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The EU’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders

An Analysis of the Public Discourse on the Legitimacy of the European Union in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France

Master’s Thesis for International Public Management and PolicyJuly 2009

Author: Jan Pieter BeetzStudent Number: 272262

Supervisor: Dr. Hans W. BlomSecond Reader: Dr. Markus Haverland

– The EU’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders –

The EU’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders An Analysis of the Public Discourse on the Legitimacy of the European Union in the Netherlands, the

United Kingdom and France

Master’s Thesis for International Public Management and PolicyDepartment of Public Administration

Faculty of Social ScienceErasmus University Rotterdam

© July 2009, Rotterdam

AuthorJan Pieter Beetz, BSc BAStudent number: 272262

Contact: [email protected]

SupervisorDr. Hans Willem Blom

Second ReaderDr. Markus Haverland

Word count 32.569 (incl. 36.985)

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Many parts of the world struggle with the task of making state and nation congruous. But the even greater challenge is making state and market congruous. In Europe this has been tackled by the remarkable creation of the European Union. The severity of the congruity dilemma, however, is demonstrated by the fierce debate over whether the European common market should develop into a common European state.

Istvan Hont Jealousy of Trade: 155

Although usually couched in terms of sovereignty and national identity, the real question at the heart of the Europe debate has always been one of political economy.

David Clark The Guardian, September 5, 2005

We should see Brussels for what it is: a way of tackling problems in common, settling disputes between traditionally fractious neighbours and applying the rule of law to agreements that have been entered into. It serves British interests, and if we didn't have it, we would have to invent it.

Timothy Garton Ash The Guardian, June 5, 2001

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Acknowledgements

Before you lies the result of several months of ‘hard labour’. Many hours of me alone in a room with my laptop reading, writing and rewriting. This process has at last come to an end, although the next thesis is already waiting. During this time I have written many pages that have not made it into the final product or were reduced to a single paragraph or footnote, but such is the harsh reality of academic research.

A process which at times is like a mental rollercoaster-ride. One cannot complete such a ride in solitude. I would like to thank those people, who have kept me on track and moving forward at all times – even when moving forward paradoxically meant taking a break.

First and foremost I want to thank my supervisor dr. Hans W. Blom. He accepted me as a thesis candidate after a rocky start and even though one and half months later I would leave for six months to the University of Sydney. An invaluable experience indirectly made possible by him as well. From start to finish, his feedback and insights have been many and invaluable. We kept in touch through many e-mails, which ranged from feedback to relevant seminars. Further, we met in person and even ‘Skype-ed’, which just goes to show that physical distance does not have to be an obstacle for mental labour. In my experience, such commitment is rare and therefore it motivated me throughout the entire process.

I also want to thank the second reader of my thesis: dr. Marcus Haverland. His final remarks helped to improve the final version significantly, but also his quick assessment of my draft, only three days, made it possible to avoid the usual last minute rush.

Further, I have to thank two people in particular for their direct contribution. First of all, Pepijn van Houwelingen, because our ‘Skype meetings’ were a source of inspiration, motivation and relaxation. Secondly, Casper Geurtz, for, next to being a good roommate, his insights into the subject matter.

Finally, I want to thank all my family and friends, because they supported me by offering their love, friendship and showing an interest in my progress. I want to thank you all for keeping me on track. There is one last person I have to thank in particular: my mother. For without her unconditional love and support I would never be the person I am today.

Before I forget, despite of this assistance I am off course solely responsible for any omissions or inaccuracies in this thesis. It is a bitter paradox: one is responsible for all the mistakes, but cannot claim all the glory. This, I guess, is just another harsh reality of academia.

Yet, I want to pursue a career in this apparently ‘harsh’ environment and one might wonder why. Well in part for the satisfaction one gets from holding the fruits of one’s labour in one’s hands. Further, the creational process is more fun and exciting than I suggested above. I hope you will find ‘the fruit of my labour’ an insightful, but also an enjoyable read.

Jan Pieter BeetzRotterdam, July 2009

Appendix I – The French Frequency Tables iv


Executive SummaryAccording to many the European Union has a democratic deficit. It manifests itself in a lack of support among the populations of the Member States. In order to overcome this deficit the European political elites decided to democratise the European level of governance. Many academics realise that the problem is more than just democratic. They describe the deficit, more accurately, as a legitimacy deficit. In this research, the reasons for this deficit are investigated using several perspectives on legitimacy.

First, a historical perspective is taken. Central to this is Istvan Hont’s analysis of the legitimacy of the modern democratic nation-state, which leads to a distinction between legitimacy based on nationalist republicanism and universalist republicanism. The former focuses on cultural identities and state-interests, whilst the later focuses on humanist ideals, like democracy and the rule of law.

Secondly, modern democratic theory leads to the distinction between input, throughput and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy focuses on identity and support, throughput on procedures, and finally, output on performance.

Thirdly, the European level of governance is emerging as a political order of multi-level governance. A further distinction is therefore made between legitimacy based on different models of political order. The nation-state requires direct legitimacy, whilst an international regime is legitimised by indirect legitimacy. Unfortunately, neither fully does justice to the reality. This theoretical framework leads to a multi-faceted understanding of how legitimacy can be conceptualised.

The, often implicit, conceptualisation of legitimacy and evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy in people’s perception is investigated in public discourse by analysing newspaper articles from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France. Because of this method, the mass media influence on legitimacy is also discussed. Different conceptualisations translate into different visions of the EU.

The analyses resulted in the following visions: the Dutch discourse is dominated by federalists, who struggle to raise popular support for the EU. The British discourse is a clash between pro-European Gaullists and Europhobes. Neither wants to federalise the EU, but the former wants the EU to further British interests, whilst the latter fears domination by the EU. The French discourse is a battle between Euro-sceptic Gaullists and federalists. The former are turning their back on the EU, because France is losing influence, whilst the latter keep supporting the EU.

The conclusion is that the perception of the legitimacy deficit differs in each country, but they do have reasons in common for the deficit. First, there is the lack of identification of people with the EU, which makes the deficit is nationalist rather than democratic. Secondly, the EU is and in the near future will stay a political order of multi-level governance. The theoretical conceptualisations of legitimacy however do not match this reality. This reality deficit is another reason for the deficit. Finally, the mass media increase the deficit, but they do not create it.

The following recommendations are made to overcome the deficit. First, a more active media policy with recognizable faces and a story adaptable to national circumstances needs to be developed. And secondly, more funding needs to be allocated into research on the question: how to legitimise an emerging political order of multi-level governance, whilst taking into account national loyalties?

Appendix I – The French Frequency Tables v

Table of ContentsACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................................................IV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................................V

TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................................................1

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES......................................................................................................................4

FIGURES.................................................................................................................................................................4TABLES..................................................................................................................................................................4

CHAPTER 1 – THE EU’S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT?......................................................................................5

1.1 – IS THE PROBLEM REALLY DEMOCRATIC?....................................................................................................61.2 – AIMING TO UNDERSTAND IN ORDER TO OVERCOME...................................................................................71.3 – THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION...........................................................................................................81.4 – WHAT IS THE RESEARCH’S SIGNIFICANCE?.................................................................................................91.5 – PLAN DE CAMPAGNE...................................................................................................................................10

CHAPTER 2 – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON MODERN LEGITIMACY......................................12

2.1 – LEGITIMACY IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDERS.......................................................................................122.2 – THE NATION-STATE’S LEGITIMACY: A TALE OF TWO REPUBLICANISMS.................................................13

2.2.1 – Hont’s Account of a Divided Mankind...............................................................................................132.2.2 – Universalist and Nationalist Republicanism......................................................................................15

2.3 – MONGREL CONCEPTS IN MODERN DISCOURSE..........................................................................................162.3.1 – The Nation-State.................................................................................................................................162.3.2 – and (National/Popular) Sovereignty..................................................................................................172.3.3 – in Modern Discourse..........................................................................................................................18

CHAPTER 3 – ON LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE................................................19

3.1 – PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ON LEGITIMACY...............................................................................................193.2 – LEGITIMACY AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: COMPONENTS............................................................20

3.2.1 – Scharpf’s and Bernard’s Components of Legitimacy.........................................................................203.2.2 – Combining the Accounts into a Framework.......................................................................................22

3.3 – LEGITIMACY AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: MODELS........................................................................233.4 – TOWARD A MULTI-FACETED UNDERSTANDING OF LEGITIMACY..............................................................24

CHAPTER 4 – MASS MEDIATED LEGITIMACY........................................................................................26

4.1 – MASS MEDIATED PUBLIC DISCOURSES......................................................................................................264.2 – IS THERE A EUROPEAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE?.............................................................................................274.3 – THE MASS MEDIA: A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON LEGITIMACY?..........................................28

CHAPTER 5 – METHODOLOGY: FROM STRATEGY TO HYPOTHESES.............................................29

5.1 – THE RESEARCH STRATEGY........................................................................................................................295.2 – THE METHODS OF INQUIRY........................................................................................................................295.3 – ANY LIMITATIONS? ON RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY................................................................................315.4 – THE OPERATIONALISATION........................................................................................................................32

5.4.1 – The Analytical Framework.................................................................................................................325.4.2 – Hypothetically Speaking.....................................................................................................................34

CHAPTER 6 – THE DUTCH DISCOURSE......................................................................................................36

6.1 – GENERAL FINDINGS...................................................................................................................................366.2 – FACETS AND JUDGEMENTS OF LEGITIMACY..............................................................................................36


