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PAGE THEGENERA

AvaUon HiCC Philosophy Part 8We would be remiss i f we did not thank all ofyou who wrote in congratulating us on the

qua lity (and quantit y) of the new games. We wishwe had the time to answer each of your letterspersonally but such is not the case. Special thanksare in order fo r the hundreds who expressed theirconfidence in A.H. products to the tune of $50orders. We hope the games brightened yourChristmas as much as your words of praise didours.

The great success of the mail order line hasguaranteed that you'll see a similar offering fromus nex t fall. I t has also ousted one of its numberby its very success. Panzer Leader has been justtoo overwhelmingly received to maintain as amail-order-only item. Its popularity has evensurpassed that of Third Reich Therefore, begin-ning in February it will be transferred to theretail line as our spring release and you can beginlooking for it in local stores. Do not hassle yourlocal dealer for the mail-order-only titles thoughbecause he'll be unable to stock them. Eventu-ally, two of the present retail games will bedropped in to mail-order-only status to take itsplace. In addition, we hope to increase the mailorder division by 2 4 titles next fall, and willkeep you posted as to progress along those lines.

The Chancellorsville special offer of a free setof original version counters to the first 500purchasers of the game has long since faded int ohistory. But tha t was so popular we decided toinstitute another bonus buy . To all purchasersof Jutland in the next month who request them,we'll include a free set of original version Jutlandrules and manual. This offer is valid only as longas the supply lasts I f well received, we mayfollow up this offer with a similar one for Anzionext issue.

Response to the announcement of ORIGINS I(our first wargaming convention) has also beenquite flattering with interest running high frommany quarters. A number of new events are in theprocess of being added sponsored by a variety ofcompanies. We've also made arrangements for aunique line of awards for each of the competi-tions consisting of hexagonal plaques. We believethese will be a long remembered and instantlyrecognized keepsake of a fine ef for t in a greatevent. We'll keep you in formed as new plans arefinalized.

But all was not roses. The new detailed A.H.catalog which we promised you within 2 weeks ofreceipt of your last GENERAL was delayed dueto press of more important matters such askeeping up to date on shipping the unexpectedhuge demand for our new games. That tookmanpower, manpower we really didn't have.Everyone, from the vice-president on down waspressed into service over in the mail-order depart-ment. Thus, the people who usually prepare thecatalog didn't have time to prepare the catalog.The effect of this delay means that many of youwill be getting the catalog when i t is alreadyobsolete price-wise. So when placing orders onthe new order form stapled within the catalog wesuggest you fol low the instructions given and add10% to the purchase price of all parts. Anyoverages will be refunded. A ll the bookcase games

were raised to $10 and al l the flat box garaised to $8.00 wit h the exception of TACTICSwhich remains at $5.00. I t will probably ta while fo r these price increases to be reflectedretail outlets but they are inevitable and we warn you they were coming. We apologize for colossal inconvenience caused by all of this believe us when we say your disappointment sgreater than our own.

The games are not the only items to feel bite of inflation . We're sorry to say that tGENERAL has held the price line for the latime. Beginning with Volume 12 new suscription rates will go into e ffect. Af ter 11 yeof operating on a $5.00 fee constantly declinin buying value while quadrupling the size of tmagazine, we've been forced to give way to riscosts. Expected postal rate hikes in the comyear were the last straw. Therefore, as of May the going rate of a subscription wil l be $7.50 pyear wi th a two year subscription available $12.00. Single copy and back issue rates wincrease to $1.50. Al l $5.00 subscriptions ceived after May 1st wi ll be treated as 4 isstria l subscriptions . Renewals received befoMay 1st will receive the full 6 issue extension

$10 subscription before May 1st will earn a issue renewal and so on.Incidentally, every month we are bombardwith complaints about the late delivery of magazine. You're in the same boat everyone e

is everyone's magazine is mai led on the saday often in the closing weeks of the secomonth. Thus, it is a trifle unrealistic to get omagazine on February 28th and expect the none to be on time a week later. I t takes a gotw o months t o get one of these things ready aif one issue is late you can pre tty much expthe next one t o be also. The mail order line cut in on everyone's time around here and igoing to take a while for us to get back normal. As a case in point, the question aanswer mail hasn't been done in 3 weeks and probably sit a while longer before we can getit Putting out 7 games at once quite naturamultiplied the volume of this mail many timWe plan to organize all the Third Reich aPanzer Leader queries into an article format the next issue so do us a favor and ho ld off your questions until then. All of the commoasked questions wi ll be covered even manythose already answered in the rules. I f you shave questions after this presenta tion then ffree to send them in.

The December General proved to be our mopopular issue yet wi th a 2.64 rating, despite thowho disliked the predominance of Panzerblmaterial. This was due in no small part to tefforts of Larry McAneny, Bruno Sinigaglio, JHamilton, and Lew Pulsipher who worked shard to make it a success. The ratings on t1200 point maximum scoring system were follows:

The Pieces of Panzerblitz . 507Beyond Situation 13 . 256Continued on Page28

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THE GENERAL PAGE

W TERLOOThe 17 4Version

THE UNFOUGH T W TERLOOby Robert S. SledgeLouis XlV of Franc e was the child of luck, bornunto the right na tion at the righ t time. F or the firsttime in many years F ranc e was at peace, within herborders and with her traditional enemies-theHapsburgs. Louis' predecessors had built roads,canals, and bridges, making France's communica-tion system the best in Europ e. And wha t it lacked ina comm on language and pol it ical system, he morethan made up fo r wi th the prestige of the Crown. Hemade his people feel tha t he-the King wassomehow a symbol of their common "Frenchness".The greatness he inspired was reflected upon themall; and it is with his usual lack of modesty th at hedeclares 'L'etat c'est moi ' (1 a m the State ).He expanded the Crown's influence at theexpense of the nobles, who had been so t roublesome

in the past. Depriving them of their politicalfunction, they were left with only their social andeconomic privileges a nd their m ilitary careers. Yetthey crowded aro und the m onarch a t his splendidnew palace of Versailles; acres of beautiful gard enssurrounding a palace that housed a court of 10,000nobles and their families, followers, and s ervants."So completely did Louis mak e Versailles the centerof French social life tha t everything else in Eu ropeseemed provincial, from the private country h ousesof the French nobles, to the courts of all othermonarchs. The proper standard of sophist icatedbehaviour for all of Europe was set here; how todress, what to read, what games to play, and whatmusic to listen to. At every court with a pretense togentility the master and mistress would ask whatVersailles did before deciding."Yet this proud picture of Fran ce and Louis XIVat their height of power and glory had onedangerous flaw. Louis was ambi t ious; ambi t ious toa fault. Not content with the natural borders ofsecuri ty on the Rhine and the Low countries, hedreamed of expansion in Italy, India, and the NewWorld; and his dream was answered by a disrupt ionin the Spanish line of succession. Louis' brother inlaw, Charles 11 of Spain, had no heir to claim thetitle of the vast Spanish possessions that includedmost of So uth and Central America as well as theprosperous Spanish Netherlands. In his will ,Charles 11 proclaimed tha t Louis' gran dson Philipwould obtain all; and when the old man died in1700, Louis could not resist temptation; hepromptly announced Philip V king of Spai.n.Almost immediately England, Holla nd, the Emp ire

and the German states wi th theexcept ion of Bavariaand Cologn e, joined in a Gran d Alliance againstFrance and Spain . It was 1701. The war of theSpanish Succession was on.It is best to step ba ck n ow and get an overview ofthe opposing powers. France and Spain in 1701were not unlike Ger man y and A ustria in 1914-theyhad interior lines of communication and couldstrike outward in several directions; Lowlands,Rhineland, Italy. T he French army was by far thesuperior and played a role to i t s Spanish al ly muchthe same as Germany was to play for Austria in theFirst W orld War . Louis XIV in his autocra cy couldplan the campaigns in all secrecy without dom esticinterference from politicians and special interestgroups. He was a rather capable st rategist , andlucky in that he had a good Minister of War

(Louvois) and several excellent marshalls; VillarsVendome, and Villeroy. The army was uniform,highly disciplined, a nd filled with an elan from pastsuccess.

The Allies, on the other hand, were looselyjoined together by necessity. They feared thedominance of France but that did not keep themfrom jumping ateach other's throat . On the seas, theEnglish and Dutch fleets were by far superior; butthe Me diterranean was still solidly French. F or thatreason supplies and co mmunicat ions to the Empirewere tenuous at best . Engl ish and Dutch t roopswere a reliable formidable force, thos e of the Empireadequate, and t roops from the Ger man states ofteninsubstantial. Th e routes by which they could piercethe French front ier were not so num erous as fi rstseems evident. An ar my of 60,000 to 100,000 men inthose days needed constant ly to move throughfertile lands. If supplies and dry forage were to bebrought along , the best way was by river or canal.As a ma tter of fact, the great rivers of Europ e werethe railways of war. Thus every major juncture ofrivers and ca nals were barred by elabora te for-tresses. And thou gh the Allies had a superiority innumbers, France began with a windfall advantage;

the vast Fortress Zone (with the key exceptionMaestricht) in the Spanish Netherlands was turnover to them before hostili t ies began.These fortresses were marvels of modeengineering. Thick walls and palisadesgu arded blarge ditch, converging fields of fire for the gunand storerooms vast enough for a years suppl icombined to give them the impression of a labattleship. If resolutely defended by its garrison

fortress could withstand an enem y force 10 timesnumber for a year o r more In addi t ion to the large fortresses the French controlled, Louis hVauban, the chief engineer of his day, construccont inuous series of smal ler fort i ficat ions alongamile crescent from Antw erp to N amu r. These "Linof Brabant", finished just in time for 1701, with thentrenchm ents, palisades, and inunda tions, faibristled toward the enemy. They were in factminiature M aginot Line. If properly backed up bfield army , it was deemed the enem y would suffer less than 10,000 casualties in just breaching the liThis 18th century war was curiously like other in the history of Western man. We migalmost call it civilized. The previous generation soldiers in the Thirty Years War were more oft

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PAGE THEGENERAthan not just a disorderly band of thugs roamingabout the countryside. Often their whole familywould travel with them; and if the opposition paidmore, it was no major obstacle to ioin the formerenemy. Brigandage and slaughter of innocentcivilians was the order of the day. Between 1618 and1648, .eight million Germans disappeared from theface of the earth. It was warfare at its worst.

