd le East , ani r on i c t r i bu t e t o a tan k replacedby t he B r i t i s h s ta r ti nq i n 1965 . ..ROF : 10 rpm .

I!. 1". ~ e l ionversion o f T-54 ,..J

an d T-55 tanks. Captured in 1967mount ing same gu n as i n P a t t u r i onan d M -60A 1 Some sources c laimIsrael replaced Russian engine w i t hWestern engine.

5 T I -67 ...... ts 36 ?m oun t i ng 1 0 5 m mguns (about 4 0

rounds each), 1 0MG, 2 0 men.

IULU I L ~ U several ~ ~ . I I - ~ I u - & ~ ~ ~ ; ~ q g ~ z ~$p&.!*.*")*i.h..,.<.

ferry pel led ferries. :+yd;g@4~~~tgIeveral M-60A V L B 4 8

bridge I p w ~ r c

IS Israel also usess im i la rM48A VLB.

r r u b a b l y 1srae11-maoe.useu tr

1967 an d 1973.ermanf la i l -

S Guru, ,,.ade i n Isr Uses opt i ca lsighting system.

I m m A A 6 ~ ~ V I I I2Om m A A guns 9

mounted o n M3hal f -..'A-113A.1 4 T O W Saudia

TOW af t

FR

m ~ s s ~ l eaunchersm oun t ed on M3 half -tracks, 1 2 crew .

-I SS-11 also used b y Saudi Arabia.S. .,#'A3

I S Obtained In 1976. Ca n carry u p t o

6 T OW A T m~ssi les l t h 4 0 0 0 m

Several A H - 1 H u

Cobra at tack he1COP

Several UH-1assault 4

helicopters.

IS I tal ian-produced A B -205A versiono f U.S. designed U H - 1 assault transpor t .

25-35 men, u p t o 25 A R, LMG, Composi t ion varies considerably, depending upon nat ional i ty , period, an d o f un i t . Syria

an d SMG, several RP G-7 A T infantry , an d Egypt ian mechanized in fant ry between 2 5 an d 3 0 strong. Jordanian infantry an

rocket launchers poss ibly a Egypt ian 1973 in fant ry around 35 strong. Egypt ian 1973 in fant ry has A T sect ion wi thsagg er

6-10 8 2 m m RG , Sagger A T A T missile team, b u t capabil i t ies are inc luded i n th e Sagger units.

missiles.

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THEGENERAL PAGE 1

25-3, ,..,.., AR, SMG

some RPG-7's.

T . unit. .,,.-,,... ...- .,--.-. --......,. i d o L ...., ...-. -...st in -.. ...-I -.....--. .--..

equipment than regular uni ts, they cannot generate as much fi repower , a weakness compensate, . . . ,

nora' ' vels.

Engineer about 50 men, with engineering Every Syrian and Egyptian brigade includes such a unit, which provides combat engineering

and light infantry weapons suooort.

includina flamethrowers.

Pontoo about 50men, w i th light pecialized engineers trained in the use of pontoon bridgingequipment

Sagger abou t 12 men, 3 Sagger AT

missile launchers, Sagger A T

missiles.

Known as PUR-64 ("Bumblebee") t o Soviets, code names given by Western intelligence includ

AT-3and Sagger. Foot troops carrying so-called suitcase version of $heSagger A T missile (the

name comes from the case in which the Saggers are carried). The Sagger with an effective range

of 500 to 3000 meters, can penetrate 400mm of armor. The 11 Kg. missile takes 27 seconds to

reach maximum range (compared with the 15 seconds required fo r the TOW A T missile). It is

estimated that about 15 t o 25% of all Israeli tanks destroyed in 1973 were knocked ou t by the

Sagger. The Sagger is continuously controlled by the operator during its entire flight, using a

joy-stick. Thus, the operator must be highly skilled, able t o concentrate on the missile fo r up

to 30 seconds. To achieve this level of skill, operators are required to make 5000 practice firing

using a special simulator. Even during the fighting operators continued to practice on a daily

basis on the simulator. The Egyptian troops often fired Saggers over Suez Canal on the first da

of the 1973 war t o support troops in the Sinai.

.his Soviet weapon dating from the 1940s. has a maxlmum range of 4000 m. With a crew of

the mortar can achieve a ROF of up to 25 rounds per minute. We~ghs nly 56 Kg. The mortarused as a battallon weapon by the Arabs, though the Soviets have replaced i t with the 1 Z h m

mortar in al l bu t paratroop units. Range inferior to comparable Israeli 81m m mortar.

107mm RG 4-6B-11 107mm RG,about

20-40 men.

'his weapon has long since been removed from front-line Soviet use, replaced by better weapo

The B-11 has a maximum effective range t requires a 5 man crewLl"l:L-,. ;+ A*-".-., '

n counterpart lnlm m

17 pdr 6 17-pdr (76.2mm)

ATG, about 50 men. - JN WWll Surplllc

25 par.

85mm ATG 6 SD-4485mm AT G 2300-'--.~t

70 men

EG Equipped with Auxiliary Propulsion Uni tSY (APU) giving sen&-̂ '--I led s----I -& 25 k r

122mm HOW EG

SY WWll vintage. Still effective although ou t

ranged by modern weapons. Israelis organ

ti M-43120 mortars, 50 0 6 SU tc, W~VII intage. Very efficient weapon evenZumm Mort

about 40 men. SY though it barely outranges Israeli 81mm

medium mortar.

bZt*s!F:r.+$Y:%;+T* <-

G Highly effective optically-controlled gun.

ZPU-4 6ZPU-4quad 14.5mm 2100 1200 4x600 ? SU EG Optically-controlled weapon, relying onHMG. about 40 men. SY large numbers fo r effectiveness.

MG ORIGIN USE COMMFNTS

4 BTR-152V, MG, 8.6

8 crew.

First APC used in large number

b y Arabs, after 1967 confined t

second-line use.

Israel uses la^,, , nu , , , u , , ,

captured vehicles since 1973.

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PAGE 14 THEGENERAL

4 BTR-GOPB, 10 80 500 2/14 2 SU SY

8 MG. 8 crew.

4 OT-62, 3

107mm RG

12 crew.

:zech version of BTR-50.

4 BPM-1,4-73mm 1guns, 4 MG,Sagger

AT missiles, 12 crew.

EG Originally, ..vas thought the

SY BMP carried 76mm gun. The

73mm gun is automatically

loaded, with 40 rounds carried.

truck 2-6 SIL-151 rucks 4.5 60 600 1/19 - SU EG Jordan usesequivalentWest Germ

drivers. nd U.S. vehic

Effective range: 1100m RO

3PT-76B,376mm 14 45

guns, 2 BTR-SOPB,

5m 30n

EG Small number or capturea model

SY used by Israel.

r oost-war develooment of the

vrlwll Katyusha ro'cket launcherNumber of rounds: 16; Range:

'0.600 (exact range stroversial), time to reload: 3-4

inuiABRDM-1 Sagger 6missile carriers, 1

BTR-40PB, 1 MG,

42 Saggers, about

20 crew.

EG The BTR-40 s a command

SY vehicle. In Egypt all BRDM Sagg

carriers were assigned to mecha-

nized infantry brigades but many

were detached during the 1973

war to support the infantry

''riqades ir -? Sin;

6 SU-700 assault 30

guns, 6 MG, 24

crew.

EG WWll vintage. An effective

SY weapon used by Egypt in

1956, 1973. Probably still i n

WWll vintage. In 1973 only

used as training vehicle. Syr

sed 200 as statlc anti-tank

5 T-55 tanks 36

mounting 1OOmm

guns (42 rounds

each 10 MG 20

crew.

EG Captured models used by Israel

SY as TI-67. ROF: 3-5.

- --1OM i0 45

ing 122mm guns (30

rounds each), 10 MG,

20 crew.

EG Improved version of .IS-111 used

SY in WWI II ; some used by Israel.

Powerful gun limited by small

ammunition capacity.

Limited range and ihferior Spec

hamper an otherwise satisfactory

design. Egypt received32 n 195

nd Jordan 40 nore 1967

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THE GENERAL PAGE

*zFsw#*q@]#F&n u n t i f i g m i n eI ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ < ~ h 4 .% .. -ng 4 n . i -#p/2 $3, en t .

M T U - 2 several T-55 anksm o d i f i e d t o ca r ry

and la v br idae.

PMP large n u m b e r o f

heavi ly m o d i f i e d

1 0 - t o n TATRA

813 rucks .

Sh i l ka ZSU-23-4Sh

SP AA vehicles,

m o u n t i n g quad

2 3 m m guns.

Mi-8 t far

he l icopter!

S im i la r t o T-55ca r ry ing a 1 9 m

bridge; E g y p t also used earlier

MTU- 1 based o n T-54.--Pon toons m o u n t e d o,, ,",carr ier able t o carry load:

5 2 tons. T w o GSPs ar e c o m b i

t o f o r m on e fe r ry .

E g y p t also used earl ier Sovie t

bridges, th e TMM and TPP,

as w e l l as br idges ob ta ined

f r o m West G e r m a n y .

T h e m o s t e f fec t i ve AA weapo

i n th e w o r l d . E f fec t i ve ROF:

4 x 4 0 0 r p m ; Range: 2 5 0 0 m .

Can ca r ry bo mbs , napa lm ,

rocke ts , o r Segge

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PAGE 16 THEGENERA

BARBAROSSA REPULSED!Expanding on The Viipuri Defense

Defense for th e Soviet player in RUSS IAN

C AM P A I G N s no t an easy task. By th e first wintermany Soviet commanders are reduced t o tears astheir paltry army is torn t o shreds by th e ruthless

German advance. Al l advantages a re o n th e Germanside: power, mobility, a i r suppor t an d evenpsychology. T h e German a r m y appears invinciblewhile th e Russian forces a re continually haunted byth e specter of defeat. However. a defeatist att i tudemust be avoided if th e Russian line is to hold. Lossof confidence a t a critical time ca n be fatal. A river is

abandoned without a fight. A fallen city tha t couldhave been liberated is left t o th e mercy of th e

invader. O r a hundred o ther positions tha t could besaved a re lost, due t o despair rather than to tacticalo r strategic considerations.

F or some players, these problems a r e insur-mountable. They would rather take command of th eGerman forces, with their overwhelming attacksa n d spectacular breakthroughs, while swarms ofS t u k a s harass th e Russian defense. Despite these

disadvantages, 1 still prefer th e role of Stalin.Patience is it s ow n reward. With careful play an dproper utilization of resources, th e German tide ca nbe stemmed. Psychology ca n also work to th eRussian's advantage. T h e desire fo r revenge, th echance of defeating a n enemy who attacked withoutprovocation, an d the reclaiming of land rightfullyyours ca n al l be very satisfying an d contribute t o th eRussian atti tude.

Having presented a n opening defense for th eRussian player ("The Viipuri Defense," in Vol. 13 ,No . 6) . th e next logical step in a s tudy of Russiandefensive tactics is an analysis of th e middle game.

F o r purposes of this article, th e m i d d l e . g a m e isdefined a s th e period from Sept.-Oct. '41 t o Nov.-Dec. '43. This critical time will determine t o whatex ten t an d when (if ever) th e Russ iancan assume the

offensive. Consequently a n overall policy of defensean d consolidation is proposed. Offense is consid-ered only prior to o r dur ing snow months o r whennecessary to regain a crucial objective. Whereas inth e first few months of war, th e Russian is willing t ogive u p large areas of land , th e middle game periodis one where ground must be.held, in some cases a tal l costs. In these instances, offensives a re no t onlydesirable, bu t mandatory . If th e Russian is able toassume a n overall offensive posture before th e en d

of 1943, well an d good; bu t with evenly matchedopponents and normal weather, this is generally no tpossible.

Basic Russian Strategy

As this article is primarily concerned with th e

tactical aspects of Russian defense, only slightconsideration will be given t o th e overall strategicpicture. However, a s strategy is by necessityinextricably intertwined with tactics, some discus-

sion is necessary. T he major question of strategy iswhere should th e Russian forces stop falling backan d a t tempt to form a cohesive defensive line. In th eopening, river lines a r e used t o advan tage , bu t theselines should be recognized a s being only temporary ,serving to delay, bu t no t stop, th e German advancewhile th e Russian produc t ion builds u p steam.Obviously th e Russian cannot retreat forever, as hewould s o o n retreat of f th e board and lose th e gameby default . T h e question is where?

,

In Diagram 1 tw o major defensive lines a r eshown. T he yellow line is th e First Line of Defense( F L D ) an d th e red line is th e Main Line of Defense

( M L D ) . This is th e basic position tha t th e Russianwould like t o present t o th e German when th eweather clears in 1942. While local exceptions t o th edefense presented are unavoidable, a n a t temptshould be made to recreate this line a s faithfully a spossible.

T h e F L D should be held whenever possible, bu tno t a t th e cost of committing a large a m o u n t ofresources a n d / o r reserves. Once broken, a n orderlywithdrawal should be made t o th e M L D . This is th eline that should be held if th e Russian hopes t oretain any chance of winning th e game. If it can't beheld, a n effort should be made t o make th e breach s ocostly to th e Germans that it will be fa ta l to hi s

cause. T he M L D is also th e line where reservesshould be committed in order t o regain key riversan d major cities. Only in th e most dire circum-stances should this line be abandoned . Only whenal l hope of a win ha s been lost should th e Russianretreat t o th e final line of defense, which consistsbasically of th e line from Gork i t o Astrakhan (whichwill remain th e subject of a future article). Don'tgive up hope too easily. Yo u (and th e Russianproduction) may surprise yourself.

, RAM I f hexes

By J . Richard Jarvinen

As mentioned before, local exceptions ma y exin th e Russian position of th e F L D . In most cashowever, lost river lines o r key hexes mayregained with a winter offensive. Winter is when tGerman is most vulnerable, and therefore mocautious. Attack with a b a n d o n in Nov-Dec 'Snow is assured fo r th e next tu rn , an d most Germcommanders will undoubtedly retreat fa r ou trange of potential Russian attacks. January aFebruary should not be used to attack retreatiGermans, bu t rather t o consolidate your positia long th e F L D . Care must be taken not t o stray tfa r from t h e F L D when attacking th e Germabecause if th e weather suddenly turns, yo u ma y fiyourself exposed an d vulnerable on th e opRussian steppes.

The Russian Dream Defense

Presented in Diagram I is what I have termth e "dream defense." Ambitious is a nicer word, b

unfortunately dream is more accurate. Shownth e m a p a re some 15 9 combat factors ou t ofpossible 227 factors available (no t count ing Guarworkers, paratroopers, Stalin o r Stavka). Itunlikely that th e Russian will have this many unin his command when March rolls a r o u n d . Also

German will be trying qui te hard to penetrfu r ther than th e lines indicated by th e first wint

However, th e following assumpt ions a re made: TGerman ha s failed t o take Leningrad, MoscoKharkov an d Rostov; th e bulk of his a rmywintering in o r near Bryansk; th e F inns have fait o break o u t of F in land ; an d 159 factorsavailable. In th e event that there a re less thanrequired number of factors, units in hexes markwith a n asterisk ca n be released. T he total numberfactors would then be 116, certainly a reasonafigure. However, weaknesses a re created whereunits a re released. If given a choice, units in lthreatened areas (such a s in o r near Rostov) shobe given preference over those around Moscow

N o guards a r e shown o n th e map. Rather thwould be placed o n th e hexes marked with (*),

reserve forces t o counte r any German breathrough . Specific disposition is left t o th e playediscretion, dependen t upon German threats.March, 38 factors of Guards will be available, w

rei

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THE GENERAL PAGE 1

more pouring in every turn. These units areinvaluable, as their mobility and strength can stopall but the most determined German drives. Don'thesitate to use them to reestablish the MLD, butcare must be taken to prevent these units from beingsurrounded. Allow paths of retreat and screenwiththe weaker infantry forces. Don't go chasing minorGerman units out in the open where counterattacksare inevitable.

With the exception ~f the Moscow-Tula region,

the MLD uses river lines to best advantage. It isunfortunate that no river lines exist around Tulathat can be efficiently utilized for defense becausethis area must be guarded. The rail line fromMoscow to Y-8 is the only rail line linkingthe Northwith the South. Control of this line isessential if theRussian is to have the capability to shift his forcesquickly to meet the various threats. (Note that thereserve forces should be placed on the rail hexes inorder to insure their rapid deployment.) Severingofthis critical rail line is tantamount to splitting theRussian army in two, a situation from which it maynever recover.

man attacks. Holding the river line on A-9 and B-9 isnot recommended. First, this would requireanextraunit. Second, units retreating from this line have along way to go to reach any type of security. Andfinally, as long as the hexes F-8 or G-8 are held, theGerman supply must be traced to B-11, whichseverely restricts any advance north of LakeLadoga.

The defense in front of Moscow is ratherstandard, the goal being to prevent an easy overrun

which would leave Moscowvulnerable to an attackin the second impulse. The river line in front of Tulais heavilygarrisoned, for reasons mentioned earlier.Note that only one unit in this defense is susceptibleto being surrounded: the 4th Inf on V-13. The uniton Y-13 is necessary if Kharkov is to be protectedfrom being flanked. Even if overrun, the Germandoesn't gain much. In order to surround Kharkov,this maneuver would cost a minimum of 39 factorsand two Stukas to assure success. And after all thathe hasn't even broken the river line!

If considerable German forces are near Rostov,the unit on GG-13 is almost mandatory to prevent afirst impulse attack against units along the Donestrriver. In the second impulse, the Germans couldthen cross the river lines near JJ-I 1, making thedefense of the lower Dondifficult, if not impossible.

The small armored and cavalry units are founddefending the Donestr river. These faster units arenecessary to reach the MLD once the Donestr linecracks. The slower moving infantry would just betrapped on the open steppes. A unit on JJ-15 isnecessary if Rostov is to be protected from a seainvasion.

Note carefully the paths of retreat shown. Ifunits have been properly placed, the MLD can beformed in only one turn. Rail movement isnecessary to provide Stalingrad with the properprotection.

With a severe shortage of units, it may not bepossible to form the Donestr river line. In this case,the Don river line should be formed as quickly aspossible, with bastions of defense in Kharkov andRostov to slow the Russian drive.

The more astute among you may have noticedthat Archangel has not figured heavily in thisanalysis. Generally 1don't worry about Archangelduring the first two years for the following reasons:The Germans must first take either Leningrad orMoscow before they can even consider moving onArchangel. The Finns by themselveshave no chanceto succeed. Even after Moscow or Leningrad hasfallen, it is still a long way to Archangel, and theGerman goal will be advertised by the disposition ofhis forces. And unfortunately for the German, hissupply line must run through X-2, a hex which isvery vulnerable to attack by Soviet reinforcements.These reasons, plus the fact that there are no majorcities within hundreds of miles, makes for a veryformidable German task.

The Combat Results TableThe CRT in RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN is quite

interesting, and when coupled with the doubleimpulse moves and attacks, can yield someinteresting facts. One of the more significantfeatures is that a 1-1 (or even a 1-2!) attack is not at .bad as it appears. While the German is loathe toattack at poor odds (he generally wants to beassured of breaking a position and is very unhappywith exchanges or A1 results), the Russian com-mander can be much freer with such tactics.Assuming he is willing to chance some losses inorder to retake a keyposition, a well executed attackat low odds can give quite favorable results.Consider Table I. The first column lists theattackers' odds, the second the chance of successwhen attacking in only one impulse, and the third

column gives the chance of success when attackiin both impulsesat the same odds. (A Contact resis considered a success as it will hold a desirposition. But obviously a Contact followed byAR or Al is not a success, and this fact has beconsidered when computing Table I.)

