T he past four years have seen enormouschanges in southern Africa, driven by theend of the global Cold War, the exhaus­

tion of the apartheid system under the pressure ofsanctions and internaI resistance, war-weariness inthe battered nations of Angola and Mozambique,and the demand for democratization common topost-colonial regimes throughout the continent.

In contrast to the Reagan era, with its uneasymix of crusading anti-Communist fervor andhalting moves towards negotiated solutions, theBush administration coincided with a period ofstress on conflict resolutio'n. Continuing the trendof the Namibia/Angola settlement of the lastRea.gan years, Bush's diplomats sought to projecta more even-handed posture, accepting the factthat Congress had imposed sanctions on Pretoriaand stressing that aIl parties in the region wereweary of conflict.

Despite tl:te skillful exercise of diplomacy onsorne occasions and a belated willingness tocriticize former favorites such as Mobutu, Savimbiand Banda, the Bush team still showed a funda­mental unwillingness to confront recalcitrantdefenders of the old order. By failing to step uppressure on the de Klerk regime and its regionalallies, V.S. policy lessened the chances for estab­lishing a peaceful and democratic post-apartheidand post-Cold War order.

Right-wing pressure, bureaucratie inertia and

TONCA

The BushLegacyandSouthern

AfricaA Post-Cold WarBalance Sheet

old prejudices reinforced administration sympathyfor the new-look apartheid regime under deKlerk. This was coupled with condescension andsuspicion towards the frontline African states andthe liberation movement in South Africa.

To its credit, the V.S. continued to supply vitalrelief and development aid to southern Africanstates. Simultaneously, however, a rigid insistenceon World Bank/International Monetary Funddireeted Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)and free-market dogma helped to undermineprospects for long-term sustainable development.

Printed on Recycled Paper

Vi lenee nd the aest t rcm eracy in 5 ath friea

T he ~ush administration sought to avoidthe controversy surrounding SouthAfrica policy which had marked

Reagan's "constructive engagement" and theimposition of V.S. sanctions by Congress overan administration veto. Initially, V.S. officiaIsdid not attempt to lift the 1986 sanctions. OncePresident F. W. de Klerk released NelsonMandela and legalized the African NationalCongress CANC) in February 1990, however, theadministration began to work towards liftingsanctions, succeeding in July 1991.

At the end of the Bush term, almost three yearsafter de Klerk's promises of reform, the white­minority regime was still clinging to power.

The administration consistently gave the deKlerk regime the benefit of the doubt, andshowed little urgency in pressing the SouthAfrican government to move swiftly to create acountry in which "aH races are permitted freepolitical participation." It played down abun­dant evidence of the regime's covert involve­ment in promoting political violence. This low­profile .and ostensibly impartial approach servedas a de/acto license for repeated South Africandelays in releasing political prisoners, incurbing violence and in advancing with good­faith negotiations for a new democratic consti­tution. The posture of neutral bystander or"concerned outsider," in the words of AssistantSecretary of State Herman Cohen, precludedactive involvement in promoting the stated V.S.goal of a democratic order in South Africa.

Diplomacy

Nelson Mandela's release and the unbanning ofthe ANC and other groups in February 1990

marked the beginning of increasingly warmdiplomatic activity between the V.S. and SouthAfrica.

Secretary of State James Baker made a visitto South Africa on March 23, 1.990, the first D.S.official of such rank to visit South Africa in fiveyears. The stated purpose of the trip was tourge the ANC and the South African govern­ment to negotiate on the country's future. Butsince the trip took place before Mandela's tourof the V.S., and against the request of the ANC,Baker's meeting with de Klerk was taken as asignal of a V.S. tilt towards the South Africangovernment. The ANC stated that this high­profile visit sent the wrong message to theinternational community, coming at a timewhen t~e ANC had asked foreign govemmentsto step up the pressure on de Klerk.

Nelson Mandela's 10-day tour of the V.S.beginnîng June 20, 1990 helped to achieve twogoals: raising funds for the organization andstrengthening Congressional support forsanctions. Mandela spoke to a full house in ajoint session of Congress on June 26, 1990. Thestanding ovations he received reinforcedsençiment against premature lifting of sanctions.Nevertheless, Mr. Cohen stated in an interviewon July 23 of that year that the president was"quite close" to rewarding de Klerk for reformsby lifting sorne sanctions.

During the Mandela visit, President Bushmade an issue of calling on the ANC to re­nounce the armed struggle in a public state­ment made before the two met privately onJune 25, 1990. There was no correspondingappeal to the Pretoria regime to abandonviolence. Critics such as former House AfricaSubcommittee Chairman Howard Wolpe

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PRODUCED DY. Imanl Countess (Executive Direetor), William Minter, Kristen Lee, John Metzel, Kristin Wells, Janice Hoggs and Kathi Austin.

2 Washington Notes on Afrlca

Political Violence

was de Klerk's failure to control or to disassoci­ate himself from the campaign of covertviolence in which elements of bis securityforces were implicated.

7be pastfouryears have seen

enormouschanges in

southern Africa

pointed out the double standard to which Bushseemed oblivious, noting that the administrationhad no qualms supplying arms to guerrillas inCentral America and Afghanistan, and even inAngola, while deploring the use of violence byopponents of apartheid.

In September 1990, President de Klerkvisited Washington, the first visit to the U.S. bya South African president in 45 years. Withpolitical violence raging in South Africa'stownships, the ANC called upon the U.S.administration to address the problem with deKlerk on this trip. But the administration barelytouched on the issue; the two leaders "did notgo into a detailed discussion about the causesof violence." Instead, "the main United Statesobjective for the visit was to congratulatePresident de Klerk... " (White Rouse, September24, 1990).

Lifting Sanctions

Mr. Busb said tbis week tbat be nevertbougbt tbe sanctions sbould bave beenimposed in tbe ftrst place and addedthat he would lift them (cheerfully.'

(Washington Times, July Il, 1991)

On July 10, 1991 the sanctions imposed by theComprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA)were lifted. Justified as sending a clear signalthat the V.S. was fully..behind moves to endapartheid, the action sent precisely the oppositemessage. Although democratic change had notyet been achieved, the D.S. was ready andwilling to welcome South Africa back into theworld community.

Under last-minute pressure from the V.S. tocomply with the remaining conditions of theCAAA, the South African government releasedmore than 1,000 detainees from jail and re­pealed sorne of the major pillars of apartheidlegislation. The Bush administration assertedthat the South African government had "techni­cally complied" with the conditions for liftingsanctions.