The soldier of 1701 on the other hand was aprofessional. Highly disciplined and well trained,his life was valued by his officer and governmentalike, mainly because he was so expensive to trainand provide for. Issued with a percussion capsmooth bore rifle, the soldier could expect to fireeffectively no more than 75-100 yds. His chief tool ofdestruction was often the bayonet, and since ago odrifleman could get off perhaps two shots a minute,things were usually decided at close quarters. Therewere no higher formations in those days such as adivision or corps, even brigades were in theexperimental stage. And in the case of health care,his best medicine if wounded was luck; even a minorwound could prove fatal because of complications.The cavalryman was the more dashing of the lot,often a person of high birth. His main weapon wasthe sword, except inthoseunits that used a lance.

Pistols were as yet cumbersome and mostlyineffective. In addition to scouting ahead as the"eyes of the army", he could expect to reconnoiterthe enemy's line, and in a cavalry engagement-itwas sword to sword combat with the intention ofdriving the other from the field. Against infantry hewas best employed when they were losing cohesion;a cavalry attack on faltering infantry could bedevastating, a cavalry attack on unbroken infantrycould be disastrous. Timing was the key to thematter. The cavalryman couM also dismount andact as auxiliary infantry, not often employed, butdone if need be as bv the French at the Battle ofRamillies (May 23, l j06) . The least desirable dutywas massing behind friendly infantry to keep themfrom retiring, even if they were being cut to pieces bymurderous gunfire, as at the storming of theSchellenburg in 1704.

Artillery of the day was becoming more mobile,yet its effect was still less than perfect. Most often itsposition was fixed at the beginning of battle andthen left stationary throughout. Scenes of caissonsand guns bounding along to an endangered sectionof the line were a thing of the future. Grape shotagainst massed infantry could be devastating, butonlv if the gunners were backed U bv sufficient

infantry. The really effective pieces of war were thebig guns, "Hawbitzers" and mortars, used inreduction of fortresses. At the siege of Bonn, theAllies used 90 large mortars and 500 smaller guns,some with 6 and 8 inch bores, to fire day and nightfrom April through May, until the fortress and townlay in ruins. It was exactly this kind of siege warfarethat the chief strategists of the day recognizedas theproper way to conduct war. This or that fortressmight fall, and slowly the army advanced-protecting the besiegers from the opposing fieldarmy. To out maneuver the besieger and threatenhis lines of communication could suspend a siegeand cause him to retire. A pitched battle betweenfield armies was out of the question Especially sinceprofessional soldiers were so costly. To paraphrase,"War was too important to be left up to the generals,it must be waged by gentlemen".

But this very kind of siege warfare had a decisivedrawback; to besiege a fortress meant t o divide yourforces and lose all offensive initiative. Even indefense a marshal1 had to spread his troops thin togarrison all the threatened sectors. Onlv one maninT701 detected this flaw with clearsightkd resolve-and in the process left his mark upon history; JohnChurchill.The Duke of Marlborough (Churchill) was aveteran of the previous war with France, but as yethad not made his mark as a commander. But in thatvery grevious year with the French massing uponthe borders of Holland, the Dutch made a bolddecision and accepted this English general asCommander-In-Chief of all the forces in theNorthern theatre. He had very strange ideas for ageneral of his time; nothing less than the destructionof the French Northern Army in the field, and thehumbling of Louis XIV would do. In this contest ofworld wide proportions, he was every bit up to thematter of defying the Sun King.At once Marlborough seized the initiative andthreatened to pin Marshall Boufflers 60,000 troopsagainst the important Allied fortress of Maestricht.

A decision was fast drawing near-battle orretirement? The French chose to retire. Always heforged on with the same resolve to bring a decisionby arms to one great battle; but the recalcitrantDutch oppossed one of his daring plans afteranother. They were afraid to see their great army,Holland's only defense, wither away in a blood-drenched few hours, such were battles in those days.Within the space of four or five hours as many as tento twentv thousand men on each side could be

casualties. But because of these very fears French were holding their own in the Low Lawhile actually winning in Italy and the RhinelaWith the advent of Bavaria joining the FrenchalGermany and the Empire were on the vergecollapse. It seemed as ilf1500 ears of Imperial histowere about to crash down in ruins.Marlborough quickly ascertained the situatand in an epic march, cut his ties with the Chanand marched at the head of 20,000 British trointo the very heart of the continent. The Frenwere held in suspension on all fronts, mesmerizeWinston Churchill calls it, "by this scarlet caterlar wending its way across the face of Europe."Marlborough gained a bridgehead across Danube at the Schellenburg by tactics mconventional to our times than the 18th centuOut of each battalion, 130 men were handpickedlead the attack as, in what today we would c"shock troops." They literally raced ahead of main army at an amazing speed, 15 miles on broads and then to a battle at 6 p.m. as dusk wfalling. This was unheard of The defenders hthem off in vicious fighting, but this was Marlbough's intention; the enemy's attention wasriveted by this daring and furious attack that thweakened the rest of their front. Before they coremedy their mistake, Allied German trocrashed through the weakened sectors, annihilatthe defenders. Out of 14,000 men, barely 5,reached safety.This tactic of dispersing the enemy by a violsecondary attack, followed by a piercing mthrust on the weakened sector was used successfby Marlborough in all his great battles. He pinnthe French and Bavarians to the hills at Blenhe(August 13, 1704) and then crushed their center wan infantry assault followed by waves of cavalry tdispersed behind the enemy's rear, cutting retreat. Of 60,000 French and Bavarians onthe fithat morning, barely 16,000 made it back acrossRhine.

The Unfought Waterloo:Now we return to the Low Countries and cockpit of war. It is summer, 1705. Marlboroughintricate maneuvering just outwitted the Frenfield army under Marshall Villeroy and pierced Lines of Brabant. They said it would cost 10,Allied casualties. It costs less than 100.Even after this remarkable acheivement Dutch marshalls are afraid to let their magnificarmy do battle. Days creep by inexorably. The fiDeputies finally allow Marlborough "three marcwithout summoning a war council." He hopes these three marches to make a battle inevitableven for the Dutch. In scorching hot weather Allied Army swings down the road, clouds of dmarring the sky. Cavalry patrols clatter throuvillages and fields. On August 15th they pthrough Corbaix, on the 16th to Genappe and

headwaters of the Dyle. The following morning thare confidently heading north on the Brussels rotoward the small village of Waterloo.

Villeroy and the Elector of Bavaria, encampbetween Louvain and Brussels watch this movemwith amazement. He had marched clear across aaround their front and is coming on with supply asiege trains. This is madness He has cut his linecommunication with Liege against all rules military law. 'We can attack this, but it is risWell, he is coming on with a siege train-surely must e heading for the fortress of DendermonSo we will send Crimaldi with 18 battalions andsquadrons to support Col. Pasteur at Waterloo.and await events.'

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THEGENER L P GEConclusion has destroyed. T h e Allied player receives 1 pointAn Allied victory in August 1705 would have each French factor destroyed.

Marsnal vll leroy as deplcted In a painting byHyacinthe Rigaud

The Night of August 17-18; the confederateadvance guards brushas ide Col. Pas teur before helpcan arrive. Their infantry advancing by nighttoward Brussels, crowd the high road. Cavalry arelike shadowy figures emerging f r o m the misty dawn,to "amuse the French army."Surely Mar lborough is trying t o maneuvertoward Brussels. "I confess to Your Majesty tha t thechoice is very difficult, because a single false s tepdraws with it the loss of the Low Countries. T omarch toward Brussels is t o abandon the positionwhich up to this time has saved Louvain, t o stay hereis to lose Brussels and the larger par t of the countryas well. T o divide the a r m y is impossible. It isnecessary t o choose between the loss ofBrussels or of Louvain, there being n o middlecourse."Well we must sacrifice LouvainThe order is hardly given when the whole scene issuddenly transformed. A column of hostile infantryis marching upon the front-it is English infantry.They are not after Brussels because they come fromthat quarter. Masses of infantry debouch f r o m theForest de Soignies. They are a b o u t t o d o BATTLE'For all o u r vigilance we are a s astonished asMarshall Tallard b u t a year ago a t Blenheim.'Our line drawn up a r o u n d the Ysche s t reamnumbers bu t 76 battalions a n d 127 squadrons(including Grimaldi w h o is t o o far afield t o be ofmuch help). The enemy appears t o be superior in allforces (in fact 100 battalions a n d 162 squadrons)and has by his movements made us dangerouslyoverextended. Not the least of these is a large forceof the enemy upon o u r right flank, w h o threa ten t oturn us and march upon o u r rear. If they succeed inthis, all hope of retreat is doomed. We considerretreat but the dangers of a flank march a n drearguard action are too great. S o we fortify thevillages and wait.At this point there occurs a scene rarelywitnessed in the anna ls of war. T h e Dutch Marshallspronounce that the confused a n d numericallyinferior enemy are by far t o o powerful t o attack."Murder and massacre," they mut te r a s they s tandaround in a council of war. Try a s he will, withthreats, logic, and pleas, Mar lborough cannot shakethem from their obstinance. Shamefaced butstubborn, they persist until what was a weak line ofdesperate enemy, becomes a fortifcation. There isn a battle. It remains for ano the i genera t ion ofsoldiers, fighting for different reasons t o make thename Waterloo immortal.

smashed the French forces in Belgium. It was t o olate in the season for fielding another French forcethere. T h e campaign of 1706 could have well beenthe last as the Allies plunged on toward Paristh rough the fertile plains of Artois and Picardy.Instead they were faced with 8 more years of bitterconflict and an indecisive peace. Hostilities wouldcease mainly f rom mutua l exhaustion.THE U N F O U G H T WATERLOOA Game Variant using the WATERLOO board