Table I

From this table we can conclude that in all caexcept for a 1-3(or worse)attack, a double impuattack definitely increases your chance for succeDouble impulse attacks, however,are moredifficto mount because a reserve force of armoredguards must be available should the first impuattack fail. A case in point is shown in Diagram

In the north (Diagram 1 again) we find the

Leningrad front garrisoned less heavily than somemay desire. However, I don't recommend commit-ting a large force to this area for several reasons.First, it is a difficult area in which to maneuver, andthus requires armored or guards to defend ade-quately. Also, it is somewhat isolated, and a heavycommitment may find themselves surrounded andaway from the fronts where most of the actionoccurs. Therefore 1 have only two basic objectiveswhen defending Leningrad: I) to prevent a firstimpulse attack whenever possible, and 2) holdingthe Finns in Finland to allow an escaperoute shouldthe Leningrad defenders be required to retreat. Thefirst objective can be attained by maintaining a uniton F-12 (as indicated). The second objectiverequires 7 factors to defend on B-10, preventing theFinns from getting a 1-1 (without air support). If

resources are available, counterattacks may bemade in order to regain F-12, thus buying more timefor Leningrad. Generally, however, I prefer to letLeningrad stand alone but with a sizeablegarrison,forcing the German to commit armored and/orStukas in his attack, and thus robbing other frontsof these valuable units. If (or when) Leningrad falls,the defense shown in Diagram 2 should beestablished as quickly as possible. It is notnecessary, or desirable, to place a unit on 1-10. Thishex can be assaulted from both H-1 I and J-11, thuslosing the benefit of the river. The mountain hex ofJ-10 is much more effective o hold the line. Note the3-5 armored units stationed in the mountains. Theseunits have more mobility than infantry for penetrat-ing into(or out of) the mountains, yet aredoubled indefense, creating effective retardants against Ger-

X r n Ml lAC6 .M "The Fall of Len~ngra :p '41)

Due to a well-coordinated German attack, goweather, and Russian mismanagement, you halost Leningrad in Septemberof 1941(shame!). Otoken forces face the bulk of Army Group Noand the Finnish army. It appears that Leningradlost forever. What would you do? (Assume soreplacements are available and that the weatheclear.) The solution is given in Diagram 4. Adou

-impulse 1-2attackagainst the Finns isplanned, w

a resultant chance of success equal to 38.9%. (Inot 44.4% as indicated in Table I because ifresult of the first impulse attack is AE, there areenough armored units in the vicinity to manother attack at 1-2. However, if the arriving 1Inf. is replaced by an armored unit, the expectanis raised to 44.4747.) If an A1 is the result of the fimpulse attack, the 8th Inf. should be eliminatallowing the two armored units to reenter Lengrad and attempt a second 1-2attack. Since thera 50% chance of snow next month, you may fyourself in possession of Leningrad for the enwinter! The best odds the German can get (assumsnow) against the 5th Inf. on F-13 is 3-1, and thonly by soaking offagainst the7th Inf. onG-11. TFinns will face at best a 1-1 attack on Leningrand at worst 1-2. Some luck is necessaryand so

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE 18 THEGENERAL

much simpler it would have been to placethe guardson U-8 and the infantry on V-9. After thesuccessfulattack on the 7th, the guards can advance into Tulaand assist the 39th and 59thfora3-1against the 7th.Not a sure thing, but it beats the hell out of a 1-2!

credit. At least you tried. My solution is to launchmassive attack against the German left flandriving the Germans back and opening a route fosecond impulse attack against the 6th and 8th on13. Massive, you question? How can thatpossible? Well, just examine the positionDiagram 8. The placement of the newworker unitKalinin is essential in order to createa 4-3 unit thcan attack the 13th Inf. from N-11, robbing tdefender of the river's advantage,as well as givinga 5-1, which assures us of victory. By creati

another replacement in Moscowweare able to ge4-1 on the units on 0-12. By placing the newarriving guards on Q-11, a 4-1 attack on the 6th an8th Inf. can beattained in the second impulse.Othunits secure the river line in front of Moscow. Tworst result that can occur against the 5th and 20isa Contact, but that virtually sealstheir doom. T7th Armored could then advance to N-I?, surrouning the German force on 0-12. My computatioconclude a 9.03 (!) expected loss of German combfactors against a Russian loss of only 1.97. Threturn plus the overwhelming strength in the arwill force the German far from Moscow in toncoming snow months. And there is always tchance that the attackswill result in the loss of allGerman factors (9.3%). These losses will certainhurt the German badly, and if his losses ha

already been considerable, may amount to a majdisaster.

risk must be taken, but the rewards are well worththe effort. The situation is nowhere near hopeless, assuggested by Diagram 3.

8 '.,: *,* w,

.".... . a,,

*. * .",,**re....'"....

w, .

.i"..AU., .."..

...I.......

,- *.,. ..w*. ..,.a,.. .

'" . . :, .I. '.I..

-

:ntial Russian Disaster"

Invariably this type of situation occurs when aContact result is obtained in a primary attack that isin conjunction with a soakoff. There are severalsolutions to this problem. The first thing is torecognize the possibility of its occurrence. Then,assuming that enough unitsare available, to executethe attack in one of the following ways:

1) Position the less mobile infantry in hexeswhere they can attack both forces in question,allowing the armored or guards to swing aroundand flank the defending units (as in the aboveexample).

AM 4 "The Fight for (Sep '41)Rd lMovcaual

Soakoffs

Soakoffsare an integral part of most wargames,and are particularly important in RUSSIANCAMPAIGN .Faulty executioncan havedisastrousresults. Therefore some analysis is required of thisimportant concept. In Diagram 5 is presented arather simple problem concerning placement andsoakoffs. Assume it is clear weather, no other unitsare available, you may not enter the Q or the Z row,and your orders are to drive the Germansfrom Tulaand occupy it if possible. Not toodifficult, but thereis one fatal trap. Finished? All right, how many of

you placed your twoguard units on V-9?(Nobody, Ihope!) This could be a calamity. Assume you cameup with the attack shown in Diagram 6. True, youhave a 5-1 against the 7th Inf. which assures you ofvictory, at the cost of a 1-6soak-off against the unitson V-I0 and X-10. But if this is what you did, youdidn't study the consequences of such a move.Regardless of the result against the 7th and thesoakoff, the two guard units are committed to a 1-2attack, against the 8th and 12th Inf. on V-10. Noother units are available to flank the Germans, andyou face the loss of the cream of your troops. How.

2) Position an extraarmored (or possiblyguard)unit where it can advance and soakoff in the secondimpulse should the original soakoff unit beeliminated or unable to advance.

3) Place an extra unit in the primary attack thatis not necessaryto achieve the desired odds in a hexwhere it can attack both forces. Should the primaryattack be a Contact and the original soakoff unit beeliminated, this extra unit can now provide therequired soakoff. Note that this unit need not be anarmored or guard unit.

"Moscow Threatened? (Nov '41)

Comparing Diagram 7 with Diagram 8, we casee a difference in Russian strength of 47 combfactors! Despite the movement restrictions on thRussian forces, it can be demonstrated that, givthe right conditions, a lightning strike can bquickly generated, throwing the Germans obalance or possibly hurting him critically.

Russian Offensive Tactics

Many Russian commanders often curse theirslow moving troops. The small movement allow-ance and lack of ability to move in the secondimpulse for most of his units preclude the sweeping,enveloping attacks that the German uses soeffectively. However, the observant Russian doeshavesometechniques available that can concentratehis forces very quickly in a threatened area, perhapsnot as dramatically as the German but still effectiveenough to stage rather strong attacks. For example,consider the situation in Diagram 7. The time isNovember, 1941,and the 1stGD had just arrived inMoscow.The weather, fortunatelyfor the Germans,has remained clear. The German, however, hasdispersed much of his force in assaults against

Leningrad and the southern production centers. Butstill the Russian seemsto begreatly outnumberedbythe powerful and more mobile German forces.Assuming you have production facilities totallingeight combat strength points (countingthe arrival inNovember), all types of units are available in thedead pile, and the newly arriving reinforcementsarenot needed elsewhere, how would you handle thesituation? (Assume you may not enter hex row U.)

DIACRAM 8 "AGC Stun

DIACRAM S "It's Never Tula(te)"

.,u

Note carefully the retreat paths for the GermanThe 13th is retreated such as to allow the 7Armored access to N-12 should it be necessary.T5th and 20th are retreated to non-rail hexes, almoalways a good idea.

ll h Inl

Ill those who assumed a defensiveposture go tothe back of theclass. Now is the time toattack! Withsnow next month, the German will be forced toretreat his starving troops, especially when facedwith potential Russian attacks. For those whoattempted a 4-1 on the5thand 20th Infantryon0-12with a soakoff against the 13th, give yourself half

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THEGENERAL PAGE 1

And while some may criticize the soundness ofplacinga worker unit so near the front as well as on aminor city, this particular situation certainly meritssuch a tactic. While we're on the subject of workerunits, I might add that 1generally place the large"2"workers in Archangel and Astrakhan. Both citiesare remote enough to be out of harm's way, and thusprovide the maximum possible production beforebeing destroyed. The small "1" units I place in othermajor cities in the rear, such as Gorki and Saratov.

Only in the most unusual circumstances (such as inthe above example) will I consider placing workersnear the front line or in surrounded cities.

Harassment Techniques

partisans are the primary force that the Russianhas available to harass the German army. Despitetheir obvious limitations, they should not be takenlightly by either the German or the Russian. Theyhave three major functions:

I) Delaying reinforcements2) Cutting German supply lines3) Preventing an easy shift of German forces

from one front to another

The third function is particularly importantwhen mounting an offensive against a German

position. The availability of German reserves mayspell the difference between victory and defeat in anarea.

Never assume that you have no place to put yourpartisans. There is almost always some hex theGerman has overlooked or where you may gain anadvantage, however slight. If the German hasgarrisoned entire rail lines to secureafront, then thepartisans have already done their job before evenbeing placed, having tied up numerous units in"partisan duty."

Partisans are not the only means by which toharass German supply and movement. Raids deepinto German occupied territory can severelyhamperGerman logistics, and coupled with partisans orparatroopers, may prove crippling. Not uncommonis the situation presented in Diagram 9. Army

Group South has had good success and threatensboth Kharkov and the key rail junction of Kursk.

DIAGRAM 9 "German Weakness?

Partisans are not the only means by which toharass German supply and movement. Raids deepinto German occupied territory can severelyhamperGerman logistics, and coupled with partisans orparatroopers, may prove crippling. Not uncommonis the situation presented in Diagram 9. ArmyGroup South has had good success and threatensboth Kharkov and the key rail junction of Kursk.With only minimum forces in the area, the Russian

must fall back. However, a popular German trickcan be used against him in order to stall hisoffensive. Assuming the weather is clear, the 11thArmored on CC-I I should move down to 2-11 andattack the 30th Inf. Hopefully you can get an ARresult, allowing you to retreat to Y-18, and thusmove into Kiev during the second impulse. TheGerman will be forced to attack this minor unit, asKiev controls the supply lines into southern Russia.If you can spare the unit, the 18th Inf. in Kharkovcan be added to your attack to raise it to 1-1. On anA1 result, the infantry unit is eliminated and thearmored unit is retreated as before. If a DR is theresult, the 1 th Armored can now move down to X-18and attack the Rumanian4th at 1-1,again hopingfor an AR which would enable it to "retreat" intoKiev. Counting occupation of Kiev and EX asgoodresults, the chance for a favorablemission is 75.0%!Even if the mission is a failure, this strategem willcertainly keep the German commander on his toes,and will undoubtedly force him to garrison suchplaces as Kiev or form a stronger, but moredispersed front line.

Paratroopers are another weapon at the Rus-sian's disposal that can cause the German grievousheadaches. While not strong enough to create anoffensive threat by themselves, in conjunction withother forces they can prove to be an effectiveweapon. I prefer not to use them freely, but toreserve their use for a particularly importantoffensive phase or when there is a chance to trapsome German armored units. In wargames, as inchess, the threat is often greater than the execution.

As they may not move and may not be droppedin an enemy ZOC, it is rare when you would want todrop more than one paratrooper unit in the samehex. Their purpose is not to securestrongpoints butto block enemy paths of retreat. Oncedropped, theyare gone forever, so be stingy with their utilization.As long as the Stavka unit lives, there should be noreason to bring them on as ordinary reinforcements.

Another effective trick is a pre-winter invasionof Rumania. If the German has not garrisonedRumania, a 3-5 armored unit should invade theRumanian coast at EE-27 in September, advancing

to DD-28 in October (see Diagram 10). Note thatthis trick will not work in November as theBulgarian garrison will be able to successfullydefend Bucharest in January. If the German has alsobeen careless with his units on "partisan duty" itmay be possible to place a partisan on W25, whichvirtually assures the armored unit of reachingBucharest in November, causing the surrender of allRumanians. Recapturing Bucharest in the winter ispractically impossible, and even during non-snowmonths will require considerable effort on theGerman's part.

Even if the German isable to reach BB-27 by railmovement, valuable units are still drawn from thefront lines as well as use up two or three of the fiverail allocations which the German has available. If

snow does fall in November, this relief force will atbest get a 3-1 on the invader.Regardlessof the number of ports controlled by

the Russian, 1still recommend an invasion againstan ungarrisoned Bucharest. The rewards involvedfar exceed the cost of replacing one small armoredunit.

The possibilities involved in this maneuver areinteresting enough to make it a "mini-game" forstudy, with the race for Bucharest slightly in favor ofthe Russian player.

Someone once said, "a little knowledge is adangerous thing." In RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, thismaxim can visibly be demonstrated. While it isconceivable that none of the above tactics will beused in any given game, just knowledge of thesetactics will place an additional burden on the

DIAGRAM 10 "Waltzing Up the Danube" (Sep '41)

* nva*ion He x Husrlun Move Grrman Rut1 MCIW

German commander's shoulders as he is forcedgarrison such remote places as Kiev and Bucharkeep rail lines open, protect front lines frparatrooper assault and numerous other liirritants, all of which can add up to a giant plus-the Russian cause.

@

AREA

TOP .TWENTYTimes Previ

Rank Name On List Rating Ran

I. W. Dobson 2 KFH2366 I2. R. Chiang 8 FGN2156 23. J. Zajicek 3 DGJ1992 44. P. Huffman 3 DCC1882 55. T. Oleson 9 MMT1860 36. J. Angiolillo 2 CEH1842 87. D. Cornell 2 KEE1823 78. S. Packwood 7 EFE1803 99. T. Dobson 1 LEBl794 -

10. D. Barker 7 EFJ1786 13I I. R. Wood 6 FFM1761 612. S. Heinowski 7 DFJ1746 I113. G. Kilbride 6 DEI1744 1214. D. Greenwood 1 CCD1742 -15. R. Leach 2 CEI1734 1016.K.MacDonald 1 CDF1717 -17. J. Sunde 1 DED1686 -18. K. Blanch 2 CDD1677 1519. B. Haden I CEF1671 -20. D. Agosta 2 ECE1639 16

The above players represent th e 20 highverified ( 1 l + ated games) of the 3,000memAREA pool. Players with an opponent qualifless than C were not calculated among th eplayer ratings.

The following AREA memberships have been terminaNo rating points can be awarded for games wlth tIndividuals as they are no longer members of the System.

0610941 4520841 70601-04 93063411121441 4655641 7313941 Canada21403741 5810241 9178941 O V E R S 42830142 6064141 9355541

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PAGE 20 THEGENERA

THIRD RE1Introduction

In it s th ree years, T HIR D REICH ha s attractedrelatively few articles o n tactics an d strategy. Asidefrom a Series Replay in Vol. 11 , No . 6 of th eGE NE R A L , th e article o n Russian play an d a few

pathetic ( to be frank) efforts in o ther magazines,writers have shied away from i n d e p t h analysis ofplay, while lesser simulations have spawned pages ofprint.

Strange, ye t unders tandab le , tha t a game ofT HIR D REICH'S rich tactical a n d strategic varietywould receive such t rea tment . S t range , becauseT HIR D REICH strikes a fine balance between th eusual wargame, which deposits players in a situationno t of their ow n making with victory condi t ions notof their own choosing, an d th e curren t flood of"monster" games, most notably G.D. W.'s DrangNach Ostenl Unenrschieden an d S.P.l. 's Wa r in theEasr, West an d Pacific, where broad strategy liesburied under th e avalanche of counters a ndmapsheets. T H I R D REICH s tands o u t a s a truestrategic-level wargame, allowing it s players t o

conduct th e w ar a s they choose, working only underth e broad limitation of their nations' economicabilities. S o it is strange tha t so few would exploreth e myriad opt ions of th e game.

Bu t understandable, too , tha t players would behesitant t o advise o n a game where al l plans a r egood and bad, depending o n how th e rest of th e"world" responds. T H I R D REICH defies th eperfect plan. Perhaps for tha t reason, it discouragesarticles f rom players w ho only write when they have"cracked" a game-system.

This article is written, then, no t t o exhaus tdiscussion but to stimulate it. 1 trust many willdisagree with my opinions an d advice. I hope tha t

some of them will be sufficiently outraged t o replyin these pages.

T h e scope of th e game a nd th e limits of my

experience require tha t this article cover only th eearly years of th e campaign game, from Fall 1939 t oWinter 1940. Among poor players, th e game canen d by then. Among better players, these early tu rnsca n put one side a t a disadvantage it may neverovercome. T h e early campaigns , from blitzkrieg inPoland t o prepara t ion fo r Barbarossa, illustratemany of th e tactics which will help determine th eoutcome in Russia, Nor th Afr icaand o n th e drive t oRome an d Berlin.

The Conques t o f PolandIn T H I R D REICH (hereafter 3R). a s historical-

ly, th e German player must conquer Polandquickly. Failure to occupy Warsaw in Fall 1939willno t only cost 15 BRP's fo r a n offensive op t ion next

tu rn , it will delay th e Axis timetable fo r th e conquestof th e Lo w Countr ies an d France. No t surprisingly,then, th e Allied goal is t o delay th e fall of Po land a slong a s possible.

CH: THE EAIby David Bottger

Allied strategy in Poland essentially consists ofth e deployment of Polish units. This problem ha salready been th e subject of some discussion, notablyth e contest solution appear ing in Vol. 12 , No . 5 ofth e GE NE R A L a n d th e more sophisticated analysis

by Rober t Beyma in Vol. 13 , No . 4. As Beymademonst ra ted , th e set-up suggested a s best by A Hwill inflict, on 'the average, 7.59 B R P casualties o nGermany (figure I).

Figure I AH Defense

F..ure 2 ,.....late Defense

However, Beyma's article is subject to criticismin tw o respects. First, 1 believe he errs in directinghi s attacks against th e alternative Polish defense heanalyzes. In this defense Cfigure2).he moves th e 1-3from Brest-Litovsk t o th e hex northeast of Warsaw,preventing a direct attack o n th e city. H e thencorrectly notes tha t th e best German assault o n thisset-up is t o attack th e 2-3 southeast of Warsaw a t2:1, followed by a 3: l exploitation against Warsawitself. Bu t I d o no t agree tha t th e 2:1 should beperformed by a 4-6 a r m o r an d 4 ai r factors, a s hesuggests. In th e event of a ny kind of exchange, thisa t tack forces th e German to lose expensive a i rfactors so tha t th e a r m o r ca n occupy th ebreak through hex.

1 prefer t o make this 2: l attack with a 3-3

infantry, a 4-6 a r m o r an d I a ir factor. With theseunits, a full exchange will cost only 6 BRP 's(infantry an d th e a i r factor) an d a CAexchange willeliminate only th e infantry. Using Beyma's equa-tion, my 2: l followed by th e same 3: l attack willcost:

Expected losses = ,1875 (6+ 3) + .03125 (14) +.96875 [.I714 ( 1 6 ) + I 143 (8)]

= 6.67 BRP's.

