two conceptions of citizenship

7/30/2019 Two Conceptions of Citizenship

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Two Conceptions of CitizenshipAuthor(s): Angus StewartReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 63-78Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591623 .

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Angus Stewart

Two conceptionsof citizenship

ABS I RAC IWiththe collapseof the Leninistproject n the Soviet Union andEasternEuropeand the fluid relationsbetweenmarketand stateconsequent upon the New Right project of the Reagan andThatchereras n theWest,citizenship nalysishasassumeda centralplace in the politicalsociologyof democraticsocieties.However,such analysis s presentlycharacterizedby a varietyof divergentand, on occasion, ontradictory ositions.This articleproposes hatthe debatesaround citizenshipcan be clarifiedby recognizing heexistenceof two conceptionsof citizenship.The firstof these, statecitizenship, involves the identificationof citizenship with theelaborationof a formallegal status,co-terminouswiththe emerg-ence of nation-statesand their diverse lineages.The articledis-cussesthe two mainformsin whichthis conceptionappears n therelevant iterature:hatof full formalmembership f anation-stateand that of a distinctivewelfare-rights ersion.Somelimitations fthe status conception of citizenshipare considered and recentpoliticaldevelopmentsnrelation o its usein theBritish ontextarediscussed.A second conception, that of democraticcitizenship,is thenproposed which involves the elaborationof citizenshiparoundsharedmembershipof a politicalcommunity, n whichconceptioncitizens are political actors constituting political spaces. Someimplicationsof this alternative conception are discussed andexemplified with reference to the possibilitiesfor a Europeanpolitical ommunity.

The discussionof citizenshiphas become an increasinglymportantaspectof the political ociologyof democratic ocieties Turner1986and 1990; Brubaker1989 and 1992;Bottomore 1992;Roche 1992.)The reasons orthisdevelopmentare doubtless omplexbut twoseemof particular mportance:the collapse of the Leninist project ofPSJvSVolumeno.46 I.ssueno. March1995 [.S.SNO()07-Z315 )I.orldon.SchoolofA:conomics1995


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64 Angus Stewartstate-centred ocialchange in the East,and a renewedfocus upon thenature and conditionsof politicalmembershipas a source of socialintegration n the context of changing state-market elations n theWest.Within he renewed discussionof citizenship here are inevitablydiversityof positions. Thus, for example, Mann has proposed thatcitizenship s most fruitfullyviewedas offering a range of possibilitieswithina repertoireof ruling-class trategies,while Turner, althoughpositivelyassessingMann'sargumentas a general advanceupon thework of T.H. Marshall, nevertheless criticizes that argument aseconomically reductionist and analyticallyrestricted. Seeking tonegotiate hese shortcomings,Turner outlinesa theoryof citizenshiporganized around a twofold matrix, public/private,active/passive(Mann 1987; Turner 1990). Alternatively, Roche has implicitlycriticized both such positions as excessively state-centredand hasargued for the necessityof disconnecting he discussionof circuitsofcitizenship rom one particular olitical orm (Roche 1992).Even this small selection from the range of variationsaround thetheme of citizenship becomes less problematic f one adopts theposition advocatedby van Gunsterenand Leca, that citizenship s acontestableconcept, lacking a fixed meaning and requiringspecifi-cation n termsof its use by 'historical articipants'n varyinghistoricalcontexts (van Gunsteren 1978; Leca 1991). Such a stance s stronglysupported by Derek Heater's extensive survey of the historicallyvariableusagesof the conceptof citizenship, eadingto the conclusionthat

from veryearly n its history he term alreadycontaineda clusterofmeanings related to a defined legal or social status, a means ofpolitical dentity, a focus of loyalty, a requirementof duties, anexpectationof rightsand a yardstick f good behaviour.... (Heater1990: 163)

This argument eadsto the furtherconclusion hatwe mayreasonablyquestionthe modern assumptionthat the status (of citizenship)necessarilyadheres o the sovereignnation-stateEmphasis mine) [It] can beassociatedwith any geographicalunit from a small town to thewhole globe itself. (p. 163)

The significance f this propositionwillbecomeclear n due course.As a contributionto clarifying the central issues at stake in theemerging body of citizenshipanalysisand to removing confusionswhichobstruct ts development,I wantto argue thatthere is a tensionat the centre of the contemporarydiscussionof citizenshipwhich onoccasion amounts to a contradiction.This tension arises from the


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Twoconceptions f citizenship 65* * * a- s * s s * s * * *Juxtaposltlonot two eltterent conceptlonsot cltlzenszlp, one state-centred and emmanent, he other democratic,non-state-centred ndimminent. The former conception involves the identification ofcitizenshipwith the elaborationof a distinctive, ormal legal status,whichelaboration s co-terminouswiththe emergenceof nation-statesand their diverse ineages.We may dentifythis as state itizenship.hesecond conception involves the elaboration of citizenship aroundsharedmembershipf a political ommunitynd requires he non-identifi-cation of such politicalcommunitiesand states. In this conception,citizensare politicalactorsconstitutingoliticalcommunitiesas publicspaces.We may dentify his as democraticitizenship.

