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A Rebirth of Diplomacy: The ForeignPolicy of Communist Romania betweenSubordination and Autonomy, 1948–1962Cezar StanciuPublished online: 10 Jun 2013.

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Diplomacy & Statecraft, 24:253–272, 2013Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0959-2296 print/1557-301X onlineDOI: 10.1080/09592296.2013.789770

A Rebirth of Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy ofCommunist Romania between Subordination

and Autonomy, 1948–1962

CEZAR STANCIU

Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania was well-known during the ColdWar as a non-conformist voice in the Communist bloc, especiallybecause of his opposition to the Soviet Union and spectacular for-eign policy initiatives. But was that line Ceausescu’s creation?This analysis examines the sources of Romania’s dynamic andautonomous foreign policy in the Cold War and shows that theorigins of this foreign policy can be traced back to Ceausescu’spredecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. The shock caused by de-Stal-inisation and Nikita Khrushchev’s reformist policies saw theRomanian party leadership limit its dependence on the SovietUnion, both politically and economically. Romania’s foreign pol-icy experienced a revival starting from the tumultuous momentswhen Gheorghiu-Dej listened to Khrushchev’s Secret Report at the20th Congress in February 1956. Fearing the loss of his position inpower, Gheorghiu-Dej saw relations outside the Communist bloc asa source of stability.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Josef Stalin imposed Soviet-typeregimes in most Central and East European countries, severing their political,cultural, and economic relations to the rest of the world. As the ideologicaland political conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States inten-sified, Soviet satellites were isolated from the ostensible “Western world,”in which the communist regimes saw nothing more than a threat to theirsecurity and stability. These changes had a dramatic impact on diplomacy,as well. Stalin’s grip on these countries prevented them from exerting theslightest degree of autonomy or initiative in foreign policy, and their entirediplomacy was subdued by Moscow, serving only Soviet needs as subsidiaryinstruments of the Kremlin.

Such was the case with Romania. After the communist regime hadpurged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian diplomacy remained

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nothing more than a conveyance belt for Soviet-style Romaniandecision-makers, a loud but empty voice of propaganda directed against theWest with no trace of autonomy. With most Romanian diplomats barely grad-uating from grammar school, countless accusations were raised against theWestern world—imitating Soviet rhetoric to the last detail—and the UnitedStates was declared as the ultimate enemy of mankind, the “enemy of peaceand peoples’ liberty.”1 Two decades later, an American president was wel-comed in Bucharest, whilst an excited communist dictator expressed hisfriendship and admiration for the American people.2 Before that moment,a Romanian diplomat was elected president of the General Assembly of theUnited Nations (UN). As Romania became increasingly famous for its disobe-dience to the Soviet Union, at least in the field of foreign policy, Romaniandiplomacy had been thoroughly transformed, able to conduct a real dialoguewith Western governments. With the absence of a professional diplomaticcorps, Romania’s policy of autonomy in the Communist bloc could not havebeen successful.

The rationality of this transformation is related to the emergence ofRomania’s policy of autonomy from the Soviet bloc. A recent study empha-sises that the factor that triggered change in most Soviet satellites was NikitaKhrushchev’s reforms following Stalin’s death.3 The origins of Romania’sautonomous foreign policy reside in the same context: the perception of inse-curity caused by Khrushchev’s reforms to the Romanian regime.4 Althoughaccepting the risks that de-Stalinisation involved for the regime in Romania,the beginning of its autonomous policy occurred after 1962.5 But most suchstudies focus on the causes and manifestations of Romania’s independentconduct in foreign policy: neutrality in the Sino–Soviet dispute, oppositionto Soviet reform plans at the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)and the Warsaw Pact, and development of relations with the West.

Agreement exists that a fundamental component of Romania’s autonomyin the Soviet bloc involved improving political and economic relations withthe West.6 The regime’s aim centred on identifying alternative economic part-ners, outside the bloc, thus reducing dependence of the Soviets. To developsuch relations, diplomacy had to be the most valuable instrument. GheorgheGheorghiu-Dej, the communist leader of Romania from 1947, needed aprofessional diplomatic corps able to convey messages and negotiate agree-ments. Literature so far has paid little attention to the changes that occurredin Romanian diplomacy in the context of Khrushchev’s reforms, focusinginstead on the results achieved by this reformed diplomacy later in the 1960s.The reformation of diplomacy became crucial for the Gheorghiu-Dej’s regimeand represented one of the first steps on Romania’s way to assert autonomyin the Soviet bloc. Gheorghiu-Dej had to ensure that Western governmentsregarded his regime as a credible partner to handle long-term economicagreements. In relation to other communist states, relations relied on partyto party contacts and decisions; but in relation to the Western world, relations

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were conducted at the state level, hence the need for a professional diplo-matic service. Its reformation came about through the changes initiated byKhrushchev and aimed at providing Gheorghiu-Dej with reliable instrumentsfor developing relations in the West.

Although changes in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) hadbeen implemented from the moment the first Communist-dominated govern-ment took office in March 1945, alignment with Soviet demands gained anew meaning after 1947 when Ana Pauker became foreign minister—Paukerbecame the first woman to serve as minister of Foreign Affairs in the govern-ment. Soviet control over the satellites intensified after the first InformationBureau of Communist Parties (Cominform) meeting in September 1947 andleft no room for autonomy, including foreign affairs.7 A radical interpreta-tion was imposed upon all communist parties, dividing the world into twocamps, Socialist and Imperialist, between which there could only be com-plete antagonism since each was trying to destroy the other.8 This Sovietperspective on international relations claimed that Imperialism, led by theUnited States, looked to enslave all nations and overthrow the communistregimes, therefore unity and discipline were deemed necessary.9 Dependenton Soviet support and confronted with a hostile Western world, Romania’sregime endorsed this view and its conduct in foreign policy derived fromit. Since the West, described as aggressive, always plotted the overthrow ofcommunism and used espionage and infiltrated agents for that purpose, iso-lation became an inherent part of unity and discipline.10 Once appointedforeign minister, Pauker did everything to align Romania’s diplomacy to thisapproach.11

Her first and most urgent task involved control over the diplomatic appa-ratus. Often engaged in anti-Communist propaganda or abandoning theirmissions to remain in the Western capitals to which they were accredited,most Romanian diplomats had democratic and anti-Soviet views. The newregime underwent waves of purges, removing all diplomats and replacingthem with obedient men from within party ranks.12 Decades later, in a seriesof interviews, former Soviet minister of foreign affairs Viatcheslav Molotovrecounted:

Who was a diplomat? An able one? We had a centralised diplomacy.Ambassadors had no independence. And they could not have had anybecause the situation was so complicated. It was impossible for theambassador to take any initiative.13

The kind of diplomacy that Pauker was called upon to construct neededonly one quality: obedience. Competence remained futile, since ambassadorslacked any power to suggest or implement measures. Only the Kremlin madeforeign policy and transmitted it to all Soviet satellites, which then carried itout.14 To ensure party control, the Central Committee (CC) of the Romanian

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Workers’ Party (RWP) organised a specialised section charged with supervis-ing and controlling all personnel working abroad in diplomatic offices of anykind. The Section of the Exterior Party Cadres had to organise and conductideological education amongst diplomats, monitor and verify all appoint-ments, and make certain that party criteria were respected when it cameto selection to the diplomatic service.15 The basic aims of these measuresinvolved obtaining guaranteed loyalty from diplomats, preventing defections,and avoiding unwanted initiatives. When in need of counselling, diplomatsreceived instructions to seek it at the Soviet Embassy in the foreign capital inwhich they resided.