Fi-ure j Standard Defense

T he second criticism of Beyma's analysis is thathe uses a n obviously inferior Polish defense (figure2) fo r compar ison to AH'S defense. W h a t 1 call th estandard defense Cfigure 3) provides a much bettercompar ison . T h e proper attack o n this defense is a2: l across th e river o n th e 2-3 southeast of Warsaw,then a 3:1 o n th e capital. These attacks require,respectively, a 3-3 infantry, 4-6 a r m o r an d 5 a i rfactors, plus 3 a r m o r units and 12 a ir factors.Average losses here are:

ILY YEARSE.L. = ,1875 (12+3) + ,03125 (26) +

,96875 [.I714 (16) + ,1143 (8)]= 7.17 BRP's.

As Beyma notes in closing, B R P losses a re nthe only consideration in picking a Polish defen

After all, th e difference between 7.59 an d 6BRP's is no t likely to decide th e game. T h e defewhich requires th e greatest commitment of Germunits, particularly a ir an d a r m o r , to Polaprovides th e best insurance against a first-tuattack elsewhere. T h e following table shows tcompar ison .

Combat FactorsI n t Armor Air* Tota

AH defense 6 0 20 26

Lkyma's comparison 3 16 I5 34

defenseStandard defense 3 16 19 38*Includes 2 factors to counterair Polish air.

As this table shows, AH'S defense finishes delast in diverting forces from other areas. Nespecially tha t it requires no a r m o r , while th e o t

'defenses demand al l 4 armored units. An ds tandard defense uses only I a i r factor fewer. TA H defense thus exacts a high price from th e Allplayer in return fo r a n average gain of .42 BRP

German Opt ionsEven without al l of tha t a r m o r freed by th e A

defense, German y in Fa11'1939 ha s enough unitsg o looking elsewhere fo r combat . Basically, tGerman player ha s four op t ions .

1) D o nothing. N ot very appealing toaggressive ( o r wise) German .

2) Attack Russia. 1 d o no t advise it . Russtarts with 68 combat factors and 90 BRP's, fototal strength of 158 combat factors (assuming tBRP's a re used exclusively t o build infantry). Giva sloppy Russian deployment, Germany ma yable t o take Leningrad in Fall 1939, costing Rus15 BRP's an d he r fleet, if docked there, becausewill have n o other por t a s a refuge. This leaves tequivalent of 11 6 combat factors fo r RussAnother 42 must be destroyed before Spr ing 1940bring Russia below 75 an d force surrender. GivGermany's weak initial forces, most of which willattacking Poland o n th e first tu rn , an d France aBritain pounding on th e western border, destructof 42 factors in tw o turns is most unlikely. On1940 begins, Russia gets 75 more BRP's (6 0Moscow ha s fallen), and German success becomeven more remote.

3) Invade the Lo w Countr ies a n d / o r Denma

This is th e course I suppose many players adoptha s t h e advan tage of posing a n early threat

France. It also ha s it s disadvantages.

Against almost an y Polish defense, th e uncomitted German forces m ay be ab le t o conquLuxembourg an d Belgium, Netherlands o r Demark , bu t no more. T h u s fo r th e price ofoffensive op t ion and tw o declarations of wGermany gains u p to 20 BRP's and threatens Franfrom 3 more hexes. Worth it? Hardly.

T o digress a bit, th e importance of th e yeacycle in 3 R ca n scarcely be overstated. The fatenations, especially France a nd Russia, often hingo n surviving until th e year-start sequence areceiving a fresh B R P al lo t tment . F o r this reasGermany benefits little f rom attacking France1939. Absent idiotic play, France cannot be felledtwo turns. And knowing that 85 BRP's a re du eth e spring, th e French player ca n counterattack w

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THEGENERAL PAGE 2

a b a n d o n . S o Germany should attack in Spr ing1940, forcing France to stretch he r BRP's over 4turns instead of 2.

Since th e French campaign will no t begin until1940, those 3 Belgian hexes provide little advan tagein Fall 1939. Incidentally, if Germany moves intounoccupied Luxembourg in Fall 1939, units therecould be attri t ioned ou t immediately, since Luxem-bourg ha s n o capital. Bu t if Germany waits untilF rance occupies Luxembourg , units there can beattacked across th e river, thus allowing Germany t o

place a bridgehead marker in Luxembourg. T h ebridgehead prevents th e Allies from taking Luxem-bourg by attri t ion an d permits German units t ooverstack in preparation fo r th e drive on Paris.

T he better course, therefore, is t o wait untilWinter 1939, then take Belgium, Netherlands,Luxembourg a n d , if desired, Denmark, in on eoffensive op t ion . T h e 15 BRP's saved ca n bu y 5 a i rfactors, a sizeable dividend. And by 1940. Germanywill be in position t o invade France.

4) Declare war o n Yugoslavia. 1 favor thiscourse.

Most German players will prefer toge t ltaly intoth e war a s soon a s possible, particularly now tha tth e rules prohibit German units in neutral Italy. Bu tif ltaly declares war in Fall 1939 fo r 35 BRP's, sh eca n spend only 2 more that turn, no t enough fo r a n

offensive option against France o r British t roops inNor th Africa.

YFigure 4 Yugoslavian Defense

In th e west, th e ai r unit on Lyonsiscounterair(n o losses), while ano ther German a ir unit stanready t o intercept th e o ther French a ir unit. T.armored units move into Luxembourg a n d , witfactors of ground suppor t , attack th e Freninfantry unit o n Sedan a t 3: 1. Exchange losses muunfortunately, be taken from th e a i r factors. Oarmored unit advances into Sedan . The remainina r m o r units exploit t o Sedan and attack th e infanunit east of Paris a t 2:l f igure 6). Meanwhile,

Italians take a n attri t ion option in th e Mediternean an d make threatening gestures toward Su

A German declaration of w ar o n Yugoslaviapermits ltalian units t o takeana t t r i t ion option therea s well a s in Nor th Africa. Unfortunately fo r th eAxis, ltalian initial g round strength totals only 14factors. Even if al l 14 participated in th e attri t ionoption against Yugoslavia, a 116 chance tha t n oYugoslavs would be eliminated remains. A n d a full-strength Yugoslav a r m y ca n prevent a 2:1 attack o nBelgrade by th e deployment shown in figure 4.

Because of stacking limits, ltaly ca n cram only 14ground factors in to th e hexes across th e river f rom

Belgrade. Countera i r of Yugoslavia's 2 a i r factorsleaves 8 ltalian a i r fac to rs a s ground suppor t , f o r a no p t i m u m a t t a c k of 22 : 1 2 = I: I. Roll a 5 a nd ltaly is introuble.

Remove any one Yugoslavian unit in Fall 1939,though , and th e defense breaks down, allowing a 2: 1against Belgrade in Winter 1939. T o guaran tee tha tth e attri t ion option in Fall 1939 bags a t least 1 unit ,th e German player should send enough units there,probably excess infantry, to reach the21-30 columnon th e attri t ion resolution table. This move virtuallyassures th e fall of Yugoslavia in Winter 1939, makesfo r a happy ltalian ally an d gives Germany 10 BRP'sfo r a cooperative conquest. No t ba d fo r a ninvestment of 10 BRP 's a n d a few infantry units.

Incidentally, since ltaly ha s only 2 BRP's t ospend o n unit construction in Fall 1939, Germany iswell advised t o build a few replacement units fo rstrategic redeployment t o Italy. An Allied

amphib ious assault o r attack across th e Alps andexploitation t o Rome in Fall 1939 bodes ill fo r th eAxis.

The rest of th e German builds should emphasizeth e weapons of offense; air, a r m o r and a i rborne . Asth e German player, I always build th e airborne unitin Fall 1939 and base it a t Bremen, where it canreach London and Paris. Th is forces bo th th eBritish and French to garrison their capitals. F romhere th e para unit ca n also be dropped onCopenhagen t o a id infantry attacking across th ecrossing arrow. From Copenhagen, th e para unitca n either be strategically redeployed back toBremen o r , in conjunction with a n a ir unit , assaultOslo. M o r e o n Norway later.

A Two-Fron t W a r

F or th e real crapshooter, o r simply t o liven u pth e game, th e German player may consider asimultaneous a t tack o n Poland an d France in Fall1939. This option promises either a s tunn ing Axissuccess o r a n early en d t o th e war. Most of all, itrequires good t o excellent German die rolls. T oillustrate this strategy, I will use th e standard Polish

defense Cfigure 3) and th e French set-up suggestedby A H in its contest solution in Vol. 12 , No . 1 of th eG E N E R A L (figure 5).

Figure 5 French Defense

Germany begins th e wa r with 8 infantry units, 4

armored units, 20 a ir points and 2 fleets. O n einfantry unit must be placed in Finland t o prevent aRussian attack. T h e o ther 7 start in East Prussia o reastern Germany , poised t o attack Poland . Deployth e 4 armored units in western Germany in positionto attack through Luxembourg. As f o r t h e a i r force,on e unit must start in th e east to counterair th ePolish a i r force a n d provide ground suppor t fo r oneinfantry a t tack . Place a n airbase counte r o n th e he xeast of S t rassbourg with a n a i r unit there t ocounte ra i r th e French a i r unit a t Lyons. T h e o t h e r 2a i r units base in western Germany, in range of th ehe x east of Paris. Dock the fleet in Kiev o r furtherwest to threaten interception of British t ranspor tmissions t o France.

ltaly deploys strongly in North Africa in a na t tempt t o divert British reinforcements fromFrance. Place tw o 1-3's on th e French border, tw o 1-3's o n R o m e and one in Albania. O ne a ir unit shouldbe based where it ca n reach th e units guard ing th e

French border, Rome a nd both nor thern beachhexes. T he fleet starts a t Taran to , a nd everythingelse goes t o Nor th Africa.

At th e start of Fall 1939, Germany declares w aro n Luxembourg a nd takes offensive op t ions in th eeast (free) and west, a t a totalcost of 25 BRP's. Italydeclares w ar o n th e Allies fo r 35 BRP's.

In Poland , th e infantry a n d 3 a i r factors make3:1 attacks o n th e four 1-3's n o r t h an d west ofWarsaw, while th e o ther tw o air fac to rs counte ra i rth e Polish a i r force, neither side taking losses. Atleast I infantry unit must advance into th e he xvacated by each eliminated Polish unit . Al l 4 hexeswill be needed next tu rn fo r a 2:1 o n Warsaw.

Fieure 6K rma n units in black: Allied in blue)

NO-te that infantry northwest of Sedan may not trace supplyDieppe to hex southwest of Dieppe, and so cannot move.

Germany uses th e 50 BRP's left fo r buildsfollows: in th e east, u p t o 3 infantry units, maktotal forces there 8 infantry; in th e west, 1 a ir uth e a i rborne unit , 2 armored units and whateinfantry is left over from th e east; 1 replacement umust also be built and SR'd t o Rumania.

Italy's builds a r e limited t o tw o BRP's. Use th

t o build replacement units o n th e unguardbeach hexes.

If Axis luck ha s been good, France will bedifficult straits. Because of th e German a r madjacen t to Paris, n o French units ma y be built onSR 'd to Paris. T h e only unit which ca n reach Pawill be th e French armor . Note that the infannorthwest of Sedan is o u t of supply and canmove. As a result, th e he x northeast of Paris wremain vacant.

In general, French units will move north, towaParis. Replacement units ca n be built on th e Italborder , freeing th e infantry there. Any suwiv ingfactors stage t o bases o u t of range of Germcountera i r , such a s Lorient and La Rochelle.

Ra ther than waste BRP's o n a low-odds, riscounte ra t tack , France should take an attritiop t ion , hoping t o regain th e he x next t o ParGermany , o n th e o ther hand, must keep tha t hfree of French units. If necessary, th e German armthere should be removed a s attri t ion lossesprevent a French advance. This will, howevpermit S R t o a n d builds o n Paris an d th e hnortheast of Paris.

With a full 42 BRP's t o spend, France ca n buits entire force pool. As mentioned above

replacement units should be placed on th e ltalborder. T h e fourth appears in th e vacant MagiLine hex. O n e armored unit probably shobacks top th e ltalian f ron t defense t o prevbreakthrough there. T h e o ther a r m o r andinfantry appear a r o u n d Paris, in anticipation ofcoming attacks.

Germany aga in takes offensive op t ions ineast a n d west in Winter 1939. In Poland, thinfantry units attack Warsaw across th e river a t(Polish a i r force counteraired again). In France, ta rmored units occupy each of th e following hexhe x east of Paris, Sedan and Luxembourg. Witha i r factors ready to intercept th e French a i r forth e a r m o r o n Sedan an d 4 ground support facta t tack th e ad jacen t infantry a t 3:l. The othearmored units exploit , tw o reoccupying th e he x e

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PAGE 22 THE GENERA

of Paris and 2 taking the hex northeast of Paris.With the para unit, they attack Paris at 3:1, twovictorious armored units advancing. Vgure 7).

Figure 7 (German units in black: French in blue)

Position after German Winter 1939 combat phase. France can get

only 17 ground factors adjacent to Paris for counterattack.

After combat, Germany builds her air force tofull strength and spends the rest of her BRP's on afew armored units, more infantry and/or replace-ment units to help defend Italy. The fleet is SR'd eastwhile the victorious infantry in Poland is SR'd west.

If all has gone well for Germany, France canattack Paris from only 4 hexes at 18:22 = 1:2, withlittle chance of success. Before trying this strategy,remember that I have assumed near-perfectdie rollsfor Germany and no British forces in France. The

two German fleets cannot stop all transport ofBritish units to France and cannot prevent SR ofBritish units at all. In addition, the British air unitsdo not need naval help to int~rvenen France. TheItalian deployment in North Africa should divertsome British units but perhaps not enough toguarantee success in France.

If you, as the German player, want a quick gameof 3R or if you see a faulty French deployment,consider this strategy. But be prepared to take yourlumps.

The Allies in 1939As the foregoing suggests, Allied strategy in

1939 and for as long as the Axis stays on theoffensivedepends on Axis strategy. This isespecial-ly true of France, whose goal is nothing more thansurvival. France must deploy carefully, build herentire force pool in Fall 1939, and wait for theinevitable. Unless Italy deploys miserably on theborder, France should be content to stay on thedefensive. The AH French set-up Wgure 5) seemsbest, although1would likea unit on Marseilles.Thatport provides the only link between France and hercolonies.

Britain, however, is another matter. The Britishneed have little fear of a "Sealion" in 3R. Germanystarts the war with only 2 fleets and will usuallybuild air and ground units rather than expensivefleets. The main threat to British survival is an airassault on London. But this threat may be defusedby keeping 7 ground factors on London. Given therestrictions on ground support imposed by 3R'ssecond edition rules, Germany can muster only 12factors against the British capital (para plus 9 airfactors). Seven factors on London, doubled ondefense, assure that Germany can do no better than1 :2 odds.

Relatively secure on their island, the British canconsider sending troops overseas. Depending onItalian and German commitment to North Africa,much of Britain's armed forces may be requiredthere. Whatever can be spared should, in my view,be sent to France. Allied victory demands thatGermany not conquer Russia. And as long asFrance stays alive, Russia cannot receive the fullAxis attention. So far from beingaltruistic, a Britishpresence in France works to the benefit of Britainand the Allies generally.

How should British troops in France be used?The rules dictate that British units cannot occupyParis or Maginot Line hexes. Beyond these

restrictions, the Britishcan deploy on the front linesfor defense or lay back as an offensive reserve.

If Britain decides to use its French contingentdefensively, the units should be placed in theexpected path of the German advance on Paris.Likely hexes are directlyeast and southeast of Paris.The former represents the most direct route fromLuxembourg; the latter, the only approach whichavoids river defense lines.

The Anglo-French cooperation rule makes theplacement of British units especially critical. Thatrule prohibits stacking of British and French units.AH has ruled that "stacking" includes British airunits flyingdefensiveair support for French groundunits and vice-versa, because DAS requires that theair units be placed on top of the defenders. As aresult, if British ground units are deployed awayfrom the German advance, then Britishair units willbe unable to fly DAS at all.

British units may also be held in reserve for theeventual counterattack on Paris. British armorassumes particular importance here, as they allow 8

factors to be crammed into a singlehex, rather thanthe French maximum of 6. Those 2 extra factorsmay spell the difference between a desperation 1:2and a usually successful I:1. Remember that Britishunits cannot advance into Paris; make sure that atleast one French infantry piece survives even a fullexchange. This may force the Allies to takeexchange losses in British units, but this may be thebest course. With only French units left, next turn'sattack to re-retake Paris will require only a Frenchoffensive option. And it saves the British player thetrouble of staging his own Dunkirk withdrawal. Torescue British units from France in one turn willrequire an offensive option. The British fleets mustchange to a French port, transport the groundforces back home, and be SR'd home themselves.Better to be lost in combat and leave the Frencharmy intact for another turn.

RussiaIn the early turns of a typical game, the Russian

player must be ready for anything and do nothing.Russia should deploy with at least 3 possibilities inmind: (I ) attack on an ungarrisoned Finland; (2)attack on an ungarrisoned Rumania; (3) earlyGerman declaration of war and invasion. The firstrequires strength in the north; the second, strengthin the south; the third, strength in the center.Consequently, the Russian army finds itself spreadalong the border. But that is necessaryanyway, tooccupy all of the pact cities in one turn.

Clearly, a premature Barbarossa should bewelcomed rather than feared. War in Russia whileFrance remains in the game guarantees victory forall but the most inept Allies. But there is no point inmaking Germany's task any easier. The approachesto Leningrad and Moscow should be guarded wellenough to prevent a one-turn conquest of thesecities. And whenever the German airborne unit getsin range, a ground unit should be placed on Parno.Otherwise, the para unit can drop on Parno andopen the port to German naval transport or SR.Even without the airborne unit, Parno and Talum,as the pact cities leastaccessibleto Germany, shouldbe well defended.

No discussion of Russian options in 3R wouldbe complete without exploring the question of warwith Turkey. In his comments to the 3R SeriesReplay in Vol. 11, No. 6 of the GENERAL, DonGreenwood hypothesizes a two-turn conquest ofTurkey, costing 40 BRP's plus losses. Since Turkeyis worth only 30 BRP's, Greenwood concludes thatthis strategy will result in a net loss of at least 10BRP's by the time Barbarossa begins.

The flaw in Greenwood'sanalysis lies in valuingBRP's spent in 1939and 1940at face value, instead

of their 1941 value. Since Barbarossa will occmainly in 1941, every Russian decision shouldevaluated on how it will affect Russia's readiness1941.

The following chart traces the usual courseRussian BRP spending and growth from Fall 19to Spring 1941. It assumes that German garrisoprevent attacks on Finland and Rumania and thTurkey is left alone. As the chart shows, by Spri1941 Russia will have built her entireavailableforpool totalling 61 BRP's and will have available 1BRP's. with a base of 124.

NO WAR WlTH TURKEY

1939 1940 19

The chart below assumes that Russia declawar on Turkey in Winter 1939 and conductsoffensive option that turn. It allows for 2 mooffensiveoptions plus 10BRP's of casualties befoTurkey is subdued sometime in 1940. By Spri1941, Russia has conquered Turkey, occupied tpact area and built to the limits of her force poSurprisingly, even after spending 65 BRP's battliTurkey, Russia starts 1941with 161BRP's, 12mothan would be available if Turkey were nattacked. The new base BRP figure is 106, 18belthe base achieved by not attacking Turkey.