6.2.1 – Dimensions and Judgements of Legitimacy.......................................................................................376.2.2 – Components and Judgements of Legitimacy......................................................................................376.2.3 – Models and Judgements of Legitimacy..............................................................................................386.2.4 – Conclusions on Facets and Judgements of Legitimacy......................................................................39

6.3 – MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE.....................................................................................................................396.4 – OVERVIEW OF THE LEGITIMACY DISCOURSE.............................................................................................39

CHAPTER 7 – THE BRITISH DISCOURSE....................................................................................................42




CHAPTER 8 – THE FRENCH DISCOURSE....................................................................................................47




CHAPTER 9 – FROM NUMBERS TO NARRATIVES...................................................................................53

9.1 – NUMBERS...................................................................................................................................................539.1.1 – General Findings................................................................................................................................539.1.2 – Facets and Judgements of Legitimacy................................................................................................539.1.3 – Multi-level Governance......................................................................................................................549.1.4 – The Overall Legitimacy Discourses...................................................................................................549.1.5 – The Grouping of the Numbers............................................................................................................55

9.2 – SIMILAR NARRATIVES OR NOT?.................................................................................................................559.2.1 – General Support and a Legitimacy Deficit.........................................................................................569.2.2 – The Diversity of the Democratic Deficit.............................................................................................569.2.3 – The Tension between Nationalist Government and Multi-level Governance.....................................57

9.3 – THE THREE DISCOURSES AS NARRATIVES.................................................................................................599.3.1 – The Dutch Debate: Infighting Federalists..........................................................................................599.3.2 – The British Struggle: Europhobes versus Gaullists...........................................................................609.3.3 – The French Dilemma: Gaullists versus Federalists...........................................................................61

9.4 – SPEAKING HYPOTHETICALLY AGAIN.........................................................................................................639.4.1 – The Democratic Problem of Nationalist Identification......................................................................639.4.2 – Government or Regime, but not Governance.....................................................................................659.4.3 – The Mass Media’s Shortcomings: Apparent and Acknowledged.......................................................66

CHAPTER 10 – THE REASONS: THE DENIAL OF IDENTITY AND REALITY....................................68

10.1 – DETERMINING THE REASONS FOR THE DEFICIT.......................................................................................6810.1.1 – The Diverse Deficits.........................................................................................................................6810.1.2 – Identity, Reality and the Mass Media...............................................................................................6910.1.3 – Not a Democratic Deficit, but a Nationalist and Reality Deficit.....................................................71

10.2 – DEALING WITH THE DEFICIT....................................................................................................................72

Appendix I – The French Frequency Tables 2


10.2.1 – Lost in Translation? Or the Facelessness of the EU........................................................................7210.2.2 – How to Legitimise a Political Order of Multi-level Governance?...................................................73

PROPOSITIONS...................................................................................................................................................74

LITERATURE......................................................................................................................................................75

APPENDIX A – CODIFICATION FORMAT ARTICLES..............................................................................79

APPENDIX B – CODIFICATION FORMAT ARGUMENTS........................................................................80

APPENDIX C – KEYWORD SEARCH RESULTS..........................................................................................81

APPENDIX D – DUTCH ARTICLES................................................................................................................82

APPENDIX E – THE DUTCH FREQUENCY TABLES.................................................................................88

APPENDIX F – BRITISH ARTICLES...............................................................................................................92

APPENDIX G – THE BRITISH FREQUENCY TABLES...............................................................................98

APPENDIX H – FRENCH ARTICLES............................................................................................................101

APPENDIX I – THE FRENCH FREQUENCY TABLES..............................................................................107


List of Figures and Tables

FiguresFigure 2.1: The Features of the Two Republicanisms 16Figure 3.1: Scharpf’s Components of Democratic Legitimacy 21Figure 3.2: Bernard’s Components of Legitimacy 21Figure 3.3: Components of Legitimacy 22Figure 3.4: Models of Legitimacy 24Figure 5.1: Strengths and Weakness of Documentation 29Figure 5.2: The Features of the Two Republicanisms 32Figure 5.3: The Operationalisation of the Dimensions and the Components 33Figure 5.4: The Operationalisation of the Models 33

TablesTable 6.1: Dutch Distribution of Judgements 36Table 6.2: Dutch Distribution of Dimensions 37Table 6.3: Dutch Dimension * Judgement Crosstabulation 37Table 6.4: Dutch Distribution of Components 37Table 6.5: Dutch Component * Judgement Crosstabulation 38Table 6.6: Dutch Distribution of Models 38Table 6.7: Dutch Model * Judgement Crosstabulation 38 Table 6.8: Dutch Distribution of Multi-level Governance 39Table 6.9: Dutch Facets * Judgement Crosstabulation 40Table 7.1: British Distribution of Judgements 42Table 7.2: British Distribution of Dimensions 42Table 7.3: British Dimension * Judgement Crosstabulation 43Table 7.4: British Distribution of Components 43Table 7.5: British Component * Judgement Crosstabulation 43Table 7.6: British Distribution of Models 44Table 7.7: British Model * Judgement Crosstabulation 44Table 7.8: British Distribution of Multi-level Governance 45Table 7.9: British Facets * Judgement Crosstabulation 45Table 8.1: French Distribution of Judgements 47Table 8.2: French Distribution of Dimensions 48Table 8.3: French Dimension * Judgement Crosstabulation 48Table 8.4: French Distribution of Components 48Table 8.5: French Component * Judgement Crosstabulation 49Table 8.6: French Distribution of Models 49Table 8.7: French Model * Judgement Crosstabulation 49Table 8.8: French Distribution of Multi-level Governance 50Table 8.9: French Facets * Judgement Crosstabulation 51



Chapter 1 – The EU’s Democratic Deficit?

[There is a need] to improve and monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions, in order to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States.

The Nice Declaration on the Future of the EU1

From June 4th to June 7th, 2009, the people of 27 countries could vote for the European parliament. The pre-election debate in the Netherlands was dominated by the Partij van de Vrijheid (PVV)2 of the well-known Geert Wilders. The party ran on an anti-Europe platform and won four seats coming second in the Netherlands, thus many people seem to share their anti-European, nationalist sentiment.3 The legitimacy of the European Union (EU) is doubted by this party and the problem seems to be more than just democratic. For this party is not running for a more democratic EU – they want to abolish the European Parliament – but for ‘less Europe’. In their eyes, the EU should only be an economic union and national sovereignty is to become paramount once again. Their slogan is simply: For the Netherlands!4

This is interesting for the EU’s legitimacy problem is often described as a democratic deficit. This democratic deficit is a rather new problem for the European project. At the start the European project was seen as an international regime. It was not until the beginning of the 1990s that the EU became perceived as a system of multi-level government in other words another level of representative democracy (Nispen and Posseth 2007). This is also about the time when public support for the EU started to decline among the populations of the Member States. The legitimacy of the European level of governance became a political issue (Bursens and Baetens 2004: 2).

The EU’s legitimacy deficit was observable in several events over the last two decades. There was the failed referendum on the Maastricht treaty in Denmark in 1992. More recently the French, Dutch and mostly likely British no against the constitutional treaty in 1995, of which then a modified version was rejected by the Irish in October of 2008. Further, there were collective actions against the EU, like violent anti-EU protests as part of the anti-globalisation protests and protests against the Bolkenstein services directive. Finally, there is the ongoing decline in voters turnout and support in general for the EU by the public at large (Bursens and Baetens 2004: 2; Bursens and Helsen 2004).

The European political elites thus felt forced to consider the question of public acceptance of the EU. At the Nice European Council, the democratic deficit became officially acknowledged and the intent was formulated that future institutional reforms should aim tackle this problem. The Laeken Declaration (2001), the Constitutional treaty, the EC White paper on Governance, the establishment of the EC Vice-president for communication were all initiatives to tackle the EU’s democratic deficit (Ibid.).5

More thematically, Van Middelaar (2009)6 distinguishes between three ‘roads’: a German, a Roman, and a Greek ‘road’. The first focuses on the creation of a common identity – European citizenship, anthem and flag –, the second focuses on the Roman slogan of bread and games – Europeans are seduced with (economic) achievements. The third road tries to increase the role of the

1 European Council 2000 2 Party for Freedom. The translations are all my own unless stated otherwise. For the readability and consistency all non-English quotes have been translated.3 There are other possible explanations, but for argument’s sake only this one is discussed. For the election results, see the EU website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2009/results/default.htm?language=EN (accessed June 16, 2009).4 Voor Nederland! The website of the Party for Freedom is http://www.pvv-europa.nl/ (accessed May 5, 2009).5 All European treaties and declarations are available at the EU’s website: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm. 6 These roads and their meaning were explained at the Kieswijzer Live, but they are based on the reference.



citizens or more in general to improve ‘the democratic life of the Union’. 7 The European parliament was made more powerful, a constitution was to be introduced, and after its failure plan D was enacted with the aim to close the gap between the EU and its citizens through ‘communication’ (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 8). What all these initiatives have in common is their interpretation of the gap between the EU and its citizens as a democratic deficit.

1.1 – Is the Problem really Democratic?Many have linked the EU’s democratic deficit to the need for a finalité politique for the European project. The idea is that if the goal of the project is clear then the project as a whole becomes more transparent, and thus more legitimate. One of the most famous contributions to this discussion was in 2001 at Humboldt University in Berlin, when former minister of foreign affairs of Germany Joschka Fischer gave the speech: From Confederacy to Federation.