The first conception, state-centredmodern national citizenship,was,as Brubakernotes,an inventionof the FrenchRevolution.The formaldelimitation fthe citizenry; he establishmentof civil equality,entailing sharedrights and shared obligations; he institutionalisation f politicalrights;the legal rationalisation nd ideologicalaccentuation f thedistinctionbetweencitizensand foreigners; he articulation f thedoctrineof national overeignty nd of the link betweencitizenshipand nationhood; the substitutionof immediate, direct relationsbetween he citizenand the state or the mediated, ndirectrelationscharacteristic f the ancient regime - the Revolutionbrought allthese developments ogether on a national evel for the first time.(Brubaker1992: 35)

Central to this conception is the idea of citizenship as a generalmembership status. The definition of citizenship is abstract andformal, not concrete and substantive (Brubaker 1992: 40). Thecontextof this definition s the diversestruggleswhereby entralizing,rationalizing erritorialmonarchiesgradually ubordinated he liber-ties, immunitiesand privilegesof feudal lords and corporatebodies(see Poggi 1978and Bendix 1964).This statusof citizen s thusab nitiothe correlateof emerging modern state power, that is, of a distinctform of political administrationand control and the legitimationthereof. As Brubaker argues further, pace the classicalWeberiandefinitionof the state,statesare not only territorialbut also member-ship organizations, n which the capacity o determine membershipand to enforce the resultantdecision has been fundamental o statepower.This is clearly he conceptionof citizenshipwhich Mannutilizes nhis discussionof ruling-class trategies.Here citizenship s merelyoneof a number of such regime strategies dentified in the course ofcomparativeanalysis. In this overwhelmingly lass-reductionist c-count, the possibilities or and the institutionalization f differentdimensions of citizenship are essayed purely as the function ofruling-classpower. In such an argument, any connection between


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66 Angus Stewartcitizenship and power relationss severed and citizenshipbecomesmerely a function of relations of domination.his leads to thetreatment of the dubious concept of 'socialcitizenship's if it wereseparable from any conception of civil and political freedom andthereby to the treatmentof Nazi Germanyand the Soviet Union asthe examplarsof ruling-class trategies n which such social citizen-ship was maximized. The wisdom of hindsight alwaysconveys anunfair advantagebut one can not help but wonder if there is notsome connection between Mann's unfortunate statement thatauthoritarian ocialism appearsno less stable than other enduringtypes of regime'(Mann 1987: 350) and the unproblematic reatmentof welfare as social citizenship. T.H. Marshallwas more accuratewhen he tellinglyobserved hat the provisionof welfarewithoutciviland political itizenship tuntedthe growthof liberty Marshall 981:170).In contrast, Brubaker argues that much of the significanceofcitizenship n the modern world flows from its ormal ropertiesas aspecification f membership and non-membership)n a worldwhichis universallydivided into a systemof bounded states,bounded bothterritorially nd also in membership erms.He furtherproposes hat,within this context, the politics of citizenship have been shapedaround a numberof 'distinctive raditionsof nationhood by deeplyrooted understandings f whatconstitutesa nation' Brubaker1989:7). Thus, in France, the politics of citizenship have historicallyreflected the fact that the nation has been conceived of mainly inrelation to the institutionaland territorial rameworkof the state.Politicalunity, and not shared culture, has been the basisof nation-hood and the universalist,nclusive heoryand practiceof citizenshiphave depended on confidence in the assimilatoryworkingsof themajor nstitutions.By contrast,becausenational eeling developed nGermanybeforehe nation-state, the German dea of the nation wasnot a political one, nor was it linked with the abstract idea ofcitizenship.'Over time, this produceda politicsof formalcitizenshipwhich focused upon exclusionratherthan inclusion.Both these specificvariantsof nationalcitizenshipcan be furthercontrasted with the case of Britain. Here, Brubaker argues, theabsence of a clear conception of British nationhood has beenparalled until recently by the absence of a clear conception of

* * a

cltlzens. zlp.The concept of citizenshipas membershipof a legal and politicalcommunity was foreign to British thinking. Legal and politicalstatuswereconceived nstead n termsof allegiance in termsof thevertical ies between individualsubjectsand the king. The ties ofallegianceknit together the Britishempire, not the Britishnation.(Brubaker1989: 10)


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Twoconceptionsf citizenship 67With the end of the empire, Britain had to redefine itself as anation-state nd seek to create a nationalcitizenship.The absenceofboth of thesehascontributed o the confused andbitter politicsof immigration ndcitizenshipduringthe last quartercentury.... While othercoun-trieswere debating he citizenship tatusof immigrants,Britainwasdebating he immigrationtatusof citizens. Brubaker1989:11)

