tugendhat, e., the meaning of 'bedeutung' in frege

8/13/2019 Tugendhat, E., The Meaning of 'Bedeutung' in Frege

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The Meaning of 'Bedeutung' in FregeAuthor(s): Ernst TugendhatSource: Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 6 (Jun., 1970), pp. 177-189Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis CommitteeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328033

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ANALYSIS 30.6THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGE

By ERNST TUGENDHATHE rendering in English of Frege's term 'Bedeutung's 'reference',which has become popular since the translation of Geach andBlack, is quite as misleading as the earlier renderings 'denotation' and'nominatum'. They all suggest that what Frege meant by the Bedeutungof an expression is the object which the expression names. This cannotbe correct, since Frege speaks of the Bedeutung ot only of names butalso of predicates. It is true that Frege often used the term 'name', in

keeping with the then accepted usage in logic, for predicates as well,reserving for what are normally called names, words that name objects,the term 'proper name'. But this extended use of the term 'name' shouldnot mislead us, since it is well known that Frege insisted that predicates,in contrast to proper names, do not name objects at all. In a recentlypublished manuscript Frege himself expressly repudiates the extendeduse of the term 'name': 'The word common-name may mislead oneinto assuming that a common-name, like a proper name, essentiallyrefers to objects.... But this is incorrect; and consequently I prefer tosay concept-word instead of common-name .'1 Therefore, althoughit is true that in the case of proper names, including assertive sentences,Frege considered the Bedeutung f the expression to be an object namedby it, the name-relation cannot be implied in the very meaning of theword 'Bedeutung'.What, then, did Frege mean by this word?In order to state the problem without begging the question, we havein English to use a word which is as free of definite associations fromsemantic theory as the German word 'Bedeutung'n Frege. 'Bedeutung'snot free of such associations in ordinary German usage, but Frege madeit so for the German reader simply by using it in an unusual way. Thetranslators have preferred to withhold from English readers the puzzle-ment which every German reader experiences with this word on firstreading Frege's essay 'UberSinn undBedeutung'.They chose to anticipatean answer, and to have done this is perhaps worse than that it happensto be the wrong one, since it deprives English readers of the opportunityeven to become aware of the question.It seems safest to use for Frege's term the nearest English equivalentto the word 'Bedeutung' n ordinary German usage. In semanticalcontexts other than that of Frege the word 'Bedeutung's usually trans-1Frege, Nachgelassenechriften Hamburg 1969), p. 135. In the same manuscript, Fregeeven goes so far as to consider misleading the term 'dieBedeutung', hen applied to concept-words, on the grounds that the definite article suggests that the predicatemust refer to some-thing (p. 133). 177

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lated by the English word 'meaning', and therefore Mr. DummettrenderedFrege's 'Bedeutung',n his article'Frege'in TheEnfyclopaediafPhilosofhy,adequatelyenough as 'meaning'. However, 'Bedeutung'sused in Germannot only in the senseof 'meaning',but also in the senseof 'importance', 'significance'. And since Frege obviously did notunderstandby 'Bedeutung'hat the word means in normal semanticalcontexts,we shouldexpectthe second,not specifically emantical, enseof the word to have had someweight with himwhen he chose this wordin order to introduce a new concept into semantics. In English, theword 'significance' s used, more or less like the Germanword 'Bedeu-ung',n the senseof 'meaning'as well as that of 'importance'.The word'significance'further recommends itself as the rendering of Frege'sterm by being relatively free of definite associations from semantictheory.'So much for terminology;now to the problem. I shall deal with thesignificanceof predicates ater by way of supplementary onfirmationand shall tackle the problem of significancefirst at a point which hasfound extensive though unsatisfactorytreatmentin the literature. ImeanFrege's doctrineof the significanceof assertivesentences. Herethe translationof 'Bedeutung'y 'reference' eemspartially ustified,sinceFregeconceivesof sentencesaspropernames andtakestheirsignificanceto consist in one of two objects, the True and the False (SB 34).2But of course it is misleadingeven here to anticipate he answerby thechoice of the word used to statethe question.Over this Fregeandoctrine of the significanceof assertive sentenceslogicianshave been divided into two camps,in disputenot concerningthe interpretation ut concerningthe evaluationof the doctrine. On theone side,therearethosewho, likeKneale, indFrege'sdoctrineunaccept-able becausethe assimilationof sentencesto proper names obliteratesimportantsemanticaldifferences nd becausethereis no way of identify-ing the allegedobjects the True and the False except aspropertiesof sentences or propositions.3 On the other side, there are those who,with Church,insist on the analogieswhich Frege has shown to existbetween the referenceof a name and the truth-valueof a sentence.4Surelyboth partieshave a point, but neither point is enough for anoutrightrejectionor an outright acceptanceof Frege'sdoctrine. Let usgrant to the second party that the referenceof a name and the truth-valueof a sentencehave something n common,and let us call this theirsignificance;does it follow that, sincethe significanceof the name is the1 owe this suggestion and other advice concerning this paper to Mr. J. L. H. Thomasof All Souls College, Oxford.2All citations are to the original German edition. The translation by Geach and Blackand the German edition of Patzig give the pagination of the original. I use 'SB' as abbre-viation for 'UberSinnundBedeutung'.Translations are my own.3W. and M. Kneale, TheDevelopmentf Logic,pp. 576f.4A. Church, Introductiono Mathematical ogic, pp. 23-25.