Anti-apartheid groups charged that theadministration adopted lenient interpretations ofthe conditions, and, most importantly, disre­garded evidence that de Klerk was not negotiat­ing in good faith, but was stalling on a rapidtransition to democratic mIe.

The most significant evidence of bad faith

In December 1992, after years of denying anycomplicity by bis armed forces in covert violencein the countty, South African President de Klerkdismissed six generals and 17 other officersimplicated in illegal activities. Declaring him-self "disappointed and shocked,"de Klerk still denied that their ac­tivities had constituted a "thirdforce" promoting violence. Re de­clined to announce the names ofthose dismissed, and claimed min­isters and top officers had beenkept in the dark about secret mili­tary intelligence programs.

The ANC and other critics wel­comed the dismissal as a first step,but demanded that full details ofthe operations be made public.They wamed that others, such as Military Intelli~

gence head Joffel van der Westhuizen, shouldaise be dismissed.

De Klerk's refusaI to acknowledge suchinvoivement had long convinced most indepen­dent observers that he either approved or atleast tolerated a two-track policy blendingreform and negotiations with covert efforts toweaken anti-apartheid forces. Press investiga­tions, the work of the independent Goldstonejudicial commission, and a series of leaks hadby late 1992 begun to crack the facade, how­ever, with police and military officiaIs scram­bling to place the blame on each other.

The three years since Nelson Mandela'srelease, however, had already racked uphorrifying statistics of political violence, with anaverage of more than nine deaths a day. Whilethe ANC, investigative joumalists and indepen­dent human rights groups charged the regimewith extensive involvement in promoting theviolence, de Klerk stonewalled. And the Bushadministration consistently gave priority tobolstering de Klerk's political position. Insteadof actively investigating the charges, or de­manding fuller disclosure, the United Statesadopted a stance of "see no evil," deploring theviolence on aIl sides, but claiming the data was

Washington Notes on Atrica 3

investigation, and police involvement withInkatha attacks.

The Bush administration, however, refusedto critidze the South African authorities. Evenwhen pressed by reporters on the issue, as at aJuly 1990 press briefing by State Departmentspokesperson Margaret Tutwiler, U.S. officiaIsconsistently avoided identifying the SouthAfrican security forces as part of the problem.

In 1991, as the township violence continuedin both Natal and the Transvaal, accompaniedby unexplained assassinations of anti-apartheidactivists and professional attacks on commutersbetween Soweto and Johannesburg, additionalevidence accumulated. At the very least, lack ofpolice action to stop the violence was indisput­able. But press reports aIso forced the SouthAfrican govemment to admit that it had pro­vided secret police funding for Inkatha. Defec­tors provided detailed reports of covert unitsassigned to work with criminal gangs and withInkatha to mount train attacks and other raids.In mid-July, instead of responding to demandsthat lethal weapons be effectively banned frompublic gatherings, de Klerk introduced newregulations giving Inkatha legal authority tocarry "traditional weapons." The State Depart­ment, nevertheless, still claimed, in a July 1991statement crafted to support the lifting ofsanctions, that they had "seen no evidence thatthe South African government entities aresupporting black-on-black violence."

By 1992 de Klerk was fmally pressured intoappointing a new commission of inquiry into theviolence, under respected judge Richard Gold­stone. In June 1992, the massacre of over 40people at Boipatong township by Inkathaattackers forced the issue of violence and ofgovemment responsibility onto the internationalagenda. Following a spedal mission by UnitedNations envoy Cyrus Vance, de Klerk agreed tothe presence of a small UN delegation tomonitor the violence. Press investigations andthe Goldstone Commission continued to unearthnew data pointing to security force involvement.

In the second half of 1992, the governmentannounced the disbanding of military units suchas 31 Battalion, 32 Battalion and Koevoet,special forces composed largely of Namibiansand Angolans which had eamed a reputationfor brutality in the fighting in those two coun­tries. But members of the units were dispersedto other pOSitions in the security forces, a

insuffident to point the finger of blame.Because of the secrecy maintained by the

South African govemment, it was indeeddifficult to pinpoint precisely who within thesecurity forces was most responsible. Andviolence in local townships took on its owndynamic, with conflict between the ANC andChief Buthelezi's Inkatha, between townshipresidents and migrant workers in hostels, andamong a variety of local factions. Yet pressreports and investigations by human rightsgroups quickly documented complicity by

various govemment-linkedbodies in the escalation ofviolence which coindded withde Klerk's tenn of office. Thoseinvolved included Inkatha andthe KwaZulu police, otherhomeland governments in theCiskei and Bophuthatswana,police accused of failure to act orof actually joining in the vio­lence, and special commandounits most often linked to themilitary intelligence apparatus.In early 1990, President de Klerkappointed Judge Louis Hanns tohead a commission on unex­plained killings in South Africa.Testimony before the commis­sion established the existence ofa secret death-squad operationlabelled the Civil CooperationBureau (CCB) linked to militaryintelligence. But instead of usingthe opportunity to expose such

operations, the regime restricted the/'

commission's work, allowing CCB operatives toremain anonymous although the unit wasostensibly disbanded.

Simultaneously, violence initiated by Inkathaagainst ANC supporters escalated and expandedgeographically. Whereas previous confronta­tions had pitted In~atha, the KwaZulu authori­ties and the South African police againstsupporters of the ANC in Zulu-speaking Nataland KwaZulu, in July 1990 Inkatha beganlaunching attacks from migrant worker hostelsagainst res.dential areas in the Transvaal. Inreports in late 1990 and early 1991, AfricaWatch and other groups presented extensiveevidence of attacks on anti-apartheid activists,the shortcomings of the Harms Commission

Right-wingpressure,

bureaucratieinertia and old

prejudicesreinforced

administrationsympathyforthe new-look

apartheidregime

4 Washington Notes on Afrlca

solution denounced by the VN as inadequate. ASeptember 1992 massacre of almost 30 demon­strators by the Ciskei government was followedby press revelations of extensive cooperationby South African military intelligence officerswith the homeland leader.

In 1992 the House of Representatives passed

House Resolution 497, calling on the presidentto prepare and transmit to Congress a report onthe nature of the violence, the role of partici­pants, the impact of violence on the negotiationprocess, and recommendations for action to hetaken by the U.S. to stop the violence. Aparallel resolution passed in the Senate.

•ln

cc struet· nd IftCtzam i ue

In Angola and Mozambique, the countriesmost devastated by the wars of apartheid'slast stand, peace settlements were achieved

by the end of the Bush years. Washington wascredited with a supportive role in the peaceprocess in both cases, culminating in thesignature of settlements in May 1991 for Angolaand in October 1992 for Mozambique. But theaftermath of renewed war in Angola and thelong delay in reaching peace in Mozambiqueindicated flaws for which V.S. policy was inpart responsible.