In this speech, Fischer sought a solution to the legitimacy problem of the EU and pointed toward the possibility of a European Federation. Or as he describes it: “[This speech forms] a contribution to a discussion long begun in the public arena about the ‘finality’ of European integration” (Fischer 2000: 1). The reception of his finalité politique was mixed, and criticism came from both Euro-sceptics and Euro-enthusiasts (Börzel and Risse 2000: 3). For the former, Fischer’s idea went too far from their ideal of ‘L’Europe des nations’ and violated the nation-states’ sovereignty, whilst for the latter it gave too little powers to the European level of governance and put too much emphasis on the nation-states. Fischer’s finalité politique of the European project was aimed at making Europe ready for a globalised age, in which (economic) cooperation is essential, whilst also doing justice to the historical realities of the European nation-states.8 He tried to propose a middle way between ‘L’Europe des nations’ and a full-fledged European Federal State, because these two ‘straightforward’ finalité politiques are not viable options.

Let us take a closer look at these other two finalités to understand the reasons for their unlikeliness, if not impossibility, in the foreseeable future, but also to uncover why the EU’s legitimacy deficit might not just be democratic in nature. First, returning to ‘L’Europe des nations’ is a highly unlikely road to travel down. Many sovereign powers of the nation-states are already effectively bundled at the European level of governance – the pooling of sovereignty. A return to the former situation seems unconceivable, but also unwanted, because of the historic achievement of the EU to bring peace and prosperity to a traditionally war-torn continent. Further, the EU’s problem-solving capabilities and competitiveness are needed in a global age. So much for the first finalité.

But also a European Federal State seems very unlikely to emerge anytime soon. Let us start with the nation-state’s perspective. The problem of full-fledged federalisation lies with the national political elites. Even though the EU is seen as important, they do not want to give away all their power.9 Political power is never easily surrendered. Still, the national political elites cannot turn away from the EU for, as already pointed out, they depend upon on it. In this regard the relationship between the EU and the Member States is much like a pro-wrestling match. Pro-wrestlers trade punches and some blows actually connect, but in the end they need each other. For what is the superstar without the jobber? The relationship is symbiotic. The problem is clearly not democratic in nature.

7 A Constitution for Europe: Title VI of the first Part of the Constitution (Articles I-45 to I-52). http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/democracy_en.htm (accessed May 29, 2009).8 “... it would be an irreparable mistake in the construction of Europe if one were to try to complete political integration against the existing national institutions and traditions rather than by involving them. … The completion of European integration can only be successfully conceived if it is done on the basis of a division of sovereignty between Europe and the nation-state” (Fischer 2000: 6). 9 This reluctance was observed for example during the OMC negotiations (Bekkers et al. 2007: 249-250).



There is though another non-democratic obstacle. The European political elites have tried to tackle the EU’s democratic deficit. The result is that the European institutions are broadly speaking democratic in nature: an elected parliament, commissioners appointed by democratically legitimised heads of state and both democratic bodies play an important role within decision-making procedures. 10 Democratic institutions are a necessary condition for the legitimacy of a democratic political order, but they are apparently not sufficient. The ‘European success’ of Wilders seems to indicate: people feel more closely connected to their own nation-states. They perceive national governments as legitimate and Brussels as a threat to their sovereignty. As Fisher observes people are loyal to their country and not to the ‘faceless, soulless Eurocracy in Brussels’ (2000: 1). The democratic improvements are perceived as the start of European federalisation, which is seen as an assault on the national identity and sovereignty. The peoples of Europe might then paradoxically themselves be a non-democratic obstacle or rather European democratisation is the source of the democratic deficit.

Yet, in this internationally connected world, problems have become increasingly more complex and ‘borderless’ and so have their solutions. People expect national governments to solve these problems. Democratic institutions were created and expended on the European level of governance in order to tackle these problems, but they are not perceived as legitimate by those, who indirectly demanded them.

Thus we find that both from the Member States’ as the peoples’ perspective, the EU is an illegitimate necessity: We cannot live with or without it. The legitimacy problem is clearly more than just democratic: there are problems related to (state) sovereignty and people’s loyalty. If the legitimacy deficit is not just democratic what then are the reasons for it?

1.2 – Aiming to Understand in order to Overcome This research aims to uncover reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit and so hope to help overcome it. The first important assumption is, as Carl J. Friedrich (1974) argues, that legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder: No legitimacy without perception thereof. Normative theories applied as objective standards to reality are meaningless in themselves. Legitimacy lies in people’s perception of reality in combination with the theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy. One might assume that the problem is that discussions on the EU’s legitimacy, at least those which result in the analysis of a democratic deficit, focus exclusively on objective democratic standards rather than people’s perceptions.

Another reason for this exclusive focus on democratic standards might be a flawed understanding of the nation-state’s legitimacy combined with the also flawed assumption that nation-states do not have a democratic deficit. Istvan Hont (2005) shows that the legitimacy of the nation-state is built on the basis of two versions of republicanism: universalist and nationalist. These republicanisms have mutated, taken each other’s place from time-to-time, are often not compatible, and even at odds with one another. The nation-states would also fail to meet the universalist democratic standards of legitimacy, but because their legitimacy is also based on the principles of nationalist republicanism they are seen as legitimate. In nationalist republicanism, which nowadays is often more salient, we might find an explanation for both Member States’ resistance and people’s lack of connection with the EU.

Another important element for our understanding of the EU’s legitimacy deficit is placing it within the context of Europe as an emerging novel political order of multi-level governance (Bekkers et al. 2007: 14; Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 392). Our ideas of legitimacy might still assume a hierarchical government structure of the nation-state, but this system of governance has become outdated (e.g. Bekkers et al. 2007; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). The European political elites focus on

10 EU-expert Rinus van Schedelen argued during the Kieswijzer Live that the European Parliament is more influential compared to the national parliament of the Netherlands.



democratic legitimacy, but our ideas of democratic legitimacy are not developed for the current reality. This mismatch between theory and reality might further explain the EU’s legitimacy deficit.

As said, legitimacy depends on the eye of the ‘beholders’ and therefore public discourse is important. In large modern societies, public discourse is mediated by the mass media. Their role though is not undisputed and may partially contribute to the EU’s legitimacy deficit (Bursens and Baetens 2004; Liebert and Trentz 2008). Therefore the mass media is also considered as a possible contributing source to the legitimacy deficit.

By analysing the EU’s legitimacy deficit within the wider historical discourse on legitimacy, this research aims to do more justice to the complexity of salient ideas contained in the ‘democratic consensus’ and their influence on the perception of the EU. Further it aims to understand the legitimacy deficit by investigating how normative principles – universalist and nationalist republicanism, and democratic theory – influence perceptions of the EU’s legitimacy and how they relate to empirical developments – globalisation, multi-level governance, state interests and people’s loyalty. This is important for legitimacy can only be achieved if theory and reality are in sync in perception.11

1.3 – The Central Research QuestionThe problem definition and the aim presented above form the basis for the central research question, which goes as follows:

What are the reasons for the European Union’s legitimacy deficitand how can this deficit be overcome?

The first part of the central research question is explanatory, but more is expected from research for a master’s thesis in the field of public administration. It should also offer (policy) advice on how one might solve the problem or at least point in the direction of possible solutions, hence the second part of the central research question.

Several research questions are formulated that will systematically guide us toward this goal.

1. How is the modern nation-state legitimised?

This question is theoretical in nature and it is the set up for the first part of the theoretical framework. Two related issues are discussed from a historical perspective. First, a definition of legitimacy is introduced, namely as a consensus, which is different from the one usually adapted by scholars within the field of public administration. Then we will investigate the consensus that has developed on our current political order: the nation-state. A political order dependent on two versions of republicanism – universalist and nationalist – enshrined in mongrel concepts.

2. What are the different facets that form the legitimacy of a political order?

After the historical, some might say, philosophical approach to legitimacy, this second research question will return us to the for many more familiar territory of public administration. The common approach to legitimacy within public administration is introduced and arguments given for rejecting it. Then a component framework of legitimacy is developed with which we can analyse the role the idea of representative democracy plays within the current discourse. A discussion of the concept of multi-level governance as the system of EU governance and its relation to legitimacy forms the third part of

11 On the importance of discourse and the role of ideas and reality in this for politics(/political philosophy), see e.g. Blom (2005), Van Middelaar (1999: 155 - 166) or Pettit (1997: 1-2).



this chapter. The distinction between models of direct and indirect legitimacy is introduced in order to make sense of this reality. The components, models and the two versions of republicanism are the basis for a multi-faceted understanding of legitimacy.

3. What is the influence of the mass media on the legitimacy of a political order?

The public discourse is where we can find the consensus on legitimacy or lack thereof. As said in modern societies public discourse is mediated by the mass media. The mass media’s role as objective mediator is often criticised. In chapter four, the last theoretical chapter, we will discuss the ideal of public discourse and the role of the mass media, but more importantly the (imperfect) role they actually play with regard to the EU’s legitimacy.

4. How will the EU’s legitimacy deficit be investigated?

This question is the methodological question of the research questions, which is discussed in chapter five. What is the research strategy? What are the methods of inquiry chosen and why? What are their strengths, weaknesses and how could they limit the research? Finally, the framework of analysis is operationalised and three hypotheses are formulated.

5. How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in the Netherlands?6. How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in the United Kingdom?7. How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in France?

These three questions guide the empirical chapters on the three discourses. The quantitative findings of the research are presented, but neither interpretation nor comparison will yet be given. At the end of these chapters one should have developed a preliminary understanding of the role different facets of legitimacy play in the perception of the EU’s legitimacy deficit in each country.

8. What are the similarities and differences between these public discourses?

It is this question that gives us ‘the full story’. In chapter nine, the quantitative data of the three discourses is compared then they are placed in their qualitative context. This narrative approach to the findings will uncover the full ‘stories’ hidden behind the numbers and also check their reliability.

