A WOREING DOCUMENT:

QUANITIFING GENOCIDE INTHE SOUTERN SUDAN

1983-1993

by

MIlard Burr, Ph.D.

October 1993

This paper was written by Millard Burr. a retired U.S. government official and a consultant to the U.S.Committee for Refugees. It is based on his experience as director of logistics operations for the U.S. Agencyfor International Development (USAID) in Sudan from January 1989 to March 1990, and subsequent in-vestigations.

For a review of the history of the Khartoum displaced, see the author's Khartoum's Displaced Persons: ADecade of Despair. U.S. Committee for Refugees Issue Brief, August 1990; and Sudan 1990-1992: FoodAid Famine and Failure, May 1993.

@ 1993 American Council for Nationalities Service

PREFACE

More than 1.3 million southern Sudanese lost their lives between May 1983 and May1993 as a direct result of civil war and the malign policies approved by a succession.ofKhartoum governments--that is the conclusion of this paper written by Millard Burr for theU.S. Committee for Refugees.

It is tedious reading. How many different ways can one say with freshness that"thousands died" in this location or that? Still, it is a story that must be told.

Attention to Sudan's humanitarian tragedy runs in cycles. The media on occasiondiscover the disaster, humanitarian efforts are racheted up, administrations prepareresponses for questions at Congressional hearings on Sudan. Even the Sudan governmentresponds at such times. It offers relief agencies improved access to the victims, promisesto simplify bureaucratic obstacles, curtails bombing villages and markets, engages in peacenegotiations.

But when the spotlight moves on, the only consistency is that of southern Sudanesedying avoidable deaths in incredible numbers. The government is not alone in creating thisoutcome. In the last two years, fighting between southerners has also been a major factor.But even that violence is played out in a context created by a government that has chosen toview its southern citizens as its enemy.

Mr. Burr did not create these numbers: these sources are profusely documented. Hehas collated them and displayed them to tell the gripping, horrible story.

Some may choose to quarrel with this fact, or that, with one source or another.That's fair, but changes nothing.

The basic message remains: more than 1.3 million men, women, and children, whocould have been among us still, are gone.

Roger P. WinterDirector, U.S. Committee for Refugees

LakeI EG Y PT N06 RE.D

I /

L I LBY A -------------- - --.sEA -2a2

usTRN

Atbare

CHAD I --.- 11Kharto uM 0 Kassala

KORDOFAN- DARFUR

Kuturn Wgd edoni

14 - acom 6kashowa reareq

.: El Fasher El Obeid .-

En Nahud. ** .

0 FulsEd o*; Sobenuse KodugI

wCe .-. UPPE R -z

.4,1 Mlkai ' E T H I 0 P I Aj

- CENTRALO - -

REPUBLIC 'e. Ko te

46. B0e t *P1 **--.Tail Post

'B eWIIu * UALTORIA

C 200 300 mles17T I y* ot

A10 o0 ZAIRE K ENYA -

~ view . ~ op..,o

S UD ANNational Capital- IntArnational Boundary

Regional Capital - e.ional Boundary

. Cities and Towns -- Provincial Boundary.

- %ailroad

F22S: April 23. 10

I. OVERVIEW

Since May 1983, a civil war has raged in Sudan. For more than a decade, a succession ofSudanese governments, dominated by riverine Arab clans of the Nile Valley, have carried outunremitting warfare not only against the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), butagainst the civilian populations of southern Sudan as well. The civilian population--Africanrather than Arab--has been attacked militarily and bombed indiscriminately; its major citieshave been dominated and its inhabitants corralled by callous military commanders and theirunprincipled Sudan People's Armed Forces (SPAF). Khartoum governments continuallyused food as a weapon of war, ensuring that SPAF troops garrisoned in the South would befed even while the civilian population starved. Indeed, when the abid (slaves)--assoutherners are called by much of the Arab populace--sought to escape war or famine byfleeing to the North, they were often attacked en route by Arab civilians and militia. Thosekilled number in the tens of thousands. Rapes and kidnappings were common; incidentsinvolving the sale of young children by starving mothers (choosing the only way to ensurethe survival of their progeny) numbered in the thousands. Rather than suffer suchtreatment, hundreds of thousands would choose (and many died seeking) a safe haven innearby countries. While the South endured a decade of war, it also suffered a series ofdroughts, floods, and infestations, and it was only thanks to the United Nations, the Westernfood aid community, and international nongovernmental organizations that hundreds ofthousands of southerners were saved from starvation and disease.

Year after year, successive governments employed policies that spread terror anddestruction throughout southern Sudan. For those who have studied this decade of despair,there can be little doubt that the various governments ruling in and from Khartoum haveeither been active participants or silent partners in the slaughter of hundreds of thousandsof African Sudanese. Consequently, analysts have argued that the governments were guiltyof genocide--as the term is defined by the 1948 United Nations Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: 1

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed withintent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, assuch.(a) Killing members of the group;(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about itsphysical destruction in whole or in part:(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Indeed, the depredations have been so great and the incidents so many that therehas been extensive speculation on the number of deaths involved. The range begins at an

1

absurdly low figure of 259,000 deaths declared by Sudan's governing RevolutionaryCommand Council in October 1989; in contrast, most writers use 500,000 to 600,000deaths attributed to the war in the South, even though there has been speculation that thenumber exceeds a million. 2

Given this wide discrepancy, the author has attempted to quantify the disastrousconsequences of what has been called Sudan's Second Civil War. The author now believesthat more than 1.3 million southern Sudanese lost their Lives as a direct result of a decade ofcivil war and its consequence -- the malign policies approved by a succession of Khartoumgovernments.* To place the loss of 1.3+ million lives in context, Sudanese populationexperts generally agree that, despite the problems with the 1983 national census, at thetime of the outbreak of civil war there were nearly five million southern Sudanese located inthe South (comprising Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal regions).

The Dinka ethnic group, largest of the myriad cultural entities that made upsouthern Sudan, accounted for about one third of its population. 3

Regardless of whether the South held either one-fourth or slightly less than one-third of Sudan's total population (as southern politicians claimed), the 1983 data areimportant in light of later claims of genocide and estimates of deaths resulting from thesecond civil war. Given the regional population growth rate of 3 percent in southern Sudan,and taking into consideration the present sketchy population estimates of 3.2 millionsoutherners residing in the South and 1.8 million found in displaced camps in the North,the natural increase one could have expected in the South's population in the period 1983-1993 has simply evaporated. Thus, when the numerous atrocities carried out against thecivilian population are added to the number of deaths by starvation and disease, it is theauthor's opinion that in the last decade the death of at least one infve southern Sudanesecan be attributed to the civil war and government policies. Certainly, the war and theconsequent population movements of large numbers of rural southern Sudanese has causedutter dislocation in -- if not the ruination of -- the South itself.

* The estimate of 1.3+ million deaths is hardly the last word on the subject, nor should it be.There are hundreds of Sudanese and expatriates who have worked in southern Sudan who maywish to provide more detail to this study or challenge its assessment including the thesis that aseries of Khartoum governments have carried out a policy of genocide vis-a-vis the Africans ofsouthern Sudan. Such efforts are welcome.

2

Table 1Southern Sudan Population

1983 Census

Upper NileProvinceUpper Nile

Jonglei

Bahr al-Ghazal Bahr al-Ghazal

Buheirat

Equatoria Eastern Equator

Western Equato

BentiuMalakalRenkNasirSobatFanjakAkoboPiborBor

Subtotal: 1,722,000

Raga 50,000Aweil 182,000Gogrial 585,000Wau 170,000Yirol 212,000Rumbek 352,000Tonj 295.000

Subtotal: 1,846.000

Ppulati354,000151,000127,000221,000

52,000149,000202,000113,000353,000

ia Juba 217,000Yei 370,000Torit 237,000Kapoeta 241,000

ria Tombura 107,000Yanbio 93,000Maridi 132,000

Subtotal: 1.397.000Total For Southern Sudan: 4962.000Grand Total For Sudan: 20,181,000

(95.7 percent rural)

(95.6 percent rural)

(88.0 percent rural)

Source: Population of the Sudan and [ts Regions, 1983 Census, Population Studies Center, University of Gezira, May1984. Note also, Population and Development in the Sudan: The Quest for National Policy, 3rd National PopulationConference, Khartoum, 10-14 October 1987, page 3.

3

II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

With the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, the first Sudanese Civil War, pitting the government

forces of the Arab north against the Anyanya rebels of the African south, came to an end.

That war was estimated to have resulted in the deaths of a half-million southerners.4 The

People's Local Government Act of 1971 and the 1973 Constitution were to have ensured a

decentralized government and a form of home rule in the South. However, peace between

the regions would not last long. A short-lived mutiny of southerners enlisted in the

Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) erupted at Akobo, Upper Nile region, in 1975.

The rebel group, which took up the name Anyanya II, fled to the bush and began to use the

Ethiopian borderlands as a safe haven. The next problem emerged in 1976 at Aweil, Bahr al-

Ghazal region, where southern troops mutinied because of disputes involving pay, the

removal of southern units to the North, and failed efforts to have southern officers lead

southern units. In the years to follow, the Nimeiri government chose to neglect the

problem caused by Arab raiders of the Rizayqat ethnic group, who by 1980 had crossed the

Bahr al-Arab (to give the river Kiir its Arab name) in large numbers. Driven by drought in

northern Sudan and the subsequent search for more pasture land, the Arab cattle nomads

(baqqara) penetrated deep into the Dinka homeland in Bahr al-Ghazal.

Great dissatisfaction followed the dissolving of the Southern Regional Assembly in

1980 by Sudanese president and dictator Jaafar Nimeiri. Southern trust in Nimeiri wasfurther strained when his government reneged on its promise to hold plebiscites at Abyei

district in South Kordofan, and at Kurmuk and Chali el Fil districts in Blue Nile; theplebiscites would have permitted residents to decide whether or not regional boundaries

would be redrawn to allow their re-incorporation in southern Sudan. Problems were

especially acute in Abyei district where Arab raiders, called Murahileen, of the Missiriya tribe

began to attack Dinka villages. Missiriya pillaging became so widespread that an Agency forInternational Development project in Abyet District was terminated in 1981. For some

Dinka, Sudan's Second Civil War began in 1981 when villagers from the Winejok region,Bahr al-Ghazal, were attacked 30 kilometers south of Abyei by Missiriya Arabs. TheMurahileen killed scores of Dinka and drove off at least 3,000 head of cattle. 5

Ominously, by 1982, many of the Arab raiders were well armed and bragged in Abyei

village that they had received automatic weapons from "important friends" in the North. Itwas an open secret that arms were being funneled to the Missiriya. General Babu Nimr,who was married into the family of Sudanese politician Sadiq al-Mahdi, and was a leader ofthe Missiriva nazirate centered at Muglad in South Kordofan, was directly involved, andMuglad district soon became an important nexus of militia and Murahleen operations.Throughout 1982, Murahileen raiding continued along the Bahr al-Arab, and by the time areconciliation conference attended by Rizayqat and Missiriya Arabs. Dinka leaders, and thegovernors of Kordofan and Darfur was convened at Nyala, South Darfur region in April 1983,

4

a tangible enmity already existed between Arabs and the Nilotic peoples of the South.

The 1980 discovery of oil north of Bentiu in southern Sudan raised southern

aspirations that the region could be transformed economically. Unfortunately, it only

exacerbated the North-South problem as the Nimeiri government immediately sought tomaximize central government control over the resource. Nimeiri proposed a 1980 RegionalGovernment Bill that would re-delimit regional boundaries between North and South andthus include the oilfelds in the North. When that failed. Nimeiri sought to split the South byproposing the re-division of the single southern polity into three separate regions -- Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria -- each with its own capital. This further opened a breechbetween North and South, one that simply could not be spanned. In March 1983. Battalion105, a unit comprising southern troops based at Bor, Upper Nile, and units at Pibor, Ayod,and Pochala, mutinied after receiving orders to transfer operations to the North. When thesoldiers refused to leave, the government cut off their pay. Colonel John Garang, a respectedsoutherner born in Bor district, was sent to Bor to mediate the dispute. Garang -- aware thatNimeiri intended to extend his personal dominance over the SPAF, its southern officers, andthe South itself -- would soon join the rebels. When Batallion 105 was finally attacked bygovernment forces in May, it fought off the SPAF units as long as it could and then took tothe bush. Within weeks, thousands of southerners would join the Sudanese People'sLiberation Army (hereafter SPLA), whose Manifesto, published on July 31, 1983, urged a"United Socialist Sudan, not a separate Southern Sudan."6 In September 1983, thegovernment's break with the southern insurgents was made irrevocable when it transformedthe existing Sudanese penal code to allow the use of draconian punishments, or hudud,permitted but rarely invoked under Islamic law (shari'a).

5

III. THE GENOCIDE CLAIM

As the civil war progressed into 1984 and beyond, the army carried out purposeful attacks on

helpless southern civilian populations. In addition, the SPAF was supported by

pro-government Nuer comprising the Anyanya II force active in Upper Nile Region that would

not join the SPLA, the Arab militias, and government-armed militias like the Mundri and

Toposa whose leaders were inimical to the Dinka-dominated SPIA When the SPIA managed

to survive and extend its hold over much of eastern Upper Nile, SPAF and SPAF-assisted

attacks became more vicious. 7 By the time Nimeiri was overthrown by a military coup in

April 1985, some southerners were already claiming that the dictator was carrying out a

conscious policy of extermination in the South. The situation did not improve during the

year a Transitional Military Council ruled Sudan. The Council sought modern arms to bring

the war to a conclusion, and received substantial aid from Libya. During its tenure, the

attacks on helpless civilians by Arab Murahileen increased in number and intensity.

In May 1986, a professional politician, Sadiq al-Mahdi, was able to form a civilian

government: al-Mahdi became leader of the Umma Party, composed in large part of the three-

million-strong Ansar sect that had numerous followers in Darfur and Kordofan. An

American journalist would write shortly afterward that "Mr. al-Mahdi never doubted his

particular ethnic and religious group's right to dominate others," and his "obstructionist

attitude toward allowing food supplies into the south, very much reflected the reluctance of

Arab-Sudanese to accept what is geographically obvious: that Sudan is only half an Arab

polity."8 After toying with the idea of peace talks, he continued the war in the South with a

vengeance; General Burma Nasr, an Umma partisan with family roots in South Kordofan --and considered the Godfather of the Missiriya militia -- expanded and further armed the

regional militias in Kordofan and Darfur.9

By 1987, the army and their militias had attacked hundreds of villages in southern

Sudan. Most raids were never reported, as they occurred here and there in southern Sudan --a vast area the size of Texas. Survivors claimed the slaughter was merciless. Ironically, SPLA

leader John Garang was loathe to employ the term genocide; he would only admit that the

SPLA was fighting a "cultural, political, and economic war" for the "greater autonomy for all

regions of Sudan."lo Nevertheless, as Garang was aware, the SPAF was carrying out an

unmerciful campaign against southerners, all of whom were considered SPLA supporters.

The Arab traders who controlled trade in southern cities and towns had used food scarcities

to squeeze the capital and the life out of the South: their egregious activities finally led Bishop

Nyekindi of Wau to declare in 1989 that the Arab jalLaba was "the biggest gun in this war.

People are dying while looking at food in the market." 11

If the SPAF was merciless, so was drought, and 1988 was a terrible year in the South.

Hundreds of thousands of southerners died. Perhaps as many as 100,000 perished while

making the trek to the haven of refugee camps in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, Michael Priestley, the

6

senior UN representative, characterized the Sudanese arrivals as people being in a "holocaust

condition."12 The situation throughout the South was so dreadful that first in October 1988,then in November 1988, and again in April 1989, the claim of genocide was leveled against the

government by Archbishop Paulino Lukudo Loro of Juba.13 In an October 1988 interview

with the Associated Press, he described the healthy government soldiers living in Juba and"accused the government of deliberately withholding food aid in an effort to depopulate the

south and rob the rebels of their base of support." He added, "It is really genocide going on."

In November, he claimed that the Sadiq's "extermination campaign" was presaged in a 1986meeting during which Sadiq reportedly stated that "if John Garang does not stop this war,

the north will exterminate the south."14 Another churchman, Bishop Macram Max, claimedin 1988 that conditions in the South had assumed "the proportion of genocide."15 Asoutherner and Ministry of Information official noted: "No food has arrived in the volume thatthe [August 1988] flood assistance arrived in Khartoum. It's a genocide. They are'disappearing' a whole people."16 Bona Malwal, a Dinka and editor of The Sudan Times, asked:"How can this Government tell you and me that the rebels are denying food to [southerners]when the army in these areas is being supplied by the same government?" 17

Abroad, the charge was leveled by Aryeh Neier, Director of Human Rights Watch in theUnited States, despite his general unwillingness to use the term "because it should be reservedfor the most extreme circumstances." 18 U.S. Congressmen Gary Ackerman claimed the civilwar was a "racial and cultural conflict," and argued in 1989 that by providing arms to theSudanese army the United States had "participated in genocide."' 9 Indeed, an AssociatedPress report from Sudan (March 26, 1989) noted the following:

The Government says of Sudan's 22 million people, 4 million are southerners. It sayshalf have been displaced by the war to camps in Ethiopia and northern Sudan, andhalf still need relief in the south. Southerners, however, claim they are 6 million.Western relief workers suspect that the discrepancy--2 million people--represents thenumber who died as a result of the war.

Certainly, by 1989, at least 80 percent of the southern population had been displacedat some time since 1983. In August 1989, the U.S. Agency for International Developmentcalculated that there were 2.8 million southern displaced in Sudan (including 1.0 million inKhartoum) and more than 400.000 Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and Uganda. As such, thesouthern Sudanese displaced -- whether in terms of total number, or as a percentage of thenation's population -- comprised the largest internally displaced population anywhere in theworld. In Khartoum, there were, however, few Arab officials or politicians who seemed tocare. The powerful Hassan al-Turabi, National Islamic Front (NIF) party leader and Muslimfundamentalist theoretician, provided the laconic evaluation that "the more people who die orflee the South, the weaker the SPIA becomes." 20 This seemed to epitomize the sentiments ofriverine Arabs. Still, John Garang, at a talk given at the Brookings Institution in May 1989,would only suggest that Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi was "fanning" racial sentiments" inthe war against the SPLA. 2 1

7

When the army was unable to defeat or neutralize the SPLA, in December 1988, itsleaders supported the opening of peace talks with the SPIA. When Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi finally accepted the military demands, there was great hope in Sudan that the SecondCivil War might soon be ended. In March 1989, conditions were perfect for the creation of ahumanitarian effort -- Operation Lifeline Sudan -- which would lead to the distribution of food

aid to needy southern Sudanese needy regardless of where they were located or under whosecontrol. The peace effort and Operation Lifeline Sudan itself were truncated on June 30 whena group of junior military officers carried out a putsch that ended civilian government.Backed by the Islamic militants of the National Islamic Front party, the junta's RevolutionaryCommand Council (hereafter RCC) soon initiated policies that jeopardized the lives of yetmore thousands of Southerners.