All W TERLOO rules except those notedbelow remain the sameSTACKING Units may stack only two high(exception, see artillery rule). In a stack of two, onlyone unit may defend; if it is eliminated b o t h go.Artillery present in a stack may add t o the defense ofthe stack above a n d beyond the "only one defendingunit" limit.TOWNS (such a s Nivelles a n d G e n a p p e ) ~Infantry add 2 t o defense; cavalry a d d while intowns. These addi t ions are per unit, n o t per stack.R O A D MOVEMENT O n main roads, unitsadd two extra movement factors. O n secondaryroads (dashed lines) they a d d one extra.MOVEMENT AFTER COMBAT W h e n thedefender must a b a n d o n a square due to elimination,exchange, o r retreat attackers may move up to twounits into tha t square regardless of terrain andenemy zones of control.ARTILLERY May stack upon two other unitsin excess of the stacking rule a n d a d d to the stacka t tack ing factor. Only one artillery unit is allowedper stack above normal stacking limits.VICTORY POINTS The French player gainsdouble the a m o u n t of points of each unit he movesoff board through Charleroi o r the road tha t exits a tthe Le Haine River. These points add towardvictory a long with 1 point fo r each Allied factor he

Leading Allied stack starts a t 8 th road squajust Nor th of Ligne River, heading toward QuaBras. (All units of Allied Army and Main FrenForce cannot come o n board in one turn. Sommust be left off fo r next turn.)Example A 5-4 that is eliminated is worth fipts. to the victor. A French 5-4 th

exits th rough Charleroi o r the Le HaiRoad is worth 10 pts.A NOTE ABOUT THE DESIGN

Since there were n o higher format ions in tarmies of 1705, such as corps o r divisions, I decidt o devise units as approx imat ions . Each infanunit is roughly a composite of four battalions. Tha t tack ldefense factors a re based mainly o n tperformance and strength of various historicunits. As such 1 can't give a designation t o a unother t h a n its nationality, a n d since these are juapprox imat ions the figures c a n n o t be exact. Bufound tha t using battalions and being histomakes a lousy game-there are just t o o many uninvolved, a n d stacking gets to be a real problemAlso a key note; the action of August 18th toplace just to the north of the Forest de Soignies. Sit is assumed the French move a d a y early, and ththe Dutch aren't s o s tubborn this time

VICTORY CONDITIONS

FRENCH ALLIEDMarginal 45 pts. Marginal 60 pTactical 70 pts. Tactical 80 pDecisive 90 pts. Decisive 106 p

O R D E R O F BATTLE

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PAGE THEGENERA

DEC DE WITH D S FRIK KIORPSJ y O m a r L. DeWittIt has been eleven years since A F R I K A K O R P S

first was published. It came out in 1964, a long withthe first issue of the G E N E R A L . I still have the firsteditions of both. In those days the G E N E R A L c o s tonly $4.98. Nowadays the cost has skyrocketed t o$5. What d o we get fo r the 2c? All we get is 34 pages(instead of 12), color, illustrations, a n d five t i m e s a smuch printed material . G o n e are those %-pagepictures of Car l Knabe a n d Louis Zocchi (who isLouis Zocchi?). G o n e a r e the tips o n winning by theSage Sarge: "Smoke heavily D r u m your fingerso n the table while you whistle a tuneless off-keypiece of nonsensedur ing his t u r n etc." G o n e a r ethe days when being a subscriber t o the G E N E R A Lput you in a select group-there were only 72 of uslisted in tha t first issue. Times change.Those were also the days when the publication ofa new game was a real event. There had no t been a

new game for almost a year, a n d we would open thebox somewhat reverently, inhaling tha t special new-AH-game o d o r (second in favor only t o new-carodor). After slowly separating the unit counters, wewould start devour ing the rules.A F R I K A K O R P S a l though it has changedslightly f rom the original version, has passed the testof time. After eleven years it is still going strong. Ihave been playing it all of those eleven years, a n d 1still enjoy it. I enjoy it for the reason 1 th ink anyoneenjoys a particular game: I win mos t of the

A F R I K A K O R P S games 1 play. Other people maysay they like a game fo r other reasons, but I justcanno t see someone liking S T A L I N G R A D best ofall after he has lost 27 games in a row. I lose games,too. I recently finished a game as the Germans inwhich I did no t receivea supply unit fo r six tu rns in arow. The odds of tha t happen ing were I in 324.Suddenly those ineffective 1-1-6's tu rned i n t oattacking hordes; it was like a nightmare. But tha tmakes it interesting; the games are all different.In a decade of playing, 1 have picked u p a fewitems that may be of general interest, and I haveaccumulated (since I play mos t of my games bymail) a few "problems" tha t might be of interest.Opening Moves

Bengasi T h e 212 S .G. unit is the newest looking unitin my A F R I K A K O R P S box . While some of theother units have the printing almost worn away, thisunit is still shiny. T h a t is because it starts everygame in Bengasi a n d leaves the game after thesecond turn. All G e r m a n players 1 have seen isolateBengasi o n T u r n I. Different players have differentplans, but the a p p r o a c h I like best is a s follows:using the R o m m e l b o n u s and moving cross coun t ryf rom W-9 t o S-9, Ariete can move t o H-3 and theslower Italians to 3-3 (see Fig. I). Elements of the21st Division could be used t o completely seal offBengasi, bu t they are better employed elsewhere.The British have two options, then. They can movethe 1-1-7 o u t of Bengasi t o G-2 and a t tack Ariete a t1-5, in which case it has one chance in th ree of beingretreated t o F-3 and tying d o w n those Italians fortwo more turns. O r , they can leave the unit inBengasi, which ensures tha t two or three Italianunits will be delayed one more turn. Which is thebetter course is a decision you will have to make,based upon your knowledge of your opponen t . If indoub t , be conservative.

re 1. A c o m m o n opening move t ha t isolates Bengasi. TheBrittbn tnen have the oppor t un i t y to break ou t by movi ng to G-2 andat tacking Ariete a t 1-5 ( the only ret reat is toward freedom), o r theycan stay put and t i edow n s o m e l t a l i ans f o r one mor e turn. Note t ha t if~ h r . t . ~ l ~ a n >~ n l > r t~ d o K - 3 the A111zscdn. tccompl1~hdh l mumrlr.ls\ h\ mo\ l n r 2 2 ; to 12 thu~c~~ntroll~nr:thcrosd~~ndlorc~nrthe l t a l ~ a n s o s t op on t he escarpment a t 54.

In one game I played as the British, the Germanleft the slow Italians o n K-3 rather t h a n 5-3. If I hadattacked Ariete and rolled a n A BK 2, he could haveretreated my unit back into the pocket a t 1-2. M yresponse was t o move t o 1-2, which tied up Arieteone more tu rn , as well as the slow Italians, becauseAriete had t o protect the north.If the British keep the 1-1-7 in Bengasi, theGerman can save a little time by positioning theblockading Italians as far a long the road to Tobruchi . possible (see Fig. 2).

Figure2. Bengasican be sealed off on t hes econd turn with t w o Ital ianunl t s . S avenacanno t bea t t acked wi thout a s u p p l y uni t ; even i f t he 212S . G. survlves the 1-6 a t t ack o n T r en t a , it is pushed back i n t o t hepocket and 1s removed a t the end of t ha t second turn because ofi s o l a t ~ on .Pavia and Ariete have moved o n toward T obr uch .If the G e r m a n did no t have foresight and did not have a 2-2-4near B engas ~ , e would need three 2 - 3 4 s to cover the for t ress . Thesewould be placed a t F-5, H-4 n d 5-3.

When 1 have the British and I leave the unit inBengasi, 1 move my first supply to the front lines(usually K-18). Someday 1will have the oppor tun i tyt o move it cross coun t ry and suppor t a 1-2 attackou t of Bengasi. The 2 l s t Division In the early days,we used t o move the 21st up toward Mechili, waitfor the Italians, then force a breach in theescarpment line of defense. This often led t oGerman casualties, which can be ill afforded. T h eline of a t tack I now use is to send 21 / 5 and 21 13 plusthe supply unit and Rommel directly east. With t h eRommel bonus. they can get t o T-22 a n d T-24

respectively. O n the second tu rn , they can be soof Tobruch o n S-29 and P-29, threatening a) theof the escarpment defense line, b) Tobruch , anthe British H o m e Base. T h e British canno t coveof these threats effectively a n d will usually fall bon Tobruch , saving the Germans one riskexchange. T h e British will usually leave a 1-1-6of Mechili t o delay some Germans o r make thwaste a supply unit.T h e 21 104 unit is sent nor th o n T u r n 1 o LThis movement ties down the British units o nescarpment defense line, which are usually inpositions shown in Fig. 3. Th is nor the rn threaTobruch makes the sou the rn thrust more pote

Figure 3. A s t anda r d openlng move t o r the British. T he r e is a sunit In T obr uch , and all the 1-1-6's are a t sea.I f t he G er mans open w ~ t h a s o u t h e r nhrust , avar iat io n i s toN-20 uncovered and move a 2-2-6 to P-29.T h e British, if the German moves 211 104 nohave little choice in their first move. It will usulook like Fig. 3. When the British retire o n Tobruthey usually leave a 1-1-6 or two to delay

Germans a n d tempt them t o waste a supplyattack. The trick is t o not leave too many) to man a t tack worth while). The British a lso have t o ndecide if they want to threaten the German H oBase. What makes the decision harder is tha tonly unit usually available for such a move is 2-If the British unit issent south) the usual pa th beN-20, S-20, S-15. etc.), the Germans have thop t ions : a ) attack the unit, which is more likelysupply unit accompanies it. b) s u r r o u n d it, whdelays a t least three units for a month , o r c) isolalater with a north-south line of ,un i t s eastTobruch . Again, you have t o know your opponbefore deciding.T h e third threat of the sou the rn move byGermans tha t I mentioned is aimed a t the BriHome Base. With the Rommel bonus, the 21 / 3

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TH GENERAL PAGEbe on P-31 a n d the 2 115 plus Supply #I c a n be on S -30 on the April (2) Turn . T h e British must cover thepass at 5-34, usually by putting a unit o n K-35 o r K-36. or the Germans have a clear line to the BritishHome Base (even if the H o m e Base is protected witha combat unit, the Germans cana t tack tha t with the7-7-10 while the 2-2-12 cap tures t h e Home Base).After the British cover the pass a t 3-34, the 21 / 3 c a nstill be on the escarpment a t M-42 o n the May ( I )Turn, making another problem for the alreadythinly spread British.