1.4 – What is the Research’s Significance?The research’s significance is important to address. The academic significance is shown by placing this research within the current body of knowledge and then showing its novelty. The democratic legitimacy of the EU has become a ‘top priority’ on the European agenda, but it is not just on the political agenda, also many scholars have tried to come to terms with Europe’s (democratic) legitimacy deficit (c.f. Bursens and Baetens 2004: 1).

In order to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy deficit this research draws from four bodies of knowledge: first, the literature on theories of (democratic) legitimacy (e.g. Beetham and Lord 1998; Bernard 2001; Scharpf 1999) and secondly, the literature on multi-level governance (e.g. Bekkers et al. 2007; Marks 1993; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996). The third body of knowledge is on the role of the public sphere, public discourse and the mass media, in general and with regards to the legitimacy of (democratic) political orders, specifically the EU (e.g. Oosterbaan and Wansink 2008; Ward 2004). The final body of knowledge is a historical perspective on legitimacy: specifically of the nation-state and the role of nationalism in this process (Hont 2005).



The combination of theories of (democratic) legitimacy, multi-level governance and the role of the mass media are not new in analyses of the EU’s legitimacy deficit (e.g. Bursens and Baetens 2004; Liebert and Trentz 2008; Peters et al. 2005). The application of Istvan Hont’s historical perspective is the novelty of the research. The use of a historical analysis is relatively new within the field of public administration in general, but it is quickly catching on. Case-in-point is that the central theme of Festival der Bestuurskunde 2009: Democratie tussen Wal en Schip 12 was the application of the counter-factual approach to the future of democracy: A historical method applied to the realm of politics. The novel application of historical analysis in this research will enhance the body of knowledge on the subject of the EU’s legitimacy deficit.

Now for the practical significance of this research. Gambling with legitimacy is for any political order a form of Russian roulette, but for a novel political order the odds are stacked against it. Would legitimacy break down then the road of reasoned elaborations is closed. A political order that does not want to disappear will then either have to resort to bribery or worse force (Matheson 1987). 13 But even if the system does not break down completely there could be serious consequences if the peoples do not perceive the EU as legitimate. Larry Siedentop asks: “How will [the nation-states] react if disillusionment with the European project as an ‘elitist conspiracy’ creates a resurgence of nationalism?” (2000: 224-225). Whether extreme left or right rises to the occasion neither presents an attractive alternative to democratic politics.14 Siedentop wrote this in 2000 and one might recognize this disillusionment in the success of the PVV and other nationalist parties in the last European elections.

So much for the societal significance and urgency of the subject matter, but there is also a contribution to the everyday life of policy practitioners. If the EU is not perceived as legitimate then as a result neither are EU-regulation and policy-procedures. For practitioners in the field of public administration this means the legitimacy deficit taints all policy. This research might help us understand the reasons for the legitimacy deficit, which in turn might lead to better policies for solving it. This is necessary for the EU is not going to disappear, because Member States have an interest in keeping it, but it is a source of authority, which needs legitimacy for its policies to be accepted.

1.5 – Plan de CampagneThe plan de campagne is as follows: The next three chapters – 2, 3 and 4 – form the theoretical framework of the research. In the subsequent chapter a definition of legitimacy and Hont’s analysis of the nation-state’s legitimacy are introduced. In chapter three, two important concepts are ‘unpacked’ – democracy and multi-level governance – and related to legitimacy. This will lead to a multi-faceted understanding of the legitimacy of a (democratic) political order and how it is, often implicitly, conceptualised. Chapter four discusses the ideal and actual role of the mass media within modern society in relation to public discourse and legitimacy. The fifth chapter tackles methodological issues and the analytical framework and hypotheses are introduced.

12 The Festival of Public Administration 2009: Democracy between a Rock and a Hard place. The proverb directly translates: Democracy between ship and quay.13 Scharpf points out that the consensus after the break down of communism in the Western World is that force is no option – it is both morally wrong and economically inefficient (1999: 5). Although the analysis is correct, it would be naive to leap to the conclusion it will thus never be resorted to again. Admittedly, Scharpf does not necessarily imply that.14 Siedentop (2000) reminds the reader throughout his book that there is no guarantee that the push for further integration – federalisation – will simply turn out alright, because it has done so many times before. As a saying in the Netherlands goes: past results are no guarantee for the future. For a more philosophical criticism of the utopian believe in progress, see John Gray’s argument on the basis of his book Black Mass (2007) in Tegenlicht: In Gesprek met John Gray (Counterlight: A Conversation with John Gray). Accessible via: http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/index.php/aflevering?aflID=9454438&md5=b8fd21a51c91bf34fa1bf263d2b5fe6d (accessed June 21, 2009).



Then we will arrive at the empirical part of the research. In chapters six, seven and eight, the empirical findings of respectively the Dutch, British and French discourse are presented and analysed. How many observations are positive? What role do the different facets play? And is the reality of multi-level governance taken into account? The ninth chapter is a discussion of these findings. The discussion is roughly divided into three parts: a quantitative part, a qualitative part and the testing of the hypotheses. The final chapter presents the conclusion followed by recommendations for policy initiatives and further research.


Chapter 2 – A Historical Perspective on Modern Legitimacy

Legitimacy is in some sense the political scientist's equivalent of the economist’s invisible hand: we know it exists as a force that holds societies together, but we cannot give very satisfactory explanations of how to create it or why it is sometimes very strong and sometimes seems to disappear.

Deborah Stone15

[L]egitimacy can be achieved only when there exists a prevalent belief as to what provides a rightful title to rule.

Carl J. Friedrich16

In this chapter, a historical approach to legitimacy is presented. First, a definition of legitimacy is given. Then we will look at Istvan Hont’s analysis of the nation-state’s legitimacy. From his analysis two versions of republicanism are distilled. Finally, we will see how these republicanisms still inhabit two modern concepts – the nation-state and sovereignty –, which legitimize the current democratic political order.

2.1 – Legitimacy is in the Eye of the BeholdersLegitimacy is a notion applied to relationships of command and obedience. In these relationships there are a power-holder(s) and power-subjects. Historically, legitimacy was seen by power-holders as a cost-effective alternative to coercive or reward-based authority. It is a reasoned elaboration of why the command and obedience relationship is rightful. Reasoned elaborations (legitimatisations) constitute types of explanations or understandings of authority.17 They have the dual function of both explaining and justifying the social order and its moral basis (Matheson 1987: 199-200).18

But for reasoned elaborations to be an effective alternative there has to be a consensus on what makes a power-holder’s authority legitimate. The ancient Greeks connected the right to rule to the general question of what is right, but in medieval times this link was severed. There was a general consensus on the divine rule of kings, probably most systematically put forward by Sir Robert Filmer in Patriarchia or the Natural Power of Kings (1680; McClelland 1996: 231), but no consensus on what was right or more specifically which Christianity was the true gospel. The two questions – what is right and what makes rule rightful – are connected, but they do have to be distinguished (Friedrich 1974: 111-112). In short, if there is no consensus on what constitutes rightful rule then legitimacy cannot be established.

For the authority of the power-holder(s) to be perceived as legitimate there has to be a consensus on what makes it so. This draws attention to a very important element of legitimacy: It is ultimately in the eye of the beholder or in this case beholders. Legitimacy is a social artefact, which means it is the product of social beings or their behaviour (Babbie 2001: G10). Legitimacy is socially constructed19: the power-subjects, but also power-holders, in their interactions (hope to) establish a

15 Stone 2002: 28516 Friedrich 1974: 11117 For specific types, see e.g. Matheson (1987) or Friedrich (1974).18 This partially explains why for an account of legitimacy to function it has to do justice to reality. For if it is not in line with reality it cannot explain, much less justify a political order.19 (Social-)constructivism is a scientific paradigm, although interesting it goes too far to go into further detail here. For more information, see e.g. Babbie (2001) or Robson (2002).


consensus on what gives the power-holder the right to rule. In the case of highly symbolic social-construct, such as legitimacy, discourse and thus rhetoric play an important role.20

So where does this leave us? Legitimacy is a reasoned elaboration on why a relationship of command and obedience is rightful. Further, there has to be consensus on what establishes this rightfulness. This implies that legitimacy is ultimately in the eye of the beholders. Friedrich gives us the following definition, which includes these three elements:

[Legitimacy refers to] a very particular kind of consensus which concerns the question of the right or title to rule or to govern (1974: 112).

The one important addition made in this definition is that it focuses on the right ‘to rule and to govern’. This makes it a definition of political or state legitimacy, rather than just any command-obedience relationship. The legitimacy of an emerging political order is the subject of this research and therefore this definition is fitting.21

2.2 – The Nation-State’s Legitimacy: A Tale of Two RepublicanismsThe EU’s legitimacy deficit might be the result of a flawed understanding of the current consensus on the legitimacy of our political order: the nation-state. Let us therefore investigate the origins of this consensus in more detail in order to understand how the EU’s (policy) focus on democratic legitimacy might (further) obscure an already often salient component of state legitimacy.

For a historical account of the nation-state’s legitimacy we will turn to Istvan Hont. In ‘The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: “Nation State” and “Nationalism” in Historical Perspective’, which is chapter seven of his Jealousy of Trade, Hont analysis the origins of the legitimacy of the nation-state. The title of the book refers to David Hume’s essay “Of the Jealousy of Trade” (1758). “Hume’s idea reflects the moment [that inaugurates] ‘global market competition as a primary state activity’” (Blaazer 2007: 507), because the “acquisition of external economic resources was deemed essential for both self-preservation and grandezza”(Saksena 2008: 189). This jealousy of trade might still play an important, although nowadays often salient, role in the legitimacy of the modern democratic nation-state.

