zohar goshen columbia law school & ono academic college assaf hamdani hebrew university; ecgi
DESCRIPTION
Regulating Controlling Shareholders’ Conflicts. Corporate Governance, Family Firms, and Economic Concentration December 19, 2011. Zohar Goshen Columbia Law School & Ono Academic College Assaf Hamdani Hebrew University; ECGI. Overview. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Zohar GoshenColumbia Law School & Ono Academic College
Assaf Hamdani Hebrew University; ECGI
Regulating Controlling Shareholders’ Conflicts
Corporate Governance, Family Firms, and Economic Concentration
December 19, 2011
Overview
What should be the legal test for identifying related-party transactions?
Delaware approach is problematic:- Formal test: (i) expressly excludes “indirect” conflicts; and
(ii) has not been consistently applied
Legal treatment of controlling shareholders’ conflicts should depend on:― Controlling shareholders rights/duties― Enforcement concerns
Tentative approach concerning boundaries of control2
Controlling Shareholders and Investor Protection
Dominant shareholders have incentive and power to discipline management
Principal concern: minority expropriation through self-dealing, tunneling, and conflicted transactions OECD (2009): one of the biggest corporate governance
challenges facing the business landscape in Asia
3
Implications for Corporate Law
Dominant shareholders have incentive and power to discipline management Law generally should not interfere with business
decisions
Principal concern: minority expropriation Closer regulation of self-dealing and conflicts
“Transactional Approach”
4
Corporate Law for Controlled Firms
I. Identify self-dealing or conflict transactions
II. Regulation of conflicts/self-dealing:- Majority-minority vote (Canada; UK; Israel)- Independent directors- Disclosure- Judicial review (shareholder lawsuits) Ex
post
5
Ex ante
Anti-Self-Dealing IndexDjankov et. al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (2008)
Public Co. Private Co.
Mr. James
60% 90%
Corporate Law for Controlled Firms
I. Identify self-dealing or conflict transactions- Atanasov, Black & Ciccotello (2011)
II. Regulation of conflicts/self-dealing:- Majority-minority vote (Canada; UK; Israel)- Independent directors- Disclosure- Judicial review (shareholder lawsuits) Ex
post
7
Ex ante
Our Project:
What should be the legal test for identifying tunneling or other transactions that deserve closer scrutiny?- Not question of acquiring evidence
Use Delaware case law Entire fairness v. business judgment
8
9
Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971)
Sinclair Venezuelan Oil Company
Sinclair Oil: 97%; Public: 3%
1960-1966: $108 million (pro-rata) dividends
Plaintiffs: ? “Sinclair caused Sinven to pay out such excessive
dividends that the industrial development of Sinven was effectively prevented”
“these dividends … resulted from an improper motive -- Sinclair's need for cash”
10
Partner CommunicationsDec. 1, 2011 Press Release
Partner Communications Company Ltd. … (Nasdaq:PTNR)(TASE:PTNR), a leading Israeli communications operator, announces that it was served with a motion to approve the filing of a derivative claim.
The Claim alleges, inter alia, that the said directors breached their duty of care towards the Company …by approving dividend distributions, in order to assist the parent company in repayment of the financing it undertook to acquire the controlling stake in the Company.
11
Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corporation, 261 A.2d 911 (Del. 1971) (Chancery)
“Whether dividends will be paid is within the sound discretion of the directors and, in the ordinary course of events, they are entitled to a presumption of good faith….”
“But given the special circumstances which obtain here (including Sinclair's fiduciary obligation …), Sinclair has the burden of showing that .. payment of the dividends were fair to Venezuelan after careful scrutiny by the Court.”
“I find that Venezuelan was not treated fairly because of the extraordinary and large cash withdrawals … The result was a drying up of the subsidiary and the only reasonable conclusion is that this was done because it was in the interest of Sinclair to do so.”
12
Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971)
“Self-dealing occurs when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.”
Business judgment rule applies
13
Dividend Example: I
Parent
Sub
Controller
60%
90%
Buyer
Control bloc: $100 million Premium: $10 millionController: $60 million (6 premium)
14
Dividend Example: I
Parent
Sub
Controller
60%
90%
In-kind pro-rata distribution
15
Dividend Example: II
Parent Sub
Controller
60% 54%
Buyer
Control bloc: $64 million Premium: $10 millionBefore: $ 60 million
16
Fairchild Corp. ExampleAtanasov, Black & Ciccotello, Law and Tunneling (2011)
Steiner: 25% ownership
Dual class recapitalization: All shareholders could exchange their A shares for B shares
B share: 10 votes, but unlisted and 50% dividends
Steiner ended up with more than 50% of votes
Charter later amended to allow free conversion of B shares to A shares
17
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1994)
Geier family controls more than 50% of total voting power of Milacron, Inc.
Tenure-voting recapitalization (change of certificate): Each holder of common entitled to 10 votes per share.
Upon sale voting rights would revert to 1 vote per share.
