London GlobalistThe Self and the Other: Identity in Crisis

The

LSESU’s student-run international affairs magazinewww.thelondonglobalist.org

Issue 03 -- Spring 2013

Shani Orgad on

Media and Id

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Identity & Natio

nalism:

The case of Catalonia

Nepalese Education

and Identity

Dear readers,

We are happy to present to you the third edition of the London Globalist magazine. The London Globalist is published by the LSESU Global 21 annually and is one of the many chapters of the Global 21 Network, with magazines being produced by students around the world. The London Globalist chapter was set up by enthusiastic LSE students in 2009 and I am pleased to have been elected President, leading this year’s amazing committee. After a break from the print edition last year we are pleased to bring to you this year’s edition The Self and the Other: Identity in Crisis. We would also like to thank The Round Table at Routledge for becoming the official sponsor of the London Globalist magazine and making it possible to print this edition.

We want to thank all the writers who contributed an article for this year’s edition, without their amazing work we would not have such a fantastic magazine to present to our readers. Previously only LSE students had been invited to contribute to our magazine but this year this invitation was extended to other London universities in an attempt to represent students throughout London. This was met with great interest from King’s College and UCL students and we thank them for joining our writing staff.

I personally would like to thank my amazing committee which made many things possible this year that were not done in previous years. I want to express a special thank you to our Design Editor, Lina Salih, who was responsible for putting together this year’s issue and using all her creativity on the design. I also think it key to mention that although he is not featured in our committee photo, Alex Gabriel, our Treasurer also played a great part in the amazing work that this committee achieved.

With the launch of our third edition of the London Globalist, we are also proud to be introducing our new website to you. The London Globalist blog has achieved great success under the leadership and ideas of Maria Beatriz Coelho, our Online Editor. We encourage you to keep checking www.thelondonglobalist.org for new content by our writers and also for reviews of LSE and Intelligence Squared events who have kindly given our writers free passes to their wonderful events. Thank you to our online writers for deliver-ing great comment pieces for our viewers to read regularly and to the LSE Annual Fund for sponsoring our website.

On behalf of my committee, thank you for visiting our website and taking the time to read the third edition of the London Globalist. The committee and I really believe this magazine is a great way for students to discuss topics they are passionate about and we are grateful that you took an interest in what they had to say.

Kristina StoyanovaPresident, The London Globalist

Message from the President

ContentsEditorialInterviewEuropeBritish Identity: The 2011 Riots and the OlympicsScottish IndependenceCataloniaEurope: Caught in an Identity CrisisEurope: PoliticiansEurope: Christian Identity and Turkey

Middle East & AfricaEgypt and Tunisia: Re-emergence of Religious IdentityKenyaRwandaExchange article: South Africa

AsiaNepalHong KongExchange article: Filipino-Chinese Identity

The AmericasEl Salvador’s GangsLatin America and the Legacy of ColourInuit Communities in Canada

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COPYRIGHT © 2013THE LONDON GLOBALIST

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Editorial

Dear Globalist readers,Welcome to the 2013 issue of The London Globalist, a magazine devoted to international affairs. Compiled by students at the London School of Economics, with contributions from students at London’s best universities, this issue is built around the theme of identity.

Hardly anywhere is the blend of multiple identities more evident than in London and particularly, in its international student body. This issue of The London Globalist reflects the multicultural nature of our writers. Starting off from various backgrounds, they set out to analyse challenges relating to identity that shape debates and socio-political processes throughout the world.

Our aim is to address not only questions that are the current focus of international media attention, but also to highlight the less frequently discussed topics. While concerns about the state of European identity have increasingly dominated the news in this part of the world, other regions are debating seemingly incomparable issues, which often remain hidden to outside observers.

This magazine features articles on topics as diverse as Canadian Inuit communities and Nepalese edu-cation, while not losing sight of developments in the Middle East and Africa. Closer to home, individual struggles for independence, as in Scotland and Catalonia, are also being fought.

There are various ways of approaching identity as historical and social constructs, and our authors grasp the nuances of these complex concepts, looking at identity from different angles.

This is demonstrated by the wide range of pieces tackling issues with economic and ethnic determinants, such as the identity of El Salvadorian gang members, the legacy of the slave trade across Latin America or the definition of a distinct Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis mainland China.

We are proud to include two exchange articles from our Global21 partner publications in South Africa and the Philippines, whose writers bring you insider insight on the myth of the “rainbow nation” as well as on the Filipino-Chinese identity.

The London Globalist is a result of a journey started in 2000 at Yale University. Wishing to deliver high-quality student journalism to inspire and provoke debate among their peers, The Yale Globalist soon developed into more than just an independent magazine and today consists of 15 chapters worldwide. We are proud to include LSE within the Global21 and hope to enable our dynamic and engaged student body to contribute to global discussion.

Enjoy,

Ariane Defreine & Laura HartmannEditors, The London Globalist

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Interview

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Media and Identity: From the personal to the collective

By Katy Young and Naomi Robertson

Identifying the selfTo start with, we asked Shani exactly how she thinks media representations shape personal identities, and in particular how she felt the media had shaped her own identity.

“We often don’t want to admit that the media have anything to do with our own identities but the media’s influence is inescapable”. She described the media’s influence, through the kinds of images and narratives we encounter on a daily basis, as providing us with the resources which we use to make judgements. For exam-ple, media representations of migrants or terrorists shape how we imagine ourselves and how we perceive ‘others’, particularly since we tend to identify ourselves in relation to others. The media do not tell us what to think but are a vital source of information and so can criminalise certain identities, projecting them as negative, though they also can potentially offer a more inclusive script.

When pressed about her own experiences, having grown up in Israel before moving to the UK to do her masters, Shani replied “My experience of being a migrant has been central in thinking and reflecting about these issues. What is my identity? Who am I in this world? But also what resources are available to help me reflect about my identity?” In particular for the identity of migrants there

are the added dimensions of “consuming media in a coun-try that you’re not from, in a language that is not your mother tongue, these are resources that are inevitable, and are so central in shaping thinking” and “starting to think about how you think about and observe the world, and also how you observe yourself”.

Shani stressed how these issues and our conceptions of ‘others’ are particularly relevant in the Israel-Palestine conflict, “These questions for me have a very political con-text and background.” She believes the media have the potential to offer and indeed foster more inclusive ways of thinking, being able to accept an identity that has beenlabelled in a negative way for years, “the media have the potential for inclusivity, to enable us to see the world in more ambivalent ways, not just ‘us and them’”. The

Shani Orgad is a Senior Lecturer at the London School of Economics in the Department of Media and Communications. She has looked at how the media can play a role in shaping narratives about the world we

live in, narratives about others and who we are as individuals. These questions are explored in her book ‘Media Representation and the Global Imagination’ (2012, Polity). She has also been co-directing a research project

entitled ‘Mediated Humanitarian Knowledge; Audiences’ Reactions and Moral Actions’ exploring public understanding and reactions to humanitarian communications.

Shani’s work centres around ideas about “how the media, and the mediated spaces we live in, form and shape our self-narratives, the ways in which we tell stories about our lives, which are inextricable with our identities, and how these form, shape and influence our self-narratives as well as public life” and within this topic the “in-tersections between personal identity and collective identity”. She asserts that the main question in assessing the

media’s power and role in shaping our personal and collective narratives has to do with “finding our place or placing ourselves in the modern world”. We discussed these issues with her, broadly focusing on the connection

between the media and personal and collective identities.

Talking toShani Orgad on

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Indeed the media can offer ways to “estrange ourselves from ourselves…this moment of becoming an observer of ourselves, reflecting on our own identities and how they are constructed”.

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international media also have a meaningful role in shap-ing, and disturbing, people’s national identity. Israelis could be watching CNN or reading BBC World online and seeing “visions that are potentially very uncomfort-able because they don’t fit with the way their national media tell their story, particularly in times of conflict”. Indeed the media can offer ways to “estrange ourselves from ourselves…this moment of becoming an observer of ourselves, reflecting on our own identities and how they are constructed”

New mediaWe asked Shani what she felt the impact of the inter-net and social networking had been. She was quick to point out that she was neither in one camp or the other, neither celebrating social media nor lamenting over it. In her recent book ‘Media Representation and the Global Imagination’ she discusses the ways in which minority groups, referring to them as ‘former others’, gain a meaningful voice and achieve recognition through these platforms. In the book she gives the example of minority groups in the French riots of 2005 where they gained a voice in the national sphere with one commenting, “the microphones have been pointed towards us”.

Communicating humanitarian issuesFollowing this we discussed the media’s role in human-itarian crises and how this has led to new notions of identity as international citizens. In an on-going joint project, Shani has been investigating humanitarian issues and the media, particularly the gap between our knowl-edge of what’s happening and us taking action on which she commented that “here the media’s main role is to expose”. She remarked that we need to look at what kind of narratives are offered, the kinds of imagery that

show people in undignified, sometimes humiliating ways, we need to question how disasters and humanitarian issues are presented and represented. There is no excuse now that we don’t have access to information but there are still atrocities being consistently under-reported, those that aren’t visually ‘attractive’ or that don’t feature Westerners. The media have a “responsibility to make visible the on-going conflicts that are much more difficult to report, that are potentially more boring, that are very complex and hard to tell about in stories”, as well as to consider how such stories are framed.

From the individual to the collectiveWe then moved on to debate the relationship between individual and collective identities and how they feed into one another. “The media provide us with the lan-guage and a set of symbols through which we make the connection; otherwise we would all be in our own individual bubbles”. The power of collective identity is articulated largely through the symbolic, and so rituals play a key role in helping us form a sense of belonging to collective groups, for example national or religious groupings, “When I teach masters at the LSE, often to a very multicultural group of students, I ask them to bring an advertisement that seemingly has nothing to do with national identity. The students find it hard to reflect on what this has to do with national identity, say toiletries, but it is the other students who are not from that country who can so clearly and intuitively pick up on specific na-tional elements. That’s what I mean by symbolic power. These are the very mundane ways in which we reassert our alliances to the nation.”

Relating this study back to international relations, we asked Shani about her thoughts on how we go from feel-ing like a nation to acting as one, such as in foreign pol-icy and practical responses to international crises. She answered that our perception of identity provides the pre-condition for action. “If we see a particular country or particular continent the same way for years and years to then justify sacrificing money from our national budget or to send ‘our boys’ there” our decision does not come “out of the blue” rather it is in a cultural context, the way the media feed stereotypes and how ‘us’ and ‘them’ are defined. Shani also added that “politicians themselves are not above influence, they watch television, their kids go on Facebook, and they’re often now on Facebook or Twitter, they are nourished by the imagination that the media feed. The policy makers themselves make decisions, and those decisions are part of these cultures in which the media play a very big role”. Shani notes that we definitely have agency because we may accept or reject information that is available to us. However, when similar and persistent narratives are being told and retold in so many spheres of our lives, our ability to think independently and critically is in jeopardy. “How are we to think differently? How are we to meaningfully oppose?”

We would like to thank Shani Orgad for giving up her time for this interview and for giving us

such an insightful take on the connection between notions of identity and the media.

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Shani Orgad’s book where she discusses the media’s role in shaping narratives about the world we live in, narratives about others, and who we are as individuals

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Two British Summers: The 2011 Riots, the 2012 Olympics and British Identity

by Katy YoungThe sudden outbreak of violence and looting in August 2011 shook British society, challenging ideas of solidarity and national coherence. The 2012 London Olympics with their display of British national pride stand in stark contrast to this gloomy episode, demonstrating tensions

within this country’s identity.

On the 8th August 2011, the United Kingdom experi-enced some of the worst rioting in a generation; injuries were in the double-digits, thousands of young people were arrested, and the result was an estimated £200 mil-lion in property damage. In remarkable contrast, almost exactly a year later, on the 4th August 2012, “Super Saturday”, the entire nation was in jubilation. Britain won three Olympic gold medals in one evening. Some com-mented that Britain was unrecognisable, so how then can what appears to be a transformation of national identity be explained?

The 2011 summer riots were characterised by division. The country was divided and adrift. However, this cannot be reduced to a split between the looters and the rest of the country, but was rather more nuanced.

Firstly, the rioters themselves were not unified. Rioting broke out in distant boroughs of the capital and in cities across the country. A London School of Economics study, “Reading the Riots”, identified multiple motivations for rioting, including perceived social injustice, deprivation, opportunism, and poor relations with the police. When asked by a journalist if rioting was the best way to ac-complish their objectives, one rioter replied “if we weren’t rioting, you wouldn’t be talking to us.”

This was not a political demonstration. There were no dis-tinct goals or negotiations with officials. Rather, the riots were an outlet for a socially excluded group to articulate their dissatisfaction. The looters felt detached from the rest of society, left out from the debate, their interests ignored. But it was not only the rioters who were disunited – so was general society.

There were disputes over what the appropriate response

should be, within the Government, the police andamongst individual communities. The police and the Gov-ernment argued over the use of watercannons in the face of stubborn violence towards police officers. Some individuals called for the army to be drafted in to secure peace on the streets. There were examples of the police failing to stop looters and vandal-ism, failing to protect the public. The Coalition’s failure to keep the situation under control sparked anger and resentment among ordinary people. In some cases, local business owners took responsibility for their own security, forming protection units around their shops. The whole country was in distress, the picture of a fragmented soci-ety. People questioned whether this generation could live up to the inherited British values they felt they had a duty to maintain. Britons felt ashamed of their nationality and of the alleged “breakdown of social morality”.

In the run-up to the London Olympics, people were highly sceptical as to Britain’s performance but also regarding national unity in light of the previous year’s riots. The UK has long seen itself as a country of sarcasm and self-deprecating humour, having difficulty expressing intense nationalism. Coverage of celebrations of national identity often tends to descend into newspaper carica-tures of members of the Royal Family and politicians.

This is a far cry from the American model of nationalism where people hang the American flag out of their bed-

The riots were no political demonstration with specific goals. Rather, they were an outlet for a socially excluded group to articulate dissatisfaction.