In Angola the V.S. tried to play the doublerole of mediator and of partisan for its clientUNITA, and accordingly disregarded thep10téntial threat to peace posed by Savimbi'sambition and reluctance to disarm. InMozambique the Bush administration, re­strained by its partiality to the de Klerk regimeand possessed of no sense of urgency, refusedto target for exposure or pressure the continuedsupport for RENAMO coming through SouthAfrica, Malawi and Kenya.

Flawed Peace Process in Angola

The United States played a supportive role inthe talks leading to the May 1991 peace treatyin Angola, although the central part in hostingthe talks was played by Portugal. One keybreakthrough came as a result of joint Soviet­U.S. pressure when VNITA leader JonasSavimbi agreed in late 1990 to a merger of thetwo armies before elections.

Persistence in promoting the negotiationswas followed by a slow post-cease-fire trendtoward greater neutrality. A 1990 push inCongress to limit aid to Savimbi signalled a shiftin balance of opinion on the controversial rebel

leader. And more direct experience at workingwith the various parties in Angola raisedquestions even among Dnita partisans withinthe administration. The U.S. worked withPortugal, Russia and the Untied Nations tosustain a cease-frre interrupted by only isolatedincidents. By fall 1992, the D.S. was projectingan image of concern for the election processrather than for the victory of a particularcandidate, contributing to the relative calm andorder of the election days themselves.

Yet the aftermath, in which Savimbi's troopsimmediately withdrew from the formally unitednational army once election results seemed tohe going against him, revealed fundamentalproblems with D.S. policy. They were related,above aIl, to an unwillingness to question thelegitimacy of Cold War client Savimbi, or todiscard the assumption that the process mustlead to the overthrow of the Angolan govern­ment, the traditional Cold War enemy. Whetherthis was the result of internaI administrationpolicy, or of the substantial clout of the UNITAlobby in Washington, the result was a signifi­cant tilt away from impartial support for thepeace and election processes.

After the 1988.agreement on independenceof Namibia and withdrawal of Cuban troopsfrom Angola, which D.S. officiaIs agreed wasscrupulously implemented by the Angolan andCuban govemments, Luanda expected greaterflexibility from the United States in consideringdiplomatie ties and reduction in military aid forUNITA. Angolan peace proposaIs advanced in1989 were premised on bringing UNITA intothe govemment, much as previous FNIAopponents had been incorporated, rather thancompetitive winner-take-aIl elections. TheproposaIs required the temporary withdrawal of

Washington Notes on Afrlca 5

The renewedwar in Angola~nd the delay inreaching peacein Mozambiqueindicatedflawsfor which. u.s.policy was in

part responsible

Savimbi from the political process, but alsoincluded assignment to UNITA of governorshipsin their regional strongholds.

The U.S. supported Savimbi in rejecting suchpower-sharing alternatives, which would haveleft the Angolan govemment as the clearlydominant party. For both Savimbi and the U.S.,the argum~nt for early competitive electionswas premised on the assumption that UNITAwould easily defeat the incumbent MPIA,realizing Savimbi's long-held ambition to be theundisputed leader of Angola.

In 1990, the Angolan govemment,despite its suspicion that Savimbiwould never stop short ofabsolute power, conceded to thedemand for elections. Luanda feltagreement was necessary, withCuban militaty support no longeravailable, and prospects ofcontinued Soviet aid fading, whileUNITA continued militaty escala­tion with the help of CIA suppliesthrough Zaire. But Angolanleaders also contended thatelections could only be genuinelyfree of intimidation if they werepreceded by formation of a non­partisan national army and by aunified national administration,which would take time. UNITA,reluctantly agreeing to theprinciple, argued for a short time­

period. The compromise 18-month period theagreement specified proved inadequate, even inpractical terms, for integration of the armies.

UNITA showed little urgency to complete theprocess in time for the elections, preferring tokeep unilateral control of areas under theirmilitary authority and to preserve their separatecommand structures intact. Although the smallUN monitoring force had neither the mandatenor the resources to identify ail the violations ofthe peace agreement, the decisive fact was thatonly the United States had the possible clout toinsist that UNITA comply. Despite belated insist­ence on election neutrality, U.S. officiais werestill reluctant to critidze their traditional client.

For his critics in southern Africa and eIse­where, Savimbi had long been discredited byhis collaboration with the apartheid regime,which built up his military strength in southernAngola and joined the United States in backing

6 Washington Notes on Afrlca

a wider guerrilla war·as well. As long as Cubantroops were present on the other side, theapartheid alliance was easily excused by U.S.cold warriors. As the anti-Cuban rationale forbacking Savimbi was disappearing, evidencealso began to reach the outside world ofSavimbi's totalitarian control and violent purgesof rivaIs within UNITA. But neither the initialreports from UNITA exiles surfacing in 1988and 1989, nor even c~nfinning revelations bySavimbi's previously admiring biographer FredBridgland, jarred the Bush administration intogoing beyond statements claiming insufficientevidence. Far from launching serious investiga­tions, the U.S. even failed to save the life offormer UNITA Washington envoy TitoChingunji, who was killed in UNITA captivityafter the May 1991 cease-fire agreement.

As in the case of accusations of complicity inviolence by South African security forces,Washington allowed political bias to induce anostrich-like response, ignoring repeated indica­tions that Savimbi's commitment to democraticways was a facade for outside consumption.

Following the September 1992 elections, D.S.officiaIs were dismayed by Savimbi's violentrejection of the results, which were accepted asgenerally free and fair by the UN and almost aIlother observers. Acknowledging that failure toinsist on demobilization of the separate armieswas a mistake, and that Savimbi was primarilyat fault in breaking the peace, the administra­tion still declined to grant the promised diplo­matic recognition to the Angolan government.Moreover, Washington refused to considermore than diplomatic condemnation as a meansof pressure on Savimbi, and played downevidence that new supplies were still reachingUNITA from South Africa.

Many officiaIs accepted privately thatSavimbi could not be trusted to accept peace­fully his defeat nor to cooperate in a mnoff tocomplete the election process. But the D.S. stillclung to an ostensibly even-handed support forthe process, without any provision for penaltiesfor non-compliance. At the end of 1992,restoration of peace in Angola seemed again adistant prospect.

