Africa's Thirty Years' War: Chad, Libya and the Sudan, 1963-1993 by J. Millard Burr; RobertO. CollinsReview by: Dawn M. HewittCanadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol. 35, No. 1(2001), pp. 179-181Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Canadian Association of African StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/486361 .

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus 179

Investments, Ltd (NAIL), the black-led business consortium that has attracted other prominent South African lawyers like Cyril Ramaphosa, the former trade union leader and ANC secretary-general once touted as a possible successor to Mandela. (Ramaphosa has since left NAIL and is now chair of the Black Economic Empowerment Commission.)

The stories contained in this book provide excellent examples of the contradictions and ironies of apartheid, the struggle against it, and the transition from it. The stories confirm the importance, in South Africa as in tropical Africa, of the stratum of mission-educated Africans in leading the nationalist struggle. While Bantu Education, from the mid-1950s, eliminated mission education, the need of the growing economy and popu- lation for black professionals continued to propel young black men and women, especially children of teachers, toward legal careers. While many such lawyers labored in obscurity in practices dominated by divorce and injury cases, the circumstances of South Africa under apartheid gave many of these lawyers the opportunity - often taken up at great personal cost - to achieve prominence through political representation. The fact that apartheid severely limited educational and professional opportunities for blacks has ironically worked to the professional advantage of many of these lawyers in the post-apartheid era as many of them have been thrust, at relatively early stages of their careers, into positions of great power and remuneration. (Lest the reader attribute this simply to affirmative action, I should add that I have also observed such relatively rapid advancement among my university-educated white friends in South Africa.)

Black Lawyers, White Courts provides a compelling and readable introduction to some of the harsh realities and strange ironies of life under apartheid. It will prove useful to undergraduates and specialists who wish to gain an understanding of the lived experience of apartheid for black professionals.

Thomas McClendon Southwestern University

J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins. Africa's Thirty Years' War: Chad, Libya and the Sudan, 1963-1993. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999. 300 pp.

This survey of the thirty years' war among Chad, Libya, and Sudan argues that the war resulted not from ideology or religion, but from individual, even imperial motives, the same motives, in fact, that have propelled conflict in the region since the Romans. And similar to Roman times, conflict flowed along the trade routes and involved securing key oases.

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I80 CJAS / RCEA 35:1 200oo

Instead of camels and scimitars, the warriors carried AK-47s and revolu- tionized the use of armed Toyota 4x4s. Also, as the region's figures of the past, Habre, Deby, and Qaddafi were fighting for strips of wasteland of little economic value.

The thirty years' war started with Chad's independence and President Tombalbaye's poor administration of the Arab north, which fomented a rebellion. Sudan and Libya were unable to resist intervening in Chad's civil war, particulary Qaddafi, who saw an opportunity to expand Libya's borders. The result was thirty years of conflict in Chad and the impover- ishment of the country. The war ended when President Deby took power in 1990 and, through the International Court of Justice in 1994, secured Qaddafi's agreement to vacate Chadian territory (the Aozou Strip). Throughout the war, the French spent the three decades sending and with- drawing troops.

Since the book is ultimately about war, the number of mistakes it makes regarding military matters is distressing. To cite one example, USCENTCOM (Central Command) is not responsible for North Africa and Chad (165). USCENTCOM does cover Egypt and the Sudan, but North Africa, to include Chad and Libya, falls under USEUCOM (European Command). Further, An RC-135 is not a refueling plane (nor a tanker, the proper term) (165) but a signals intelligence aircraft. And the authors do not have a clear understanding of the capabilities of the AWACs (169, 173, 185), an air weapons control platform that does not provide detailed reconnais- sance of ground troops. In addition, the US strike force against Tripoli came from not only RAF Upper Heyford (202-03), but also RAF Lakenheath and the attack on Benghazi by aircraft from US Sixth Fleet. And although the planes left England the night of 14 April, the attack was carried out on 15 April (209).

The text cries out for a good editor, first, in order to eliminate the duplication that too often occurs. For example, in one paragraph, it is announced twice that the Foreign Legion 2nd Parachute Regiment was departing Chad (52). Second, more careful editing would have ensured that all the dates were correct. The number of misprinted dates is truly confus- ing. We are told Abatcha fled Chad after independence, but resurfaced in 1982 and was seen in Algiers in 1965 (38). Presumably, the year 1982 was meant to be 1962; 1985 is printed as 185 (198), while 1989 is related as 1889 (239). Third, the appalling number of typos should be corrected, one exam- ple of which is FROLINAT suddenly becoming FROLINART. Nor would it hurt to rewrite such strange phrases as, "given the impersonal technology of Soviet tanks and the all-seeing one-eyed Libyan pilots" (135). And last, while there are several maps, even a couple more would be helpful to the reader. In particular, the book needs a map of Kordofan and Darfur, which

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus 181

featured prominently in the war. Despite the errors in regard to the military, an incredible amount of

research was put into the text. The book's great strengths are the details of the interpersonal relationships of the ruling elites of each country, in particular those of Chad, as well as a description of how the various tribes and ethnic groups interacted. The discourse on the leaders and the politics of the 1980s and early 1990s is well done; it is obvious that this is the area with which the authors are most comfortable. In the end, the authors' thesis about the causes of the war is persuasive as a result of the presenta- tion of those personalities.

Major Dawn M. Hewitt United States Air Force

Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: James Currey, 1999.

In a 1994 review of Jean-Francois Bayart's The State in Africa (London: Longman, 1993), Christopher Clapham identified Bayart's central argu- ment as "Africa works." In borrowing this phrase for their title, Chabal and Daloz reveal their indebtedness to Bayart, Clapham, and the extended African studies community. It is all the more amusing therefore to read their insistence on the individuality of their arguments, described as "substantive differences with most current interpretations" (1).

Their central point that Africa works is both intriguing and probably valid, in that if the system did not benefit elites, doubtless it would not perpetuate itself. In other words, it does not help our understanding of African politics to describe the continent as retarded, dysfunctional, or otherwise inoperative. This perspective represents a welcome contrast to the pervasive afro-pessimism found in the media and academic accounts. Still, Chabal and Daloz's normalisation of current African politics ignores the fact there are many who do not benefit; trickle-down patronage, like trickle-down economics, is not inclusive or equitable.

Of equal concern, reform-minded political activists do not appear in this narrative. Chabal and Daloz dismiss them summarily as saying merely what the donors want to hear. When they are briefly present, they are accused of merely continuing a "politics of the mirror" (117) - saying one thing and doing another - a claim more commonly heard from (ex- )Rhodesians explaining the black mentality to naive westerners than from serious researchers. Chabal and Daloz miss Bjorn Beckman's point that whatever our criticisms of political liberalisation are, basic, liberal, rules

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