Since seizing power in June 1989, the RCC has joined with the militants of theNational Islamic Front to impose shara in the North and in Khartoum, and its leader,Brigadier Umar al-Bashir, has overseen the metamorphosis of the militias in northern Sudaninto a 150,000 strong paramilitary People's Defense Force. In the South itself, "he hasencouraged southern Arab militias to terrorize their African neighbors."22 Bashir has notedon various occasions that "Sudan is an Arab country which supports Arab national unity."23

His internal policies have been generally subservient to NIF causes, including that aspect ofthe NIF charter that states: 'The Muslims are unitarian in their religious approach to life. Asa matter of faith, they do not espouse secularism. Neither do they accept it politically."24

Islamic jurisprudence was and would be the "general source of the law," as it was "theexpression of the will of the democratic majority." The South would either accept that dictateor be crushed -- no matter how long it took or the number killed in the process.

8

IV. QUANTIFYING THE DEAD

While it is both a sad and Sisyphean task to try to quantify the dead, the author believes thatmany more than one million southerners died as a result of war-related causes prior to1990, and additional hundreds of thousands have died since then. In a decade of warfare,their number probably reaches two million.

Table 2War Related Deaths of Southern Sudanese

May 1983-May 1993

1983-8,5 2 198 198 198 1909 1929

Upper Nile >20,000 x10,000 >10,000 x100,000 >10,000 >25,000 x100,000

Bahr al-Ghazal >50,000 >20,000 >50,000 >100,000 >10,000 >50,000 x10,000

Equatoria >10,000 >5,000 >5,000 >25,000 x1,000 >5,000 x5,000

Kordofan i/d i/d >10,000 >50,000 >10,000 i/d x10,000

Darfur i/d i/d >10,000 x10,000 x1,000 i/d x1,000

Ethiopia i/d i/d x10,000 x10,000 x1,000 i/d id

Khartoum id i/d x100 x1,000 x100 x1,000 i/d

Subtotal: >100,000 >50,000 >150,000 >500,000 >75,000 >125,000 >300,000

GRAND TOTAL: >1.300.000

Notes on tables: This table and those throughout the text employ the following symbols: > = Greater than;x100 = deaths in the hundreds; xl,000 = deaths in the thousands, etc.; i/d = insufficient data. Forexample, x10,000 indicates that evidence points to the deaths of some multiple of ten thousand of people;perhaps 20,000, 30,000, 40,000, etc. The use of >20,000 indicates that at least 20,000 people died, butnot as many as some multiple of 20,000. Throughout this and other tables, the author has consistentlyemployed conservative estimates of the number of deaths. The regional and yearly subtotals take intoaccount these conservative estimates, and represent what the author believes to be the minimum number ofdeaths within each region or each year.

For tables within the text, the author has employed a modified outline fonnat in an attempt to provide asmuch detail as possible. As an example, see the table for estimated deaths in 1986 in Bahr al-GhazalRegion on page 19. The author has subdivided the locations of the more than 20,000 deaths in the regioninto provinces, and the provinces into smaller areas, be they districts, cities, villages, hinterlands, etc. Ofthe deaths that occurred within Bahr al-Ghazal Region, Bahr al-Ghazal Province, some multiple of 1,000occurred within Aweil District. Of these, some multiple of 100 occurred within Aweil Town, somemultiple of 100 occurred along the railroad to the north, and more than 100 occurred in Akon Village.

JMBurr, 9/1993

9

The deaths of more than a million southerners in the period 1983-1993 does not includemilitary losses, which in the SPLA case probably exceed 25,000 men killed. It does notinclude southerners who died in the terrible 1983-85 famine that struck hardest in theNorth, in Darfur and Kordofan regions, nor the 1991 famine that struck the same regionwith practically the same results. In both cases, Khartoum governments headed by Arabsfrom riverine ethnic groups were content to allow the abbala (camel nomad) Arabs of theSudanese Sahelian zone to die or relocate, while nothing was done to relieve the suffering ofsuch non-Arab tribes as the Fur and Berti or southerners who had relocated north of theBahr al-Arab River.

10

V. SUBSTANTIVE DATA: 1983-1985

In early 1984, the U.S. House of Representatives received information that the SPLA had"put the Sudan army on the defensive in the South."25 This was true in eastern Upper Nile,but in late 1983, well-armed Arab Rizayqat militia crossed the Bahr al-Arab River in forceand began the slaughter of Dinka and the destruction of scores of Dinka villages. North ofBentiu, the Leek (Liek) Nuer were decimated by Arab Murahileen of the Missiriya tribe. 26 By1985, Rizayqat Murahileen were active as far south as the outskirts of Wau in Bahr al-Ghazal,while the Anyanya II carried out a series of raids on villages near and south of Bentiu. Theraiders were, as the General Secretariat of the Catholic Bishop's Conference would later callthem, an "unchecked, undisciplined militia armed, supported and served by the Army, withfull approval of the government" and "inspired by religious fanatics."27 In many cases andmany regions, the army acted little better: From Bor to Bentiu in Upper Nile Region andfrom Bor to Aweil in Bahr al-Ghazal, the SPAF picked off villagers just as though they werehunting wild game, and by 1984 there were thousands of individuals on the move. The firstscud of what would become waves of dispossessed southerners appeared in Wau, Juba,Malakal, and other government garrison towns where they formed spontaneous settlements.These so-called "displaced camps" rarely received the assistance of local governmentofficials who acted in the name of a succession of Khartoum governments. There were alsoreports of tens of thousands of Sudanese, many of whom were starving, appearing inEthiopia.

Once removed to a displaced camp, southerners often found that they were heldhostage by the local government and their freedom of movement was greatly circumscribed.The South's major cities, Juba, Wau, Malakal, Torit, etc.. were ringed by fortifications andminefields, and "free fire zones" existed. Although the cities themselves were surroundedand besieged by the SPLA, shelling was minimal, and the rebels generally sought to hitmilitary targets. No effort was made by the SPLA to force the displaced to remain in thecities: rather, the rebel radio constantly sought truces that would permit the displaced toleave in peace. A succession of Khartoum governments denied these requests, andstarvation and accompanying diseases (especially measles, malaria, and spinal meningitisthat victimized the severely malnourished) took the lives of tens of thousands, the effect ofthat policy. Civilians might die in terrible numbers, but it was axiomatic that in the South,the government's military garrisons would be fed, and the black markets for food run bynorthern Arab merchants (jallaba) would everywhere be abetted by the Sudanese military.

11

Estimated Deaths 1983-1985Upper Nile >20,000

Bahr al-Ghazal >50,000Equatoria >10,000

1983-85 TOTAL: >100,000

A. UPPER NILE REGION (Estimated Deaths 1983-1985: >20,000)

Estimated Deaths 1983: >1.000

1. Upper Nile Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Bentiu Area (x1OO) Dinka, Nuerb. Sobat River (>100) Bunm

In 1983, Murahileen attacks occurred in a vast region stretching from Bentiu north tosouthern Kordofan and Northern regions. Missiriya militia were very active in northernUpper Nile through Northern region, and Dinka and Liek Nuer villages were especially hardhit.28 Battles involving the SPLA and the SPAF occurred in the east, around Nasir and alongthe Sobat River. In late 1983, regional insecurity resulted in the first great populationmovement of the civil war- more than 20,000 Burun living north of the Sobat removed toDamazine in northern Sudan to escape the warfare.

Estimated Deaths 1984: xl,000

1. Upper Nile Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Nasir to Pochala (x100) Nuer, Anuak, Murleb. Bentiu District (x100) Dinka

2. Jon2lei Province

a. Bor District (x100) Dinka

In 1984, there was continuous skirmishing along the Ethiopian frontier from Nasir to Akobo.SPAF units attacked and burned numerous Anuak, Nuer, and Murle villages. In southernUpper Nile. with the onset of the war, Bor district, birthplace of SPLA leader John Garang,suffered continual depredations that lasted until Bor was captured by the SPLA in April 1989.It was reported that Arab troops repeatedly attacked district villages, "randomly shooting atcivilians, forcing many to flee." 29 Pro-government forces of the Anyanya II commanded byWilliam Abdallah Chuol attacked Dinka villages northwest and south of Bentiu. but invariablyavoided any battle with SPLA forces themselves.30 When drought struck Upper Nile, villages

12

as far south as Pibor reported crop losses and incipient famine. In 1984, the United StatesEmbassy in Khartoum reported the first great wave of southern displaced moving towardEthiopia; "approximately 60,000 Sudanese" moved to camps in Ethiopia because of what wascalled euphemistically "unsettling political and economic conditions in southern Sudan."3 1

Other thousands of needy moved toward the north, and Malakal, a city of some 35,000inhabitants, was soon swollen with newly displaced. A UNICEF/Red Cross investigation of theregion in May 1985 discerned that starvation conditions existed north of Malakal, up river, andto the west (especially around Tonga village). Insecurity caused the closure of the road fromKosti to Malakal through Renk- this important food lifeline would rarely be opened in the yearsto come.

Estimated Deaths 1985: x10.000

1. Upper Nile Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Renk & vicinity (x100) Variousb. Kodok to Kaka (x1,000) Shillukc. Bentiu to Pariang (>100) Nuer, Dinkad. Malakal Area (5/85) (x1OO) Variouse. Gegeir Area (>100) Various

2. Jonglei Provincea. Jonglei-Kongor Area (x100) Dinka, Nuer

As early as January 1985, reports reached Malakal that famine was widespread. A FamineRelief Committee created in Malakal soon reported that "in some areas like Pariang in Bentiu,Kongor in Jonglei, and Kodok" the death rate from starvation "was approximately 10 persons aday and the number increased gradually to 80 persons."3 2 The famine in Upper Nile led tothousands of starvation deaths, especially in villages north of Malakal. Famine wasaccompanied by outbreaks of dysentery, measles, and other infectious diseases that causedthousands of deaths. No food aid was provided by the government. As food became scarce,some SPAF used the situation to hoard grain and create a black market for food that existedeven as the hungry died in Malakal. SUDANAID, the relief arm of the Catholic Church ofSudan, investigated conditions in Upper Nile and found extensive starvation. In Melut,starving children ate raw grain sent by SUDANAID. In Kodok, the cultural heart of the Shilluk,famine conditions were extreme, and from July 16 through August 9 a local medical assistantpersonally enumerated 1,392 famine deaths. Scores of deaths were reported in Renk, and asmany as eighty deaths a day were reported in locations as disparate as Pariang, Bentiu District,Kongor in Jonglei. and Kodok north of Malakal. 33

13

B. BAHR AL-GHAZAL REGION (Estimated Deaths 1983-1985: >50,000)

Estimated Deaths 1983: >1,000

1. Bahr al-Ghazal Province Death Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Wau vicinity (x100) Dinka, Lwo

Estimated Deaths 1984: >10,000

1. Bahr al-Ghazal Provincea. Aweil District (>5,000) Dinka

2. Buheirat Provincea. Tonj District (1-6/84) (>1,000) Dinka

The 1983-1984 drought in Kordofan and Darfur drove the Arab cattle tribes (Missiriya. Humr,Rizayqat, etc.) to spend much of the year south of the Bahr al-Arab in Aweil district, wherethey attacked and drove thousands of Dinka from their seasonal pastureland. In January 1984,the regional government received reports that well-armed Murahileen attacked Tonj district,Buheirat province, and hundreds of Dinka villages had been burned; the report claimed that"every member from that destroyed area ran away for safety." As a result, no crops werecultivated. 34 In November 1984, the Rumbek commissioner tried and failed to influenceKhartoum to send 15,000 tons of food aid needed because drought had been especiallydevastating in eastern Yirol, and crops had failed entirely in parts of Rumbek and Tonj. InDecember, Governor Lawrence Wol Wol failed in an effort to obtain 40,000 tons of emergencyfood aid for his province. 3 5 By year's end, the first great wave of Dinka displaced began toappear in the North; they sought work in the grainfields of South Kordofan or moved on toKhartoum.

14

Estimated Deaths 1985: >25,000

1. Bahr al-Ghazal Province D Ethnic Gmps Affecteda. Aweil District (x10,000) Dinka

(1) Wun Rog >1,000-

(2) Nyamlell >1,000-(3) Ajok Area >1,000-

2. Buheirat Provincea. Rumbek District (x1,000) Dinka

b. Rumbek Town (x1,000) Dinka

In January 1985, the acting governor of Bahr al-Ghazal region sent an urgent radio messagefrom Wau to Khartoum advising that the SPAF commander and police chief in Rumbek districtwere reporting starvation deaths "in big numbers." He advised that more would soon die. 36

The starving in Rumbek and surrounding villages began to die in March. In April. Khartoumreceived a report that people were "dying daily." and the acting governor informed Khartoumthere were no seeds for planting just "as there is nothing to eat."37 A month later, theUNICEF/Red Cross team found people in Rumbek "dying on the street due to hunger."38

Some 700 sacks of grain were rushed from Wau to Rumbek: they would be the last government-sponsored movement of food relief for years to come. In November, the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal wired Khartoum that a million people in the region were in desperate need of food aidbecause of drought, "floods and cattle raiding" since the Dinka "cattle are robbed byMurahileerL.. who have destroyed crops in the field in mid-August.... Now the towns of Awell,Gogrial, and Wau are full of destitute and displaced people who are in need of essentialcommodities." 39 In May, the UNICEF/Red Cross team requested the immediate movement of1,000 tons to Aweil district where famine was incipient and where the Arab Rizayqat militia ofSouth Darfur had begun to attack villages in western Aweil; Winejok and surrounding villageswere nearly deserted. The Missiriya continued their attacks in the north, forcing theevacuation of more than a score of villages along the rail line between Aweil and Muglad, SouthKordofan, and again forced the Dinka from their seasonal grazing and fishing grounds on theBahr al-Arab. 4 0 In September, SUDANAID tried desperately but failed to move 50 tons of foodto Nyamlell village in the heart of a region that suffered continuous Missiriya raiding. As theattacks continued, more and more Dinka moved to Aweil. Just south of Abyei District, SouthKordofan, the Murahileen raided the Ajok region, killing hundreds of Twic Dinka and runningoff huge cattle herds. The year ended with the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal reporting that bothnorthern Aweil and northern Gogrial had been "affected by waves of cattle raiders" and byfloods that destroyed crops. 4 1

15

C. EQUATORIA REGION (Estimated Deaths 1983-1985: >10,000)

Estimated Deaths 1983: No Infomiation

Estimated Deaths 1984: xl.000

1. West of the Nile Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Juba Area (x1O) Various

2. East of the Nilea. Torit Town (>100) Toposa, Variousb. Torit District (x1OO) Boya, Didinga

In 1984, about half the region's population were affected by drought, including more than100,000 people in Kapoeta district. Drought along the southeastern frontier with Ethiopiaforced thousands of Toposa to move their cattle toward the Nile. SPAF proselytizing amongthe Toposa led to the creation and arming of a militia that began indiscriminate attacks againstnearby ethnic groups wherever Toposa were settled. Their attacks were especially viciousamong the Boya and Didinga of Torit district. By July, warfare had expanded into the Jubadistrict, creating thousands of displaced. Also by mid-year, the price of food commodities hadsoared to unbelievably high prices in Juba. In November. police and SPAF carried out a policeaction against students from the University of Juba who were protesting the closure of theirstudent union. Perhaps a score of students were killed when they were fired on. Throughout1984, there was continuous skirmishing along the Ethiopian frontier, and Catholic ReliefServices warned "as early as October-November 1984" that there would be a "general shortageof food in Eastern Equatoria for most of the coming year."4 2 For the first time, acute foodshortages were noted in Juba. Government officials reported in December that nearly 500,OOCpeople had been affected by drought in Equatoria and were at risk of starvation. 43

16

Estimated Deaths 1985: >5.000

1. West of the Nile Deaths Ethnic Groups Affected

a. Terekeka (5/85) (>100) Various

2. East of the Nile

a. Okaru Village (>100) Acholi

b. Torit District (x1OO) Various

c. Kapoeta District (5/85) (>100) Toposa, Various

d. Chukudum (5-7/85) (x100) Didinga

In May 1985. a joint UNICEF/Red Cross team visited drought-affected Torit, Kapoeta, and

Terekeka. They found people starving to death in Terekeka and equally horrible conditions in

Torit and Kapoeta. 44

Also in May, Catholic Church officials reported that people were dying of hunger in

Kapoeta district, and there were "acute shortages" in other districts as well. 4 5 In June,

Catholic churchmen reported famine conditions in the 'Toposaland" of south-southeastern

Sudan. where drought and cattle raiding had already caused hundreds of deaths. In July, they

wrote that there were "still reports of people dying of hunger" in Kopeota District. 46 As the

SPLA went on the attack, the SPAF was involved in a series of atrocities, the most brutal being

an attack on Okaru village where scores of Acholi were murdered. By year's end, the SPLA had

surrounded Juba ("the capital of the South"), and the city's airport was under infrequent attack

by mortars and artillery.

SUBSTANTIVE DATA* 1986

In February, the Sudanese Council of Churches reported that food shortages in the South had

reached a critical stage and that 1.5 million people were "experiencing or vulnerable to a

deteriorating nutritional status," with at least 190,000 in Equatoria, 130,000 in Upper Nile,

and 225.000 in Bahr al-Ghazal at immediate risk. 4 7 Despite a plethora of requests for food aid,

neither the Transitional Military Council nor the civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi

responded, although the Minister of Defense acknowledged in February that eighty people a

day were "dying from famine in the South."48 In early 1986, governor Fadimula of Bahr al-

Ghazal warned Khartoum that the 1985-86 crop harvest had been disappointing and that a

famine would strike Bahr al-Ghazal province because families were consuming the seed they

needed to plant crops. 49 Elsewhere it was reported that armed groups were ranging through

the South, destroying herds once numbered in the hundreds of thousands. "Government

officials, clergy, and witnesses" reported that Murahileen were attacking with "rifles,

17

submachine guns, and mortars."so And the raids would continue both before and after Sadiq al-Mahdi was named Prime Minister in May. Given widespread famine that prevailed in much ofthe South, the UN and Western food aid donors sponsored "Operation Rainbow" to airlift foodaid to the needy. Given government obstruction, the program failed in its objective to supplythe starving in Wau and Malakal with desperately needed food aid. A review of reports led oneU.S.-based agency to report in October that there was "a malnutrition rate of about 30 percentin southern Sudan."5 1

Estimated Deaths 1986

Upper Nile x10,000Bahr al-Ghazal >20,000

Equatoria >5,000

1986 TOTAL: >50,000

A. UPPER NILE REGION (Estimated Deaths 1986: x10,000)

1. Upper Nile Province Deaths Ethnic Grouns Affecteda. Malakal City (x1,000) Variousb. Kodok and Lul (>3,000) Shillukc. Melut Region (>1,000) Variousd. Kaka Region (>100) Variouse. Renk District (9-10/86) (x100) Various

2. Jonalei Province

a. Pochala District (>100) Anuak(1) Ajika Village x10- Anuak

.b. Bor District (x1,000) Dinka

By mid-1986, Malakal had grown to nearly 90,000 people, of whom two-thirds were displaced.A nutritional survey of Malakal children taken in August 1986 found that one of four childrenunder five years of age was very badly malnourished.5 2 When the acting governor declared thatall hoarded grain would be confiscated and sold to the public at the official price, he wassacked. When "Operation Rainbow" failed, hundreds died of starvation and thousands beganthe trek to the North. To the north, Kodok and Lul regions were the center of military actionand were among the hardest hit regions in the South. There the government confirmed thedeaths of more than 3,000 people due to starvation; further north, at Melut, in 1985-86 anestimated 2.000 people "died in the area due to war, starvation and forced migration."5 3

18

trap and feared that "many people in Wau will starve to death."s8 In August, the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross announced that Wau was "at the end of its rope."59 Nearly twentypercent of children were severely malnourished, and at the Agok displaced camp, the total washigher than one in three. Days later, the Sudan Council of Churches warned that "due toinsecurity," food aid had been practically cut off to 20,000 displaced who had taken refuge inthe city. Another 8,000 were found in three camps around Wau town itself and were "in needof immediate assistance,"60 and a Red Cross survey of two displaced camps found 36 percentof the people severely malnourished. With no food aid present the displaced began to die. Inlate August, there were food riots, and a battle ensued over the rapidly dwindling reliefsupplies. By September, the Red Cross reported that Wau was being "strangled to death."6 1

The SPAF wanted no media scrutiny of conditions in Wau and refused to permit charteredaircraft to land anywhere in Bahr al-Ghazal. By year's end, the relief arm of the EpiscopalChurch of Sudan reported Wau continued in a desperate state.