The Section of the Exterior Party Cadres had to work with the tradeunions to select candidates for various positions in the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade for new and reliable communiststo compensate for the purges. Apparently, they remained difficult to find.A statistic from 1950, forwarded by the MFA to the RWP Politburo, describeda dire situation: from 349 positions available in the diplomatic corps, only155 were occupied; this situation constituted a source for terrible disar-ray in the Ministry. Except for those in China and the United States, allRomanian diplomatic offices abroad lacked essential personnel. Moreover,amongst those 155, there were many who needed to be recalled for variousreasons, especially for proving inadequate in their positions.16 The criteriafor selecting new personnel included party membership, working class ori-gin, class consciousness, discipline, devotion to country and family, and,not least, having no relatives in foreign countries.17 To identify such candi-dates, the CC established new commissions charged with selecting potentialdiplomats from industrial enterprises and mass organisations. Similarly, theMFA received instruction to organise a one-month course in diplomatic workfor new candidates.18 Such a situation could only generate difficulties. Themobility of diplomatic personnel was particularly intense, largely becausemost of these people were unable to comply with the rigors of diplomaticlife. A few examples are indicative.

After working as a counsellor at the Romanian Legation in the UnitedStates, Alexandru Lazareanu became minister in India in autumn 1950; fivemonths later, he transferred to Paris where, after one year at the Legation, hewas appointed minister at Vienna.19 In 1952, Iacob Cotoveanu, a locksmith byprofession, went as minister to China.20 Recalled in May 1953 for reasons ofimmoral behaviour, Ichim Rusu, the ambassador to the German DemocraticRepublic had engaged in an affair with the embassy’s cook.21 The ambas-sador at Warsaw, Nicolae Dinulescu, also suffered recall in 1951 by ruininghis reputation in making derogatory comments about other diplomats inPoland.22 But despite these shortcomings, Pauker achieved her aim: obedientdiplomats.

Romania’s dealings with most non-communist countries suffered severedeterioration after 1947. The isolation imposed by Stalin to safeguard his

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“empire” from Western influences produced policies that had a dramaticimpact on Romanian external relations. One involved cutting off culturalrelations with Western Powers beginning in 1948. That summer Pauker pro-posed that the Politburo dissolve both the French and Italian institutes inBucharest, a decision put into effect.23 At the same time, Romania asked theItalian government to close all of its consulates in Romania;24 and not surpris-ingly, the American Library at Bucharest also closed. In July 1948, Romania’sConcordat with the Vatican was denounced to isolate Romanian Catholicsfrom the West and dismantle the Greek-Catholic Church.25 The Vatican hadalready been described as an important centre of Imperialist espionage byparty propaganda, leading to numerous arrests in the following years.26

An even worse effect on Romania’s external position occurred with sev-eral arrests of foreigners with accusations of espionage. In September 1948,for example, four diplomats working at the American Legation in Bucharestwere detained under charges of espionage.27 In 1952, several French citizensresiding in Romania confronted a similar fate whilst the party-led press usedthese cases for an anti-Western propaganda that sometimes assumed a hys-terical tone.28 Romania was not unique—similar measures occurred at thejuncture in all “peoples’ democracies”—and the purges and public trials thatshook the satellite parties after 1949 involved many accusations of espionagedirected against high-ranking party members, almost all presumed “Titoists”blamed for spying in favour of the United States or Great Britain.29

Another factor of severe strain affecting Romanian relations with theWest centred on nationalisation. Following the Soviet economic model,the communist regime nationalised all industry in June 1948 and all otherproperties thereafter. A number of these nationalised entities belonged tocitizens of West European states, and the compensations granted by theRomanian government proved almost non-existent.30 Moreover, with ownersand proprietors accused and imprisoned, even foreign citizens, most Westerngovernments exerted intense pressures on Bucharest to obtain reasonablecompensations. Such pressures included confiscation of Romanian assets andinvestments abroad. The Swiss government, for example, decided in summer1948 to seize all Romanian bank accounts as a guarantee for compensation,causing considerable difficulties for Romania’s foreign trade.31 Other govern-ments adopted similar measures, increasing the strain in Romania’s relationswith the West.

One final element of strain can be mentioned: after 1947, manyRomanian personalities such as politicians, diplomats, writers, and monar-chists of all kinds fled the country looking for refuge in the West. Whereverthey settled, they organised themselves in associations and societies that mil-itated against the communist regime and the Soviet takeover—for instance,the Romanian National Committee. Given the international political situation,most Western governments sympathised with their cause and allowed themto organise rallies and exhibitions, seminars, and publications. For Bucharest,

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Western government tolerance and sometimes encouragement of such activ-ities was seen as a proof of enmity. Embarrassing situations for the regimeoccurred especially on those rare occasions when Romanian delegationsvisiting Western countries—of sports, music, and culture—faced protestsorganised by the immigrants. The MFA gauged one situation:

The French government continued to provide shelter and support toRomanian fascist elements and traitors of the Romanian people in France,giving them material assistance and facilitating their contact and the co-ordination of their activity, hostile to the People’s Republic of Romania.This became also evident in 1955 when gangs of Romanian fascists, withthe support of French authorities, tried to forestall the tournament of aRomanian assembly of dance and folklore in Paris and force them toreturn home.32

Questionable diplomatic representation, nationalisation, foreignerarrests, abrogating the Concordant, and manifestations abroad of organ-ised criticism of the Romanian regime compromised the diplomatic dialoguebetween Romania and countries other than the Soviet satellites. Two factorsrequire emphasis to explain Romania’s diplomatic isolation: first, the regime’scomplete dependence on Moscow for political and economic support andthe centralised Soviet decision-making imposed by Stalin in foreign affairs;and second, a genuine belief amongst Romanian communists about a hostileWest looking to overthrow the regime by means of propaganda and espi-onage. These tendencies, in turn, saw a regime determined to isolate itselffrom the outside world and ensure full control over the links connectingRomania with the outside world. Diplomacy constituted one of the mostprominent of such links. In the end, given the regime’s limited diplomaticautonomy, most foreign policy decisions were made in Moscow and indis-criminately imitated by all satellites, in which case there was no objectiveneed for a professional diplomatic apparatus. Such a need could only emergeshould the regime decide to assume more attributes of an independentforeign policy and develop its own diplomatic initiatives.