Hackney Riots, August 2011

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room windows and proudly sing the national anthem. As a collective, Britons have a reluctance to appear arro-gant, perhaps due to of shame of their past as an oppres-sive colonial power – although the experience of slavery does not appear to affect American national pride to this extent. As a result, many British politicians and citizens alike were concerned as to how the country would re-spond to such a prolonged display of nationalism while hosting an international event.

In addition to this, Britain’s participation in international sporting events has been fraught with high expectations and subsequent disappointment – and on occasion realistic expectations and yet still disappointment. For the Olympics, this induced a common attitude of pessimism in an attempt to avoid humiliation on home soil. These low expectations resulted in people being overwhelmed by British athletes’ success, and this astonishment added to the national elation.

British people love an underdog, and this time they were the underdog, rising to third place in the medal table and winning 18 more medals than in Beijing, 10 of those be-ing gold. The success had people chatting in the pub, on the bus, at the supermarket checkout, even in the decid-edly unfriendly capital. There was a great sense of nation-al pride and coming together of a people to celebrate its achievements, not just those in sports but Britain’s contri-bution to music, film and technology as highlighted in the opening and closing ceremonies, along with its industrial history and triumphs such as the National Health Service.

Yet, what is most remarkable in the contrast between these two British summers is that, in the period from August 2011 to August 2012, little changed structurally. According to BBC News, UK GDP growth in the second quarter of 2011 was 0.1%, whereas in the same period in 2012 it was a discouraging -0.4%. In fact, at the begin-ning of 2012, the economy was defined as officially in a double-dip recession. So during the London Olympics, Britons had little to be optimistic about. Job losses and government spending cuts were hitting households so people were arguably worse off. Therefore, it is obvious that national identity at any point in time is influenced by something more than the bare facts of economic performance, and perhaps even some-thing beyond our personal circumstances.

National mood is unpredictable. In the cases of the London riots and the Olympics, one short event managed to unsettle British identity. The common thread between these two events is that they showed the extremes of British life. The Olympics gave a platform to showcase the inspiring stories of British athletes, such as Mo Farah,

whose talent and hard work were rewarded with success.In marked contrast, the riots shone a spotlight on some of the most deprived in society and their struggle to break free from the traps of poverty and youth unemployment. The events had great power to unite and to divide, high-lighting both what people aspire to achieve and what they are thankful to have avoided or even fear failing to avoid. It is these moments that force a population to re-evaluate its national identity and the real value of the opportunities its society provides.

In both cases, the events triggered national policy de-bates. For the riots, the debate was on how to improve prospects for young people, for example increasing the availability of apprenticeships. The Olympics were focused on creating a legacy, “inspiring a generation”, which has led to campaigns to increase participation in sport. Both the riots and the Olympics brought to the fore elements of our national identity that already existed, at both the extremes of our conceptions of com-munity. Really, there was not such a transformation at all.

Both summers showed the extremes of British life, with the Olympics showcasing inspiring stories of British athletes and the riots shining a spotlight on some of society’s most deprived.

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Katy Young, Events Officer of the LSE SU Global21 Society, is in her second year of studying Economics at LSE.

Scottish Independence: Nationalism Over Pragmatism

by Chris Glancy

The Scottish referendum on independence, scheduled for 2014, could mean the break-up of a cen-turies-old union. While advocates of Scottish independence cite potential gains, this author argues that on both economic and political levels, independence could prove disastrous for Scotland.

Though overshadowed in recent months by the cacopho-ny of wails surrounding austerity and the Eurozone crisis, the Scottish Government’s plans for independence have quietly become one of Europe’s most pressing political issues.

In the midst of vicious protestations from Westminster and despite tepid public support in Scotland, Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond and his Scottish National Party (SNP) have managed to secure an Autumn 2014 referen-dum on the issue of Scottish independence.

Despite Salmond’s pronouncements that independence is vital for Scotland’s continued economic and political growth, the true implications of breaking up a Union that has persisted since 1707 could be far-reaching and cat-astrophic for Scotland, Britain and the European Union. Concerns over Scotland’s independence are prevalent. However, there is little evidence to suggest that such a scenario would be realistic in the near future, or that the 2014 referendum would be successful, as more Scots are opposed to independence than supporting it.

According to British polling organisation YouGov’s May 2011 report, 58% of Scottish adults are opposed to independence. Furthermore, only 28% of those polled believed that Scotland would be better off financially as an independent state. One may wonder whether Sal-mond has embarked on a fool’s errand.

With both his political future and that of his party pinned to the outcome of a referendum that is anything but an assured victory, Salmond will certainly be feeling the pressure from Westminster, as well as Europe’s less than enthusiastic response to his proposals. In December 2012, the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, showed his colours by declaring to the House of Lords that “if one part of a country wants to become an independent state, of course as an independent state it has to apply to the European membership according to the rules – that is obvious.”

The SNP has repeatedly claimed that an independent

Scotland would not need to reapply to the EU and wouldnegotiate its status in the EU “from within”. Whether the SNP claimed this out of naïveté or purposefully, so that Scottish people would be more inclined to support inde-pendence as political turmoil would be reduced, remains unclear.

Barroso’s statement, however, has thrown up doubts about the future and opened up debate on yet another raft of issues related to Scottish independence.

If Scotland were forced to renegotiate the terms of its membership in the EU, the new state may well be com-pelled to adopt the Euro, which could turn out to be an utter disaster for Scotland.

The British Pound Sterling, Scotland’s present currency, is currently the strongest in Europe. While far from robust, Britain’s economy has largely weathered the current economic storm battering the Eurozone, in no small part thanks to the strength and stability of its currency. If Scotland is forced to adopt the Euro, the country will then be susceptible to the economic fluctuations that have plagued the Eurozone over the past years. With the possibility of a Greek exit from the Eurozone and the resultant depreciation in the Euro, joining the Euro is not an appealing prospect for Scotland.

Furthermore, as an independent state within the EU, Scot-

Both Salmond’s political future and that of the SNP are firmly pinned to the outcome of a referendum that is anything but an assured victory.

Uncertainty on the horizon: Scotland’s future will be determined by the 2014 referendum

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land would be relatively small in terms of population and GDP, at 5.2 million people and £149 billion, respectively. It has to be acknowledged that this GDP figure is only the best available estimate based on Scotland’s economic output as a part of the UK, and an independent Scot-land’s GDP could certainly increase. However, Scotland’s current GDP places it in the same bracket as countries such as Ukraine and Poland. In short, an independent Scotland would be a small, politically and economically weak nation trapped within a larger economic union that has shown few signs of stability or growth over the past two years.

A further look at the SNP’s plans for bolstering the economic standing of an independent Scotland offers yet more disheartening information.On the home front, Salmond and the SNP have long claimed that an independent Scotland could tap into its reserves of North Sea gas and oil to fund the state. In particular, Salmond has backed the creation of a Norwe-gian-style oil reserve fund, where around a billion pounds of oil revenue per year would be set aside for public expenses. However, the Glasgow think-tank Centre for Public Policy for the Regions (CPPR) has cast up doubts as to whether this policy is genuinely viable. In December 2012, it stated in a report that oil revenues had “halved within 18 months”.

The CPPR also starkly announced that due to the increas-ing volatility of oil prices, Scotland would lose its current economic position of being better than the rest of the UK within the next three years. On the same note, former Chancellor to the Exchequer and pro-Union advocate Alistair Darling highlighted that “they [the SNP] would be looking to set up this [oil reserve] fund at exactly the same time that the revenues from oil and gas would start to steeply drop”. Over-reliance on such a fund at a time of dwindling gas and oil revenue would thus be highly risky and could lead to a huge budget shortfall, making it much harder for the Scottish Government to sustain itself and provide basic services. Despite the SNP’s unfounded claims, the looming spectres of the Eurozone and de-creased oil revenues cast a huge shadow over the suppos-edly bright economic future of an independent Scotland.

It is confounding, at least in economic terms, why the SNP would seek to pull Scotland down a path that could very easily lead to financial ruin. Salmond’s beliefs on what Scotland’s role within the EU would be have been roundly criticised both within Scotland and without. When ques-tioned about the issue during a Scottish Parliamentary session in September 2012, Salmond stated: “[Scotland] would quite clearly remain part of the European Union and negotiations will take place from within that context”.

He was sharply criticised by Scottish Labour politician Johann Lamont, who called attention to the fact that Salmond’s claims stood in stark contrast to President Barroso’s, and that Scotland would almost certainly be drawn into the Eurozone upon independence being declared. With an independent Scotland’s economic for-tunes in serious doubt, many are understandably baffled as to why the SNP ploughs ahead with these plans. The answer, unfortunately, seems to be that Salmond and his inner circle have chosen to venerate the fickle god of nationalism over common sense.

Modern Scottish nationalism has existed in some form or another since the 1800s, but the movement began to have a serious impact within the Scottish political establishment only in the 1970s. Founded in the 1960s, the SNP won eleven seats in Westminster in the 1974 General Election thanks to a rather fortuitous bit of timing. As the Labour Party, under the leadership of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, had won Parliament by a very small margin, the SNP’s support was needed for a government to be formed. The SNP used their newfound leverage to force a referendum on creating a Scottish Assembly, which was held in 1979. Although a majority voted in favour of creating a devolved Scottish Assembly, the outcome was struck down on the basis that turnout (at 63.8 per cent) was too low. This inflamed tensions between Scottish na-tionalists and Westminster, but did provide an important stepping-stone on the road to devolution proper, which came into effect in 1999.

At the root of the SNP’s bold push for independence in the 1970s was the belief that with the North Sea oil fields under Scottish control, an independent Scotland would flourish within Europe. The McCrone Report, commis-sioned commissioned by the Conservative Government in 1974, concluded that oil revenues could give an in-dependent Scotland a strong currency, and even a tax surplus. Though circumstances have changed dramatically for Scotland’s oil reserves since the 1970s, the SNP still

An independent Scotland would be a small, politically and economically weak nation trapped within an economic union that has shown few signs of stability or growth over the past two years.

Which way to go? Concerns over an independent Scotland range from political to economic and monetary

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clings to this notion as one would a life raft. The prob-lem is, their raft has sprung a leak and they are the only ones unable to see the looming danger.

To a casual observer, the term “Scottish nationalism” conjures up images of a wild-eyed Mel Gibson screaming “freedom!” at the close of the film “Braveheart”. The type of nationalism propagated by Hollywood’s face-painted warriors is all well and good, and is actually important for modern Scottish culture as it provides a window to what some would call a prouder past. Salmond himself is not above using these concepts as leverage to persuade voters that Scotland should be “free”.

Shortly before the Scottish Parliament broke up for the summer in June of 2012, a backbencher asked the First Minister what he would say to Prime Minister David Cam-eron when they finally met after the summer. He replied, rather tellingly, “let my people go!” However, a myriad of examples have proven that there is little place for chest-beating in modern Scottish politics. It accomplishes nothing but inflaming tensions and encouraging parti-

sanship; a lesson that Salmond and the SNP find hard to learn. Economic statistics are stark and polls even grimmer. This plan for Scottish independence is rooted in fallacy, not fact. It will more than likely lead the nation to ruin because Salmond and his ilk cannot understand that a defeat in 2014 would not be so much a blow to nation-alism as a resounding victory for pragmatism, sense and security for future Scottish generations.

The grim reality is that with Salmond’s political future so firmly linked to the success of the referendum, there is simply no chance that he will pull his head out of the sand before it is too late.

Identity & Nationalism: The case of Catalonia

by Sergio Marin-Zapata

Catalan identity has re-emerged increasingly strong since the end of Francoist rule. Today, the question is how far independence should go, while Catalonia is facing its own challenges.

Identity shapes politics more than one would imagine at first sight. Most cases of turmoil and war have had a com-ponent related to identity, be it religious, ethnic, national or otherwise. It could be said that because we live in a modern, post-national and globalised era we are now more aware of our unity than ever before, and thus iden-tity has ceased to be such a key factor. This statement, however, is problematic, as it fails to take other factors into account. Religious extremism is bigger than ever, with nations that have developed into melting pots experienc-ing it within their borders. Ethnicity remains at the core of politics, with racism and the debate for affirmative action having a very significant role in most Western societies nowadays.

This article will focus on a different aspect of identity: nationalism and nation-building. Why have I chosen Cata-lonia? Firstly, it is a modern example, simmering over the years and increasingly appearing to boil over in recent times. Secondly, it is happening in a complicated context, comprised of both an EU framework and an economically debt-ridden country affected by a crisis that is global in scope. Lastly, this is the case I am most familiar with, since I myself hail from Barcelona.

So what exactly is Catalonia? Catalonia is a region in the Northeast of the Iberian Peninsula. Nowadays, it con-

stitutes an autonomous community within Spain, herself a pseudo-federally divided state. In national terms, the so-called Catalan Countries is an unofficial entity made up of all territories where Catalan is spoken: Catalonia, Va-lencia, the Balearic Islands, Andorra and bits of Southern France, Aragón, Murcia and Sardinia in Italy.

Historically, Catalonia has been part of the Frankish Empire, the County of Barcelona, the Crown of Aragon (later united with Castile to form Spain), the Napoleonic French Empire, and eventually the Kingdom of Spain. Catalonia, unlike most of today’s Spain was never under Moorish rule, and is culturally and linguistically closer to France. In recent times Catalonia was a Commonwealth under the Spanish Second Republic (1931-1936) and later became a part of Franco’s centralist and totalitarian regime, during which the Catalan language and culture where outlawed.

After Franco’s death, a process of civic Catalan nation-building through stressing language and culture began.

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Chris Glancy is a UCL Master’s student concentrating in Security Studies.

Be it with our own state or not, Catalans wish to be recognised as a nation, with our own language and traditions.

