A S I A - L A T A M C O N N E C T I O N | I C B C A R G E N T I N A

M A R K E T I N S I G H T S

INTER-REGIONALWEBINAR

L E J O N C H U A

C O R D A G E A N D P O T H A N G E RM A K I N GB A T S A I K H A N Z A G D R A G C H A A

C A R O L A R A M Ó N B E R J A N O F É L I X P E Ñ A

M A R I A N O T U R Z I

D E L I A P A R E D E S

OUR SPEAKERS

Felix Peña

Carola Ramon-

Berjano

Delia Paredes

Mariano Turzi

BatsaikhanZagdragchaa

Lejon Chua

Director Institute for International TradeICBC Foundation

Dr. Peña is a specialist inInternational economicrelations, international tradelaw and economic integration.He is currently Director of theInstitute for International Tradeat ICBC Foundation, Directorof the Master in InternationalCommercial Relations andDirector of the Jean MonnetModule and of theInterdisciplinary Center forInternational Studies at theNational University of Tres deFebrero. He is also a foundingCounselor and member ofthe Executive Committee ofthe Argentine Council forInternational Relations(CARI).

Ms. Paredes has more than 10years as a professionaleconomist. She joined Banorteas Executive Director ofEconomic Analysis 6 years ago,after 6 years at BancoSantander as Senior Economistfor Mexico. Ms. Paredes alsohas public sector experience inPemex as Deputy Director ofFinance and in the Ministry ofFinance as Deputy Director ofProject Finance. She activelyparticipates in nationalpublications, as well as a hostof national and internationalconferences about variouseconomic issues. She holds aBusiness Economics degreefrom the Anahuac University inaddition to a Masters ofScience Degree in GlobalMarket Economics from LSE.

Dr Ramón-Berjano has aMaster's degree in economicsfrom creating (Argentina) and aMaster's and PhD in economicsfrom university of London. Shespecialises in economicdevelopment and integration.She worked at the University ofHong Kong for 3 years. She is aconsultant member of CARI(Argentine council for foreignaffairs) and belongs tothe committees for Asian andfor Latin American studies aswell as the China workinggroup. She is a lecturer at theUniversidad de Belgrano andIsen (ministry of foreign affairs)and the school oforiental studies (USAL) whereshe is also a researcher.

Dr. Turzi received a PhDInternational Studies from theJohns Hopkins University. He hasan MA in Strategic Studies andPhD in Latin American Studies.He is also a professor at DiTella University and NYU BuenosAires. His areas of researchinclude the political economy ofnatural resource governanceand emerging markets. He hasalso published a book on BRICSand contributes regularly tojournals and opinion editorials.

Mr. Batsaikhan is a risk andresilience expert. He advises UN,WB, governments and privatesector institutions in riskmanagement, contingencyplanning & business continuity.He has managed humanitarianresponse actions with UNDPand UNHCR, involved in designof emergency plans for the Asia-Europe Foundation, UN Systemof Influenza Coordination andthe Gobi Wolf exercise,and delivered trainings on riskmanagement for mining,insurance, banking andservice sectors based in Asia.Mr.Batsaikhan holds a Master ofPublic Administrationfrom National University ofSingapore and has beenleadership fellow with the East-West Center of Hawaii, USA.Lejon Chua graduated fromImperial College London withFirst Class Honors in ChemicalEngineering. In 2014, hedeveloped an innovativescheduling tool for ExxonMobil UK’s proprietary halobutylrubber plant, helping to reduceoperational costs significantly. Asa manager with InternationalEnterprise Singapore, Lejon wasresponsible for groominga portfolio of Singapore-basedchemical companies for globalcompetitiveness. He is the firstSingaporean to join the inauguralclass of Schwarzman Scholars,the most historic program of itskind since the Rhodes, designedto prepare the next generation ofglobal leaders.