Gheorghiu-Dej gained complete control over the party by successfullypurging Pauker, his main rival, and those who supported her in May 1952.33

But any moment of joy proved short: in March 1953, news of Stalin’s deathreached Bucharest. For any East European communist dictator, Stalin existedas a person to be admired and idolised, but also feared. Gheorghiu-Dej wasno exception. On one hand, Stalin’s death was a reason for relief but, onthe other, any changes that followed his death caused distress. In terms ofRomanian foreign policy as a result of the Kremlin power struggle for Stalin’ssuccession, two major changes occurred to which Gheorghiu-Dej had toadapt: Soviet efforts to overcome tensions and animosities in the their policytowards the West and the alleged “New Course” in the Soviet policy towards

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its satellites. On 15 March 1953, the Soviet premier, Georgy Malenkov, madea statement in front of the Supreme Soviet that claimed that from Moscow’spoint of view, no issue existed in Soviet–American relations that could notbe resolved peacefully.34 This declaration raised many hopes in the West, asexpected, but the peaceful intentions of the new leadership were confirmedin the following years, along with the settlement of the war in Korea and theapparent success of the 1955 Four Power Geneva summit.35

The “New Course” constituted a more immediate concern for thesatellites. Moscow’s new leaders decided to lower the political and socialpressures in the communist bloc to prevent explosions of the kind thatalready took place in May–June 1953 in Berlin and Plzen.36 In summer 1953,most leaders of the satellite parties were summoned to Moscow and con-fronted two imposed key policy changes: significantly reduce the pace ofheavy industrialisation in favour of consumer-oriented goods and decreasepolice control over society. These policy changes came with numerousreplacements in satellite leadership, for instance, in Hungary, where theStalinist dictator Mátyás Rákosi was forced to resign in favour of Imre Nagy.37

Summoned to Moscow like all the others and enduring harsh criti-cism for his policy of heavy industrialisation, Gheorghiu-Dej was not inthe position to mention that heavy industrialisation had been imposed bythe Soviets—just like the “New Course.” Whilst not replaced as party leaderbut understanding that criticism of his policies amounted to criticism of himand the Romanian leadership, he had to accept culpability without blam-ing Stalin or anybody else.38 For the moment, Gheorghiu-Dej’s only optioninvolved complying with the demands, which he did. In August 1953, a CCPlenum adopted a series of decisions for the re-orientation of Romania’s eco-nomic policy.39 Gheorghiu-Dej learnt a valuable lesson on this occasion, ashe would later testify: to preserve his position in power, he had to increasethe domestic stability and popularity of his regime and reduce dependenceon Moscow.

At that point, Gheorghiu-Dej could not foresee the future course ofevents, which led him to be cautious. But the first Romanian–Soviet diver-gences concerning economic development can be traced to this point. Later,during a CC Plenum in 1961, he confessed that Soviet directions regardingre-orientation of investments were disobeyed. A pattern of behaviour hadbeen born—simulated change. The party officially announced the launch ofthe “New Course” in August 1953 but, according to Gheorghiu-Dej’, thosechanges were quietly reversed within months.40 Years after, in 1961, he evencongratulated himself on having the inspiration to disobey Soviet demands.

But the reformist animus of Khrushchev, first secretary of the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union (CPSU), soon targeted another sphere of Soviet-East European relations largely ignored until that point: CMEA. Created byStalin in 1949, CMEA had been inactive for years; but the new leadershipin Moscow decided to re-activate it to promote economic development in

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the communist bloc. One fundamental problem of the bloc lay in its pursuitof economic autarchy; during Stalin’s years, most satellites allocated massiveinvestments to develop various branches of heavy industry. Complicationsderived from two factors: first, all satellites were developing the sameindustrial branches and, second, they lacked the resources necessary forthose particular industries—iron ore for the steel industry, for example.41

Therefore, an important change envisaged by the Kremlin’s collective lead-ership involved the co-ordination of plans so as to avoid both autarchy andparallelism. In March 1954, the CMEA convened in Moscow, the first for fouryears.

After Soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan engaged in a severe crit-icism of CMEA mechanisms, the session decided to undertake certain reformslike co-ordination of five-year plans to avoid parallelism.42 At this pointanother measure, trade with the West, came under consideration. NumerousCMEA countries had problems procuring raw materials or industrial productsfrom CMEA markets and also found difficulty in placing various products onthose markets. Opening trade with the West was regarded as a viable mea-sure, meant to compensate the shortcomings of intra-CMEA trade.43 Giventhe uneasy relations between the West and the satellite countries, such ameasure would not be easy to implement. Most communist regimes lackedthe experience, cadres, and expertise to handle international trade and itschallenges, not to mention the animosities in bilateral relations such as thosedescribed above in Romania’s case. Building trade bridges across the IronCurtain appeared as a difficult task involving many risks, but the Sovietreformist spirit went further.

The March 1954 session of CMEA decided to convene a separate meetingof a specialised CMEA commission to discuss trade development with cap-italist countries.44 Meeting in Prague in May 1954, this commission decidedto expand trade relations with Western countries and drafted a resolutionadopted later at another CMEA session. The resolution recommended thatall member countries employ necessary efforts to improve relations with for-mer traditional trade partners like Great Britain, France, Italy, Austria, andthe Scandinavian countries.45 The resolution contained practical directions,too. It specified that member countries must look for long-term trade agree-ments with Western countries that would facilitate the functioning of plannedeconomies; and it indicated that member countries pay particular attentionto developing relations with Yugoslavia and Finland.46 These decisions wereparticularly convenient for Gheorghiu-Dej because they provided a justi-fication for finding economic partners outside the bloc that would makeRomania less dependent economically on the Soviet Union. In 1954, the firststeps aimed at improving relations with Western countries were already beinginitiated by Bucharest. A second important recommendation concernedimport-export relations. Under American pressure, most West European gov-ernments imposed restrictions on the export of products considered strategic

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to the communist bloc. CMEA specified that member countries must notnecessarily condition the export of strategic goods on Western markets toimports of the same nature; foreign currency obtained by exports could easilybe used for separate imports of strategic goods in various ways. Conditioningexports on imports would only compromise chances for profitable trade.47

Other changes facilitated Gheorghiu-Dej’s reconsideration of his for-eign policy. The Soviet quest for détente with the West soon gained atheoretical framework with the emergence of the concept of “peacefulco-existence”—a concept that became increasingly better known after theBandung Conference of African and Asian countries in April 1955.48 Theorganisers elaborated and presented the self-styled “five principles of peace-ful co-existence” and, soon after, the expression became a leit-motif of Sovietpropaganda, especially in the context of the Geneva Summit. In December1955, at the second party Congress, Gheorghiu-Dej used the notion toexplain Romania’s foreign policy.49 At the moment, peaceful co-existenceexpressed a commitment, rather than a programme of action, to improverelations with the West and prove—in Malenkov’s words—that conflict wasnot inevitable.