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THE MEANING OF CBEDEUTUNG'IN FREGEobjectnamed,the significanceof the sentencemust also be thoughtof asan object? Surelynot. And if we grantto the firstpartythat sentencesarenot names,do thesephilosophersnot agreethatthere is a functionalconnectionbetween the referenceof a name and the truth-valueof thesentencesof which the name may be a part and that so far they havesomethingin common? Let us call this againtheirsignificance.Now ifthe significanceof a sentencecannotbe thought of as an objectnamed,this partyought to presentan alternativeaccountof significance. Thetwo partiescould thereforebe reconciled on the basisof a new accountof significancewhich is not biased towards the name relationand yetdoes full justice to Frege's discovery of the functional connectionbetweenobjectsof propernamesand truth-valuesof sentences.Nothing would seem easier hanto providesuch an account. Modernsemanticsis alreadyin possession of a technicalterm for significancewhich is not biasedtowardsthe namerelation,the term'extension'. Wespeak of the extension of names and of sentences(and of predicates)without necessarily mplying that the extensionis, exceptin the case ofnames,an object. So the solutionto our problemseemsreadyat hand:the significanceof an expressionis its extension.l Although I believethat this answerleads in the right direction,it is not satisfactoryas itstands, because the term 'extension' is defined in a differentway fornames andfor sentences andagainfor predicates).Two sentenceshavethe same extension if and only if they have the same truth-value,andtwo names have the same extensionif and only if they refer to the sameobject. The term 'extension' s used in both casesfor the samereasonasFrege used the term 'significance' n both cases,but whilst Frege gavean answerto what it is they have in common, the term'extension' doesnot give an alternativeanswer,it simply leaves the matteropen. Ourquestioncannow be reformulated hus: what is it that the extension ofnames and of sentences have in common? Can we find a unitarydefinitionof 'extension'which is not biased towards the name-relation?Let us takeas ourpoint of departureFrege'sown introductionof theterm'significance' or sentences. He writes(SB 32f):

Does a sentenceas a wholeperhapshaveonlya senseand no signi-ficance?It mightindeedbe expected hatsuch sentences ccur,justasthere are parts of sentenceshaving sense but no significance.Andsentenceswhichcontainpropernameswithout ignificance illbe of thiskind. The sentenceUlysseswasset ashoreat Ithacawhilesoundasleep'dearlyhasa sense. But since t is doubtfulwhether hename Ulysses'nthatsentencehasa significance,t is alsodoubtfulwhether he sentenceas a whole has one. But whatis certain s thatanyonewho seriouslytakesthe sentence o be true or falseascribesa significance,nd notmerely sense, o the name Ulysses'... Thatweconcern urselveswith