T o b r u c hIn defending the escarpment a r o u n d Tobruch ,the British have to be careful t o no t ex tendthemselves t o o much. If they do , the Germans canattack a t the center a n d cut off a t least the westernBritish flank (see Fig. 4). S o m e players prefer t o no tdefend the escarpment except fo r a 1-1-6 t o waste aGerman supply. I usually defend the escarpmentwith all but a b o u t three I-1-6's, t w o of which guardthe pass f rom K-35. If the G e r m a n does bypassTobruch, he will have t o leave a very large coveringforce, which he is unlikely t o do. Also, a n exchangeor a soak-off loss will weaken the Germans

T h e emphasis now is on position, a n d play takes o na chess-like flavor. Books could be written o n endgame positions a n d analyses of them. Other bookscould well be filled with problems o n the playa r o u n d El Alamein. I find the action here intriguingand fascinating. Several of the problems deal withthis area.T h e German normally has a n acu te supplyproblem at this end of the board (unless Tohruchhas fallen); so he has to weigh each a t tack carefullyin order t o get the most ou t of each supply unit. T h eBritish have t o protect their H o m e Base a n d hang o nt o as much territory a s is possible.It is practically impossible t o give any generalrules o r suggestions of play here because so manydifferent situations can exist. Several specificsituations a r e depicted in the problems, a n d theymay be of some general help.

The End-Game a t TobruchVery often AFR IKA KO R P S is resolved a tTobruch , the British having been eliminatedeverywhere else o n the mapboard . T h e Germanproblem, then, is simply to reduce the number oflarge British units available for defense. Problem #7covers this aspect of the game in some detail.

long hau l aht. q d l e

General Aspects of PlayIsolation. Supply is extremely critical in AFR I KAKORPS I a m particularly conscious of supplybecause I lost my first game to one of my students ina game of AFR I KA KORPS after he isolated alarge g r o u p of my units. He, by the way, is still in t h e8th grade.

Figure 4. Before the first reinforcements arrive, the British cannotdefend much more of the Tohruch escarpment than shown here. 1-25is the key. Ifthe Germans can attack and move on t o 1-25, British unitswest o f Tobruch are effectively cut off; it will take them two moves toget Into Tobruch via G-23 and G-24. T o keep fromgett ingcut off, theBritish may have to defend only from hexes G-24, H-25, and H-26from the beginning.When I have the G e r m a n side, I drive the Britishback into the fortress of Tobruch , leave two 2-3-4'sto cover it, and move the rest of the Axis a r m y o ntoward Alexandria. If 1ever had a chance a t a 3-1 o nTobruch, I would take it a t tha t time, bu t tha topportunity has never come up.Tobruch is the key for a G e r m a n victory, a n d heshould not lose sight of that. However, a low-oddsattack on Tobruch a t this stage of the game is veryrisky; any sizable loss can be crippling. If theGerman attacks now a t low odds, he is turning

AFRIKA KORPS i n t o a dice game.As the Germans move closer t o the British H o m eBase and threaten it, the British will sometimesweaken the Tobruch garrison to reinforce the HomeBase troops. T h e Germans should watch theTobruch garrison; it may get low enough t o take. If

all British units are o n land, a n d if n o reinforce-ments are due, the Germans have t w o turns t o driveback to Tobruch a n d a t tack it before it can bereinforced by sea. T h e 21st a n d 15th PanzerDivisons can be u p t o 4 3 hexes f rom T o b r u c h whenthat garrison is down t o three o r four defensefactors, and they can get back (using the road a n dRommel bonuses) a n d a t tack a t 3-1. The Germansshould lw ys keep this in mind (so should theBritish); the cap ture of T o b r u c h early, while n oguarantee of success, is a great help.I El AlameinAs the British retreat o n their Home Base, theaction changes while it funnels t o El Alamein. Sincethe area is constricted, movement is not the majorconsideration it is o n most other areas of the board .

Figure 5 .4lthouph the 22 ids unit I ~sulatcd t the \tart o f ~tsturn . 1a n m o \ e ad ~accn t 021 3 and besuppl led lrom thcsupply unltat theend of its mbvement and before combat via the dottkd path.

A unit tha t starts a tu rn isolated can, dur ing thecourse of the movement portion of the tu rn , becomesupplied. This act will normally commit him t oattack, however (see Fig. 5). If the British unit inFigure 5 had been a 1-1-6, it could have a t tempted t obreak o u t of isolation by moving adjacent t o Paviaand attacking a t 1-3, n o supply being needed. If theattack resulted in A bk 2, the 1-1-6 would have hadt o be retreated out of the isolation pocket.In not all cases can an isolated unit break o u t byitself (see Fig. 6). T h e British unit here can break o u tonly if outside units attack, a n d the surroundedBritish unit could participate in the attack only if itstwo attack factors would bring the total of theattacking factors t o 10 o r more (which would give 5odds surrounded o n Bologna).Supply lines are a n impor tan t corollary ofisolation. Supply lines c a n n o t be drawn th roughhexes where the supply unit itself could not,eventually, move. Therefore, it is possible for asupply unit adjacent t o a c o m b a t unit t o be unable t osustain the a t tack of the combat unit because ofenemy zones of control (see Fig. 6). There are o ther

Figure 6. In this situation, the 9 A / 18cannotattackandcannot bout of isolation by itself. It could move to hex A a n d thesupplycmove to hex B, but the supply unit could not sustain the abecause of the German zones o f control. The supply line cannwhere the supply unit itself cannot go. The supply unit could nmove from B to A the German units being where they are); ssupply line cannot run from B to A .situations where, a t first glance, you might thsupply is impossible (see Fig. 7). All four Germunits in Figure 7 can be supplied by the one supunit because the Automat ic Victories o n the tBritish units negate the British zones of control. Tsupply unit could actually move in a straight lover Pavia a n d 7 A / 2 a n d s t o p o n Ariete; therefothe supply line can be drawn to Ariete, and151 115.

Figure 7. The one German supply unit can supply all four Axisbecause the British zones of control are ignored as s o o n a s AutomVictory is established.

Automat ic Victory (that flash of genius f rom TShaw) isano ther very impor tan t aspect of AFR IKORPS It is a constant worry of the British. Tthreat of Automat ic Victory c a n be minimizedsome cases, a l though it often requires cannfodder. In Figure 8 the Poles cannot be attack(unless the Germans can move units a r o u n d frthe south). Those G e r m a n units tha t move o n t oescarpment must end their move there. It is possit o get a n Automat ic Victory against 7A/1 ,German units c a n n o t move through the hex tBritish unit is o n because the Pole zone of conextends in to tha t hex, and the Germans couldmove through the Pole zone of control. TGermans c a n n o t s t o p o n top of 7 A / becauserules prohibit that. And , of course, combat canoccur between units o n E-18 a n d F-19. As a resthe Germans can get a n Automat ic Victory o n 7Abut c a n n o t attack the Poles a n d they cannot mpast the Poles.

Figure 8 Although a n A u t omat ~cVictory can be,achieved ag7A / the Poles cannot he attacked.

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PAGE 8 TH GENERA

Figure 9. For the Poles to be safe here, another British unit wouldhave to be put on F-19. Otherw~se, n Automatic Victory could beachieved against 7A / a n d a c e m a n u n i t moved to F - I9 to attack thePoles.Problem #6 shows a n example where the 2 S A / 7is safe f rom attack unless a n Automat ic Victory canbe made against the 9 A / 18 nd 501 151.In less confined areas, the British must be readyto sacrifice more units if they want t o s l o w down the

German advance. In Figure 10, the British needthree units t o protect one and s t o p a n y Germanadvance. It is not often that the British canafford t osacrifice so many units, but when time is extremelyimpor tan t , it can be bought in this mannei . Thisdisposition of units i s more effective t h a n stackingthem in fewer hexes.

Figure 10. 11the 51 19 is to he safe from attack, three buffer units areneeded. (If 5 1 / 1 0 had been one hex to the left, t he5119 would not hesafe from attack.)Conclusions

Many people put down AFRIKA KORPSsaying it is not a very good simulation. If tha t reallybothers someone, perhaps he should try a n o t h e rgame. T h a t criticism has never meant very much t ome. I a m interested more in the game: Is it achallenge? Is it interesting? 1 would say tha tAFRIKA KORPS is both.Another criticism of the game is tha t t o o muchluck is involved in the outcome. There are fewerunits a n d fewer battles; so, the ou tcome of one battleis much more crucial t o the ou tcome of the game

another. And a third example is illustrated inProblem # I . But these are only some examples. Ifthe German player (and t o some extent the British)keeps in mind tha t the direct approach is not alwaysthe shortest, many other examples will presentthemselves in the course of play. When AFRIKAKORPS is played in this manner , luck is minimized,and the game itself is much more interesting t o play.FRIKA KORPS can be reduced t o a dice game,but it certainly does not have t o be. A fine wine canbe drunk with a n anchovy pizza, but it does not havet o be.

Introduction t o Prob lemsIt is entirely possible tha t some readersdisagree with my solutions t o these problems. And o not discount the possibility that better solutiare available. However, all of these problems cau p dur ing the course of my games and the outcoof the games was brought t o a happy conclusiohost cases directly because of the solution providYou'll f ind the solutions t o these problemspage 12

Prob lem 1

statement is true, the problem is more often than notcreated by the players themselves in their approachto the game. Many German players will makeattacks freely at 2-1 and 3-1 a n d be, usually,disappointed by the game's end. While the Germansmust make attacks, they c a n often win position byfinesse. They can maneuver rather than bargestraight ahead . In AFRIKA KORPS perhaps morethan in any other game, Liddell Hart's concep t ofindirect approach can be put into practice. T h eopening German move t o the s o u t h tha t poses threeproblems for the British is one example. T h eGerman fork of Tobruch/British-Home-Base is

AXIS: 151115 ,15 /8 , Supply-L12; 15133-L14; 2113 T h e German s have only two supply units a t-L37 1 104-M20; Ariete-117; Trenta-G15; start of their May (2) 1941 Turn . 21 / 5 has just bBresica-F15; Supply-Q32; 2115, Rommel-037; isolated by the British o n their May (1) T uBologna -M 17 Pavia-Ell . Savena is o n W-3, a n d British supply #2 is o n thALLIED:9A/20-G18; 22 Gds-H21; 7A/2-K23; Home Base.41 15-N26; 7 / 3 1Mot-H25; Supply-Tobruch; 41 / 7 What is the best G e r m a n move?-035; 213-M36; 41 11-438; 7A / 1-039; Pol-537.

than it would be in, say, BLITZKRIEG. ~ h i i khe I

P r o b l e m 2The time is Oct . ( I ) , 1941. Savena is o n W-3, a n dBritish Supply #2 is o n 5-62. T h e British Novemberreinforcements arrive in two turns. What is the bestGerman move?