This striving for détente, typical for Khrushchev’s policies, was promptlytransmitted to all the satellites. In January 1956, a conclave of communistparties convened in Moscow to discuss issues of foreign policy amongstothers. Shortly before the meeting, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs elab-orated in an Informative Note—the basis for discussions in the forthcomingmeeting—to all communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. The Notemade a comprehensive presentation of latest evolution in foreign affairs fromthe Soviet point of view and drew some priorities and tasks to be assumedby communist states for the period to come.50 One priority involved strength-ening relations with Third World countries by granting them technologicaland industrial assistance. As the Note explained, communist states will beable to reach new markets for their industries and pull these countries awayfrom “Imperialist” domination:

The international situation and the interests of the struggle for strengthen-ing the positions of Socialism demand a more active stand of our forcesin the field of foreign policy. We must emphasise the existence of con-siderable possibilities, still not used by us, to increase the activity of theentire Socialist camp and each country individually in the field of foreignpolicy, to consolidate our common position in the struggle for peaceand Socialism. There is an insufficient use of the existing possibilitiesof improvement in relations with Western Capitalist countries, as well aswith countries from Asia, Near and Middle East. . . .51

Activation of diplomatic work was the key directive, which Khrushchevalso conveyed to the meeting. Speaking about the need for unity in

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communist bloc foreign policy behaviour, Khrushchev demanded the othercommunist states assume a louder voice in such matters, a leading role incertain issues, at least for the sake of appearances:

There where it is convenient for our entire camp, in a series of cases, itis preferable that the initiator would not be us, the Soviet Union, but oneof the peoples’ democracies. The other countries, including the SovietUnion, will support such an initiative. In a series of cases, it will be moreconvenient from a political point of view to behave this way. I think weshould all consider this.52

Basically, Moscow transmitted a message of activism to the satellites,although Soviet decision-makers were well aware of the difficulties insatellite state diplomacy. As Molotov pointed out:

There are still problems about which we’ve done little. It is the casewith our penetration and consolidation of our influence in Latin America;in this particular matter, all friendly countries can contribute with some-thing. Also, another problem about which we’ve done little is improvingour relations with Turkey. . . . But we must also say that, in what con-cerns the issue of diplomatic cadres in the capitalist countries, peoples’democracies are still at a most unsatisfactory level.53

Gheorghiu-Dej took advantage of the situation and made a quick turnas soon as he returned from Moscow. Many Romanian diplomats wererecalled for consultations in a large meeting bringing together the party lead-ership and leading MFA officials. Most ambassadors and ministers were topresent the ministry with detailed reports concerning their activities abroad,Romania’s relations with the country to which they were accredited, propos-als for further developing relations, and so on. Their reports had already beendiscussed in a prior meeting held at the MFA and led by the minister, GrigorePreoteasa. On 18 January 1956, accompanied by other Politburo members,Gheorghiu-Dej met with Preoteasa and influential diplomats and discussedRomania’s foreign policy in the past years and its future development.

Preoteasa began the meeting with a long exposition in a highlycritical—and self-reproaching—tone. Above such “comradely” conveniences,he emphasised an important conclusion: developments like détente or peace-ful co-existence took Romania’s diplomatic apparatus by surprise, and itwas not—politically and ideologically—ready to rise to the challenge.54 AsPreoteasa pointed out, such problems seemed particularly acute in Romania’sdiplomatic offices from the West:

In the capitalist countries we determined that the political and ideologicallevel of our activity is weak. This is one of our failures, of the ministry,of our directions. . . . About that, there are also some problems as to

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how should be regarded the international détente, not as a mechanicalfact, but as a result of a battle. . . . A second category of problems, deriv-ing from our political and ideological weakness, is that empiricism andbureaucratism dominate our work, a lot of matters are solved automat-ically: we did so last year, we will do the same this year, despite therapidly changing conditions.55

When Gheorghiu-Dej spoke, his speech embroidered on the notion thatRomania had to develop its own foreign policy as an independent state withindependent interests. Romanian diplomats, he emphasised, must overcometheir isolation and establish contacts abroad, especially in the West, activelysearching for information and analysing policies and situations so that theirwork could be useful to the Ministry in Bucharest. In front of these manyRomanian diplomats, he stated:

. . . we made a terrible mistake by staying isolated for so long, we spoketo the capitalist world in such a way that we alone isolated ourselves. . . .in the exterior, this shyness and excessive caution prevent people fromhaving initiative. We must manifest ourselves in the realm of foreignpolicy as a state which has a foreign policy, which has certain interests.Of course, we must always be careful so that our country’s interests, intheir method and affirmation, would not interfere with the interests ofother countries from the Socialist camp, but on the contrary.56

He asked diplomats to be practical: think outside the box, obtain andinterpret information, take initiative, and draw proposals as independentunits. And he called upon Pauker’s “working class” diplomats to becomeprofessional diplomats and, for that, only the West was the real test. It couldonly be a long and complicated process, but Gheorghiu-Dej needed a pro-fessional diplomatic service to be able to elaborate an independent courseof foreign policy. During the meeting, Gheorghiu-Dej made no mention ofSoviet instructions or directives and tried not to associate the purpose ofthe meeting with Moscow’s “advice.” Developing relations with the Westseemed a reaction to Soviet demands but, as time progressed, these rela-tions were used to reduce dependence on Moscow. It is, again, a case ofsimulated change. Gheorghiu-Dej appeared subservient whilst finding alter-native options. Significantly, as Romania’s opposition to the Soviet Unionincreasingly amplified, its volume of trade with the West increased.57

The first signs of a change in Romanian diplomacy already appearedby 1955, when Romania joined the UN.58 But significant changes in attitudeand a somewhat coherent policy towards the West started in 1956, soonafter the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Gheorghiu-Dej understood that sincepower in Romania belonged to him during those years, so did the respon-sibility for everything that happened—in this context, the argument exists

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that Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin initiative constituted nothing more than the firststage of the future Romanian–Soviet dispute.59 Gheorghiu-Dej flinched fromreal debates and assumptions of responsibility by blaming everything onPauker. Having spent many years in Moscow and purged shortly beforeStalin’s death, she proved an easy target for taking the blame for Stalinistcrimes in Romania.60 But Gheorghiu-Dej also understood that to preserve theparty’s leading role, he had to reduce his vulnerability in front of Moscow andconsolidate his regime both domestically and internationally. Reconciliationwith the West was a crucial step; it had the potential to provide alter-nate economic partners and international credibility and prestige that hisregime lacked. The 1956 Hungarian revolution—proof that de-Stalinisationwas dangerous—strengthened his resolve to consolidate his regime and keepaway from dangerous Soviet reforms.