Consultant MemberArgentina Council forInternational Relations (CARI)

ProfessorDi Tella University and NYUBuenos Aires

Executive Director ofEconomic AnalysisBanorte Risk & Resilience Advisor

Partner, Prosper Consulting

ManagerIE Singapore

B R O C H U R E D E S I G N E D B Y : S W A R N I M A S I R C A R

The entry into force of the TranspacificEconomic Partnership Agreement (TPP) is stilluncertain. The time it will take for this to happenmight still be long. The fact is that in somecountries there is a growing discontent causedby the effects of globalization on theexpectations of welfare and employment. Thisseems to be more evident in European countriesbut it is also so in the US. This should not beoverlooked when assessing the feasibility ofmega preferential trade agreements.

The growing uncertainty about the future of thenegotiation of the TTIP (the Transatlantic Tradeand Investment Agreement between the US andthe EU), contributes to a pessimistic climate withregard to this type of preferential agreements. These mega-regional agreements imply, for asignificant number of countries not necessarilylimited to a geographical region, due to theircontents and geopolitical objectives, a so-calledWTO-plus scope.

As for the anticipated effects of the TPP withrespect to the signing countries and non-members, especially those in Latin America whoare not part of it, studies indicate that the effectswould be positive with regard to employment,trade and investment in the former. Logically, theeffects would differ from country to country. Asfor the Latin American countries that are notmembers, none could assume that the entry intoforce of the TPP would have no effect on theirforeign trade and on their integration into theworld economy. It would be a logicalconsequence of the relative importance of theTPP member countries in trade, internationalinvestment and global product..

If that were the intention of Article 30-4, one mightthen wonder about the real scope of the TPP andits impact on the effectiveness of the multilateraltrading system. The idea that it could have a longterm disruptive impact on the current WTO andthe effects sought in the GATT through theinterplay of Articles I and XXIV, would then have agreater incidence on the debate on thegovernance of the international trading systemand on the consequences of the different forms oferosion of its institutions and rules.

Adapting the rules and institutions of the globaltrading system to the new realities of trade andinvestment, on the one hand, and to the currentdistribution of world power, on the other hand,will then be a dominant theme of the globalagenda in the coming years and, therefore, alsoof the agenda of Latin American integration.

Over the last decades, China´s impressiveeconomic development, growth and insertion inthe world have made it a major player ininternational economics, trade and politics. Thisgrowth has also impacted our region, andArgentina, in two ways. The first one is regardingits direct effects and the second one the indirecteffects.

Regarding its direct effects, China has increasedits trade with every region in the world. AlthoughLatin America is a small percentage of totalChinese trade (about 6%), the relative growthover the last decades has been more thansignificant. However, and although the directeffects are important, it is the indirect effectswhich are most interesting.

How to adapt the strategy for internationalintegration of each of the countries in the region,including that of their companies, to thesepossible alternative scenarios would then be oneof the requirements resulting from the entry intoforce of the TPP. This would have an interestingeffect on how countries and their companies,whatever their relative economic dimension,prepare to navigate an increasingly complexworld trade and under continuous change.

One issue that deserves special attention is thepossible effects that the TPP and other mega-preferential trade agreements could have on thedesign and operation of the global tradingsystem. The question of the design of the futureinternational trade order is becomingincreasingly important. This is so largely becauseit is becoming clear that the institutional systemof world trade is going through a critical period.This is reflected in the standstill of the DohaRound, not necessarily overcome at the lastWTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi.Some articles of the TPP text call our attentiondue to their potential erosion effects on themultilateral global trading system. Article 30-4, inparticular, which establishes who can adhere tothe TPP, reads as follows: "This Agreement isopen to accession by: (a) any State or separatecustoms territory that is a member of APEC; and(b) any other State or separate customs territoryas the Parties may agree, that is prepared tocomply with the obligations in this Agreement,subject to such terms and conditions as may beagreed between the State or separate customsterritory and the Parties, and following approval inaccordance with the applicable legal proceduresof each Party and acceding State or separatecustoms territory (accession candidate)." Furtheron, in paragraph b, it opens the possibility forother countries that are not members of theAPEC and with no physical connection to thePacific Ocean, to apply to join the TPP. Would itbe possible for those countries of the Atlanticcoast of South America, Africa or othergeographical regions distant from the Pacific toadhere to the Treaty?