1 This is Camap's answer, given in his book MeaningandNecessity,to which the presentpaper owes much.

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thesignificancef partof the sentence tall s a signthatasarulewe alsoacknowledge,ndrequire,he sentencetselfto havea significance....But nowwhy s it werequireverypropername o havenotonlya sense,but a significances well? Whyarewe not satisfiedwith the thoughtalone? Because,and insofaras, we are concernedwith its truth-value.... It is the striving or truth,then,thaturgesus in all casesto pressforwardromthe sense o thesignificance.The conclusion which Frege drawsfrom this line of reasoningis:'Thus we are impelled to accept the truth-valueof a sentence as itssignificance'.But the passagesuggestsa furtherconclusion. Frege saysthat we are interested n the significanceof any partof a sentenceonlyinsofaras we are interested n the truth-valueof the sentence. Is thisnot to saythatthe significanceof the partsof sentences,andin particularof names, consists in their contribution to the truth-value of thesentencesinto which they may enter? In this case we should have totake the significanceof sentencesas primary. nsteadof transferringhecharacteristicsf the significance f namesto that of sentences,we shouldreversethe orderandtryto definethe significanceof namesby meansofthe conceptwith which the significanceof sentences s defined.In orderto do this I propose the technicalterm 'truth-valuepoten-tial'. As a firststep, this term canbe definedfor namesin the followingway: two names 'a' and 'b' have

the sametruth-valuepotentialif andonly if, whenevereach is completedby the sameexpressionto form asentence,the two sentenceshave the sametruth-value. This, of course,is only a cumbersomeway of expressingthe well-known definitionofextensional equivalence: a=b =Def. (P)Pa=Pb, which is Leibniz'Principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles, to which Frege himselfexplicitlyappeals SB 35). But now a furtherstep suggestsitself. Withslight modification, the definition can be converted into a generaldefinitionfor the truth-valuepotentialof an expression,whethernameor sentenceor predicate:twoexpressionskand bhave hesame ruth-valuepotentialf andonlyf, wheneverachs comfiletedythe ame xpressiono orma sentence,hetwosentencesavehesame ruth-value.f we substitutenamesfor q6and b,this definitionbecomesidenticalwith the firstdefinition. Ishallreturn ater to the case of predicates.If we substitutesentences or0 and 0, we obtain the following statement:two sentences'p' and 'q'have the same truth-valuepotential if and only if, whenever each iscompletedby the sameexpression o forma sentence,the two sentenceshave the sametruth-value.Now 'p' and 'q' arealreadysentences;theyarenot susceptible o being completedas sentencesby a furtherexpres-sion. Therefore, the addition 'whenever each is completed ... ' issuperfluousn this case,andthe definition s reduced o the simpleform:two sentences p' and'q' havethe sametruth-valuepotential f andonlyif they have the sametruth-value.It is obvious that the two definitions or the samenessof truth-value

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THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGEpotentialof names and of sentencesare identicalwith the well-knowndefinitionsfor the samenessof extension of names and of sentences.But they now appearas applicationsof a single general definition ofsameness of extension. The concept of truth-value potential, thusdefined,can therefore be considered as an alternativeaccount of signi-ficanceto that given by Frege. Let us comparethe meritsof the twoaccounts. I shallfirstshow that the new account is morevaluableevenin understandingFrege's own exposition.Frege'sreasonfor callingboth the objectof a propername and thetruth-valueof a sentencetheir 'significance' ies in what has been calledby Carnapthe 'principle of interchangeability': f in a sentence wereplaceone part by another with the same significancebut a differentsense, then the sense, but not the significance,of the sentence maychange (cf. SB 32). Frege did not give a justification or this principle,and his interpretershave been puzzled over its precise status. Fregeenunciates he principlebeforesayingwhat the significanceof sentencesconsists in, and he clearlyuses it precisely as an instrumentfor dis-coveringwhat the significanceof a sentence s. The principlethereforedoes not seemto be a propositionthatcanbe trueor false,but functionsratherasa definition or introducing he term'significanceof a sentence'.We shall,Fregeseemsto say,callthe significanceof a sentencewhateverit is which remainsunchangedwhen we replacea namein the sentenceby another name with the same significance. However, critics haveobservedthat this is unsatisfactory, ince the truth-value s not the onlything thatremainsunchangedwhen a name is replacedby anothernameof the same object. We can, for example, think of all the sentenceswhich have the same predicateand whose subject-termsrefer to thesame object as belonging to the same object-class. Then the object-class of a sentenceevidently meets the requirementof the principleofinterchangeabilityustas the truth-valueof the sentencedoes.The difficulty s solved if we go about it the other way andtake thefunction of the principleof interchangeabilityo consist in the intro-duction of the significance,not of sentences,but of names. We thenstart from the truth-valueof sentences,call this their significance,andproceedto saythatwhateverpropertyof namesremains he samewhenwe exchange them in otherwise identical sentenceswithout changingtheir truth-valueshall be calledthe significanceof the names. And thissimplyamountsto sayingthat we shall call the truth-valuepotentialofnames theirsignificance.Proceeding n this direction, t then turnsout,instead of being assumed,that the significance s, in the case of names,the object referred o.1