From 1955–1956 onwards, initiatives aimed at increasing Romania’sinternational visibility increased, and so did active steps aimed at improv-ing Romania’s relations with western European countries. In March 1956,for example, Preoteasa submitted two notes to the Politburo proposing anintensification of Romania’s presence in international organisations. Onenote concerned the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and CulturalOrganisation (UNESCO). The MFA suggested that Romania sign the UNESCOConvention and establish a national UNESCO Commission. Preoteasa arguedthat Romania could neither take advantage of the possibilities to populariseits achievements as a people’s democracy nor take part in important discus-sions regarding the role of science and education in the contemporary worldunless it was a member.61

The second note concerned Romania’s membership in the World HealthOrganisation (WHO). In 1950, as the international climate severely deteri-orated with the outbreak of the Korean War, Romania decided to give upmembership and cut off all contacts with WHO. Preoteasa now proposedthat Romania resume its membership and participate in the organisation’sactivities. His argument held that through membership, Romania had thepossibility to exchange important scientific knowledge with other countriesin the field of medicine.62 A few weeks later, the Politburo adopted bothproposals, charging the government with taking the necessary steps in thatdirection.63 Such measures had the potential to increase Romania’s inter-national visibility and, implicitly, the credibility of the regime as a reliablepartner in negotiations.

At the same time, the economy could not to be neglected. After 1948,the communist regime in Romania embarked on an intense course of indus-trialisation following the Stalinist model. This newly built industry did nothave sufficient export markets, since Romania’s relations with most coun-tries outside the communist bloc had severely deteriorated. So Moscow’simpulse for broadening trade relations with the developing countries well-suited Romanian needs. Most of these countries could not always afford to

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buy industrial products from the developed countries of the West, but theywere in acute need of them. Although initial Romanian demarches towardssuch countries appeared to have a subordination character—obeying Sovietinstructions—the regime soon discovered that intensifying relations withthe developing world also created a certain degree of independence fromCMEA markets and supplies of raw materials. As Gheorghiu-Dej’s determina-tion to distance himself from Moscow increased in the next decade, so didRomanian efforts to establish fruitful relations with less developed countriesoutside the communist bloc.

The fact that the RWP leadership was dissatisfied with the country’seconomic relations with the Soviet Union is clearly visible from a statementmade by one of Gheorghiu-Dej’s closest associates, Chivu Stoica, during aconfidential meeting with a Yugoslav delegation in July 1964. Stoica talkedabout Romanian–Soviet joint companies, “sovroms”:

All coal-mining enterprises, the uranium industry, later steel industry andothers, became sovroms. The losses of such enterprises were coveredwith the Romanian budget. The profit was covered from the state budget,as well. It was obligatory. If the company had losses and no benefits, theRomanian budget had to cover it. At a certain moment, we even asked,is Stalin was still alive? Cmd. Gheorghiu raised the issue: what kind ofrelations are these between our countries? Socialist relations? Capitalistrelations? There was no response. Only in 1956 we could talk about it.64

This statement is instructive from many points of view. First, Gheorghiu-Dej’sregime perceived its relationship with Moscow in a negative way, especiallyfrom an economic point of view. It serves also to explain that his movestowards the West were not only generated by Khrushchev’s demands buthad domestic motivations—at best, they only offered the ideal opportunity.It demonstrates further that due to explicable political pressures, it was notunusual for the regime to hide its real intentions from Moscow and raisethem in convenient circumstances.

The first steps aimed at developing durable relations outside the com-munist bloc can also be traced to this period. Romania and Egypt hadalready signed a Trade Agreement in 1954; but, one year later, a largeRomanian governmental delegation visited Cairo to negotiate and sign athree-year agreement providing for a significant increase in bilateral trade.Egypt’s value for the Romanian economy resided with its control of theSuez Canal, since at that juncture Romania’s entire trade with countries likeChina, India, Burma, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia bypassed the Suez Canal.65

In autumn 1955, another governmental economic delegation travelled toLebanon and signed Romania’s first trade agreement with that country. Theagreement involved Romanian exports of industrial equipment and importssuch as cotton and mineral ores. Romania also obtained Lebanese approval

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for re-exporting Lebanese products to third markets.66 At the same time, asimilar delegation visited Burma for the same purpose. The trade agreementsigned in Rangoon provided for Romanian exports of industrial machineryand equipment in exchange for cotton, rubber, rice, and various ores.67 Acomparable agreement was signed with Syria in January 1956.68

But the milestone of this turn in foreign policy came in the relations withWestern countries. The earlier arrests of diplomats and other Western citizensproved a great challenge. A recent survey regarding Austro–Romanian rela-tions shows that the first signs of change appeared in 1955–1956.69 Sometimeduring 1955, Romania proposed raising the level of diplomatic representa-tion between the two countries to legation. Austria rejected the proposal,conditioning any further development in relations to the release of Austriandiplomats arrested in Bucharest in 1952 on charges of espionage. In June1955, these diplomats were released from prison and allowed to return toAustria. Austria then agreed to establish legations in both capitals.70

Similar progress had appeared in relations with France. In 1954 negoti-ations began regarding a Franco–Romanian trade agreement after Bucharestagreed to consider another sensitive issue: compensation for French goodsand property affected by nationalisation. And negotiations made significantprogress after Romania agreed to release a large number of French citizensfrom prison and allow them to return to France. The agreement was even-tually concluded in autumn 1954. France became the first Power with whichGheorghiu-Dej decided to conduct negotiations regarding compensations.Similar discussions with other Western countries were initiated later. Sincethere was no particular reason by which France could have been consid-ered a priority for Romania in 1954, these negotiations may be consideredGheorghiu-Dej testing the diplomatic waters.