With this perspective,therefore, the institution of citizenshipisinextricablybound up with the formationof the modern state andstate system.But as Brubakerrightlypoints out, the converse is alsotrue. The formationof the modern state and state systemcannot beunderstood apart from the emergence and institutionalization fcitizenship.As well as territorial rganization, tatesare membershipassociations onstituting hemselvesand delimitingthe field of theirjurisdictionbyconstituting theircitizenry.The literatureon citizenshiphas frequently emphasizeduniversalityand inclusivenessbut Bru-baker is clearly right to emphasizethe inherentdualityof modernnation-state itizenship,

a statusat once universaland particularistic,nternally nclusiveandexternallyexclusive . . . (Such)citizenship s inherentlybounded.Exclusions essentialboth to theideologyof nationalcitizenship . .and to the legal institution. Brubaker1992: 72)We should be quite clear that in the contemporaryworld thisdefiningprocessof inclusion/exclusions not anundifferentiated ne.It is not the case thatall those subject o the authorityof agiven statecan be meaningfullyhoughtof as occupying hesame status,as being'included' o the sameextent. A simple distinctionbetweenAuslan-

ders andInlanderswillnot do. A more accurateand useful distinctionis betweenforeign nationals,denizensand citizens: oreign nationalsare those who are citizensof anotherstate,who have not beengrantedfull residential ights n the state nwhich hey are domiciledand whothereforeshould be thought as occupyingonly a temporarystatus;denizens, n contrast,are those who, althoughthey are notcitizensofthe country n whichthey have their domicile,neverthelessdo have alegal and a permanent resident status (Hammar 1990: 12 seq.).Followingthe large-scalemigration patternsconsequentupon therecruitmentof foreignlabour,therewere by the late 1980ssome 12million foreigncitizensresident in the westernindustrialized tates,some 50 per cent of whom have been estimated to be denizens(Hammar1990: 19 and23).Froma state-centredperspective, herefore, citizenship hould beseen as the pinnacleof a hierarchyof legallydefined statuseswhichtogether comprehendinternal state-membershipBrubaker1989).Such citizenshipstatusconfers full rights, privilegesand obligations


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68 Angus Stewartupon some members, several rights upon denizens and virtually norights upon short-term visitors. Within this perspective, citizenshipquestions concern the basic rules for decisions and judgments aboutwho are citizens and who are not. Questions as to precisely what rightsflow from being a citizen are on the whole not addressed and neither arequestions regarding the relationship between such rights. The mainqualification to this generalization concerns the matter of politicalrights which have usually been thought of as central to the idea of fullcitizenship. Hence, as Hammar proposes, two types of questions aregenerated within this perspective: those concerning the extent to whichpolitical rights should be given to those who are not formal citizens andthose regarding the extent to which and the conditions upon whichformal citizenship should be given to foreign residents with a longperiod of residence (Hammar 1992: 3). To these we may reasonably,and I would propose necessarily, add a third type of question: with theemergence of both supra-national and sub-national forms of politicalorganization of actual or potential great significance, this third type ofquestion concerns the relationship between citizenship as full formalmembership of a nation-state and membership of other forms ofpolitical organization at the level of the international community or theregion.

I HE WELFARE-RIGHS VERSION OF CI I IZENSHIPA seminal contribution to the discussion of citizenship was made byT.H. Marshall.In his initial exploration of the topic which has become asociological classic, Marshall defines citizenship as follows

Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of thecommunity. All who possess the status are equal with respect to therights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is nouniversal principle that determines what those rights and duties shallbe, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution createan image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can bemeasured and towards which aspiration can be directed. (Marshall1963: 87)He further proposes that citizenship requires a particular kind ofsocial bond involvinga direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to acivilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free menendowed with rights and protected by a common law. Its growth isstimulated both by the struggle to win those rights and by theirenjoyment when won. (Marshall 1963: 96)As is well known, Marshall argues that the analysis of citizenship inthe modern world would be greatly facilitated if we were to


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Twoconceptions fcitizenship 69differentiate citizenship rights into three types. These are civil,politicaland socialrightsrespectively, achtype being associatedwitha particular nstitutional phere.Marshallusesthistypologyof rightsto advancean account of the developmentof citizenship n Britain,focusing,in particular,upon the impactof the institutionalizationfcitizenshipupon class nequality.Having been absorbed nto the conventionalsociologicalwisdomconcerning the institutionalization f class conflict, Marshall'sdis-cussionwassubstantially eglected or sometimebut in the lastdecadehas received an increasingamount of attention and criticalanalysis(Dahrendorf1988; Giddens 1982and 1985;Turner 1986 and 1990;Lockwood1992).Partof suchanalysis arelatively mallpart, t has tobe said) concernsMarshall'sreatmentof the role of the state in thedevelopment of modern citizenship. Giddensspeaks of Marshall'sdepictionof the evolutionarydevelopmentof citizenshipas beinghelped alongby the'beneficenthand of the state' Giddens1982: 171).Turner also sees Marshall as taking the British nation-state forgranted, thereby neglecting the importantquestion of the linkbetween the notionof national itizenship' nd'theconstitution f thenation-state' Turner1987:46).