'As has been pointed out to me by Mr. Dummett, it is not strictly correct to say that thetruth-value potential is the object referred to. All we can claim is that two names that referto the same object have the same truth-value potential. Consequently, it would be preferableto say that the truth-value potential of a name is, ratherthan the object referred to, its refer-ence to that object.

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One merit thereforeof the accountof significancehere advanced sthat it permitsa betterunderstandingof Frege's own exposition. Theprincipleof interchangeability,n the interpretationhere given, simplyrepresentsthe Principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles, and Fregehimselfrefersto it in this form when he proceedsto the finaltest of hisproposal(SB 35). The conclusionsdrawnfrom the previous consider-ations he calls mere 'conjecture'('Vermutung').Nonetheless, Fregethought even then that he was proving by means of the principle ofinterchangeabilityhat the truth-valuesof sentencescorrespondto theobjectsof names,whereas n fact the principleof interchangeabilityanonly prove that the objectsof namescorrespondto the truth-valuesofsentences.That Frege proceeds in this reverse direction-from names tosentences--must have been the mainreasonwhy he appliedthe termin-ology of the name-relation o the significanceof sentences. Therewas,of course,an additionalreason,andthatwas his well-knowndistinctionbetweencompleteandincompleteexpressionsand his doctrinethatbothsentencesand names are complete expressions.' But this doctrine initself is not enoughto accountfor Frege'sconceptionof the significanceof a sentenceas an object,becauseeven if it be concededthatnamesandsentences orm one classof expressions n contrast o predicates, t doesnot follow that this class hasno essentialsubdivisions n turn. And whythe name-relation houldbe transferredrom the sub-classof namestothe sub-classof sentencesFrege never explainedon any grounds otherthan the principleof interchangeability.Hence we must conclude thatFrege'sapplicationof the terminologyof 'name'and'object' o sentencesand their significanceis due, in the last analysis, exclusively to thetraditionaldoctrinethat the prototypeof a complete ( categorematic )expression s the name. And yet it wasFregehimself who hadopeneda

new approachwith the famous dictumin his GrundlagenerArithmetik(?60):'Only in the contextof a sentencedoes a word signify anything'.It is this statementwhich points to the conception of significanceastruth-valuepotential.So far I have been concerned to show the advantagesof the newconception of significancefor the interpretationof Frege's own text.Let us now comparethe two conceptionsin their own right.There exists a connectionbetween names and sentences,expressedby the principleof interchangeability.This, andthis alone, is the facttobe accountedfor. Whatthe principleof interchangeabilityxpresses snot the symptomof anythingelse, of some deeperpropertythat namesand sentencesmight have in common. If we wish thereforeto charac-terizeboth names and sentencesby one and the sameproperty,whichwe cancall the propertyof havinga significance, his propertymustnot

1Cf. the essay 'FunktionundBegriff',especially p. 18.