Following Missiriya raids on Gogrial villages, thousands of Twic Dinka moved southtoward Thiet, which was under SPIA control. When the July 1986 groundnut harvest failedand the sorghum crop could not be harvested until December, famine emerged among thedisplaced who had moved south of the River Lol. By May, starvation deaths inside the townwere reported, and an OXFAM survey carried out in Aweil town found 35 percent of childrenunder the age of five to be less than 80 percent of normal weight to height ratio. Spring rainswere uniformly poor, and by summer, nearly 100,000 displaced had crowded into Aweil -- astaggering number and an historic anomaly. The town relief committee provided what littlefood it had to only the neediest.

In the wake of a May road mining incident, the 600-strong SPAF garrison went on arampage in Aweil town, killing at least 50 Dinka and burning down the market and half thetown. The garrison continued its undisciplined conduct through the year, burning downthousands of huts in villages surrounding Aweil. A railroad convoy with a small amount ofWestern relief aid arrived in November; it would be the last shipment for months to come.Father Rudolf Deng of Aweil warned Khartoum that there had been much sickness and death in1986 and that the situation would be even worse in 1987 if substantial relief operations werenot undertaken soon.62 .

C. EQUATORIA REGION (Estimated Deaths 1986: >5,000)

1. East of the Nile Deathi Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Kapoeta & Torit (x100)

2. West of the Nile

a. Juba District (x1,000) Various(Juba City) >100- Dinka

20

Nearer Renk, in September 1986, Melut town had declined to 2,000 people from its pre-wartotal of 5,000; to the north, the sorghum harvest failed at Kaka due to Murahileen raiding, andthousands moved to Malakal or Renk. At Renk, the prevalence of starvation among arrivingdisplaced led UNICEF and Concern-Ireland to initiate an "emergency" food aid program inOctober 1986.

As fighting raged in Pochala, the SPAF attacked the Anuak, an ethnic group that hadsupported SPIA objectives. Scores of deaths resulted, including many deaths in Ajika as thevillage was leveled. Bor district was generally isolated due to warfare, where "Arab troopsattacked villages, randomly shooting at civilians, forcing many to flee."54 Thousands weremoving toward Malakal or Juba due to airstrikes, "during which mostly animals at cattle campswere hit" as they were "easily identifiable from the air."55

B. BAHR AL-GHAZAL (Estimated Deaths 1986: >20,000)

1. Buheirat Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affected

a. Rumbek District (x1,000) Dinka

b. Yirol (x1,000) Dinka

2. Bahr al-Ghazal Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Wau District (x1,000) Mostly Dinkab. Gogrial District (>1,000) Dinkac. Aweil District (x1,000) Dinka

(1) Aweil Town x100- Dinka(2) Railroad to north x100- Dinka

(3) Akon Village >100- Dinka

The year began with Murahileen pillaging of both Gogrial and Aweil districts. Mark Duffield ofOXFAM would later note that, with regard to Arab attacks on the Dinka, "since 1986 it hasbeen clear that the war is being fought on the basis of destroying the cattle-based subsistenceeconomy."56 In late November 1986, the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal admitted that from 1984through 1986, the Murahileen displaced 600,000 persons and rustled 340,000 head of cattlein his region. He added that they had only killed 1,000 people and kidnapped 500 children --figures that woefully underestimated the material and human damage done in Bahr al-Ghazal.When pressed, he would only admit that half of all residents had been uprooted in that periodof time. 5 7

The situation was especially bad in 1986. Thousands were displaced and nearby villageswere razed by the SPAF as the SPLA captured Rumbek and Yirol in March. When thegovernment counter-attacked -- thanks to an infusion of Libyan arms -- the SPLA evacuatedRumbek but made Yirol its center of operations for southern Bahr al-Ghazal. In May, theCatholic bishop of Wau warned Khartoum that the city was on the verge of becoming a death

19

The SPIA spring offensive, which placed the SPAF on the defensive in eastern Equatoria,created by May 1986 more than 100,000 displaced east of the Nile in Torit and Kapoeta

districts. When those districts began to run out of food, thousands made their way to Juba,

where a large food aid center, supported by private voluntary agancies, was created at Rejaf,south of the city. By June 1986, Juba had 150,000 to 180,000 inhabitants, double its pre-war

population.In June, it was reported that the government had formed an Acholi militia to fight the

SPLA. Many Acholi were from Uganda and had served in the armed forces of President Milton

Obote, deposed in July 1985. Acholi depredations soon led to the first outflow of Sudaneseinto Uganda. In mid-1986, the USAID office in Juba informed USAID-Khartoum that therewere already 54 villages and 45,000 people in great need of food. Inside Juba itself, thegovernment-armed Mundari militia attacked resident Dinka on numerous occasions, killing

scores of civilians. SUDANAID reported that the SPAF had supplied "various tribes with guns

in the hope they will attack the SPIA," but claimed the policy had only led "to tribal attacks

and a general breakdown of law and order" in Equatoria.6 3

The SPAF "policy of concentrating rural dwellers in towns" throughout the South

resulted in little food being planted for the autumn harvest OXFAM warned that there was verylittle food in the South and the whole of the vast area was "sliding into chaos."64 As the year

ended, there were reports of extensive malnutrition in the South, especially in villagesrecently taken by the SPIA. Still, the SPIA was spurned by Western nations who had beenasked to provide food aid through its auspices to an estimated two million needy under itscontrol. 65 In Khartoum, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi considered the incipient famine "aproblem that the wealthy West is obliged to deal with."66 His government did nothing torespond to the problems of food aid for the South, and he was able to shrug off the news inNovember of 16,000 displaced leaving Malakal on a barge convoy, which would add to the tensof thousands of southerners pouring into Renk, Kosti, and Khartoum. By 1987, the Bahr al-Ghazal office in Khartoum estimated that there were as many as 160.000 Dinka from Aweildistrict alone residing in Khartoum and elsewhere in the North.

SUBSTANTIVE DATA* 1987

The Sudan Early Warning System Group, funded by the European Community, advised inDecember 1986 that, based on "relatively limited but reliable information currently at hand,"one million southerners were at risk as they had insufficient food, or resources to acquire food,to avert a nutritional crisis. In contrast, the government argued that the South was "returningto normal."67 As it turned out, nothing was "normal" in southern Sudan in 1987. Murahileenand government-sponsored militias continued their attacks on civilian populations. Droughtwas widespread, as was hunger. Famine-related deaths undoubtedly exceeded 100,000.

21

Estimated Deaths 1987

Upper Nile >10,000

Bahr al-Ghazal >50,000Equatoria >5,000Kordofan >10,000Darfur >10,000Khartoum x1,000

1987 TOTAL: >150,000

A. UPPER NILE REGION (Estimated Deaths 1987: >10,000)

1. Uper Nile Province Deaths Ethnic Grouos Affected

a. Malakal District (X100) Various

b. Mayom area (x100) Nuer

c. Ethiopian frontier (x1,000) Various

(4/87) >100- Uduk(10/87) >100- Uduk

By June, about 70,000 displaced packed into Malakal. Thousands of displaced, sleeping in theopen and subject to summer rains, sickened. In July, the region's government requested foodaid from Khartoum, and though food did not arrive in September, the number of displaced hadreached an unmanageable 130,000 people. In October, a barge convoy leaving Malakal carriedmore than 15,000 displaced to the North. Most disembarked at Renk, swelling the number ofdisplaced in that district to more than 40,000. In mid-November, following the SPLA victoryat Kurmuk, some 52,000 Arab displaced fled to Damazine. In contrast to what was occurringin government garrisons in the South and the treatment of southerners in the North, thegovernment immediately pledged 1,500 tons of sorghum for the displaced, and largequantities of powdered milk, sugar, vegetable oil, beans, and clothing were distributed to Arabfamilies.6 8 By 1988, there were still at least 100,000 displaced in Malakal, and, with no foodstocks for distribution, it was possible that thousands more would starve that year. Thousandsof desperate people began the trek toward Ethiopia, and along the way thousands would die.

In September 1984, the Anyanya II forces of William Chuol accepted governmentprotection and moved their headquarters to Mayom, a Nuer village, located west of Bentiu.The undisciplined forces and the Arab militias that appeared from time to time in both placescarried out numerous atrocities that caused tens of thousands to flee the region. The 1987famine practically emptied Bentiu and reduced substantially the already reduced population in

22

Mayom. Hundreds died while fleeing to Kalik, an agriculturally productive area west ofKadugli. South Kordofan.6 9 South of Bentiu, in the panic that accompanied a Kala Azarepidemic, scores of villages were emptied.

The region encompassing northeastern Upper Nile was hard hit by drought from 1985through 1987. In 1987, following fighting near Daga Post, SPIA forces retreated into Ethiopia.They were followed by some 10,000 Uduk. Government troops fired on civilians and "burnedand looted villages and churches in six locations." The SPAF encouraged Arabs to attack Udukvillages and hundreds were reported killed. 70

B. BABR AL-GHAZAL REGION (Estimated Deaths 1987: >50,000)

1. Bahr al-Ghazal Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affected

a. Aweil District (>10,000) Various

(Aweil Town) >1,000- Dinka

(Maryal Bai) ->500- Dinka

b. Wau District (>10,000) Various(Wau City 1/87) >100- Dinka

(Wau City 6-7/87) >100- Dinka, Jur(Wau City 8-9/87) >1,000- Dinka(Wau City 11-12/87) >1,000- Various

c. Raga District (>1,000) Various(Boro Village) >400- Ndogo, others(Abuk Diin/Mabyor Nyang,

Abuk Tiyep/Achoo 1/87) >100- Dinka

In Gogrial district, where suffering was perhaps greatest in Bahr al-Ghazal, it was that reportedthe area was being emptied of people and cattle. The situation was little better in Buheirat,and in late June, 200-300 emaciated southerners were daily arriving in Wau from Ton andRumbek. A researcher at the University of Khartoum would write that the Government hadturned a blind eye to violence that was unheard of in the context of the traditional conflictinvolving Dinka and Arab. 7 1 It also turned a blind eye to starvation and actually held up thetransport of food aid by train from Babanusa in the North to Aweil in the South. The number ofdisplaced in Aweil town increased from 18,000 in April to 30,000 in June. In May, the foodaid donor community met with General Burma Nasr. Minister of State for Defense, to protestthe inadequacy of "delivery facilities" to move food aid to the South. Their protests werebrushed aside, and, despite United Nations efforts to involve Nasr and Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in efforts to send food by train, their efforts were continually frustrated. 72 In July, thenumber of displaced in Aweil and nearby villages exceeded 100,000 needy, and theCommissioner for Aweil claimed that fifty to sixty persons were daily starving to death insideAweil town. In nearby Marial Bai village, government officials stated that more than 400

23

deaths had occurred in August alone.73

When a train finally appeared in Aweil in August (without food aid). Aweil grave diggers

were so weak they could no longer "dig and bury the dead."74 Thousands scrambled to board

the train for its return to Babanusa, and hundreds died along the way. In October. another

train arrived in a town where only the military garrison had food; it transported only 240 tons

of relief food for some 80,000+ in need. In November, the UN/World Food Program reported

that Aweil's population had swollen "to between 120,000 and 150,000," and though a good

harvest was expected in nearby villages, "no food [was] allowed from the countryside to thetown."75 The train, returning to Muglad in December, brought with it 4,000 starving people.

Left behind were some 65,000 desperately hungry and sick in Aweil town (and some 150,000displaced in Aweil district). They were virtually without food, and Khartoum received initial

reports that thousands of young men had begun the long and harrowing trip to Ethiopia to

escape the famine.Given the continuing starvation in Wau city, in March, the Western donors began the

shipment of 8,850 tons of food aid by truck from the North. The shipments were halted and

then stored at the Raga military base, and other insecure sites in Raga, western Bahr al-Ghazal.With the connivance of SPAF forces and local government officials, the food aid was then

stolen, and the starving of Wau received no benefit from the program. The Raga Districtcommissioner, an Arab, was personally blamed for not providing assistance to Boro and

surrounding villages, causing the starvation death of more than 400 people. 7 6

For the displaced of Wau, by mid-year the Fertit militia (comprising Islamicized

members of the Bandala, Feroge, Banda, and Kresh) had made their lives a living hell. BishopJoseph Nyekindi of Wau would later claim that in 1987 the Fertit militia, euphemistically

called the Fertit "Peace Forces," began to receive SPAF arms and training.7 7 In four days ofrioting in January, the militia burned down at least one Dinka ward, and subsequent attacks inWau and the surrounding territory were notorious for their savagery. In July, a new militarycommander, Major General Abu Gurun, arrived in Wau and would soon earn the title "thebutcher of Wau" as his troops ran amok. Dinka deaths were numbered in the thousands,especially after the military provided the Fertit with more weapons, including 80mm

mortars, 78 and looked the other way as the militia lobbed grenades into Dinka compounds.The chaotic situation in the city would not be reduced until Gurun was named Commandant.ofthe Sudanese Military Academy and was recalled to Khartoum in November. In August, theU.S. Embassy reported that many new arrivals were "too malnourished" to eat and died shortlyafter moving into displaced camps in Wau. 7 9 At year's end, Wau hospital reported 833 deathsby starvation in 1987, but hospital workers admitted the number was but a small fraction ofthose who perished in the city.8 0 World Vision reported that in November-December some 75of 451 children and adults registered at a single feeding center had died.81 People arriving inKhartoum from Wau in January 1988 reported that relief

stores were empty and that a sack of sorghum was selling for 20 times its price inKhartoum.

In January, the SPLA reported that Rizayqat raiders were responsible for the deaths of

24

more thai 100 villagers in Abuk Diin area. In February. Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi named

General Burma Nasr to the position of minister of state in the Ministry of Defense, where Nasr

became even more involved with Arab militias. At least one analyst claimed that it was

"Mahdi's personal decision to give an unprecedented level of modem firepower" to the Arab

militias. 82 Nevertheless, 1987 was a turning point as the SPIA began to attack Murahileen

raiders operating north and south of the Bahr al-Arab.

C. EQUATORIA REGION (Estimated Deaths 1987: >5,000)

1. West of the Nile D Ethnic Groups Affected

a. Maridi (x100) Various

b. Jebel Kajur (>100) Mundri

2. East of the Nile

a. Lowquoi (xlO)

b. Khor English (xlo)

In 1987, there were a large number of displaced who had no desire or ability to return to their

villages. Western Equatoria, which had not suffered as villages east of the Nile had, began to

have serious problems as government armed militias began to roam through the region,preying on helpless villagers. A drought in Yambio and Maridi districts created addition

problems that were not soon relieved, given the poor harvest, and militia attacks in the Maridi

region caused scores of deaths. In 1987. all major towns faced the growing problem of needy

displaced fleeing military action, militia attacks, or food shortages. Hundreds of Mundri died

of starvation after they were removed from Jebel Kajur to Niamen where their militia were to

serve as an SPAF outpost. 83 In July 1987, an ecumenical conference brought to Juba more

than 200 Christian leaders from the southern Sudan. Attendees, concerned with the daily life

of Christians in the South, agreed that the nation was "deeply and deadly sick." They decried

the government's "current plan and programme of Arabization," and the means ("sometimes

even inhuman ones"), to impose Islam in the South. In a joint prayer that ended the

conference, Catholic Archbishop Paolino Lukudu Loro asked his friends and his flock, "Ills it a

crime to be an African in Sudan?"8 4

East of the Nile, government militias destroyed villages along the Juba-Torit road.85

The SPLA began the siege of Torit, trapping thousands inside the district capital.

D. KORDOFAN REGION (Estimated Deaths 1987: >10,000)

1. South Kordofan Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affected

a. Abyei District (x1,000) Dinka

b. Meiram (x100) Dinka

c. Safaha (x100) Dinka, Lwo

d. Babanusa (>100) Dinka

25

With no food in Aweil, thousands of Dinka began to make their way to the North. One path ledthrough Abyei district, and in February, the Governor of Kordofan urged the delivery of food aidto assist a growing displaced persons population in the district. 86 Local officials claimed inApril that there were present some 25,000 Dinka from Abyei district and 10,000 displacedfrom other villages in Bahr al-Ghazal, and in June a journalist from the London Independentfound Abyei "teeming with 20,000 sick, emaciated Dinka."87 As the number of starvingincreased, the situation worsened in Abyei village after resident Arabs burned down mostDinka huts in town. Given the lack of stability in the district, it was impossible to use avoluntary organization to supervise and monitor a food aid program. 88

Meiram first attracted attention in late 1987 when "waves of hungry southerners beganfleeing north."8 9 Despite being home to an SPAF garrison and a Missiriya militia, in April,some 10,000 needy Dinka, hundreds "in a bad condition," congregated there in search offood. 90 When a Western aid agency offered to install a feeding program, the "government saidno." 9 1

Still other thousands made their way north through Safaha waystation on the upperBahr al-Arab River, or through Muglad to Babanusa. In the latter site, many hundreds of thesick and starving sheltered in unused railway wagons where they were allowed to fend forthemselves. Other thousands began to appear in villages throughout South Kordofai and SouthDarfur.

E. DARFUR REGION (Estimated Deaths 1987: >10,000)

1. South Darfur Province a Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Ed Daein (>1,000) Dinka

In May, the Rizayqat Arabs of Ed Daein town attacked the Dinka displaced located there. Hutswere torched, Dinka were burned alive in railroad cars and slaughtered while seeking asylumin the police station. More than 1,000 (and probably more than 1,500 southerners -- mostlyold men, women, and children) were killed in the attacks. 9 2 No town officials were ever triedor reprimanded for their role in the holocaust. In August, it was reported that Murahileenbelonging to "a group known as the General Union of the Arabs" burned churches in ElKarkariya and El Katmur and killed Pastor Matthew al-Nur and family "after setting his houseablaze."93

F. KHARTOUM (Estimated Deaths 1987: xl,000)

By 1987, it was estimated that the number of southern displaced in the capital area totalledapproximately 100,000 people. In February 1987, some 23 significant settlement sites werelocated, and aid agencies began the distribution of food aid to the needy. The program becameso successful that the government halted it "when it ran into political problems."9 4 A broad

26

survey of the displaced determined that one of five displaced children was malnourished, andinfant mortality for children under five was a very high 165 per thousand. 95 When thesituation of the Khartoum displaced could no longer be hidden from the outside world, the

government's Commissariat of Health for Khartoum finally allowed indigenous and Western aid

agencies to provide food and medical support for the needy, while the government avoided theproblem of their health, education and livelihood. By June 1987, the program targeted200,000 displaced. Following heavy rains and consequent extensive destruction in August

1987, a new survey was undertaken to quantify the displaced, and a total of 687,000 wereenumerated. 96 The number of persons who could have survived with proper medical and

nutritional care is speculative, but private voluntary agencies calculated unnecessary deaths in

the hundreds.