Such criticisms,however, have failed to identify the central de-ficiency n this area of Marshall's iscussion.As far as a state-centreddiscussionof citizenship s concerned, Marshall's laborationof hisargument in relation to Britainwas singularlyinappropriate.AsBrubakermakes clear in his instructivecomparativeanalysis, thestrikingcharacteristicf the Britishcase is theabsence f a state-derivedconceptionf citizenship.See also Hammar 1990: 23.)1 Within thisperspective,Marshall's nalysis n Citizenshipnd SocialClass s mostusefully thought of as contributing to our understanding of thechanging relationsbetween legally defined status and other dimen-sions of socialstructure, most notably class inequality(see Turner1988).Such changingrelations n the Britishcase,however,must beseen as taking place alongside a high degree of continuityn theconstitutionof political actors as subjects f political overeignty,irstexclusivelymonarchical, hen in the form of parliamentary over-eignty.In spite of this limitation,Marshalldoes neverthelesshave a realcontribution o maketo our understandingof differingconceptionsof citizenship. n order to explicate his contribution,wehave to takenote of his account of the transitionto market society in Englandwhichpresentsus witha fruitfulparadox Marshall 963).On the onehand, it is central to that account that there is a fundamentalincompatibilitybetween citizenship as a universal status within acommunity of rights and a market society. On the other hand,citizenship using the indices Marshall pecifies)and market societydid co-existuntil the time of Marshall'sffering of hisaccount n the


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70 Angus Stewartmid-twentieth entury.Marshall's xplanationof this apparentpara-dox is that 'the core of citizenshipat this stage (thatof market ociety)was composed of civil rights'.Such civil rights were an indispensablepartof a competitivemarketeconomy,allowing ach man o engage ineconomicstruggleand denying him socialprotectionon the groundsthat he wasable to protecthimself.The content of such legal citizenship in market society wasextremelyconstrained. n practice lle right tojustice, to true equalitybefore the law, did not exist due to the existenceof obstaclesbetweenformal rights and possibleremedies.Such obstacleswere principallyof two types: one subjective, hat is, class prejudice,which Marshallconsidered o have been substantially roded by culturalchange andsocialmobility; he other, objective n the senseof material bstacles olegal equality.The latter Marshall onsidered to have been amelio-rated by such measuresas the Legal Aid provisionsadvancedby theLabourgovernment n Britainafterthe SecondWorldWar.Contrast-ing a commitment o 'equalsocial worth'with that to 'equalnaturalrights', Marshallsaw these post-warchanges as stemming directlyfrom the former. I propose that such a commitment o 'equalsocialworth' s fundamental o an emancipatory onceptionof democraticcitizenshipand that such a conception s distinct rom, in tensionwithand frequently in contradictionwith a state-centredconception of

* * acltlzens. zlp.Implicit n Marshall's rgument, herefore, are distinctive oncep-tions of citizenship.The first,elaboratedaroundthe conceptof equalnatural ights, s formaland individualistic nd whollycompatiblewiththe premises of market society. Such a conception, however, asDurkheim argued, is incapableof supplying an adequate basis forsocial integration.(See Lockwood 1992.) Marshall mplicitlyrecog-nizes this when he invokes a second emancipatoryconception ofcitizenship rticulated round he conceptof equal ocialworth s beingnecessaryfor social integration n an otherwise fissiparousmarket

9soclety.GivenMarshall'soncernwiththe impactof state nterventionuponsocial nequality, he particular ocus of his analysiswas upon 'socialcitizenship',which, although viewed as distinctive, s neverthelesstreated as both continuous with and complementary o civil andpoliticalcitizenship.Further, he relationshipbetween the provisionthrough centralized tate mechanisms f those welfarerightsseen asdefinitiveof socialcitizenshipand the enhancementof individualandgroup autonomy is viewed unproblematically.Marshalldoes notconsider the possibility hat there may be at the very least a tensionbetweena welfare-rights ersionof (social)citizenshipand a concep-tion of citizenship focusing on emancipationand autonomy.3AsRocheargues, Marshallimplies hat the citizenworld'rcommunitys asphere in which rights-claiming itizenshave their claimsservicedby


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Two onceptionsf citizenship 71the state-basednstitutionsof the law, parliamentary emocracyandthe welfare state' (Roche 1992: 21). The consequenceof this insti-tutionalizationf the socialcitizenas mainlya rights-claimer as beento erode the distinction between citizen and client. Such erosioncarrieswith it a dual danger: de-moralization nd de-politicization(Roche 1992: 31-2; 3G7). In the case of the former, the moralcharacterof social participation for example, in the welfarestate)involving notions of interactionalreciprocityand a logical andpractical onnectionbetweenights ndduties s lost, with a consequentloss of freedomand more autonomy or dependentclients.4Theseconsiderations avean obviousrelevance o a seconddanger,that of depoliticization.As RochenotesThe statusof citizen is essentiallya legal and politicalstatus ofmembership n a civil and politicalcommunitywhich both makesand alsoabidesbyits own laws. It thus impliespoliticalrights andduties.In the lightof this the idea of socialcitizenship . . is not at allclearandwellgrounded,whether n practice r in principle. Roche1992:35)Consequently,I would argue, a state-basedoperationalizationofparticular ocial rightsrequiresa prtor nstitutionalizationf democraticpolitical tatus to enable the effective maintenance of citizenship.'De-moralisedndividualsare unlikely o be ableto see themselvesasbeingcrediblebearersof the civiland politicalpowers, he identityandstatus,of full citizenship'p. 35).5CITIZENSH I P AS S I A I US