Since the transition to democracy, Catalonia has won a great deal of autonomy. A recent protest in which hun-dreds of thousands have taken to the streets demanding Catalonia’s secession from Spain has made the Catalan centre-right nationalist government call for a snap elec-tion. This election’s results are complex: on the one hand, the government party lost several seats and fell unques-tionably short of the absolute majority it was aiming for. On the other hand, however, pro-independence parties make up nearly two thirds of Parliament and the ruling coalition is formed by the right-wing Government party and a far-left pro-independence party. Such a coalition would be ungovernable in many places but it is working in Catalonia due to the sharing of a common desire: leaving Spain.

Nation-building: How it all started The fact that many of those who call for independence base their claim on historical roots is hardly a secret. The Crown of Aragon was one of the Mediterranean’s main powers. Even in terms of written language Catalan appeared early: the first record of more than a mere fragment of text being written in Catalan, the Homilies of Organya, dates from the 12th century. At a literature lev-el, the famous work Tirant lo Blanc was written in the late 15th century by Valencian knight Joanot Martorell and is one of the main influences Cervantes had when writing Don Quixote. This all stopped with the Nueva Planta Decrees implemented after the Napoleonic wars, which centralised Spain and made Spanish the sole official and

legal language. Catalonia’s Generalitat (government) ceased to exist.

For over a century, Castilian became fashionable among the Catalan bourgeoisie and Catalan was not only out-lawed but also thought of as a shabby dialect. Catalan was relegated to a low vernacular language of the poor in a diglossia with Castilian, and the culture was largely absorbed into mainstream Spanish society. This era is known as Decadència, meaning decadence of the Cat-alan nation, language and culture. This was not to last, however.

A process began in the early 19th century commonly referred to as the Renaixença, meaning re-birth or renais-sance, followed by Modernisme and Noucentisme, which saw a true and Romantic re-birth of Catalan national identity. The language was revived through literature and press, and it became once again fashionable among the Catalan bourgeoisie. The Jocs Florals, a poetry contest, were restored. Andalusian Pep Ventura created the sar-dana, Catalonia’s current national dance, in the 1850s, unifying several traditional dances of the land. During that time, Catalonia became industrialised, in line with modern Northern European powers, thus leaving the rest of Spain behind in terms of development and infrastruc-ture. This period also saw Barcelona becoming Iberia’s first city served by rail in 1848, and saw it hosting Spain’s first World Exposition in 1888. By the end of the century Catalan orthography became standardised and coded by Catalan scholar Pompeu Fabra. Architecture was linked with Catalan identity as well; with famous architect Antoni Gaudí as the main exponent of Modernist architecture, having designed buildings such as the emblematic Sagra-da Família. Ildefons Cerdà also modernised Barcelona by creating a new urban plan to expand the city, which later became the Eixample.

The Catalan colours are proudly displayed again after decades of repression

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The Commonwealth of Catalonia, established in 1914, ended in 1925 to give way to a relatively centralist dic-tatorship by Primo de Rivera. A few years later, Spanish king Alfonso XIII abdicated and the Spanish Second Re-public was established in 1931. With it, the Catalan Gen-eralitat was restored, but the Spanish Civil War ground this progress to a halt. Francoist Spain’s motto was “one, great and free”: Catalans found their language outlawed and themselves severely persecuted once again.

Nation-fostering: Immigration and TransitionBarcelona’s metropolitan area was already Spain’s indus-trial centre. In the post-war period and up to the 1970s, millions of Spaniards from elsewhere in Spain – especial-ly from the rural southern half – immigrated to Catalonia in search of better opportunities. There is seldom any detailed data on Catalans’ ethnic origins nowadays, but it is safe to say that people who are not fully Catalan in eth-nic terms make up a majority of Catalonia’s population. For instance, while my parents were born in Barcelona, all four of my grandparents migrated from the South.

All these immigrants were already living in Barcelona by the time the baby boom happened in the 1960s, helped by a constant increase in the quality of life and gradual opening up of the country. This led to a huge growth of Castilian speakers in the land.

When Franco finally died in 1975 and democracy ar-rived, the Catalan government was restored. Catalonia found herself in a difficult position, since Castilian speak-ers already made up a big majority of her population. A process of civic nation-building through language and culture began, largely fostered by CiU (Convergence and Union)’s Jordi Pujol, one of Catalonia’s most revered politicians of modern times. The use of the language was to be encouraged through its teaching in schools, aiming at linguistic normalisation. Cultural events such as human castle building (Castellers) and sardana dancing have also been bolstered.

The situation today: Modern challenges to Catalan identity Normalisation has brought about a loose and vague concept of nation, based to a very large extent on lan-guage. Anyone who lives in Catalonia, who speaks and feels Catalan is a Catalan. Arguably this works better for descendants of non-Catalan Spaniards than for children of immigrants from abroad. This immigration, mostly from Latin American, North African, Eastern European and Far Eastern countries, is turning Catalonia into a melting pot once again. Adult immigrants do not always learn Cata-lan and learn Spanish instead, but their children already speak Catalan at school, both with teachers and their peers.

Our society is by no means perfect, though. Surveys are showing an increasingly hardening view on Catalonia’s legal position. In recent months, support for independ-ence has grown to be larger than support for staying in Spain, even if a federal model is established. There are fewer people who feel equally Catalan and Spanish. Independence’s effects may not be truly known until it happens, and after the disparity between exit polls and the actual results of the 2012 Catalan election, it is argu-ably hard to forecast what the result of the 2014’s self-de-termination referendum is going to be. Furthermore, most nationalist parties wish for an independent Catalonia, but a Catalonia within the EU as a member state with full rights.

Nationalism, multiculturalism and Europeanisation may prove hard to mix. What is clear however, is that, be it with our own state or not, Catalans wish to be recognised as a nation, with our own language and traditions. We are a multilingual and multicultural society and proud of it. Moreover, over the years, we have been both richer and poorer than our neighbours, to a point where we no longer know where we stand (or if we are standing at all), in the midst of an economic crisis as well as a social one. Unemployment rates have gone through the roof and welfare is being cut savagely by EU crisis regula-tions, as well as by the Spanish and Catalan governments alike.

Reconciling all of this will not be easy, but I am not scared. Throughout the nation’s history, Catalans have always proved, whatever the times and whatever their origins, how great they are, so there is no reason to fear that we will not, once again, succeed and make it happen.The Catalan colours are proudly displayed again

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From Barcelona, Sergio Marin-Zapata is currently in his second year of studying Politics with International Relations.

The euro-crisis is not just an economic and political one. The deeper problems that the European Union faces deal with European cultural, social and religious identi-ty. Sharing even a degree of sameness or oneness with others instils people with positive self-esteem and a sense of belonging. This is because of mutual identification with characteristics, values and beliefs. Part of this self-esteem exists because of the possibility of dissociation about who is in and who is out of the group.

Therefore, the question of the EU’s identity is intrinsical-ly linked to the identity of the states and their peoples. Consequently, the challenges standing between the EU as it is and a fully-fledged federal, centralised state are not restricted to economic and political integration, as these are highly influenced by culture and the restraints of the perception of history.

Originally, the European Community’s creation was part of a strategy to promote peace between the two major powers in Europe, Germany and France, to prevent them from engaging in yet another war. This was accomplished through economics and free trade, as this was considered a sure-fire way of achieving peace. Thanks to the EU, the mutual benefits that go hand-in-hand with economic integration meant that freedom of circulation turned what used to be rigid frontiers between nations into the largest market in the world.

However, the European project now stands at a cross-roads, as it is still an incomplete piece of work. It is a sui generis entity in International Relations; that is to say that it does not fit into any of the usual frameworks of analy-sis. It is neither an international organisation nor a federal state. Either the EU and its member-states accept the success of the EU as a monetary union and nothing else, or they take the leap from the formalities of the economic relationship intrinsic to being a member of the EU and in-tegrate further, which would consequently also mean the adherence to social norms and not just policy. The real solution could be the path in between.

This is where, in a Hobbesian fashion, states as well as their citizens hit a wall. Economic integration means loss of economic sovereignty, and the further states integrate the more economic sovereignty they transfer, which at

this point is also political sovereignty. The fear of loss of sovereignty is linked to the loss of control over people’s destinies, because self-determination, as a key component of Western nationalism, will be at stake. If there is indeci-siveness and uncertainty about taking the leap to a fiscal union, politicians will be weary about further integration as they risk losing votes at home.

Here, the cracks in the EU’s seemingly bright future start to become clear. The Euro-crisis is uncovering them, and they lie essentially in the differences between mem-ber-states, not in their similarities. People’s idea of what is akin to them and what is not. This is exacerbated by the Euro-crisis and how it is perceived as an underlying moral crisis and not just an economic one.

The North-South divide, paradigmatically portrayed as Germany and the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain), depicts a parallel where these states’ public debt is also a reflection of their moral inferiority and Germany is the condescending preacher attempting to lead them to the righteous path. The EU has brought increased economic competition to Europe and while an increase in market size means prosperity, it seems that some nations are only reaping these liberties’ rewards, but are not fulfilling their responsibilities. They are freeriding, and Germany, as the heart of Europe’s economy, censures the fiscal irresponsibility of those states.

Europe: Caught in an Identity Crisis?

by Madalena Abreu

Europe continues to struggle with the economic and sovereign debt crises. The crisis is not only a material, but also one of identity, with the foundations of the European project shaken by

doubts and recriminations.

Antagonism over identity often shows its true colours in times of crisis.

Quo vadis, Europe? The common identity is in crisis, and not just since the economic crisis.

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The bailing out of some states by others only emphasises already existing tensions, notably in the realm of cultural and religious identity. Firstly, a European identity is a relative one, seeing as a Spaniard feels European in the United States or in the Far East, but if he visits France they will feel Spanish and not European. The rigid nation-state mentality is still so ingrained in the collective conscious-ness of the people that frontiers are not just physical, they are also mental barriers.

On another note, some compare the EU and the mem-ber-states that comprise it to the United States when it was still a confederation. However, this comparison is lacking in depth – and even if the EU were to become a federal state, it would never be called the United States of Europe. Above all, there is no common language, this being a main defining cultural characteristic. On a religious note, before Greece joined, the European Community was predominantly made up of Protestant and Catholic states, but after 1981 there was an Ortho-dox member-state, a distinct religion. Therefore, it seems religion is an identity component that truly separated the member-states, rather than uniting them. This is also seen in the controversy of whether Turkey should be allowed to join. Some arguments clearly refer to the issue of religion, going back to the idea of social identity, in that many indi-viduals and consequently member-states don’t want to be associated with a predominantly Islamic country – even though Turkey is a secular state.

However, this is ironic, as there are millions of Turks with EU passports. Antagonism over religion and identity dissociation often shows its true colours in times of crisis in particular. The Euro-crisis being depicted as a moral one can also be reflected in religion through the North-South divide with the maxim “while Catholics sleep well, Prot-estants eat well”, which suggests Southern laziness and Northern hard work and discipline, obvious causes for resentment and reasons why euroscepticism is on the rise. Rigid national identity, language and religion all show how the differences between member-states in these areas outweigh their similarities.

Should identity play such a crucial role in European integration, however? Obviously, the issue of populism is crucial here. Besides the fact that social and cultural factors influence economic policy, with some countries have a seemingly greater bargaining power due to their economic might, the problem is on a whole other level – the personal feeling of belonging to a certain group of people, territory and culture.

It is important to take into account that for a constitution-

al nation-state to exist, even at a supra-national level, its constitutional power – the defining driving force of what the state is, the values it stands for – has to be largely ap-proved by the people. This is the pinnacle of governance, and in the case of the EU only a small number of states actually had a referendum on whether it was the peoples’ will to join. It is important to note that this is because, as an unfinished project, the EU never had a defined, fin-ished line and therefore deep integration was not always on the plans for Europe.

The truth is that one cannot talk of a European people per se if there is no sense of true belonging and community. It is true that the EU and its economic policies have kept Europe, most of it at least, out of war for more than half a century and that its states do share a certain common history, but it is one of grappling over territory, influence and economic power, both within Europe and abroad. The EU has been an extremely successful project, but it remains an unfinished project with no real definition of how its goals will be achieved and how far integration should go.

In conclusion, it is impossible to form a coherent union from a rigid pre-existing state structure with an estab-lished identity consciousness. There is no such thing as a European people, capable of comprising the consti-tutional power of creating a new state. Perhaps Europe has moved too fast. Schuman, in his 1950 declaration, advocated the incremental approach. Europe is not ready for a fully-fledged fiscal union before it defines what it is in concrete terms, just like the people of Europe are not ready to become true European citizens before they define where they truly belong. The question is: which identity prevails?

The rigid nation-state mentality is still so ingrained in the collective consciousness of the people that frontiers are not just physical, but also mental barriers.

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Originally from Portugal, Madalena Abreu is a General Course student of

Law at LSE.

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Turkey’s predominantly Islamic identity hinders its entry into Europe

”In the largest metropolis of the European Union, London, the local community is so diverse formulating a coherent, informed and complex description of what it means to be a Londoner would be an uphill struggle. Certainly, one can spot some similarities between the individuals, for example the love-hate attitude of the city’s populace towards the Tube. But this is only the circumstantial evi-dence. What matters is the reason why such a variety of individuals, all and sundry, can instinctively come together because of some sense of common identity, experienced both personally and collectively. If one wishes to discover a key to the common European identity, this is the right question to ask – alas, so far, it is lacking the rightanswer.