Lack of Urgency on Mozambique

In the final year of Reagan's first term, the D.S.took credit for facilitating the Nkomati Accord

between South Africa and Mozambique. Thetext of the accord promised an end to SouthAfrican sponsorship of violence againstMozambique, in exchange for Mozambicanrestriction of the ANC to a purely diplomaticpresence in Maputo. Yet RENAMO's terrorcampaign continued for eight more years, whilesuccessive U.S. administrations tolerated SouthAfrican failure to impIement the agreement.

The Reagan and Bush administrations neveragreed to far-right demands to shift towardssupporting RENAMO, and built good diplomaticand economic ties with the Mozambicangovernment. But as in the case of the violenceinternaI to South Africa, U.S. officiaIs consis­tently refused to call Pretoria to account forseeurity force or private-sector South Africaninvolvement with RENAMO. Nor did the U.S.address the murky networks of private U.S. andother support for RENAMO channeled throughMalawi and through Kenya.

Instead of increasing pressure on RENAM0with serious efforts to eut off its outside sourcesof supplies, the primary U.S. posture was toseek ever greater flexibility and new conces­sions from the Mozam..bican government. Thisallowed RENAMO to drag out the war andrepeatedly delay the peace negotiations,resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thou­sands more Mozambicans than if the war hadbeen terminated earlier.

When the cease-fire was finally signed, inOctober 1992, South African journalists visiting

Two of the longest-surviving dictators onthe African continent-Mobutu SeseSeko of Zaire and Hastings Kamuzu

Banda of Malawi-faced strong pro-democracymovements during the Bush years. The Bushadministration moved, in rhetoric at least,towards support of democratic reform in thesecountries. But U.S. policy remained reactive andrepeatedly stopped short of significant pressureto nudge the aging despots from power.

Especially in Zaire, where the U.S. has longbeen identified as the primary patron of

a key RENAMO base close to the Mozambicanborder with South Africa reported thatRENAM0 commanders admitted receivingregular supplies from the South African militaryuntil the very end. Through the years since theNkomati Accord, Mozambican intelligencesources and occasional press reports citedcontinued South African support. OccasionalU.S. government statements admitted the fact ofSouth African aid. But never was it taken asgrounds for more than quiet diplomatic protest.

Once President Botha was replaced by deKlerk in South Africa, Mozambican leadersjudged that South African support for RENAMOwas shaky enough that it was time to begindirect negotiations with RENAMO. FormaI talksbegan in mid-l990. By then Mozambique wasformally moving to a multi-party constitutionalsystem, had accepted World Bank economicrestructuring, and enjoyed a solid reputation withthe U.S. as weIl as other Western diplomats forserious diplomatic efforts to bring peace.

But quiet U.S. support for Mozambicandiplomacy, as weIl as exasperation at RENAMO'sintransigence, was not matched by serious effortsto squeeze RENAMO's supply lines from outside.That would have entailed confrontations withSouth Africa, Malawi, and Kenya, as well as withright-wing groups in the United States. But forthe Bush administration, falling out with oldCold War friends-for the sake of a country ledby a govemment with a Marxist past-wassimply not on the policy spectrum.

Dictatorship and Democracyin Zaire and M la i

Mobutu, Washington lagged behind othermembers of the international community incalling for change. Low-profile and cautiousresponses signalled tolerance for continuedhuman rights abuses and delay in democratiza­tion. The lack of U.S. leadership helped toprolong Mobutu's and Banda's tenures, reducedthe chances of peaceful transition to democracyin their countries, and, collaterally, providedcontinued sanctuary for UNITA and RENAMOtroops to disrupt Angola and Mozambique.

Washington Notes on Afrlca 7

Tiptoeing Away from Mobutu

Mobutu's reputation as a corrupt and wilydictator who has bankrupted his country is notnew. But until recently, most policy-makerswere persuaded by the Cold War argumentthat he was necessary to preserve U.S. interestsagainst leftist threats in neighboring Angolaand more generally in the region. Suppressionof the new wave of opposition, whichemerged in the 1980s most prominently in theUnion pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social(UDPS), met with little protest from the U.S.The Bush administration continued thistradition, as Mobutu became the first Africanleader received by the new U.S. president, inJune 1989. It was Congress, not the administra­tion, that took the lead in calling for cuts in .V.S. aid and other pressures. Mobutu's 1989visit to the V.S. was met by protests, includingover a thousand demonstrators at a talkscheduled at Harvard University.

Finally in 1990, as economic collapse ex­ceeded even the patience of the World Bank,and international talk of democratization madethe Mobutu regime appear ever more anachro­nistic, the U.S. did urge Mobutu to acceptdemands for a multi-party system. Secretary ofState James Baker visited Kinshasa in March1990, explaining to Mobutu that he would haveto at least make sorne gestures towards demo­cratic refonn. In April Mobutu announcedacceptance in principle of a multi-party system.The gesture was s\lfficient for the Bush adminis­tration, and for FY 1991, the administrationproposed $56 million in military and economicaid to Zaire.

In September 1990 that request was tumeddown by Congress, which rejected administrationarguments that Mobutu's good intentions andstrategie value should take priority over democ­racy and human rights. Congress was respondingto events in Zaire such as the massacre of over200 university students at the university ofLubumbashi on the night of May Il, 1990. Theincident, which provoked widespread coverageand reaction in Europe, particularly in Belgium,was virtually ignored by the U.S. media and bythe State Department. The lack of administrationreaction was taken as a signal that Washingtonstill had confidence in Mobutu.

Mobutu's initial commitment to elections byApril 1991 quietly lapsed. Instead, he agreed to

8 Washington Notes on Afrlca

the convening of a national conference onAugust 7, 1991, to chart the transition to a newpolitical order. The over 5000 delegates werechosen from diverse sectors of society; but withsignificant input from Mobutu.

Surprising Mobutu, the conference elected aleadership committed to democratic reform,chaired by Archbishop Laurent MonsengwoPasinya. But Mobutu refused to allow theconference to function freely, packing it withhis supporters and surrounding it with troops.The impasse culminated in a crisis in Septem­ber, when unpaid troops mutinied and rioted,foreigners were evacuated From Kinshasa, andwhat remained of Zaire's economic structurewent into a tailspin. Mobutu briefly concededto appoint opposition leader EtienneTshisekedi as prime minister, but dismissedhim a few days later.

At this critical period, a strong V.S. stanceagainst ~obutu could have been decisive.Instead, the administration stressed that Mobutushould still play a key role in the transition.President Bush repeatedly refused critics' pleasfor a public statement calling on Mobutu to giveup power. Mobutu exploited this V.S. ambiva­lence, and found excuse after excuse to delayhis departure.