Possible effects of the TPP and othermega-preferential trade agreementson the design and operation of theglobal trading system. Theconsequences for Latin America.about us

China: the new world economic andpolitical counterbalancing force

F É L I X P E Ñ A

C A R O L A R A M O N - B E R J A N O

Regarding the indirect effects, we must bear inmind that on the one hand most of Chinese tradeis directed to its neighboring region of AsiaPacific (over 50%), and on the other hand, wemust consider the interaction between the UnitedStates and China. While 50 years ago China´sshare of world GDP was only about 5% - while theUS was 31% - at present they both are about 16%.These two factors have huge implications forChinese economic policies and strategies which,in turn, affect our region and our countryindirectly.Most US initiatives are met with acounterbalancing one from China, andconversely with every initiative led by China. Forinstance, the pivot to Asia from the US has thecounterbalancing ASEAN + 3 deepening led byChina (Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Vietnam,Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailandand the Philllipines – plus China, Japan andSouth Korea. In the case of the (Trans PacificPartnership Agreement) TPP, it involves 5American countries and 7 Asian ones; while theRegional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP) led by China comprises the ASEAN 10countries, plus the previous 3, plus India, NewZealand and Australia. Another example ofcounterbalancing initiatives are on the one handthe Trans Atlantic Trade and InvestmentPartnership Agreement (TTIP) between the USand Europe which is now met by a much moreambitious and overreaching initiative such as theSilk Road Initiative (SRI) or One Belt One Road(OBOR).

In this context Latin America is somewhat dividedbetween a “Pacific-looking” and an “Atlantic-looking”; or an “open” Latin America versus amore “autarkic” one. Countries such as Chile,Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico are eithermembers of the TPP, or the Pacific Alliance, or innegotiations with either or both, and most ofthem have trade agreements with the US, the EU,China and other Asian countries.

By contrast, when looking at MERCOSUR and itsmember countries, it can be seen that they arecharacterized by their lack of trade agreementswith such areas and countries. This poses amajor risk for these countries as they riskbecoming marginalized in the future.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, andLatin American políticsM A R I A N O T U R Z I

The recently signed Strategic Agreement Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has decisive implicationsnot only for the future of the international economybut the global order 1 In that sense, consolidationor stagnation will largely determine the future ofthe Latin American regional integration. This newtransforming reality of global affairs will decisiveaction strategies and external insertion ofgovernments and companies in Latin Americaconsequences. If in the twentieth century thePanama Canal marked the separation of theAmerican continent north and south, in theXXI century the TPP is introducing a new vector tothe Latin American integration process, dividingthe region into east and west, or Pacific andAtlantic . The risk for Latin America is that thisdivision will translate into differences anddivergences of regionalization regionalism. Thefirst refers to a process rather economic innature, mainly led by commercial (companies) andfinancial non - state actors (banks and creditagencies). The second highlights the institutionaland political dimensions.

Understood as the growing process oftransnationalization, Latin American regionalization is the dimension most directly impacted byTPP. In a stage of globalized capitalism organizedaround value chains, the TPP introduceschanges that will impact on patterns of nationalintegration of each of the countries / sectors/ links. Asian and Latin American companies willsee how your costs and benefits because of thenew institutional structure and it is expected arealignment of interests and strategies to newopportunities and threats. For example, theVietnamese textiles which today face a tariff ofentry into the US of 17.5% - have no taxes underthe TPP.