WAR WlTH TURKEY

As this analysis illustrates, the 25 BRP's spent1939and the 40 spent in 1940areactuallyworth lto Russia in 1941 than the 30gained by conqueriTurkey. This is so because the 25 spent in 1939athe equivalent of only 2 BRP's (25 x .3 x .3) in 19and the 40 spent in 1940areequal to only 12(40x1941 BRP's, disregarding the base increase.

All this does not make invading Turkey a foproof strategy. As seen in the analysis of Poldefenses, BRP's alone should not dictate decisioIf, for example, Germany defeats France rapidBarbarossa may begin while Russia is entangledTurkey. Furthermore, German conquest of Turkas a preliminary to invading Russia both coRussia an immediate 30 BRP's and opens upsouthern front. At least, the Turkish conquest wrequire diversion of precious units southwarddefend the conquered territory. In short, I tendaccept Greenwood's advice against attackTurkey, but 1do not accept his BRP calculatio

Ironically, a Turkish campaign in 1940, eveunsuccessful, may blunt a potentially devastatGerman tactic. More on the problem of"unwanted initiative" later.

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The foregoing comments on strategy in 1939substantially cov er strategy in 1940. This is as itshould be-decisions in 1939 must be mad e with aneye to the coming year and beyond. But 1940 alsopresents unique problems, a few of which are

considered here.

Norway

If 3R is won o r lost in Russia , then Rus sia maybe won or lost in Norway. German y needs Norwayas a base for interdiction of Mu rmansk convoys,potentially Russia's lifeline. Conver sely, the Alliesneed Norway to prevent interference with aid toRussia.

For Germany, Norway must be conquered in Iturn or not at all . If Norway survives the initialattack, Britain may and should intervene withsubstantial ground and air forces, landing atBergen. This, in turn , will force Germ any to eithersend more strength to Norway orco nced e Britain 10BRP's and unmolested convoys to Russia.

Germany can effect a one-turn conquest ofNorway only through th e air . As mentioned earlier,the German a i rborne un i t may be d ropped onCopenhagen, untripling the Danish defense. Fro m

there, Oslo lies in range of another drop.Preparatory to this assault , the German playershould build an airbase in northern Denmark andstage an ai r unit there. Even if both N orwegian 1-3'soccupy Oslo, the ensuing attack at 2:l odds almostassures that Norway will fall. One German fleetSR'd to Bergen makes Norway invulnerable toAllied invasion. Th e Allies have no air bases within

range of Bergen to reduce the fleet there below 9factors, making am phibious assa ult possible.

Britain must take Norway in I tu rn fo r the samereason. Germa n air units staged to Oslo or Germanground forces landed southeast of Oslo can makethings tough for the British. But Britain too has thecapabili ty to complete a one-turn conquest, by sea.

Britain requires both 4-5 armor units, the 2-5arm or and 36 naval factors to take Oslo. One 4-5plus 6 naval factors (2 comba t points) attac k the 1-3on the western beach at 2:1, losses extracted fromthe fleet. The other 4-5 and 2-5 exploit to Oslo,attacking the remaining 1-3 at 3:l. If both 1-3'sgarrison Oslo, the 2-5 occupies the beach(breakthroug h) hex and both 4-5 's exploit andattac k at 2:l . Either way, Oslo should fall.

For Germany and Britain, then, Norwegianstrategy is to attack first and decisively.

North AfricaNor th A frica is the battleground of the tactician.

Because of the relatively few units usually sent there ,each small mistake is magnified and each largemistake is disastrous. The unnecessary loss of oneunit, insignificant in Russia, can tip the balance ofpower in North Africa. Although strategy therevaries greatly, depending on what units can be

spared from other theaters, tactics remain constantenough t o merit a few remarks.

As it did historically, supp ly plays a crucial rolein North Africa. Egyptian and Libyan ports act assupply sourc es for Allied a nd Axis units, respective-ly. Conquered ports and beachhead markers mayalso function as supply sources, but this requires anine-factor fleet per 9 units supplied. With navalstrength at a premium in the Mediterranean, playersare well advised t o guard their Egyptian o r Libyanports well.

Supply considerations also increase the impor-tance of two oth er game concepts; zones of controland controlled hexes. Units cann ot trace supply

thro ugh enem y ZOC , even if the hex is occupied by afriendly unit . Nor can supply be traced throughenemy-controlled but unoccu pied he xes (3.4). As a

result , armored units , with their ZOC and highmovement rate, assume added imp ortance in NorthAfrica.

As noted ea rlier, the African fron t often receivesthe left-over units of bo th sides. Similarly, playersmay be reluctant to spend many BRP's on'offensiveoptio ns there. Thus bot h sides increasingly resort toattri t ion combat.

Normal combat (i.e., the offensive option)demands that the strongest units defend the mostimportant hexes. Attrit ion combat encourages

deployment of weak units on critical hexes. Thesequence of attri t ion com bat creates this anomaly.When th e attri t ion table requires both eliminationof counters and enemy occupation of hexes, thecounters are eliminated first . Not surprisingly,players prefer to eliminate weak, easily replacedunits. But this leaves the impo rtan t hexes, occupiedby strong units , subject to enemy occupation. Onthe other hand, elimination of these strong unitspreserves the hexes but at a high price. Th e solutionis to place weak units o n critical hexes. Th eirelimination saves the big units and the now-vacanthexes.

This tactic works well enough during enemyattrit ion options. But what if the enemy takes anoffensive option instead? Much to his delight, thevery hexes he wants ar e the most poorly defended.

To protect these units a nd hexes during offensivecombat, the defender needs superior air power.Without i t , he must guess which option hisopponent will select each turn and deploy ac-cordingly

O n e tstrategic question does recur in NorthAfrica. After F ranc e falls, the die determine swhether Lebanon-Syria and Algeria-Morocco-Tunisia become Vichy or Free French. P ut simply,Britain cannot permit a Vichy Leba non-Syriaat theback door to the Suez Cana l . Ra ther than dependon the die, Britain must plan ahead.

The turn before France's fall is anticipated, theBritish player should station one or two units atLebanon's border. On the turn that Germany entersParis, these British units move through Beirut tooccupy the beach hex. Even if Lebanon-Syria turns

Vichy, the British units there control the sole port,occupy the sole beach hex and are positioned toconquer the entire colony. Obviously, the presenceof a French-turned-Vichy unit would complicatethings. For that reason, the infantry unit starting inLebanon-Syria must either return to mainlandFrance o r be eliminated in North African combat.

RussiaThe notes on Russian strategy in 1939 also cover

most of 1940. One additional problem, alluded t oearlier, may arise in 1940, to th e great displeasure ofthe Soviet player. This is the problem of theunwanted initiative.

The initiative rule, unique to 3R, provides thatthea l l iance w ith the most BRP 'sa t the s ta r t o fa tu rnmoves first that turn. T his rule makes it possible foran alliance to move twice before the enemy canrespond. Fo r example, if German y and ltaly spendBRP's heavily in Fall 1939, Britain and F rance, byjudicious spending , may gain the initiative in Winter1939. An unsuspec ting ltaly may fall as a result ofthis doub le turn. Of course, the Axis will regain theinitiative in S pring 1940, giving it a do uble tu rndurin g which Fran ce will likely fall. But what Alliedteam would not trade France for l taly in Spring1940?

S o viewed, the initiative rule presents extr astrategic options. I t can also place Russia in anunrealistic dilemma. Assume Russia declines-toinvade Turkey. Instead the Russian player occupiesthe pac t area and builds his entire force pool in 1939.He starts 1940 with 116 BRP's and nowhere tospend them. As a result, he ends 1940 with the sam e116 BRP's.

Germany, on the other hand, spends BRPeasily in 1940. Assum e that F ranc e falls by Fa1940, allowing Germany'sfullatten tion to turneasEven with the 42 BRP's gained from the Frenc

victory, Germany can and probably will spenherself below Russia's 116 B RP level by Wint1940, in preparation for the invasion of Russia.

Rusian will therefore "gain" the initiative Winter 1940. After Russia's turn, Germanlaunches Barbarossa. With a fresh infusion BRP's in the 1941 Year-Start sequence, the Ax

regains the initiative fo r Spring 1941. Germanmoves again and attacks again, driving deep inRussia, possibly taking Leningrad and /o r Moscoand surely placing much of the Russian arm y out

supply.In my view, this tactic is both unrealistic an

unfair . Perhaps AH intended this use of thinitiative rule to reproduce the shock effect of thinitial Germa n atta ck. If so, it overdoes it. Surely thshock effect was no t equivalent to giving Germanythree-month headstart , as 3R does. Even worfrom t he players' point of view, Russia can dalmost nothing t o defend herself. Almost nothinbecause Russia could spend some BRP's in Turk ish invas ion. But 3R surely perverts history ifforces Russia t o attack Turkey in orde r to avogiving Germany an unw arranted advantage.

Perhaps for this reason AH has advised thplayers ma y o pt t o ignore the initiative rule if thagree beforehand. Even this solution has iproblems. It prevents the two-turn Allied conqueof ltaly discussed earlier. It also locks the Axis inthe initiative for the game's dura tion, an historicalinaccurate situation. Better, in my opinion, amend the initiative rule to permit Russia to waivthe initiative until actively at war with GermanOnce Barbarossa begins, Russia will have ampopportunity to keep its BR P level below the Axlevel.

CONCLUSION

As any 3R player knows, this article barescratches the surfa ce of the game's strategy antactics. Unlike som e of the A H "classics," 3R mnever foster a "perfect plan." And if this means th3R will be played and replayed, discussed andebated, then 3R will surely take its rightful placeon e of the best wargame s ever published, an d easithe finest true strategic-level game developed-pending release of THE RISING SUN , that is.

I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledg e RoMagaz zu, whose fine PBM system (yes, we play 3by mail) and skilled opposition have helped give m

the experience and motivation to write this articl

Q

AVALON HILL GIFT SERVIC

With Christmas fast approaching readers mawell want to take adv antage of our special GI FTSERVICE-be it for Christmas, birthdays, or Ge

Well occasions (commemorating your mossuccessful attack ever against a PBM tur key . .err, opp onen t). Even if you don't love youopponent enough to buy him a game in order tget him to play yo u again , it's still a good way todro p afe w hints to mom, wife or other gift bearingwell meaning, but unimaginative relatives.

It's simple. Ju st have them place an ord er foan AH game or subscr ip t ion to e i ther thG E N E R A L o r REPLA Y and request the AvalonHill Gift Service. An attractive all purpose cardwill be included with the item and mailed toei thethe recipient direct or back to the purchaser. Bsure to specify who the gift is for and who is dointhe giving. Remember: to play a n Avalon Higame is a challenge; to give one, a subtlcompliment.

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PAGE 24 THEGENERAL

STALINGRADRUSSIAN: Tom BaruthL GER M AN : Joe AngiolilloCOM ME NTA RY: Paul Bakulski

Jo e Angiolillo is among th e most veteran ofwargamers having been active postally since th every beginning of th e hobby . A native o f Hartford,C T which is irsel fa renown hotbed o f wargaming.Joe was a highly visible personality in rhe mid-60'sthrough hi s polished arricles in th e Jrst amateurwargaming 'zines of that day. Along with such otherlocal Hartford sralwarts as th e Bakulski brothers.Dave Roberts, Paul Siragusa, Ray Clark, etc. Jo efast gained a repuration fo r invincibility in th eclassic games of th e day. Even now the venerable ol dwarhorse S T A L INGRA D holds great fascinationfor many gamers-if only because rhey've mastered

most o f he r secrers. Jo e is among rhose who can d owith S T A L I NG R AD whar a concerr pianist doeswirh rhe ivories.

Tom Baruth is unknown to your editor bu t hi splay in th e game which follows will serve best t ointroduce h im. Paul Bakulski ha s roots very similarto those o f Jo e upon which we've just dwelled. Thebiggest dgference is that Paul won th e A H Classic500 ar OR IG INS 11 over 140 other entrants whileJoe ha s neverf inished higher t h i n this year's 4th.PaulS neutral comments are printed in italics.

This will be ou r first Series Replay to beserialized into tw oparts. Th e concludingpart o f &isarticle will appear in th e December issue.

S T A L I NG R AD is regarded by many of th ehighest rated A R E A players a s th e best tournament

game fo r play a t conventions. It is balanced, well-known, depends a lmost exclusively o n skill, an d ha sbeen studied a n d written a b o u t in th e GENER A Lsince th e "Dark Ages" of Avalon Hill history.

Avalon Hill, unfortunately, chose AFR IKAKORPS over S T A L I NG R AD a s "the tie-breaker"a t tournaments. Logically A K wa s th e number onegame played a t th e last Origins (4 5 games).

However, S T A L I NG R AD wa s a close second with36 games played an d it wa s chosen by both th efinalists a n d semi-finalists fo r play in those rounds.AFR IKA KORPS wa s hardly even played in th elast three rounds.

Avalon Hill again dealt a dea th blow t oS T A L I NG R AD by putting it in their mail o rder lineonly. Tak ing it s place is RUSS IAN CAMPA IGN , amove which will surely place S T A L I NG R ADfu r ther into obscurity.

It is unfor tuna te tha t bo th of these games lackth e rules to make them a s good a tournament game

a t a convention a s S T A L I NG R AD is. AFR IKAKORPS can be won by o n e die roll, a "one" by th eGermans attacking Tobruch a t 1-1. RUSS IANCAMPA IGN is t o o long an d still d raw pronedespite th e revisions in th e rules. Possibly th e finesttournament PB M game ever developed will di e a nunna tura l dea th a t th e hand of it s ow n creator.

This S E R I E S REPLAY, played using th e ol dPBM C R T but with th e latest rules, i s a n illustrationof th e high level of play that S T A L I NG R AD ha sachieved. It will either become a rallying standardfo r th e "old guard" wargamers to barrage AvalonHill with letters t o keep this classic o n their retail

list, o r possibly a eulogy fo r on e of th e finest gamesever designed.

Initial Russian Comment (after hi s set-up): This is afairly standard type of setup, except that 1 like t oavoid giving u p more than one 2-3-6 t o au tomat ic

victory attacks o n th e first tu rn . Every unit savedwill be very impor tan t later, and a 2-3-6 saved no wactually t u r n s in to a 4-6-4 which would have t o besacrificed o n th e July o r August turn before th ereplacement rate begins.

German J u n e Move: T h e Russian set-up ha stactical weaknesses except a long th e Pru t .concentrated G e r m a n effort here would be strategsuicide (lessening th e alternatives available ffuture turns); therefore, a series of tactical "risks"on e specific area-along th e Brest-Nemunas dfense line seems to be the best prospect. Of tproposed 1-2attacks, th e 1-2against S1 8 a nd th e 1against th e tw o 2-3-6's o n B B l 5 would be th e mospectacular if they succeed. O n th e P B M table thea r e 4 chances in 10of success with only 3 chances

10 of a n AElim.

Neutral Comment: Th e Russian set-up is goodlike th e 8 units o n th e Finnish border. Nor placing2-3-6 at U18 leaves S I8 vulnerable an d X I7 cannbe held nexr rurn. I would have attacked S18 at 2since a lone 7-10-4 there o n turn on e is no letempting than a single 7-10-4 in Brest Litovsk. I'seldom found sticking m y nose into BB14 tosuccessful. It is betrer t o attack CCI4 ro m CCon!v (one big l - I , three little 1-2's. an d a 2-1 ansoak-off, etc.)

It looks like a good game shaping up-theRussian is apparenrly competent an d th e Germanplaying with intelligent aggressiveness. Th e bchange in S T A L I NG R AD play over th e last feyears is this: as th e Russianplay ha s improved to tpoint where very few units are poorly positioneth e German has been orced to take inrelligent risk

Correctly anticipating Russian moves an d properpositioning hi s own units in order to make 7-15.IS an d soak-offs is sriN rhe mainstay o f Germplay. Bu t making te n or so low odds attacks in tcourse o f a game, at th e right places an d at th e rigrimes, is now necessary in order t o create rhose hiodds attacks. I f t h e German catches a break on, s40% of those 1-2. 1-1, an d 2-15. irk a good gam

GERMAN JUNEVI: The28&29 lnfantrysoak-offacrosstheSiretulat -2 butarcrepulsedto MM12.The main attack. a 1-1 by the 57th Armor and 20th Infantry vs 22 & 24 is dealt an A ELIM. Th eremaining 3-1 by 61.23.54, and 55 vs 27 earns only an exchange but succeeds in staying across theSiretul.Th e assault on the Bug is bloodier. The German 24th Armored is lost in a 1-2 vs the Russianlightweights,as is 3R in its 1-6 soak-off vs 36.13. and 14th Infantry. Th e remaining German might

eliminates the Russian 12th at 4-1. But incompleting the necessary soak-offs the 7th is lost in a 1-5Brest-Litovsk. The 8th and RI Ith do survive their 1-3 on the same city. To the north the Germangamble vsthe Russian 3rd across the Nemunashurtsneithersideas they retreatto U 16. TheGermanpaid 31 factors to destroy 16 Russian factors, break the Siretul,and grab a perilous bridgehead acrthe Bug.

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THEGENERAL PAGE 2

GERMAN JULY '41: The Russian compounds the German headachesby destroyinganother 12 Axis against the Nemunas--one of which eliminates a 7 -104 in an exchange. The Germanshave trade

factorswith AV's vs the Finnish 2nd and 6th, and a successful3-1 against theGerman 14th SW of Brest. factors for 16 Russians-still a rate of attrition they can't long afford.

No w down 43 factors, the German settles for AV's vs the 2-3-6 delaying units and a pair of 1-2's

Russian June Move: I've never played against Joe Russian July Move: Joe is really determined to get Joe made the classic attack on the Nemun

before, so I don't know what to expect from him, across the Nemunas early. As much as I would like To o ba d 18 factors can't reach EE13, avoiding

other than that he is recognized as a good player. I to get an AElim on some of these 10-factor 1-2 soak-off. Attacking 1114 is a good move.

am learning raoidlv after seeing his first move. attacks, at least I'm avoiding disasterous D Back 2" . < -however! Joe plays aggressively apparently, and

doesn't wait around for 3-1 attacks and soak offs,which is usually slow suicide in this game against acompetent Russian. I was very surprised by theaudacity of a potentially expensive attack in theBrest-Litovsk area. I can't sit here and give up thatcity on turn I, hence my counterattack there. I justkept my fingers crossed and hoped to avoid theexchange, which I did in grand style.

German July Move: Losses are starting to mountand the Russian position is still as solid as a rock.Again, a series of tactical "risks" seems the bestprospect. 1-2's on S18 and V19 look good. What adifficult position for Tom if they both work! Evenone German victory here will pose quite a problem.

The rest of the move is standard although I regrettaking the 1-1 in the south last turn with the 57thpanzer. It was a dumb attack and a waste of a unit.

Neutral Cpmment: Nor placing tw o 5-7-4's at S19allows thatfavorite 1-2 of Joe's. Ilike a Russian wh ocan defend well on the mainfront an d stillpush theFinns around. Soaking off against BB15 againwould be throwing good money after bad. Nothingto be gained by taking risks in the south. You'vegotra like that 1-2 against V19.

results. The exchange of my 28th Infantry at thisearly stage could be serious, however,because it willbe more difficult to make river linessecureagainst 3-1 attacks. As much as I would like to continue theoffensive in Finland at an unabated rate, thesituation at the main front requires the withdrawalof units.

German August Move: Well, the Nemunas isassaultable, but what a soak-off. Maybe I shouldjust kill the 17,29, and 65? But with the losses I'vetaken I'll need to continuethe gamble. Besides, if theNemunas falls it will pave the way for a northernoffensive in the early fall, a switchto the south in thelate fall, and an attack in the south in the winter.