Both the formal membershipand the welfare-rightsversions ofcitizenshipare thereforestate-centred.While nstitutionalizing ightsin the form of passive claims, both tend equallyto institutionalizehierarchyand dependency. These limitationssignificantlyderivefrom the particular onceptionof citizenshipwhich ies at theheartofboth the foregoing versions:a conceptionof citizenshipas status.AsOldfieldargues, the emphasison status n what is fundamentallyanindividualistic onceptionof citizenship givesrise to a languageof"needs"and "entitlements"which are required both for humandignityand for the possibility f individualsbeingeffective agents inthe world'(Oldfield1990a: 178). The status'citizen' nvolvessuchentitlementsas 'rights'defined by collectivedefinition, .e., the state,and supplied by collective provision. Parallel duties are strictlycircumscribedo the paymentof taxes and the possibility f militaryservice n defence of the state.Within his conception, ocialrelationsare contractual.Consequently, ctivityn the publicrealm is a matterof choicefor, in principle,autonomous ndividuals.Sucha conception


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72 Angus Stewart'generatesno social bond . . . (and) neither creates nor sustainsanysocial solidarity or cohesion, or any sense of common purpose'(Oldfield1990a: 180).Marshalland many others have charted the historicalstruggleswhich ed to the establishment f such citizenship ights.A numberofsuch accounts, including Marshall's wn, have been criticized forcasting heir narrative n an evolutionary ramework, herebygivingastrong sense of irreversibility o the institutionalization f rights,which recent developments in Britain and elsewhere have madehighly questionable.Perhapsmore fundamentally, here has been acontinuousdiscussionas to the meaningfulnessof particular ombi-nationsof citizenship ights n relation o the empowerment f equallyautonomous ndividuals.The centralthrustof much of the study ofsocialstratification,or example,has been to demonstrate he mannerin whichpatternsof social nequality n the form of class,sex and raceserveto give manyformalrightsonly a literalmeaning.From a very different standpoint,the re-affirmationby the NewRightof the necessityof re-establishinghe unregulatedmarketas thecentral nstitutionof capitalist ocietieshas led to a directchallenge oMarshallian rguments regarding citizenship n general and socialcitizenship in its welfare-staterights version in particular.Thus,typically,Peter Saundersargues that only . . . a liberalsocialorder ofmarket capitalismcan generate the conditions for full citizenship(and) that (the) pursuit of egalitarianismand the constructionofsocialistpolitical nstitutions end necessarily o undermine t' (Saun-ders 1993:57).Sucharguments orm partof the frameworkwithinwhichone mustview the recent incoherent,not to say contradictory, ttemptson thepartof successiveConservative dministrationsn Britain o appropri-ate the concept of citizenship.These attemptsbegan in 1988 with acritique of Labour's commitment to a 'passive' nterpretationofcitizenship n the form of rights and entitlements from the state.Senior ministers(Douglas Hurd in particular) ontrasted his inter-pretationwith the Conservatives' dvocacyof an activecitizenshipofaltruistic ommunity nvolvement,describedby one commentator srichesse blige.Central to the rhetorical flourishes of these initialattempts at appropriationwas a linkage between citizenship andcommunity.When subsequentlyan actualpolicy for citizenshipwasactually egislatedby the Conservative dministrationn 1991, ts formwasdistinctly t odds withsuch a linkage.Citizenship s statusbecameonce again the basis of what was proposed. But with the Citizen'sCharter, the status enshrined in legislation was that of consumer:contractualmarket relations and not social or community bondsbecame he contextof empowerment.As ColinCrouchhas noted, theCharter proved o be entirely ndividualand non-political: seriesofdevices whereby ndividualcomplainants ould seek redress against


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Twoconceptionsf citizenship 73publicservants,not politicians,ncasesof inadequate ervicedelivery'(Crouch1992:71).

A quitedistinctive onceptionof the status citizen' nd of its formalimplicationss advancedby the organizationCharter88. The UK isaloneamongthemembersof theEuropeanCommunitynnot havinga formallywritten constitutionand Bill of Rights. Although thecommon law has been argued to offer parallelsafeguardsto thoseembodiedin writtenconstitutions,he view has becomeincreasinglywidespread hatthereare inadequatemeansto control publicpowerandto protect ndividual ights n the UK.(See,for example,Johnson1977 and Harden and Lewis 1986.) Arguing therefore that thecustomarynatureof Britain's onstitutional rrangementsno longerprovidesan adequatedefenceof civilandpoliticalibertiesagainst hepowerof an 'electivedictatorship',Charter88 promotes he necessityof embodying itizenship tatus na formalBillof Rightsand a writtenconstltutlon.Whatever he meritsof this particularproposal,it does have thepotentiallimitationof securingpoliticalcitizenshipwithin a singlepoliticalcontext, that of the nation-state,preciselyat an historicalmomentwhenthat contextis seen to be of diminishingsignificance.(SeeHall andHeld 1989: 183.)Thus,for example,ElizabethMeehanhaspersuasively rguedthat

a new kind of citizenship s emergingthat is neithernationalnorcosmopolitanbut that is multiple (emphasismine) in the sensethatthe identities,rightsandobligationsassociated . . withcitizenship. . . areexpressed hroughan increasinglyomplexconfiguration fcommonCommunitynstitutions, tates,nationaland transnationalvoluntaryassociations, egionsand alliancesof regions. (Meehan1993: 1)