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THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGEconsist in anythingover and above the functionalconnection which isexpressedby the principle of interchangeability.This requirement smet by the conceptionof the significanceof an expressionas its truth-valuepotentialandis not metby the conceptionof the significanceof anexpressionas the objectnamedby it.But the argumentdecisive for the adequacyof the account hereproposed,andfor the inadequacyof Frege'sown account,is the follow-ing. Granted on the one hand that names and sentences form twodifferent emanticcagetoriesand on the other that they have somethingin common,we must requireof an adequateaccountof what they havein common that it shouldnot obliterate heir differences.This require-ment is only met by the present account. Why is this so? Why is itthatif we interpret he significanceof sentencessettingout fromnames,we cannot help assimilatingsentencesto names, whilst names are notassimilatedto sentenceswhen we interpretthe significanceof namessetting out from sentences? The reason s that we havehereaninstanceof afunctionalconnectionbetweenpartandwhole. In anysuchinstance,for examplea tool, machine,or organism,the partcan only be definedby its relationto the functionof the whole andnot viceversa. Sincetherelationof partto whole is functional,the reference o the whole in thedefinitionof the partdoes not resultin the assimilationof the propertiesof the part to the propertiesof the whole. On the other hand, anyattemptto definethe whole by meansof its parts s bound to resultin anon-functionalaccountof the whole which either assimilatests proper-ties to the propertiesof the partor definesit as a mereconglomerationof its parts,or both.Thus the fact that the interpretationof significanceas truth-valuepotential is adequatewhile its interpretationas reference s inadequatesheds light on the natureof sentences and their composition:it can beused as evidence for the claim that the primarysemanticunit is thesentenceand it can also be used to protect this claim from misunder-standing. The contentionthatthe sentence s the primaryunit of mean-ing does not exclude its divisibility into meaningful parts; it onlyclaims that the significance, and consequently the sense, of wordscannot be understood in isolation, but rather consists in their contri-bution to the significanceor sense of sentences,respectively. Wheels,cranksandpistonscanexercise heirfunctiononly aspartsof a machine;but this is not to say that they cannot be taken apartand used in theconstructionof a new machine.What I have said so far can be summarizedas follows. The correctaccount of Frege's term 'significance'would seem to be to understandit as truth-valuepotential;and sincethis accountalso agreesbetterwithsomepartsof Frege'sexpositionthanhis own accountdoes, we canalsosay that this was what Frege himselfreallymeant and that he was only

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prevented from saying so by his attachment to the traditional conceptionwhich he was overthrowing. Now a claim such as this, that an authorreally meant something that he did not actually say, easily arousessuspicion. It is therefore fortunate that my proposal is practically con-firmed by Frege himself, at least as far as the significance of predicates isconcerned.In his published writings Frege never treated explicitly of thedistinction between sense and significance in the case of predicates, andamong students of Frege there has been considerable uncertainty anddisagreement on this matter. In particular, it has seemed strange to somethat in 'BegriffundGegenstand'Frege says that the concept is the signific-ance of the predicate (198). If that is so, what should we suppose thesense of the predicate to be? Might one not have expected the sense ofthe predicate to be the concept and the significance its extension? Onthe other hand, the contrast between concept and object, so essential toFrege's thought, obviously committed him to thinking that the conceptis to the predicate what the object is to the name-it could only be thesignificance of the predicate.These difficulties can now be resolved thanks to the publicationin Frege's Nachlass of a small manuscript1in which Frege deals with the

problem of the sense and significance of predicates, which was leftopen in his essay. The manuscript, which the editors have publishedunder the title 'Ausfiihrungeniber Sinn und Bedeutung',opens with thefollowing remarks:I distinguished in an essay ('On Sense and Significance') at firstbetween the sense and significanceonly of proper names.... Now thesame distinction can also be drawn for concept-words. Uncarity, how-ever, may easilyarisethroughconfusing the distinction betweenconceptsand objects with the distinctionbetween sense and significance,with theresult that sense and concept on the one hand and significance and

object on the other are conflated (p. 128).Frege here anticipates the confusion which has led to the translation of'Bedeutung' y 'reference'. He then explains:

Just as the proper names of the same object can replace each othersalvaveritate,he sameholds of concept-wordstoo if the extension of theconcept (derBegriffsumfang)s the same. Admittedly, as a result of suchsubstitutions the thought will be changed; but this is the sense of thesentence, not its significance. And the latter, that is to say the truth-value, remains unchanged. So one could easily be led to consider theextension of the concept as the significance of the concept-word; butthen one would overlook the fact that the extensions of concepts areobjectsand not concepts . . . Nevertheless thereis an elementof truthinthis (p. 128f).