Events in Zaire, with belated and mildurging from the V.S., forced the process along.After Mobutu's troops opened fire on achurch-Ied pro-democracy march in February,killing over 42 people, Mobutu was forced toallow the National Conference to resume inApril. But only after weeks of church-Iedprotest activity against Mobutu did PresidentBush write a private letter to Mobutu callingfor the National Conference to be reconvened.U.S. public statements were still equivocal,stressing that "We do not support Mobutu orany other political personality." In Juneadministration officiaIs received NationalConference Chair Archbishop Monsengwo ona visit to Washington. But, as critics such asSenator Paul Simon noted at the time, theWhite House was still disinclined to a clear-cutcondemnation of Mobutu.

In August 1992, the National Conferenceelected Tshisekedi as prime minister. Underpressure from congressional critics and from U.S.church leaders, the administration gave nominalsupport to the new government. But Washingtonstill failed to respond energetically to Mobutu's

The lack ofu.s. leadership

helped topro10ng

Mobutu 's andBanda 's tenures

killings of protesters, detention without trial,abuse of political prisoners, and assassinations.

Africa Watch credited the United States withcriticizing the detention of Jack Mapanje,Malawi's most famous poet, but noted thatWashington simultaneously increased militaryassistance to the Banda regime. As late as1991, the administration was still presentingproposaIs for military assistance to Malawi forfiscal year 1992.

ln early 1992, public opposition withinMalawi finally surfaced. In March Catholicbishops issued a statement criticiz-ing the regime for human rightsabuses. In April exiled tradeunionist Chakufwa Chihana re­turned and was immediately ar­rested while calling for a nationalconference on democracy. In Maya strike by textile workers bur-geoned into wider protest. Troopssuppressing the protests killed atleast 38 people. Protestant as weIlas Catholic church leaders spokeout openly in favor of a transitionto democracy. Malawians, longintimidated from any expression of dissent,began to criticize more openly.

The U.S. joined with other internationaldonors, at their regular meeting in Paris justafter the May strikes, in approving a six-monthsuspension of aid to the Banda regime. Butlater news revealed numerous loopholes,including the continued provision of WorldBank aide In June the World Bank approved a$55 million loan as part of a total package of$125 million dollars to build a hydroelectricdam in southern Malawi, while Malawi was alsoprovided with interim finance during the six­month periode

In response to the pressure, Banda agreed inOctober tb hold a referendum on multi-partymIe, currently scheduled for June 1993. But theimprisonment of dissidents continues and lawslimiting the freedom to assemble and limitingthe access of opposition parties to the aitwaysremain on the books. Most importantly, Bandainsists on a yes and no ballot box in each localeand that the boxes be located in a public place,thus insuring no voter confidentiality. Inresponse, the main opposition groups haveissued demands to ensure fairness, and havethreatened to pull out of the referendum

continued efforts to sa!=>otage the process.In response to Tshisekedi's selection,

Mobutu, with his deposed prime minister,Nguza Karl 1 Bond, orchestrated attacks againstTshisekedi's ethnie group in Shaba province,resulting by early 1993 in more than 350 deathsand the flight of over 100,000 refugees. Therewas little reaction from Washington.

In December, following repeated refusaI byMobutu to allow the new govemment toassume control of Zaire's central bank, and anew attempt by Mobutu to dismiss Tshisekedias prime minister, the V.S. government issued ajoint statement with France and Belgiumsupporting the Transitional Government.

Even then, the response was late. In Septem­ber rival delegations appointed by Mobutu andTshisekedi visited Washington for discussionswith the U.S. govemment and with internationalfmancial institutions. BOth delegations werereceived, and there was no clear signal support­ing the Transitional G~vemment at the time.

Only three weeks later, Mobutu sent ar­mored vehicles and troops to the central bank,effectively blocking the dismissal of the incum­bent central bank governor Shabani, a Mobutuappointee. The news of Shabani's dismissal hadan immediate positive effect on Zaire's hemor­rhaging rate of inflation which fell from 2.5million zaires to the dollar to 380,000 in lessthan a week. But the ongoing stalemate de­layed outside economic support for the Transi­tional Government.

As the Bush administration left office, theimpasse over control of Zaire's central bankwas still not resolved. President Mobutu stillclung to the central levers of power, economicand military.

Inconclusive Pressure onLife President Banda

Pro-democracy pressures on Malawi's HastingBanda, who has dominated the country sinceindependence in 1%4, have been late in com­ing. Until recently, the country attracted virtuallyno international attention. Its pro-Westerndiplomatie and economic policies insured itvirtual immunity from official crlticism, andgained it praise from international economicagencies. In October 1990 Mrica Watch issuedan extensive report documenting numeroushuman rights abuses, including rigid censorship,

Washington Notes on Afrlca 9

process if the government does not respond.As in Zaire, the old order in Malawi is now

discredited. But Banda and bis key lieutenantsstill hold the levers of military and economicpower. If there is to be a peaceful transition,international pressure must be sustained andconsistent. So far that does not appear to bethe case.

Gracefu1 Exits Require ActiveDiplomacy and Real Pressure

After decades in which support for dictatorialregimes like those in Zaire and Malawi wasrationalized by their support for Westernstrategic and economic interests, the Bushyears saw the disappearance of these justifica­tions. Reluctantly responding to the changedworld context and to rising criticism, adminis­tration officiaIs came to accept the necessityfor change.

1 and Its lm actin Southem Alrica

Since the formation of the u.s. Agency forInternational Development (USAID) in1961, foreign assistance policies have

been shaped by U.S. national interests. Themost significant rationale for foreign aidprograms in this regard has been the contain­ment of Soviet expansion and influence; andpriorities in Africa reflected these strategicconcerns. Between 1962 and 1992 the sixleading recipients of U.S. aid to sub-SaharanAfrica were Sudan, Zaire, Kenya, Ethiopia,Somalia and Liberia.

In the, 1980s, largely as the result of congres­sional initiatives, U.S. aid was increased to theSouthern African Development CoordinationConference (renamed in 1992 as the SouthernAfrican Development Community - SADC).Legislation creating the Development Fund forAfrica set developmental rather than geo­strategic objectives for aid.