DEMOCRA'I'IC I'I'IZENSHIPAND COMMUNI'I'YThe necessityof relating he possibilitiesor and the limitationsuponcitizenship o the context(s)whichgave themmeaningwas identifiedin an earlycontributiono the contemporary iscussionof citizenshipin Britain. Writing of the reconstitutionof status that had ac-companiedthe rise of citizenship n Britain,A.H. Halseynoted howimportant t hasbeen thatthe possibilitiesor citizenshiphavebeendefined in the context of the nation-state(Halsey 1986: 62). Inpursuing the goal of creatinga nationalpoliticalcommunity,theLabourparty ound itself in a paradoxical ituation.In itsemergenceas a serious political force, the Labour party was significantlydependentupon the solidarityof local class communities.To a veryreal extent,communitywasthe resourcebasefor the developmentof


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74 Angus Stewartparticular orms of citizenship.However,the welfare-rights oncep-tion of citizenshipwhichhas been so central o Labourparty hinkingand institutionalizationwas crucially dependent upon continuingeconomicgrowthanxl hange.Apart rom the depoliticizing ffectsofthe statist model, economic change also produced changes in theoccupational tructurewhich have steadilydiminished he size of thetraditional working class and eroded working-classcommunities.Recalling he argument advancedby Brubaker o which I referredearlier, it seems reasonableto conclude that with respect to bothcitizenshipas formalmembership nd citizenshipas a sourceof socialsolidarity hrough the deliveryof formal and substantive ights, thetaskof constructing nationalpolitical ommunity n Britainremainsto be achieved.

AN AL'I'ERNA'I'IVE ONCEP'I'IONOne conclusion from the foregoing discussion of state-centredconceptions of citizenship of both the formal membership andwelfare-rights ersions seems inescapable, ertainlyas far Britain sconcerned. The possibilities or the creationof politicalcommunity(or communities)remain unfulfilled. Behind formal legalismsandpolitical hetoric, he sociological ealitiesare those of subjects, lientsand consumers, not those of citizens of equal social worth anddecision-making apacity.The constructionof politicalcommunitiesclearly requires an alternativeconception of citizenship. Such analternativeconception of citizenship nvolves politicalactors, rightsand duties and a conception of political forms as subordinatendadaptiveo a varietyof citizenries, ooted in the divisionsand diversepurposes of civil society.6Such democraticcitizenshipsare createdand reproduced hroughthe constitutionof substantive ommunitiesof reciprocity nd balanced ightsand duties, nvolving onceptionsof'equal ocialworth'.In contradistinction,herefore,to conceptionsand specifications fcitizenship centred upon nation-states,the political communitieswhich provide the contexts of democratic itizenshipare, as MichaelWalzerhas argued, 'phenomenological nd imminent' Walzer1983:26). For this reason,such political ommunities re able to encompassgroup as well as individual citizenship and their social sites arepotentiallywidespread,both subnationaland transnational, he cityand the region as well as the communityand the federation. Suchpoliticalcommunitiesneed not, indeed should not, be thought of asembodying ome anteriororganic dentityof territory r blood.Thus,for example, exploring the possibility for the emergence of aEuropeanpolitical ommunity,Tassinarguesthat ust


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75woonceptions orcitizenshipastheinstitutionalisedommunity annotfallunderthestatistogicof the monopolyof legitimateviolence, so its constituentpartscannotestablish hemselvesagainsteachother in a relationshipofdomination.What s requiredrather s a principleof 'participationin government'... which can only be guaranteedby a publicspace.... (Therefore, instead) of being the preconditionfor apublicspace,the Europeancommunity s actually ts result:it is acommunity estingnotuponanamalgamationf interests, eelingsand wills,but on the contraryupon a politically onstitutedpublicspace n whichthe plurality f politicalnitiatives tandfaceto face.(Tassin1992:188)Tassin's further explicationof this conception of a non-state-centred itizenshipdemonstratesits implicationsfor our earlierdiscussionf a formalmembershipapproach o citizenship.Arguingthe ase for the developmentof a Europeanfellow-citizenship, enotes hat the nation-stateprincipleof citizenshipis based on adeliberateonflationof the conceptsof generalwilland nationalwillor n an amalgamation f nationalityandcitizenship.The construc-tion f a Europeanpolitical ommunity,however,requires itizenshiptobebrokenaway romnationality.The rightof foreignresidents . . to votein localelections . . is anessentialand obligatorystep in the formationof this new com-munitycitizenship. tindicates hatparticipationnthelifeof publicinstitutions akesprecedenceover nationality; hat, whateverthecitizen'sculturalor national dentity,his or her insertion n publicpoliticalspace is electiveand not 'native'; hat it derives from apolitical hoiceandnotfrombirth(natio) ranidentitypassedonbyhistory. . . (Tassin1992:189)Withinthe imminentconceptionof democratic itizenship, here-fore, politicalcommunitiesare the productof citizenshippractice.The distinctivecharacteristicsof such a conception vis-a-visthestate-centred onceptionof citizenshipmay be further clarifiedbyrecognizinghedivergentrelationships etweenpoliticalnterestsandpolitical ontexts mpliedbyeach.Within hestate-centredonceptionof citizenship, t is assumedthatpreferences, nterestsand identitiesare given exogenouslyn advanceof publicdiscoursend deliberation,whetherby explicitstate-specificationr implicitstateprioritization

amongthemanycompetingpossibilitiesontainedwithincivilsociety.