This is the best strategy to win the game (I feelanyway)-constant pressure in the south so that theRussian does not hold up in Stalingrad on the lastfew turns of the game.

Neutral Comment: V19 is in trouble. Tom'sgoing tomake it expensive. The 1st Armoredar XI9 is weak;just ask the 9t h an d 10th Infantry Corps. Placingonly one unit at BB15 is smart. Iusuallypull back t othe Dnesrr (and HH14) on the second turn.

Russian August Move: I didn't expect Joe to attaacross the Nemunas this turn with such abandondisregard for the health and welfare of his trooafter the substantial losses he suffered in the ftwo turns. It certainly paid off, though, as heacross with no greater losses than I suffered.northern half of the main front is in bad shape athe 3rd Infantry is the only unit of the big thremaining to defend crucial spots in the river lineslooks like a rough winter.

German September Move: What a blood bath!time to coast and rebuild myarmy. TakingV19wan exchange against the 4th cavalry was quitelucky break. Butwith the PBM table it ismuch m

beneficial to attack than the regular FT Ftable. I ccontinue my northern feint, southern punstrategy.

Neutral Comment: The Russian seems to hapanicked a little an d given u p next turn'spositioHo w about holding HHI4, FF14, FF16, and DDin the south and W2O an d 720 in thenorth? Theran extra exposed unit bu t 21 8 isn't surrounded amay live. I would have another unit in Finla

- 4 i i i i i A&

-.WPDEN

GERMAN AUGUST '41: Th e Russian July move eliminates only the R a t 7-1 and August sees the earning an Exchange in their 1-2 vs the 1st Armor. The German enjoys less luck to the south. . .German continuing his drive across the Nemunas-and with considerablesuccess.4.6, and R continue pushing back the 65th and 17th to AA17 and HH13 in their respective 3-1's. The Russian 24t

their luck of surviving 1-3's. 8, 1 1 . and R4 d o even better-snaring a 1-2 Exchangevs the4th Cav which eliminatedin a 4-1 but all the German soak-offs areeliminated;38vs2at 1 - 3 . 3 5 ~ ~ 3 5t 14.and 2 .

enablestheGerman mainarmorthrust toadvanceacross the riverfollowingtheir3-1D ELIM s the8th 13.42 at 1-3.

Inf. 4R is eliminatedin the resulting 1-6 soak-off vs 9, 10 but 17 and R5againcost the Russiana unit by

L A -

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PAGE 26 THEGENERA

Knocking of f those Finns an d getting th e Russianunits to th e main front in three turns is th e Russianace in th e hole.

There are n o worthwhile risks available ro rheGerman so he does what he has to . Ifearlier losseshadn't been so high, th e Russian units beginningtheir retreat along th e DD hexrow may havesweated ou t a I-I .

Russian September Move: At least there were nounexpected surprises this turn. The anticipated loss

of the three 4-6's was bad enough. Even though myFinnish offensive has been prematurely curtailed,what I do have going therehas been going wel) in thecombat results.

German October Move: My losses are considerablebut so are Tom's, especially his losses in big units.With my meager army I will have to use theindirectapproach and automatic elimination as much aspossible. Soak-offs and low-odds attacks must beselective. In the south I must look for anyopportunity to hurt the Russian position. TheGerman forces must rest and rebuild. This isdefinitely not a typical game.

Neutral Comment: Th e Russian is playing well.Maybe FF18 (not surrounded) an d DD2O (n o DB 2into th e swamp) would be better. Riga looks safe.

As he did last turn th e German takes what th eRussian gives him. Ir is no t as expensive as last turnso th e German el t he could no w affordan attack o nthose D D units-an "intelligent risk." Th e Russianis about to be winkled ou t of Minsk.

Speaking of taking what th e Russian gives, Ithink that this is really the essence of Germanstrategy. He has t o be strategically lexible (rransla-tion: opportunistic). Thoughts early in th e game of"heading or Moscow" or "taking Leningradfirst"serve mainly t o limit German flexibility.

Russian October Move: Ouch! The exchangeagainst my units on DD19 hurt. I can see that I willbe short on units for holding the Dnepr this winter,so that river will probably fall early. 1really regretthe suspension of attacks in Finland, as it ties downseveral units just to keep those Finns contained. I

hope to resume the offensive there as early aspossible.

German November Move: The first winter is themost important phase of S T A L I N G R A D . With areduced German army 1 must employ the indirectapproach to the utmost forcing the Russian todefend the way I want him to. The south is the keyand GG22 is the critical hex. By defendingalongtheDnestr one more turn, Tom has limited his retreatand I must take advantage of the situation.

Neutral Comment: Pulling guard duty in Finlandmay hurt T o m later on . Those three 5-7-4's shouldbe back to th e Bug in case of bad weather (whichhappened). But as with previous moves, anycriticism o n m y part has been primarily concernedwith nitpicking helped by 20-20 hindsight. The only

criticisms approaching a serious level involve th ehasty retreat (shown in German Sept. '41 move)andth e slackening of pressure in Finland. And ,arguably, Tom's right an d I'm wrong even there.The Russian isplaying well; th e German willhave to

play well an d catch a couple more breaks (not m a n y)in order to win. A t thispoint getting A Backs (vs. AElims) on soak-ofls becomes important.

The German has obviously positioned himselfwell for his next move.

Russian November Move: 1want to delay one moreturn before giving Joe a good chance at the Dnepr,but that river is sure to fall in January due to theshortage of Russian units in the middle. Joecertainly knows how to get the most mileage out ofhis armored units by maintaining them in strategiclocations until needed on the front. Hopefully I can

bfinrnn~ EPTEMBER '41: Th e Russian withdrawal is a bit Russian large scale withdrawal the battered German army restsovergenerous. Even so, more Russian units have been withdrawn gratefully accepts the three AV's against the Russian delayingfrom Finland leaving only four Red units in Finland to face five Axis (3.65.22).units-one of which (F7) is eliminated a t 4-1. As a result of the

G E R M A N OCTOBER '41: Th e Russians have dipped into their With Mu d as the weather the German takesthe tw o AV'soffestrength along the Divina to returnthe2nd Infantry to Finland where by the Russian (15.42). an d tries a prudent gamble vsthe Russian

it takes p a n in a successful 5-1 vs FGO-reducing Axis strength there an d 17th a t 1-1 an d is rewarded with a n exchange. Fo r the firstto three units an d I I factors. Th e first Russian replacements appear the German hasextracted a favorable rate of attrition: 8 German t(7.15) to take up delaying positions. Russian factors.

G E R M A N N O V EMBER '41: Desp ~t e he arrival of the 2nd an d fo r at tacks vs the Russian delaying units but his armies' weakne15th Armor an d 4th Ca v as replacements the Russian is feeling the demonstrated an d fur ther advanced by the 3-1 exchange vs thepiece shortage an d hares the Finnish front to a garrisonof jusl three infantry. Th e 2nd an d 7th fall to AV's.units to contain the three remaining Axis units. T he German settles

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THEGENERAL PAGE 2

IAN DECEMBER41:- Th e ~ Z a ninter reduces th; position for nextturn's use. Th e Germanattacksarelimitedto 3 AV's

bloodshed and slows the arrival of red reinforcements-only the 7th vs delaying units 7, 4, & I5 Armor.

Armored nettinn into oosition. The 2nd and 8th Infantry take up

German, unable'toreach undefended Leningrad du e tosnow, retreats the next turn. Th e Russian reinforcements arc beginning to tell (28.

to Helsink~and ~ n d sX4 on a run into the h~nterlands. IS. 7) and more than counterbalance the reappearance of the 14th

On the mainfronttheRussianoffersonly onesacrificialdelaying bringing the German armor back to full strength.

GERMAN FEBRUARY '42; Strengthened by the arrival of the weather. AVingthe 15th Armor and taking Dnepropetrovskwith

replacements in the form of the loth Inf.2nd Cav,and2nd Armorthe a 3-1 D Elim vs the 36th. The German48th Infantry survives the 1-4

Russian nonetheless falls away from the Dnepr-giving away several soak-off, thus allowing the German to take no losses while

potential doubled positions. Th e German follows as best hecan given eliminating 10 Russian factors and gaining much valuable ground.

keep the breakthrough to one point on turn oneahold segments of the river for another turn beffacing the problem of wide-open central Russia

German December Move: I have decided afmuch deliberation not to assault FF22 with two2's because of the weakened condition ofGerman army. This may be the most critical turnthe game. I hope my choice to play conservativea while does not blow the game.

Neutral Comment: There is one Russian unit t

many along the Divina, especially since the Dne

will be in trouble nexr turn.

Given his somewhat higher than normal los

to thispoint andgiven the3-1opportunityalong

Dnepr next turn, the German takes the (correc

my mind) conservative approach this turn.

Russian December Move: Well, kiss the Dniegoodbye this turn; it was nice for the short timelasted. My amazing luck in Finland continuthank goodness! I could use some of those unitsthe main front.

German January Move: I should have made the tw1-2's. Resistance in the south is stiffening. I cbreach the Dnepr but 1will need a DElim to beclo

to catching the Russian replacement rate.Neutral Comment: There is not much to be saSacrificing only threefactors is always nice. T

German concentration at Minsk (threateningbo

the Divina and the Dnepr) is a good move.

The Opening Game ends and the Middle Ga

(covering the period from the Dnepr to the Dowill begin a turn or two earlier than most game

Russian January Move: I would sure likeexchange or two on these doubled 3-1 attacksreduce the German army further, but I cacomplain about the D Back 2. I could hang onmore of the Dnepr this turn, but defenders at Yand 22 4 would be in trouble next turn trying toout of there safely. In addition 1 believe t

delaying out in the open would get meno advantain the long run, and I would be pushed back tosame place by April, but at agreater loss in units.definitely need every unit 1 can scrounge updefend the ever-lengthening front againstsummer offensive,so I'll continue to fall back toKursk-Kharkov line giving up only one 2-3-6 abuilding strength for the summer.

German February Move: What is this? The Sovrun away! Maybe it's a good idea givingup spacean increased army but I have never seen it donethis extent before. 1have gained quitea fewturnsthis move, but my army is scrawny and I will nsome DElims to keep the momentum goiExchanges or DBack2's won't help. The northoversolidified with Russian hordes. Let's keepthat way with the indirect approach so that progr

will continue in the south.

Neutral Comment: Rather thanconrain the Germ

bridgehead at Kiev with a couple of units and h

the rest of the Dnepr, Tom decided to pull bac

shades of August '41! The Germanlooksalittle t

on the ground until the Hungarians and Ifali

arrive, but he'sgobbled up a lot of territory. Iwo

give Joe the edge at thispoint to win thegame. T

is, the game can now be won without low o

attacks and should not be thrown away.

Bur will it be? Thar question and much more

be answered next time when we continue wit

study o f the Middle and End Game in conclud

the STAL INGRA D Series Replay. Q

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PAGE 28 THEGENERA

W AR AT

France went under on Ju ne 17, 1940. With herwent the hopes of a sho rt war in the West. But alsowith her collapse went the fear that the French Fleetwould become a part of the German wa r machine.

Article 8 of the French Armistice simply statedthat the French Fleet, except that part left free forsafeguardin g Fren ch Colonial interests, "shall becollected into ports to be specified and theredemobilized and disarmed under German andItalian control." This apparently meant th at Frenchwarships would pass into AX IS control fully armedand operational.

The collapse of France had been sudden, butAdmiralty Staff studies had forseen such a possibili-ty. The studies had pointed out the grave conse-quences to England should the might of the FrenchFleet be wielded against British commerce aroundthe world. The Allies would be over the proverbialbarrel, for the British Fleet would not be stron gerthan both AXlS Fleets plus the French.

The studies had concluded that should Francefall out of the alliance, the French Fleet must beneutralized, either by the terms of the Armistice,through voluntary internment, o r by destruction atthe hands of the Royal Navy.

Thus the Admiralty prepared to strike followingthe surrender of France. But the strike was to becomplicated for a great part of the French Fleet wasin locations where the British could not bringeffective naval pressure. On the 1st of July, theFrench capital ships were disposed as follows: InPor tsmouth& Plymouth-2 BBs; In Alexandria-IBB, 3 CA; At Oran-2 BBs, 2 BCs; At Algiers-4CAs; At Casablanca, D akar, and the French WestIndies, the JEA N BART, R ICH ELIE U and theBEARN. T he rest of the Fleet was in Toulon.

On the dawn of July 3rd. the British seized theships in Portsmou th, Plymouth , and Alexandria.

Also at dawn Force H sailed from Gibraltar underAdm. Somerville, arriving off Oran at 9:30.Following a day of misunderstandings and muchfrantic signalling, Adm. Somerville followed hisdirect orders and attacked the French at 5:54.

In the shor t engagement , the B RET AGN E wasb lown up , the PRO VEN CE was beached , and theDUN KER QUE ran aground . Only the STRAS -BOUR G escaped, although she was hit by torpedo

olanes before reaching Toulon.With this sour not; the final chapter was written

on the major part of the French Fleet. Only the

C O U R B E R T , L O R R A I N E , a n d R l C H E L l E U s a wextensive Allied active service out of the 7 capitalships in the French Navy. Despite possession ofmany of the others, the Germans never manned anyof the ships against the Allies.

Were the British right in their assessment of thesituation, and the subsequent attack on Oran?Could more time have persuaded the French Adm.Darlan t o join the Alliesand bring the French Fleet?These and many other questions concerning theFrench Navy have been source for controversy sinceJuly of 1940.

THE FRENCH N A V Y

Tha t the French had such a strong navy in 1939was a product of the naval arms race that beganfollowing WWI. Escalation became so expensivethat an armaments conference was called. OnNovem ber 12, 1921, the participants of the navalarmaments conference met for the first t ime inWashington. Through her abili ty to outbuild the

SEA & The French Navyby Dr. Joseph Connolly

other nations, the USA was able to outlinerestrictions and coerce the other nations into

agreement.

A relative ratio of strength among the navalpowers was laid dow n as follows: United Kingdom:USA: Jap an: France: Italy as 5:5:3: 1:75: 1.75. Otherrestrictions. such as m ax gu n size and max weightset at 35,000 tons , were written into th e documents.

After three months of negotiations, the delegatessigned the agreement in Fe b. 1922. It turned ou t tobe one of the few successful international agree-ments since it slowed the a rm s race, but even it wasviolated by all the signees.

The immediate consequence of the treaty wasthe surrenderin g of Britain's century-old position asthe world's strong est naval power. Also, thro ugh thetreaty, France came to be the world 's 4th mostpowerful naval presence.

By S eptember 1939, the four E uropean powershad built themselves to strengthsshown in thech art.

The French Fleet was the second largest and controlof the Mediterranean was based on equal forceapplication by both the British and the French.

The French Fleet was based o n a combination ofmodifications to WWI ships and a strong buildingprogram which had matured earlier than the Italianprog ram . In all, the Fleet contained 7cap ital ships, 2modern Battlecruisers, an aircraft carrier based on aconverted battleship, an d 7 new 8" cruisers builtfrom 1925-32.

The old battleships were of tw o classes. Three ofthe ships were of the COURBE RTclass. These werethe COURBERT, PARIS , and O CEAN (a l thoughthe latter was a training ship and not seaworthy).Moun ting 12-12" guns a nd displacing 23,000 tons,these ships were modernized in the 30's. but stillrepresented holdovers awaiting scrapping when the

treaties would allow new construction. The otherclass, the PR OVE NC E, consisted of three ships, thePROVENCE. BRETAGNE. & LORRAINE.Designed and built in the period 1912-20, they wererefitted in the 30's and were represe ntative of shipsthroughout the world. With 10-13" guns on 23,000tons , they were the French equ ivalent of the BritishQUEEN ELIZABETH Class, although slightlyslower (mo re so after the refit). Nonetheless, theyremained an effective fighting force.

France laid down her first two new ships in '32and '34. These were the Battle Cruisers DUN-KER QUE and STRAS BOUR G, of 26,500 tons andmounting 8-13" guns in two turrets forw ard. Bothhad been designed in 301 32 and were built solely forpolitical reasons, allegedly as a "reply" to th eGerman 10,000 ton arm ored ships, but no doubt

also with an eye to the upcoming Italian Battleships.The proportion of armor relative to the designdisplacement reached 36.8% which was the highestvalue recorded until then, although all thicknesseswere such that they should be described as ust at thelower limit of acceptable. The arrangement ofarm or relative to the bow was unsatisfactory in thathits forward of the main turr ets would have resultedin the ingress of water with a resulting reduction inspeed. In any case they were superior to theDE UT SC HL AN D Class of pocket battleships.

The next class of ships laid down by the FrenchGovernment was the RlCHELlEU Class, begun in

1935 and planned for 4 ships. Th is class was to bearmed with 8-15" guns in two forward turrets akinto the a r rangement o f the DUNKERQUE. Theywere also to carry 15-6" guns, later reduced to 9.

With a weight of 43,000 tons (announced as 35,00later revised to 38,500) the first ship, the RICHELIEU, had 16,500 tons of armor-37% of the shidisplacement. The second ship was started in 193and was planned f or somewhat m ore weight,46,5tons. Th e JE AN BA RT was on ly about 75complete when the Germans overran France, bwas sailed from France, finally reaching Casablaca. The third ship, the CLE MEN CEA U, was onabou t 10% completed and was declared G ermwar booty. Th e fourth ship of the class was to habeen the GASCO GNE. However, in 1938 thedesiforth is ship wascompletely changed withadifferelayout planned for the 15" and 6" guns. The wpostponed the laying down of this ship, and at ttime of the French collap se only 6%of the materiahad been allocated.

Last in the list of French capital ships was t

BEAR N, a NORM A ND IE Class BB converted1927 to th e first French Aircraft Carrier. With a 60

flight deck, design called for two hangar dec

providing capacity for 40 aircraft .The French also built 7 modern 8"gun Cruise

between 1925 and 32. Not much can be said abothem other th an they were generally comparablethe normal interwar CAs built by Italy, U.K., athe U.S. However, they werenot in thesame classt h e B L U C H E R S o r t h e J a p an e s e M Y O K O s.

With this navy the French entered the war 1939. It was obvious that they were more thanmatch for th e Italians, and along with the availabBritish forces, the Allies opened the war wcontrol of the seas.

W A R A T S E A V A R I A NT

WAR A T SEA is a strategic simulation of naval war in the west in WWII. This variantintended to put th e French Fleet in thegame, and

allow it t o continue throu gh 1940 with the Flallocation based on the relative strengths of tALL IES and the AXl S at the beginning oftu rn 2does not add balance to the game, nor wasintended to. What it does add is the influence tthe French Fleet could exert in this theater.

A . Changes to the Mapb oardAdd G ibraltar as a port in Southern Europe

the eastern end of the M editerranean. M ovemfrom G ibraltar can beeither into the Mediterraneor the S outh Atlantic, and disabled Allied shipscreturn there from either sea area. Gibraltar hapoint of repair facility and cann ot be bombed. Ialways an Allied port.B. Changes to the Navies

I. The Ger man Nav.v-Two of the pre-WWDE UT SC HL AN D class BBs were refit ted in 19

36 and to ok part in WW II. At 13,OOOtonsandfiwith I I" guns they w ere slightly more powerful thmodern cruisers. Due to their f ire control and gsystems they do no t receive the Ger man bonus. NUnits: SC HL ES IEN (1-1-3): SCH LESWHOLSTEIN (1-1-3)

2. The French Nav.v-For thev arian t the FreNavy consists of 7 completed BBs, I A/C, thmodern 8" cruisers, and the JE AN BAR T. NUnits: RI CH EL IEU (5-6-7): J EA N BART(3-6-COUR BERT(2 -3-3): OCEA N(2-3-3): PA RIS(23): B EAR N (0-1-6(1)): PR OV EN CE (3-3-3): BRTAG NE (3-3-3): LO RR AIN E (3-3-3): DUKE RQ UE (4-3-7): STR ASB OUR G (4-3A L G E R I E . C O L B E R T , D U P L E I X , DQUESNE, FOCH. SUFFRE N. TOURVILLE(I

7).