SUBSTANTIVE DATA: 1988

In the period 1986-1988, Dinka leaders estimated that more than two million cattle, crucial tothe Dinka way of life, were stolen from their villages in Bahr al-Ghazal by Arab Murahileen.Tens of thousands of cattle were driven to stockyards in Omdurman where they were sold fordomestic consumption or export to Saudi Arabia and other states. Without crops or herds,more than a million southerners were at risk when crops failed in 1987, and hundreds ofthousands would die. In February, United States congressmen warned that "according to bestavailable information," starvation was threatened around Wau, Malakal, Juba, Kapoeta, Kongor,Yirol and Pochala."97 In May, the UN/World Food Program reported to its Rome headquartersthat, due to a "lack of food, shelter, and security," the situation in the South was "desperate."9 8

Eventually, the famine would kill more than a quarter-million southerners, leading RichardDowden, African Editor of The Independent, London, to write in December 1988: "Nothing wehave ever seen or heard from Africa -- not from Biafra, not from Ethiopia in the famine, orUganda under Amin and Obote -- is as bad as what is happening now in Sudan."99 TheGovernment, which claimed it had drawn up a relief plan to respond to the pleas of southernofficials, had no plan at all. 100

In October 1988, Equatoria's Episcopal Archbishop Benjamin Yugusuk estimated that atleast 250,000 southerners had died of starvation and inadequate medical care. At year's end,UNICEF-Sudan director Cole Dodge stated, "whoever was vulnerable has died." Mickey Leland,Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Hunger, advised hiscolleagues that the death toll from the famine that affected southern Sudan "could be as high as500,000 people" and scored the activities of "militia, armed by the government" for theirmurderous raids, cattle rustling, and kidnapping of children "sold into forced labor." Anestimate of 500,000 deaths was seconded by other relief agencies, and was used by the media;OXFAM used the figure of 260,000 deaths, but considered it a "conservative estimate."10 1 TheRefugee Policy Group of Washington. D.C. estimated 300,000 had died. The UN used theestimate of 250,000 deaths, noting in late 1988 that 500,000 southerners were still "at risk"

27

and in danger of starvation.102 A U.S. congressional survey team noted the numberless SPAFfood diversions and SPAF efforts to ignore the starvation in the South; It noted that Arabmilitias continued to attack southerners moving north, and its report concluded that the"abduction of children, rape of women, theft of cattle and indiscriminate violence by[Murahileer] forces have become horrifyingly comonplace."1o 3 The militias and raiders hadmuch to prey on, as it was estimated that half of the South's population "had fled to safety inother parts of Sudan or to neighboring countries." 1O4 More than a million displacedsoutherners were located in Khartoum, in slums called "among the grimmest, mostimpoverished urban areas of Africa."105 Nearly 400,000 were found in Ethiopia, and the UN/World Food Program estimated that there were slightly more than 500,000 displaced insouthern Sudan itself. Simple calculations led analysts to believe that at least 80 percent ofthe South's population was displaced at one time or another since the start of the second civilwar, and the various estimates that one million lives were lost during the same period seemedhardly far-fetched.10 6 In the United States, InterAction, a coalition of humanitarian anddevelopment agencies, put conditions in Sudan squarely in focus: what was occurring in Sudanwas "a situation of genocide whether it's called that or not."10 7

Estimated Deaths 1988Upper Nile x10,000Bahr al-Ghazal >100,000Equatoria >25,000Kordofan >50,000Darfur x10,000Ethiopian Camps x10,000& Frontier

North Kordofan x1,000& Khartoum

1988 TOTAL: >500,000

A. UPPER NILE REGION Estimated Deaths 1988: x100,000)

1. Jonglei Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Pibor Area (x1,000) Variousb. Bor Area (x1,000) Dinkac. Kongor Area (x1,000) Various

2. Uoper Nile Province

a. Kodok Area (>1,000) Shillukb. Malakal vicinity (x1,000) Various

28

In 1987, the "eastern corridor" from Pibor to Kurmuk in the North suffered almost completecrop failure. By mid-year, there were numerous reports of famine in eastern Upper Nile, andstarving people (throughout the South) began to make their way to Ethiopia. SPAFdepredations continued in Bor District, and other thousands, having lost their grain and cattle,began the trek to Ethiopia. Untold thousands died along the way. 108 By mid-year, there werereports of hundreds of deaths in the Kongor region; in April, the Red Cross had requestedgovernment permission to carry out a nutritional survey in the area, but the petition wasdenied.10 9 In May, thousands of starving Shilluk from Kodok began to appear at Kosti inCentral region and at Malakal.

Pacifico Lolik of the Sudan Supreme Council found in a visit in September that "therewas absolutely no food in Malakal," and 50 people had starved to death in the previous threeweeks. .110 The situation worsened until food aid finally arrived in early 1989. In October, thedisplaced continued to starve, and the SPAF stopped civilians "going out to plant or even foragefor something to eat." Inhabitants reported that "after nightfall, army lorries regularly dumpbodies in the Nile." 111

B. BAHR AL-GHAZAL (Estimated Deaths 1988: >100,000)

1. Bahr al-Ghazal Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Wau Town (>5,000)

(1/88) >100- Various(9/88) x1,000- Various(10/88) x100- Various(11/88) x100- Various(6-8/88) >2,000- Dinka, Lwo, Fertit

b. Wau vicinity (x10,000)(1/88) >1,000- Dinka(Kadcariya, Katum) x10- Dinka

c. Aweil Town (>10,000) Dinka(7-9/88) >7,000-(10/88) x100-

d. Aweil vicinity (x20,000)(1) Maryal Bei >100- Dinka(2) Gom Mashar >100- Dinka(3) Mareng Akuar >200- Dinka(4) Winejok >100- Dinka(5) Ariath, Paliet, Palioping, other x10,000- Dinka(6) Akon >1,000- Dinka

29

In January, the acting governor of Bahr al-Ghazal sent an urgent message to Prime Minister

Sadiq al-Mahdi informing him of the desperate situation in his province. He claimed, "Right

now, citizens are starving to death in villages. Wau town has run out of essential food items

like grain." He urged food shipments by any means available "to avert a very devastating human

tragedy."11 2 No grain was sent, and thousands would die inside Wau itself. Bahr al-Ghazal

Governor Laurence Lual claimed that from June through August there were more than 100,000

displaced in Wau, during which time "twenty to thirty people a day had died from hunger."

With the end of the rainy season, 50,000 displaced "left for the countryside to look for

food."113 In September, people were dying at the rate of 100 per day; a month later, the

Commissioner for the South reported that the city had been without relief food for more than a

year and "62 people die daily of hunger."114 In December, some 5,000 of Wau's most destitute

were surviving on a daily bowl of cassava porridge; the situation was finally relieved when the

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) instituted a C-130 airlift of food aid.

When no food aid arrived in Aweil, in April, thousands of displaced began to die. The

Governor reported that between April 1 and September 15, some 8,303 deaths were

recorded. The UNDP found in November that the death rate of children below age five had

been 2.6 per 1,000 per day, calculated over a period of 180 days between June and November.

Thus, a third of all children under five died in half a year. Some 30-150 deaths were

registered daily from July through September, and more than 7,146 deaths were recorded in

the same period; the starving "died outside the town or around it" in numbers greater than

those reported in Aweil itself. 115 In December, a survey still found one-quarter of all children

severely malnourished and one-quarter moderately malnourished. 116

The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies reported in February that there

was extensive fighting between Dinka and Rizayqat Arabs around Maryal Bei and Gom Masher,

and "right up to the south bank of the Bahr al-Arab." The harvest in the region had collapsed,

most livestock had been stolen, and most villagers were leaving.11 7 At Mareng Akuar, some

170 Dinka were herded and then burned alive by Murahileen in a single raid. The governor of

Bahr al-Ghazal reported in September that aside from the thousands of deaths in Aweil, deaths

at Winejok, Ariath, Paliet, and Palioping rural councils "could be tens of thousands."118 The

SPLA itself estimated that more than 10,000 Dinka, "mainly women and children, may havedied of hunger" while following the railroad line between Aweil and the North. 119

In August and September, flooding along the Lol River exacerbated existing famineconditions. Thousands of Dinka made for SPLA-held Akon where food supplies were minimal

and where the SPLA had previously reported famine conditions. Khartoum finally allowed the

ICRC to investigate conditions at Akon, after which the Red Cross learned that many of the

starving displaced had "died on the spot" and were buried in Akon's "countless mass

graves."120

30

C. EQUATORIA (estimated Deaths 1988: >25,000)Deaths Ethnic Groups Affected

1. East of the Nile (x10,000)

a. Torit Town x1,000- Various

b. Kapoeta x10(-

c. Kiyala x10-

2. West of the Nile (x5,000)

a. Juba Region x5,000- Various

(Juba City 10-11/88) x100- Various

b. Yei (12/88) x100- Various

In June. the Torit Relief Committee reported that starvation within the besieged town had

"risen to between 30-40 daily." 12 1 In Khartoum, the Chairman of the government's Council for

the South raised fears in September that as many as 10,000 had died. 122 Certainly, thousands

died, and by December what remained of the Torit Relief Committee, led by Bishop Taban, had

run out of food, and the army garrison's 6,000 soldiers had to be supplied by airdrop. The

civilian population was reduced from 40,000 to less than 5,000, many of whom were too old or

weak to move. In July, there was widespread malnutrition in the Kapoeta area, and in one

report it was noted that in two months some 142 people had died of meningitis in the area (a

near certain indication of famine conditions wherever it was found in southern Sudan).123 In

September, hundreds of starving from Kiyala arrived in Bor, where there was no food available

for them. Bishop Taban could only ask his people to prepare themselves for death and urged

his superiors in Juba to obtain OAU or UN intervention to save his starving thousands. 124 The

besieged city fell to the SPIA in January 1989. By April, Torit would regain its pre-civil war

population and crops were being sown throughout the region. A year later, Bishop Taban

described the situation in southern Sudan as the "freest he has known since the British left

Sudan in 1956."In Juba, food shortages began in May, and increased in September when military

activity cut off overland delivery of food aid. Food became scarce for some 200,000 needy, and

through December "up to 400 hunger-weakened people, most of them children, were dying

each month" in the city's two hospitals: In December, Juba officials claimed only 55 starvation

deaths, "but foreign relief workers put the death toll in the hundreds." 125 An airlift of relief

food arrived in December, but hunger was still widespread within the displaced camps.

Renewal, The Catholic Diocese of Juba's monthly, would report in April 1989 that it was"common knowledge in Juba that relief food has for a long time been the delicacy of those in

position of influence. . . . This outright cheating, coupled with the fact that most of the local

relief workers are seconded from government departments, may explain in part why it has

been difficult to arrest these irregularities."1 2 6

During the period August-November 1988. there were reports that "many people lost

31

their lives" by starvation or SPIA attacks, in a bid to escape Yei and "walk to nearby villages." 127

By December 1988, Yei was totally besieged, and its "famine-threatened" population wasnumbered in the thousands.

D. KORDOFAN REGION (Estimated Deaths 1988: >50,000)

1. South Kordofan Provincea. Kaduglib. Nuba Mts.c. Malwald. Mieram

(7/88)(8-10/88)

e. Muglad(1-3/88)(7-8/88)(9-10/88)

f. Babanusa Town(9-10/1988)

g. Abyei District(1) Turalei(2) Abyei

(6/88)(7-8/88)(9-10/88)

2. North Kordofan Provincea. El Obeid Districtb. En Nahud District

(x25,000)x100-

x100-

x100-

x10,000-

x1,000-

>3,000-

>5,000->100-

>2,000-

x100-

x1,000-

x100-

x10,000

>1,000-

>4,000-

>4,000-

>2,000-

(x1,000)x100-

x100-

Ethnic Groups Affected

Nuer, DinkaNuba, DinkaDinka

Dinka, Jur, etc.

Mostly Dinka

Various

Dinka, NuerDinka

Various

In early September, Angelo Beda, Chairman of the Council of the South, claimed that "morethan 50,000 southern Sudanese" had died of famine "in the first eight months of 1988."128The figure was well wide of the mark, and it seems certain that at least 50,000 died inKordofan alone. In April 1988, 3,500 starving Nuer from Bentiu and Mayom approachedKadugli and congregated at the "Mukhta camp," five miles from town. Help arrived for thesick and starving in June 1988 when Agence Internationale Contre la Faim (AICF) began thecare and feeding of as many as 5,000 displaced, most of whom fled famine in government-heldvillages in Upper Nile. Some who wanted to continue to the north found that they had to pay

32

officials 50 pounds or "voluntarily sell" a child. 129 SPAF attacks on Nuba mountain villages

caused hundreds of deaths among ethnic Nuba of the North and the Dinka of the South.

To the west, hundreds died at Malwal, a small railroad stop located south of Meiram

while fleeing Aweil district for the North. At Meiram itself, 95 kilometers south of Muglad."more than 1,000 people died in July after staggering in from the southern battlefields." 130 In

late July, 475 deaths were secretly recorded in five days. In August, MSF-France reported that

"70 people died each day," and weekly death rates were the highest it had ever recorded in

any of its programs around the world; despite local government opposition, MSF-France alone

enumerated more than 3,500 deaths from the last week of June through the first week in

October. 131 In early September, visitors found that at least 40 southerners were starving todeath every day at the makeshift camp that still housed some 6,000 displaced Dinka. The

"Crude Mortality Rate," which was averaging 53.9 deaths per day per 10,000 population, wasone of the worst death rates ever recorded in the Sudan or elsewhere. 132 By month's end,

there were practically no children between five and thirty months still alive in Meiram. AnOXFAM team was informed that north of Meiram there were hundreds of dead bodies "strewn

along the paths between Nabaq and Muqaddina." 13 3 When food aid arrived in Meiram, its

distribution was decided by the Missiriya members of the town council and the military, and

much of it was "creamed off by the army" before it reached the distribution point. 134 ByNovember, Western aid agencies had found it impossible to work in Meiram and were

eventually forced to leave.In March, as many as 100 Dinka displaced arrived daily as they followed the rail line

from Bahr al-Ghazal to the north. A file of corpses lined the path between Mierarn and AbuBateik and thence to Muglad. Muglad itself was the home of Shaikh Ali Nimr, leader of the

Missiriya Arabs and putative leader of their militia. Nimr and his people were for more than acentury the enemy of the Dinka, and the Missiriya had little love for the abid (slaves) of the

South. Concern, an Irish-based relief agency, noted that 1,000-2,000 displaced died at ornear Muglad during the summer 1988 rainy season alone. 135 The U.S. Centers for DiseaseControl reported that eighty people a day died during August. Following the arrival of a trainfrom Meiram in September, at least 30 of 300 displaced died within 24 hours of their arrivalin Muglad. 1 3 6 In October, a sample of displaced huts found that some 43 percent of dwellingshad reported at least one death in the previous month.

The displaced who were able scrambled atop trains bound from Babanusa to Khartoum,and hundreds died from hunger and dehydration before they arrived at Khartoum where thetrain station offered a macabre spectacle of the dead and dying. On one occasion in April1988. an estimated 7,000 displaced were forced off a train and left to fend for themselves in abarren region between Babanusa and El Obeid. 13 7 In August, the displaced in Babanusanumbered more than 6,000 and the mortality rate was estimated at 15 persons per day. 138 Inearly October, it was estimated at 3.1 deaths per 1,000 displaced per day, the highest campmortality rate then encountered.

"Of the 27,000 cattle herders and farmers who once lived around Turalei, about 1,000died of the famine.. .and as many as 75 percent migrated to the north or other areas in the

33

south in search of food."139

In June, Abyel "was teeming with 20,000 sick, emaciated Dinka refugees and morewere arriving every day." 140 Many of the "walking skeletons" had been attacked by armedMissiriya militia along the way. 141 The UN reported that "in June, an average of 150 peopleperished every day."142 In July, the mortality rate fell to 5-8 per day and then increased inAugust to 100 or more a day. 14 3 In September, 295 deaths were "officially" recognized. InOctober 1988, a UN team was appalled by the horrible conditions in Abyei town. MSF-Belgiurnreported that "it acquired, together with Meiram, the reputation of graveyard for thousands ofdisplaced."144 Ten of the village's 26 omdas provided lists that totaled more than 3,000people who starved, and it was estimated that their number far exceeded 10,000 for theyear. 145

In addition to the deaths in South Darfur, hundreds of starving from Bahr al-Ghazalwere buried in El Obeid. Elsewhere in North Kordofan, many starved while moving betweenMuglad/Babanusa and En Nahud, and by year's end there were more than 7,000 displacedlocated in the En Nahud displaced camp.