Healing the woundsAt the time when the EU’s very own ‘founding fathers’ – Jean Monnet, Alcide De Gasperi, Robert Schumann, Konrad Adenauer and others – embarked on a difficult mission to construct an acceptable way forward for the ever-divided continent, they used the common European identity as the ultimate goal and primary objective of their work. The Italian statesman and Prime Minister De De knew too well that, in order to safeguard the fragile process of continental reconciliation, “the advancement of the European mentality must take precedence over strengthening and increasing the power of federal institu-tions although they are moving at the same pace”.Contrary to some of the well-known ideas, the main urge for the European nations to come together could just as

well not be an economic one. Since 1945, among the governments and the nations they represented, a sense of solidarity emerged, primarily motivated by the shared fear of war, connected to the apprehension of the possi-bility of the Cold War turning into another bloody con-flict, which would be the third one in less than 50 years. This was the background for the common identity of all Europeans, even cutting across the Berlin Wall. It made the isolated peoples of Eastern Europe feel that they be-long elsewhere (even today, politicians in these countries recall “the will of return to Europe”) and generated some sympathetic attitudes on the other side of the Iron Curtain. But it also served its underlying purpose quite efficiently – creating a friendly environment and sound foundations for the institutions of a federal Europe in the making.

This year, on May 9th, the celebration of Europe Day, bringing together citizens across the continent, will mark 53 years since Robert Schumann put forward the propos-al for the European Steel and Coal Community, an early precursor of what was later to become the single most diverse political and economic union in the modern world. A union with institutions that by now appear to be well-es-tablished and consolidated.

The European consensus challengedHowever, once the Cold War had ended, and following the most significant enlargement of the EU in its history, which saw the “old Europe” rejoined by the new nations from the east in 2004, the main motive for forging the common identity – and consequently its institutional ma-terializations – has vanished. Recent years have brought these institutions to face their biggest test yet. Although the European institutions continue to muster, although with difficulty, the capacity to withhold shockwaves emanat-ing from the global economy, few can now claim that they rest upon a coherent common European identity or even the promise of such a thing. The financial crisis not only challenged the underpinnings of the EU institutions. It changed the way political elites use and influence the notion of identity. Quite evidently, it also revealed a complete lack of substance or of any stable, constitutive elements.

The narratives of the common European identity were stripped of their historical ornaments. Greeks and citizens of other nations in need were not to be like Eastern Euro-peans – saved from financial downfall and societal decay because they belonged to the same family, the same

The Clay and the Potter: How politicians from De Gasperi to Cameron have tried

to mould the common European identityby Adam Malczak

David Cameron’s speech on Britain’s role in Europe was an attempt to shape a sense of identity by playing to different conceptions about what it means to be European. The author links this to

a long tradition of identity creation in the European public discourse.

David Cameron’s long-awaited speech on Europe stressed the UK’s preferences for its relations with Europe

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community of nations. They were not to be seen as flat-mates in a big house. Putting it bluntly, they were simply annoying neighbours whose lodging is on fire and so pos-es a threat to us. But what emerged as the old Europe’s new, rational and realpolitik type of approach to EU affairs came under harsh criticism from the tenants who had most recently moved in.

Restoring solidarityMarking the commencement of his country’s first EU Council presidency, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk vowed in the European Parliament in mid-2011 to revive the solidarity that for years kept the continent in a con-stant movement towards integration, unification and devel-opment. He pointed to the deeper, more dangerous crisis beginning to wreak havoc across the Union, undermining the contemporary basis for the more integrated and pow-erful institutions, i.e. the mounting lack of trust in the EU showed by its citizens. This lack of trust generates feelings of insecurity, while insecurity, in turn, leads to fear. The fear of Europe falling apart once again is what in fact feeds the financial crisis and its various repercussions.

What is the ‘new’ Europe’s response to that? What consti-tutes the new basis for European integration and the fresh concept for the common identity? It is what Tusk kept re-peating throughout Poland’s time at the helm of the Union and what was echoed in the Eastern capitals from Tallinn to Budapest: whereas in previous decades the viable and stable European community was the goal, it is now to be the foundation. What makes the nations of Europe come together is their inner experience of community and an acknowledgement of its unique features as a frontrunner in freedom, human rights, democracy, tolerance and – above all – solidarity.

It is clear why the nations of Central and Eastern Europe formulate their vision of the European identity in such terms. This was their image of what the united Europe promised to give them once they escape the iron grip of the Soviet Union. Although this particular nexus of characteristics is nearly taken for granted within the EU, it has become secondary to other considerations of what it means to be a member of the European community.

Resetting relationship with EuropeAt first, it appeared that the new British Government in particular was foolishly isolating itself from mainstream European politics by opposing the build-up of preroga-tives for institutions located in Brussels. Yet the approach of the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron has now begun to yield some visible successes. Cameron not only managed to stimulate likeminded colleagues from

the Scandinavian states to boost efforts aimed at re-al-term cuts in the EU’s budget. It can be argued that this was simply the first positive outcome of his larger strategy to reconstruct how governments and nations should see Europe now and in future.

The long-awaited and much-publicised speech by David Cameron on Britain and Europe was by no means a grand attempt to draft the new vision for European iden-tity. Aimed at the domestic audience, it focused on the contemporary narrative used by the Conservative Party to denounce the imbalance of powers between London and Brussels. However, a careful ear could pick up some ideas behind Cameron’s image of a European community. His opening lines were a reminder of the initial reason for integration: the memories and fear of war. But while the reconciliation and solidarity following the atrocities of the 20th century are to be admired as the EU’s great achievements, their role as cornerstones of the community is now over.

Whatever solutions we adopt to tackle the current turmoil and internal tensions within the European Union, they must not jeopardize these achievements. Yet the prime target is located elsewhere. Behind the economic side of Cameron’s argument, and his bid for a more “open, flexible, and competitive” union, stands a very distinct scheme. The belief here is that generating European identity within the community of nations requires the re-turn of political powers closer to the citizens, namely the national parliaments. Preservation of the essential unity of the EU is contingent on embracing the innate diversity of this community, yet understood as a release of some of individual states’ political latitude.

This lack of trust generates feelings of insecurity, while insecurity, in turn, leads to fear. The fear of Europe falling apart once again is what in fact feeds the financial crisis and its various repercussions.

Polish PM Donald Tusk stressed the need for European solidarity

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Cameron’s belief is that generating a European identity within the community of nations requires the return of political powers closer to the citizens, namely the national parliaments.

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Understanding unityThe European Union faces one of the most challeng-ing moments in its history. For years, statesmen like De

Gasperi, Monnet, and Kohl tried to glue together the divided nations of Europe. Were they flogging a dead horse? Now the whole community is at a crossroads, with opposing visions of what it means to be a European, what the EU should or should not do, and what kind of Europe we want. Paradoxically, both visions claim to embrace the Union’s own motto: in varietate concordia, which stands for “unity in diversity”. The real problem with the common European identity is that while both politicians and EU citizens know all too much about diversity, neither have a clue about unity.

With its population size second only to Germany, Turkish EU membership could potentially lead to a substantial shift in the dynamics of European governance.

De Gasperi understood the importance of strengthening the “European mentality”

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Europe’s (Christian) Identity?

How Turkey’s admission into the European Union is delayed by its Islamic faith

by Daniel Barabás

With the spreading fear of Islamisation, the question of whether or not Turkey should become a member of the EU is more contentious than ever. This article charts the establishment of the

European polity in connection with its Christian identity and the effects this has had on relations with Turkey.

In the context of Turkey’s strengthening bid for European Union membership, the question of Europe’s religious identity surfaces once again as an ever more controver-sial issue.

Although Europe is largely governed by secular institu-tions and professes declining rates of religious engage-ment, since formal negotiations between the EU and Turkey began in 1999, a pervasive fear of Islamisation has been sweeping the continent, forcing Europe to con-sciously question how 74 million Turkish citizens – 99% of whom are Muslim according to the US Bureau of Euro-pean and Eurasian Affairs – would demographically and culturally affect its identity.

Geographically, Turkey belongs – at least partly – to the European continent, and the country also shares a common history with Europe. Furthermore, Turkey has progressively reformed its constitution to better respect

human rights, in order to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. However, it is unmistakably Turkey’s Islamic history that prevents its bid from being successful. Religion, specifically Christianity, has been crucial to the historical development of Europe as a polity, and as such, European leaders are now more than reluctant to compro-mise this identity by officially integrating Turkey. Tellingly, in a 2004 interview, Pope Benedict XVI, who was then still Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, asserted that “Europe is a cultural continent, not a geographical one”.

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Adam Malczak is studying for a BA in International Politics at King’s College

London and pursuing an LLM at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland. He is Secretary-General of the KCL Think

Tank.

Historiography shows that after the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe grew in size and scope as a reaction tothe expansion of Islam. The alliance of Frankish rulers – whose land initially stretched much of modern France and Western Germany from 481 to 614 – with the Papacy, ge-ographically expanded the Holy Roman Empire, provid-ing Saxony in the north, Bavaria in the south and much of northern Italy to the polity.

In the 8th century, Pope Stephen II requested that the Holy Roman Empire be placed under the protection of Pepin the Short – Charlemagne’s father – as Islam ex-panded its influence peripherally in northern Africa. The consecration of Charlemagne as Emperor by Pope Leo III on Christmas day 800 AD with the title Romanorum Gubernans Imperium subsequently became a watershed moment in the conception of Western Christendom. As Charlemagne’s military conquests extended further into southern and eastern Europe, Christianity spread conti-nentally, along with the ethnic Germanic and Saxon gene pool and European systems of governance.

In the meantime, Constantinople – or modern day Istan-bul, Turkey’s current capital and former capital of the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire – fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453 under the conquests of Mehmed II, thereby establishing bordering Constantinople as the centre of the Islamic world.

As Belgian historian Henri Pirenne noted, “without Islam [on Europe’s borders], the Frankish Empire would have probably never existed, and Charlemagne, without Muhammad, would be inconceivable”. Christianity, with its Catholic and Protestant variants, was legitimised by its antithetical opposition to Islam, and subsequently served as a uniting force within Europe.

Antagonism remains salient today, as Turkey’s bid for EU membership demonstrates. According to the 2011 Census, 45% of the United Kingdom’s population identify themselves as Christian, whilst according to a 2012 poll by Ifop, 64% of the French population, that is to say 41.6 million people, identify themselves as Roman Catholics. This widespread identification with Christianity serves as an important normative factor in Europe’s will to prevent Islam – through Turkey – from gaining unrestricted access to European politics.

With its population size second only to Germany, Turkey would benefit from a significant proportional voting ca-pacity in the European Parliament if it became a member state. This is all the more institutionally challenging as according to American political scientist Mark Steyn, by 2050 the Muslim population could account for 40% of Europe’s population, thereby potentially leading to a sub-stantial shift in the dynamics of European governance.

Examples of social discontent against Europe’s 23 million strong Muslim population abound, with former French President Nicholas Sarkozy banning the burqa in 2010, whilst in July 2011 Anders Behring Breivik killed 69 Nor-wegians to warn of the “Islamisation of Western Europe”. The German Marshall Fund in December 2011 found that 71% of participants surveyed in Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK were opposed to Turkey’s membership.

In a reflection of nationalistic discontent with Islam, Geert Wilders, former leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom summed up the European religious predicament: “the first Islamic invasion of Europe was stopped at Poitiers in 732. The second was halted at the gates of Vienna in 1683. Now we have to stop the current stealth invasion”.

With its population size second only to Germany, Turkish EU membership could potentially lead to a substantial shift in the dynamics of European governance.

Istanbul – part of Europe? The debate continues.

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Daniel Barabás currently studies Political Science at UCL. He has just com-pleted a dissertation on how Turkey’s rela-

tions with the EU and prospective member-ship have reformed Turkey’s

domestic human rights regime.

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2011 was a pivotal year for North Africa and the Middle East. Filled with protests, this year marked a turning point from authoritarian rule to calls for democratic change and reform. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have so far been successful in ridding their countries of dictators and setting up elections. Along with this, there has been a re-emer-gence of religious identity in the political structure of two powerhouse nations in North Africa and the Middle East, Egypt and Tunisia.

Though the reasons behind revolutions in both countries were socioeconomic ones, namely high unemployment and rampant corruption, the ability to pursue Islam more openly and within constitutional rule is something both countries now share as a result. Whether Tunisia or Egypt are on the path to becoming Islamic states, circa 1979 Iran, is a question on many people’s minds, and notably a concern for feminist groups, within these countries, as well as for external actors. Indeed, secular rule is not a pattern shared by most countries in the region. For instance, Algeria established an Islamic governing system in a bid to differentiate itself from the French colonial rule the country was previously under. Nevertheless, Muam-mar Gaddafi ’s Libya was under similar secular rule as Egypt and Tunisia.

The re-emergence of religious identity is particularly evident in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, took stride in the parliamentary elections, coming off as a strong, organ-ised party and taking 47%of the votes. In June 2012, Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won the presidency following elections. The democratical-ly elected government with an Islamist political party as majority stands in stark contrast to Mubarak’s authoritari-an and nominally secular rule. Under Mubarak, the state enforced a secular dress code for female newscasters. This has changed now that Mubarak has left, as this past September, for the fi rst time, Fatma Nabil, Egypt’s state TV Channel 1 female news anchor, wore the hijab, there-by breaking decades of secular dress code.

From 1956 onwards, Tunisia had experienced a period of secular rule introduced after independence by Ha-bib Bourgiba and maintained by his successor Ben Ali. However, this strictly secular culture was at odds with a population that is 98%nominally Muslim. This has been refl ected by the outcomes of the political shakeup in the country after Ben Ali’s departure. In the October 2011 elections, Ennhada, a moderate Islamist political party won 37%of the popular vote and 89 of the 217 assembly seats. With the new Islamist party in power, the country is embracing the Islamic ideals that have come with this political change. The burqa is now more visible, beards have appeared on male faces and religious education is becoming more of a presence in schools.

The reconciliation between the secular and the traditional-ist Islam will prove diffi cult and tensions are beginning to

Th e Re-emergence of Religious Identity:

Egypt and Tunisiaby Susan Sebatindira

Since the Arab Spring, Egypt and Tunisia have experienced the re-emergence of religion as an essential component of national identity. Th e reasons and implications of this shift away from

secularism are explored in this article.

Rashid Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia’s Islamist Party, is one of the foremost ideologues of the modern Muslim world. His vision is that of a state where respect for Islam and other faiths exists within a secular system.