Prob lem 3 the British, where d o you retreat the attackers anwhat is your move? (British units no t shown: 7 AO n the M a y (2), 1941 Turn , the German 21 / 5 o n K-35, Po l a n d Supply #1 o n 5-37, a n d Supply #and 104 plus Ariete have a t tacked 9 A / 2 0 a n d 41 / 5 o n 5-62, German unit n o t shown: 21 / 3 o n M-49ana t , believe it o r not, 2-1. T h e result was A bk 2. As H o m e Base is garrisoned.) British unit not show

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THEGENERAL PAGE

Problem 4T h e time is Sept. (I) , 1941. In Tobruch , theBritish have 213, 717, 714, a n d Supply # I . T h eGermans have Supply #3 on G-22, Supply #I on L-22, Tren ta o n H-26, Brescia o n G-24, and theirHome Base is garrisoned. What is the best German

nnvr?

5T h e time is Dec. ( I ) , 1941. Rommel is o n W-3.No other British units are o n the board, bu t theyhave all their November reinforcements available:two units with a defense factor of 4, three units witha defense fac to r of 2, a n d eight with a defense factorof 1. What is the best German move?

Experimental Panzer ontinued f rom age

the German turn ; a Russian engineer unit mignite its own hex, b u t may not move onturn i.e., it mus t remain in that hex andsubjected t o fire attack a t the beginning ofnex t turn.

In ConclusionT h e war on the Eastern Front, 1941-1gave t o history the te rm scorched eartStrategically, scorched earth was a meansdenying resources t o the enemy by widesprself-inflicted arson. These experimental optiorules for PanzerBlitz are in tended t o simulatepolicy o n t h e tactical level, as a means of denyterrain t o the enemy. From Sherman's Marchthe Sea t o the napalming of Viet Nam, milihistory records many examples of arson as a wof waging war. T h e proposed rules, with suitmodifications, might b e applicable t o any tactscale game o n twent ie th century warfare.forest fire scenario for Outdoor Survival malso be developed. related issue is the quesof the effects of smoke o n the battlefield.PanzerBlitz t h e wreck counte rs depict a burnvehicle. Players might wish t o experiment wthe following optional rule: T h e smoke fromburning wreck obstructs the Line of Sight duthe entire Turn following t h e Turn in whichcreated. We could also th ink about the effectwind direction and velocity b u t thaqu i te beyond the scope of this brief article.

ONTESTT h e Russian player has chosen t o defend inopen in front of Moscow t o a t tempt t o ga inanottu rn of replacements. As the German you minitiate a n a t tack plan that has thegreatest chancresult in German units adjacent to Moscow a tend of the turn. However, if you feel the cost ofattempt a t the former t o be prohibitive merely ma n attack which presents you with the mfavorable attri t ion ratio. This ratio is defined a shighest ratio of Russian t o German probable fa

losses, count ing Russian units which mightsur rounded a s lost. Regardless of the optionchosattention should be paid t o maintaining the mfavorable attri t ion position. German units may obe placed in the shaded attack hexes. All othersconsidered inaccessible due t o neighboring Russunits. Indicate your placement of Germa n unitswriting their combat factors in the desired hex,in the proper place o n the chart below.AVAILABLE G E R M A N FORCES: 47,41,46, 6 R , 57 ,44 , 24, 39, 56 Armor; 2 , 2 6 , 2 8 , IR,3R. 4 R , and 5R Infantry.

T h e en try form for Contest No. 64 may e foundthe Reader's Response Page.

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THE GENER

RICHTHOFEN S WARANALYSIS

how to use the last MP depends on the range of B TTLING THE RED B RON ex~ ect ed ttack When ~ndoubt. consult the tabby David BottgerRichthofen s War is the finest game available onaerial warfare and one of the best wargames evermade. Its clean mechanicsand realistic, comprehen-sive rules allow players to rapidly confront the samestrategic and tactical problems confronted by pilotsin World War 1. Despite its quality, however,Richthofen s War has received relatively littleattention in the General. No one has attempted tosystematically analyze the decisions faced by R Wplayers. Specifically, the Allied player typicallyfaces two difficult problems: (1) how to cope withGerman superiority in firepower, and (2) how toproperly use Allied advantages in maneuverability.This article will discuss these questions from theviewpoint of the Allied side, although what is saidmay be applied by the German player as well in

appropriate situations.German Superiority in Firepower

In a number of scenarios and throughout thecampaign game, the Allied player is badly out-gunned. Most players soon realize this. But it is im-portant to know how large the German advantageis. This information can aid greatly in the initialselection of tactics and in the implementation ofthose tactics. The source of Allied inferiority infire-power and thus the logical starting point in dis-cussing this area is the Target Damage Table.As it appears on the box sleeve, the TDTprovides little tactical guidance. It gives only therange of possible results, which may be misleading.Each player, and particularly the Allied player,needs to know how much damage he can expect toinflict or absorb in a certain attack-that is, theexpected or average damage.The tables which follow supply this information.The four tables, labeled A, B, C and D, correspondto the four columns of the TDT. The numbers alongthe top of each table represent the range in hexesfrom the attacker to the target aircraft. The numbersdown the left-hand side of each table list the possiblemodifications to the die roll from the use of aces, theoptional deflection rule, o r both. To illustrate, whenan ace fires at a non-ace from any direction,disregarding the deflection rule, 1 sadded to the dieroll. Thus, the I row is used. An ace firing at ano n-ace from the side, using the deflection rule, woulduse the 0 row. A non-ace firing at an ace from theside, using the deflection rule, would use the -2 row.By cross-indexing the range in hexes and theapplicable die roll modification wo numbers arefound. The top number is the average number ofdamage points inflicted in the attack. The bottomnumber is the percentage chance of a critical hit. Forexample, a Nieuport 17 uses column C of the TDT,so it uses Table C. Fir ingat an Albatross D-111 headon at a range of 3, givinga die roll modification of 0,yields on the average 1.25 damage points and acritical hit 8 of the time. If the Albatross returnsfire, Table A gives an expected result of 1.58 damagepoints on the Nieuport and an 11 chance of acritical hit.The tables provide a clearer picture of Alliedinferiority in firepower. Allied planes using columnC of the TDT (which includes the Sopwith Triplaneand Pup, Nieuport 17 and others) are about two-thirds to one-half as effective as German planesusing column A (all important German fighters). To

DieRollMod.

ieRollMod.

T BLERange2 3

3.00 1.9419 14

2.42 1.4214 I11.89 .978 8

1.39 .616 6

T BLE CRange2 3

T BLE DRange1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I 1.89 1.11 .67 .53 .50 .31 .I91 4 1 1 8 8 8 6 3

Die 0 1.39 .78 .39 .31 .31 .I7 .08Roll I 1 6 6 6 3 3 0Mod. 1 .97 .50 .I9 .I7 .I7 .08 .03

compound this deficit, German planes generallyhave damage factors, ranging from 10 (FokkerTriplane) t o 15 (Roland C-11). In contrast, manyAllied planes have low damage factors, e.g.,Nieuport l l a t 6, Nieuport 17 at 9, FE-2 at 7. Ofcourse, some Allied planes (Snipe, SPAD 13) havehigh damage factors, but this is little consolation tothe pilot of a Nieuport.A cursory examination of the tables providessome tactical guidance. It shows first that there is nogeneral principle covering the situation where,under the deflection rule, a player has the choice ofusing his last movement point to increase the rangeof an expected enemy attack next turn or stay in thesame hex and turn one hexside, thus forcing adeflection attack. As an example, suppose an Alliedpilot battling a Fokker D-VII has 1 MP left of hismovement allowance. He can use it either toincrease the minimum range of his opponent'sattack in the next turn-segment from 1 o 2, or allowan attack at range but force a deflection shot.Table A tells what he should do. Increasing therange from I to 2 reduces expected damage by .89,from 3.89 to 3.00. Forcing a deflection attack atrange reduces the expected damage by .78, from3.89 to 3.1 1. Thus, the Allied player should use hislast M P to move, not turn. But if the Allied player isat range 3 with 1 MP left, he should turn rather thanmove an extra hex. Forcing a deflection attack atrange 3 reduces expected damage by .47, from 1.58to 1.11 lncreasing the range from 3 to 4 reducesexpected damage by .41, from 1.58 to 1.17. Clearly,