Attention to southern Africa grew in the late1970s and 1980s, along with the conflict in theregion. Total U.S. assistance to sub-SaharanAftica reached its highest levels in fiscal years1991 and 1992 at $800 million. Of that total,

10 Washington Notes on AfrIca

The administration argued, however, thatpeaceful transition can best be fostered by aconciliatory stance to the defenders of the oldregime, that criticism should be low-key andthat assurances should be given to assuage thefears of the rulers on the way out. The evidenceaccumulated in the case of Zaire, and beginningto add up in Malawi as weIl, is that tbis argu­ment is fatally flawed. The result of equivoca­tion is to encourage stalling.

Opposition leaders may, as administrationoffidaIs argued, sometimes exaggerate thecapadty of the United States and other Westerncountries to bring instant change. But a postureof active diplomacy and pressure would provideevidence that U.S. support for democratizationapplies to former clients as weIl as to formeropponents. The odds of success, moreover, arefar greater than if policy remains stuck betweenhalf-hearted support for democracy and mis­

guided loyalty to former Cold War clients.

$430 million went to the southern Africa region.The U.S. also became deeply involved in reliefefforts, particularly in war-ravaged Mozambiquewhich by 1990 was the leading recipient of U.S.government funds in sub-Saharan Africa.

After the failure of most foreign-advised andlocal development approaches in the 1970s, thestress during the 1980s was on InternationalMonetary Fund stabilization programs, WorldBank structural adjustment guidelines, andsectoral adjustment plans. Both the Reagan andBush administrations joined in this focus onexport-Ied economic growth, development ofthe private sector, and austerity for publicsector programs.

As elsewhere in Africa, southern Africansrecognize that there must be adjustments ineconomic policies. Over-relïance on stateownership and central planning, unrealisticexchange rates and food subsidies that buildgrowing budget deficits--to name only a fewtargets of outside critics-must go. But impos­ing indiscriminate cuts, privatization andausterity measures while focusing on exportpromotion is not a recipe for success even in

•1 5 uthern frica... Perverse C nse uences

~ Zimb b 8In response to the drought of 1992, V.S. relief effortswere mobilized effectively. But the region's owncapacity to respond had been undermined by earlierlack of support for SAOC's regional food securityplans. Zimbabwe, a country with food surpluses, wasdesignated by SADC to maintain reserve stocks andplan responses to emergencies. But storing the surpluswas expensive, requiring government subsidies. AIDalong with other foreign donors advised selling off thegrain on the world market. The V.S. declined morethan token support for Zimbabawe's triangular tradeproposaI, which would supply maize (corn) toMozambique in exchange for American wheat forZimbabwe. Instead the V.S. pushed increased suppliesof V.S. yellow maize to Mozambique, which assisted inreducing V.S. surpluses.

The D.S. also urged Zimbabwe to cut prices formaize to reduce the surplus, and increase prices fortobacco, an export crop. Following this short-termmarket logic, Zimbabwe's economic planners suc­ceeded in reducing farrn production of maize. Whenthe drought came, Zimbabwe was unable to help itsneighbors and had to pay higher prices for importedgrain on the world market. (For more discussion ofD.S. policy and the drought see Washington Notes onAfrica for Summer 1992, as wel1 as the paper by CarolThompson cited on page 12).

~ MozambiqueIn Mozambique, the D.S. has become one of theleading donors since 1984. Relief aid supplied by theU.S. has been critical in the survival of Mozambiqueagainst RENAMO attacks. Yet the structural conse­quences of dependence on outside funding haveradically reduced the country's options for indepen­dent decision-making. The V.S. in particular has oftenused its leverage to underrnine the capacity of thegovernment and itÎlpose D.S. policy views givingpriority to the free market often at the expense ofpublic welfare and long-term self-reliance.

A recent Swedish study of aid relief inMozambique, for example, charged the D.S. agencyCARE, which has advised the Mozambican nationalrelief agency, DPCCN, since 1984, with taking overrather than supporting the institutional development

of Mozambican institutions. The study quotes aUSAID official as saying "it has never been the VSA'spolitical and aid-related intention to go in andstrengthen Mozambican public administration byhelping to establish a national, state organization tocounteract emergencies. Quite the opposite; the fastersuch attempts erode, the easier it will be for privateinterests and non-govemmental organizations toassume responsibility."

By providing food aid to be sold in local markets,with receipts deposited in a special account that canonly be spent with D.S. approval, the D.S. has come tocontrol "counterpart funds" ahnost equal toMozambique's total tax revenue. The funds in turn giveleverage over the government agencies they support,such as the Ministries of Agriculture and Health. TheV.S. has stressed support for private commericalfarmers at the expense of cooperatives and peasants.And instead of building on Mozambique's positiveexperiences with primary health care, legalization ofprivate medicine was one of the objectives of D.S.policy in this area.

While many of the specific programs provided bythe V.S. and other donors may be necessary anduseful, the stress on privatization and cutbacks havedrained the public sector of many of its smal1 numberof skilled Mozambican workers. Payments for sorne3,000 foreign experts cost sorne $180 million in 1991,three times the total wages for the entire Mozambicancivil service of 100,000, including teachers and commu­nity health workers.

~ TanzaniaIn Tanzania, over six years of an IMF-imposed struc­tural adjustment program reveal sorne ironic contrasts.Opening up import regulations has allowed import ofluxury goods, including expensive foods and cars, butthe capital does not have potable water. Nor can onedrive the streets at more than a snail's pace because ofthe potholes. With budget cutbacks, there is littlemoney for road repaire Tanzania's exemplary primaryhealth and education systems have been crippled bycuts. The costs of inadequate infrastructure andreduced investment in human resources hamperprivate enterprise as weIl as public welfare.

Washington Notes on Afrlca 11

purely economic terms. As even sorne WorldBank studies have concluded, cuts in invest­ment in government capacity and humanresources may cripple the prospects for eco­nomic recovery.

Aid and the Southern African Region·

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the independentstates of southern Africa now grouped in SADCfocused on cooperation for development thatwould strengthen regional integration andenhance independence from South Africandominance. V.S. aid to SADC projects hastotalled roughly $50 million a year in retentyears. V.S. involvement in famine relief playeda central role in Mozambique from 1984 on,and elsewhere as weIl, particularly during theunprecedented drought of 1992.

But the lives saved and constructive projectssupported were also accompanied by a numberof perverse consequences, particularly inimposing a V.S. agenda that at times under­mined African independence and prospects forlong-tenn development.

Budget cuts and the free-market alonecannot create econoinic advance in Africancountries any more than they can in the VnitedStates. In V.S. domestic policy there is anincreasing recognition of the need for strategicpublic investment in infrastructure, environmen­tal protection and human resources. But V.S.policy towards African countries does not yetreflect such priorities.