The explanations which follow in the manuscript show that what Frege1 Frege, Nachgelassene chriften,pp. 128-36.

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THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGEmeans is that, although we should not say that the significanceof aconcept-word is the extension, 'two concept-words have the samesignificancef andonly if theirextensions coincide'(p. 133). So herewehave a case whereFregerefuses to considerthe significanceas anykindof object whatsoever and is content to say under what condition twopredicateshave the samesignificance.And althoughFregedoes not putit in thesewords,this conditionclearlyconsists in havingthe sametruth-value potential.WhatFrege says in this manuscriptabout 'having the samesignific-ance' corresponds to the characterizationof 'having a significance'which he gives in the GrundgesetZe29. A predicate,he theresays, has asignificance f, when appliedto anypropernamethathas a significance,it yieldsa sentencethatitself has a significance.1These explanationsare furtherconfirmedby what Frege says aboutwhat it means for a predicateto have no significance:'When we areconcerned with truth, . . . we have to reject concept-words whosedemarcations indistinct. Of everyobject t must be determinedwhetherit fallsunderthe conceptor not; a concept-wordwhich does not satisfythis requirementhas no significance.'2 This passage is particularlyilluminating,for Frege is here pointing to the specifickind of truth-valuepotentialof predicates,which is essentiallydifferentrom the truth-valuepotentialof names. This distinction s all too easilyblurredby theusualaccount,according o whichbothobjectsandconceptsareregardedby Frege as entities . Frege did not use such a term,andhis so-calledrealism appears o be overemphasizedn the literature.Although wemay say that a concept-word standsfor a concept, just as a namestandsfor an object,whatthis meansn the case of a concept-word s thatit providesa demarcationor the distinctionof objects.Looking back now at names, sentences and predicates,we canconclude that what Frege discovered was not, as is often said, thatnameshave, besides a reference,a sense and that sentencesand predi-cates have, besides a sense, a reference,but that all these expressionsnormally have, besides a sense, a significancein terms of truth andfalsity:3sentencesare significant 'bedeutungsvoll')nsofar as they aretrueor false;predicatesaresignificantnsofarastheyaretrueof someobjects

1 Theproperty f predicateshusdefinedhas been labelledby Montgomery urth, n hisarticle 'Two types of denotation' Studiesn LogicalTheory,d. N. Rescher,Oxford1968,pp. 9-45) the 'propertyZ'. Furththinksthat 'theproblem s: is possessing he propertyZanything ikehavingdenotation?'p. 31). ButFregedidnot usetheword'denotation', ndthe word whichhe did use does not commit us to asking any suchfurtherquestion. TheanalogieswhichFurthproceeds o pointout betweenwhathe callstwo kindsof denotationareprecisely he analogieswhichobtainbetweennamesandpredicatesnsofaras bothhavea truth-value otential.2 Nachgelassenechriften,p. 133.3Here the non-technicalmeaningof Bedeutungn the senseof significance omestothe surface.