E. DARFUR REGION (Estimated Deaths 1988: x10,000)

1. South Darfur Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Safaha (1-4/88) (x1,000) Dinka, otherb. Nyala "camps" (x1,000)

OXFAM advised in February that, beginning in December, a large influx of destitute southernershad moved into the region. By March, Safaha on the Bahr al-Arab had become the funnelthrough which thousands of starving southerners made their way north. It was reported thattheir arrival was "connected with the collapse of security in and around Wau." 14 6 A Britishjournalist who arrived at Safaha and tried to interview the displaced was arrested and his notesand photographs were destroyed. In April, there were reports that starving Dinka motherswere selling their children for 300-400 Sudanese pounds to Rizayqat buyers in order to obtainenough food to ensure that some members of their family might survive. 147 MSF-Belgiumwould later report a mortality rate of 35 deaths per thousand per month of people passingthrough Safaha. 148

After transiting Safaha, more than 25,000 persons were relocated in seven campslocated near Nyala. On arrival, they lacked the barest essentials to survive on their own, andthe South Darfur Deputy Executive Officer, after touring the displaced settlements, "was visiblyshocked" at their condition, and MSF/Belgium reported the general nutritional status ofarriving Dinka was "devastating."149 In September, a UNICEF consultant wrote that "peopleare still dying because they are too weak to be treated properly. This ranges from 20 to 100people a week in the various camps."1so

34

F. ETHIOPIA REFUGEE CAMPS/FRONTIER (Estimated Deaths 1988: x10,000)

Ethnic Groups Affected

1. Dimma Ca (x1,000) Various

2. Itang Camp (x1,000) Various

The southern exodus that began in late 1987 continued through 1988. British Overseas

Development Minister Chris Patton, who visited the Ethiopian refugee camps, was informed

that the "road to the Ethiopian border is a graveyard, littered with the bones and corpses of

the dead." Relief workers estimated that of every ten who began the trek to Ethiopia, four

perished along the way. For those who did make it, 15 percent died after their arrival. 15 1 The

estimates were astounding: in April 1988, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

reported that their camps housed 250,000 Sudanese (Dinka, Murle, Taposa, Latuka, etc.); byJanuary 1989, they contained some 335,000 southerners -- an indication that in nine months,

more than 50,000 may have died on the trek to Ethiopia. Certainly, by year's end, thousands

continued to arrive, most being "in a critically malnourished state."15 2

In April, it was reported that mortality rates for newcomers in the various camps

averaged about 2/10,000 (more than 100 persons) a day and could have been as high as

8/10,000 (more than 400 persons).153 Pellagra was noted at Dimma camp, as were cases of

scurvy, and anemia was prevalent. At Itang camp, in early 1988 malnutrition was so

widespread that about 25 percent of in-patients treated at the hospital died. The UNrepresentative for Ethiopia found conditions in the Fugnido camp, where some 20,000

orphans were cared for, the "worst he had seen in 37 years in the United Nations."15 4 A "grim

clue" indicating the horror encountered by the tens of thousands of southern Sudanese who

fled to Ethiopia in the period 1987-1988 was "the discovery of 8,000 bodies of those trying to

escape Sudan found along the routes to Itang." iSS In October, Organization for African Unity

delegates were told that some 60 percent of the 43,000 Sudanese refugees at Fugnido were

orphans under the age of twelve. 156 By 1989, the worst was over, but of an estimated 700,000southern Sudanese who undertook the trek to Ethiopia, UN officials estimated 100,000 died

en route. Christopher Patten was not far wrong when, after touring the UNHCR camps in

Ethiopia, he claimed that the South was "being turned into a graveyard."15 7

G. KHARTOUM (Estimated Deaths 1988: xl,000)

Hundreds of displaced who managed to reach Khartoum died shortly after their arrival (manyin the Khartoum railroad yard) and before Western aid agencies could provide food aid. Amongthe displaced, infant mortality was very high, leading the UNICEF director to claim that deathshad "probably risen from a prewar level of 180 per 1,000 live births to over 250 in the last twoor three years." 158

35

SUBSTANTIVE DATA* 1989

In December 1988, the AID-Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in Washington, D.C.estimated that 1.5 million southerners were still "at risk of starvation in the southern

provinces of Sudan.15 9 Indeed, in January. "starvation conditions still existed throughout

much of the South." with reports that some 6,000 people had died in Bahr al-Ghazal and

Equatoria in early January "and several thousand others could die of hunger" if food supplies

did not arrive soon.16 0 The 1988-89 crop harvest was excellent, and 300,000 tons of

sorghum were actually exported in 1989, but the government made no effort to create a

strategic reserve. Despite relief officials' claims that 100,000. civilians "were menaced bystarvation," 16 1 the government sent no food aid either to the South or to southern displaced

located in northern Sudan. In March, the United Nations forced the recalcitrant governmentof Sadiq al-Mahdi to recognize the neutrality of relief aid and initiated a food aid program on

April 1. The so-called Operation Lifeline Sudan had, by mid-year, helped alleviate foodshortages throughout much of the South and southern Kordofan. An investigation of conditions

in SPLA-held Eastern Equatoria found "no indications of widespread starvation or widespread

deaths from starvation-related diseases at Kapoeta, Pibor, Narus and Torit." In contrast, the

situation was still bad in government-held garrison towns.On June 30, a military putsch overthrew the civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, and

a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), led by Brigadier Umar al-Bashir and comprising 15military officers, took charge of government. Among the first delegations to arrive in

Khartoum and personally pledge their support to the Revolutionary Command Council were the

Anyanya II and Missiriya militias. Among the first acts of the Revolutionary Command Council

was the creation of a People's Militia that was to enroll more than 100,000 soldiers by 1991and that increased tension and enhanced military activity in South Kordofan and along Sudan's

north-south divide. An RCC-sponsored National Dialogue Conference on Peace that wasconvened in September would report that the civil war had caused the deaths of some 4,600SPAF officers and men, 27,000 SPLA rebels, a quarter-million civilians, and seven million headof cattle. With the exception of the latter figure, all data were egregious underestimates. InOctober 1989, it was reported that the Sudanese Armed Forces had begun to provide arms tothe Oromo Liberation Front rebels of Ethiopia with the aim of attacking UN refugee campshousing more than 430,000 southern Sudanese, including many SPIA soldiers. As thegovernment moved to the right and made common cause with the National Islamic Front of

Muslim ideologue Hassan al-Turabi, the humanitarian aims and food aid delivery successes ofOperation Lifeline Sudan were not repeated under Operation Lifeline Sudan II in 1990, or

under subsequent programs. With the delivery of more than 100,000 tons of food aid in 1989,the number of deaths, although greatly reduced, was still significant.

36

Estimated Deaths 1989

Upper Nile >10,000Bahr al-Ghazal >10,000

Equatoria x1,000

Kordofan >10,000

Darfur x1,000

White Nile >1,000Khartoum x100

1989 TOTAL: >25,000

A. UPPER NILE REGION (Estimated Deaths 1989: >10,000)

1. Upper Nile Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affected

a. Malakal District (x1,000) Various

(1/89) >500-

In January, the Sudanese Red Crescent reported 30,000 displaced in precarious health in

Malakal with at least 15 people a day dying of starvation.16 2 When Western food aid arrived on

Nile River barges in February, the 150,000 hungry displaced were saved from imminent

starvation. Local merchants who had hoarded and sold grain at inflated prices were able to re-

stock and were seen dumping rotten grain in the Nile. Following the RCC putsch in June, the

military was soon involved in the diversion of more than 1,000 tons of UN/World Food

Program aid. When Bishop Vincent Mojwok complained, the SUDANAID relief organization

effort was suspended "indefinitely," and distributions were taken over by the military governor.

In October, a Shilluk "chieftain" stated: "Life is going on here. We are life. We are giving

birth, and we are eating. Although very little." 16 3

Region-wide, a visceral leishmaniasis (Kala Azar) pandemic spread with great rapidity

through both government and SPIA-held regions of Upper Nile, striking hard at Leer, Abwong,

and Bentiu, and moving north toward Renk. As was the case with outbreaks of meningitis in

both South and North, the Khartoum government did nothing to publicize the event or make

an effort to limit its diffusion. Western aid agencies were left to attack the problem;

MSF/Holland opened a clinic at Abwong, an SPIA-held village. Although the disease was noted

in Khartoum where more than one million southerners sought relief from the war, the

government provided no medical services to halt its spread.

37

B. BAHR AL-GEAZAI REGION (Estimated Deaths 1989: >10,000)

1. Bahr al-Ghazal Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affected

a. Wau District (x1,000) Dinka, others

(Wau City)(1-2/89) x100- Dinka

(1-4/89) x100- Dinka, others

(7/89) >100- Dinka

(Wau area) (1-4/89) x100- Various

b. Aweil District (x1,000) Dinka

c. Aweil Town (11/89) >15 Dinka

Wau continued to suffer throughout 1989. In January, a displaced camp was attacked by Fertit

militia, and at least ten people were killed. The raids were repeated in February, and killings

of displaced and Dinka residents became "a feature of life after nightfall." 164 In late March, it

was reported that "only a handful of people die daily of hunger or disease in Wau, thanks to a

three-month-old airlift."16 5 In July, following a road land mine incident, the SPAF 311th Field

Artillery ran amok inside Wau killing more than 100 Dinka in the Zagalona ward. The RCC did

not seek to punish those responsible for the atrocity.At Aweil, a train carrying 900 tons of food aid arrived in January, after which food was

distributed by the Dinka-dominated Aweil Relief Committee to slightly more than 50,000displaced, nearly all of whom had been "at risk" of starvation. Dinka villages continued to

suffer famine until distribution of relief food was normalized by a USAID-supported airlift thatbegan in March. On November 11, a truck filled with Dinka exploded an SPLA land mine that

had been uncovered by the SPAF. In an example of SPAF cruelty inside Aweil, The SPAFpurposely allowed the truck to explode the mine and then stalled the evacuation of injured for

a day because the critically injured were "only Dinka." MSF-France personnel treated the

wounded, and a month later its Islander airplane devoted to the delivery of relief supplies was

shot down by a missile fired from the police compound in Aweil, resulting in the deaths of four

relief workers and the end of direct Western relief activity in nearly all of government-heldBahr al-Ghazal.

38

C. EQUATORIA REGION (Estimated Deaths 1989: x1,000)

1. East of the Nile Deaths Ethnic Gmups Affected

a. Torit District (x1,000)(1/89) x100- Various

(10/89) x10- Various

2. Equatoria West of the Nilea. Mundri (6/89) (>100) Various

b. Sudan-Zaire Frontier (x100) Kakwa, others

c. Juba (x1,000) Various

The UN-sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which was active in both SPLA andgovernment-held territory, made use of airlifts and "corridors of tranquility" to deliver some26,000 tons of food aid in SPLA-held territory. When the government garrison at Nimule wasoverrun in March, eastern Equatoria -- a region the size of Uganda -- fell under the control of

the SPIA and was more completely opened to Western food aid. Throughout Equatoria (andmost of southern Sudan) rainfall was good, crops were excellent, and outside of Juba andgovernment garrison towns, famine was greatly reduced by year's end.

Before the fall of Torit to SPIA forces in January. there were reports of the massacre ofcivilian residents inside the town. 166 Before the town fell, residents ate anything they couldfind to stay alive. A grader was used to bury the dead. 167 After the town was captured by theSPIA, it soon regained most of its pre-siege population, whose needy were fed through OLS.On March 4, the government's Nimule garrison fell to the SPIA, and the last SPAF outpost eastof the Nile was taken. Food aid was then rushed to Kapoeta, Torit, Nimule, and to Bor, inUpper Nile, and slowly the region began to return to normal. In October 1989, the SPAFinitiated a campaign of high-altitude bombing of SPLA-controlled towns. On October 4,government airplanes bombed Waat in Upper Nile; at month's end Torit was hit, and at leastten civilians were killed. Elsewhere in the South, civilian sites(e.g., Kongor) suffered bombingcasualties. In Bahr al-Ghazal, Nyamlell was bombed and nearby villages and cattle herds werestrafed, while Aluakluak and Akot were also hit. According to a UN official, the SPAF initiatedat least ten air attacks on seven SPIA towns during the first three weeks of December.Invariably, civilian centers rather than military targets were hit. The government-controlledmedia admitted that the bombing had as its objective "to stop the ongoing relief effort." 168

West of the Nile, Mundri was besieged by the SPIA, but the SPAF made it nearlyimpossible for starving people to leave the town -- just as it had in Juba city. The result wasthe deaths of scores of civilians. At mid-year, the UN confirmed the presence of famine andfound that most civilians had managed to escape or had died. In Juba itself, the senior medicalofficer at the government hospital claimed in March that up to two-thirds of Juba's displacedsuffered from malnutrition. Patients hospitalized and even prisoners in the Juba jail had died

39

of hunger. 169 An OXFAM representative added that "some people" were "dying of diseasebrought on or complicated by lack of food."170 It was reported in February that "ten childrendie every day in Juba's two hospitals from famine and disease. Many more die unreported intheir homes because they are too weak to move." 17 1 This situation lasted the rest of the year.

In October, fighting resumed among SPIA and SPAF forces, and the RCC soon haltedfood aid flights to Juba. Thereafter and through 1992, the arrival of relief supplies for185,000+ displaced was dependent on RCC whim and the extent of military activity nearby.Regardless of military activity or the presence or lack of food supplies, the SPAF denied theJuba displaced the right to return to their villages. Thus the displaced were then, and through1992, held hostage to RCC policy. In December, the battle for Kajo Kaji and villages along theZaire frontier was waged. The defeated SPAF forces committed numerous atrocities as theytransited villages on their way to asylum in Zaire. In one notorious case, the SPAF commanderaccused a Kakwa sub-chief of supporting the SPLA; the tribal leader's hands were cut off and hewas allowed to bleed to death.

D. KORDOFAN REGION (Estimated Deaths 1989: >10,000)

1. Southern Kordofan Province Deaths Ethnic Grouos Affecteda. Malwal (>100) Dinkab. Muglad (1-4/89) (x100) Dinkac. Kadugli Region (x1,000) Various

(Lake Keilak) (1-6/89) x100- Dinka, Fallata, etc.(Lagowa) (10-11/89) >100- Nuba, Dinka

Southern Sudanese investigating the myriad claims of child kidnapping and slavery occurringin the Transition Zone between North and South estimated that there were at least 75,000Dinka children sold into slavery in the North. Lists of children located in Arab families begancirculating in Khartoum in 1989.172

Malwal, a Missiriya village and militia outpost south of Meiram, received 150 tons offood aid in January. It was later reported that none of the food reached the southerndisplaced. There were reports of hundreds of deaths in and near the town as southernerstrekked north toward Muglad. 173 At Muglad, deaths decreased in 1989, with a report of only28 deaths inside the displaced camp in January. Nonetheless, the camps in South Kordofancontinued to grow in size and continued to receive southern Sudanese in distress. In March,more than 200 southerners were arriving daily, and the new arrivals told harrowing tales ofthe continued murder, kidnapping, slavery, and starvation occurring on the trek north fromBahr al-Ghazal. 174 The Muglad camp was often threatened by Missiriya townspeople. In April,it was reported that 17,000 displaced had arrived "in the last few months"; some failed tosurvive, including, according to an April 19 report, 15 people who had died of thirst in theprevious days."175 By June 1990, government official General Burma Nasr, bent on using"security" as a reason, tried to close down the Muglad camp that housed more than 18,000

40

southern displaced, mostly women, children, and old men. That tactic would be continued bythe RCC until the closure of all displaced camps in South Kordofan in 1992 and the creation ofRCC "Peace Villages" where displaced were little less than captives and were used as a laborforce.

Missiriya militia depredations caused the deaths of hundreds of Fallata and Dinka insouth-central Kordofan, and only ceased after the SPIA badly mauled a militia unit in June.Following SPIA successes in the Nuba Hills, the RCC announced in August that it wasorganizing a People's Defense Force (PDF) to be "supervised by the Army." The first unitswere organized by Dr. Issa Bushra, a known Muslim extremist, and shortly thereafter tensionsincreased as Nuba, Hawazna, and Dinka were threatened by Arab militias operating under PDFguise. Owing to fighting around Kadugli, some 20,000 displaced had relocated in LagowaDistrict, heightening tensions between non-Arab and Arab groups. On October 30, fightingerupted between the 3.500 member Misslriya militia (qua PDF) and civilians at Lagowa.(Lagowa was the birthplace of retired general Burma Nasr, former SPAF and Umma partypowerhouse and generally considered the godfather of Kordofan's Arab militias.) A Missiriyaattack began in Lagowa town on October 31, and spread to the surrounding area. Twelvevillages were destroyed, creating more than 20,000 displaced.176 A "Peace Conference" heldin January whitewashed the activities of the attacking forces.

E. DARFUR REGION (Estimated Deaths 1989: x1,000)

In early 1989, thousands of hungry continued the trek from Bahr al-Ghazal to the North. Manythousands made their way toward villages and towns in South Darfur. Many died en route orafter arriving in camps. The situation was, however, much improved over 1988, and Westernrelief aid helped to minimize the number of deaths in this region.

F. CENTRAL REGION (Estimated Deaths 1989: >1,000)

1. White Nile Province D Tribes Impacteda. Kosti (1-5/89) (x100) Variousb. Jebelein (12/89) (>1,000) Shilluk

Until relief supplies reached Upper Nile, the food situation remained critical in the regionbetween Kaka and Malakal. Thousands of displaced arrived in Renk and Kosti, swelling thedisplaced camps there. Many were in terrible condition, suffering from Kala Azar and cerebro-spinal meningitis. 177

On December 28, an argument involving a Jebelein omda and Shilluk field handscelebrating the last day of their Christmas vacation ended in the slaughter of an estimated1,500 Shilluk (including more than 100 killed in the Jebelein police station) by an armedmilitia and mob of Sebha Arabs. The massacre was the subject of an RCC investigation that didnothing to reduce tensions among local Arab villages and some 40,000 displaced southernerswho had arrived in the region between August and December 1989, hoping for work in thegrain fields.

41

SUBSTANTIVE DATA: 1990-1991

The 1989-90 grain harvest was quite good in most of southern Sudan. However, in isolatedvillages such at Ikotos, Isoke, Chakari, and Lodwara. food supplies were found to be "seriouslyinadequate,"17 8 and the Sudan country director of the International Committee of the RedCross noted in January 1990 that some 350,000 persons "in the war zone of southern Sudan[might] die" unless relief supplies reached them before the end of February. 179 When the

government was slow to respond, relief workers and diplomats warned that in Equatoria, "tensof thousands of people" were threatened with starvation because "the country's ruling Juntawas delaying a relief program with near-impossible conditions." 180 In March 1990, a UN-sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan II program was begun, but it would not repeat the successof OLS I. Nevertheless, OLS II supplied at least 50,000 tons of food aid to needy villages anddisplaced camps. Of the total, nearly 20,000 tons were received in SPLA-controlled areas.

In 1990, the war was most active in Western Equatoria where the SPLA captured eleventowns in January. By summer, government forces held only Juba and Yei, both of which werebesieged; food aid donors were, however, slow to respond to SPLA requests for food aiddeliveries to villages captured from the SPAF.

The 1990 rainfall was poor along the Sahelian tier of Kordofan and Darfur, and Westernrelief agencies warned of an extensive famine should there be a second year of poor rainfall.The rains also failed in much of the northern tier of southern Sudan. Food aid inventories inWau, Juba, and Malakal were dangerously low. In July 1990, the OLS II director admitted thatthere were few food supplies in the South and that inventories would be exhausted by October.The problems of the South, however, were obscured after the rains failed once again in theSahelian zone. In September 1990, the Agency for International Development in Washington,D.C. warned that Kordofan and Darfur were entering the initial stages of a major, nation-widefood crisis, as that which occurred in 1983-85. The food aid problem in both the North andthe South was exacerbated after the RCC supported Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait in August1990. The food aid program was halted during the UN's Operation Desert Storm, and the OLSprogram did not begin again until well after a cease-fire with Iraq was concluded.

Western Sudan suffered extensive famine in 1991, and though there were droughtpockets in the South, the region suffered nothing like the terrible famine that struck northernDarfur and Kordofan. Nevertheless, conditions affecting hundreds of thousands of southernerschanged drastically following the disintegration of the Ethiopian government of Haile MengistuMiriam in May 1991. The SPLA was forced from its safe haven in Ethiopia, and Ethiopianforces, particularly the Oromo Liberation Front supported by the RCC, began to threaten the435,000 refugees located in Ethiopian camps managed by the UN High Commissioner forRefugees. In late 1989, the Oromo Liberation Front forces of Ethiopia, which were supportedby the RCC, began to attack near the Sudanese refugee camp at Asosa, which was eventuallyobliterated. Following their May 1991 attacks on the camps, southern Sudanese refugeesranged over much of Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria in a frantic search for food and shelter.

42

The plight of the displaced was made more difficult.when, in August 1991, the SPIA split into

two camps: the so-called Nasir Group that favored independence for southern Sudan split with

Garang. Its forces, comprised of Nuer, attacked Dinka villages in Upper Nile, laying waste a

once prosperous region., With the tacit approval of the RCC, it challenged Garang's Torit group

for primacy in Nile villages from Fanjak to Bor. Meanwhile the SPAF continued the buildup of

the army and the PDF. Still, by year's end, most of the South remained under SPIA control.