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“Th ere’s a true way that Islam represents the common ground for everyone … Eventually Islam becomes a reference point for everyone.”

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occur along the fissure lines of politics and religion. Ques-tions arise over how the Brotherhood intends to square its beliefs in sharia law with a secular opposition vocal about their fears of a dominant Islamic state. Ikhwan leaders state that they will lessen the influence of sharia law whilst in rule, though the extent of this promise is yet to be seen. Foued Ben Salah, a member of Tunisia’s ultra conserv-ative Salafist Reform Front stated, “Separating religion and politics is a major mistake, since politics is the man-agement of people’s affairs.” The AHA Foundation notes that women’s rights advocates are concerned about the implementation of sharia law within the new constitution in Egypt.

The secular rule established in Egypt and Tunisia allowed for access to education and civic rights for women, which has left room for the belief that this progress may be reversed by strict Islamic governments. The effectiveness of this secular opposition in shaping the religious identity now present in these countries can be called into ques-tion. The ruling Islamist parties have proven to be much bigger and organised than their secular counterparts. The secular opposition in Egypt is often divided and disor-ganised concerning issues of debate/opposition with the Brotherhood’s political party.

Only time will tell whether Egypt or Tunisia will emerge as stringent Islamic states or will balance sharia law with secular concerns. Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia’s Islamist Party had this to say concerning the moulding of a religious identity in the region post-revolution, “There’s a true way that Islam represents the common ground for everyone … Eventually Islam becomes a reference point for everyone.” As Egypt and Tunisia are demographically majority Muslim countries, the resurgence of religious ide-als may be a natural response to the suppression of polit-ical and religious freedom that the countries faced under authoritarian, secular rule.

Fatma Nabil is said to be the first anchor to wear a hijab on Egyptian state television.

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The Kenyan Identity Crisisby Alex Raymakers

In a political climate fraught with recurring tribal tensions exacerbated by the presidential elections, Kenya is currently undergoing an identity crisis which further undermines national

unity.

As presidential elections loom in the East African country of Kenya, the old debate of national identity and tribal allegiances has once again come to the fore. Identity re-mains a highly divisive issue in Kenya, with individuals di-vided between an urge to unite themselves as one Kenyan nation and their traditional loyalty reminding them of their duty towards their tribe. However, the issue of tribalism and the chaos it causes is not rooted in the fact that most Kenyans have two different allegiances. The core issue remains that the 10 main tribes that make up most of the different ethnic groups Kenyans belong to are highly hos-tile to each other because of ancestral conflict over land, water, cattle, political power and preferential treatment. The presidential elections to be held in March 2013 have therefore rekindled old traumas of bloodshed and chaos. The debate on identity and a need to construct a sense of national identity has never been so important.

Like many African countries, Kenya is an artificial creation of the scramble of Africa in the shape of a box going

from Great Lake Victoria to the sandy coast of the Indian Ocean. The country is home to over 40 million people from 10 large ethnic groups with a number of smaller, usually nomadic, groups and a large Arab and Indian diaspora. This highly heterogeneous country has always had a tumultuous history with identity and ethnicity. Indeed, in 1964, after the old East African colony gained independence after 70 years of British rule, its “Founding Father”, President Jomo Kenyatta, used the weak unity of Kenyan society to entrench his power and enforce the dominance of his tribe, the Kikuyu, which is the largest of Kenya’s ethnic groups, representing 17% of the total population. His successor, President Daniel Arap

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Kenya remains at the mercy of ethnic disputes as the elections loom and tribal rhetoric becomes increasingly violent.

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Moi, sustained division in the country and empowered his own tribe, the Kalenjin. In 2002, hope was restored when incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was elected on a national unity platform. Despite the economy developing in the East African powerhouse, development booming, and the country being the West’s favourite in the region, his 10 years in offi ce have been a disappointment. Kenya remains marred in corruption, violence, crime, and poverty, whilst unscrupulous politicians are still the norm.

President Mwai Kibaki’s legacy will always be tarnished with the events of “post-electoral violence” (as they are colloquially known in Nairobi), when the country’s ethnic tensions came to a boiling point after the last elections in 2007. During the period of December 2007-January 2008, Kenya plunged into violence and ethnic strife as the Kikuyu tribe and its allies fought a coalition of other tribes to settle the disputed elections which pitted the Kikuyu incumbent Presdient Mwai Kibaki and his one-time ally and now political nemesis, the Luo Leader of the Opposition, Raila Odinga. The matter was settled, after widespread violence caused over 1000 deaths, and a large national unity government was created, brokered by none other than former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, re-grouping all major ethnic groups around the leadership of Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, with a cohort of Vice Presidents and Vice Prime Ministers to round up the top. Neverthe-less, Kenya remains at the mercy of ethnic disputes as the elections loom and tribal rhetoric becomes increasingly violent.

With the elections trail back in 2013, under the auspices of a new constitution offering a wide range of lucrative government positions - governorships and new seats in the best paid parliament in the world - Kenya seems to be at a historical crossroads. The elections, planned for the 4th of March, could easily turn into chaos, or bring Kenya closer to progress. Unfortunately, the latter outcome is highly unlikely. With President Kibaki out of politics due to his old age, the arch rivals Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto have formed an unlikely and worrying electoral partnership, with Uhuru Kenyatta as the presidential can-didate and William Ruto as his running mate, in an effort to stop the leading contender Raila Odinga winning his third bid for the presidency.

The election voting patterns already seem to be divided along ethnic lines, even if the Kenyatta/Ruto ticket unites two very hostile ethnic groups. This could also mean that the two men, who face a trial in The Hague for crimes against humanity, could become heads of state, a disas-ter for the national image of a country with so much to offer. Violence has already erupted in the west of the country between the Orma and Pokomo groups while the Government and the military remain helpless in their efforts to end the violence. Evidently, the construction of the Kenyan national identity is far from over, and tribalism still has a strong presence in Kenya’s day-to-day politics.

Population 34.5m, comprising more than 40 ethnic groupsKikuyu are the largest tribe, mostly concentrated around Nairobi. Most of Eastern/ North-eastern regions sparsely populated with ethnic Somalis. Main ethnic groups are: Kikuyu: 22%, Luhya: 14%, Luo: 13%, Kalenjin: 12%, Kamba: 11%, Kisii: 6%, Meru: 6%, Other African: 15%

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Th e presidential elections to be held in March 2013 have therefore rekindled old traumas of bloodshed and chaos. Th e debate on identity and a need to construct a sense of national identity has never been so important.

Kenya has a history of troubled post-election periods. Political violence notably took on an ethnic dimen-sion after Kenya’s disputed 2007 elections and tribal tensions remain particularly pervasive in Kenya.

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Alex Raymakers is an undergraduate stu-dent in History and International Relations

at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has lived in Africa,

notably Kenya, for most of his life.

April 6th, 1994. This day marks the beginning of the Rwandan genocide, which lasted for 100 days and claimed the lives of 800,000 innocent people. On average, this equates to 8,000 deaths per day, 333 deaths per hour, and 6 deaths per minute. Today, the Rwandan genocide represents one of the biggest failures of humanity, leaving many disturbed by the possibility of genocide in modern times.

How this horrific act occurred is something I hope to unravel in this discussion, putting some presumptions to rest. Was it really the endless “tribal conflict” of “sav-age” and “uncivilised” Africans that Western media so often portrayed? Many have taken to this view in order to make sense of this senseless cruelty. However, a more in-depth analysis of this case will find identities defined by politics to be at the heart of these genocidal motivations, historical wrongdoings planting the seeds of resentment that would later turn into a full-scale massacre.

In 1923, Rwanda was colonised by Belgium, implement-ing a “divide and conquer” strategy, the colonists estab-lished a new social hierarchy privileging the “superior” Tutsis through special education and preferable economic and political positioning. Their decision was based upon so-called “science” which demonstrated the Tutsi people as having more European features, in comparison to their Hutu counterparts. Additionally, the Tutsis were reported by scientists to possess a bigger head – and thus it was believed a bigger brain. These findings helped implement the minority Tutsi (just 14% of the population) as the new ruling class, thus enabling an indirect colonial regime that marginalised the majority Hutu (85% of the population)

who became the subject of forced labour.

The distinction between the “Hutus” and the “Tutsis”, two previously integrated ethnic groups, marks the origin of the genocide. Prior to Belgian colonisation, both groups had lived harmoniously for generations, their relations coloured by intermarriage and homogeneity, causing many to question the possibility of a pure “Hutu” or “Tutsi” bloodline. During the genocide, this blurred distinction was so prominent that killing was frequently carried out on the bases of ethnic identity cards. Evident-ly, these groups were not separated by religious, cultural or linguistic differences, but by their identities defined by extremist politics.

Ethnic identity cards were introduced in 1933, part of a policy that institutionalised Hutu and Tutsi differences. The policy of identity cards would last for over half a century, ensuring the social endurance of the divide and the de-fining of a once blurred distinction. Moreover, it assured that Hutu hardship and suffering during Belgium’s coloni-al reign would not be forgotten, even long after Rwandan independence. The consequences of Belgium’s coloni-sation were decisive, and when Rwanda regained inde-pendence in 1962, the politics of racial division remained.

After Rwanda’s independence, the years of exploitation and of political, economic and social oppression were widely recognised. The regimes that ensured Rwanda’s independence were ones of avengement, and when the Hutu mass found their voice, is was a voice hardened with bitterness. As strong Hutu nationalism was championed and the discrimination against the “alien minority” Tutsis began, the nation became rife with racist undertones and an anti-Tutsi disposition.

In contrast, the second independent regime under Habya-rimana (1973) sought to reconcile these differences,

Rwanda’s Killing Fieldsby Candice Williams

Although there has been a sharp shift and re-conceptualisation of ethnic identities in Rwanda and efforts are focusing on reducing separative ethnic identities into a single “Rwandan” iden-

tity, the legacy of colonial rule and the 1994 genocide remains a challenge to national unity.

The distinction between the “Hutus” and the “Tutsis”, two previously integrated ethnic groups, marks the origin of the genocide. Prior to Belgian colonisation, both groups had lived harmoniously for generations, their relations colour-ed by intermarriage and homogene-ity, causing many to question the possibility of a pure “Hutu” or “Tutsi” bloodline.

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A child surrounded by corpses of genocide victims

emphasising Tutsis as a minority, but a minority with a Rwandan heritage. However, this reconciliation was met with fierce opposition from the Akazu, a small elite group of Hutu extremists, whose ideologies and political power were built upon the foundations of Hutu and Tutsi differ-ences and a conceived threat of repeated Tutsi oppres-sion. Henceforth, an era of anti-Tutsi sentiment continued and escalated, the country wholly divided, with civil war and propaganda efforts becoming increasingly wide-spread.

In December 1990, the “Hutu Ten Commandments” were published in Kangura, an anti-Tutsi, Hutu Power Kin-yarwanda-language newspaper, thereby exacerbating anti-Tutsi sentiments. These “Hutu Ten Commandments” prohibited Hutu and Tutsi intermarriage, business part-nerships, and social relations. While the Hutu elite sought political power, their propaganda efforts focused on the threat and fear of Tutsi domination reoccurring, and this

fear became conducive to rallying the Hutu mass.Contention intensified and ultimately expressed itself in the murder of Habyarimana, the one man believed to be standing in the way of Hutu domination. With the mo-bilised Hutu mass spurred on by political propaganda, the blood bath began. Mantras of “with or against us” flooded radio stations, and along with Habyarimana, the beginning days of the genocide saw around 100,000 other Hutu sympathisers murdered by other Hutus due to their potential obstruction of the orchestrated genocide. The slaughter continued to claim another 700,000 lives. Doctors killed patients, teachers murdered students, and churches, supposed places of refuge, became host to the bloodiest massacres, many permitted by the priests themselves.

The formation of ethnic identities in the century preceding the Rwandan genocide has been one of the most signifi-cant social and political outcomes in modern history. The manipulation and institutionalising of these identities has demonstrated the devastating and long-lasting conse-quences of these decisions. Today, Rwanda appears to have made progress, and attempts are being made to proceed quickly past its dark history. Nonetheless, cau-tion prevails as the potential for future genocide remains. There has been a sharp shift and re-conceptualisation of ethnic identities in Rwanda and efforts are focusing on reducing separative ethnic identities into a single “Rwan-dan” identity. However, this is not a shift that will happen overnight, and the objective of eliminating ethnicity differ-ences remains ambitious and challenging.

There has been a sharp shift and re-conceptualisation of ethnic identities in Rwanda and efforts are focusing on reducing separative ethnic identities into a single “Rwandan” identity. However, this is not a shift that will happen overnight, and the objective of eliminating ethnicity differences remains ambitious and challenging.

“I am an African”Is there gold at the end of the rainbow?

by Robert Attwell

Since the election in 2009 and re-election in 2012 of Jacob Zuma as President of South Africa, the myth of the “rainbow nation” has been severely undermined. This new wave of racialisation

of politics is in clear contradiction with Nelson Mandela’s legacy of embracing multiculturalism and jeopardises South Africa’s identity as a unified nation.

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The expression “rainbow nation” was coined and popularised by two of South Africa’s most illustrious Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former President Nelson Mandela. A moniker of post-apartheid South Africa, it refers to multiculturalism as a unifying factor in the construction of South African identity.

However, the ideal of unity in diversity has lost its potency in the post-Mbeki South Africa. Instead, under

Jacob Zuma’s presidency, who looks set to remain in office until at least 2019 following his re-election as the African National Congress (ANC) President in December 2012, the country has become increasingly fractured and political rhetoric has been racialised once more.The ANC is well aware that it does not need to uphold the rainbow nation ideal as it does not require the support of minority groups to remain in power. It appears to see no value in appealing to minorities as a value in itself.