In fact, several apparel companies from Chineseprovinces already have been investing billions ofdollars in the apparel sector of Vietnam to takeadvantage of favorable tariff and tax advantages ofthis new agreement. The same may happen adintra the regionalization process in Latin America,

As for regionalism, and increasing fracture warnspolitical nature. The Pacific Alliance (AP) has beenpostulated by politicians and analysts as a forcecontrary to the Southern Common Market(Mercosur). This new grouping would bepolitically pragmatic, open in trade, liberal financiallyand more functional to US interests inthe geopolitical. Mercosur, however, would be ananachronism stuck by its ideological populism, hisdefense of mercantilist protectionism and mistrust ofinternational financial players, but at the same time isthe support of a more autonomous projectof Washington. These two different models ofintegration and open regionalism competitive-bilateralism are not inherently incompatible orantinomian. In fact, the Community of LatinAmerican and Caribbean States (CELAC) has madeitself the motto "unity in diversity". But from theperspective of international political economy, TheTPP provides an external structure of incentives thatpromote and strengthen internal coalitions of powerthrough visions and efforts of nationaldevelopment projects that have no Latin Americanintegration as a strategic priority.National economic integration and regional economic integration in Latin America have to take into account the new limits and opportunities of the TPPurgently and with depth in the analysis.Organisations such as the CELAC or UNASURshould raise a dialogue to possible positions andstructure transitions. Both politics and autonomy forproductive development, lack of co-ordinationrepresents a significant risk. Even if the trendtowards competitive fragmentation is unavoidable,the ordering of the process under a regionaldisintegration scheme would be preferable todisordered disintegration.

The risk is that this difference is transformed intodivergence. The external incentive the TPP couldgenerate both regionalisation and regionalismend up captured by extra-regional interests andagendas. In fact, documents on preliminarynegotiations that have leaked through Wikileaksreveal, for example in the case of rights ofintellectual how regional trade structure propertywould be redesigned according to the corporateinterests of industry giants.

However FTAs benefit not only export-orientedSMEs, but also those who are involved in supplychain of big companies. According to the KoreaSmall Business Institute (2007), majority of SMEssupply their goods to the big corporations withinthe country rather than export goods directly orsell these in the domestic market. In Korea, SMEs’supply of goods to the domestic enterprises,97.6% of them are dependent on the supply ofgoods to the big corporations. Another exampleon Chinese SMEs, major challenges forparticipation into FTAs was the lack ofinformation, time delays and admin costs ofapplying for documentation, many exclusion andother non-tariff measures.The special aspect of new TPP is it has a specialchapter on SMEs to faciliate their participation.The chapter includes commitments by each TPPParty to create a user-friendly websites targetedat SMEs to provide easily accessible informationon the TPP and ways small firms can takeadvantage of it, including description of theprovisions of TPP relevant to SMEs, regulationsand procedures concerning intellectual propertyrights, foreign investment regulations, businessregistration procedures, employment regulations,and taxation information. For SMEs, there is a need to focus on 3 keyframeworks: legal, cultural and institutional. First,TPP requires new binding responsibilities by theGovernments, particularly in intellectual property,environmental protection, labour rights and goodgovernance (corruption). Also TPP agreementestablishes an investor-state dispute settlementmechanism, which grants investors the right tosue foreign governments for treaty violations.

Free trade agreements promise great opportunitiesfor SMEs in terms of access to new markets,expanding production networks, mobilization offinancial resources and technology transfer. On thedown side, the increased regional economicintegrations, such as TPP, will increase competitionboth in regional and domestic markets that willeventually increase pressure on SMEs. There will beboth great opportunities and challenges for SMEs,but the impact and implication of the TPP might bedifferent from country to country and sector to sector.

.The question for SMEs is how to maximize benefitsfrom multilateral free trade agreements and how tominimize its potential negative impacts. It is verycritical for SMEs to reduce their vulnerabilities,improve their resilience and better re-position itselfand their business strategies in order to convert thepotential risks and challenges into awards.