Particularly critical in southern Africa is therestructuring of the economic relationshipbetween South Africa and the region as SouthAfrica moves to a democratic constitution.South Africa accounts for over three-quartersof the region's gross domestic product. DespiteSADC's efforts, Pretoria's traditional regionaldominance was accentuated in recent years bythe destructive military campaign it pursuedagainst its neighbors. Regional transportroutes, a major focus of SADC programs, were

• Many of the arguments and illustrations in thissection are taken from papers by Carol Thompson,currendy a senior re~earch associate at the Universityof Zimbabwe. See particularly Beware the Hand thatFeeds You: U.S. Aid in Southern Africa (Africa Fund,198 Broadway, New York, NY 1(038) and SouthernAfrica after Apartheid (Africa Recovery, Room $­

3362, United Nations, New York, NY 1(017).

12 Washington Notes on AfrIca

prime targets.Regional integration on purely market terms

would benefit primarily the strongest eco­nomic forces in the region-the South Mricanbusiness community. Both SADC and the ANChave declared their support for negotiatedregional cooperation which would take intoaccount and try to compensate for the grosseconomic disparities within the region. But theV.S. has not been sympathetic to this ap­proach, and has put pressure on SADC tostress more market-oriented approaches toregional economic integration.

With the rationale of supporting SADC as acounterweight to apartheid South Africa becom­ing obsolete, questions are being raised withinAID about continued support. Recently TedMorse, the head of the VSAID regional office,questioned whether SADC members were readyfor "the good governance, transparency,accountability, and mIe of law that has to bepresent for economic integration to take place"within the region.

As with countries elsewhere in Africa, mostopinion leaders in SADC member states do notdisagree with general principles of goodgovernance. But they question whether VSAID'sprescriptions of reliance on the market and itsown internaI difficulties in accountability andmanagement qualify it for decisive influence onthe region's economic integration and develop­ment plans~ If deve10pment efforts are toenhance both growth and equity, then thesuccesses and failures of outside aid as weIl aslocal governments must be transparent andaccountable to the emerging civil societies ofsouthern African countries.

USAID in South Africa

AID programs in South Africa, as many of theprivate V.S. ventures of assistance to SouthAfrica, began as attempts to provide alternativesto the sanctions demands by anti-apartheidforces. They were stepped up under PresidentReagan's constructive engagement policy,despite criticism that they might be used tomask the deep structural problems of apartheidand postpone pressure on the minority regime.When Congress passed the ComprehensiveAnti-Apartheid Act in 1986, limited sanctionswere joined with substantial aid provisions forvictims of apartheid.

The US. has noready-madeformulas or

solutions whichcan he applied

to South Africa'seven moredauntingheritage of

racial inequality

The precise shape of U.S. assistance pro­grams has been shaped by this uneasy compro­mise heritage. Their contribution to endingapartheid and to alleviating its heritage ofinequality is still sharply debated within SouthMrican and international anti-apartheid circles.

Development assistance to South Mrica wasminimal until fiscal year 1982 when Congressappropriated $4 million for higher educationscholarships for legally disadvantaged SouthAfricans. Congress stipulated that funds toSouth Africa should bê channeled throughNGOs to facilitate the end of apartheid and thedevelopment of a non-racial democracy. USAIDprograms in South Africa targeted the areas ofeducation, human rights, labor, private enter­prise and community development.

Prior to 1990, the small scale of the program,as weIl as congressional insistence on sanctions,limited the possible impact of aid in delayingthe transition. In FY90 Congress appropriated$38.1 million in aid to South Africa, and in FY91that aid was increased to $40 million. Tenmillion dollars was aIso set aside in economicsupport funds for the "promotion of ~emoc­racy", but quickly became involved in a contro­versy which delayed its expenditure. The CAAAprohibited U.S. government financial supportfrom going to "organizations or groups whichare financed or controlled by the Governmentof South Africa." But despite revelations aboutSouth African goveflllllent funding of Inkatha,the eventual allocation of the Transition toDemocracy funds included $2.6 million forInkatha as weIl as $4.8 million for the ANC. InFY92, after lifting the sanctions in the Compre­hensive Anti-Apartheid Act, President Bushdoubled aid to $80 million.

The issues raised by U.S. aid include its useas a diversion from the need for a politicaltransition to a democratic system, and theimpact of particular programs on the legacy ofinequality left by the apartheid order.

Of funds allocated to particular sectors, two­thirds of all aid to South Africa has gonetowards relatively uncontroversial educationobjectives. In addition to the initial scholarshipprogram, USAID also managed a program toprepare black South African students with theirmatriculation exams. The goal of tbis programwas to help students pass their secondaryschool exams and become eligible for admis­sion to U.S. universities. Other AID programs

have supported students at South Africanuniversities and community colleges. Whilesuch funds contributed to the advancement ofindividual black South Africans, they set noprecedent for dealing with the structural issuesof racial inequality in education.

Sînce 1979, USAID has provided smallamounts of fmancial support to protect humanrights in South Africa. Funds totalling sorne $1.5million a year since 1986 have been channeledthrough NGOs to finance legal services, supportlegal education, support research on the impact .of apartheid and human rightsabuses and to contribute to organi­zations working to challenge apart­heid laws.

USAID's "Labor Union TrainingProgram" has trained union mem­bers in organizing, recruiting, en­gaging in collective bargaining andaddressing occupational healthand safety issues. Administered bythe AFL-CIO's African AmericanLabor Center (AALC), this programwas strongly criticized in its earlyyears for bias towards rivais of theANC-linked Congress of South Af­rican Trade Unions (COSATU). Al­though it later expanded its tieswith COSATU, AALC's objectivesin 1990 still included encouraging"black unions to remain politicallyindependent and sensitive to thebenefits of a market-orientedeconomy." Such language raises fears ofcontinued U.S. efforts to sideline radical viewswithin the labor movement.

Aid for community and institutional devel­opment has focused on agriculture, educationand marketing cooperatives. Leadershiptraining and organizational management skillsare provided to members of numerous localand regional community-based organizations.Although "community consultation and ac­countability" is officially one of the criteriaused in assessing funding proposais in SouthAfrica, critics charge that in fact USAID hasrelied on a small cadre of black leadership,rather than consulting with a broad range ofparticipants. The emphasis on the programs, intum, has emphasized formation of an eliterather than the promotion of participatory andaccountable democratic organizations.

Washington Notes on Afrlca 13

Evaluating the critics' claims in detail wouldrequire an in-depth analysis of specifie propos­aIs accepted and requested, but there can be nodoubt that USAID's vision of desired changes insociety differs significantly from that of thegrassroots anti-apartheid organizations con­cemed with redistribution of resources andparticipatory democratic structures.