The conceptionof democraticcitizenshipdoes not makeor requiresuch an assumption.It 'appreciates, ather,that preferences, nter-ests, and identitiesareas muchoutcomess antecedentsfpublicdeliber-ation;ndeed, theydiscursively onstituted n andthroughit'(Fraser1992:130emphasismine).7The crucialcontextualreferentof democraticcitizenship s thuscommonmembershipof a sharedand imminentommunity.In that


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76 Angus Stewartspecific ense, such democratic itizenship equiresus to acknowledgethe other membersas being of equalsocialworth.Within his context,'citizenship s an explicitlypoliticalactivity, n which people who areequals address collective and general concerns' (Phillips 1991: 82emphasismine). The case for the 'absoluteprimacyof politics' n theelaboration of a conception of democratic citizenship has beenforcefully argued by Anne Phillips (Phillips 1991: 82-7). Drawingupon the contributionsof two US feminists, Phillipselaborates hecase that a democraticcitizenship s necessarilymplicatedwith thepolitical,public phere.Thus, suchcitizenship equires if you will- amovement, certainly symbolic and phenomenological, frequentlyliteral, rom the privateworldof familyand work o an involvement nmore general, publicconcerns.Equally,however,democratic itizen-ship does not require a false dissociation rom the realityof groupidentities. Rather, political organization n a democraticcitizenryoccursaroundsuch group identitiesbut is only fully realized hroughinteraction with others, in which interaction we are necessarilyremindedof others'claims.Thus diversity nd contingency re inbuiltconditionsof genuinelydemocratic itizenship

there is no way to know in advance whether the outcome of adeliberativeprocess will be the discoveryof a common good inwhich conflicts of interest evaporate as merely apparent or thediscovery hat conflictsof interestare real and the commongood ischimerical. Fraser1992: 130)The combination f the structural nd organizational imensionsofglobalization nd the politicaluncertainties nd possibilities haracter-isticof an emerging post-national ra is certain o accelerate heoreti-cal debate and practical onflictaround the meaningand implemen-

tationof citizenship. believe that both the termsof such debateandthe natureof such conflictwillbe constructively larifiedby recogniz-ing the importance and distinctivenessof the two conceptions ofcitizenship dentifiedhere.(Dateaccepted: anuary1994) AngusStewart,Department f Sociology,LondonSchoolof EconomicsNO I i:S

1. Turner potentially recognized this personality whose indelible social rightsparticularly in his 1990 article but failed are constituted by a monarch sitting into draw the appropriate conclusions: parliament. The notion of citizen-as-A more important point is that the subjectndicate.slearly herelative xten.siveconstitutional settlement of 1688 notion of .socialright.sbut atso the pos.sivecreated the British citizen as the British character of Briti.sh civil in.stitution.s..subjectemphasis mine), that is a legal (Turner 1990: 207) [emphasis mine]


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Twoconceptionsfcitizenship 772. It should be noted that Marshallfurthercompoundsthe confusionsand

complexities surrounding these con-flicting conceptions of citizenship byadditionally invoking national con-sciousness as an additionalsource ofsocialintegration,placing at the centre,^ . . w . .Ot tze mtegratlveprocessesot cltlzen-ship 'a direct sense of communitymembershipbasedon loyaltyto a civil-

. . . .zatlon wzlc ls a commonpossession.'(Marshall1963).3. For an interestingattemptto con-sider the normativejustification for. , . . . . .treatmgwetare provlslonand cltlzen-ship as intrinsically inked, see Kingand Waldron1988.The authorsdo notconsider,however, he degree to whichdifferentdimensionsof citizenshipmaybe in tensionwithone another.4. In addition to Roche's illuminat-ing discussion and the referencestherein,see also Habermas1987.5. For a parallel discussionof thedepoliticizingeffects of the welfare-

. .

state mstltutlonazatlon ot economlcrights, see Sheldon Wolin 1992:245-46. Thus, 'Economic ights,or, . .."entitlements"do empower people.

. . . .. .

Lzere ls a gam m dlgnlty, autonomyand well-being, and no democratshouldbelieveotherwise.But this mustnot blindone to the anti-politicalonse-quences resulting from the preoccu-pationwitheconomicrights'6. AdrianOldfieldhas elaboratedan