In Khartoum, the RCC began the forced relocation of tens of thousands of southern

displaced found in spontaneous settlements within the greater Khartoum conurbation. In the

process, thousands were returned to their homes in southern Sudan with little more than the

clothes on their backs. Others were relocated in desert camps west of Omdurman and well

south of Khartoum where food, health, and education benefits were negligible. The death toll

for the two years, although hardly approaching the disastrous years of 1987 and 1988, was still

significant:

43

Estimated Deaths 1990-1991

Upper Nile >25,000Bahr al-Ghazal >50,000Equatoria >5, 000Khartoum x1,000

1990-91TOTAL: >125,000

A. UPPER NILE REGION (Estimated Deaths 1990-91: >25,000)

1. Uoper Nile Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Sobat R. Area (1-2/90) (xlO) Burun

b. Ayod Area (5/90) (x100) Various

c. Malakal (6-8/90) (x100) Various

d. Nasir Region (x5,000) Various

(5-6/91) x100- Various

(9/91) x100- Uduk

(11-12/91) x100- Various

e. Fanjak/Bentiu (12/91) (x100) Nuer

2. Jonflei Province

a. Bor District (x5,000) Dinka

(9/90) x10- Dinka

(9-12/91) >5,000- Dinka

b. Kongor (x1,000) Dinka

In 1990, famine pockets existed practically the length of the Ethiopian frontier. The Burun ofthe Upper Sobat were especially hard hit, and scores starved and hundreds appeared at Renkin search of food aid. 181 Elsewhere, a government convoy comprising 13,000 soldierstravelling toward Juba reportedly targeted civilians in villages around Ayod. "Several villageswere burned," and "dozens of civilians" were reported killed. 182 During 1990, faminethreatened much of the "Nuer-land" when drought was followed by torrential rains andflooding. In addition, there was a series of SPAF attacks on villages south of Bentiu. Thus, by1991, thousands of Nuer were on the march toward Ethiopia or to Malakal. Once again therewere reports of adults starving so that their children could reach the safety of Ethiopia.1 83

The Malakal displaced suffered when the RCC refused to allow an ICRC barge to deliverfood aid to Nile villages situated north and south of Bor. In September 1990, the governmentairforce attempted but failed to bomb the barge, which the SPLA then hid to avoid its

44

destruction. Although the SPLA had agreed in August 1989 to allow UN-flagged food aidconvoys to pass unmolested from Kosti to Malakal, the RCC allowed no food aid to be barged toMalakal for nearly a year. With 100,000 displaced on the verge of starvation, the ICRC beganan emergency airlift of food on August 12, by which time there were reports of starvationdeaths inside the city. Once again Upper Nile was in flux, and in July there were reports ofemaciated "stick-children" once again appearing in Ethiopian refugee camps. 18 4 Thousands ofstarving displaced in Malakal made their way north to Kosti where the number of displacedsoon passed 100,000.

On May 26, 1991, the Oromo Liberation Front, which received direct support from theSudanese RCC, attacked the refugee camp at Gambella, Ethiopia. Fighting spread to the Itangcamp and in a matter of days, more than 300,000 Sudanese had fled back into Sudan.Following the exodus of displaced from camps in Ethiopia, thousands starved as they searchedfor food elsewhere. Groups of refugees, mostly women and children, had marched throughmarshlands to reach Nasir, and survivors reported that thousands had died along the way.1 85

A group of 26,000 Uduk who had moved from the Asosa camp when it was destroyed to Itangcamp and thence to Sudan "had diminished to 18,000 by the time they reached Nastr." 186

Along the way, refugee concentrations were bombed near Nasir, a hospital in Nasir itself wasdamaged by SPAF bombers, and UNICEF reported that UN staff and journalists observed"bodies floating past in the Sobat River."187- As a result of the flight from Ethiopia, in June1991, AID warned that more than 100,000 southerners were "in poor health," and at graverisk. Given the impending tragedy and the inaccessibility of the region, "massive airdrops"were undertaken by Western aid agencies to save the situation. 188

Tens of thousands of displaced congregated at Nasir and Jokau, and to the south atPochala and Pakok. In every case, food supplies were limited and the UN and internationaldonors undertook emergency food aid programs to avert massive starvation. In September,there was practically no food at the Nordeng displaced camp, and hundreds of Uduk died. InNovember and December 1992, scores of starvation deaths were reported at Nordeng andother displaced settlements where thousands of former Sudanese refugees from Ethiopia hadcongregated.1 89 In December, it was reported that one in three of the 2,000 orphans found inthe Nasir displaced camp suffered from severe malnutrition, and starvation deaths continuedwell into 1992.190

In December, the RCC reported thousands of displaced suffering from acutemalnutrition in Fanjak, Bentiu, and other towns south of Malakal.191 AID reported that aninflux of 50,000 displaced suffering from malnutrition had arrived in the region.

In fall 1990, at least five SPAF air raids on Bor (and similar raids on villages under SPLAcontrol -- Yirol, Waat, Leer, Akon, and Ayod) carried out in the period September 20 to 25caused a series of United Nations protests. The attacks caused numerous civilian deaths,threatened UN personnel and planes on the ground, and led to a halt in the movement of foodaid. The UN protested that the RCC had introduced "a new and very dangerous element" inthe civil war, and the U.S. State Department called them "a threat to the relief effort inSudan."192

45

True disaster struck Bor beginning in September 1991 when the breakaway SPIA-Nasirbegan the forced displacement of more than 200,000 inhabitants of the Bor-Kongor area. InDecember, it was reported that interfactional fighting between SPLA forces continued inKongor. Villagers "suffered terribly" and were "forced to leave their homes at gunpoint; thosewho refused were shot dead." 19 3 Continued factional fighting in camps and villages in the Borarea between December 8 and 11 resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people and theslaughter of thousands of cattle. Following SPLA-Nasir attacks, tens of thousands of Dinka fledpell-mell southward into Equatoria and toward the Uganda border. 19 4 The internecine SPIAwar that pitted Nuer against Dinka provided a perfect opportunity for government forces toreoccupy most of southern Sudan in 1992.

B. BAHLR AL-GHAZAL REGION (Estimated Deaths 1990-91: >50,000)

1. Bahr al-Ghazal Province Dh Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Aweil District (7-9/90) (x1OO) Dinkab. Mayen Abun (>100) Dinkac. Akon (1-7/1990) (>100) Dinka

2. Buheirat Provincea. Yirol (7J904/91) (>35,000) Dinka

A small drought "pocket" surfaced in late 1989 in the Mayen Abun area north of Awell.Nevertheless, the RCC denied the use of a train or the creation of a "corridor of tranquility"through which food aid could be moved to some 50,000 threatened southerners.Consequently, most of the needy began the trek north, arriving at displaced camps at Abyeiand Muglad in South Darfur, where Western relief aid was still being distributed. Otherthousands moved south toward the SPIA stronghold at Yirol, although the Government inSeptember 1991 refused to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to continue itsaid program (and where only a small amount of food aid continued to arrive through NorwegianPeople's Aid).

Following a two week survey of the region, an OLS II report distributed in May 1990claimed there existed the threat of imminent starvation in the northern parts of Bahr al-Ghazaland around Juba. 195 In July 1990, the U.S. Embassy worried that sparse rainfall in northernBahr al-Ghazal would lead to "crop and cattle losses" that could replicate the 1987-88 famine.Food aid inventories in Aweil (and Wau) were dangerously low and would remain so through1993.

In 1990, The New York Times reported the forced return of at least 60,000 southerners.Thousands appeared in the Akon region where food supplies were minimal. In Khartoum, theRCC admitted it was in the process of "helping about 190,000 refugees [sic] return to thesouth" but denied it was forcing the displaced to do so. 196 Finding no food in Akon and with

46

the problem of drought in nearby Mayen Abun, thousands of starving Dinka made their way

toward SPLA-held villages located near the Nile or in southern Bahr al-Ghazal. 197 Thousandsof emaciated displaced arrived in Yirol where food supplies were limited. As food becamescarce, people sickened and a meningitis epidemic was claimed to have taken the lives ofnearly ten percent of the region's 450,000 people. Those who had already slaughtered cattle

to survive were forced to eat leaves and wild food. In March 1991, a Belgian researcher

reported that health conditions within the district were deteriorating.1 98

C. EQUATORIA REGION (Estimated Deaths 1990-91: >5,000)

1. West of the Nile Deats Ethnic Groups Affected

a. Juba Region (x100) Various

b. Zaire borderland (9/90) (>100) Various

2. East of the Nile

a. Torit

(11/90) x10 Various

(10-12/91) x100 Dinka

By 1990, relief agencies had registered nearly 190,000 people in Juba in need of food aid.Most subsisted on "half-rations," and "starving people attempting to leave to forage for food inthe countryside [were] turned back by the army."1 99 The RCC suspended relief flights forthree months beginning on November 3, 1989, and when relief supplies were late or cut off ahandful of the weakest displaced would die. By February, "everybody" was confined "within alimited radius of the [SPAF's] garrison towns," and there were reports that civilians who triedto flee Juba had been shot by government soldiers. 200 During the two years, hundreds woulddie as a result of famine-induced causes. The government used the deteriorating food supplysituation as a reason to close the University of Juba in October 1989, and its 1,500 studentswere forced to relocate to Khartoum where a new curriculum would be imposed and coursestaught in Arabic would be mandatoiy. (Only 700 students relocated.) In January 1990, theSPIA initiated an artillery attack on military targets in Juba (airport, headquarters of thegovernment's Southern Command), its first in nearly a year. Nearly a score of civilians werekilled. In January, General Alison Magaya, a southern Sudanese, was replaced by Major GeneralNasraddin Ibrahim as military commander of Equatoria province. Thereafter, SPAFmistreatment of civilians was commonplace.

During fighting in Western Equatoria, tens of thousands fled their villages in search ofsafety and food. Many would head toward Kajo Kaji. Others fled to Zaire. In September, theWorld Food Program reported that there were 8,000 displaced at Lasu, where deaths bystarvation were averaging five a day. 201

In eastern Equatoria. the Sudan military continued its air raids on civilian targets. In

47

one case, a bombing raid on Torit in November caused a dozen civilian deaths. 20 2 Later,following battles between the two SPLA factions, thousands of Dinka began to make their waysouth toward Torit. Hundreds died along the way.

D. KHARTOUM (Estimated Deaths 1990-91: x1,000)

Death Ethnic Groups Affected

1. Souk Markazi (1/90) (>20) Dinka

By October 1989, by the Revolutionary Command Council's own reckoning, there were 1.8million displaced (nearly all from southern Sudan, and including an estimated one millionchildren) living in the greater Khartoum area. Almost without exception they lived in misery,rarely receiving assistance from the government. Aside from the activities of Western reliefagencies, where assistance was made available (food, medicine), the proselytizing activities ofArab relief agencies (Islamic Dawaa, Islamic African Relief Agency) went hand in hand withdistributions. Thousands of displaced died after arriving in Khartoum, but apparently no onehas ever tried to calculate their losses. In June 1990, UNICEF reported that 23 percent ofchildren under three living in Khartoum were severely malnourished: less than 50 percent ofall Sudanese children had been vaccinated, two-thirds of Khartoum residents lived inunsanitary conditions, and almost 90 percent of displaced children did not attend school.Khartoum was, in fact, a horror for the displaced. In August 1991, AID/Famine Early WarningSystem reports a 17 percent malnutrition rate among the displaced in Khartoum. 203 SouthernSudanese lived in constant fear of being evicted from their dwellings and dwelling sites. Theyalso had reason to fear the police, the military, and after July 1989, the PDF. In one instance,in a fight over water supplies, the newly formed PDF capital militia attacked the Dinka camp atSouk Markezi causing the death of more than twenty Dinka. Despite the consequences andthe human casualties involved, the RCC began a campaign in 1991 to return to the South allsouthern Sudanese (approximately 1.6 million people) who had settled in the capital area after1983.

SUBSTANTIVE DATA* 1992-1993

Following the split in SPLA ranks, the SPLA-Nasir group dominated by ethnic Nuer sought toexpel the Dinka from Upper Nile. The result was chaos, spreading hunger and disease, andthe disintegration of the SPLA forces themselves. Malaria was on the increase, and of anestimated million cases, at least two-thirds would go untreated. Four million doses ofmeningitis vaccine were needed, and in 1992 UNICEF estimated that at least 2,000 would dieif vaccine was unavailable. 20 4 In addition, famine conditions worsened in 1992, and a UN planfor relief flights to 14 famine-affected sites in southern Sudan (which were to begin in May

48

1992) was rejected by the government of Sudan. 205 Eventually, the government authorizedflights to Waat, Akobo, Nasir, Pibor, and Pochala, all under the control of the SPLA-Nasir group,but permitted nothing for areas under SPLA-Torit control. In January 1993, the RCCacknowledged that it had exported sorghum to Somalia and Kenya but claimed there was "noshortage of food in other parts of the country."206 Meanwhile, in February, MSF/Hollandreported that hundreds of thousands of southerners were at risk from Kala Azar, and estimatedthat 60,000 people had already died from a disease that had devastated Upper Nile. 207 InMarch 1993, Roger Winter, the director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, noted: "I recentlyread an estimate that 500,000 [southern Sudanese] deaths occurred in 1992," but Winteradded quite correctly that it would be difficult for anyone to "make an educated guess," exceptto say that people had died and were continuing to die "in large numbers."208 As the situationworsened throughout much of the South, in April 1993, the UN/World Food Program reportedthat food shortages there were at "a crisis point" and malnutrition rates were "among thehighest in the world." 209

49

Estimated Deaths 1992-1993

Upper Nile x100,000Bahr al-Ghazal x10,000Equatoria x5, 000Kordofan x10,000Darfur xl, 000

1992-1993 TOTAL: >250,000

A. UPPER NILE REGION (Estimated Deaths 1992-93: x100,000)

1. Upper Nile Provincea. Malakal District

(1) Malakal Town(2) Ulang (5/93)

b. Renk (8/92)c. Waat (10-11/92)d. Nasir Region

(2/93)(5/93)

e. Akobo

(3/92)f. Yuai (5/92-4/93)

2. Jonelei Provincea. Bor Region

(3/93)b. Kongor Area

(9/92)(3/93)

c. Ayod

d. Pariang

(x1,000)x100-

x10-(x100)(x100)

(x1,000)x10-

x100-(x5,000)

x100-(>1,000)

(x10,000)x100-

(x10,000)x1,000-

x100-(x1,000)

(x100)

Ethnic Groups Affected

VariousVariousVariousNuer

VariousNuer

NuerNuer

Dinka, NuerDinka

Dinka, Nuer

Various

In Upper Nile province, crops failures were common in 1992, especially in the eastern sector.This exacerbated an already critical food supply situation brought about by RCC restrictions onfood aid flights.210 Following a rebel attack inside Malakal in 1992, the RCC responded withincredible savagery, detaining civil servants and others making life a "living hell" inside the

50

city; reports of bodies dumped in the Nile were common. 2 11 In August, a barge convoy arrived

in Renk from Malakal with 6,300 displaced persons aboard; many were naked and starving and

most arrived without personal belongings at a town that was loathe to distribute food aid to the

needy.2 12 To the east of Renk, there were reports of starvation among the Maban in the

vicinity of Doro and Boing. In October, the WFP described "shocking conditions of starvation

and suffering among the displaced" in Malakal, where people were reportedly "dying on the

streets."2 13 In October 1992, there were reports of scores of dead and dying in Waat. 2 14

Hundreds died of hunger before Save the Children (U.K.) was able to set up a feeding center

and move food aid into the region. Yuai village located South of Waat was burned down during

fighting between SPLA factions, with the loss of hundreds of lives. In May 1993, Nuer from

Waat attacked villagers at Ulang, forcing more than 4,000 villagers to flee to Nasir and Malakal.

Malakal was once again awash with thousands of hungry, as the hungry and dispossessed made

their way in search of food.In February 1993, a yellow fever outbreak was reported along the Sobat River. Three

months later, an estimated 30,000 were displaced in the Nasir region as Nuer clans battled

"over access to fishing."2 15 In March 1992, some 5-10 people were daily dying from starvation

in Akobo.216 In May, a churchman reported that 23 people had died the previous day and

more than 250, mostly children, had died in "the past few weeks" of starvation. He reported

"everybody is weak and waiting to die." Akobo had received no food aid in more than two

months as the government "grounded relief flights to southern Sudan as it launched a major

offensive" against the SPLA. 2 17

In Jonglei Bor/Kongor remained the center of SPLA inter-factional fighting.

Depopulation continued after Bor was captured by government forces in April 1992. In

September 1992, the Norwegian People's Aid reported that the famine situation in Bor was

"very desperate." Thousands had already died and those that remained were almost universally

suffering from malnourishment. 2 18 In March 1993, there were some 7,100 displaced living in

Bor, "with a daily mortality rate of eight."2 19 Like Bor, Kongor suffered from flooding in 1991and 1992, and was the nexus of SPIA battling in March and June 1992. In September,Norwegian People's Aid reported "very tragic human suffering" with monthly death rates of

more than 500 persons reported. 220 In early 1993, the U.S. Centers for Disease Controlvisited Kongor and found 84 percent of all children under five either moderately or severelymalnourished. (A malnutrition rate greater than 8 percent is considered a "nutritionalemergency.")22 1 Later, following an attack by the Garang faction, the area around Kongor was

estimated to have only 20,000 inhabitants, most of them starving. The WFP estimated thatless than three percent of that population were children -- as opposed to the normalcalculation of twenty percent "in average developing countries."222 In March 1993, USAIDfound extensive and "very serious malnutrition." Another report found that of the 145,000

"facing starvation... more than 15 are dying each day."223 The situation was considered"desperate" and likely to get worse in the event of interfactional fighting.

In 1992. Ayod was the center of Nuer fighting with clans from the Waat area attackingin June, July, and August 1992. In January 1993, riots to reach planes transporting food aid to

51

Ayod led to the deaths of more than 100 adults and children. 224 Worse,.at Pariang, a Kala Azarepidemic had reached "catastrophic proportions," and the UN/WFP warned that "the entirepopulation may die" from the disease "in the next several years." Hundreds of children werereportedly "orphaned by the disease." 225

In early 1993, a U.S. Centers for Disease Control investigation discerned that, withKongor, Ayod was "the current epicenter of famine in southern Sudan. 226 USCDC found that,in Ayod, some 75 percent of all children under five were either moderately or severelymalnourished and estimated their annual crude death rate at 276 per thousand per year; thiswas one of the highest rates ever documented. The annual crude death rate for Sudan as awhole in 1989 was 15 per thousand per year, and 24 per thousand in non-famine areas in sub-Saharan Africa. 22 7 In February 1993, there was practically no food for an estimated 20,000people. As the desperate began to search elsewhere for food, UNICEF reported in Februarythat ten people were dying daily and there were very few children under five still alive. InMarch, USAID found that survival was dependent on wild foods that had become increasinglyscarce. In April, a UN/WFP representative claimed there were more than 4,000 people in thefeeding center at Ayod who would not survive given fighting in the region which impeded thedelivery of food aid.22 8

B. BARH AL-GHAZAL REGION (Estimated Deaths 1992-93: x10,000)

1. Bahr al-Ghazal Province Deaths Ethnic Grouos Affecteda. Wau Town (1993) (x1OO) Variousb. Akon region (5/93) (x1OO) Dinkac. Raga District (1/93) (x1O) Variousd. Aweil District (x1,000) Dinka

2. Buheirat Provincea. Tonj District (x1,000) Dinkab. Thiet village (4/93) (x100) Dinka

WFP reported high malnutrition in displaced camps inside Wau, and by May 1993, the situationwas very bad at Mariel Ahjeith camp "among children under five." 229 Elsewhere, by May, ashortage of food stocks in Akon prevented the WFP monitor from distributing food "to thevulnerable groups," whose mortality rate was "reportedly increasing."230 An MSF/Francenutritional survey in Lietnhom and Winejok near Akon indicated that food aid reaching thedestitute in that region was insufficient given vast needs. To the west of Wau, nearly 20,000displaced had crowded into Raga, where food was in short supply and reports of highmalnutrition rates were noted among children under five and the elderly. 23 1

Government troops accompanying trains moving to Wau in late 1992 and early 1993were responsible for destroying villages north of Aweil and killing more than a thousand

52

civilians, including "almost a thousand persons between Malwal Station and Aweil." 232In Buheirat, SPAF attacks near Rumbek and on Yirol created nearly 150,000 displaced

by mid-1992. During government attacks beginning in April 1992, the SPAF burned villagesand food supplies "in a 25 kilometer radius" from Yirol. Further atrocities were perpetrated bythe government's Mundari militia. 233 Some 50,000 escaped Yirol and gathered without foodor shelter at Aluakluak where according to Catholic churchmen, many were "hungry and sick"and where hundreds would die when no food aid reached the area. Others fled southwest intoEquatoria. Near the Nile, Dinka villages were attacked and razed by Nuer raiders. By mid-1993, one of the South's major cattle regions was nearly devastated, a pastoral people had lostan estimated 60 percent of their cattle, and the remaining herd was threatened byRinderpest. 23 4 Destitute from Wuncuel and Lou Arik villages had arrived after fleeing Nuerraiders who killed villagers, destroyed homes, and ran off cattle, and in Thiet town a WFPnutritional survey found severe malnutrition among 25 percent of the children sampled underage five.