In congressional guidelines, such objectivesas promotion of development that is "equitable,participatory, sustainable and self-reliant,"benefiting the "poor majority," stand side-by­side with mandates to promote private-sectordevelopment and reduce the role of centralgovernments. In practice, these diverse objec­tives may compete or contradict each other, andwill inevitably be the subject of political dis­agreements. That is why many grass-roots SouthAfrican activists fear that V.S. governmentpriorities for influencing the political andeconomic contours of a future South Mricansociety may have damaging effects, particularlyas the sums involved expand.

This is reflected in the current emphasis on

Lessons and Questionsfor Fut r U.5. licy

In the new post-Cold-War era, there are asyet few reliable guidelines to orient policypriorities. In the final months of the Bush

administration, as direct U.S. intelVention underUN auspices got under way in Somalia, aninteragency task force drew up National Secu­ritYReview 30 to guide U.S. policy towardsAfrica in the 1990s.

The review, as outlined in a confidentialsummary published by AIr/ca News (December21, 1992), called for an activist policy promoting"peaceful change and the resolution of conflict,democracy and improved govemance, sustain­able development, and resolution oftransnational issues." An activist policy, thepaper argued, "presents no risks to our nationalsecurity and can save resources by COnfrontingproblems before they become costly to amelio­rate and intractable to resolve." The directive,noted AIr/ca News, may shape the initial Mricapolicy of the Clinton team.

The issues raised by the review, and by the

14 Washington Notes on Afrfca

training of black entrepreneurs in South Africa.Beginning with a small program to promotebasic business skills in FY83, this program wasexpanded to support the black-owned AfricanBank of South Africa, provide credit to small­scale enterprises, support corporate affirmativeaction programs and train black accountantsand financial managers.

The issue is not whether support should heprovided for such activities, but how muchemphasis they should receive as contrastedwith more broadly-based community programs.Emphasis on affirmative action for a market­oriented elite can only benefit a small minorityof South Africa's black population. The V.S.,which has not resolved this issue for its owninner-city and rural poor, should recognize thatit has no ready-made formulas or solutionswhich can be applied to South Mrica's evenmore daunting heritage of racial inequality. Tomake a positive contribution, it is not onlydesirable but necessary to build· in effectivestructures for consultation with a wide range ofgrass-roots actors in South Africa.

new global and African context, require signifi­cant debate before one can judge what theymay mean in practice for the continent, or forsouthem Africa in particular. But one can listbriefly.a few negative lessons and questionsfrom the Bush era that merit reflection assouthem Africa enters 1993. It will he a criticalyear for the region, with decisive negotiationsover a transition to democracy in South Mrica,the prospect of finally seeing Mobutu andBanda exit their life presidencies, sustaining orrestoring peace in Mozambique and Angola,and shaping a new regional political economy.

.On Conflict Resolution

During the Bush years, conflict resolution inSouth Africa, Angola and Mozambique washindered by U.S. partiality towards two· of theprincipal sources of violence: the SouthAfrican regime and VNITA. Skillful V.S.diplomacy was at times deployed to promote

peace agreements. But in the guise of even­handed condemnation of violence on all sides,Washington refused to identify or to supportpenalties for those parties involved in the mostserious violations. As a result, internationalreaction failed to serve as a deterrent tocontinued violations.

Questions:

(1) How can standards and means ofpressure be identified for D.S. andinternational involvement to deter theprincipal perpetrators in a conflict,without adopting a new partisanship orsubstituting rhetoric for diplomacy?

(2) What criteria should he adopted fordeciding where the D.S. should take anactive direct role in conflict resolution,and where the D.S. should provideconstructive support to efforts byAfrican or other international efforts?

On Democratization and Human Rights

During the Bush years, support for democrati­zation in Africa and around the world wonnominal support from virtually all parts of thepolitical spectrum around the world. In prac­tice, however, resistance to democratization andfailures to protect human rights were oftenregarded with tolerance when the culprits wereU.S. clients or friends.

Questions:

(1) How can the D.S. and the internationalcommunity best promote formaIeiectorai democracy, without imposingimpossibly rigid conditionalities deter-

mined by outsiders or biasing theelectoral arena themselves by playingfavorites?

(2) How can the D.S. and the internationalcommunity support African grassrootsdemands for participatory institutionsand rights for civil society, rather thanconcentrate support on political andeconomic elites?

On Economie Governance, Equity andSustainable Development

During the Bush years, as earlier, the D.S. usedits bilateral influence and leverage withininternational agencies to promote rigid free­market doctrines. It combined support forlegitimate and necessary economic reforms withadvocacy of policies which undermined thewelfare of vulnerable groups, eroded thecapacity of African governments to control theirown economies and diminished the prospectsfor sustainable development.

Questions:

(1) How can D.S. policy he more sensitiveto African concerns that free-marketefficiency be balanced with the de­mands of equity and sustainabledevelopment?

(2) How can legitimate demands for moreeffective and transparent governance inAfrican countries he combined withparallel demands that the decisions ofinternational and bilateral aid agencieshe transparent and democraticallyaccountable?

T he Washington Office on Africa Educational'Fund (WOAEF) has been planning a wider role,

particularly concentrating on identifying key policyissues, bringing in grassroots per­spectives, and making informationand analysis accessible to a broadrange of V.S. constituencies. Newlyrenamed the Afrtca Poltcy Infor­matton Center(APIC), we are cur­rently planning for expanded infor­mation activities beginning some­time in the second half of 1993.

A pilot publication, Afrtca'sProblems ... Afrtcan Intttattves,containing concfensed versions ofthe African Alternative Frameworkto Structural Adjustment Programs,the African Charter for Popular Par­ticipation, and The Kampala Document, came off thepress in mid-September.

The Washington Office on Africa110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Suite 112Washington, DC 20002(202) 546-7961

(!) 21

Late in the process, we discovered that AfricanPolicy Information Center was also the name of aprogram of the African-American Institute (AAI) in

New York. Both organizations areanxious to avoid confusion betweenthe twQ, which despite the identicalname, have different functions, loca­tions and affiliations.

The African-American Institute'sAfrica Policy Information Center(APIC), which is administered by AI­rtca Report magazine, is a unique re­source consisting of a daily updatedlibrary of clipppings from over 200African, American and Europeansources, dating back to 1974. It is 10­cated at AAI's office in New York,and is an invaluable resource for re­

searchers and historians on the latest developments.It is open to the public by appointment.

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