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and false of others; and names are significant nsofar as they refer tosomethingof which predicatescan be trueor false.In the lastpartof my paperI shalltry to show how the explanationof significanceas truth-valuepotential also helps us to understandFrege's theory of complex sentences and his doctrine of obliquesignificance .Frege begins his analysis of sense and significance in complexsentencesby enunciating he principleof interchangeabilityor this casealso (SB 36), as if it were self-evidentthat it should hold universally.He did not explicitlygive any reasonwhy this principleshouldhold inthe caseof simplesentences,nor doeshe give anyreasonnow in the caseof complex sentences. In the former case we found the unexpressedreasonto be that the significanceof thepartswasdefinedby theprincipleitself. This was possible, as we saw, because the significanceof a partof a simplesentencecanbe takento consist in the contribution t makesto the significanceof the whole. This rationaleobviously cannot inturnbe applied o the case where thepart tself is a sentence. We cannotdefinethe significanceof the sentenceas its contribution o the signific-ance of complexsentences,since its significance s alreadydefined, t isits truth-value.If, therefore, the principle of interchangeabilitys tohold in this second casetoo, it can do so only for the contraryreason:whereas the significanceof the part of a simple sentence consists, bydefinition, in its contribution to the significanceof the whole, thesignificanceof a complexsentencewould haveto dependon the signific-anceof its parts. And this is, of course,what we findactually o be thecasewherevertheprincipleof interchangeability oldsat all for complexsentences: the complex sentencesare defined in these cases as truth-functionsof theircomponentsentences.But what of the othercases? It might seemthat the explanation ustgiven shows that,and why, the principleof interchangeability oes notin fact have universal applicationin the case of complex sentencesbut holds only in those cases where the significanceof the complexsentenceis definedby this principle. In all other cases the significanceof the whole dependson the sense, and not on the significance,of theparts. It is well known how Frege solved the difficultywhich thusseemsto arisefor his claimthat the principleof interchangeabilityoldsuniversally:he callsthesenseof anexpression, n particular f a sentence,its 'obliquesignificance' 'ungeradeedeutung'). nd he thinks that he isentitledto assertthat where complex sentencesarenot truth-functionsof their component sentences,the significanceof the latter is not itsnormal significance,its truth-value,but its oblique significance, itssense. For in these cases the sentenceis nominalized and functions asthe nameof whatnormally s its sense(cf. SB 28, 36f). The universalityof the principleof interchangeabilitys thus restored:the significance

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THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGEof the complexsentencedependsin one case on the normalsignificanceof the component sentencesand in the other on their oblique signific-ance, in every case thereforeon theirsignificance.This theory is usually considered to be somewhat artificialandinventedsolely in orderto savethe universalityof the principleof inter-changeability.Besides,Frege is accused of having let himself be misledby the close connection between significanceand the name-relation; tis true that a sentence may function as a name, but how could thesignificanceof a sentence,in Frege'stechnical sense of the word 'signi-ficance',ever be anythingbut a truth-value? Is it not, then, more satis-factory to throw overboardthe universalityof the principle of inter-changeabilityand remain content with saying, as one normallydoes incontemporary emantics,that there are extensionalcontexts and inten-sionalcontexts?I think not. The suggestionjustmade thata sentencecould havenoother significance, in Frege's technical sense, than a truth-value, ismistaken. A significance, n Frege's technical sense, can be anythingwhich may be considered a truth-valuepotential of any kind. Nowwhen a sentence is nominalized and a predicateattachedto it, or as iscommon in intensional contexts a two-place predicate s attachedto itand anothername, the sentence,Frege says, merelyexpressespartof athought ,andonly togetherwith a predicatecanitforma sentence, hatis to say, expressa thought; such a sentencecannot standby itself (cf.SB 36f). And, we may add by way of elucidation, the truth-valuepotentialof such a sentencewhich cannot standby itself cannot consistin a truth-value. It can only consist in the contributionwhich it makesto the truth-valueof sentences nto which it mayenter as a part. Apply-ing ourgeneraldefinitionof truth-valuepotentialto this case,we obtainthe statement hat two nominalizedsentenceshave the sametruth-valuepotential f and only if, whenevereachis completed by the sameexpres-sion to form a sentence,the two sentences have the same truth-value.And, since this is only the case when the sentenceswhich have beennominalized have the same sense, Frege's contention is fully justifiedthat what he calls the oblique significance, hatis to saythe significanceof the sentence in its new role as subjectof a second-ordersentence,isthe sense which the sentence has when it functions independently.Nominalization, hen, is not just an accidentalgrammaticaleature. Inwhateverway it maybe grammaticallyxpressed,a sentenceassumes herole of a name,when it is so used that its truth-valuepotentialstands nneed of supplementationby a predicativetruth-valuepotentialto yielda truth-value. This result shows once more that Frege's concept ofsignificances functional:the significanceof one andthe sameexpressiondiffersaccordingto whether t expressesa self-sufficient emanticwhole,a thought , or only part of one.