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Candice Williams is currently doing an MSc Development Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Mandela saw a need to unify the country and build a sense of nationhood, and consequently, South Africa was defi ned by a celebration of diversity. In contrast, the current Government does not appear to share the same view, with its agenda being determined by its under-standing of transformation. The general understanding of transformation is that it refers to the promotion of the rights of racial groups which were disenfranchised by apartheid. However, the ANC often uses transformation to delegitimise criticism of controversial actions by calling these critics “untransformed” or “counter-revolutionary”. These critics include journalists and judges whose opinions are not in line with government thinking.

The question is, where does this leave South African minorities? For many among the minorities, the political rhetoric has become increasingly alienating. One notable example is that of the insistence of former ANC Youth League President Julius Malema to keep singing the strug-gle song “Kill the Boer” despite South Africa’s High Court ruling it as hate speech and banning the ANC from sing-ing it in September 2011. Some Afrikaans-speaking South Africans fear that Julius Malema was thereby implicitly calling for ethnic cleansing. The fact that President Jacob Zuma sang this song at the ANC centenary celebrations in March 2012 certainly did not help. Additionally, the comments made by ANC Spokesman Jimmy Manyi, asserting that there was an oversupply of coloureds (people of mixed descent) in the Western Cape, caused a public outcry. However, as the ANC still enjoys massive electoral support, these gaffes seem to have little impact.

Many among the minorities feel that the ANC denies them the right to claim an authentically African identity. Indeed, many statements made by Zuma seem to confi rm this. For example, in a recent speech on the issue tradi-tional courts Zuma said, “Let us solve African problems the African way, not the white man’s way.” Implicit in this statement is that white people cannot be African. In the same speech, Zuma denounced “clever blacks” for

criticising the ANC and for losing touch with their roots by benefi ting from the education system resulting from South Africa’s encounter with British colonialism.

In spite of these comments, many South Africans look outside ANC rhetoric and contemporary politics to defi ne their sense of nationhood. Many fi nd inspiration in the history of the countries’ peace movements. South Africa has four Nobel Peace Laureates who provide inspiration worldwide: they are Albert Luthuli, Desmond Tutu, Fred-erik Willem de Klerk, and Nelson Mandela. These laure-ates fought for values which are now enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution. Most South Africans are extremely proud of both the laureates and the Constitution, which is one of the most liberal in the world.

Furthermore, former President Thabo Mbeki celebrated South Africa’s diversity in his “I am an African” speech given before the National Assembly in 1996, when the Constitution was adopted. An excerpt from this speech reads, “I am an African … I owe my being to the Khoi and the San whose desolate souls haunt the great ex-panses of the beautiful Cape …. Today, as a country, we keep an audible silence about these ancestors of the gen-erations that live, fearful to admit the horror of a former deed, seeking to obliterate from our memories a cruel occurrence which, in its remembering, should teach us not and never to be inhuman again.” He continued with, “I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to fi nd a new home on our native land …. In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East. Their proud dignity informs my bearing, their culture a part of my essence.” Contained in these words is the recognition of South Africa’s harsh past. It also captures the fact that South African identity is formed by multiple traditions. Being African, therefore, is not determined by skin colour – a fact the ANC needs to be reminded of.

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Under Jacob Zuma’s presidency, the country has become increasingly fractured and political rhetoric has been racialised once more.

Zuma said, “Let us solve African problems the African way, not the white man’s way.” Implicit in this statement is that white people cannot be African.

In September 2011, South Africa’s High Court ruled the song “Kill the Boer” as hate speech and banned the ruling African National Congress from singing it. Nevertheless, President Jacob Zuma defi antly sang it at the ANC centenary celebrations in March 2012.

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Robert Atwell has recently completed a BA (Hons) Economic History at the University of Cape Town. He

currently works as a researcher at the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch

University. Th is article was written for Th e London Globalist as part of this year’s

article exchange with Th e Cape Town Globalist.

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Nepalese Education and Identity

by Holly Brentnall

Growing state control and uniformisation of the country have spelled out the suppression of ancestral cultural identities in Nepal. Education emerges as a controversial tool which can be used either to further this process of cultural impoverishment or to reaffi rm and preserve

unique identities.

Across the “developing” world, one tactic all policy-mak-ers agree on is the importance of universal education for the alleviation of poverty. In Nepal, after the recent construction of two new schools under the Nepal-India Economic Cooperation Programme, India’s Ambassador to Nepal, Jayant Prasad, declared that these projects would help Nepali people in their strides towards peace and prosperity. But such words disclose other more ambiguous projects, namely the suppressive expansion of the state, evidenced by the country’s uniformisation and growing state control, notably over education. On the one hand, it is questionable whether this expansion will bear with it the promised fruits of modernity, and on the other, a state-imposed education system may mean the suppression of cultural identities.

According to anthropologist June Nash, education is partly a tool of the state, in that the intent is to “produce a modern nation of dedicated citizens from a population of peasants who have small experience and understand-ing of civic, consensual or mobilisation politics”. This was evident in the schooling of children living in Rosuwa district, central Nepal, where I volunteered for a non-governmental organisation (NGO) working in conjunction with the Nepali state. The organisation had started up a children’s home and was funding the local school in the district’s capital of Shufrabensi.

Each morning, the courtyard in front of the home would ring with a chorus of young voices chanting the Nepali national anthem, preceding the children’s walk to school. Throughout their lessons, the schoolchildren were incul-cated with nationalist symbolism. I was amazed at the accuracy with which they were able to draw the map of Nepal, the same map which adorns the walls of every school room, alongside murals of the national bird, the rainbow coloured Danfe, and the national fl ower, the rhododendron. Children had been so indoctrinated with this imagery that in art competitions held by volunteers working for the NGO, the predominant entry would be a montage of these nationalist symbols, even though the theme of the drawings was open for them to decide.

Such imagery is reminiscent of nationalist movements in Norway around 1905, when the middle-classes appro-priated symbolism from rural dress and folk tunes. Yet despite these seemingly inclusive moves, in Norwegian society, rural Sami minorities are excluded from offi cial bureaucracy and public participation. National symbolism acts only as a veneer across what are most often highly plural and unequal societies.

Feeding into the nationalist mechanisms of Nepalese education is the way that lessons are only taught in the national language, Nepali, as well as English. Outside of school however, only the media, government offi cials and tourists’ porters use Nepali, whilst the majority speak in the native Tamang and Sherpa languages. Here, it is clear that the words of the new constitution only run so deep when promising that all Nepali communities will be granted the right to preserve and promote their languag-es, scripts and cultural identities, and to educate their children in their respective mother tongues.

Nepali schoolchildren chanting the national anthem.

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For the past three decades, Nepal has been developing backwards rather than forward, indicating the cruel irony of the term “developing country”.

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Aside from enforcing the Nepali language onto muti-lin-gual ethnic groups, the image of Nepal as a unified nation is an abstraction irrelevant to a reality of grossrural-urban inequalities which divide the country into a cluster of separate nations. According to the Gini index, a measure of distribution of income by which total equality is represented by 0 and maximal inequality by 1, ine-quality in Nepal increased from 0.30 in 1984 to 0.47 in 2004. The share of the top quintile increased from 40% in 1984 to 55% in 2004, while nearly a quarter of the population earns less than US$1 a day.

For the past three decades, Nepal has been developing backwards rather than forward, indicating the cruel irony of the term “developing country”. Foreign assistance supports roughly two-fifths of Nepal’s government spend-ing. The ruling Nepali National Congress Party is made up predominantly of upper caste Bahuns who continue to propagate the Hindu state, encourage corruption, and use their positions to exploit Nepal to their own advan-tage. However, the increase in inequality also coincides with the implementation of Structural Adjustment Pro-grammes (SAPs) by the World Bank. Failing in all other areas including economic development, these SAPs only succeeded in opening up the country to foreign trade and investment, an arrangement much more in the interests of international corporations than the exploited, under-paid Nepali population. Whilst corrupt Nepali politicians delineate vague policies supposedly aimed at eliminating social inequality, imposition of neoliberal reforms and increasing dependency on foreign aid aggravate this economic division.

Village schools are state institutions that are conspicu-ously organised to pretend such inequalities do not exist. Related to the national matrix in bureaucratic ways and subject to central planning efforts, they represent organ-isational and symbolic extensions of a hitherto alien na-tional society, encompassing a new language and cultural identity. In blind pursuit of nationalism, refusing to teach in languages other than Nepali and English, schools also achieve the marginalisation of ethnic minorities. Recently, in the radio series broadcast on Radio 4, “Our Language is in Your Hands, Nepal”, Dr. Mark Turin explained how languages, like species, adapt to and reflect their envi-ronment. With their loss comes the loss of ways of life, ancestral traditions and indigenous knowledge. In Eastern Nepal, local languages are prolific with indigenous terms for flora and fauna that have medical and ritual value.

If such languages are to fall into disuse, cultures and ways of life will recede with them. Schools systematically disregard minority languages, despite a popular calling for lessons to be taught in students’ mother tongues. Although most Sherpa and Tamang ways of life can be learnt from growing up within their social systems, skills such as Buddhist painting and carpentry are dying out fast. In one instance, Thakali children sent to study in large Hindu towns returned home to attempt to desecrate and destroy Buddhist “ghompas” (monasteries).

As a consequence, parents are – unsurprisingly – re-luctant to let their children enter the national education system. This was initially an issue in the 1960s, when Khumbu Sherpas did not support new schools built as a gift from Sir Edmund Hillary to those who helped him on the Everest trail. Twenty five years later, parents still have to be talked into letting children receive a modern edu-cation. Instead, they urge their children to give up school to do something useful and profitable. It was a similar situ-ation in Rosuwa, where even lower caste Tamang employ-ees sent by the NGO were unable to convince the most politicised inhabitants of Ghutlang village to send their children to the new school in Shufrabensi. Nevertheless, modern schools are necessary for Tamang, Sherpa and other rural castes if they are to have any hope of dealing with the outside world from any other than a submissive and subordinate position. Knowing Nepali language aids them in conversing with tax collectors and government officials, providing them with the self-confidence to assert their rights as ethnic minorities. Additionally, Sherpa school children surveyed in Khumbu saw their life chances to be significantly greater in the future as opposed to the present or past as a result of education, and parents see education as an important component of their children’s upbringing.

However, the importance of including Sherpa and Tama-ng culture in the local curriculum cannot be underestimat-ed. Ideally, village schools should combine political encul-turation with the traditional monastic regime of painting and scripture. Anthropologist James Fisher envisages an “integrationalist” slant, teaching traditional Sherpa and Tamang activities alongside arithmetic, geography and science. If such were made possible, it would ensure the participation of ethnic minorities in wider society, offering greater chances of a career in the capital of Kathmandu, as well as the continuance of skills and knowledge inher-ent to languages and cultures and crucial to the survival of mountain communities. Uniformisation on top of cul-tural diversity and inequalities remains a paradox to be solved. However, in order to begin repairing the divisions inflicted by the forces of richer parts of the world, Nepal must use every means at its disposal to channel empower-ment to every one of its citizens, whilst protecting castes, languages and cultures for the preservation of cultural identities that will otherwise be erased.

Uniformisation on top of cultural diversity and inequalities remains a paradox to be solved. Nepal must use every means at its disposal to channel empowerment to every one of its citizens, whilst protecting castes, languages and cultures for the preservation of cultural identities that will otherwise beerased.

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Anthropology at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Th e Struggle For a Hong Kong Identity Under

China’s Neo-Colonial Ruleby Jocelyn Lau

Despite the “One country, two systems” principle, aimed at warranting Hong Kong’s autonomy, China has been exercising signifi cant control over Hong Kong. Th is form of neo-imperialist rule

has been criticised for jeopardising Hong Kong’s identity.

Th e re-nationalisation of Hong Kong by China seems no less than another era of colonisation, and autonomy under the principle of ‘’One country, two systems’’ becomes increasingly jeopardised.

1st July 1997 was a historical day for Hong Kong. Cele-brating the end of Britain’s 156’s years of colonisation, it marked a new beginning within Hong Kongers’ conscious-ness. Fifteen years on since the historical hand-over of power, the joyful emotions that had once been bolstered within the city have turned into antagonisms, as the re-nationalisation of Hong Kong by China seems no less than another era of colonisation, and autonomy under the principle of ‘’One country, two systems’’ becomes increasingly jeopardised.

The ‘’One country, two systems’’ principle was enshrined in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration to ensure a smooth transition of power. The People’s Republic of Chi-na (PRC) thereby committed to granting a ‘’high degree of autonomy’’ to Hong Kong for at least 50 years after 1997. Yet Chinese domination now seems more salient than ever. A series of incidents, such as Beijing Univer-sity Professor Kong’s speech labelling Hong Kongers as ‘’dogs of British imperialists’’, as well as the introduction of a ‘’national education’’ component into Hong Kong’s education curriculum, have stimulated Hong Kongers’ re-sentment towards both the local government and Beijing.

The apparent inability of the mainland Chinese to respect Hong Kong’s culture serve to justify the prominent level of resistance from the inhabitants of the former British colony on one hand, and to stimulate the revival of a Hong Kong identity on the other.

The gap between ‘’civilised’’ Hong Kong people and the “barbaric” mainlanders could be understood from politi-cal and social perspectives. Hong Kong is a society

which respects the rule of law. Thanks to the legacy of British rule, its 7 million citizens are now able to enjoy modern core values and resilient institutions that sustain a transparent and effi cient government. Furthermore, the presence of an independent judicial body upholds the notion of fairness and is submitted to public accounta-bility. Socially, people in Hong Kong enjoy freedom of speech and freedom to protest. Free access to Internet sites such as YouTube, Google or Facebook has enabled the development and rise of civil society. These elements are all in sharp contrast with the situation in China, where the judicial body is not independent, and where neither CCTV, nor the Xinhua news agency, have ever been free.