.Potential impacts of TPP might be shift in regionaltrade structure in Asia, potentially gain over non-partycountries, increased competition and price reductionin domestic market, aggressive marketing bymultinational companies, accessibility to affordablefinancial resources, fast technology transfer andimproved new regulatory frameworks, particularly interms of labour rights, environment and intellectualproperty rights.

While looking on effects of previous FTAs on SMEs,the German Association of SME Businessesconcluded that the Transatlantic Trade andInvestment Partnership (TTIP) between EU and USaggravated competitive pressure: increasedcompetition not only in exporting, but also threat totheir domestic market on substitutive products. It wasmore beneficial for SMEs, who are already exportingtheir products or highly export-oriented companies,which export more than one-quarter of their goodsand services.

The critical geopolitical fact is that the TPP is notan agreement to create trade but to managetrade and finance. it is a rear movement ratherthan advance; managing a declining more thanthe deployment of a rising power. Washingtondoes not trust his own position. Whenhegemonic powers feel safe, they proclaim andpromote the principles of freedom. Withoutconsidering the initial differences, freecompetition works in facor of the existingasymmetries. His power is global and aspirationsconstruction order as well. Either by will orcapacity , the TPP clearly reflects that current USambitions are much less ambitious. The "pivot toAsia" and the institutional responses the TPP aretrying to give the American superpower torealities that are beyond their control: theeconomic policy of globalization andinterdependence. That reality is that the worldisreconfigured based on regional blocs rather thanglobal parameters . The TPP has introduced toLatin America a strategic long-term threat: thehegemonic recreation. Whether intional orunintentioonal, from the north or east. Noawareness of region "Latin America will losespace for international action and will begeopolitical and geo-economically relegated to aposition functional designs beyond their opinionand control.

Potential Challenges and Opportunitiesof the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) onSMEs: From Risk to Reward.BATSA I KHAN ZAGDRAGCHAA

Second, understanding new culture/businessenvironment (especially trust issue),niche/diversification/re-designing its productsand services to cater local need and demand inpotential unfamiliar markets is something thatneed to look carefully. High standards indestination countries may act as barriers to tradeeven if tariffs are low.

Among the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)members, Chile stands out as the only countrythat currently has bilateral agreements with allother member states. During the negotiationphase, Chilean officials repeatedly emphasizedthat it is important for Chile, as a small countrydepending heavily on foreign trade, to participatein the setting of new international trade rules(Benedikter & Zlosilo, 2015) (Otto, 2015).However, given that Chile has already achievedeither a substantial or full degree of tradeliberalization with all TPP countries, the potentialbenefits it could reap are most likely limited.Government officials, however, remain optimisticon the future performance of agricultural andfood industries under the TPP.

Chile’s export structure displays a strong relianceon primary products (see table 1). A prolongedslump in copper, its largest export, has spurredthe country to invigorate investments in theagricultural and food industries (Esposito & De laJara, 2015). Over the last three decades, thecountry has attempted to diversify its product bysubstituting the share of commodities with highervalue-added goods, especially in agriculture(Yong, 2015). Aligned with the government’saims to turn the country into a “world foodpower”(Jensen, 2012) , the agri-business sectorshows high potential for growth.

Next to copper, fruits and nuts are Chile’s secondlargest exports to the United States. The signingof the TPP will not alter the status quo drasticallyas the two countries already have a bilateral freetrade agreement. The supply chain linkages,however, are expected to strengthen after theimplementation of the agreement.

While Chile has been successful at increasing theproduction of fresh fruit and vegetables andshows high competitiveness in these exports(Lee & Im, 2015), its production technology stilllags behind other sectors such as textiles andautomobiles (Yong, 2015).

However, developments under the TPP couldwitness increased imports of agriculturalmachinery from countries such as the U.S. A dropin labour-intensiveness and a productivityincrease are expected to create more productivecapacity for the further development of value-added agricultural goods.