C. EQUATORIA REGION (Estimated Deaths 1992-93: z5,000)

1. East of the Nile Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Ame Displaced Camp (1992) (x1,000) Dinka, otherb. Atepe & Aswa region (1992) (x100) Acholic. Lafon (5/93) (x200) Lokoro

2. West of the Nile

a. Maridi (1993) (x1OO) Various

b. Kajo Kaji (2/93) (x10) Variousc. Juba city (x100) Various

Following the SPLA's loss of Kapoeta in May 1992 and Torit in July 1992, some 150,000people fled south to areas along the Uganda border. "Large numbers" fleeing Kapoeta werereportedly killed by local Toposa militiamen "armed by the government."235 More than100,000 displaced would settle at the so-called "triple A" camps at Atepe, Aswa, and Arapiwhere food supplies and health services were, at first, very minimal. At Ame, the U.S. Centersfor Disease Control investigation in early 1993 found 81 percent of all children under fiveeither moderately or severely malnourished and estimated their annual crude death rate at234 per thousand per year.236 Thousands of adults and children who attempted to reach thethree camps died while fleeing a series of internecine SPLA offensives and counter-offensivesthat laid waste to Kongor and Bor in 1992. Acholi villages were especially hard-hit duringgovernment-SPLA battles in the latter half of 1992. Lafon was next: located 60 miles north ofTorit, it suffered crop failure in 1991 and extensive flooding in 1992; in May 1993, a JointWFP/UNICEF mission found that, following a battle between SPLA forces, the food situation was

53

critical as seven villages had been burned and at least 200 villagers were killed. 237 It wassubsequently reported that In the area there were 34,000 homeless and an average of sevenpersons a day were dying from starvation and attendant diseases.

West of the Nile, despite reports of severe malnutrition in the region, the RCCprohibited airlifts or airdrops to Maridi until well after the onset of the 1993 rainy season. AtKajo Kaji, a town controlled by the SPLA, government planes bombed a crowded market placekilling more than a dozen civilians. 238 In Juba, government policy and SPLA attacks had adisastrous effect on the more than 200,000 displaced. In July, SPIA bombardment causedscores of civilian casualties. Following the attacks, government atrocities were widespread and"summary executions were frequent."239 Hundreds of people were reported killed.240Arrests and executions of civilians were common, as was the detention of southern officers andsoldiers in the government army. Catholic bishops from SPLA-controlled regions in Equatoriaclaimed that the army had "turned on civilians," refusing to allow them to leave the city andusing them as human shields in warfare. The bishops "accused government troops ofgenocide" in Juba. 24 1 Meanwhile, Juba residents lived "hand to mouth," and in fall 1992,visiting UN under-secretary for humanitarian affairs Jan Eliasson reported 70 percent severemalnutrition among children located around Juba hospital. The situation did not improve in1993.

D. KORDOFAN REGION (Estimated Deaths 1992-93: zlO,000)

1. Southern Kordofan Province Deaths Ethnic Groups Affecteda. Kadugli District (x100) Variousb. Meiram (x1,000) Dinka

(9/92) >500- Dinka(5/93) x100- Dinka

c. Abyei (1-3/93) (x1OO) Nuer, Dinka

For the displaced in the Transition Zone, conditions were little better in 1992-93 than theywere in the South, and access by aid agencies and UN employees was greatly circumscribed bythe RCC. In 1993, it was reported that since late 1991, some 4,000 Nuba and Dinka ofKadugli district were "either massacred, enslaved, or subjected to gang rape in a series ofincidents attributable to the Islamic Fundamentalist militia."242 Tens of thousands of Nubawere relocated. In May 1993, NGOs reported that for the displaced in Kadugli district thefood supply situation was critical.243

In November 1992, the UN reported 43,500 displaced in Meiram, with an averagedeath rate in September of "20 a day." For the displaced, shelter, water supplies, andsanitation were rudimentary. The U.S. Embassy later noted that there were "reports thatthousands died of starvation in Meiram displaced camp [in 1992], while local authorities wouldnot release donated relief food." Still more thousands were at grave risk in 1993 as food wasin short supply at displaced camps at Meiram and Abyei. 244 In May, it was reported that

54

mortality rates for children under five were on the increase due to the continuing influx of

hungry displaced from Bahr al-Ghazal. 2 45 In early 1993, the starving from Bahr al-Ghazal

began to move toward Abyei. Starvation deaths were reported in the vicinity, and the increase

in displaced suggested "massive hunger in the surrounding area."2 46 In March, Nuer reaching

Abyei reported that militia "had taken children by force. killing the adults who resisted."24 7

E. DARFUR REGION (Estimated Deaths 1992-93: x1,000)

Deaths Ethnic Groups Affected

1. Southern Darfur 1992-93 x1,000 Dinka, others

By May 1993, more than 300,000 southern displaced living in Darfur, an estimated 100,000 of

whom arrived in 1992-93 from Bahr al-Ghazal, were "suffering from hunger, malnutrition, and

disease."2 48 In October 1992, some 92,000 southerners were enumerated in nine camps in

Ed Daein, where water and sanitation facilities were termed "extremely inadequate" and where

malnutrition rates were "very high."249 In April 1993, AID-FEWS reported that Sudan still had

an estimated four million displaced people, with most experiencing some level of food

insecurity. Meanwhile, warfare in the South pushed people into the Transition Zone and

southward toward Uganda.

55

VI. CONCLUSION

In June 1993, the UN/World Food Program estimated that there was a continuing need toprovide emergency food aid to some 165,000 needy in Bor, Kongor, Waat, Pariang, and Ayodwho would be "relying almost entirely on outside relief in 1993"; in addition, some 220,000displaced located at camps at Ame, Aswa, Atepi, Yondu, Aguran, Mundri, and Yambio were alsoin desperate need of help. "Vulnerable groups" in Bahr al-Ghazal and Western Upper Niletotalled approximately 380,000 persons. Also, there was a need to provide aid toapproximately 700,000 southerners living in "zones of conflict" including "those living alongthe boundary of the Nasir/Torit faction split." All told, the UN considered 830,000 people atgreat risk, and some 1.5 million southern Sudanese in need of assistance. 250 Among the mosttragic were the thousands of orphans extirpated from the pastoral Nilotic societies from whichthey sprang. Even worse, M6dicins Sans Frontidres/Holland warned that some 300,000 to400,000 southerners were at risk from a frightening Kala Azar pandemic that was spreadingthrough the South and even into parts of northern Sudan.25 1

In 1992, the international community recognized that the Sudan RevolutionaryCommand Council was little less than an outlaw regime that had little respect for the humanrights of its citizens in the North and no respect for its citizens from southern Sudan. TheUnited States Senate, the European parliament, the Vatican, various Arab organizations, andthe UN General Assembly all either expressed reservations or passed resolutions stronglycondemning RCC violations. Nevertheless, despite international condemnation, the militaryjunta did nothing to improve the human rights conditions inside Sudan or provide theconditions for peace in Sudan. Indeed, the deaths would continue among southerners. AWorld Food Program official posted to Sudan noted in February that, with regard to southernSudan, "a whole culture, a whole civilization is disappearing." 2 5 2 Days later, AssistantSecretary of State Herman J. Cohen warned the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign AffairsCommittee, Subcommittee on Africa that "several hundred thousand face starvation [insouthern Sudan] if they do not receive assistance in the coming months. In at least someareas, people are already dying in large numbers, at rates comparable to the worst [famineconditions then existing] in Somalia." 253 AID reported in May 1993 that critical conditionsexisted in Kongor, Yuai, Ayod, Nagdiar, and Bentiu, and in Bahr al-Ghazal, "the population inWau" was reported to be "extremely vulnerable if not worse."254 When the UN andinternational response to the impending disaster was tardy, and as heavy rains inundated muchof southern Sudan making airlifts impossible and airdrops questionable, the southern Sudanesewould start a second decade that promised to be as bad, if not worse, than the period May1983-May 1993.

56

VII. ENDNOTES

1After many years, the treaty received U.S. Senate approval on February 19. 1986. On the subject of geno-cide. note for example: Gist, -UN Genocide Convention.' U.S. Department of State, June 1986; also theInstitute for the Study of Genocide's The ISG Newsletter. John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York City,and reports from the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide, Jerusalem. Also noteworthy is F. Chalk and K.Jonassohn. The History and Sociology of Genocide. Yale University Press, 1990.

2600,000 deaths were cited in the Christian Science Monitor, 'Officials Sound Alarm on Sudan. Citing Dangerof Mass Starvation.' February 22. 1993, and Middle East International. June 11. 1993, page 17; 500,000 wascited by The Washington Post February 12, 1993. page A29. Perhaps the most extreme estimate of thenumber of deaths caused in the Sudan's Second Civil War -- but perhaps one closest to the mark -- wasmade by Representative Howard Wolpe at a U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting held in February1989: Wolpe, a member of the House Sub-Committee on Hunger, stated that 250,000 southerners had died in1988, and that 'some one million people have died in the Sudan since the war there began in 1983."

Generally recognized figure, although no systematic census of Dinka has been taken.

4The Times of India, "Islamic Law in Sudan, May 19, 1984; The Guardian, 'Sudan's hidden war escalates asUgandans join the fray,. June 13, 1986.

'Author's discussion with Dinka leaders and southern Sudanese politicians, 1989-1990.

8ITe SPLM's Manifesto was published on August 31. 1983, location unknown. Copy in the author's posses-sion.

7 For a study of militia activities and their -gross human rights abuses,- note Amnesty International report.December 1989.

R Bonner, 'A Reporter at Large: Famine,' New Yorker, March 13, 1989.

For an indication of the viciousness of the militias, note the Wall Street Journal, 'Dinka Tribes Made Slavesin Sudan's Civil War,' April 11, 1989*A19. Brian Wannop. UN Director in Sudan during much of 1989. notedthat Burma Nasr. -in an earlier post as Minister for State for Defense.' had been "an architect of the policy ofarming militias in Southern Kordofan, his own native region." See Wannop. B.. 'Report on the First Muglad-Aweil Relief Train." Khartoum. April 29, 1989. page 4.

10 'Sudan's rebel leader signals flexibility,' Christian Science Monitor October 14. 1987.

"1 Reuters Library Report, 'Search for Food Goes on Amid the Dying," March 23. 1989.

12 The Atlanta Journal, 'Terror and Hunger Spread As Sudan 'Holy War' Rages,' June 27, 1988.

Reuters, 'Starvation. War. Disease, Stalk Besieged Sudan Refugee Town,' March 28, 1989.

4 The Daily Telegraph. '6,000 Sudanese Die in Famine As Food Shortages Increase,' January 12, 1989.

Los Angeles Times, "Suffering Sudan Needs Our Help,' December 18. 1988.

to Christian Science Monitor, 'Peace Talks Ring a Bit Hollow for Sudan's Besieged Southerners.' November 29,1988.

1 U.S. News and World Report. 'Starvation as a Political Weapon." February 6. 1989, page 34.

' Note his comments in The Atlanta Journal. "'Thousands Died in Sudan as U.S. Remained Silent." December18. 1988.

1o The New York Times, 'Focus on the Sudan." March 9. 1989:B 14.

= Baltimore Sun. 'Food Rushed to Sudan as Lives Hang in the Balance,' April 18, 1989.

Reuters report. June 16. 1989.

I The Economist, "Rumor and Red Tape," August 11. 1990.

* New African. "Sudan's Mr. Tough Guy," October 1989. page 12.

24 lbid.

I U.S. House of Representatives. "Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa. Committee on Foreign Affairs.-Washington D.C., March 28, 1984.

' The horror of the time has been captured by Sharon Hutchinson in 'War Through the Eyes of the Dispos-sessed: Three Stories of Survival." an unpublished manuscript provided the author in 1990.

7 General Secretariat. Sudan Catholic Bishops Conference, 'News Bulletin." September 15. 1988.

1 S. Hutchinson. 'War Through the Eyes of the Dispossessed: Three Stories of SurvivaL" an unpublishedmanuscript provided the author in 1990.

* Christian Science Monitor, "Life Improves Despite Sudan's War," January 10, 1990. page 6.

I Note M. Ottaway's "Post Numeri Sudan." Third World Quarterly, August 1987. page 896.

-1 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984. February 1985. page 328.

I Anade Othow, P.. "Famine and Drought in Upper Nile Administrative Area." Malakal Famine Relief Commit-tee. Malakal. July 1985.

* SUDANAID, "Report on Relief Dura Brought to Malakal by Sudanaid" Malakal, September 1985.

* M. Duffield. "Food Insecurity in Sudan." Oxfam. Khartoum. April 1988.

* Commissioner. Lakes Province. Drought Report LP/SCR/19.A. Rumbek. November 16, 1984: Governor.Bahr al-Ghazal Region. Relief Requirement. Wau. December 17, 1993.

2 Radio message. Aldo Adjo Deng to Dr. Lawrence Wol. Khartoum. Wau. January 4. 1985.

* Commissioner for Lakes Province. "Relief and Rehabilitation for Drought and War Affected Areas in LakesProvince." Rumbek. April 27, 1985.

3 E. Hagen and B. Kurup, -Trip Report to Southern Region from 28 May to 1 June 1985," UNICEF,Khartoum. June 5, 1985.

' Bahr al-Ghazal Administrative Area. Governor's Office. "Emergency Food Estimates." MemorandumCBGAA/K/19.A.1, November 11. 1985. Also note Lakes Drought Committee Report, SSU/LP/1.cl/3,Rumbek. November 9. 1984.

0 "Meeting of Agencies Involved in Relief to Southern Sudan." Khartoum. June 25, 1985.

" Bahr al-Ghazal Administrative Area. Governor's Office. Emergency Food Estimates. Memorandum CBGAA/K/19.A.1., November 11. 1985.

' CRS-United States Catholic Conferences, -Emergency Relief for Southern Sudan." Nairobi. November 25,1985.

' Lukudu. S. and P.O. Bula. Report on Drought and Hunger Threatened Area of Equatoria Region. Juba.December 1984.

" E. Hagen and B. Kurup. -Trip Report to Southern Region from 28 May to 1 June 1985." UNICEF.Khartoum, June 5, 1985.

' Sudan Council of Churches. "Meeting of Agencies Involved in Relief in Southern Sudan." Khartoum. June25. 1985.

4 Catholic Relief Services/U.S.C.C., Emergency Relieffor Eastern Equatoria, the Sudan, Nairobi, July 3, 1985.

47 IbicL, "Especial Report on Southern Sudan." Khartoum. February 3. 1986.

4 R.D. Kaplan, "Sudan. A Microcosm of Africa's Ills," Atlantic. April 1986, page 30.

49 SUDANAID. Emergency Relief & Rehabilitation Programme, Annual Report, 1986. Khartoum. May 1987, page102.

- The Guardian. "Sudan's Hidden War Escalates as Ugandans Join the Fray." June 13. 1986.

51 Interfaith Action for Economic Justice, Civil War Brings Hunger to Sudan. Washington, D.C., October 31,1986.

a United Nations/Sudan Relief & Rehabilitation Commission, Southern Sudan Emergency Operation. Techni-cal Committee, "Minutes," August 19. 1986.

* SUDANAID and Sudan Council of Churches. "Emergency Assistance Needs, Bahr al-Ghazal & Upper Nile,"Khartoum. September 28, 1986.

* Christian Science Monitor. "Life Improves Despite Sudan's War," January 10, 1990, page 6.

* SUDANAID and Sudan Council of Churches. "Emergency Assistance Needs, Bahr al-Ghazal & Upper Nile,"Khartoum. September 28, 1986.

a M. Duffield. "Food Insecurity in Sudan." Oxfam. Khartoum. April 1988.

5 7Catholic Relief Services/USCC, "Emergency Relief for the Southern Sudan." Nairobi. November 25. 1986.The first major report on Murahileen raiders to appear in the West was, "Guns Tipping Cruel Balance in theSudan." The New York Times, May 4. 1986.

1 Bahr al-Ghazal. "Emergency Relief Food Program Proposals for 1986." Office of the Governor. November 5.19E

" The New York Times, August 31. 1986

" SUDANAID and Sudan Council of Churches. "Emergency Assistance Needs, Bahr al-Chazal & Upper Nile."Khartoum. September 28, 1986.

6 The New York Times, August 31, 1986.

SUDANAID, Letter from Rudolf Deng. Aweil. September 21, 1986.

a SUDANAID, Sudanese Relief & Rehabilitation Programme, Annual Report. Khartoum. 1986.

* M. McLean and C. Williams, "Economic War Against the Dinka." Oxfam. Sudan. June 1986.

The Washington Post, "U.S.-Sudan Ties Back to Normal." December 2, 1986. Reference Garang's concern asexpressed to the BBC. note Africa Report, "John Garang: A New Sudan." July-August 1989, page 45.

* Wall Street Journal "Why Sudan Starves." November 5. 1986.

G Government of Sudan/RRC-UNDP-UNEOS, Khartoum. "Southern Sudan: Relief Needs Estimate." December23. 1986: Government of Sudan. Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Circular. December 30. 1986.

* Miami Herald. "Tribal Traditions Destroyed by Power of New Weaponry," December 11. 1987.

* Government of Sudan. Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Southern Sudan Emergency Operatlon/TCC."Minutes." September 21, 1987.

" SUNA. Khartoum, "Sixty People Die of Famine," August 20, 1987; Cultural Survival Quarterly, "The Situationof the Uduk." Vol. 12. No. 2, 1988.

7 Note Le Monde Diplomatique. "Soudan a l'epreuve de la rebellion sudiste," June 1989. page 11: Middle East

International. "Sudan: The Heavy Toll of Civil War." April 16, 1988, page 17.

7 UNDP-Khartoum. Letter to "H.E. Mr. Sadig Sedig El Mahdi," June 24. 1987.

" Bahr al-Ghazal Region Governor's Office. Hunger Situation in Aweil Area. Khartoum. August 24. 1987.

74 lbid.