According to the Hong Kong Tourism Board, 8.88 million of mainlanders visited Hong Kong in 2011. Their purchas-ing power on luxury goods as well as housing properties has undeniably boosted the city’s economy, yet it also has negative consequences. The ‘’Dolce and Gabbana’’ incident led to hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers worrying about the increasing threat of economic integra-tion on local interests, as one of the security guards of the Italian retailer prevented locals from taking photographs, and yet allowed mainlanders and foreigners to snap

According to various surveys, only a third of Hong Kong’s 7 million residents consider themselves Chinese.

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freely. This perceived discrimination in favour of wealthy mainland tourists implied that the more Hong Kong is economically dependent upon mainland China, the more undermining the impact is on its own unique values and interests.

Hong Kong people are undoubtedly striving to safeguard some of their core values - such as freedom, justice and the rule of law – notably through protests against the imposition of policies from Beijing. However, these efforts are hardly sufficient. Ideally, the Hong Kong government would step up and act as the main gatekeeper for its citizens. Social movements joined by thousands of citizens this year act as a reminder that the local government should not only cater for the desires of mainlanders, at the expense of the local people’s needs.

Without the Hong Kong government being more trans-parent and receptive to its citizens’ concern with regards to integration issues, the city will be in danger of falling under China’s neo-colonial domination, stripping away Hong Kong’s independence, once again.

The ‘’Dolce and Gabbana’’ incident led to hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers worrying about the increasing threat of economic inte-gration on local interests, as one of the security guards of the Italian retailer prevented locals from taking photographs, and yet allowed mainlanders and foreigners to snap freely.

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Exploring the Facets of the Filipino-Chinese Identity

by Kathleen Yu

In this article, Kathleen, a Filipino-Chinese, questions and defends her Filipino identity upon accusations by native Filipinos regarding her cultural heritage.

My fascination with the Filipino-Chinese social identity began on a plane trip back from Hangzhou, China. I was returning to the Philippines from my first solo trip abroad and found myself seated next to an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW). She smiled at me when I sat down, a friendly, welcoming gesture which encouraged me to strike up a conversation.

“Wow”, the woman said, obviously astonished. “You can speak Filipino!”

“Why wouldn’t I be able to speak Filipino?” I asked.

“You look Chinese”, she clarified. “Aren’t you Chinese?”

“Both of my parents are Chinese”, I explained. “But I was born in the Philippines. I’m a Filipino.”

She shook her head. Her friend, another OFW seated behind us, piped up, “No. You’re not Filipino. You’re

Chinese. Your parents are Chinese.” I frowned. I had always thought of myself as a Filipino-Chinese, an ethnic Chinese born and raised in the Philippines. Didn’t thatmake me a Filipino? Wasn’t I as Filipino as those two OFWs on the plane, returning home after their stints abroad? I always thought I was, but I wasn’t so sure anymore.

The Filipino Chinese (sometimes called “Tsinoys”) have a long history in the Philippines. We are one of the largest overseas Chinese populations in Southeast Asia, boasting a population of 1.5 million – nearly 1.6% of the total Philippine population as of 2005. Our presence is felt in all sectors of Philippine society, and many of us have be-come prominent figures in the country. Some examples of notable Filipino Chinese include former president Sergio

Celebrating Chinese New Year in Iloilo, Philippines

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While many of the Filipino Chinese today are third to fourth generation descendants of immigrants – who have already assimilated and even integrated themselves into Filipino society – separation still occurs to an extent.

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Jocelyn Lau is a student at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Osmena, Cardinal Sin, Mayor Alfredo Lim... and even the richest man in the Philippines, businessman Henry Sy.

We have assimilated ourselves well in Filipino culture and society – many of our own practices have even been adopted into the mainstream culture. Prominent Filipino Chinese businessmen also fostered the “shopping mall culture” in the Philippines, setting up wellknown mall chains like SM and Robinsons. In spite of the economic and political clout enjoyed by the Chinese Filipino commu-nity, we are still widely regarded as an “outsider” culture within the larger context of Philippine society.

Such was my experience with the two OFWs on the plane, who regarded me as “Chinese” even when I told them I was born and raised in the Philippines. This “out-sider” status has led to something of a paradox in the “Chinese-Filipino” identity – wherein in spite of our Filipi-no nationalities and upbringings, we are often regarded as more “Chinese” than “Filipino”.

In the recent dispute between China and the Philippines over the oil-rich Scarborough Shoal, the Chinese-Filipino community has often found itself accused of upholding “Chinese interests”, not to mention being referred to as “Intsiks”, a derogatory term for Chinese, which refers to their slanted eyes. Another incident was the 2010 Manila hostage crisis, where Hong Kong tourists were held hos-tage by a Filipino gunman and subsequently demanded an apology from the Filipino government. Many Filipinos were outraged and complained, calling them “arrogant” and even blaming the Chinese-Filipino community for what they regarded as “atrocious” demands. Moreo-ver, Chinese Filipino businessmen and their families are also popular kidnap victims/targets in the Philippines. Although this does not reflect general Filipino sentiment toward the Chinese Filipino community, it is indicative of how – in spite of our economic and political clout – we are still treated as outsiders in Filipino society.

Another facet of the Filipino-Chinese identity is their entre-preneurial nature. The Filipino-Chinese community makes up the bulk of small business owners in the country today. In fact, many Filipino Chinese families often have their own “family businesses”, and generations of children are usually trained by their parents to eventually take over the enterprise. Statistically speaking, the Filipino Chinese community – although comprising a small part of the country’s population – boasts a large impact on the Philippines’ trade and industry. Filipino-Chinese are esti-mated to control 50-60% of non-land share capital in the Philippines and as much as 35% of firms’ total sales. The Filipino-Chinese community also makes up a huge chunk of wealthy and middle-class families in the Philippines. While this is one facet of what has come to be known as our “social identity”, one cannot ignore a pressing phenomenon that is rapidly changing our conception of who we are.

While many of the Filipino Chinese today are third to fourth generation descendants of immigrants – who have already assimilated and even integrated themselves into Filipino society – separation still occurs to an extent. Separation occurs when a smaller culture chooses to reject the dominant, host culture, to preserve their own practices and values. This is the phenomenon that is being witnessed today, what with the emergence of the China and Taiwan as dominant political powers and the heated dispute between the Philippines and China over the oil-rich Scarborough Shoal. The Filipino Chinese community, while having always been a “separated community” within the larger framework of Philippine society, has slowly begun to rediscover and embrace Chinese values, customs and practices – developing a sense of “Chinese pride” in maintaining these attitudes and behaviours.

The Filipino Chinese identity is a product of unique social, cultural and historical influences in Philippine society. Although ethnically Chinese, we have thrived by embrac-ing the best aspects of both cultures. Thus, we are deservingly called “Hua Fei” or “Chinese-Filipino”.

The Filipino Chinese identity is a product of unique social, cultural and historical influences in Philippine society. Although ethnically Chinese, we have thrived by embracing the best aspects of both cultures.

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The flag that all Filipinos are most proud of

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Kathleen Yu is a writer at the Philippine Globalist, another chapter of the Global 21 network. This article was written for

The London Globalist as part of this year’s article exchange.

The Struggle for Security and Prosperity:

El Salvador and its Gangs by Samuel Peat

While the El Salvadorian government is working hard to counter gang violence and has man-aged to establish a successful truce, the author argues that the approach is lacking in long-term solutions for re-integrating gang members into society and into the country’s sense of identity.

To most people, the words “El Salvador” have become synonymous with gang violence. This is a sad reflection of how violence has become fused with the identity of what was until recently the most dangerous country in the world. Central to the problem is the struggle to rehabili-tate gang members back into El Salvadorian society who through their tattoos become indelibly defined, for life, as a member of either MS -13 or 18th Street, the country’s two main gangs. The El Salvadorian government is only too aware of the problems that the gangs present for the country and Pres-ident Mauricio Funes is striving hard to counter violence. However, the crucial and missing parts of the solution are efforts to re-assimilate gang members into the El Salvado-rian identity itself, in other words rehabilitation.

The gang problemRoss Kemp’s recent documentary on gangs highlighted the severity of the problem within El Salvador. Prior to the gang truce brokered between MS-13 and 18th Street in March 2012, murder rates of 14 per day, the highest in the world, were not uncommon. In a recent interview,

General David Munguia Payes, Minister for Justice and Security, claimed that more than 90% of murders were gang-related: “so it was very simple - if we could get to the gangs we could control the killings”. However, the gang issue extends well beyond day-to-day life, their impact is much wider. In a recent US State De-partment report, one of the main factors listed as prevent-ing El Salvadorian economic growth was the poor securi-ty situation throughout the country. Gangs also generate and sustain widespread corruption: in 2009, Time Mag-azine reported that millions of dollars are extorted from the public transit system “annually in protection money”.

Current efforts to counter the gangsUndoubtedly, the biggest success in countering gang violence was the gang truce brokered by Chaplin Monsig-nor Fabio Colindres. Whilst this has more than halved El Salvador’s homicide rate and led to the first murder-free day in three years in April, many remain unsure about the durability of the truce. Indeed, a similar agreement was brokered last year in Nicaragua, which tragically ended in a bloodbath within six months. Most crucially, the truce fails, on any significant scale, to rehabilitate gang mem-bers into El Salvadorian society, which is an essential step towards long-lasting security and peace.

When Mauricio Funes came to power, he pursued a broader approach than the failed mano dura and super mano dura of his predecessor, Antonio Elias Saca, which in essence consisted of attempting ever-tougher clamp-downs on gangs. Instead, he favoured a broader and more rounded strategy of “social prevention, law enforce-ment, rehabilitation, victim support and institutional and legal reforms”.

Branded for life? A gang member in El Salvador.

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The truce fails to rehabilitate gang members into El Salvadorian society, which is an essential step towards long-lasting security and peace.

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The Americas

This policy has notably involved efforts to engage El Sal-vador’s young people within society through the national youth organisation INJUVE, thereby preventing them from being lured by gangs. This organisation has had impres-sive successes, as demonstrated by the free youth festival organised by INJUVE in August 2012, showcasing dance, job opportunities, and music, which was visited by over 70,000 young people. Parallel to this achievement, there has, however, been an increase in the militarisation of El Salvador as President Funes increasingly relies on armed forces to counter gangs, consequently granting more powers to the military and appointing former General David Munguia Payes as Minister for Justice and Security.

RehabilitationAs mentioned above, there is an absence of any real re-habilitation programme, forcing gang members to rely on their identity within gangs for their livelihoods. One for-mer gang member reported that he had to stay in touch with his gang, despite being inactive, in order to secure his family’s safety, as well as his own. Gang members are also often marginalised and scapegoated for problems – with the police’s approach to crime-solving often being arresting gang members and accusing them of the crime. Indeed, Al-Jazeera has reported that police officers have been arresting and beating gang members just “for fun”. This is exacerbated by the fact that gang membership is effectively for life as a result of the obvious tattooing.

Undoubtedly, the greatest worry is that the unique oppor-tunity for real rehabilitation presented by the gang truce may be lost. If this comes to pass, much of the blame has to lie with the – quite understandable – lack of public support for rehabilitation amongst communities exasper-ated by gang violence. In 2011, a prison fire leading to the deaths of gang members was widely celebrated in El Salvador as the people find it hard to uphold expensive rehabilitation efforts for violent criminals in a country where so much poverty exists, with 36.5% of citizens living below the poverty line. However, rehabilitation is a necessary measure if El Salvador is ever to find a new violence-free identity that could provide prosperity for all.

The new El Salvadorian policy has notably involved efforts to engage young people within society to prevent them from being lured by gangs.

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According to the UN statistics, more people per capita were killed in El Salvador than in Iraq, in recent years.

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Samuel Peat is a second year BSc Social Policy student at LSE and President of the

LSE SU Central America Students Association. He has also volunteered in the

region as a development worker.

Similarly to North America, Latin American citizens of African descent are often some of the most impoverished, undereducated and malnourished people of the continent.

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Ethnic groups threatened in Colombia

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The Legacy of Colour in Contemporary Latin

American Identityby Max Horder

The eruption of public sentiment following Hugo Chávez’ death in March this year has yet again brought the distinct political identity of Latin American countries to the international media’s attention. Beyond ideologies, however, underlying issues of ethnicity and the repercus-

sions of slavery continue to shape perceptions of identity in the region.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was memorable for colourful speeches about the evils of United States foreign policy and the social limits of modern capitalism. His quote “long live the unity of Latin America”, unremarka-ble yet tentative, deserves an equal amount of further ex-amination. It is fair to wonder to what degree such a unity actually exists in contemporary practice. Simón Bolívar, the great Liberator of Spanish America, certainly thought it did. If we are to examine the region’s history before the modern divergences leading to different nation-state formation, it is easy to see why.

The story of Christopher Columbus’ discovery of America in 1492 is known to most, as are the calculated extermi-nation of indigenous people, numbering in the tens of mil-lions, and the fusion of Spanish and Portugueselanguage and culture into the South American continent. What ap-pears to have often been left out of this discourse about contemporary Latin America, however, is the extent to which the African diaspora was a significant part of this historical process.

The United States is famous for its attempts to come to terms with the legacy of the transatlantic trade that brought in 450,000 people from Africa to be exploited as slaves, mostly on plantations that grew cash crops like tobacco and cotton. Over time, however, the US has be-come fertile ground for the creation of new social forms of black identity, solidarity and civil resistance.

On the other hand, Cuba imported approximately

800,000 Africans slaves to labour on similarly lucrative sugar plantations right up until 1886. The figure is nearly double the number of those that were imported into the US and is even more surprising given the relative sizes of the two countries. What is even more astonishing, howev-er, is that Brazil received millions of Africans – up to ten times that of the US.

There is no doubt in anyone’s mind as to the strong influ-ence of African culture in Latin countries such as Brazil. One need only think of syncretic religions like Santería, or dances like Salsa and Samba. Capoeira, too, was created by black Brazilian slaves as a form of defensive martial arts, appearing to be only harmless dancing. Similarly, there are approximately nine million people of African descent currently living in Colombia. They have added much to the country’s culture, famously through the influence of Cumbia music.