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PAGEHEGENERAL

C. Rules ChangesI . Disposition of the French Fleer:The French Fleet i s ' a lways controlled by th e

Allies during turn I. French ships begin th e game inMa l t a which represents th e French h o m e por ts ofO r a n and Toulon . T he exception is th e J E A NB A R T which comes in as a replacement o n turn 2 inFrance.

After tu rn I, dice a r e th rown fo r con t ro l of th eindividual ships of th e fleet, with con t ro l a s follows:If th e A X l S is ahead 2 o r more P O C then:

2.3.4.5 = A X l S con t ro l6.7.8 = scuttled

9,10,1 1.12 = A L L I E D contro l

If th e A X l S is even o r ahead 1 P O C :2,3,4 = A X l S con t ro l5,6,7,8 = scuttled

9.10.1 1.12 = A L L I E D contro l

Otherwise:2,3 = A X l S con t ro l

4,5,6,7,8 = scuttled9,10,11,12 = A L L I E D contro l

Once con t ro l is established, th e ships underA X l S con t ro l then g o to th e A X l S por t in th e se aa rea where th e sh ip was located a t th e en d of tu rn I.

A L L I E D controlled ships d o no t move.2. French ship movetnents:

O n turn 2 n o French ship m ay sail. This reflectsth e internal French struggle an d required shiprefitting.

A t th e start of turn 8 a ll French ships in A X l Scon t ro l ar e scuttled. Th is is th e reaction of th eFrench t o ge t o n th e winning side, a s th e Europeanlandings a re taking place.

3. A L L I E D air strikes:

T h e A L L I E S lacked sufficient land based a i r inth e Mediterranean a t th e start of the war. N oA L L I E D land-based a i r strikes allowed in th eMediterranean o n turn 1.

4. German commerce raiders:T h e Germans knew when th e w ar would start ,

a n d were able t o pu t th e commerce raiders o nstation. O n tu rn I th e German "pocket battleships"m ay start in a ny se a a rea .

5 . A L L I E D ship reallocation:With th e Japanese a t tack in th e Pacific, th e

A L L I E S ha d t o send th e P R I N C E of W A L E S an dth e R E P U L S E t o help. They weren't much help.

T he A L L I E D player must remove these tw osh ips from th e board a t thes ta r t of t u r n 4 . If they a r e

ranean could they bring pressure against th eG e r m a n ground forces early in th e war. Thispressure led to th e A X l S defeat in North Africa, a ndth e eventual fall of Italy.. . . M E D I T E R R A N E A N : 3 points fo r A X l Scon t ro l . . . A L L I E D Fleet presence in th e Medi-te r ranean helped keep th e neutrals quiet an d keptth e Italians from a n aggressive naval policy. F o r thisreason, it was imperative that s o m e A L L I E D shipsremain in th e M ed regardless of who controlled th esea. If a t th e en d of a turn th e A L L I E S d o no t have

a t least one ship in Malta , award th e A X l S I P O C .

PerspectiveGiven th e above variant an d th e outlined

probabilities of con t ro l of th e individual ships,WAS ca n be extended t o include th e effects of th eFrench Fleet. It must begran ted that th e selection ofth e criteria for division of th e ships is somewhatarbitrary. N o impor tan t French ships fought fo r th eA X I S . However. there existed s o m e d o u b t as t owhether they would. Certainly th e Admiralty wouldno t have risked th e action off O r a n ha d there beenno chance of th e Germans obtaining parts of th eFrench Fleet.

T h e advantage of a strategic simulation is that ifyo u d o not agree with th e method ofsh ip allocation,yo u a r e free t o change it.

Q

DIPLOMACY WORLD is a q u a r t e r l y m a g a z i n eo n Dip lomacy w h i c h is ed i ted by W a l t e rB u c h a n a n , R.R. # 3 , Bo x 3 2 4 , L e b a n o n , IN4 6 0 5 2 a n d subs id ized by T h e Ava lon Hill G a m e

C o m p a n y . T h e p u r p o s e of e a c h 4 0 - p a g e of fse ti s s u e is t o p r e s e n t a b r o a d overv iew of t h epos ta l Dip lomacy hobby by printing a r t i c l e s o ng o o d play. z ine n e w s , lis t ing ra t ing s y s t e m s ,g a m e o p e n i n g s , a n d pr in t ing a c o m p l e t evar ian t g a m e a n d m a p w i t h e a c h i s s u e . S u b s

a r e $ 4 . 0 0 w i t h s i n g l e c o p i e s ava i lab le fo r $ 1 . 2 5Fore ign s u b s c r i p t i o n s $5.

s u n k , then he must remove tw o capital ships (o the r O r d e r s fo r DIPLOMACY WORLD m u s t b ethan carriers). m a d e p a y a b l e t o DIPLOMACY W O R LD a n d s e n t

t o t h e ed i to r ' s Ind iana a d d r e s s .D. Changes in Po in ts o f Contro l

T h e Mediterranean was a vital focal point f o r DEALER INQUIRIES INVITEDth e A L L I E S during th e war. Only in th e Mediter-

TABLE OF NAVAL STRENGTH as of Sept., 1939

BattleshipsBattle Cruisers"Pocket Battleships"Aircraft CarriersHeavy Cruisers*

British Fleet German Fleet Italian Fleet F rench Fleet

built building & built building & built building & built building &

projected projected projected projected

* M o d e r n o r refitted Heavy Cruisers(a ) tw o never built(b ) tw o never built(c) none built

(d ) tw o never built(e) Jean Bart launched, o the r tw o never built(f) never built(g) never built

ELITE CLUBGood news fo r Elite C lub members. F rom no

on your Elite C lub Discount coupons a re gotowards th e Mail o rde r purchase of any AvalHill game direct from Avalon Hill-not just tMail Order only variety.

Discounts a re applicable only t o those mebers of th e Elite C lub w ho staple their 1ca lendar year Elite C lub ticket t o their o rde r . Uo r lost Elite C lub tickets a r e no t replaced unan y circumstances.

Yo u too ca n become a member of th e EClub . T o qualify yo u must place a mail o rde rany si x Avalon Hill games. No discounts applythis qualifying order. When placing such a n orbe sure t o as k fo r your Elite C lub memberscardltickets t o insure we don't forget.

You'll then be a lifetime member of th e Ava

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7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE 30 THEGENERAL

Bill Farone is a member of the Old Guard wh odoes most of hisplaying by mail. As such it comes asno surprise rhat he presides as an official judge fo rAHIKS postal P N Z B L T Z games. AHIKS, by rhe

way, is the exclusive (adulrs only) national clubdevoted entirely to posral play of wargames. As sofew of rhe new games these days are suitable t o p b mit is only narural that aposral buff such as Bill wouldfavor us wirh yet another Situation 13 or one ofhisfavorite postal games.

f MapConfiguration 5

Situation By W ~ l l i a mA. Farone

*RUSSIAN FORCES g *GERMAN FORCES

46 1 1%? 3 4 n% 1

8 5 4 3 3 10 9 9 8 4

2 3 2 2 2 2

J

Although many situations have appeared fo rPanzerBlitz th e early ac t ions of 1941 have not beendeveloped a s fully a s th e time period from 1942 t oth e en d of th e war. This is somewhat unfor tuna tebecause it wa s in 1941 that the German Blitzkriegachieved some of it s greatest successes. This perioddeserves more attention because par t of th e lure ofgames of armored warfare is t o recreate th esituations where th e speed a n d firepower of th e tankallow fo r a n intense, fast-paced struggle.

T h e situation presented here is based o n a typicalskirmish immediately after th e crossing of th eRussian border. Elements of a Russian RifleDivision face th e ons laught of th e lead elements of aPanzer Division. T h e situation in mind is th ecrossing of the Bug River by Guderian 's 2n d PanzerG r o u p on th e wa y t o Minsk.

The objective fo r th e Germans is t o des t roy a smany Russian units a s quickly a s possible a n d tobreak through t o th e East keeping the i r rou te openfo r th e units tha t follow. T h e Russians have toextract whatever toll they can in German units a n dblock th e roads thus slowing th e blitz.

Only Board 3 is used an d it is oriented such thatth e gully squares between rows V a n d Z a r e to th eWest. This places Grabyosh o n the East edge.

-Ger

moves tint

Turn

1

Al l th e units a re contained in th e standard game. A tthis time in th e history of th e w ar th e attack an ddefense factors of th e German Panzer units shouldbe less than t h a t printed o n th e counte rs because

earlier versions of th e tanks were in use. However,they a r e left a s they a re t o simulate th e advan tagethat th e Germans ha d d ue t o surprise a n d tactical a i rsuperiority. These factors ca n be included this wa ywithout the requirements fo r an y e x t r a rule whichmay be helpful t o future designers of 1941 scenarios.

T h e gully squares o n th e Western half of th eboard represent th e Bu g River an d 3 2 9 is th e onlyallowed crossing point. T h e Russian units se t u pfirst East of ro w T . T h e Germans se t u p West of th eRiver and move first. T he game length is 9 turns. Itshould be noted tha t game length in this situation isa good wa y of handicapping when players a r e no t ofequa l experience o r skill. A game of 12 turns makesth e German jo b much easier. T he only special ruletha t ha s been added fo r the sake of logic is tha t al lGerman infantry an d guns must be carried by trucks

o r halftracks. This is th e lead element of th e attackan d th e tanks a r e no t to be slowed down picking u po r carrying infantry o r guns!

T h e Germans ge t I victory point fo r each

Russian unit destroyed plus .1 point fo r eacharmored vehicle o r loaded t ranspor t unit off th eEast edge by th e en d of th e game. Once exited, unitsmay not return. T h e Russians ge t I point fo r eachGerman unit destroyed an d 3 points fo r each towno r road he x occupied a t th e en d of th e game. Inaddition th e Russians ge t a 5 point bonus if th eGermans fail t o exit 8 o r more armored vehicles o r10 points if they fail t o exit 5 o r more. T he side with1-5 more points achieves a marginal victory, 6-10points achieves a tactical victory a nd more than 10points is a decisive victory.

2

F o r th e German player time is of th e essence.he tries t o play a "safe" game he ca n ru n into timtrouble an d have t o give u p valuable road an d towsquares. He must find an d destroy th e Russia

mobile units lest they block roads o n th e last turnAn al l ou t attack will result in some losses whicmust be made u p either with exited units o r Russialosses. T he Russian player will find tha t there isjuenough hiding space in the tw o towns an d 4 woodareas bu t an y one of them ca n be easily attacked st h a t unit placement is critical. T he situationdesigned t o allow several tactical options. The basGerman decision is one of concentration while thRussians ca n play t o delay a t Opustoschenia wiartillery to th e rear o r o p t fo r do ing major damagt o th e German as soon a s possible.

T h e situation is balanced in th e sense that eithside ca n wi n but an y individual playing ca n en d ubeing highly unbalanced due t o th e difference

tactics selected.T h e difference between various tactical. do

trines will become apparen t . The G e r m a n ca n leaa b o u t th e doctrine of committing a r m o r in massopposed t o piecemeal an d th e Russian ca n learn thvalue of using armor-piercing weapons a t clorange.

3 4 5 6 7 8END

9

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


THE GENERAL PAGE 3

ARAB TANK TACTICS IN AIWOr Methods of Maneuvering Mighty Masses of Mobile Metal

By Jim Stahler

"Forty of us, and eight of yo u . . . but we're n otafraid," shout the brave A rab tankers as they

advance to meet their doom. Actually, the Arabshave plenty to fear, for the lsraelis have much m orepower at their command than their numbersindicate. Th is is as true o n the m apbo ards of A R A B -

I S R A E L I W A R S as it is on the battlefields of theMiddle East.

This article is about Arab tank tactics in AH'SA I W . A novice might say, why does the Arab needsubtle tactics? He just t akes his overwhelmingstrength and rolls over his opponent. That poorfellow is in for a rude awakening as the dunes andridges become littered with the remains of his oncemighty armored force. In situation after situation,Tel Maschara, Botzer, Abu Agheila, Ras Sudar,and especially Kuneitra, we have a horde of Arabarm or against a handful of Israeli tanks, yet theArabs have anything bu t an au tom atic win; i t is an

uphill struggle all the way.Let us examine the reasons for this. A glance a t

the counte rs shows tha t an Arab tank un i t i s nomatch for an Israeli tank unit , even though bothrepresent 5 tanks. The Israeli tanks outrange the

Arabs, have superior firepower, and better armor.For example, in 1956, the main Ar ab tank is the T-34/8 5, which is up against AMX-13's an d Sher-mans. The lsraelis have a 2 or 4 hex rangeadvantage , 13 to 16 attac k factors versus 7 fo r theT34/ 85, and 9 o r 10 defense factors compare d with 7for the T 34/85. Thus, an Israeli unit will f ire at anAr ab tank unit at 2-1, in mos t cases. A single Ar abunit fires back at 1-2.

To take a more modern example, consider theIsraeli's best-M60Al-against the Ara bs best-T-62. The M60AI outranges the T-62 by 6 hexes,

enabling it to blast the enemy without receiving firein return. I t has 25 attack factors versus 14 for the T-62, and is worth 16 in defense, while the T-62 has adefense of only 10 factors. Thus, the M 60AI shootsat th e Arab's best at 2-1, and receives fire at 1-2odds . Things haven't changed m uch since 1956,have they?

But the lsraeli advantages don't stop here. Splitmove and fire, representing superior Israeli tankhandling, allow th e lsraelis to advan ce while sti l lf ir ing at the enemy, or to withdraw from a hot spotafter rallying from a dispersal. Superior moraleallows the Israeli tanks to recover more quicklyfrom said dispersal than the Arabs.

Even worse for the A rabs, careful inspection ofthe W EC reveals that in most Situations the Israelitanks have doubled attack strength at ranges of 3 to

6 hexes. Also note that i na hull down position, mostlsraeli tanks have 2 added to the die roll, while theAra b tanks gain only a + I benefit from crests, ridges,and dunes.

By now you may be tempted to abandon a l l hopeof an Arab victory; but don't give up yet. Bravelysay, "But we're not afraid . . .," and be aware tha tthere is more to Ara b tank tactics than "Hey did dle

diddle, straight u p the middle." There are manyways to apply sup erior numbers to neutralize some,if not all, of the lsraeli advantages.

The Arabs can reduce their enemy's rangeadvantage by carefully choosing the range a t whichthey engage the Israelis. At 7 o r 8 hexes away, borhArab and Israeli gunnery is at half effectiveness.This is a g ood range t o engage the Israelis . Anothergood range is 1 or 2 hexes away, at which allgunne ryis doubled. Also, close range tanks quickly become

wrecks, which is generally to the Ar abs favor, sincethey can usually ab sorb losses much more easily

than the Israelis . The challenge is in approach ing theenemy without being blown away. A tricky playercan o ften utilize dunes, ridges, and hills to make hisapproach. Fo r example, the Arab units in Fig. 1 canapproach to within one or two hexes of the lsraelitanks w ithout suffering opp ortunity fire.

Figure 1Often the lsra eli player doesn't leave any

appr oach es uncovered. A useful tactic to employ isto stan d off at a 7 o r 8 hex ran ge an d get 2-1 o r 3-1a t tacks on enemy un i ts in an a t tempt to d isperse

enough of them t o open u p relatively safe avenues ofapproach . Even though the lsraeli tanks will mostlikely rally on their next turn, they will lose theiroppor tun i ty f i re long enough fo r Arab a rmor to

creep up on them.You can use your numbers t o deny the Israelis a

similar tactic. In many cases the Israeli units canmake 2-1 attacks on stacks of Arab tank units ,

pinning down much of the Arab strength. Byavoiding stacking-not always possible, because oflack of firing positions-the lsraelis can fire o n onlyone unit with each of his units, leaving most of theArab units untouched.

Dispersal also leads us to anot her expensive buteffective maneuver, especially useful when theIsraeli is shor t of units , an d you are not. On e unitcan shoo t at one hex, at most. When you are close tothe enemy, within overrun range, and there ar e morehexes to overrun from than he has units toopportunity fire with, you can spread out, ov errunhis positions, and be assured that some of your unitswill survive to carry the attack home. See Fig. 2 foran exam ple of this "metal wave" assault. Each of theten Arab tank units is attacking from a differenthex. Th us the three Israeli units can fire at only thre e

Ara b units. Even though the Arabs expect to losethree units , they can, in return, expect to heavilydamage the Israelis with their overun attacks.

Ano ther tactic involves the threat of overrun, busually doesn't actually result in an overru

Maneuver a force to within overrun range of enemy unit defending an avenue of approach. your next turn, maintain the threat while ymaneuver other units closer and closer to theenemIf he fires at you r adv ancing tan ks, he leaves himsvulnerable to a n ov errun attac k. If he holds his you advance to better positions for the next tuOften, you ca n maneuver the lsraelis out of stropositions w ithout a shot being fired, nor a die beculled.

The over run thr eat is especially useful when Arab arsenal includes BMP's. Even though thhave shor t range, they ar e as strong, offensively, aT-55; and since their movement rate is 8 hexes turn, they ar e an overrun threat fro m up to 6 heaway. In a situation such a s Fig. 3, the Israelisartrouble. T he lsraeli tanks must hold their f ire as

Arab tanks boldly take good positions. If lsraelis do fire, they expose themselves to destrtion at the hands (and guns) of the BMP's lurkbehind the dunes. This enables the Arabs to around the lsraeli defensive positions, robbing lsraelis of their +2 hull dow n bonus, their raadvantage, and also split move and fire capabil

Although they can still split move and fire, therno favorable place to retreat to, since the Arabs all over the lsraeli rear. Those quick little BMthat you find at Botzer and Marjayou are goodmuch more than hauling infantry.

Figure 3

Note th at while most "nits, including lsrtanks, get a +2 hull down bonus, y our Russian-mtanks get only a +I , since their guns canno t deprvery far. How depressing! Therefore, you wanavoid the situation in which both sides are firfrom a hull do wn position. The lsraeli needs himuch m ore tha n you need your + I. Swapping shwith everyone hull down only gives the lsraeli more advan tage. This situation can be avoided

using the tactic s discussed above: sneaking throuthe terrain to get close to the lsraeli units; us

superior numbers to overrun a part of the eneforces; and using the threat of overrun t o move mof your forces on to p of the Israelis , to maneuthem o ut of their good, hull down, positions.

On e last tactic is applicable to an y game in wh

a m ore num erous attack er is up against a stretcdefender. Sprea d ou t your forces to threaten evpossible av enue of advance, forcing your enem

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE 32 THEGENERA

defend everywhere at once. Meanwhile, maintain a

flexible reserve to overwhelm your enemy at one

point. He wi ll have great difficulty covering

everything, let alone rushing reinforcements to a

danger point. I t will be only a matter of time before

he runs out of troops and his line breaks. This tactic

i s most useful in a situation such as Kuneitra. The

Arabs have overwhelming numbers here, i f hey doanywhere, and the Israelis are stretched very thin

indeed. By threatening every Israeli position, i t i s

possible to mass against one spot and break

through. Units threatening the other positions pin

the Israelis in place, leaving the victims to fend for

themselves.