The second bit of tactical advice which cangleaned from a glance at the tables is that possibility of a critical hit should not affect pmuch. Cri tical hits are exciting when they occur a definite advantage to the player who inflicts thebut they occur rarely. In a normal situation, withaces in the air, an attack using column A of TDT, at range 1, with no die roll modification, give a critical hit only 19 of the time. On Tablethe chance of a critical hit normally will not exc14 . Therefore, players should not overemphascritical hits, although the Allied player is usuamore likely to suffer one.A more detailed examination of the tables gimore specific advice. In the Campaign Game, Allied player cannot trade shots with his opponenAlbatrosses with much hope of success. A sinNieuport 17 firing at a n Albatross D-I11 at rangdie roll modification 0, can expect to down Albatross in 4-5 firing turns (112.42=4.However, the Nieuport will be destroyed in German firing turns at the same range (3.89.2.31). Add to this the Nieuport's low amunition supply of 6 and the Allied player hbetter find some tactic other than shooting it oThe tables can even help dictate tactics specific scenarios. A more detailed analysisrequired for this purpose. Assume Scenariotactical bombing, using the last Advanced Lematch: 2 Sopwith Pups versus an Albatross C-V aan Albatross D-111. The Allied player has thdistinct options. He can attempt to destroy the D-first, then go after the bomber. He can attack bomber with one Pup and try to hold off the fighwith the other Pup. He can finally ignore the fighand attack the bomber with both planes.Under option I (destroy fighter first), the battack the Allied player can hope for each turn ishave one Pup firing at the D-III's tail and the otat its side, each a t a range of 1 hex. Table C tells ththis will, on the average, inflict 4.31 damage poiper turn, assuming use of the deflection r(2.42+1.89=4.31). At tha t rate, the D-I11 will destroyed in 2-3 firing turns (1 1+4.31=2.55). At same time, the D-111 should inflict between 7(3.89 2) and 11.67 (3.89 3) damage points. Twill probably cripple or destroy one of the Puleaving the other Pup to battle the C-V.The surviving Pup will need 4-5 turns (1 12.42~4.54) f optimal firing position to destroy C-V. Translating this into movement of the bombthe C-V will be able to expend 51 movement poifrom the initial attack on the fighter to tdestruction of the bomber. The bomber can expe24 MP's during the 3 turns the Pups will probabneed to destroy the fighter, and an additional MP's before it will be shot down. In addition, Pups will be able to begin their optimal attacks the D-111 only after 4 turns of climbing, giving bomber an extra 32 MP's. By these rough figurthe C-V will have 83 MP's before it is shot dowThis is more than enough MP's to bomb a clotarget hex such as V-19 and exit the board, givithe German player at least a 9-4 victory.This illustration is based on a number assumptions that favor the Allied player. It assumthat all attacks were made at range 1 and minimudie roll modifications. If the Pups attacked a t ran3 instead, they would need 5-6 firing turns to destr

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THEGENER L P GEthe D-II l(1 l t 2.1 4= 5.1 4). I t assumed that the D-111would not dam age one of the Pu ps enough to renderit ineffectual, then turn o n the othe r Pup . It assumedthat the Pups could shift their attack from thefighter to the bomber without wastinga turn . And itassumed that the C-V would not inflict significantdamage on its pursuer. Under more realisticconditions , the Allied player has even less chan ce ofwinning.Opt ion 2 (one Pup a t tacks each Germanaircraft) can be analyzed in the same way. The Pupthat do gfights with the D-111 should be destroy ed in2-3 turns (10+3.89=2.57). Th e D-Ill can thendispatch the other Pup in anoth er 2-3 turns. Thisgives the second Pup 4-6 turns of fire at the C-V,during which the C-V will suffer from 9 hits todestruction (2.42 4 = 9.68; 2.42 6 = 14.52). If th eAllied player destroys the C-V and can exi t with onePup, he will win 6-4. If both P ups aredes troye d, theGer man playe r will win 8-6. So he Allied player hasa chance under option 2 but not a great one.

Under option 3 (b oth Pups atta ck bomber), the1Pup s will need 2-3 tur ns (I 1-4.31=2.55) of op tim al'f ire to down the C-V. But the Albatross D-Ill willdestroy one of the Pup s in abo ut the same time, ascomputed under option 1. If one of the Pups isdowned before the C-V, the surviving Pup will haveto shoot down th e bo mber before falling to th e D-111itself. At the least, however, the two Pups shouldinflict extensive damage on the bomber before oneof them is downed, giving the other Pu p a goodchance of finishing the C-V and exiting the boar d.Thus, op tion 3 appears to give the Allied player thebest chance of victory.One qualification should be inserted here forqompleteness. Interestingly, s ome aircraft can beput o ut of action without actually being shot down.Inflicting I I hits on a D eHavilland 4, Albatross D-11, or Pfalz D-Ill will reduce its speed belowminimum and force it into a glide. Thirteen hits on aRoland C-11 will do the same. S o in analyzing ascenario as above, the players should realize thatforcing the enemy into a glide may be sufficient towin a scenario, and should ad just their calculationsaccordingly.

Allied ManeuverabilitySuperior maneuverabili ty provides two advan-tages: it allows the pilot to reach a firing positionand it allows him to avoid enemy fire. To theoutgunned Allied player, the main value ofmaneuverabili ty is to avoid and thereby negateGerman firepower.A look a t the Aircraft C apabili t ies Char t revealsthat most Allied fighters are more maneuverablethan most G erman fighters. Of the 16 Allied planesdesignated as fighters on the AC C, 5 use ManeuverSchedule B, 7 use C (almost ), 3 use D, and I usesE. Fou r of the 9 Germa n fighters (almost ) use B, 3use C, I uses D, and I uses E. How ever, while it isrelatively easy for th e Ge rman to use his firepower

advantage, the Allied maneuverability advantage ismore difficult to exploit.Unfortunately, this is the one and only areawhere R W falls short. The simple but i l logicalsighting rule allows a fast plane to use its speed tocompensate for a lack of maneuverabili ty, ratherthan keeping speed and maneuverabili ty in theirproper places in the game. Basically, the sightingrule requires t hat the firing aircraft spend its last 2MP's with the target in its field of fire. Thisrequirement represents the time a pilot needs toaccurately aim his guns. But the rule as i t s tandsimplies that the time a pilot needs to aim his gunsdecreases as his aircraft's sp eed increases.An example will best illustrate this point. Eachturn represents I0 seconds of actual time. If a planeis travelling at a speed of 10 MP's per turn, each M P

represents second. For a plane at this speed, the 2M P sighting requirement converts int o 2 seconds. Incontrast, a plane flying at 4 MP's per turn, so that 1M P equals 2 seconds, needs the equivalent of 5seconds to sight i ts target. .The same plane, at aspeed of 8, would need only 2 seconds for sighting.There seems to be no logical reason why a pilot'ssighting time should decline as his speed increases. Ifanything, sighting time should increase with speed.Of course, the designers of R W may have based thesighting rule on considerations other than logicalsymmetry, perhaps to promote ease of play. Butlogically, the rule is untenable.Admittedly, mere illogic does not make a rulebad. But the sighting rule unjustly favors lessmaneuv erable planes (generally German ) whileharming more maneuverable ones (generallyAllied). The advantage of maneuverability is theabili ty to change direction a t a low M Pcos t. A fasterplane can compensate fo r poor m aneuverability byits speed. So far, no 'problem. However, when thefaster plane increases its speed it should logicallyhave to spend more MP's t o sight its target. In otherwords, speed should not be a substitute formaneuverabili ty. Speed and maneuverabili tyshould each provide a distinct advantage, as eachdid in World War I . Faster planes can cover morehexes per turn, allowing them to join c ombat fasterand escape pursuit if necessary. In a dogfight,however, speed should be a relatively slightadvantage. There, the m ore maneuverable aircraftshould have a n edge.The solution is to change the sighting rule from afixed numb er of MP's to a num ber that increases asspeed increases. Sighting should require a fixedfraction, say one-half o r one-third, of the firingaircraft's M P allowance for the turn. Adopting thisrule would restore speed and maneuverabili ty totheir proper positions. As a footnote, this sugges-tion comes from SPI's lying circus a gamemarkedly inferior to R W in all other respects.

Keturning to the game as i t s tands, there areways the Allied player ca n use his maneuverability .Unlike his inferiority in gunnery, however, theAllied player needs more than an intuitive un-derstanding of the problem. The diagrams whichfollow show more systematically th e uses and limitsof maneuverabili ty. There are 5 diagrams, cor-responding to the 5 Maneuver Schedules. Th e arrowin the center of each diagram represents the positionand heading of the plane whose Maneuver Schedulecorresponds to the name of the d iagram. Forexample, the arrow in diagram A represents aplan ewhich uses Maneuver Schedule A. The num ber ineach of the other hexes shows how many M P's theaircraft represented by the arrow must expend inorder to fire into that hex. In other words, a hex withthe num ber 10 in i t means that the aircraft in thecenter of the diagram m ust expend 10 MP's to reacha position where it could fire at a plane in that hex.

Diagrams A, B, C and D ar e cut in half because left slde of these diagrams is a mirror image of r~ gh t lde. This is not true of Diagram E, whappears In full.

The uses of these diagrams should be obvioReturning to a familiar example, Nieuport 17Albatross D-111, if the Allied player knows Albatross can expend a maximu m of 8 MP's inupcoming G erman turn, he can avoid the Albatrofire by moving to a hex with a n umber above 8. TGerman player can do he same in his turn, but usdiagram C instead of B. The diagrams show tgeneral ly , the b es kp k e to be to avo iden emy f irdirectly in front of the enemy plane. Unlike actual war, being on the enemy's tail does guarantee safety in the game. This is so becamovem ent in R Wis sequentia l, while movement real dogfight was simultaneous.

Players using the diagrams should keep oimportant fact in mind. Simply because an eneaircraft has a m axium speed of 8 does not mean t

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2 THE GENERALaircraft can expend only 8 MP's. A plane canincrease its M P allowance by 2 for each 100 metersor less that it dives. An Albatross D-V, with amaximum level speed of 9, can expend theequivalent of 15MP's by diving 350 meters in a turn.The Allied player must be especially wary of thispossibility, since he cannot afford to give theGerman player many firing chances. Obviously, thesolution for the Allied player is to stay above theGerman aircraft. If the Allied planes are 250 metersor more above the enemy, they cannot dive to reacha firing position since diving even 50 meters wouldput them out of range. As in the real war, altitudecan be crucial in R W . And fortunately for the Allies,many Allied fighters have high climb rates.

ConclusionRichrhofen s War portrays World War 1aerialcombat realistically. This should give the Alliedplayer some encouragement-the Allies didwin thewar. Beating a competent German player will not beeasy, however. The Allied player must make themost of his advantages in maneuverability andclimb rate, while negating the potentiallymurderous German firepower. In addition to theadvice already given, the Allied player must followone more rule: be patient. Implementing the advicegiven in this article will require time, objectivity andprecision. Perhaps these three qualities best definethe harrow line between aggressiveness andrecklessness which the successful R W player mustfollow. J

Force or Finesse ontinued from Page 15We hope to have shown t hat Finesse, the use ofless than maximum possible odds, can oftenincrease the chance of success. Sometimes acombination of high and low odds attacks, whichadvantageously utilize th e uniq ue two line results ofthe Tournament Game Battle Results Table, canachieve more than an even sprinkling of mediumodds attacks. And sometimes the Ger man must useForce, and Hit as hard as possible. DeterminingWhether to use Force or Finesse is a challengethroughout the game

Solution for Problem 1If you attacked, I do not think you made the besrmove. The Germans have only two supply units onthe board; so it is best, other things being equal, toThe 21/ 5 is in no danger this turn.roach is to threaten ra the~ommend this move:

Pavia.TrentaBolognaSup. #I15/33. . . . . .. . . .avena

. . . . . . . . .518, 113; Sup. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ommel(Rommel cannot be isolated)

21/3 to M-48 means that the o r ~ i ~ s have LUabandon 3-62, their Home Base. It cannot bedefended by the Poles; so the supply has to be pulledIf the British maintain their isolation of 2115, theiii ans, at the very least, will eliminate more thanone 1-1-6 for their supplv unit. but more probably

The Poles and 7A/ 1 soak off against 2115 a-ieteat 1-6.The rest of the units attack 211104atI . Even if 9A/20 and 4115 are lost in an exchangAriete and 21 / 5 are doomed. The German cannget an automatic against 213or the 22 Gds, althouhe can come close. Since the surrounded Axis uncannot be in supplv before the combat portion of t. .+-.rnbegins. they are eliminated. Tobruch. Ife.