Until the new stockholder held share for 36 consecutive months.
18
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1994)
Plaintiff: “…the sole purpose of the Recapitalization was to … allow the
majority bloc to sell a portion of its holdings while retaining control of the company.”
Court: “There was on this record: … no non-pro rata or
disproportionate benefit which accrued to the Family Group on the face of the Recapitalization, although the dynamics of how the Plan would work in practice had the effect of strengthening the Family Group's control….”
Business judgment rule applies
19
eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)
Facts
Cumulative voting (allow eBay to elect director)
Jim & Craig: modify charter to provide for staggered board
eBay:
“the Staggered Board Amendments treat eBay… differently than …the majority stockholders … by eliminating eBay's ability to unilaterally elect a director to the craigslist board but having no effect on Jim and Craig's abilities to elect craigslist directors”
“this disparate treatment … requires application of the entire fairness standard of review. “
20
eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)
“The cases eBay relies on do not support a rule of law that would invoke entire fairness review any time a corporate action affects directors or controlling stockholders differently than minority stockholders.”
“Entire fairness review ordinarily applies in cases where a fiduciary either literally stands on both sides of the challenged transaction or where the fiduciary “expects to derive personal financial benefit from the [challenged] transaction in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.”
21
NJ Carpenters Pension Fund v. INFOGROUP, (Del. Ch. Sep. 30 2011)
Gupta: 37% of shares
Sale of 100% for cash
Plaintiffs:
Sale was orchestrated so that Gupta could obtain desperately needed liquidity Settlement of derivative claim for self-dealing
SEC settlement (disgorgement and penalties)
Not alleged to have obtained other financial benefit different from merger price paid to all shareholders
22
NJ Carpenters Pension Fund v. INFOGROUP, (Del. Ch. Sep. 30 2011)
“… the liquidity benefit received by Gupta was a personal benefit not equally shared by other shareholders. All shareholders, including Gupta, received $8 per share in cash …. There are no allegations that Gupta received any additional compensation as a result of the Merger from, for example, side deals, a golden parachute, or compensation as an executive ….”
While all of the shareholders received cash in the Merger, liquidity was a benefit unique to Gupta… “
23
Our Claims:
All conflicts should be taken into account; but
Not all conflicts deserve same legal treatment
Legal treatment of controllers’ conflicts should take into account:
The scope of controlling shareholders rights/duties
Enforcement concerns
Note: we do not address non-pecuniary benefits
Some conflicts are inevitable/permissible notwithstanding their impact on firm/minority investors
24
Controlling Shareholder Rights/Duties:
Controlling shareholders v. directors “A controlling stockholder has the right to control and to vote its
shares in its own interest. It is not objectionable that the motive may be for personal profit or determined by whim or caprice as long as the controlling stockholder violates no duty owed to other stockholders.”; Richard Booth, 57 Bus. Law. 127 (2001)
Optimal level of private benefits?
25
Example
Forced Exit? “Clearly, a stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in a
corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale would profit the minority”; Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987)
But: Dammann (2007): Corporate Ostracism: Freezing Out
Controlling Shareholders
26
Controlling Shareholder Rights:
eBay: “It is true that by approving the … Amendments, Jim and Craig
implemented a … structure that had a disparate and … unfavorable impact on eBay. This is not the sort of disparate treatment, however, that can be classified as self-dealing because the law expressly allows majority stockholders to elect the entire board.”
Boundaries of Control: Tentative Approach
Exit Sell control (timing) Sell control (premium) Force minority exit Pro-rata dividends
Preserve control position Firm-level decisions that
may affect control position
Mid-stream change of governance structure Including with respect to
control position
Acquiring lock on control
Non pro-rata distributions
27
28
Exit: I
Not selling control “Clearly, a stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in a
corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale would profit the minority”; Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987)
Selling control Control over timing of sale
Right to premium
Force minority to sell Freeze-outs
Sale to third party; Non-equal terms
Sale to third part; Equal terms
29
Exit II
Pro-rata dividend distributions Determine scope of assets under joint ownership
Enforcement-practical concerns
Legal rule: minority shareholders cannot challenge pro-rata dividends
30
Other Examples
Change rules of the game mid-stream Undermining minority protection; eBay
Secure control position (modifying link between cash flow and control); Geier
Providing a dominant shareholder with lock on control
31
Standards of Review: Tentative Approach (DE)
Hard-core self-dealing ; Entire fairness going private; related-party transactions
Conflicted transactions; Intermediate standard control-enhancing measures; mid-stream governance changes
Controlling shareholders’ power; BJR dividends; sale of control block
No conflicts; BJR
32
Other Implications
Supplement “transactional” approach with market measures Minority board representation
Directors’ fiduciary duties in controlled corporations
Thank You
33
Section 270(4) of Companies Act of 1999
[Material] transaction with controlling shareholder Material transaction in which the controlling
shareholder has a “personal interest”
34