2.2.1 – Hont’s Account of a Divided MankindThe nation-state’s legitimacy is the result of a process in which both circumstances and ideas, of which the latter were corrupted and adapted, play a role. This process resulted in a consensus founded on a mixed heritage of nationalist and universalist republicanism. What follows is a summarised version of Hont’s account of this process.

States by definition claim territory, and the nation-state is no different. What is different is that the nation-state makes a collectivity into the self-governing owner of that territory, making rule a matter of property right. Earlier political theorists argued that the globe belong to the whole of humankind, thus no one or group in particular. The possession of land by the nation had to be ‘legitimised through a quasi-historical explanation’ (Hont 2005: 452), such as first occupation – ‘a leap from fact to right’ (Ibid.). The state became the defender of private property, but how the nation fundamentally got its hands on national (communal) property remains unclear.22

20 Neo-Machiavellians, like Claude Lefort (Middelaar 1999), would argue discourse is of paramount importance to politics.21 For the purposes of this research, the term legitimacy will refer to the legitimacy of a political order (political legitimacy). The philosophical thesis of philosophical anarchism (Christiano 2004) argues that there is no legitimacy possible for state authority. Although this is an interesting intellectual exercise, it is completely severed from reality and thus useless for an empirical account of legitimacy, and as some argue political philosophy in general (e.g. Claude Lefort. In: Middelaar 1999).



This idea of the nation having the right to self-government within their territory is in current discourse often related to nationalism, but this is not the original use of the term. Nationalism used to refer to the system of absolutist monarchs pursuing their own ‘national’ interests. It describes the state-building efforts of these absolute monarchs, who through ‘complex unification processes welded together previously separate territorial entities’ (Ibid., 457). An important part of these state-building processes was the creation of fiscal-military institutions, which lead to further homogenisation of the populations. These institutions made it possible for these monarchs to claim ‘the’ loyalty of ‘their’ subjects instead of having to persuade feudal aristocracy, as they had done before. Central to the monarch’s ‘claim to loyalty’ of the population is the idea of the nation. In order to understand its persuasiveness we have to go to the French Revolution.

The French Revolution was a revolution against what the Revolutionaries saw as an ‘entire system of corrupt interstate power relations’ (Ibid., 509). The Revolution pursued universal, humanist goals and criticised

... the entire history of separation of peoples, and in particular to the rise of modern European states after the medieval period. More specifically, ‘nationalism’ as a term was deployed to criticize modern sovereignty and reason of state [raison d’État] (Ibid.).

This is the permanent crisis of a divided mankind, but it was ironically during the Revolution that the idea of the nation was given its current shape. The Jacobins confusingly referred to the people/civitas – a political notion – as the nation – a cultural notion. The nation comes out of the Revolution as an economic association of man (Sieyès), which has one common will (Hobbes, Sieyès), is its own sovereign (the Jacobins), owner of its national territory (philosophers of right), but also is a cultural unity (Herder) in a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ (Hobbes, Sieyès, philosophers of right); all this effectively places economics, politics and (ethnic-)culture into a single concept.23

Another important ‘confusing’ idea introduced in the Revolution was the idea of republican patriotism. In its traditional form it emphasises military virtues. The combination of this form of patriotism and the idea of the nation made it possible for the Revolutionaries to raise support for their cause and inspire their ‘conscript’ armies. In the aftermath of the revolution, this interpretation of patriotism was utilised by the ‘nationalising’ monarchs, who raised support and created legitimacy for their rule.24

But this was not the Jacobins’ original version of patriotism. That version was inspired by universalist republicanism. One was a patriot out of love for humanity and the principles were enshrined in the democratic institutions of one’s republic. In this version of republicanism humanistic ideals have to be forwarded by democratic governments in accordance with the rule of law in order for these institutions to be legitimate and deserve support. Legitimacy (support) is thus conditional, but humanist patriotism was corrupted into unconditional support for a nation’s monarch. The monarch became the representative of the will of the nation and in this role gained the support of the (cultural) nation, which people could identify with. Monarchs used this support in the pursuit of power politics and furthering trade interests in other words the raison d’État or at this time still the raison de roy.

One of the most important features of Hont’s account is that it explains that apparently democratic terms, which are used in discourse today as self explanatory, in origin embrace both these republican heritages and both still influence the terms today. The nation-state is a child of complex

22 As Hont remarks: “We still do not (and perhaps cannot) possess a theory that can provide an ultimate justification of national boundaries” (2005: 451).23 ‘[T]he relationship between [...] ethnic solidarity and commercial sociability’ (Blaazer 2007, p. 507).24 ‘[T]he revolutionary politics became transplanted into a postrevolutionary world and its principles absorbed into the politics of the larger ‘nation-states’ of Europe, which had stood against the revolution’ (Hont 2005: 522).



ideological struggles between nationalism and universalism.25 This struggle is enshrined in ‘mongrel concepts’ (Blaazer 2007, p. 509), such as popular sovereignty and nation-state. Choices by modern democratic nation-states still have to balance the demands of democracy and the raison d’État in order to survive. This tension is thus the result of the incongruent concepts on which their legitimacy is founded.

2.2.2 – Universalist and Nationalist RepublicanismThe legitimacy of the nation-state is built upon two versions of republicanism: nationalist and universalist. The features of the two republicanisms are going to be presented in their ideal form. The distinction between them will lead to clarity, which was lost in the process of state formation and is still lost in today’s discourse. This clarity is important to understand the mongrel concepts and actual discourse for in both cases the republicanisms are meshed together without further thought, but not without consequence.

Universalist republicanism is humanist, democratic and normative in nature. Its modern roots lie in the Jacobins’ ideals. The first feature is that, as the name suggests, it is universalistic. The aim of the French Revolution was humanistic and not nationalist. The Jacobins ultimately wanted to create an international – in modern terms: global – peaceful community of people ridden from the tyrannical and divisive rule of the monarchs – in the French case l’Ancient Regime. Institutions that promote the universalist goal deserve the loyalty of the people. The virtuous face of patriotism supports humane republican institutions as the only legitimate institutions. The second aspect is that universalist republicanism is de-territorialised. The goal of the institutions is universal, which means that territory essentially does not matter. The institutions rule over a certain area formed on contingent historical basis, but these territorial units are not allowed to interfere with and are completely inferior to the universalist goal. This brings us to the third aspect: universalist republicanism was anti-state and for ‘the people’. The nation has different interest than the state – l’Ancient Regime: monarchs and aristocrats. The fourth element is the democratic nature of universalist republicanism. The republican institutions have to represent the sovereign people, which thus should rule themselves instead of rule by any specific class. The fifth element is the rule of law. In humanist republics the right to be free of domination is the highest political value. In order to accomplish this all men must be treated as equals under the same law: the rule of law (Viroli 2002).26

Nationalist republicanism combines two elements: raison d’État and nationalism. The distinction is artificial, but analytically useful. Nationalism is the ‘reasoned elaboration’ to legitimize the rule of the centralist monarchs, in which the people are imagined as a homogeneous nation often culturally defined.27 The idea of the nation became a corruption of the people – at least from the Jacobins’ perspective. It made the people perceive state-interests inspired by the raison d’État as their interests. States could legitimatize and even mobilize people in pursuit of their own interests by presenting themselves as representatives of the nation. Their interests became the people’s ‘national’ interests. The first feature of nationalist republicanism is that states are nationalist in scope. Secondly, it is territorial, because the main goal of (nation-)states is to own territory. The state used to be the centralised monarch, as Louis XIV put it: “L‘État, C’est moi.”, but nowadays it is replaced by a self-governing nation. Thirdly, it is lead by the raison d’État, which central aim is its own state interests

25 A similar account although with more emphasis on commerce’s role is given by Koen Stapelbroek (2007).26 Viroli’s interpretation of republicanism as humanist in nature and would not call nationalism a form of republicanism. Therefore what Viroli calls republicanism here is called universalist republicanism. 27 Often, but that does not necessarily mean always. Who the people of the nation are was and is subject to whomever the state could convincingly fit into the category, rather than any ‘objective’ criteria. The different criteria were used if they would help legitimize the ruler or claim more territory (or any other political goal). This is where the many influences on the idea of the nation – political, economic and cultural – came in useful. It could also account for our current, often confusing, debates on national identity and citizenship.



rather than peace on earth. Fourthly, its main goals are preservation of the state (powers) and grandezza – wealth and bragging rights. In order to accomplish both, the state has to compete in trade. Commercial interests are thus the fourth feature of this type of republicanism. Finally, trade wars or threat thereof are sometimes necessary. This makes military interests vital to this version of republicanism. Here the Spartan idea of patriotism fighting out of love for one’s country (and its interests) comes in useful to create a relatively cheap, but possibly fiercely loyal and committed army. This analysis of the features of republicanism leads to the following scheme:

Universalist Republicanism Nationalist RepublicanismHumanist Nationalist

De-Territorial TerritorialPeople Raison d’État

Democratic Institutions Commercial InterestsRule of Law Militaristic

Figure 2.1: The Features of the Two Republicanisms

2.3 – Mongrel Concepts in Modern DiscourseIn reality, these republicanisms have mutated, taken each other’s place from time-to-time, are often not compatible, and even at odds with one another within what David Blaazer has strikingly called ‘mongrel concepts’. We will take a closer look at the two most important mongrel concepts – the nation-state and national sovereignty – and explain how nationalist republicanism is hidden in modern discourse.