It is also relevant to note that just like in North America, citizens of African descent are often some of the most impoverished, undereducated and malnourished people of the continent. Afro-Brazilians, largely the descend-

ants of slaves, are still more likely to be living in poverty than their white neighbours. Most Afro-Colombians live by the Pacific Coast in what can only be described as one of the most abjectly under-developed areas of the country. Of these people, 78.5% live below the poverty line, with hundreds of thousands of those living in rural areas having been displaced from their land to make way for further commodity extraction by large-scale agribusinesses over the past three decades. Moreover, they retain a chronic lack of political representation in the Colombian political institutions as well as often hav-ing to live with the historically prejudiced perceptions of many of their fellow citizens. Their current fate seems to have been conveniently forgotten by most.

So why did the kind of black social identity that grew to prominence in the US during the 20th century not develop in the same way in Latin America? One possible explanation stands out as particularly interesting, and has been referred to by many as ‘Latin American Exceptionalism’. As with many other post-colonial countries, Latin America’s borders and the national characteristics to accompany them had to be created at independence from Spain and Portugal. Mostly they were drawn up with relative arbitrariness and have led to many territorial disputes, such as the War of the Pacific between Bolivia, Peru and Chile that ended in 1883, or the tension between Argentina and Chile over the frontier in Tierra del Fuego that nearly led to war in 1978. Latin American borders and states are not just politically unclear, however. The different countries also reflect a continent that was and still is incredibly racially and culturally diversified. That is not to claim that Euro-pean colonialists did not, at least for a long time, insist on white racial ‘purity’ as in many other countries, and neither does it ignore the contemporary racial inequal-ity of white domination of Latin American political and economic spheres.

Nevertheless, racial mixing did still occur much more frequently and ubiquitously in Latin countries as com-pared with the almost entirely segregated North Ameri-ca. It must be briefly added, however, that this blend of different people did not occur universally in all coun-tries. At approximately 90% white, Argentina remains surprisingly homogeneously European even today.

So why did the kind of black social identity that grew to prominence in the US during the 20th century not develop in the same way in Latin America? One possi-ble explanation stands out as particularly interesting, and has been referred to by many as ‘Latin American Exceptionalism’. As with many other post-colonial countries, Latin America’s borders and the national

characteristics to accompany them had to be created at independence from Spain and Portugal. Mostly they were drawn up with relative arbitrariness and have led to many territorial disputes, such as the War of the Pacific between Bolivia, Peru and Chile that ended in 1883, or the tension between Argentina and Chile over the frontier in Tierra del Fuego that nearly led to war in 1978. Latin American borders and states are not just politically unclear, however. The different countries alsoreflect a continent that was and still is incredibly racially and culturally diversified. That is not to claim that Euro-pean colonialists did not, at least for a long time, insist on white racial ‘purity’ as in many other countries, and neither does it ignore the contemporary racial inequal-ity of white domination of Latin American political and economic spheres.

Nevertheless, racial mixing did still occur much more frequently and ubiquitously in Latin countries as com-pared with the almost entirely segregated North Ameri-ca. It must be briefly added, however, that this blend of different people did not occur universally in all coun-tries. At approximately 90% white, Argentina remains surprisingly homogeneously European even today.

Put simply, from the European conquest in the 16th cen-tury right up to the current moment, Latin America has been characterised by an unprecedented level of racial and cultural heterogeneity. The most demographically significant fusions of people tend to be categorised in terms of mesitzo (mixed-race between white and Am-erindian) and mulatto (mixed-race between white and black).

Of course, it would be a wild exaggeration to claim that this has produced a colour-blind and multi-cultural utopia. Chronic racism still persists and permeates many aspects of modern Latin American society. In Mexico for instance, the National Council for Prevention of Discrimination (Conapred) conducted a recent survey that found 40% of Mexicans to have treated people differently because of their skin colour. However, the continent has still largely managed to create new and interesting structures of ethnic consciousness, tolerance and inter-mixing that the rest of the world would do well to learn from.

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Latin America has been characterised by an unprecedented level of racial and culturalheterogeneity – yet, this has not produced a colour-blind and multicultural utopia.

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Boy, Afro-Colombian crossing an alleyway in the Bajamar slum, Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca, Colombia, South America.

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Canada’s Inuit Community:

“Idle No More”by Jeffrey Mo

Since November 2012, Canada’s indigenous community stands up for its rights. Their aim is not only to reduce widespread inequalities between native and non-native Canadians, but also

to preserve their unique identity.

Imagine a community where over half of the population is overweight or obese, where less than half of the adult population has graduated from high school, and only 4% have obtained a university degree. The smoking rate is over 70%, while over 35% of the population receive social benefits. Perhaps most shockingly, the prevalence rate of tuberculosis is 5%, while the suicide rate is over 100 deaths per 100 000 people per year. For compari-son, the world’s most suicide-prone country, South Korea, has a suicide rate that is three times lower.

This place exists not in the past, and not in a Third World country, but instead, in Inuit communities in modern-day Canada. Once referred to as the Eskimos, the Inuit in Canada today number over 40 000 in the Arctic and sub-arctic. Along with the First Nations, who live further south of the Arctic, the Inuit were Canada’s indigenous popula-tion, having crossed across the Bering Strait well over 10 000 years before European contact.

European contact, however, was rapid and devastating for Canada’s natives. Incapable of defending themselves

against superior European weapons, they were forced off of their traditional lands and, in some cases, away from their nomadic lifestyles onto sedentary native reserves. Many of their traditional food staples disappeared and were, to an extent, replaced by alcohol. Starting in the mid-19th century, “Canadians” – understand white Canadians – tried to assimilate the native population by removing children from their families and placing them in residential schools, where they would often be subject to abuse. The residual effects from the destruction of native culture and identity can still be seen today in the poor conditions that plague native reserves.

Indigenous populations, understandably, have regarded the Federal Government with suspicion and animosity, but the relationship took a turn for the worse in Octo-ber 2012. The ruling Conservative Party, led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, aimed to pass a wide-ranging omnibus bill, known as the Jobs and Growth Act that cov-ered issues as diverse as pensions, grain elevators, bridge construction, and judges’ salaries.

Also hidden within the Jobs and Growth Act were chang-es to three acts that concerned the native population. The Navigable Waters Protection Act, dating from 1882,

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The development of these Latin forms of race and identity pertained to what the Mexican philosopher José Vascon-celos called La Raza cósmica (The Cosmic Race): the idea of an agglomeration of all people into a ‘fifth race’ that would build a new society free from the physical prejudic-es of the old. It is true that Latin America still has many issues of racial inequality that need to be worked on. However, if we bear in mind the great ancestral intermin-gling of the people living in these countries and pause for a moment to consider a world where children are ‘not to

be judged by the colour of their skin, but by the content of their character’, it would be wise to take a closer look at the hybrid forms of identity in contemporary Latin America.

While supporters of indigenism might seem to pit native versus non-native Canadians, others are seeing “Idle No More” as an opportunity to engage non-aboriginals in a discussion about native identity and issues.

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Max Horder is a second year Anthropology student at LSE.

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While supporters of indigenism might seem to pit native versus non-native Canadians, others are seeing “Idle No More” as an opportunity to engage non-aboriginals in a discussion about native identity and issues.

Hopefully, one day, this movement for native empowerment will mean the genuine elimination of the gap between the Inuit community and non-indigenous Canadians, and subsequently, equality between the diff erent segments of Canada’s population; a lesson which would also be valuable for countries such Australia and the United States which face similar issues.

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formerly required a lengthy approval process for any construction that could harm any waterway on which a canoe could fl oat, whilst the new Navigation ProtectionAct made this mandatory for only the oceans andthe largest lakes and rivers. A complementary change to the Environmental Assessment Act further shortened the approval process for such projects. Meanwhile, the Indian Act, which concerns aboriginal populations and their reserves, now made it possible to fast-track deci-sions regarding aboriginal lands, which they regard as sacred and were placed under their guardianship. With a majority in Government, the Conservatives were able to pass the Jobs and Growth Act without signifi cant dissent or debate.

Native groups claim that the waterways no longer protected by the bill are those near traditional native territories. Furthermore, the amendments to the Indian Act also gave the Government the ability to overrule deci-sions made by Indian tribes regarding their own land. As a result, aboriginal groups believe that Ottawa and the Conservatives have acted in the interests of big business, often citing the Harper Government’s staunch support of a pipeline from the Athabasca tar sands to the Pacifi c Ocean that they claim could cause severe environmental damage to traditional lands in northern British Columbia.

Enter “Idle No More”. It started in November 2012 as a grassroots protest movement primarily aimed, at least in the beginning, at ensuring proper environmental steward-ship in the wake of the Harper Government’s perceived legislative attacks against nature. The four founders of the movement – a group of both native and non-native wom-en – perceived the environment as an issue affecting all Canadians. There was a concerted effort to involve both natives and non-natives, as the latter often had a negative opinion of the former – indeed, the name of the move-ment, “Idle No More”, refl ects what native Canadians no longer wanted to be viewed as.

Protests quickly spread throughout Canada. Many, par-ticularly in the early weeks of the protest, were peaceful, such as the fl ash mobs performing traditional round danc-es in shopping malls and hockey arenas. Events attracted both native and non-native participants, and rapidly grew in number and in prominence. However, as the movement is entirely volunteer-run and donation-driven, and is not affi liated with the Assembly of First Nations, it does not benefi t from strong, centralised leadership and control. As a result, several First Nations tribes engaged in more dis

Among the actions taken up by native protesters across Canada was this blockade of a railway line in Manitoba.

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ruptive protests, blocking major highways and railways. Public (non-native) support for “Idle No More” started to wear thin.

As “Idle No More” rapidly expanded, particularly among the native populations in Western Canada, it evolved into a movement about native rights and identity, and the one-sided relationship between natives and the Federal Government. Commentators have recently cited indigenism, or native nationalism, as a political and socio-logical theory driving the movement – in fact, the tagline for “Idle No More” is “Indigenous Rights Movement”. Indigenism holds that the relationship between anindig-enous group and its homeland is, in some way, special. “Idle No More” contends that Ottawa is denying thissacred relationship and enforcing its own will on aborigi-nal populations.

Prominent native activists and academics claim that their land was stolen from them by successive waves of immi-grants and settlers. Furthermore, while any systematic attempt to destroy native culture, or “cultural genocide”, has ended with the dismantling of the residential school system. native groups believe that they have not been adequately redressed for the cultural and social destruc-tion that resulted. Indigenists call for a dialogue between Canada, as one nation, and each native tribe as its own nation. Some go so far as to call for a return to complete self-governance. Native tribes have already been accord-ed some degree of autonomy. For instance, community elders can recommend appropriate punishments for criminals in a ‘sentencing circle,’ as is now often done in Western Canada; however, such recommendations are not legally binding, and judges make the fi nal decision on the sentence.

While supporters of indigenism might seem to pit native versus non-native Canadians, others are seeing “Idle No More” as an opportunity to engage non-aboriginals in a discussion about native identity and issues. In the past, native history was cursorily taught in schools, interspersed between the lives of great European explorers. Today, the next generation of educators are being taught how to teach native history with greater depth and accura-cy. Aboriginal artists are receiving praise for exploring their identity – an identity that necessarily combines their native ancestry and tribal heritage with a modern-day Canadian identity – and how this identity is shaped by stereotypes held by non-natives.

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One of the major problems facing aboriginal Canadians is widespread overt racism towards them. In January 2013, the following quote was published by the editor-in-chief of a community newspaper in Manitoba: “Natives are acting like terrorists in their own country. Indians/Natives want it all but corruption and laziness prevent some of them from working for it.”

Alarmingly, hate speech laws over telephone and over the Internet were repealed by the Harper Government in early 2012. In December 2012, a native woman in north-ern Ontario was raped and strangled while purportedlybeing told, “you Indians deserve to lose your treaty rights.” Although this is an isolated case, it evidences that there is still a long way to go before discrimination against natives is completely eliminated.

Is “Idle No More” efficient? Public awareness of the movement rose to above 60% across Canada by January 2013, due in large part to a month-long hunger strike by the Chief of the Attawapiskat reserve, Theresa Spence, across from Parliament Hill in Ottawa. Her call for a meeting with Prime Minister Harper was granted, but she declined the invitation, as the Queen’s Representative in Canada had earlier declined to attend, concerned that his presence would legitimise the indigenist “nation-to-na-tion” dialogue. During Spence’s hunger strike, an audit revealing the financial mismanagement of CAN$104 mil-lion on her reserve was released; she accused it of being a “distraction”. Moreover, there is no formal connection between the Assembly of First Nations and “Idle No More”, and while the Assembly of First Nations supports

the movement, it has also condemned the illegal trans-portation disruptions that have taken place. All of these factors contributed to over half of those who had heard of “Idle No More” believing that Spence’s hunger strike would not help the aboriginal peoples of Canada.

While the public may be losing interest, a potential long-term benefit of this movement are the native youth that it has inspired to become “idle no more”. Currently, a group of Cree youth from Northern Quebec, ranging in age from 11 to 21, are walking to Ottawa, covering a dis-tance of over 1100 km. While the goal of the journey was to raise awareness of “Idle No More” and of their own culture and identity, they have also found that they are learning about how their nomadic ancestors lived. Hope-fully, one day, this movement for native empowerment will mean the genuine elimination of the gap between the Inuit community and non-indigenous Canadians, and subsequently, equality between the different segments of Canada’s population; a lesson which would also be val-uable for countries such Australia and the United States which face similar issues.

The 2012/2013 Committee from left to right: Yuan Teng Yueh, Vu Nguye, Lina Salih, Katy Young, Kristina Stoyanova, Laura Hartmann, Ariane Defreine, Naomi Robertson, Maria Beatriz Coelho. Not featured is Alex Gabriel.

Jeffrey Mo is an MSc student in Economics at the London School of Economics and

Political Science.

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