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ThisFregeanaccountmaybe contrastedwith theusualcontemporaryversion of Frege's discovery in terms of extensional and intensionalcontexts by taking an examplein the classificationof which the twoaccountsdiffer. Sentences ormedby applyingto a nominalizedsentence'thatp' thepredicate is true' or 'is false' areextensionaland thereforedonot differ at all, accordingto the usual version, from any other truth-functionalcomplexsentence. Accordingto the Fregeanaccount,on theotherhand,the significanceof 'thatp' is, in this case as in anyother,notthe truth-valuebut the sense of 'p'. However, the significanceof thewhole sentence thatp is true'doesnot dependon the sense,but only onthetruth-value f 'p'. Does thisnot show thatFrege'srelianceon nomin-alization s, afterall,mistaken,andthat the usualcontemporary ccount,which is basedon the principleof interchangeability lone, is reallyfarmore satisfactory?I think not. The reasonwhy the significanceof thesentence 'that p is true' depends on the truth-value,and not on thesense,of 'p' is to be found in the particularmeaningof the predicate istrue'andnot, as in other truth-functionalentences, n the constructionof the sentence. Thisdistinction s effacedbythe contemporary ersion,whereas it is broughtout perfectlyby the originalFregeanaccount.1What conclusion are we to draw from this vindication of Frege'sdoctrineof obliquesignificance Shouldwe saythatafter all Fregewasright in assumingthe principleof interchangeability s a universal aw?But this in itself would not be very illuminating. We have seen thattheprincipleof interchangeabilityholds for quite differentreasonsin thecaseof subject-predicateentencesandin the case of complexsentences.The importantresult,which was not expressedby Fregehimself,ratherseems to be the curiousprimacywhich apparentlybelongs to subject-predicatesentencesin assertivelanguage. This primacyconsists in thefact that the significance and, in consequence,the sense) of all otherexpressionswithin assertive anguage s defined n termsof the signific-ance(or the sense)of subject-predicateentences. The partsof subject-predicate sentences are essentially components; their significanceconsists therefore in what they may contributeto the significanceofsubject-predicate entences. These expressionsin turn are essentiallywholes. If therefore heyareto enterasparts nto largerunitswhichareto be sentences hemselves,eitherthesignificance fthese arger entencesmust be definedas a functionof the significanceof the simplesentences,or else the simple sentencescan no longer function as sentences,but

1On the other hand, a weakness in Frege's account might be discerned in the fact thatnames can occur intensionally in contexts other than nominalized sentences, as in 'a isbelieved to be differentfrom b'. However, such a sentence can always be transformed into asentence part of which is a nominalized sentence. Again, it would seem that although theFregean account is more involved than the usual version, it is nevertheless more illuminating,because it refers us back to the reason for the intensional occurrence of expressions: inten-sionality is, it seems, bound up with intentionality, which is to be found primarily in pro-positional attitudes, and these are directed to what is expressed by nominalized sentences.

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THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGE 189must be converted into names, and the largersentencesthen turn outto be themselves subject-predicate entences. The universalityof theprincipleof interchangeabilitys, then, a consequencef this primacyofthe subject-predicateentence.I have passed over sentences with 1st and 2nd order quantifiers.But their significanceis also defined in terms of the significanceofsubject-predicatesentences. There are, however, kinds of sentencewhich seem to resist this account, in particularcausal sentences andcontrary-to-fact-conditionals.But such sentencespresentdifficultiesonany account. Fregetried, in the last partof his essay,to explicatesomeof these morerecalcitranttypesof complexsentence, n particular ausalsentences,but he did not attemptto relate his explicationof these typesto the assumeduniversalityof the principleof interchangeability.Universityof Heidelberg

tugendhat, e., the meaning of 'bedeutung' in frege

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