2.3.1 – The Nation-State...The nation-state was essentially a victory for absolutising monarchs. It combines two different interests: the people’s and the state’s.28 Nationalising monarch corrupted people into seeing their (state) interests as their interests by representing them as one nation and then the monarch as the will of that nation.29 Nowadays these interests have theoretically converged, because the people are the rulers of the state. The nation-states – nationalist republicanism – have become democratic states – universalist republicanism.

This convergence is only theoretical, because the raison d’État is still important. Politicians have to balance the books to some extent and pursue economic prosperity, therefore trade interests and military interventions can still be important. These are in part important to sustain government, exercise power and make it possible to pursue popular policy for important groups, whose support is needed to get re-elected and thus to stay in power. Politicians will therefore at times still follow raison d’État and not pursue policy in the direct interest of the majority of the people, let alone humanity. On the other hand, fiscal stability and economic prosperity are also important for societies with a capitalist system, in which jobs depend on economic growth. Further, politicians will hope to enact the best 28 Brain Singer gives a more positive, but interesting interpretation in this regard about the significance of the hyphened as both separating state and civil society (the nation), whilst at the same time connecting them (1996).29 The need for this nationalisation was the divine right legitimacy fell from grace, so to say, because of the bloodshed of religious wars and the justification of monarchomachs – king killings. The new source of legitimacy of the monarchs’ authority, which also suited their centralising ambitions, were national documents – constitutions. This type of legitimacy is called national constitutionalism (Lloyd 1991).



policy for the majority and not just because it will lead to popular support. The state’s and the people’s interests are connected and more converged in a democratic system, but there is no complete overlap.

Furthermore, the idea of the nation itself has become common ground and people have become attached to their national identities. It is therefore possible for part of or even the entire political program of a party to be the pursuit of ‘the nation’s interests’ (identity politics). The identity itself is felt sincerely, but is vague, hence the fierce debates surrounding the national identity in many European countries. For states, the problem is finding an inclusive notion of identity for immigrants, but which is more than ‘merely’ a political identity, because that does not create the attachment wanted from it by both state and people (WRR 2007: 103).

The democratic nation-states still balance universalist and nationalist values. There is a democratic deficit on the level of the nation-state, but it is obscured by the fact that state-interests are hidden behind a veil of rhetoric: the nation-state acts in the interest of the nation – even when this might not be apparent. People’s sincerely felt national (cultural) identity is rhetorically politicized as a means to support the state. In order to further understand this ‘corruption’, we will analyse another mongrel concept: popular sovereignty.

2.3.2 – and (National/Popular) Sovereignty...Sovereignty30 is also referred to as national or popular sovereignty. The multiple pre-scripts almost tell the entire story on their own. To understand sovereignty and more importantly its dual heritage and recognize it in discourse today, we are going to treat the ‘nation’ and the ‘people’ as images of two different communities following Bernard Yack (2001). Note the two images are nowadays used interchangeably and the distinction is conceptual rather than linguistic (Ibid., 520). The images are different ways we can imagine ourselves bound together in community.

[The nation is] an image of community over time. What binds us into national communities is our image of a shared heritage that is passed, in modified form, from one generation to another (Ibid.; Emphasis in original).

Yack notes that this is an a-political pre-state view of what a nation is. It is based on the idea that nations existed before states. Smith (2001), Hont (2005: 463) and Viroli (2002: 87) make similar points, although it is not uncontested.31 Opposed to this stands the relatively modern notion of the people.

The people, in contrast, presents an image of community over space. It portrays all individuals within the given boundaries of a state as members of a community from which the state derives its legitimate authority […] the whole body of a territory's inhabitants imagined as the final or sovereign judge of how the state's authority should be constructed and employed (Yack 2001: 520-521; Emphasis in original).

The people32 are thus the source of legitimacy of a state. The term is used in struggles over political authority or competitions for political power. They exist by right and ‘[t]o assert or deny its existence is a matter of ideology rather than a matter of sociology’ (Ibid., 521). The people are a principle of legitimacy and need no nurturing for they are asserted into being as a solution to the legitimacy problems of the modern state.

30 Hont traces popular sovereignty philosophical origin back to the works of Hobbes and Bodin.31 In the literature on nationalism there are discussions on the nature and age of nations. These discussions though do not help clarify the distinction and will not be solved here either, for more on these discussion see: Chapter 3: Paradigms in Smith (2001: 43-61).32 The people is a notion drawn from earlier notions like plebs and demos, but transforms both. The plebs is multitude, but the people is all people within the community. The demos is transformed from a governing sovereign to a constituent sovereign (Yack 2001: 521-522).



The people in the doctrine of popular sovereignty is not the majority who rule – governing sovereignty – but are the owners of political authority, who can decide on who governs them. 33 Hont calls this ‘indirect sovereignty’34, because the people are not necessarily sovereigns – they could opt for monarchical government –, but it is ‘a proprietary right’. The notion does tend to favour democracy, because the sovereign people can extend consent through accountability and the election of office holders (Ibid., 518-519).

This idea of indirect sovereignty ‘tends both to nationalize our understanding of politics and to politicize our understanding of nationality’ (Ibid., 520). This is possible, because the concept of the people has two important shortcomings: first it is a very abstract notion (Ibid., 522) and secondly, if the people are the constituent of the state this means they are a pre-political community as well as a post-political community. The post-political community derives its borders from the state, but where did the pre-political community derive them from? The abstractness of the notion and the question of the pre-political borders are the main reasons that the people became a sovereign nation. The nation went from a cultural to a political notion.35

This explains that although nowadays popular sovereignty is seen as a democratic principle it also has a more cultural connotation. In discussion on the EU this surfaces when reference is made to national sovereignty. The two terms – popular and national sovereignty – might be seen as representatives of the two versions of republicanism, but this would be a mistake, because the distinction is conceptual and not linguistic.

2.3.3 – in Modern DiscourseIn modern discourse, state-interests and power are often hidden behind a veil of democratic discourse. The nation is seen as the equivalent of the people and thus invoking the nation is associated with democracy. Case-in-point is that the European political elites tried to create a common identity (the German road) to overcome the democratic deficit. The point here is not the possible strength of this method. One might convincingly argue it has been and still is a very successful way of creating nation-state legitimacy. The point is that it is not a democratic form of legitimacy.

Another example of how nationalist republicanism has become salient in modern discourse is that the term nation-state is nowadays used as a descriptive term. The national level is a description of a level of governance in contrast to the regional, municipal and supranational levels. The concept has seemingly been completely severed from both its republican roots. This is not actually the case rather it has gained this third ‘neutral’ meaning. Some argue this is part of its current strength and use to (democratic) states36, but it is also the source of confusion for the three meanings are often hard to separate.

The two republicanisms still reside in the mongrel concepts that are central to the legitimacy of modern democracies. The non-democratic side of this heritage might account for the EU’s legitimacy problems related to the strong identification of people with their nation-state or lack thereof with the EU. Further, behind arguments of national sovereignty and identity might still hide state interests and power, rather than the people’s best interests.

33 Friedrich calls this the importance of the power-subjects approval for modern legitimacy (1974).34 ‘Popular sovereignty became mediated, or represented, instead of direct’ (Hont 2005: 465).35 Yack does not see replacing the people by the nation as a ‘sleight of hand’. For him the two play different roles: the nation is the pre-institutional community, while the people represent the community’s inclusiveness. ‘[T]o represent the pre-institutional people of popular sovereignty theory as a nation, all one needs is imagination and some cultural heritage of shared symbols and memories on which to call’ (2001: 526). Still, it creates an exclusive and unconditional common which is hard to present as democratic let alone universal in nature.36 Michael Billig coins the term banal nationalism with regards to the apparent neutrality and everydayness of nationality, whilst pointing out that is still actually packs a punch, so to say (1995). One might argue that the banality is less at the moment, because nationalism is more in the foreground today than when he wrote his book.


Chapter 3 – On Legitimacy, Democracy and Governance

[There is an] inherent tension between the rules for representational democracy and the empirical practice and implicit rules of governance networks[, which] challenges the hegemony of the state and, by implication, the construction of ‘the people’ as the self-regulating sovereign.

Erik-Hans Klijn and Chris Skelcher37

In this chapter, a multi-faceted understanding of legitimacy will be developed. We have seen that legitimacy of the nation-state is based on two versions of republicanism, but since then ideas on democracy have moved on and circumstances have changed. The EU wants to be a legitimate democratic order that uses modern governance techniques. The problem is that legitimacy, democracy and governance are what Bekkers et al. refer to as ‘fuzzy concepts’, which like most central concepts in social science have no clear meaning, but an inherently positive connotation (2007: 5). Before unpacking democracy and governance in relation to legitimacy, we will first take a look at public administration’s usual definition of legitimacy.

3.1 – Public Administration on LegitimacyIn the previous chapter, legitimacy was defined as a consensus, which diverges from the usual ‘public administration definition’. Legitimacy is more often defined as a threefold concept. Consisting of legality, rightfulness or normative justifiability, and finally, shared acceptance of the process or legitimation (e.g. Beetham and Lord 1998: 4-5; Bekkers et al. 2007: 40-41; Bursens and Baetens 2004: 4; Thomassen 2007: 6).

The first condition of legality is that a political order is legitimate if ‘political authority is acquired and exercised in according to established rules’ (Bursens and Baetens 2004: 4). 38 C.W. Morrison makes an interesting addition when he stresses that decisions have to be ‘recognized as lawful, just or rightful’ (1998: 37; Emphasis added). Secondly, there is normative justifiability, which refers to the ideological context in which a political order takes decisions. A political order must govern in accordance to broadly accepted social beliefs (Bursens and Baetens 2004: 4). Thirdly, there is legitimation as the explicit expression of approval and confirmation of legitimate positions of powers by power-subjects and other legitimate authorities (Beetham and Lord 1998).