The United States likewise became a target for re-emergent Romaniandiplomacy. Gheorghiu-Dej initiated exploratory contact with Washingtonin 1954 with the purpose of improving relations and developing eco-nomic co-operation, but with no result. In 1955, he reiterated his intentionsthrough various channels and even sent a delegation to the UnitedStates to discuss co-operation in the field of agriculture with privateAmerican firms. In March 1956, Romania informed the United States gov-ernment of its intention to open talks to settle outstanding economic andfinancial issues between the two countries, including compensation fornationalisation.71 Moreover, Bucharest also expressed interest in expand-ing trade relations and collaboration in different economic areas. Thenewly appointed Romanian ambassador in Washington, Silviu Brucan, metPresident Dwight Eisenhower and conveyed the same message. Early inSeptember 1956, the State Department informed the Romanian governmentthat it had accepted the invitation to negotiate.72 Despite the fact that nego-tiations proved to be long and complicated, it amounted to a major stepforward.

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A recent examination of Austro–Romanian relations makes a compellingobservation concerning that relationship which is also valid for Romania’sforeign policy generally. Efforts to develop further Romanian–Austrian rela-tions were held back by the events in Hungary in autumn 1956 that fosteredGheorghiu-Dej’s caution when it came to significant policy changes.73

Indeed, important diplomatic initiatives considered in 1955–1956 were tem-porarily postponed after autumn 1956 only to be resumed in 1958. Moreover,a major change of the political environment occurred in 1958: the withdrawalof Soviet troops from Romanian territory.74

Romania’s peace treaty with the Allies at the end of the Second WorldWar allowed the stationing of Soviet troops on Romanian territory until thetreaty with Austria was concluded. After May 1955, when the Austrian StateTreaty was signed, the USSR used the Warsaw Pact as a justification forcontinuing to station troops in Central and Eastern Europe, but Gheorghiu-Dej took advantage of the situation to ask Khrushchev to withdraw Soviettroops from Romania. As a proof of his policy of peaceful co-existence,Khrushchev agreed to do so in summer 1958, which was a notable suc-cess for Gheorghiu-Dej. This withdrawal implicitly involved a significantdecrease in Soviet pressures and, soon after, more determined than before,the Gheorghiu-Dej regime adopted new foreign policy initiatives.

After the shock of the Hungarian revolution, and especially after thesuccessful launch of the Sputnik satellite, Khrushchev’s initiatives respect-ing peaceful co-existence resumed in 1958–1959. Gheorghiu-Dej strived atthe time to implement a vast programme of industrialisation that requirednumerous technological and financial resources. Such assets were difficultto find in the communist bloc; evident from Romania’s efforts to improveeconomic relations with the West, Gheorghiu-Dej wanted to find them else-where. Above all, Romania actively pursued trade relations and economicco-operation that aimed to limit its dependence on the Soviet Union fortechnology and raw materials.

But discretion stood as one of the salient features of Romania’s foreignpolicy: although Gheorghiu-Dej’s foreign initiatives looked to consolidate hisregime in the face of Soviet pressures and dependence, they were all hiddenbehind the theory of peaceful co-existence or masked as reactions to Sovietinitiatives. For example, in 1958, another one of Khrushchev’s numerouspeace proposals called for developing economic relations as a bridge acrossthe Iron Curtain, a facilitator of political contacts and trust building.75 Inthis way, Romania’s efforts towards developing economic relations in theWest did not seem out of the ordinary. But certainly not commonplace wasRomania using this against the USSR itself within CMEA and the WarsawPact when it strongly opposed all measures aimed at increasing integrationand, implicitly, Soviet control over the communist bloc.76 Basically, improvedeconomic relations with the West and international visibility were seen ascounterbalances to Soviet domination.

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Romanian efforts employed for improving relations with the Westintensified significantly from 1958 onwards. For example West Germany,a very valuable economic partner, offered a great source of technologyfor Romania’s industrialisation programme, but relations suffered becauseof, amongst other things, Bucharest’s reticence in approving repatriation ofGerman citizens. A significant ethnic group of Germans resided in Romania,especially in the province Transylvania, most of them keen to leave for WestGermany; but passports were difficult to obtain. In May 1958, the Politburoinstructed the MFA to approve repatriations to West Germany and to do soin a way to improve relations with and obtain concessions from the Bonngovernment.77 Other examples exist. In January 1960, the MFA proposedthat the Politburo release a number of Romanian citizens from prisons, mostof them arrested on charges of espionage for Western governments. As theMFA pointed out, these imprisonments caused serious problems in Romania’srelations with some Western Powers such as France.78

Such steps produced the expected results. In 1959, Romania signed aProtocol with France settling the thorny issue of compensations for Frenchproperties lost to nationalisation. The same year a large Romanian gov-ernmental delegation, composed of economists, travelled to a number ofWestern states like Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands to negoti-ate and sign agreements for the acquisition of fully equipped factories andmore.79 Negotiations between Romania and the United States also paid offwhen Washington decided to accept payment of compensation for nation-alised American property. An agreement was signed in March 1960 that madea major contribution to expanding American–Romanian trade.80

During a meeting with a foreign party delegation in August 1964,Gheorghiu-Dej recalled: “We were afraid to send people abroad before, wewere terribly afraid. What are they going to do, wouldn’t the capitalists eatthem? And we started sending a few at first. We used to say, if they doeat them, they’re not going to eat them all.”81 Though humorous, his com-ment says much about Romania’s quest for autonomy in foreign policy. Thecommunist regime proved reluctant initially to send people abroad—abroadmeaning to the non-communist countries—because it did not trust WesternPower intentions and because it saw them as a source of hostility, espi-onage, and anti-communist plots. The political and ideological confrontationof the early Cold War determined a quasi-complete isolation in Romania’sforeign policy. To ensure regime control of foreign policy, purges removedmost career diplomats, replacing them with party-controlled officials. As theregime mistrusted the outside world and as contacts were undesirable, themost relevant criterion for the selection of diplomats was their loyalty to theregime.

Priorities changed radically after Stalin’s death. The Romanian regimeinterpreted the reforms implemented by the new Kremlin leadership as athreat to its stability. In reaction, Gheorghiu-Dej sought to reduce Romanian

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vulnerability vis-à-vis Moscow and become less dependent on Soviettechnology and raw materials. The regime decided to improve relations withthe West, an alternative to reduce its dependence on the communist bloc.International visibility and prestige would also strengthen the regime in rela-tion to Soviet pressures. Economic relations with the West could only havebeen established if it perceived Romania as a credible partner. To achievethese goals, Gheorghiu-Dej had to rely on diplomacy. After 1953, Romaniamade several discrete steps towards improving its relations with someWestern Powers, but without publicising any significant change in its foreignpolicy. It came about for reasons of caution. At the time, still vulnerable toMoscow, the regime proved unwilling to assume the risks of “disobedience.”As Moscow demanded that its allies become more involved internationally,Gheorghiu-Dej took the opportunity to reform Romanian diplomacy. He dis-guised the changes as merely obedient reactions to Khrushchev’s demands,but their aim was much deeper. Gheorghiu-Dej’s demand for change focusedon opening up to the West and promoting Romanian interests actively in aprofessional matter.