Involvement in the TPP could also increaseChile’s agricultural trade, particularly with Japanand Canada, as health and safety regulationsbecome standardized. (McCully, Shankar, &Tisdall, 2015) This could mean a reduction innon-tariff barriers due to pressure from the TPPon countries to set regulations no higher thaninternational standards, which Chilean productsalready meet. Together with existing free tradeagreements, the TPP will enable agricultural andfood producers in Chile to better integrate intothe global value chain.

Third, the involvement in an increasinglycompetitive markets and challengingenvironments requires a new strategy for SMEsthat focuses upon knowledge and skillacquisition, technology upgrading andinnovation. The rise of niche maketing andimportance of customization, reduced productlife cycles, subcontracting opportunities in globalproduction system, increasing importance ofknowledge and innovation as core ofcompetitiveness, ability to respond quickly torapidly changing customer demands andtechnology, low entry costs in knowledge andskill intensive sectors are key areas that SMEscan build on.In conclusion, TPP requires resilience,adaptability and vigilance from all level ofbusinesses: big and small. And there will behigher awards.

Agri-businesses: Boosting Chile'spresence on the world's economicstageY I P W I N G Y A N

On the other hand, more constraints on thequality and safety controls of agricultural or foodimports will be in place. The samestandardization of health and safety regulationsrequire countries, whose food safety regulationsare higher than the international standards, todisclose the full scientific procedures andevidence behind such decisions. In other words,countries will face increased difficulty in settingimport regulations regarding genetically modifiedingredients, additives or other potential health-risk posed by food imports. Some of theseregulations might even be considered barriers totrade by the U.S. government. (Stangler, 2015)

Some critics also argue that since Chile alreadyhas free trade agreements all TPP members, theagreement subject Chile to preference erosion(Deardorff, 2014). There is further scepticismsurrounding margins for gain with regards toChile’s agricultural industry since the tariffs forprimary food products are considered to beneither high nor extensive (Renwick, 2015).

STUDENT CONTRIBUTOR

While Chile has been successful at increasing theproduction of fresh fruit and vegetables andshows high competitiveness in these exports(Lee & Im, 2015), its production technology stilllags behind other sectors such as textiles andautomobiles (Yong, 2015). However,developments under the TPP could witnessincreased imports of agricultural machinery fromcountries such as the U.S. A drop in labour-intensiveness and a productivity increase areexpected to create more productive capacity forthe further development of value-addedagricultural goods.

While Chile has been successful at increasinproduction of fresh fruit and vegetables andshows high competitiveness in these export(Lee & Im, 2015), its production technology slags behind other sectors such as textiles anautomobiles (Yong, 2015). However,developments under the TPP could witnessincreased imports of agricultural machinery fcountries such as the U.S. A drop in labour-intensiveness and a productivity increase areexpected to create more productive capacitthe further development of value-addedagricultural goods.

Whether Chile’s agricultural sector will stand togain or lose not only depends on how much itcan benefit from the elimination of non-tariffbarriers in the countries mentioned, but morecritically on whether it can innovate and producecompetitively under a same set of market rules asthe United States and other developed countries(Renwick, 2015). If Chile manages to do so, itsagri-business sector may offset the lossesincurred by its less competitive manufacturingand service sectors.

Even with experts claiming all theseaforementioned benefits and “limited” harmfulconsequences to non-members, challenges stillemerged – the biggest, most stubborn hurdlepresently is the TPP opposition from the UnitedStates.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, consisting oftwelve Pacific Rim countries, is so close todrastically progressing the world economytowards more free trade and economic freedom.This partnership is estimated by the World Bankto “raise GDP in member countries by an averageof 1.1 percent,” and “increase member countries’trade by 11 percent” all by 2030. According to theCEO of Singapore Business Federation (SBF) HoMeng Kit, the TPP will help “boost [Singapore’s]economic growth” beyond its current state,which are still “below pre-financial crisis levels.”Moreover, Professor Annie Koh, who teachesfinance at Singapore Management University,claims that the TPP, with its breaking down oftrade barriers and free trade agreements, will giveSingapore an edge over other countries in theregion, in particular with Hong Kong. Globally,economists say that “deals like the TPP might bejust what the world needs to revive the flaggingtrade” due to the decline of Chinese economicgrowth and a mild global recovery from thefinancial crisis of 2008.