Legitimation comes closest to our definition, but approval need not be explicit. One might even argue that tacit consent implies stronger legitimation, because legitimacy surfaces either when it is threatened (Bernard 2001: 26)39 or nonexistent, as is too some extent the case with the EU, in both cases legitimacy is weak. On the other hand, when a political order is under threat from external dangers it is strong, as we saw in the aftermath of 9/11 in George W. Bush’s approval ratings.

More importantly, this threefold concept hides a division between objective and subjective legitimacy. Legitimacy can be objectively determined by analysing if it meets standards – legal or normative – or whether it is perceived as right by the relevant beholders. In this research, the idea of objective legitimacy of political order is dismissed as unrealistic, because a state cannot be objectively legitimate if it is not perceived as such: no legitimacy without perception thereof. Therefore this conception of legitimacy is rejected.40

37 Klijn and Skelcher 2007: 59338 In this regard the fact that legitimacy is derived from the Latin lex (law) is often stressed.39 Bursens and Baetens make a similar point with regards to coverage by the mass media (2004: 16).40 Some ‘objective’ aspects of this definition will return in the analytical framework of the discourse, because they play a role in people’s (implicit) conceptualisation of legitimacy.


3.2 – Legitimacy and Representative Democracy: ComponentsDemocracy41 is what Deborah Stone calls a ‘motherhood issue’: ‘In the abstract every one supports them, but the struggle begins when we start to ask what they mean’ (2002: 12).42 There are numerous definitions, accounts and classifications of democracy circulating in academic literature.43 Founding Father of the United States of America Abraham Lincoln eloquently described the basic principle of a democratic political order in the Gettysburg address as: “… government of the people, by the people, for the people” (In: Friedrich 1974: 37).

When in discourse ‘democracy’ is mentioned it often refers to constitutional democracy (Friedrich 1974).44 Further, democracy almost by definition means one specific institutional framework: representative democracy (Bekkers et al. 2007: 57; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 337). Although the exact institutional framework differs per country, the central idea is that public (government) offices should be filled by elected representatives. The authority is then exercised in accordance with judicial principles in order to protect individual rights – here constitutional democracy comes into play. In order to determine in how far this traditional idea of constitutional representative democracy influences the current discourse on the EU’s legitimacy a components framework of legitimacy is developed.

3.2.1 – Scharpf’s and Bernard’s Components of LegitimacyOne of the most influential accounts of the components of legitimacy is given by Fritz Scharpf (1999). In Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic,45 he distinguishes between two components of democratic self-determination: input and output legitimacy, which he describes as follows:

Input-oriented democratic thought emphasizes ‘government by the people’. Political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the ‘will of the people’ – that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community. By contrast, the output perspective emphasizes ‘government for the people’. Here, political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question (Ibid., 6; Emphasis in original).

Input legitimacy is a combination of two identities. The first identity, which is often overlooked in accounts of his theory, is a ‘thin’ political identity. This identity is weak and therefore there are the dangers of the tyranny of the majority and premises of ‘normative individualism’ and as a result a breakdown of legitimacy becomes highly likely (Ibid., 7-10). This brings us to Scharpf’s second and most famous notion: the thick identity. People need to believe in the sameness between the members of the community46 in order to accept state rulings that are in their disadvantage. 47 Here we return to the nationalist republican legitimacy based on the idea of the nation. Scharpf (implicitly) distinguishes

41 In this research we focus on democracy as a type of political order rather than just as a collective decision-making procedure, see the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry on Democracy (Christiano 2008).42 Of course not everyone in the world supports democracy, but the large majority within the Western world do.43 For example, Siedentop distinguishes democracy simpliciter, democratic government and democratic society (2000: 47-63) and Bekkers et al. between three traditions and six institutional frameworks, see chapter 3 (2007: 35-57). 44 We now take this dual meaning for granted, but as Friedrich points out: ‘constitutional democracy has transformed from a contradiction to a pleonasm’ (1974: 37). Siedentop distinguishes in this regard between democratic society and a democratic government. In a nutshell, the contradiction is between, on the one hand, individual rights – society/constitution – and, on the other hand, majority rule – government/democracy. The question arising from this contradiction is in which cases is the individual and when is the majority superior?45 Among others Bekkers et al. (2007) and Bursens and Baetens (2004).46 Max Weber talks about ‘a Gemeinsamkeitsglaube arising from pre-existing commonalities of history, language culture, and ethnicity’ (Scharpf 1999: 8).47 It is empirically proven that sameness raises level of trust so that people accept the rulings of the majority even if they are in one’s own direct disadvantage (Offe. In: Scharpf 1999: 8).



between the ‘demos’ (thin) and das Volk (thick), but as Yack and Hont argue this division has become conceptual rather than actual.48

Output legitimacy is orientated on the performance of the system. Scharpf distinguishes four different output legitimizing mechanisms: electoral accountability, independent expertise, corporatist and intergovernmental agreement, and pluralist policy networks (Ibid., 13-21). Note that these mechanisms are not actually outputs of the system, but demands made to the system and the way it produces outcomes. ‘[T]he legitimizing force of these mechanisms tends to be more contingent and more limited than is true of identity-based majority democracy’ (Ibid., 11). Scharpf thus distinguishes between two components of democratic legitimacy:

Two Components of Legitimacy1 Input Identity2 Output Interest

Figure 3.1: Scharpf’s Components of Democratic Legitimacy

In discourse democracy often refers to constitutional democracy, therefore it is necessary to distinguish a third component next to the input-output legitimization: throughput legitimacy. Frederick Bernard’s account of the components of legitimacy is useful in this regard. He describes legitimacy as follows:

The concept of legitimacy as a political concept is inherently complex in that it involves at least three distinguishable components: the electoral (constitutional) right to rule; the procedural (normative) rightfulness in the exercise of rule; and the substantive (teleological) rightness in the ends of rule (2001: 26).

These three components together form the legitimacy of a political order. Bernard seems to define input as constitutional, hence judicial, and throughput as normative, but this is somewhat misleading terminology. The constitutional refers to the electoral process and popular mandate, and the normative to the procedural judicial rules of the game. Finally, the output refers to the actual performance of the political system.

Three Components of Legitimacy

1 Input Right to Rule2 Throughput Exercise of Rule3 Output Rightness in the End of Rule

Figure 3.2: Bernard’s Components of Legitimacy

Bernard’s framework adds the output legitimacy to the different components. This might come as a surprise, because it seems like Scharpf already distinguishes between input and output. In my view there is a common misinterpretation of Scharpf’s theory in the public administration literature. In the literature, for example Bekkers et al. (2007), outcome is defined as performance, but as we saw

48 This reading is not undisputed. Thomassen and Schmitt argue one can distinguish between them (2004: 386). There is also a lot of discussion as to whether cultural identity is pre-political or created afterwards, but the fact is that it exists and seems to be important to the legitimacy of a political order. In the analysis – chapter 9 – we will return to this in more detail.



Scharpf actually makes procedural demands. The added value of Bernard thus lies in that he distinguishes substantive performances – output – from procedural demands – throughput. Scharpf, on the other hand, also adds to Bernard’s account with the distinction in the input between thin and thick identities. In other words, an identity based on popular support/mandate (thin) and one based on cultural identification (thick).

3.2.2 – Combining the Accounts into a Framework We will merge these two accounts into a single ‘components framework’. The different components of the legitimacy of a (democratic) political order one can distinguish are input, throughput and output. In order to steer free from any confusion: the following is not based on Easton’s policy model, even though that model also distinguishes between input, throughput and output legitimacy (e.g. Bekkers et al. 2007; Thomassen 2007).

Let us now walk through the different components. The input category combines two important elements: identity and support. Identity encompasses Scharpf’s thick identity (or at the least the feeling thereof).49 The thin identity is political in nature and therefore related to popular support for the system (Friedrich 1974). In a democratic system this is closely related to electoral mandate. Thus Scharpf enhances Bernard’s account with identity claims and Bernard Scharpf’s with the idea of popular support to give more body to the thin identity.

The throughput is an interesting component, because what Scharpf classifies as output legitimizing mechanisms all fall into this category. In this framework, throughput legitimacy is defined as how rule is exercised in order to achieve outputs.50 In democratic, pluralist societies how output – performance – is achieved is theoretically more important than its actual aims/performance, because the question: ‘what is good?’ is seen systemically unanswerable in a society with diverse value systems.51

Still actual performance – output – matters, because we might not agree or even know why something is good or evil, some acts are evaluated by a large majority of society as such (e.g. public opinion). Government is expected to perform services for its people. A negative example is the Vietnam war that almost brought down the USA’s entire constitutional democratic system (Friedrich 1974). Performance matters, at least more than one might expect from idealistic accounts of democratic legitimacy. In this category fall the interests of the people and the state, and the state’s ability to achieve these interests. Thus, the framework developed for this research looks as follows:

Three Components of Legitimacy

1 Input Identity & Support2 Throughput (Legal-)Procedures

3 Output Interests & Performance

Figure 3.3: Components of Legitimacy

Let us see how this framework works out with regards to the conceptualisation by people of the legitimacy of representative constitutional democracy. Democratic theory accepts that there cannot be complete agreement among the population on values and interests, but on the basis of a common

49 In this regard footnote 31 is relevant on the truth value of the idea of the nation: Is it real or fake? What is clear is that the identification process is important for state legitimacy (Hont 2005; Scharpf 1999).50 In Friedrich’s scheme this is procedural and as he argues this is nowadays perceived as the most important dimension of legitimacy, although he focuses on the electoral process (1974), which in this scheme falls within input category. His desciption is more in line with Bernard’s description of input as constitutional.51 Based on this interpretation Scharpf’s reference to output instead of throughput will probably make more sense. The analysis of a pluralist society is Bernard’s.



identity and representatives with a popular mandate – input – and following certain (judicial) procedures – throughput – people will accept the outcomes of the process. If people thus judge a political order on its democratic legitimacy they will focus on the input and throughput (Nispen and Posseth 2007: 223).