S on to Problem 4Thf 5 was moved to L-58 for an Autom~ctory n 5 1 / 10. Ariete then could move to M-Bologna on M-58 soaked off against the three 2-6's at 1-6 odds. 1518 went to 0-58 for an AutomatVictory against 51/29, letting the rest of the 15Division (33 and 115) go to 0-59. where th

attacked 717 S.G. at 5-1.2113 covers the right flaat 4-57. while Pavia and 21/ 104take on 70123 at58 (odds of 5-1).What makes this mo i lat Arieteded to the attack on 51 10 and does not have,,tack the stack of 2-2-6's. At the end of combthen, the three 2-2-6's are isolated and effectiveeliminated, since supply cannot get to them. Nmatter what the outcon~e f the 5-1 attacks, tGermans should have little trouble mopping up

Solution to Problem 5.the British would face isolation soon themselves At first glance, it does not seem that ththe main force of the Axis enveloping Tobruchthink the above move is very good and shows how ucrma ave enough to thdelaying 7Ai 1 and assault the British Home Basthe threat of futllrp attacks is more effective than However, with the Rommel bonus, Supply #2 caimmediate comb get to 3-42 and sustain Ariete and Savena surrounk g 7A/ at 6-1. The rest of the Axis force can nomove on toward El Alamein. Pavia (with Rommboost), 21 3, and 211 104canget a 7-1 against 7A/1518 and 115 can surround 717 S.G. at 5-1. Th104; Supply 3 allows Supply#I to move to M-60. And for thecou2113, 15/33 de grace, 21;'5 moves with the Rommel bonus to KAriete, Pavia 62 to take out the Home Base garrison at 7-1. 15/3Bologna )uld go back to Tobruch and help seal it off.l5/8, 1''Sup.k 4. . . . . . .

My British 01his Oct. ( I ) Turn, vnly lnlrrcriangru LIIC Y A t o auu9A/20 units.On my Oct. (2) Turn I fell back onTobruch with h;the panrer divisions and retreated the forward ncItalians to 5-38. The Tobruch assault was split intotwo groups: firs: a 1-2 of Trenta against 9A/ 18 (sothat a roll of I or 2 would allow the following 3-1 to nsible:advance into Tobruch), and second a 3-1 of Brescia, 1) Work on eliminating one large unit per tu15th Division, and 2115, 104 against 717 and while losing as little as possible in the necessa2SA/4. Even if the worst were to happen, the soak-off. In this example, it is possible to get aGermans could bring up the rest of its force and on the 717 (3-3-7) and soak off with a 3-3-10 at 1attack at 3-1 on the Nov. (1) Turn. (The 3-3-10 is used so that if it ever gets back intoThis play is a bit more risky than I normally lil game as a replacement, it can get to Tobruch fasteAt worse, the Germans could have lost a crippli There arc now "only" four 4-4-7's left available18 attack factors in taking the fort. (As it was, they ' ~ e ritish, plus some 2-2-7's. The Germancan kelost 10 to the British 6. That had to be weighed this until the British, or he, are worn down.against the value of Tobruch and the other attack 2) Attack two defending units at 1-2 and follpossibilities open. Decisions of this sort are also that with a 3-1 or better attack on the third defendaffected by the quality of your opponent's play. This will give the attacker two chances in sixUsually, the better your opponent, the mo being able to move into Tobruch after theyou have to take. attack. In this example, 714 and 213 can be attackat 1-2 by 15133, 115, Bologna, and SabratSolution to P. . ...3 (Important note: the attackers on the 1-2 must toi~ tnore than eight, which is exactly one-half of

~ r ~ r r u rll three units to H-21. ':fenders3 value. If the attacker has exactly eigThen move the following units: 7P e defender need remove only one 4-4-7 inprotect the Home Base. 41/ 5 and 2/3 to 1-2 hat would defeat the purpose ofand 22 Gds to G-21. 7A/ 1 e 7/7can beattackedat4-1. Iftheor"2", Tobruch falls with the

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THEGENERAL PAGE

FORCE R FINESSEA s tudy of German tactical alternatives in Batt le ofthe Bulge.

v Dr. J . Michael Robinson

In the article o n BATTLE OF THE BULGE(Vol. 9, No. 6, p. 11-12)Jerold T h o m a s describes thestrategy of creating Unit Hunger through Rein-forcement Delay. In coining these colorful phrases Ifelt M r . Th o mas displayed remarkable insight in tothe overall strategic picture confronting the G e r m a nin his early Bulge moves. However I agree with theeditors th a t the plan he offered in illustration wassomewhat lacking in the practical applicat ion ofsound tactics. Stimulated by his creative tu rn s ofphrase for the strategic problem, we would like tooffer a phrase th a t we believe illustrates the essenseof a recurring tactical choice facing the G e r m a n inBulge, Force or Finesse?Mr. T h o m a s attempted t o accomplish 5 goals:I) Reinforcement Delay of the 4th , 99th , an d2nd U.S. division,2) o r th o d o x elimination a n d / or surrounding ofthe equivalent of one division-elements of the 106thand the 14th Cav.,3) the usual 8-1 treatment of 9 / C C R ,4) t o carry the O u r fo r planned breakthrough o nturn 2,5) an d mo s t importantly t o delay the 28thdivision.I basically agree with these goals b u t feel th a ttactical improvements can be mad e th a t greatlyimprove overall chances of success.T h e improved tactical deploym ent in each battlesituation is discussed in detail t o illustrate thebalancing of Fo rce an d Finesse. T h e 10 place Play-By-Mail To u rn amen t Game Battle Results Table isutilized fo r these detailed discussions since percent-ages a re abstracted straightforwardly. Also remem-ber that a l l optional rules a re in effect.

O u r discussions support ing specific battle-options a re involved an d often hinge upon preciserule interpretations conjunctive to the unique two-line C R T . In particular important points have beenrecently reitterated a n d / o r clarified in The GeneralVol. 10, No.'s 1 & 2, Question Box: the ambigui-t y ( ~ )n the rules regarding retreats an d ad v an ces .should be reconciled by using the to u rn amen t C R T. . rules. T h e contrary rule(s) in th e appendix ofthe Battle M an u a l should be ignored.Battles & 2 against the U.S . 4th DivisionTh e 3-1 Force attack against 418 guarantees theReinforcement Delay of the 4 th Division byblocking the direct road to Diekirch, an d forcing a tleast 4 / 12 an d 4 / 16 t o take the longer route t o th esouth . T h e 1-1 th a t M r . T h o m a s proposes against4 / 8 utterly fails t o prevent the entire 4th Divisionfrom flooding in to the crucial a rea s of the center ofthe board 30% of the time. This could be increasedto 2 / 1 without risking exchange, b u t this still entailsan unnecessary 20% chance of failure to delay the4th Division. Fo rce is necessary to guarantee thedesired result, and 3-1 is the most economical forcelevel.In order t o provide infantry fo r a possibleexchange in the a t tack o n 418, it is necessary t oextend the a t tack frontage to square UU30. Th isentails so me sort of soak-off against the remainingunits of the 4th Division. R a t h e r th an limit o u rthinking t o a perfunctory 1-2 against 4 / 12 f r o mUU30, which would be easy enough, we haveemployed a degree o f Finesse and converted the

soak-off into a significant a t tack in its o wn right,capable of probable d amag e actually greater thanM r . Thomas's main attack . We have selected 217Panzer for th is task, an d VV30 for the jump-offpoint. E N G A G E D here might well result in theeventual destruction of both 4/ 12 and 4 / 16, while CONT A C T will effect further Reinforcement Delay o n41 12, by preventing 4 / 12 f ro m moving o u t a t theroad movement rate. Meanwhile a n E N G A G E Dresult will impose n o restruction o n 217, whosepanzers can withdraw a t will. Note also the use of150 Pan ze r in TT30. In the event of E N G A G E Dagainst 418 this unit will likewise be free t o pull o u tand co me in o n the undoubled flank of 4 8 in S S 3 1,o r perhaps SS32. We feel th a t these tactics of Forceand Finesse against the 4th Division maximize itspossible Reinforcement Delay, while employingforce levels consistent with pressing needs in othersectors.Battle 3 against 91 C C R