While the Arabs in AlWare outclassed ank for

tank, their numbers often make up for qualitative

inferiority; but they must use tactics that take the

best advantage of their numbers. I n the contest of

the many against the few, the many certainly have a

chance.63

D-DAY '77

James Stahler, a local gamer of considerable

repute, has authored the thi rd edition D -DAY

rules with co-development by Richard Hamblen

and Don Greenwood. The D-DA Y revision was

originally intended as just a clean up of a poorly

done, outdated set of rules which had been passed

up by the state of the art. D- DA Y has been one of

our biggest sources of nut mail due to theincomplete and poorly done rules of the 1965

edition. The current revision not only does away

with the problem in presenting ambiguity-free

rules, but also addresses play balance problems

and incorporates design innovations which have

been developed in the past decade; without going

into complicated phase systems which would ruin

the game's excellent postal characteristics.

Among the changes are revised, more realistic

supply rules which make South France a viable

invasion site, strategic movement, tactical air-

power, carpet bombing, river interdiction, and

strategic fortresses whose capture affects the

Allied replacement rate. But above all, these rules

are ambiguity-free-a competitive postal player'sdream-and a 100% improvement to the old

classic.

The revised D-DA Y rules sell for $2.00 plus

postage costs, and are available only by mail from

Avalon Hill. Due to overstock and the slowness

with which retai l supplies are moved, these rules

will not be found in D-DA Y games on the retail

shelves for several years. I f you order a D-D A Y

game by mail, be sure to request the new rules.

They will be provided free to mail order

purchasers of the game i f you request them withyour purchase. Maryland residents add 5% state

sales tax.

A.H. Philosophy . . . Continued from Pg . 2. Col.3

Game turns are leisurely u ntil trouble breaks

out-and then time is measured in seconds.

Hidden movement, ambushes, observation and

creaking floor boards all play their part up until

shotguns, carbines, Buf falo rifles, and revolvers

open up-or un ti l the players are suddenly

locked in desperate hand to hand combat.

TOTOW wi ll be a fast, fun game for tw o or more

players specifically designed so that many

people can play at once, recreat ing the interplayof th e old west.

Fast on the heels of his AIR ASSAULT ONCRETE development chores, Randall Reed has

blocked out his next design project. NORMANDYBEACHHEAD wi ll be a tactical/operational level

game of the Normandy landings and the

subsequent counter-attacks and eventual

breakout. Tentatively, the scale looks to be

batta liodre gimen t level with 2 kilometer hexes

and one-day turns. Emphasis will be on the

functional differentiation between armored,

infantry, and artillery units on a tactical level.

The game will include a range of pre-set

scenarios as wel l as the capability for a monster

campaign game of the entire breakout period.

Rules will include supply, air bombardment andinterdiction, naval fire support, parachute

assault, step-loss combat results system (flip-counters and substitute 'remnant' counters),

impulse movement, and multiple combat

capabilities. Although it will use a very large

mapboard and an impressive number of unit

counters, the designer stresses that this wi ll notbe an unplayable "monster" game. Elegance

and efficiency of the basic game mechanisms

wi ll ensure a rapid and action-oriented design.

The premiere issue of ALL-STAR REPLAYdue out shortly will introduce the longawaited

updated team charts for the Sports Illustrated

Football Game, PAYDIRT! All 28 NFL teams will

be included in the chart package, which will

reflect the 1976 team ratings. As a bonus, the$7.00 chart set will also include a completely

revised set of rules for PAYDIRT!, which takes

into account recent NFL rules changes (such as

kickoffs from the 35 yard line), and contain a

whole set of advanced rules, covering such

areas as: razzle-dazzle plays, two-minute

offenses, runbacks of fumbles and missed field

goals, quick kicks, coffin corner punts, fake

kicks, and even a unique "point-spread" system

that allo ws even the weakest team in the game

set to win (relatively speaking) against a team

like the mighty Oakland Raiders.

There's bo th good news and bad news for

postal game players. The good news is that we

will offer the RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN PBM kits

you've been asking us for. The bad news is hat i t

wil l cost $6.00 ($3.00 for a half kit ) plus postagecharges. Furthermore, all PBM kits wil l go up in

price correspondingly. We hadn't realized how

much of a loss we were taking on these kits unt il

we investigated the costs of doing a ne w one.

Postal enthusiasts should also note that the

GETTYSBURG PBM kit is for the '6 4 square grid

version and not the '77 hex edition.

Owners of Battleline's SUBMARINE game

can earn themselves a free copy of our revisedversion (U-BOAT)by volunteering their services

as playtesters/proo f readers. The game is too far

along the pub lication process to be subjected to

one of our-fu llby-mail-playtest programs but we

do have roughly two weeks of final proof-

reading and invite experienced players of the

game to volunteer for the task. Those select

will have approximately two weeks to re

copies of our typed manuscript-the purpo

being not to playtest the game but to subject

rules themselves to a closer prepublicat

scrutiny by as many eyes as possible. P

ticipants will be asked to respond almo

immediately with w ritte n comments pertain

to clarity and completeness of the rules. Tho

who make significant contributions i n terms

spotting omissions, ambiguities, or just pl

poor grammar wi ll be rewarded wit h a free co

of the finished product. Time is short however

volunteer for this project only if you can giv

your immediate attention and are at least

years of age. '

The initi al response to SQUAD LEADER h

been so overwhelmingly favorable that publi

tion of the promised expansion kits see

assured. Developer Don Greenwood is n

accepting applications for by-mail playt

volunteers for the expansion kits. Those

terested in applying should have a f

background in all aspects of SQUAD LEADEhave access to several other local SQULEADER enthusiasts, and be wil ling to respo

with in depth criticisms of the playtest kits.

Vol. 14, No. 2 proved to be a love-hate aff

among the readers. There was little midd

ground between the rave 1 and 2 ratings

KINGMAKER enthusiasts and the equally ra

enous but definitely less friendly 9 and 10's

the more conventional WWl l battle game fan

When all was said and done our 200 rando

raters had decided on a 3.27 for the issue-th

best rating of the year to date. There wer

however, agrowing number of complaintsabo

the lack of diversity in the specialized GENEALS of recent vintage. While we can understa

the plight of those subscribers not having t

game which is featured we do feel that t

concentration of theme for each issue is

definite necessity in our overall producti

picture. The special theme of each issue mak

the magazine more relevant to hobby storesal

where w e are picking up a great deal of volum

and also allows us to backlist issues of spec

interest to the many who request in dep

coverage of particular games. Yet, we w

endeavor to avoid "overkill" in the future a

limit the features to less than half of th

magazine. The new 4 page insert in effe

increases the GENERAL to a 40 pa

magazine-an effect which was neutralized la

time by the inclusion of6 pages of advertisingf

the new '77 games. In short, we're going

attempt to have our cake and eat it too and a

for both a con tinuation of the feature present

tions and more diversity in the same issue. T

article rankings on our 120 0 point maximu

scoring system were as follows:

PlayingYour Hand in KINGMAKER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Series Repay ALEXANDER ............................

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n Praise of KINGMAKER

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Squad Leader Preview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ore KINGMAKER Surpr~ses

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .valon Hill Philosophy...................................INGMAKER By Mail..

Design Analysis: KINGMAKER Rules Explanation... . . . . . .And Still More KINGMAKER Surprises.. ................

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ostal KINGMAKER Mechanics

Q

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


Dear Mr. Greenwood:

Iwish to thank the Avalon Hillgraphicsteam

for their generally excellent ob on the PAN ZER -

BL IT Z Series Replay in Vol. 13. No. 6. The

notational system of illustration o f individual

units' moves IS easier for me to follow than in

previous series replays involvi ng this game.

As with any undertaking ofthissi7e. thereare

inevitably graphical reproduction mistakes.

Several of my hard core PBM PANZERBLITZ

opponents have informed me of various am-

b~guities nd errors in the replay. So Iwould like

lo straighten out some of these gremlins In the

graphlc reproduction o f that game, and ease someof the frustrat ion of those who tried to replay the

game. On Soviet lu rn one 954(142) should be on

the hex labeled "b". 821(184) is on hex "A".German unlt 424 should be on 214, no t 217-the

latter hex should be unoccupied on the defender's

opening turn. The hex labeled "J" on Soviet turn

two should be labeled instead as "C".And on

German urn hree. onemight clarify that both 850

and 631 go to 346. with 621(41) on 3W8. Soviet

units 421 and 434 on turn four are carrying 86and

85 respectively. In German urn four. the Wespe is,

carrying the 88. so the Wespe alone fires on 956.

The editor's explanation above the illustrated tu rn

five move is incorrect: German units441.62I.and

41 should be on 3X3.3CC6and 3DD 5 respective-

ly. At that time. only 631 was on board one.

Finally on Soviet lurn seven, there should be no

" D abel on 3VI I-tha t hex is vacant. The " Dlabel on 3R6 is correct, however. On Soviet turn

three. lnfan try un its 183,184and 145 on hexes213.

212. and 2E2 respectively are all mistakenly

illustrated as being loaded. They should be

unloaded! And on the same turn, the truck on

2HlO should be 432. not 423. I n he editor's tu rn

four description above the illustration. Soviet unit

426 on stack" 0 hould be carrying 32. Stacks"V"

and " W on theSoviet fi fth turna re nonexistent-

those two hexes (2D4 and 2D5) should be

unoccupied. 434(85) goes on 2C3.424(13) goes on

2A3. 431(12) goes on 389, and 421(86) goes on

2B3. Lastly, there were two erro rsofmy own in he

commentary . On page 22. second column. line 9.

the last word should be"IA8". not "I AY .A nd on

page 23. first column. line 12. the second word

should be "X21". not "822" ( lat ter deceased!).

Hopefully no more of those gremlins have

escaped my notice.

Robert Chiang

Berkeley. CA

Dear Sir:

It was with considerable nterest that I ead

Dwigh t Hamner's recent critici sm on my article

"Game Theory and 1776" and on probab ility

articles i n general. His primar y objection was that

the choosing of the Tactical cards prior to each

battle was not subject to analysis by game theory.

He rationalizes his by stating that each separate

selectionof Tactical cards for different attacksare

not independent events, b ut a function of various

parameters. He says "the geographic location of

the battle, the relative time o f the battle, as well as

the composition and strength ofthe forces will al l

have impact on the choice of tactical cards." This

statement i s true, but on ly in he sense that these

factors have some bearing on which strategy to

use, which i n urn changes the oddsconcerning he

selection of the various Tactical cards. However,

to state that each selection is not an independent

event iserroneous. Game theorycan bea complex

subject, and it is easy to misconstrue certain

concepts or fall into fallacious arguments. J.D.Williams' book, The Compleat Strateg.b,st, is an

excellent introdu ction to game theory, and Iheartily recommend it to all novices.) Mr.

Hamner's argument is akin to theclassicexample

of flipping a coin one-hundred times, the result

every time being heads. The first hundred results,

however, have absolutely no bearing on the one-

hundred and first toss. The chance for heads

coming up is still fifty percent. Similarly, just

because my opponent picked Enfilade Left last

attack doesn't mean he won't (or w ill) pick

Enfilade Left again.

The one complication to the aboveanalysisis

that in many cases the defender may attempt t o

break off the battle rather than indulge n a war of

attrit ion. I n hese cases, an appropriate bias must

be assigned l oa successful With drawa l result. This

is discussed i n some detail i n my article, but Ishould add that even biasing the Tactical Results

Mat rix does not preclude t fr om being successful-

ly analyzed by game theory. Al l of Mr. Hamner's

Letters to the Editor ...b

PAGE 3

provide the materials necessary to PBM he game

that are not otherwise universally availabl

Number one, of course, is the game ~tse

Secondly, would be the availability of reduce

maps. such as is the case with P ANZERBLITZ.

"mitigating factors"(odds, terrain, supply, etc.) do

have a direct bearing o l~ wh ic h verall strategic

polic y should be assumed for each attack, and this

policy can easily change from one attack to the

next. But the on&, and I mphasize on1.v. effect

that the selection of the tactical cards had is an

adjustment to the die roll. Once I ave chosen the

appropriate strategy, the unit composition, odds,

terrain, whatever, are all completely rrelevant. Asattacker, I till want to maximize my chances of

increasing the die r oll adjustment, regardless of

whether I ave a force of all British regulars or a ll

Tory militia.

Mr . Hamner also claims that "a defensive

player can anticipate and choose appropriate

counter action" if an "attacker consistently uses

Recon in Force as dictated by the Game Theory

Analysis." This statement is 100% wrong. I n act,

the whole poin t of game theory is to prevent such

predictability. I ssume that Mr . Hamner means

by anticipation of my strategy that he will always

plck Stand and Defend or Frontal Assault when

confronted with my optimumapproach(thesetwo

defenses give the best result for the defender

against a Recon n Force, which should be selected

more often than any other single Tactical card

when using the optimum strategy). I f one bothers

to compute the value of the gamegiven the above

situation, he will find that it sequal tozero, which

is no improvement. As stated in my article, no

possible strategy can be better, while many n actare worse. I f M r. Hamner can find a strategy

which consistently betters mine, I ould be more

than interested n knowing of it .

Another statement Mr. Hamner makes s that

"these articles (have a) negative impact i n

achieving market growth for AH."Thisisclearly a

personal prejudice, and possibly even irresponsi-

ble. Certainlv we all have our different likes and

my deadline, one for $141.13 and the other for

$140. The former bid was accepted but I id not

reaive hischeck n ime. I ad o take the latter bid

of $140. Two add ~tlo nal bids were made on

TRAFALGAR but were less than $125. Ifsomeone hasa copy of TRAFALGA Rlh e $141.13

bid would probably still be good. Ifanyone wants

to contact me on that or knows where Roger

Cormier lives, please write me c/ o 670 Darrel lRoad. Hillsborounh. California 94010.

After TRAFALGAR the two most sought

after games were 1914 by Ava lon Hi ll and its

companion game TANNE NBURG an early long

out o f prin t game by SPI. O f my games, Aval on

Hi ll ones. on the average, had more offers than

ones from other companies. GU ADA CA NA L

and the Hexagon verslon of G ET YS BU RG were

both sought after items. The best non Avalon Hi ll

seller, other than ones mentioned was

DUNKERQUE-1940 by SDC.

I laced 9 ads i n various magazines. The most

responsescame rom CAMPAIGN(f ormerly Don

Greenwood's PA NZE RFA UST). the

GENERAL, and WARSHIP'S INTER-NATIONAL. I as selling a great many books as

well. I oticed hat most gamers bought gamesand

no books and vice versa. Two young men who

bought 186 dollars worth of games bought no

books for example. The two men who spent the

$186 not only have been playing all that they

bought, but bought several titles made about thetime they were born!

Al l n all, the market for the collector and the

seller is there. I hink that i n he years to come out

of print wargames will continue to climb i n price.

Man y games are like an inves tment in art.

However, the quali ty game will be the game that

will be most valuable.. . -dislikes concerning the various topics presented.

Jack

My opinion is that only by providing a wideHillsborough*

selection of subiects can we sustain and Dromote

growth in he ficld. As to his ~~ec ific obj edi onhat

these articles cannot attract and hold younger

audiences, I an only say that it was exactly these

types of articles that whetted my interest both in

playing and writing.

And finally. Mr. Hamner states that he is "a

little sick of . . . articles . . . which contain such

superficia l analysis.'' HereI malmost incomplete

agreement with Mr. Hamner. I.oo, am somewhat

weary of superficial analyses.

J. Richard Jarvinen

Stuttgart, Germany

****Dear Don.

This spring I old about two dozen out of

prin t games to about 75 people who responded to

various ads in Hobbv magazines. The sinnle

highest price for a game.was &r TRAFALGAR.

1sold it for $140 in cash toa oersonabout 80 miles

from where I ive.

TRAFALGAR has an interesting story.

Approximate ly 125 copies of this game were put

out in 1969 by Roger Cornie r, who then lived in

Bloomington. Indiana. (By the way, if anyone

knows where Roger is, please send me hisaddress).

I t sold then for $11 and was the highest priced

game of that period. I t used handmade plastic

range finders, a very large vinyl mapboard, many

counters (including I " long H" wide ship

counters), plasticcompartment tray,and rules. Anearly STRATEGY & TACTIC S (vol. I 1 no. 5)

rated it excellent and outstanding in every

department, though it is a long tactical game

taking I 2 hours to play. By state of the art

standards it is still a lmost up to the standards of

WOODEN SHIPS & IRON MEN.

At Origins I n auctioned copy sold for $50.

Then, i n the late winter of 1975-6, an ad was

submitted to the GENERAL offering to sell

TRAFALGA R and V IET NAM (I sold my copy

this spring f or $30. I t was produced in 1965 by

Gamescience). Tom Shaw and Don Greenwood

wrote back to the seller and old h im hecould geta

better price then what he was asking or it, but the

seller said that was O.K. and sold bo th he games

to Avalon Hill. Another T RAFALG AR was

auctioned of f at Origins 11 for $90.

I ad my copy in very good condition plus Ihad the counters from Dana Lombardy's copy,

though the rest of his copy was lost. I ffered t or

the highest bid over $125. I eceived two bids by

The collec.rorS market is not on ly sti ll here it

appears robe growing by eaps and bounds. At the

recenr ORIGINS '77auct ion prices or collec ror's

items were higher than ever before and another

TRA FA LCA R was turned u p a nd auctioned o//

for prices nor much less than what yo u quote

above. Wargames, as collecror's items. are indeed

viable purchases.

Gentlemen:

I am writing this letter with regards to the

availability of PBM materials to players of some

of your games. The best PBM kits that you now

offer are the PAN ZERB LIT ZIA NZI O types

where the map is reproduced n a reduced ashion.

Thus, players merely plot the positions of their

various units on the map. The beauty of this

system lies in he fact that i t is frequently not even

necessary to set-up the board and all the units

(quite time-consuming). I t is eminently possibe to

play the game just from the map, and for those

dedicated PBMers likemyselfwithsomany games

going at one lime, it frees more time for other

activities. I know this fr om personal experience-

in the last several years Imay have set up my

PA NZERBL ITZ once or twice for a PB M game.

As a sidelight. it is also a it tle bit more realistic for

a tactical commander o plot the situation by map;

he does not have the time of the strategic

commander for considering and experimentingwlth numerous strategies.

Now there are some A H games where no

PBM kit is available. In act, fo r thesegames, it s

quitedifficult to ru1eona"best"method for PBM.

slnce they contain so many variables that make

application of any set standard nconceivable. t s

best left up toth e ndividualplayerstodecideupona system that they li ke the best. Guidelines can be

provided. and options presented o be implement-

ed or rejected, but a standard system that satisfies

all players is the veritable carrot at the end of a

stick.

Games that fill this category nclude THIR D

RE ICH and PA NZERLE A DER. among others.

They both are PBMable-numerous gamers

including myself canattest toth is-but the players

themselves must decide how best to handle it,

given the options available.

What. you may ask, is the role of the

provi ding company, in this case. Avalon Hill, in

such a matter? The role of Avalon Hil l is to

have played THIRD REI CHby mail,and someo

my opponents have come by such reduced map

themselves. Believe me, i t aids play greatly.

realile that i n the case of THI RD REICH,

would take bo th sides of the sheet to include th

whole mapboard. Yet. 1 eel that that is all that

necessary. I f you give the players who ar

motivated enough t o p lay these games at all, th

basics. they wil l supply therest.They aregeneral

experienced or ingenious enough to put the piecet no r t h r r.-a- . -

As manager of the Conflict Simulatio

Society's T HIR D R EI CH PBM eague.Ieel suc

equipment would be well received and could onl

promote better PBM competition and better we

being for the industry as a whole. I only wish

could forward to you the deluge of mail tha

assaulted me when I nnounced in an ad in T H

GEN ERA L the opening of this league. I m sur

that these gamers wholeheartedly support thi

idea. I o hope that you will consider this.