7 UN/World Food Program. Emergency Telex Report #140. Khartoum. May 3. 1988.

78 Forward. "Opposition to the Reappointment of Mr. Azraq," Khartoum. May 22. 1989.

7 Reuters. "Sudanese Fear to Walk Town's Streets at Night." April 10, 1989.

7 Cultural Survival Quarterly, "Sudan's Secret Slaughter." Vol. 12. 1988. No. 2.

7 U.S. Embassy, Nairobi. Cable 25863, August 30, 1987.

8 Radio message from Wau to Khartoum. January 19, 1988.

sWorld Vision International. "Country Newsletter." Khartoum. December 28, 1987.

2 B. Hardin. "Life in Sudan Worsened Under Mahdi." The Washington Post. July 1. 1989.

3 Al-Sudani. Khartoum. July 29. 1987.

Renewal. Juba. "Is it a crime to be an African in Sudan?" August 1987.

* Ibid. "Halt Militia Evil Acts," May 1987. page 5.

Government of Sudan. Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. letter to USAID. RRC/EXC/19/Z/6 19/W/3. March 7. 1987.

87 Ibid.. RRC/EXEC/19/Z/6, April 4. 1987.

" USAID-Khartoum. Letter to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. April 27, 1987.

8 Atlanta Constitutlon. "Relief Workers Bear Witness as Thousands of Refugees Starve in Sudan Town." March5. 1989.

9 Government of Sudan. Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. Southern Sudan Emergency Operation/TCC,"Minutes." September 14. 1987.

11 Miami Herald. "Tribal Traditions Destroyed by Power of New Weaponry." December 11. 1987.

I U.A. Mahmud and S.A. Baldo. AL Dtein Massacre. Slavery in Sudan. Khartoum. August 1987.

I U.S. Department of State. 1987 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Washington D.C., 1988. page301.

" Sudan Council of Churches/UNICEF. "Report of MCH Survey Among the Displaced Populations. KhartoumArea." February 1987.

" E. A. Bassan. "Background Information and Program Recommendation on Displaced People in Khartoum."April 30. 1987.

' I. Laemerzahl. "Report on Interviews with PVOs Engaged in Activities to Assist Displaced People in theKhartoum Area." Khartoum. August 1987.

1 U.S. Department of State. cable 58981. February 26. 1988.

UN/World Food Program. Emergency Telex Report #141. Khartoum. May 13, 1988.

"New Statesman & Society. -The Hidden Holocaust.' December 23-30, 1988.

10 See The New York Times. "Sudan Racked by Famine." October 13, 1988: Newsweek. "The Sudan: Food asa Weapon." October 24. 1988.

to: See, for example, Associated Press, "Iree Killed in Attack on U.N. Relief Convoy," May 29. 1989. A yearlater, the AP was using a United Nations estimate of 250,000 deaths in 1988: "Sudan Rebels AnnounceDaylong Cease-Fire," January 27, 1990. Also note the Boston Globe, "Oxfam Sets Sunday Observance forSudan." March 7. 1989, page 10.

11 See, for example. The Los Angeles Times, December 8 and December 18, 1988, and Associated Press, "U.N.Says Five African Countries Face Famine," December 6, 1988.

1o Chicago Tribune, "Report Criticizes U.S. for 'Quiet Diplomacy' in Sudan," February 16, 1989, page 1 5c.

11 Reuters Library Report, "Search for Food GOES ON Amid the Dying," March 23, 1989.

105 The Washington Post, "Food Relief Trickles into Sudan," August 14. 1988:A27.

106 Note. UPI, December 28. 1988; Time Magazine, December 5, 1988.

10 Christian Science Monitor, "Aid Quagmire in Sudan," November 28, 1988, page 1.

* For interviews of those fleeing Bor and Aweil. note the Christian Science Monitor. "Sudanese Flee in Searchof Food. Safety." June 29, 1988.

'0 Government of Sudan. Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Technical Coordination Committee, "Min-utes," April 25, 1988.

Heritage, "Many Southerners Starve to Death," Khartoum, September 25. 1988.

" Middle East International, "Sudan. Change of Heart" October 21, 1988, page 13.

2Bahr al-Ghazal Acting Governor to H.E. Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Letter GO/BGR/SCR94.A. 1. Wau, January 15, 1988.

no The New York Times, "Red Cross Opens Sudan Relief Drive," December 5. 1988.

11 Heritage. "Angelo Beda Speaks on His Visit to Wau." Khartoum, October 3, 1988.

us Aweil Relief Committee report, Aweil. November 21, 1988.

" United Nations Development Program. Khartoum. "Survey Mission to Aweil." November 30 to December 1.1988.

n1 UN-World Food Program. "Emergency Telex Report. No. 127." Khartoum. January 22, 1988.

noL. Lual Akuey, "Report on the Famine/Expected Famine in the 1988/89 in Bahr al Ghazal Region,"Governor's Office, Wau. September 22, 1988.

11 Sudan Times, "Ten Thousand Feared Dead in Each of Aweil and Torit," September 4, 1988.

2 ICRC, "Survey in Akon/9-10.11.1988," Khartoum, November 19. 1988.

121 Joint Relief Committee, Torit. Radio Message to SUDANAID. Juba, June 27, 1988.

1 Sudan Times. "Ten Thousand Feared Dead in Each of Aweil and Torit." September 4, 1988.

123 General Secretariat. Sudan Catholic Bishops Conference, "News Bulletin." September 15, 1988.

124 Africa Report. "Starving the South." January-February 1989. page 65.

'2 Christian Science Monitor, "Despite International Airlifts. Hunger Persists in Southern Sudan." December 5.1988.

121 Renewal. -The Plight of the Displaced in Sudan." #32, Juba. April 1989, page 7.

127 New African. -In the Jaws of the SPLA." June 1990. page 17.

2 Panoscope. "Debating the Cost of War in Sudan." March 1989.

12 Jeune Afrique. "Le calvaire des Dinka." August 31. 1988, page 50.

'o The New York Times. "U.N. Food Convoy Attacked." April 19. 1989.

ta The Atlanta Journal. "Thousands Died in Sudan as U.S. Remained Silent.- December 18, 1988: MSF-France. "A Project for an Extension of Nutritional and Medical Assistance to El Meiram." Khartoum. October1988.

I Sudan Times, "Twenty-One Thousand Dinkas Face Death in Mairam as Misseiria Take Relief Food."September 11. 1988.

3 Oxfam. Khartoum. "Report on Visit of Oxfam and SCF Representatives to El Mieram. South Kordofan. 4th -8th September."

134 Ibid

133 Associated Press, "Christian. Animist Refugees Wear Out Welcome in Moslem Town," March 13, 1989.

138 Concern-Sudan. "Emergency Program. Sudan. 1988." Khartoum. 1989.

11 U.S. Department of State, Cable 382790, November 1988.

1as CARE International-Sudan. "Urgent Report About Worsening Conditions of Displaced Persons in Abyei andEn Nahud Districts." August 18. 1988.

Associated Press. "Dateline: Turalei. Sudan." June 14. 1989.

" Atlanta Journal and Constitution. June 26-27, 1988.

"3Note The Atlanta Journal reports, especially June 27. 1988 article.

112 TheAtlanta Journal. "Thousands Died in Sudan as U.S. Remained Silent" December 18. 1988.

11 CARE International-Sudan, "Urgent Report About Worsening Conditions of Displaced Persons in Abyei andEn Nahud Districts." August 18, 1988.

1"M6dicins Sans Frontiares-Belgium, "Relief Assistance in Health and Nutrition. Abtye, South Kordofan,"Khartoum. July 1989.

145 Reuters reported that "at least 6,000 people died in Abyei between June and October." Reuter LibraryReport, "Rain Brings Life and Death to South Sudan." April 5. 1989. See also, The New York Times. "InSudan. an Airlift to a Town of Misery," October 16. 1988.

I" K. Westgate. -Displaced People in Southern Darfur Situation Report." LICROSS, El Fasher. February1988.

14 Sudan Ttmes. 'While Their People Die of Famine Outside the Grainstore Doors. Bahr el Ghazal GovernmentStockpiles Food." March 29, 1988.

* MSF/Belgium. "Summary Report. Displaced Dinka in South Darfur." September 26. 1988.

14 K. Westgate. "Displaced People in Southern Darfur Situation Report." LICROSS, El Fasher. February 1988.Also. MSF/Belgium. "Summary Report. Displaced Dinka in South Darfur." September 26, 1988.

50 UNICEF-Khartoum. "Status Report Displaced People - South Kordofan and Southern Darfur,' September 1,1988.

'51 Reuters Library Report. 'Ethiopia Braces for Fresh Surge of Sudanese Refugees,* November 15. 1988.

152 U.S. Department of State, Cable 112584, April 9, 1988.

'53 U.S. Embassy. Addis Ababa. Cable 1536, April 4, 1988.

154 R. Bonner. 'A Reporter at Large: Famine," New Yorker. March 13, 1989.

I United Press International. 'Religion in America, Churches responding to Sudan famine, civil war,' April28, 1989.

us Reuters Library Report. Afilcan States Urged, December 24, 1988.

' The Times. London. -Confronting the Mahdi,' January 30, 1989.

158 Christian Science Monitor, 'After the Floods. Starvation on the Rise in Southern Sudan," October 7, 1988.

1 United Press International, 'Washington News," December 1, 1988.

7n The Daily Telegraph, '6,000 Sudanese Die in Famine As Food Shortages Increase." January 12, 1989.

16 Los Angeles Times, 'Western Aid to Sudan Linked to Peace Efforts," March 3, 1989.

'5 Associated Press, "Relief Barges Reach Starving Town.' February 14, 1989.

I6 Associated Press, "Civil War Ravages Civilian Life,* October 8, 1989.

* Reuters Library Report, 'Sudan Civil War Squeezes the Life from Southern Town," March 30, 1989.

* Reuters, Sudan dateline, March 23, 1989.

'n Guiding Star, -Govt. Soldiers Massacre Women," Khartoum. February 9, 1989.

'e Sudan Update. August 24, 1990, page 4.

'n Al-Sudan Al-Hadith. Khartoum, June 21, 1990.

nReuters, 'Starvation. War, Disease. Stalk Besieged Sudan Refugee Town." March 28, 1989.

170 Christian Science Monitor, 'Juba: A City Kept Alive by Aid," March 30, 1989.

171 The New York Times, August 31, 1986.

" The author has one list in his possession that includes their names, locations, and their Arab masters.Another such list was given to journalist Raymond Bonner in 1988 and contained names of boys abducted byMissiriya militia in June 1987 and working in the fields between Abyei and Muglad.

1" Government of Sudan, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. Technical Coordination Committee, 'Min-utes,' March 20. 1989.

174 Associated Press. 'UN Relief Effort Faces Daunting Problems in Sudan.* March 27, 1989.

173 Government of Sudan, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Technical Coordination Committee, "Min-utes," April 17. 1989, April 24. 1989.

176 Ibid.. Minutes,' November 20, 1989.

1" Christian Science Monitor, -After the floods, starvation on the rise in southern Sudan," October 7, 1988.

178 U.S. Committee for Refugees. 'Testimony of Roger Winter Before a Joint hearing of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. Select Committee on Hunger.' March 15. 1990.

" The Washington Post. 'Sudanese at Risk. January 26. 1990. p. A18.

8 Reuters Library Report. "Junta Conditions on Famine Aid Said to Endanger Thousands.* January 19.1990.

181 Inter Press Service. -Sudan: Famine Hits War-Tom Southern Regions," February 1. 1990.

182 Amnesty International. 'Sudan. A Permanent Human Rights Crisis, The Military Government's First Yearin Power. New York. August 1990, page 28.

1 Afrea Confidential. "Sudan: The Great Hunger," November 9. 1990.

U.S. Embassy. Khartoum. Cable 07441, July 20, 1990.

1" Reuters Library Report. 'Thousands of Sudanese Refugees Feared Dead on Four Month Trek." May 23,1990.

" Sudan Update. VoL 3. No. 23, August 7. 1992. page 3. (180) U.S. Embassy. Khartoum. Cable 10122.September 26, 1990.

'"UNICEF, Operation Lifeline Sudan Office. "Mass Migration of Sudanese Refugees from Ethiopia Back intoSudan." Nairobi. June 12. 1991.

U.S. Agency for International Development. "FEWS Bulletin." June 20. 1991.

* UN Special Emergency Program for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA), "Situation Report." January 1992.

0 U.S. Agency for International Development "Sudan - Drought/Civil Strife. Situation Report No. 52. Wash-ington D.C.. December 5. 1991.

1Ib91

19 Sudan Monitor. London. Vol. 1. No. 4. October 4. 1990. page 3.

" Middle East International. December 20. 1991. page 11.

194 Norwegian People's Aid. Nairobi. report dated December 11. 1991.

1" After seizing power. the RCC did everything It could to reduce the presence of Western media (and theirSudanese reporters). Nonetheless, the warning of yet another potential drought in Bahr al-Ghazal was filedby the Associated Press, "Southern Sudan Facing Acute Food Shortage," on May 10, 1990. As both thenumber of relief agency personnel (and reporters free of government censorship were greatly reduced, theextent of the 1991-92 famine in Bahr al-Ghazal received practically no coverage.

1" The New York Times. "Sudan Asserts it Just Helps Refugees." August 16. 1990.

* Ibid.. "Sudan Forces Refugees Back to Barren Lands." July 13, 1990:A2.

Sudan Update, "Famine Update". March 22. 1991. page 1.

CART. "CART Budget for the Period 1st March 1989 to 28th February 1990," Juba. February 1990.

The New York Times. 'Westerners Cuit Sudan Town." February 1. 1990.

o1 Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association. "Sudanese Airforce Bombs Civilians. Stopping Relief Opera-tions." undated. Washington D.C.

' The New York Times. "Sudan Again Bombs Civilians in Rebel Area." November 26. 1990.

2 U.S. Agency for International Development FEWS, Washington D.C., "FEWS Bulletin, August 20. 1991.

2 AID Cable, U.S. Embassy Khartoum. Cable 03559. May 31. 1993.

w lbid.. U.S. Embassy Khartoum. Cable 03426, April 30, 1992.

2w New African. 'Gathering Storm." January 1993. page 34.

1 Sudan Democratic Gazette. "Four Hundred Thousand at Risk in Kalaazar Epidemic in Southern Sudan."March 1993, page 3. The Washington 'Tmes. "60,000 in Sudan Killed by Parasite." January 23. 1993, pageA2.

2 Winter. R. P., 'Testimony on Recent Developments in Sudan Before the House Committee on ForeignAffairs, Subcommittee on Africa." U.S. Committee for Refugees. Washington D.C., March 10, 1993.

2 Agence France Press. April 7, 1993, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service report. "ArabAfrica,' April 7. 1993.

210 Agency for International Development/OFDA. "Sudan - Drought/Civil Strife,* Situation Report No. 55,October 7. 1992.

21 1 Sudan Democratic Gazette. "Atrocities in Malakal Continue Unabated." January 1933, page 4.

212 Agency for International Development/OFDA. "Sudan - Drought/Civil Strife," Situation Report No. 55,October 7, 1992.

213 IbC

214 The Washington Times, -South Sudanese Let Bodies Rot. Disdain the Starving as Weak." October 28, 1992.page A9.

2 15 MiLcle East International (MED. April 14, 1993, page 13.

218 Agency for International Development. Washington D.C.. "Sudan - Drought/Civil Strife," Situation ReportNo. 54. May 20. 1992.

217 The Washington Times. "Starving Sudanese Plead for Food Aid," April 15, 1982, page A9.

218 Norwegian People's Aid. Nairobi. "The Situation in Bor and Kongor." September 14, 1992.

211 AID Cable, U.S. Department of State, Cable 139806, May 7, 1993.

2 Norwegian People's Aid, Nairobi. "Me Situation in Bor and Kongor," September 14, 1992.

21 AID Cable. U.S. Department of State, Cable 139806, May 7. 1993.

1 Ibid., Embassy Khartoum. Cable 02092, April 1, 1993.

The New York Times. "Sudan is Described as Trying To Placate the West," March 26. 1993, page 3.

m The Washington Times, "Sudan Relief Flight Sparks Riot. 100 Deaths.* January 26. 1993. page A2.

2 Agency for International Development, "Sudan - Civil Strife/Displaced Persons," Situation Report No. 5.Washington D.C.. May 26, 1993.

2 MMWR. U.S. Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta. "Nutrition and Mortality Assessment - Southern Sudan.March 1993." page 304.

m AID Cable. U.S. Department of State. Cable 139806. May 7. 1993.

The New York Times, "Sudan is Described as Trying To Placate the West," March 26, 1993, page 3.

UN Horn ofAfica Report. WFP Emergency Telex Number 24. June 18, 1993.

23 0 UN/WFP-Sudan, -WFP/RLO Weekly Emergency Report for S.Sudan." June 2. 1993.

2 31Agency for International Development -Sudan - Drought/Civil Strife.' Situation Report No. 2. WashingtonD.C., February 19. 1993.

22 U.S. Department of State, letter and report sent to Representative Frank R. Wolf. House of Representatives.

May 12. 1993 (in the author's possession).

I Sudan Update. VoL 3. No. 21. July 13. 1992. page 1.

234 AID Cable. U.S. Embassy Nairobi. Cable 12071. June 4. 1993.

22s Sudan Update, Vol. 3. No. 21. July 13, 1992. page 1.

23e AID Cable. U.S. Department of State, Cable 139806. May 7. 1993.

21' UNICEF-Sudan. Khartoum. -Emergency Update.' Issue No. 95, June 10, 1993.

2- Congressional Record. VoL 139, No. 15. Washington D.C.. February 16, 1993, page 1.

2 The Washington Post. "Embattled South Sudanese Express Amdeties to Rare Visitors,' April 9. 1993.

a Africa Report. -Sudanese Talk Peace After Government Offensive." November-December 1992. page 66. TheMiddle East. 'Atrocity Becomes a Way of Life,' June 1993, page 12.

11 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 'Arab Africa,' from Agence France Press, September 3. 1992. page14.

242 Sudan Democratic Gazette. -Fresh Evidence of Slavery and Ethnic Cleansing." June 1993, page 4.

2 UN Horn of Africa Report. WFP Emergency Telex Number 24. June 18, 1993.

" U.S. Department of State. fax letter/report sent to Representative Frank R. Wolf. House of Representatives,May 12. 1993.

* UNICEF-Sudan, Khartoum. 'Emergency Update,* Issue #95. June 10, 1993.

"'The Washington Post. 'War-Torn Southern Sudan Called 'Another Somalia.- February 12. 1993. page A29.

* U.S. Department of State, fax letter/report sent to Representative Frank R. Wolf. House of Representatives,May 12. 1993.

' Agency for International Development. -Sudan - Civil Strife/Displaced Persons," Situation Report No. 5,Washington D.C.. May 26, 1993.

lbid., 'Sudan - Drought/Cvil Strife." Situation Report No. 2. Washington D.C.. February 19, 1993.

0 Undated UN/World Food Program report in the author's possession.

2s Sudan Democratic Gazette. -Four Hundred Thousand at Risk in Kalaazar Epidemic in Southern Sudan.'March 1993. page 3. The Washington Tirnes. '60.000 in Sudan Killed by Parasite,' January 23. 1993. pageA2.

252 The Washington Post -Cut Off From Everything but War.* February 22. 1993, page 1.

2 Cohen. H. J.. ITe Situation in Sudan." testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign AffairsCommittee. Subcommittee on Africa. March 10. 1993.

" Agency for International Development -FEWS Bulletin. Washington D.C., May 20, 1993.