Th e usual 8-1 Force against 9 / C C R is employed.Since n o E N G A G E D is possible we d o n o t needpanzers, so the 116th an d 2nd panzer grenadierregiments a re employed with the infantry to mak eu p the attack .Battle against 281109 (and the rest of the 28thDivision indirectly)Th is a t t ack can be said t o employ Finesse in th a tless th an max imu m Force is used with a view toen t rap and delay the remainder of the 28th Division.Although a 7-1 o r 8-1 o d d sa t tack co u ld be obtainedthe 6-1 was chosen because of the 40% chance of DBACK 4 in addit ion t o 40% elimination (includingexchange). Th e most desired result is not elimina-t ion , o r an 8-1 Force would have been employed,but the D BACK 4 - A A D V A N C E 4 (or 3). O ncloser inspection of a D BACK 4 result one canenvision the 281 109 optioned either across the ClerfRiver to ward Wiltz o r in to Clerveaux; the la t ter isthe best. (Th e American does n o t have choice ofretreat a t M M 2 8 which is not a n intersection.) Intwo cases the A A D V A N C E would put Germanunits in M M 2 7 , contro ling the vital westward ro ado u t of Clerveaux, an d in M M 2 8 an d in M M 2 9breaching the Clerf River. With the A A D V A N C E 4the German units could be placed o n the river andro ad squares LL27, LL29, and M M 3 0 , which sealsthe fate of the 28th and thoroughly breaches a nimportant defense line. Trailing units must beplaced to insure the containment of the 28th. Noticeth a t n o attack has been mad e o n 281 110since any DBACK would only help free this U.S. unit (i.e.retreat through blocking terra in is possible whereasnormal movement is not). 1161310 in 0023 prevents281 110 f ro mreach in g M M 2 4 by NN24, b u t 1161310still threatens to move intoBastogne,if not blocked.M r . T h o m a s treated 281 109 and 281 10 with 2-1attacks, obviously t o cause Reinforcement Delay byE N G A G E D while avoiding E X C H A N G E . Th is hasa 30% chance to delay each unit, o r a 9 % chance todelay both. If Mr. Th o mas was lucky en o u g h to getE N G A G E D in both battles o n the first turn andapparently try t o surround an d eliminate these inthe second tu rn , this would result in a much slowerpush through the center.Battles & 6 against 1061422 & 1061423A t first glance it might seem th a t there is little todistinguish between the positions of these two ill-fated American regiments in the Schnee Eifel. Th u smany German comanders treat th em both the same,hit both with 3-l's, and curse their luck when theyget engaged. However, close examination of thepeculiarities of the situation of each reveals th a tthere are significant differences in the way each

affects the German offensive. These differences co u t fo r different means of handling each. Tquestion is whether t o use Force o r Finesse?106/422 is the only unit th a t is actually inposition to effectively delay the German advanthe only unit between the German s and St . ViTh u s a 5-1 surrounded Force attack is modesirable here because no E N G A G E D is possibMAIN APPROACH

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TH GENERAL PAGE 1Although the CRT rule says not into an enemyZOC, the square is already occupied by a friendlyunit and should be allowed as a reinforcement.Force or Finesse?

Cont inued o n age 2LTERN TE PPRO CH

THE HIDDEN S I D E TO THE COMB T M TRIXb y J P. Connol lyProfessor Connol ly mans the School ofEngineering and Engineering Experiment Station atAuburn University rom where he has witnessed theadvances in wargaming over the past ten years.Although not an avid commercial wargamer, Mr.Connol ly has done considerable research on gametheory, especially in reference to matrix techniques.His cha l kboardpresentation is a definite mustforthose who wish t o excel at I77 and other gamesusing matrix CRTs .There has always been debate among game

designers and players over the use of combat resultstables (CRTs) in wargames. Naturally, such tableshave been developed from the results of the conflictthat is to be simulated. Thus, mistakes, personalopinions, luck, political decisions, strategic consid-erations, and general lunacy have all contributed tothe CRT for any conflict.

Though everyone would agree some of thecontributions must be retained for any semblence ofhistorical accuracy, the CRT concept is stillrelatively inflexible. Primarily, it robs the wargamerof strategicltactical assessment of the value ofobjectives. Where the field commander could put apremium on gaining or holding land, the wargamerhas been at the mercy of the CRT. If it said retreat,he had to retreat.

The combat matrix concept provides theopportunity to use past results and yet give theplayer increased decision capability. The matrixgives both the attacker and defender the option ofseveral choices, or strategies, in each combatsituation. When these are matched through thematrix, the results are obtained to that combat.

A typical combat matrix is shown in figure 1forattackerldefender odds of 1:l. The use of such amatrix appears simple and removes dice, but anunderstanding of the math behind such a matrix canallow the wargamer to improve his tactical control.There is a method to selecting the choice on a giventurn, and this method can account for differentassessments of the worth of combat objectives.

Attackers Choice

Shaded area isattacker results

Matrix Results:A Attacker RetreatsD Defender Retreats-1 AttackerIDefender lose one Unit

FIG. 1. TYPICAL COMBAT MATRIX

Let us first examine the tactical consideratiofacing a wargamer. On defense, or attack, hobjective is land, time, or enemy causualties,some combination of the three. Of these, casualtiare readily quantifiable, thus land must be quantied in terms of troop units to insure compatibilitydecisions. This process is done in the initassessment of a specific situation by the wargame

The next step is toevaluate the potential playsterms of this assessment. Returning to the matrixfigure 1 let us examine the effect on player selectiof matrix choice (one thru four) as the evaluationthe worth of land in the initial assessment vari

If we first consider the value of the land partthe objective as one unit, then retreat is ratedand enemy retreat as +I. The payoff of the combmatrix in terms of the defender then becomes thatfigure 2 (note: payoff gains-losses). Game theostates that the best mixture of choices by tattacker to assure minimum loss is 3:O:O:l. Thathe should play his matrix choices 1and 4 at the ra3:1, and should not play choices 2 or 3 at all. Tdefender, meanwhile, to maximize his gains, shouplay 0:0:3:1. Game theory also tells us that if boplay these optimum mixed strategies for selectitheir choices, the defender will win, on the averag114 unit per play. Conversly, the attacker waverage that loss. But should either differ from theoptimum mixes, the results will be less winnin(defender) or greater losses (attacker) on taverage. The strategy ratios are shown inremaining figures on the right and bottom of tmatrix.FIG. 2 Attacker's Choice

his is the strat

VALUE O F THE GAME 1 4 UNIT TODEFENDER Values are given for the defenderCOMBAT MATRIX FOR RETREAT 1 UNLOSS

If land is assigned zero value as an objective,matrix becomes that of figure 3. The win/loss is nzero for either player.FIG.

COMBAT MATRIX FOR RE1

VALU

'RE AT

IE O F TGAME

0 UN

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P GE

game. 1 have established what I believe is anexcellent disposition of the British forces.

May DeploymentBurgoyne's troops, starting at St. Johns inCanada, are the easiest to deploy. Using yourbateaus, you immediately transport ten StrengthPoints (hereafter designated SP) to lay siege to FortTiconderoga. Move (by land) your single Indianunit also to Fort Ticonderoga. Do not risk a 1-1attack this month as there is still time to wait foryour slower moving artillery and supplies to catchup with the main force. Two S P from St. Johns willThe American Revolution, with its multitude of accompany the artillery and supply units travelingskirmishes, battles, and campaigns, offers the down the west side of Lake Champlain. Thewargame designer and player alike a wide selection remaining two SP will wait in St. ohns for theof conflicts from which tochoose. Avalon Hill, with supply unit scheduled to arrive at ~~~~~~~l n June.its release of 1776 has enabled us, as wargamers, to hi^ unit at st . ~~h~~will also deter the ~~~~i~~~recreate most, if not all, of the maior conflicts of this militia entrenched at M ~ . ndependence fromstormy period. One of the more interesting of these venturing north and interfering with your arrivingengagements was the British offensive of 1777 inNew England, presented as a scenario in 1776 supply.known as the Saratoga Campaign. The original

British operation ended in a dismal failure, but I Deploy the units in New York City in thebelieve that a British commander, with proper following manner: Eleven SP and the artillery unitdisposition and coordination of the forcesavailable, should move to and attack the American fort atcan win this conflict in almost every encounter. But West Point (the artillery cannot participate in thebefore going into the details of my plan, a little attack without a supply unit, but is placed there forbackground is necessary. the future defense of the fort); eight SP and onesupply unit will move to and attack Fort Constitu-

tion; fifteen SP and one supply unit will make a seaThe Original Campaign landing on the coastal hex located southeast ofThe British strategy was to launch a three- Princeton and south of New York City; one SP willpronged attack in New England, intending to seize move to the hex immediately south of West Point,the Hudson River Valley and split the colonies in leaving one s p to preserve your entrenchmenttwo. General John Burgoyne, who had originally marker in New York City. The units attacking Fortconceived the plan, was to move south from Canada Constitution and West Point should occupy thesevia Lake Champlain*while Genera1 Howe forts after the defenders have beeneliminated. If thewas to move north from New York City, Joining American has left his unit at West Point inside theBurgoyne at Albany. A third column under Colonel Fort, peel off one S P of the attacking force and sendSt. Leger, up the St. Lawrence t up the west side of the Hudson River. It can thenLake Ontario, land at Oswego in attempt a forced march to capture the unguardedconjunction with Iroquois Indians and Tories, at ~ l b ~ ~ ~ .sweep down the Mohawk Valley to unite with theothers at Albany. This was an attractive plan, and if The third force, from Oswego, will not material-executed well, could have meant an early end to the ze until St. Leger and his supplies arrive in July.budding revolution. Unfortunately, with typicalBritish coordination, General Howe's force (nowunder General Clinton) failed to continue itsadvance and returned to New York. St. Leger'ssmall group was turned back by Benedict Arnold's May Analysisadvance. (He was still a good guy at this point in Now, what have we accomplished? In the northtime ) Burgoyne and his 5,700 men now found we have ensured the fall of Fort Ticonderoga in thethemselves surrounded by an American force of coming month of June. The defenders cannotmore than 15,000. He had no choice but to escape, nor can they be reinforced. The militia unitsurrender, thus ending the British hopes of securing at Mt. Independence cannot penetrate into the fortthe New England colonies. As a direct result of this to aid the defenders and cannot go north because ofaction Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point were the larger British unit. To remain entrenched wouldevacuated; Clinton abandoned the Hudson high- be certain destruction. The only viable alternative islands; and not the least important result was that to run off to the mountains for safety.France, delighted by the American victory, recog-nized the independence of the United States, aforerunner of her active participation in the war. In the south we have captured two forts withoutloss. (Be sure to make only the first at tack on FortThe New Campaign

Despite the crushing failure of Burgoyne's plan,it still remains a good one in theory.'Given anEnglish commander of any competence, I believethe original plan, with only slight modification, hasan excellent chance of success. As in most games ofskill and maneuver, the opening moves are criticaland generally dictate the course of the rest of the

Constitution supplied so that you may keep yoursupply unit.) The units assaulting the coast areprepared to move on Philadelphia, crossing either atCooper's Ferry or McKoney's ferry. They alsodirectly threaten the Americanforce at Morristown.The unit south of We