In conclusion, diplomatic reform served as one of the first and mostcritical steps taken by Gheorghiu-Dej regime’s to assert independence fromthe Soviet Union. Initiated after Stalin’s death, it represented an essentialcondition for providing the regime with alternative support. Later, during the1960s, when Gheorghiu-Dej publicly opposed Khrushchev’s CMEA reformsand appeared to the world as an independent voice in the communist bloc,Romanian diplomacy had already undergone significant transformation thatmade it able to deal with new and demanding challenges imposed on theregime.

NOTES

This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research.1. Dusmanii pacii si libertatii popoarelor. Politica agresiva si uneltirile imperialismului american

împotriva Republicii Populare Române (Bucuresti, 1952), pp. 3–9. This is a propaganda brochure com-piled by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1952 and distributed within Romania’s diplomaticmissions.

2. Scânteia (3 August 1969). When he came to Romania on 2–4 August 1969, Richard Nixon wasthe first American president to visit a Communist country.

3. Katalin Miklóssy, “Khrushchevism after Khrushchev. The rise of national interest in the EasternBloc,” in Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic, eds., Khrushchev in the Kremlin. Policy and Government in theSoviet Union, 1953–1964 (London, New York, 2011), p. 152.

4. Vladimir Tismaneanu, Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers’ Party: from de-Sovietizationto the emergence of national communism (Washington DC, 2002), pp. 15–18.

5. Dennis Deletant, Romania under communist rule (Bucharest, 1999), pp. 100–01.6. David Turnock, Aspects of Independent Romania’s Economic History with Particular Reference

to Transition for EU Accession (Aldershot, 2007), p. 32; for a specific case study, see Ryan Floyd, “ForWant of Rubber: Romania’s Affair with Firestone in 1965,” East European Quarterly, 38/4(2005), p. 488.

7. The turning point of 1947 in Stalin’s policy towards Eastern Europe is explained by EduardMark, Revolution by Degrees. Stalin’s National Front Strategy for Europe 1941–1947, Working Paper 31(Washington DC, 2001). Concerning the Cominform meeting of 1947 and its significance, see Grant

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Mkrtychevich Adibekov, ed., The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1947/1948/1949, vol. 24,(Milan, 1994), pp. 3–34.

8. Kees Boterbloem, The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896–1948 (Ithaca, NY, 2004), p. 312.9. Martin McCauley, Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1949 (Edinburgh Gate, 2008), p. 96. For

Western perceptions of this policy, see Marc J. Selverstone, Constructing the Monolith: The United States,Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945–1950 (Cambridge, MA, 2009), pp. 74–76.

10. Regarding Soviet political and ideological vision of world affairs and the rationalities behindit during the early Cold War, see Cezar Stanciu, “Europeans Against Europe. The Practice of ForeignIsolationism and Seclusion in Stalinist Romania,” Slovo, 20/1(2008), pp. 22–27. At the time, Stalin wasespecially preocupied with controlling information; the anti-Cosmopolitan campaign was part of it. SeeDzhahangir G. Nadzhafov, “The Beginning of the Cold War between East and West: the Aggravation ofthe Ideological Confrontation,” Cold War History, 4/2(2004), pp. 143–46.

11. For a well-documented political biography, see Robert Levy, Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall ofa Jewish Communist (Berkeley, CA, 2001).

12. Ion Calafeteanu, “Schimbari în aparatul diplomatic românesc dupa 6 martie 1945,” in 6 martie1945. Începuturile comunizarii României (Bucuresti, 1995), pp. 165–67.

13. Albert Resis, ed., Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev(Chicago, IL, 1993), pp. 69–70.

14. László Borhi, “Empire by Coercion: The Soviet Union and Hungary in the 1950s,” Cold WarHistory, 1/2(2001), p. 57.

15. “Regulament de functionare. Sectia Cadrelor de Partid din Exterior,” Fund CC (CentralCommittee Archives, National Historical Archives of Romania, Bucharest—hereafter ANIC) Section ForeignRelations, dossier 20/1950, p. 21.

16. “Catre Secretariatul C.C. al P.M.R,” Fund CC al PCR, Section Foreign Relations, dossier 20/1950,p. 5.

17. Ibid.18. Hotarârea Biroului Politic al C.C. al P.M.R. 1174/1950, Fund CC al PCR, Section Foreign Relations,

dossier 20/1950, p. 3.19. “Hotarârea Secretariatului C.C. al P.M.R. 1011/5.09.1952,” Fund CC al PCR, Section Foreign

Relations, dossier 2/1952, p. 184.20. Hotarârea Secretariatului C.C. al P.M.R. 1121/20.10.1952, Fund CC al PCR, Section Foreign

Relations, dossier 2/1952, p. 198.21. Nota M.A.E. catre Secretariatul C.C. al P.M.R. 762/25.05.1953, Fund CC al PCR, Section Foreign

Relations, dossier 2/1953, p. 27.22. Nota M.A.E. catre Secretariatul C.C. al P.M.R. 1062/8.07.1953, Fund CC al PCR, section Foreign

Relations, dossier 2/1953, p. 36.23. Stenogramele sedintelor Biroului Politic si ale Secretariatului Comitetului Central al PMR,

Volume I 1948, (Bucuresti, 2002), p. 319. Both the French and Italian Institutes organised various cul-tural events and had libraries of French and Italian language literature. Party newspapers depicted themas centres of “Imperialist propaganda” and espionage.

24. “Telegrama cifrata 93479/26 iulie 1948,” Fund TC (Ciphred Telegrams, Archives of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs—AMAE) cutia Italia 1947–1948.

25. Victor Neumann, Between Words and Reality: Studies on the Politics of Recognition and theChanges of Regime in Contemporary Romania (Washington, DC: 2000), p. 138.

26. Jonathan Luxmoore and Jolanta Babiuch, The Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for theSoul of Eastern Europe (London, 2000), p. 70. The authors also describe similar measures taken in allSoviet satellites against the Catholic Church.

27. Joseph F. Harrington and Bruce J. Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians: Fifty Years ofAmerican–Romanian Relations, 1940–1990 (Boulder, CO, 1991), p. 113.

28. Cezar Stanciu, “La signification de l’accord commercial roumano-français de 1954,” HistoricalYearbook, 4(2007), pp. 66–67.

29. Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe (Budapest, 2010), pp. 99–100.

30. Cheng Chen, The Prospects for Liberal Nationalism in Post-Leninist States (University Park, PA,2007), p. 140.

31. Stenogramele sedintelor Biroului Politic (2002), p. 182.

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32. “Nota privind îmbunatatirea relatiilor româno-franceze în cursul anului 1954 (nedatat),” Fund220 (AMAE) dossier France 1954, p. 4.