The American Barrier to the TPPB E T T Y P U

To understand why this is an issue, one must firstunderstand how the TPP can be put into action. TheTPP can only “come into force two months after allthe original signatories complete their own domesticratification procedures.” However, resistance isalready felt in “each and every member state” from“domestic interest groups and stakeholders.” In fact,The Diplomat stated that “it’s entirely possible thatsome states . . . could end up failing to ratify theagreement.” Therefore, if two years pass and not allsignatories have ratified the agreement, the TPP canonly come into force if two conditions are met:1. A minimum of six original signatories havesuccessfully ratified the agreement.2. Those six signatories must represent 85 percent ofthe total GDP of the twelve original signatories.

Therein lies the challenge. The United Statesrepresents approximately 62 percent of TPP GDP,and Japan represents 17 percent of TPP GDP; theother signatories in the agreement do not comeclose to these two major players. Therefore, if eitherone of them do not ratify the agreement in theirdomestic legislatures in time, then the TPP will notcome into force.

Luckily, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abeannounced its approval of the TPP and called forJapan and U.S. to “obtain domestic approval of theTPP as soon as possible.” American President BarackObama, despite being in favour of the TPP, will leavethe office by November 2016. The U.S. presidentialnominees have opposed the TPP, claiming that thedeal would exacerbate U.S. job losses. To makematters worse, current U.S. Vice-President Joe Bidenstated that chances of passing the agreement beforethe next presidency are “less than even.” Yet outsideof the United States, all other member states havealready taken steps towards ratifying the TPP in theirdomestic legislature.

During Singapore Prime Minister Lee’s official visitto the United States, he urged the government torecognize that the TPP is integral for America totap into the Asia-Pacific region with its vastresources:: 40 percent of global GDP and 800million people. He also makes clear that each ofthe 12 TPP signatories had to make sacrifices toaccept the agreement, therefore there should beno re-opening of negotiations. Finally, PM Lee“bluntly warned that ‘for America's friends andpartners, ratifying (the trade pact) is a litmus testfor [their] credibility and seriousness of purpose.’”

But at this point, the resistance from the U.S.Congress holds all TPP members back fromputting the agreement in force. With Singapore asa tiny player in the world economy, theconsequences of the falling out of the TPP arehighly worrisome – opportunity losses, thebarriers of trade, to name a few. Professor Kohhad emphasized the importance of Singapore to“play with everybody” for Singapore to remain anglobal economic power – but without the UnitedStates’ approval, this game-changing deal maynot ever come under action.Wingyan Yip is a sophomore at Yale-NUS Collegeintending to major in Philosophy, Politics andEconomics (PPE). Hailing from Hong Kong China,in a transitional era, she has a fervent interest ineconomic development and citizenship.YTheLatin American region development potentialand distinct culture's fascinate her. As aresearcher at the Global Emerging Markets (GEM)association, she focuses her work on the region’seconomic integration into the global supply chainand intra-regional competition.

Betty Pu is a Canadian first-year prospectiveEconomics major at Yale-NUS College. She wasthe national executive of Canada’s first andlargest student-run financial literacy organisation,where she expanded operations across 3provinces and 65 high schools. She is also theco-founder of a provincial and national-awardwinning Toronto software start-up. She hopes toexplore macroeconomic topics and issues andtheir impact on global financial markets.

STUDENT CONTRIBUTOR