Mark G. Matuschak

Uniontown. PA

Edito r's nore-PBM enthusiasrs are constant

requesting PB M kits for the latest tame

However. HY have found that due ra increas

paper an d postage costs that a PB M kit is n

lo n~ er projirahle item ra produce and sell on

ma il order basis. I n act. we come close ro losin

mone.bf on each plav-b.v-mail kit sold. We w

continue to sell kirs or the old avoriresdueta th

heneficialservice tp rovides nen' PBMenthusias

in hreaking into this particular branch of th

hobhr. However. as .you've noted yourself in h

bodbf of your letter, postal players are quick t

improvise an d once exposed o the basic comb

results and posral rechniques, hardlv needa PB

ki r to p1a.r the games posra llv.

Dear Sirs:

Often a wargame designer will sacrifice pla

balance for realism n aneffort tocreatea"youare

there" atmosphere. At times. however, this ques

for realism results n an unstable situation, wher

only b rillian t play by the underdog and mediocr

play by the favorite will result in a viable contes

Still, this is not the case with TH IR D REICH. It

secret lies in the fact that while realism

responsible for the boundaries and the relativ

strengths of the nations involved, the outcome o

each game depends entirely upon the player

personalities.

However, it appears that the figh ting abilitie

of several unit types within the nations' force poo

have been underrated. I t s well documented tha

the German Panzer division and Himmler's S

division were among the finest unlts to ente

combat during WW ll; their tanks (particularly th

Panther. Jagdpanther, and King Tiger) were i

most ways superior to anything i n the Anglo

American arsenal. Additio nally 3 R fails t

properly portray the Soviet tanks that so great

alarmed the Germans in 1941. that the latte

developed the Panther as a counter.

To overcome these deficiencies, I ropose h

following: (I ) Increase the fighting ability of th

two SS Panzer corps to 66 and that of the S

infantry divisions to 4 4 2) Beginning n Spring

1941. and cont inuing hrough Spring, 1943. allow

the German player to upgun heat tack factor (AF

of 9 Panzer Corps (a maximum of 3 Panzer Corp

per year) to 5 at a cost of 2 BRP 's per counter;(3Reduce the A F of the U.S.tank corps lo 4 bu

increase their number by 3 to 8; (4) In Spring

1942, allow the Russians to increase their tank

AF to 4 (also at a cost of 2 BRP's per counter

These changes result i n a net gain of IAF b

Germany. More importantly the German change

somewhat neutralize he vastly superior naval an

air forces of the Western Allies, which make

successful Anglo-American invasion of Franc

possible in early 1943. The Anglo-America

player must now either concentrate his invasio

forces i n Eng land while awaiting the Russia

offensive which w ill weaken the German forces

France, or start an offensive n he Mediterranea

These changes. I elieve, do not transform3Rint

a "you are there" simulation game, but rath

more realistically reflect the war-makin

capabilities of each nation as the war progresse

Jeffrey Staniszewski

Sayreville. NJ

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


PAGE 34 THE GENERA

READER BUYER'S GUIDETITLE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS PRICE $10

SUBJECT Tactical Game o f Armor Combat in the Mideast

ARAB ISRAELI WARSis the 33rd gameto As is the case with all scenario games, the

undergoanalysis in he REG and fared relatively playing time will vary greatly from onescenario o

well, placing 14th in the overall list with a the next and thelisted timeof2%hourscanonly be

cumulative scoreof 2.68. Thegamewas paced bya taken as an average figure for the 24 different

near record setting performance or Components scenarios.

which placed secondonly tothe 1.85of FRANCE.

1940. The jazzy armor and aircraft silhouettesof WHAT THE NUMBERS MEAN: Put simply, thethe PANZERBLITZfamily countersseemalways results can be considered like this: Anything

destined for good rankings and those provided in under 2.00 s pretty darn fantastic. Scores ranging

A I W proved no exception. Other strong points from 2-3 are excellent while 3's must be con-

were in the Realism category (7th best), physical sidered good. 4 through 4.5 would be considered

quality ( I th), Excitement Level ( I th ) and fair, with the upper half of the 4.5 combination

Overall Value (12th). considered poor. Anything rated higher than a 6

On the negative side A I W posted two sub indicates a dire deficiency and should merit

averagescores for their respective categories. The either immediate attempts at redesign or dropping

Ease of Understanding rating was only the 26th from the line.

best performance to date and far below the

average rating of 2.79.-although this was not

unexpected for a game as complicated as AIW.Quality . . . . . . . . 2'34

The PANZERBLITZ system gameshave become 2. Mapboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.03increasingly complicated with the publication of 3. ComponentS . . . . . .. . 1.86each new stster gameandA I W hasnot shirked its

role in this regard while introducing such new4. Ease of ' ' ' 3'31

factors as morale, guided missile echnology, split 5. Completeness of Rules . . . . 2-70move and fire, improved artillery mechanics, and 6. Play Balance. . . . . . . . . . 3.57more closely defined terrain efforts (hull down. 7. ~ ~ ~ l i ~ ~. . . . . . . . . . . . 2.31etc). The other sub par ranking was in Play

Balancewhere the game'sinnatedesign bias orces Excitement Level . . . . . . 2.51the Arabs to win with superior numbersinthe ace 9. Overall Value . . . . . . . 2.52of far better lsraeli technology. morale and 10. came ~ ~ ~ t h. . 2 hr., 15 ,,,in.weapons.

1

ARAB ISRAEL I WARS

Q . , Can you double or triple yourattack strength

(uslng the SUPPLY optional rule) when making

Overrun or CA T attacks?

A. No! Overrun and CA T attacks rely on

technique for success(and their combat bonuses),

and more ammunition does not result in more

technique. In Overruns and CA T attacks each

attack must use only one supply.

Q. Why does thegame include units (such asthe

Arab ML G minelayer) and rules (such asthe cut-building and bridge building rules that require 40

or 60 turns) that can not be used in any of the

situations?

A. Not all of the weaponry and techniques that

were important in the Middle East fighting could

be included in the limited number of situations

provided. Rather than simply ignore thesefactors.

wedecided o include hem n he gameeven f hey

weren't in any particular situation. Many players

of AIW-style games (PANZERBLITZ PANZER

LEADER) enjoy maklng up their own

situations-so we made sure such players would

have all the important Middle East terminology to

work with.

Q . When a unit expends movement points to

move fromone hex to another, in which hex is the

movement point(s) expanded? This can be

important during Opportunity Fire.

A. The movement points areexpendedwhenthe

unit entersthe new hex, i.e. they areconsidered to

heexpendedin he new hexentered.SpecialNote:

Interdiction fire attacks (Adv. Ill. ) take place

whena unit tries o expendmovementpoints, in ts

old hex before it moves.

Q. How are wrecks removed?A. A battle tank unit that starts the turnadjacent

to the wreck expends its whole movement

allowance to move one hex into the hex with the

wreck. As the tank enters the hex it removes one

stacking point's worth of wreck.

Q. I f a unit is H U LL DOWN and inan I. . (or

fort), does it get credlt for both-so 4 is added to

the die roll (for non-Soviet tank units)?

A. Yes. Additionsto the die roll arecumulativt

Q. Canaunit beattacked byopportunity Firea

it makes a CA T attack?

A. No-makinga CATattack does not countas

an expenditure of MF.

COMING UP NEXT TIME

IN DECEMBER

Q. Can blocksbebuilt in hexes hat containcrest

hex sides (but'not ridge hex sides)?

A. Yes. as indicated on the Neutral Counters

Chart.

Q. The rules say that the TI-67 gets + l o the die

roll or beingH U LL DOWN, butthe UFTsayst2.

Which is right?

A. The rules are right-the TI-67 (captured

Soviet equipment) getsa H U LL DOWN bonusof

+I .

Q. Can a unit "ball out" (Adv. 11. 8) when its

carrier is destroyed?

A. No, only i f the carrier is dispersed.

Q. Can Off-Board Artillery do Destructive Fire

attacks?(Adv. Ill. .2.a)

A. Yes

Q . When an Infantry unit makesanOpportunity

Fire attack as it 1s beingoverrun, it usesthe CA T

sectionof the WEC to calculate tsattack strength.

Does this mean that the opportunity fireattack is

2 on the die roll, like CA T attacks? (Standard.

II.E.5.g)

A. No! The CA T section is used to modify the

effective attack strength-nor the die roll.

Q . Can a helicopter move and then attack the

same turn?

A. Yes if it is face up. A helicopter unit that is

face up is no1 inverted when it moves during the

AI R PHASE, unlessa"D0WNcounter isplaced

on it at the end of the move.

Q. Can an artillery unit pre-record a " D EST or"NEUT" attack while it is still making an IN T

attack (that will end at the end of that turn)?

A. Yes

Q. Can AVLB units "pick up" bridges from

other, destroyed or dispersed AVLB units?

A. No! AVLB bridgesmust have beenunloaded

in trenches to be picked up.

Q . What happens when a bridge or a trench on

land (i.e. nor on the Suez Canal is "dispersed" by

combat ( D D or D result)?

A. It s treated like a"dispersed" pontoon bridge

(Adv. VI. E.5); a "dispersed" counter is placed on

it, it must roll or MORALE. units maymoveof f t

Q . Can pontoon bridges(Suez)ever beattack

A. Only when they are being transported ov

land.

Q. When an Israeli tank movesonehex to tow

bridge (Adv. V.D.2). does this count as its who

movement factor (for Opportunity Fire. SM

etc.)?

A. Yes

Q . Can Cobra units switch reloads like Sagg

(Adv. 11 F.9.C)?

A. Yes

Q. Are all of the situations correct?

A. No, the following changes should be mad

5-6 The "North" arrow should bepointing dow

S-9 The Egyptians should have 7 trench/cu

instead of 2.

S-I 1he"Uorth" arrou ~houlde polnungdow

S-I2 The Isrrcl17thBdeshouldhave7 M WAI a

9 Patturion, instead of the otherway around. T

lsraeli NATKE should have 3 M I I 3 A I un

instead of 3 M-3s.

A-4 Board A should be turned 180". The prop

setup is m > n A N.

A-5 Egyptian Group 8 should have one brid

placed on a cut on the canal, insteadof the MT

2.

A-6 The lsraeli bridge should beset up on acut

the Canal; lsraeli Group 8 should be set up

hoard A. Group A should have I constructi

engineer, not 2. Group C should have o

construction engineer.

Q. When using the SMOKE and SUPP

optional rules, does creating smoke count aso

of a unit's 12 attacks?

A. No! Each unit is assumed to have smo

shells in addition to its 12 attacks' worth

ammunition.

Q . Does a CA T attack count as a SUPP

attack (one of the 12)?

A. Yes

Q . Can indirect fire attacks be made aga

"DOWN" helicopters (Opt. I.C.3.c)?

A. Yes! On the WEC. note "10" applies

indirect fire attacks (except "INT" attacks).

but not onto it, etc.

AVALON HILL RBG RATING CHART

The games are ranked by their cumulative scores which is an average of the 9 categories for e

game. While it may be fairly argued that each category should no t weigh equally against the oth

w e use 11only as a general~zat~onf overall rank 8 y breaktng down a game's ratings Into ndlv~

categories the gamer 1s able to dlscern for h~msel f here th e game is strong or weak In hequal

he valuesthe most. Readersare reminded hat theGame ~engthcate~oryismeasurednmultiple

te n minutes an d that a rating of 1 8 would equal 3 hours.

2 W S & I .M .

-210

4. PANZER )ER 2.50 2.41 2.17 2.34 3.65 2.60 2.67 2.19 2.34 2.20 1

5. RICHTH( 'S 2.52 2.28 2.62 2.12 2.63 2.94 2.60 2.66 2.39 2.45

...... " .... -a. . ... a -- "a% 3,r- "'"'" " "

2 4 TOBRUK 3 1 0 2 8 5 4 6 8 2 1 3 4 3 2 2 7 7 3 0 6 2 1 1 3 0 0 2 9 6 2

3 4 3 3 7 2 4 5 4 3 6 9 2 5 6 3 0 9 4 3 8 4 5 0 3 6 0 3 5 6

7/27/2019 Ah Gen v14n3


THEGENERAL

A f inal word on contest No. 77: it turns out

that there are a few alternative solutions to the

contest, based on the "rolling supply" phe-

nomenon where a supply unit moves along,

supplying attacks as it goes. Specifically, it is

possible to "peel" the B ritish position from west

to east-instead of the othe; way around-by

executing attacks as the supply unit moveswest

to east. So don't wo rry if your solution was not

the same as the one that was printed n he last

issue-ALL entries were examined. and the

winners listed below were drawn (randomly)from among all the entries that gave a legal

solution to the puzzle.

The most common errors in the entries we

recieved: 1) AV attacks may not be "self-

justifying", i.e. each attack must be supplied at

the moment it is executed and the supply line or

that attack may not pass through the ZOC of the

unit being AV'd; 2) once a supply unit has

supplied an AV attack the supply unit must

continue to supply that attack for the rest of tha t

turn-it cannot move fart herthan 5 hexes(outof

enemy ZOC) away from the attacking units; 3)

enemy units may never stop directly on AV'd

units-they can move over the AV'd units but

may NOT stop on them; 4) in each attack, every

attacker must be adjacent to EACH defender-

so if an attacker is not adjacent to a defender,they cannot be involved i n the same attack.

The ten winn ers were: J . West, Seattle, WA;

R. Wharton, Blackwood, NJ; R. Reynolds,

Houston, TX; R. White, Cambridge, MA; A.

Lumbis, Carlisle, PA; T. Kuik, Grand Rapids, MI;

J. Munger, Crystal Lake, IL; A. Redlack, Water-

loo, ONT; L. Morrison, Arvada, CO; and R.

Goldbaum, Plaistow, NH.

Warcon IV will be held January 27-29 at

Texas A&M University in College Station, TX.

Among the Avalon Hill events planned are

tournaments in PANZER LEADER, THIRD

REICH, and KINGMAKER. Interested parties

should writ e Jerry Ruhland at hi s P.O. Box681 6,

College Station, TX 77844 address for further

information.

James Myers informs us of "The Return of

ORCCON" to be held at California State Univer-

sity in Fullerton on January 13-15, 1978.

Among the many planned events are several

tournaments utilizing AH games. Cost is $2.00

preregistration or $3.00 at the door. Moreinformation can be had by writin g Mr . Meyersat

his 13718 Norbeck Dr., La Mirada, CA 90638.

Lately, we've decided to accept books per-

taining to Wargaming for review. We make no

guarantees but if our reviewer feels the subject

matter is appropriate for the wargamer, a lis ting

and objective revie w will appear in print in due

course.

DIPLOMACY'S first book, AN INTRODUC-TION TO THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OFPOSTAL DlPLOMACYhas been published by he

Insti tute for Diplomatic Studies, Box 8416, San

Diego, CA 92102 ($16.00 ppd). Written by 11

year Diplomacy veteran Larry Peery,S&TPD is to

date the largest and most complete collection of

material available on country openings. The 376

pp., offset printed, bound volume is designed as

an introduc tion to basic Diplomacy strategy and

tactics for novice players. Included are chapters

on each of the 7 great powers, an introduction,

and a map folio. S&TPD is highly recommended

to anyone seriously interested in postal

DIPLOMACY.

II -Br~anBlume (r~gh t) f TSR presents Tom Shaw w ~ t hhe

STRATEGISTS CLUB AWARD for CREATIVITY IN GAMING wonby the AH edltlon of KINGMAKER

Avalon Hil l garnered two new awards at the

recent GEN CON X convention held at the lush

Playboy Club in Lake Geneva, WI. The Avalon

Hill 2nd edition of KINGMAKER took the

"Creativity in Gaming" award presented by the

STRATEGISTS CLUB. A similar plaque was

presented by Don Lowry to Avalon Hil l or THIRDREICH which won the "Best Game Of All Times"

accolade as voted upon by readers of C A M -PAIGN Magazine.

PAGE 3

All solutions must contain the followi

move: The Marshal must be sent to Chancery

a noble awarded the Marshal is sent to Bodw

the other three nobles must each capture o

Royal heir and no one noble can be made stro

enough to capture a Lancastrian by himself. T

Chancellor cannot be sent to Chancery becau

only w it h the Chancellor are you guaranteed

move first.

It is suggested that to test these tw

solutions against your solution, remove all

"Raid and Revolt" cards and draw al l cards weach set-up. You will note that no matter wh

Event card is drawn for the two solutions, t

captures can be made. Note: Because of t

Archbishop of York, the city of York, is friend

Hence Richard of York can be captured by a

noble able to reach the city. George of Claren

is in the open town of Cardigan and can

captured by any noble able to reach that squa

Solution #1

Neville Mowbray Grey Her

T l t l p Earl of

Essex

O f f ~ c e Chancellor of Chancellor ofEngland; or England, or Chancellor ofTreasurer of Treasurer of Lancaster

England England

M e r c r n a r v Burgundiancrossbowman

orFlemishcrossbowman

Cac,i lc Raby or Castle RtsingRichmond or

Framlingham Rockingham

Archbishop of York to anyoneOne mercenary to anyone.

1. Neville always captures Richard of York.2. Herbert always captures George of Clarence.

3. Grey and Mowbray captu re either Margaret or Edward

Lancaster depending upon the Event Card drawn.

Solution #2

Don Lowry (r~gh t) f CAMPAIGN magazlne presents DonGreenwood w~ t h plaque symboltz~ng he BEST GAME OF ALL

TIMES for THIRD REICH as voted on by the readers of thatjournal.

Northwestern University's Conflict Simula-

tion Boardgame Club extends an invitation to all

college age and adult wargamers to attend i tsmeetings every Friday and Saturday. Contact

Fred Meccia for more details (312-679-491 7).

To guarantee capturing 3 Royal heirs in

Contest No. 78, you also had to guarantee that

tw o things happen:

1. You move first. Not knowing what th e

other players hold or what Event Cards are

drawn, you may not be able to capture three

Royal heirs if you don't move first.

2. You set up your faction so that no matter

what Event card you draw during the Event

phase; your nobles wil l be i n position to capture

3 Royal heirs, one of which must be Lancastrian.

There are several possible solutions to the

contest. They fall with in two basic frameworks

with slight variations.

Neville Mowbrav

Chancellor of Chancellor ofEngland or Lancaster

Treasurer ofEngland

Archbishop

of York

Warwick Denbigh

Grey Herbert

Earl of Earl ofEssex Essex

Chancellor Chancellof England of Englanor Treasurer or Treasu

of England of Englan

Rockingham

Either Grey or Herbert is awarded Earl of Ess

and oneof the two England offices. It is preferr

to award them to Herbert as it leaves Grey free

capture Richard of York. who is more power

than George of Clarence.

One mercenary must go toei ther Nevilleor Gr

or Herbert (whoever gets the title). The oth

mercenary may go to anyone.

1. Grey always captures Richard of York Herbert always captures George of Claren

depending upon who is not given the title.

2. If the Earl of Essex is moved by Event card

Colchester, h e combines wi th Neville to captu

Margaret at Fotheringhay, and Mowbray ca

tures Edward of March.

3. If Mowbray is moved by Event Card, h

combines wit h Neville to capture either Edwa

of Lancaster or Margaret of Anjou dependi

upon his destination. Grey captures Richard

York and Herbert captures George of Clarenc

4. If Neville is summoned to Raby, as Archbis

op of York hegoes toYork instead, and combin

with Mowbray to capture Edward of Lancaste

Grey and Herbert capture Richard and Georg

respectively.

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ah gen v14n3

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