33. For the narrative of the “Pauker Group” purge, see Dennis Deletant, Communist Terror inRomania. Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State 1948–1965 (London, 1999), 236–43. More details in Levy,Ana Pauker, pp. 194–220.

34. Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.–Soviet Relations During the Cold War (Ithaca,NY, 2000), p, 42.

35. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Policy Aims at the Geneva Conference, 1955,” in Günter Bischofand Saki Dockrill, eds., Cold War Respite: the Geneva Summit of 1955 (Baton Rouge, LA, 2000), p. 55.

36. Mark Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe.Internal and External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 1/1(1999), pp. 7–10.

37. János Rainer, The New Course in Hungary in 1953, Working Paper 38 (Washington, DC, 2002),pp. 14–15.

38. Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for all Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism(Berkeley, CA, 2003), p. 139. Miron Constantinescu, an influential Politburo member, tried to exploitthe situation and blame the “mistakes” in economic policy on Gheorghiu-Dej alone, but he was notstrong enough to rally the rest of the Politburo members around him. Gheorghiu-Dej resisted andpurged Constantinescu in 1957. See Elis Neagoe-Plesa and Liviu Plesa, eds., Dosar Ana Pauker. PlenaraComitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român din 30 noiembrie-5 decembrie 1961, Volume I(Bucuresti, 2006), p. 381.

39. Liviu Taranu, “‘Noul Curs’ în politica economica a României comuniste, August 1953, I,” ArhiveleTotalitarismului, 1–2(2004), p. 147.

40. Neagoe-Plesa and Plesa, Ana Pauker, pp. 383–84.41. Miklóssy, Khrushchevism, p. 53.42. “Note din discursul tov. A.I. Mikoyan,” Fund CC al PCR Section External Relations, dossier

16/1954, p. 15.43. Ibid.44. “Raport privind lucrarile Comisiei pentru elaborarea proiectului de hotarâre a CAER în problema

comertului cu tarile capitaliste,” Fund CAER (Council for Mutual Economic Aid, ANIC), dossier 14/1954,pp. 145–46.

45. “Raport privind lucrarile Comisie,” p. 146.46. “Raport privind lucrarile Comisie,” pp. 146–47.47. “Hotarârea Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc. Despre comertul tarilor membre ale

Consiliului cu tarile capitaliste,” Fund CAER, dossier 14/1954, pp. 151–52.48. See Seng Tan, “The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference for Contemporary Asian

and International Order,” in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited: The Legacy ofthe 1955 Asian–African Conference for International Order (Singapore, 2008), pp. 1–3.

49. G. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole si cuvântari 1955–1959 (Bucuresti, 1960), p. 16.50. “Nota informativa a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al URSS cu privire la problemele politicii

externe,” Fund CC al PCR, Section External Relations, Dossier 1/1956, pp. 71–72.51. Ibid., p.73.52. “Materialele Consfatuirii 6–11 ianuarie 1956,” Fund CC al PCR, Section External Relations, dossier

2/1956, p. 9.53. “Note 6-12.I.1956,” Fund CC al PCR, Section External Relations, dossier 95/1956, 16.54. “Stenograma sedintei din 18 ianuarie 1956,” Fund CC al PCR, Section Chancellery, dossier

10/1956, 1–2.55. Ibid., 2–3.56. Ibid., 39.57. For a recent assessment of Romania’s trade policy during the period of reference, see Martin

Myant and Jan Drahokoupil, Transition Economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, andCentral Asia (Hoboken, NJ, 2010), pp. 42–43. See also Mark Kramer, “The Kremlin, the Prague Springand the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., Promises of 1968: Crisis, Illusion, and Utopia(Budapest, 2011), pp. 296–97.

58. Deletant, Communist terror in Romania, p. 223.59. Tismaneanu, Stalinism for all Seasons, p. 143.60. Steven D. Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution (London, 2000), p. 33.

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61. “Propunere ref.: semnarea Conventiei UNESCO,” Fund CC al PCR, Section Chacellery, dossier37/1956, pp. 31–32.

62. “Propunere ref.: reluarea activitatii RPR în OMS,” Ibid., pp. 42–43.63. “Protocol No. 12 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 10 aprilie 1956,” Fund CC al PCR,

Section Chancellery, dossier 37/1956, p. 7.64. “Stenograma primirii de catre tovarasul Chivu Stoica a unei delegatii iugoslave,” Fund CC al

PCR, section Chancellery, dossier 32/1964, p.10.65. Constantin Botoran, Relatiile româno-egiptene în epoca moderna si contemporana (Bucuresti,

1974), pp. 174–79.66. “Nota asupra tratativelor pentru încheierea acordului dintre RPR si Republica Libaneza” Fund

CAER, dossier 267/1955–1956, p. 192.67. Ibid., pp. 189–190.68. “Nota asupra tratativelor privind încheierea Acordului Comercial si de Plati dintre RPR si

Republica Siriana,” Fund CAER, dossier 267/1955–1956, pp. 196–97.69. Paul Ullman, “Austria and Romania,” in Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller, eds., “Peaceful

Coexistence” or “Iron Curtain” (Wien, 2009), p. 467.70. Ibid.71. Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose, p. 176.72. “Nota Legatia SUA la Bucuresti catre MAE,” Fund CC al PCR, Section Chancellery, dossier

96/1956, pp. 16–20.73. Ullman, “Austria and Romania,” p. 468.74. Donald R. Falls, “Soviet Decision-Making and the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Romania,”

East European Quarterly, 27/4(1993), p. 49075. “Propunerile Guvernului Sovietic privind problemele slabirii încordarii internationale,” Fund CC

al PCR, Section Chancellery, dossier 1/1958, p. 11.76. Regarding Romania’s opposition towards the principle of economic specialisation and further

economic integration of CMEA, see Miroslav N. Jovanovic, The economics of international integration(Cheltenham, 2006), p. 387. Details concerning Romania’s opposition towards the reformation of WTO,see Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact1955–1991 (Budapest, 2005), p. 210 et passim.

77. “Protocol 9 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din ziua de 31 mai 1958,” Fund CC al PCR,Section Chancellery, dossier 15/1958, p. 2.

78. “Nota,” Fund CC al PCR, Section Chancellery, dossier 2/1960, pp. 250–51.79. Lavinia Betea, Alexandru Bârladeanu despre Dej, Ceausescu si Iliescu (Bucuresti, 1997), p.133.80. Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose, pp 204–05.81. “Nota de convorbire,” Fund CC al PCR, Section Chancellery, dossier 40/1964, p. 5.

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