. . w . . .a ternatlveconceptlonot cltlzens lp tothatembodiedin the liberal-individual-ist conceptionof citizenshipas status,the civic-republican conception.Thoughtfuland stimulating hough hisdiscussion is, however, he does notaddress he contextualdimensionwhichis central to the present article.For aconsiderationof the limitationsof acommunitarianapproach to politicalpractice, which I believe the presentargumentavoids,see the discussionbyMichael Walzer. Oldfield 1990b andWalzer1992:89-107.7. Myargumenthere is an adaptionof Nancy Fraser'sargument which isdirectly concerned with developing acontrast between competing views ofthepublicarena.SeeFraser1992.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bendix, R. 1964 Nation-Building andCitizen.ship,London: John Wiley andSons.Bottomore, T. 1992 '(itizenship andSocial(lass, 40 yearson' in T. H. Marshalland T. Bottomore Citizenship nd SocialCla.s.s,ondon: Pluto Press.Brubaker, W.R. (ed.) 1989 Immigrationand thePolitic.s f Citizen.shipn EuropeandNorthAmerica,London: University Pressof America.Brubaker, W.R. 1992 Citizen.shipandNationhood n Franceand Germany,Lon-don: Harvard University Press.Crouch, C. 1992 '(iti7enship and (om-munity' in (j. (rouch and A. Heath (eds),SocialRe.searchndSocialReform,Oxford:(larendon Press.Dahrendorf, R. 1988 The ModernS(vcialConfict, London: Weidenfeld and Nico-lson.Fraser, N. 1992 'Rethinking the PublicSphere: a (ontribution to the (ritique ofActually Existing Democracy', in (j. (al-houn (ed.) Haberma.sndthePublicSphere,London: MIT Press, 10942.Giddens, A. 1982 '(lass Division, (lass(onflict and (itizenship Rights' in hisProfile.sand Critique.s n Social Theory,London: Macmillan.Giddens, A. 1985 The Nation-StateandViolence,Oxford: PolityPress.Habermas, J. 1987 The Theoryof Com-municativeAction, Vol.2, Boston: BeaconPress.Hall, S. and Held, D. 1989 '(itizens and(itizenship' in S. Hall and M. Jacques(eds) New Time.s:The Changing Face ofPolitic.sn the 1990.s, London: Lawrenceand Wishart.Halsey, A.H. 1986 Chs4ngen Briti.shSo-ciety,Oxford: Oxford University Press.Hammar, T. 1990 Democracyand theNation State, Aldershot: (Jower Publish-. ,)lng tjompany.Harden, I. and Lewis, N. 1986 TheNobleLie:The Briti.shConstitution4ndheRule ofLaw,London: Hutchison.Heater, D. 1990 Citizen.ship:heCivicIdealin WorldHi.story,Politic.sand Education,London: Longman.Johnson, N. 1977 In Searchof theC0n.sti-tution,Oxford: Pergamon Press.


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78 Angus StewartKing,D.S.andWaldron,J. 1988'(itizen-ship, social citizenship and the defense ofwelfare provision Briti.shJournalf Politi-cal Science18: 41543.Leca, J. 1991 'Immigration, nationalityand citizenship in Western Europe',paper presented to conference on SocialJustice, DemocraticCitizenshipand PublicPolicy in the New Europe, E(PR/ErasmusUniversity, Rotterdam.Lockwood, D. 1992 Solidarity nd Schi.sm,Oxford: (larendon Press.Mann, M. 1987 'Ruling (lass Strategiesand (itizenship', Sociology 1: 339-54.Marshall, T.H. 1963 '(itizenship andSocial (lass' in his Sociologyat the Cros.s-road.s,London: Heinemann.Marshall, T.H. 1981 The Right to Welfareand OtherE.s.says, ondon: Heinemann.Meehan, E. 1993 Citizen.shipnd theEuro-pean Community, ondon: Sage.Oldfield, A. l990a '(iti7enship: an un-natural practice?', Political Quarterly61(2): 177-87.Oldfield, A. l990b Citizenship nd Com-munity,London: Routledge.Phillips, A. 1991 '(itizenship and Femin-ist Politics' n (J. Andrews (ed.) Citizenship,London: Lawrence and Wishart.Poggi, G. 1978 The Development f theModernState,London: Hutchinson.

Roche, M. 1992 Rethinking Citizenship,Oxford: Polity Press.Saunders, P. 1993 '(itizenship in aLiberal Society' in B. Turner (ed.) Citizen-.ship nd SocialTheory,London: Sage.Tassin, E. 1992 'Europe: a Political (om-munity?' in (j. Mouffe (ed.) Dimensions fRadical Democracy:Plurali.sm,Citizen.ship,Community, ondon: Verso.Turner, B.S. 1986 Citizen.shipnd Capztal-ism: the debate over reformi.sm,London:Allen and Unwin.Turner, B.S. 1988 Status,Milton Keynes:Open University Press.Turner, B.S. 1990 'Outline of a Theory of(itizenship', Sociology 4: 189-217.van Gusteren, H. 1978 'Notes on aTheory of (itizenship' in P. Birnbaum, J.Lively and (J. Parry (eds) Democracy, on-.sen.susnd SocialContract,London: Sage.Walzer, M. 1983 Sphere.sof Justice: aDefense of Plurali.smand Equality., NewYork: Basic Books.Walzer, M. 1992 'The (ivil Society Argu-ment' in (j. Mouffe (ed.) Dimension.s fRadical Democracy:Pluralism, Citizen.ship,Community, ondon: Verso.Wolin, S. 1992 'What Revolutionary Ac-tion Means Today?' in (j. Mouffe (ed.)Dimen.sion.sf RadicalDemocracy: lurali.sm,Citizen.ship, ommunity, ondon: Verso.

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