The distinction in the input – thick-thin – is artificial, but stressed because it becomes useful in the analysis of the republicanisms in discourse later on. Democratic theory though is as much a child of both republicanisms as the nation-state’s legitimacy and it does not actually distinguish between universalist and nationalist dimensions of the components.

3.3 – Legitimacy and Multi-level Governance: ModelsThe second important concept for the legitimacy of political orders is governance. The exact state of affairs differs, but in general one can say ‘that the old hierarchical model of government has crumbled in the Western world’52 (Nispen and Ringeling 2004: 2). Governance is the new steering paradigm, which replaced the paradigm of government (Bekkers et al. 2007: 3). Several important shifts were caused by this change: ‘from nation-state to supranational institutions, from government to court, from public to semi-public or private organizations, from hierarchies to markets’ (Nispen and Ringeling 2004: 2).53 There are several different types of governance systems54, but the consensus is that the European level of governance is a system of multi-level governance (e.g. Bekkers et al. 2007; George and Bache 2001; Marks 1993; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996).

This system crystallized from the 1980’s onwards as the system of governance of the EU (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996: 372). Marks describes multi-level governance as ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers, - supranational, national, regional and local’ (1993: 392). Klijn and Skelcher add that ‘[governance networks] are based on interdependencies, but not necessarily equity, between public, private and civil society actors (2007: 587). For example, governments are a special kind of actor in this network, because of (out of all the possible reasons) their democratic legitimacy (Ringeling 2004). We can distinguish three important features for the EU’s system of governance:

1. ‘Collective decision-making involves loss of control for the governments of individual states2. Decision-making competences in the EU are shared by actors at different levels [...]3. The political systems of member states [...] are connected in various ways’ (Marks, Hooghe and Blank

1996: 346-347).

The possible impact of this form of governance on the legitimacy of a political order is unclear. Wallace et al. describe the predecessor of the EU – the European Community – as ‘less than a federation, but more than a regime’ (1983). This description is still very appropriate with regards to the EU’s system of multi-level governance. In the literature there is of yet no specific framework for the analysis of the (democratic) legitimacy of a system of multi-level governance.55 Therefore scholars often use Beetham and Lord’s (1998) distinction between nation-state – federation – and international

52 Bekkers et al. distinguish five crises in the western welfare state that lead to the shift toward the new steering paradigm. These are the financial, regulatory, rationality, implementation and complexity crisis of the welfare state (2007: 16-19).53 Bekkers et al. distinguish between several similar shifts: From public towards private forms of governance; From public towards forms of governance in which the civic society plays an important role; From central forms to decentralized forms; From national forms to international and supranational forms; From geographical forms to functional forms; From vertical to horizontal forms (2007: 5).54 Bekkers et al. distinguish five ‘ideal type’ systems: Governance at a distance, multi-level governance, market governance, network governance, societal self-governance (2007: 5-6). 55 There are discussions on the compatibility/consequences of governance networks and democracy, see Klijn and Skelcher (2007). For more specifically the relation of the different types of governance to legitimacy, see Bekkers et al. (2007).



organisation – regime (c.f. Bekkers et al. 2007: 46; Bursens and Baetens 2004: 5). This distinction is between two models of political orders, which leads to a distinction between direct and indirect legitimacy (Bursens and Baetens 2004: 3).

The notion of direct legitimacy is derived from the nation-state, in which the power-subjects can hold the power-holder directly responsible through, for instance, periodical elections or referenda. ‘Crucial is the direct link between those who are governed and those who govern’ (Bursens and Baetens 2004: 5). In the case of the EU this translates into the notions of a ‘federal Europe’ or ‘multi-level government’.

Indirect legitimacy applies to international organisations/regimes, which usually appropriate legitimacy through the approval of the legitimised member states. Authority is legitimate if recognized and thus borrowed from the (elected) representatives of the people or is if it is recognized by other legitimate authorities (Bursens and Baetens 2004: 5; George and Bache 2001: 15).

Political Order Type of Legitimacy(Federal) Nation-state Direct Legitimacy

International Organisation Indirect Legitimacy Figure 3.4: Models of Legitimacy

Multi-level governance does not fit either of these models. On the one hand, the EU knows Verflechtung of the different levels of government, which is exemplified by the pooling of sovereignty. Further, the EU is becoming more and more involved in the daily lives of whom it governs (Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 385-386), which might explain the outcry for more direct legitimacy.56 On the other hand, the nation-states are still sovereign to some extent – they have a veto on certain issues and they can and have ignored certain agreements. In short, the EU is still not a federation, yet it is more than a regime.

The exact impact of multi-level governance on the EU’s legitimacy is still largely unclear. Some argue it is a positive development57, some see it as negative58, whilst again others describe it as ‘an unlikely equilibrium.’59 One thing is certain: the EU is emerging as a political order of multi-level governance, but there is no consensus on what does or does not make such a system legitimate.

3.4 – Toward a Multi-faceted Understanding of LegitimacyThis might be a good time to summarise the theoretical findings on the possible (implicit) conceptualisations of legitimacy in people’s perception with respect to the EU as an emerging political

56 If one sees the European institutions as supranational ‘then they clearly do require direct legitimation’ (George and Bache 2001: 15).57 In 2001 then EU-president Romano Prodi described multi-level governance not simply as a reality, but as a goal (Börzel and Risse 2000: 7). George and Bach make a similar point: multi-level governance started as a description of the situation that has emerged in the EU, but became more normative in nature (2001: 25). They continue by stating they expect multi-level governance to strengthen democratic accountability and the principle of subsidarity (direct legitimacy). Realist approaches see, multi-level government as legitimate, because of its ability to keep the European nation-states relevant in a globalised world and the EU’s ability to tackle problems without boundaries (e.g. Fischer 2000: 155; Hont 2005).58 ‘[I]ssues of democratic deficit again arise as a consequence of such a network model of governance. The implications of the antidemocratic aspects of moving political power from state to civil society and/or to democratically unaccountable supranational organizations and of creating undemocratic and unaccountable decision making organizations are increasingly being acknowledged (Hudson 2000: 417). David Miller gives a more philosophical defence of the principle of nationality in his On Nationalism (1995).59 ‘However there is nothing inherent in the current system. Multi-level governance is unlikely to be a stable equilibrium. There is no widely legitimized constitutional framework. There is little consensus on the goals of integration. As a result, the allocation of competencies between national and supranational actors is ambiguous and contested ... [s]tates and state sovereignty have become objects of popular contention – the outcome of which is as yet uncertain’ (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996: 372-373).



order. First and foremost there is not one single framework shared by all scholars to analyse legitimacy, but as Beethem and Lord argue ‘the starting point of any analysis of legitimacy [...] has to be an acknowledgement of its complexity (1998: 5). In acknowledgement of this complexity a framework is created in order to create, what Bursens and Baetens call, a multi-faceted understanding of legitimacy (2004: 1).

First, there is the distinction between two dimensions of legitimacy: universalist and nationalist. This distinction gives us the analytical tools to investigate whether the EU’s legitimacy is (implicitly) conceptualised by people on the basis of democratic or nationalist principles.

Secondly, the distinction between three components of legitimacy: input, throughput and output. This distinction of legitimacy into components has two uses. First, by linking components to the dimensions it becomes possible to further specify the role of the dual heritage of republicanism in the current discourse – we will turn to this in more detail in the operationalisation. Secondly, the distinction makes it possible to analyse in how far people’s perception of the EU’s legitimacy is influenced by the ideal of a constitutional representative democracy.

Thirdly, there is Beetham and Lord’s distinction between direct and indirect legitimacy, which analyses the role of the model of the political order. This distinction is a way of analysing whether the idea of the nation-state, that of an international regime or whether the reality of multi-level governance is taken into account.

The research thus distinguishes between three facets of legitimacy: dimensions (universalist and nationalist), components (input, throughput and output) and models (direct and indirect). This creates a multi-faceted understanding of legitimacy of a political order. It will help us understand the conceptualisation behind different perceptions and how it influences the judgement of the EU’s legitimacy.

.


Chapter 4 – Mass Mediated Legitimacy

Mass media are the primary means of access to a European public sphere, and they are the main producers and reproducers of European issues in that sphere.

EMEDIATE60

In this chapter, we will look at the relationship between public discourse and legitimacy, and the role of the mass media in this relationship. First, we will look at the way public discourse is mediated in modern society and the role of politicians in creating legitimacy. Secondly, whether there is a European public sphere and how the shortcomings of the print-media might play a role in this. Finally, an analysis is performed of the ways in which the mass media might influence the EU’s legitimacy deficit, but also the ways to overcome these media shortcomings.

4.1 – Mass Mediated Public Discourses An important element in the creation of legitimacy for political institutions is the public sphere or a shared space of communication. The concept of the public sphere was made popular by Jürgen Habermas.61 The concept though has become a broad and loaded term, which although often used in the literature (e.g. EMEDIATE 2009; Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 10), remarkably often stays undefined. Peters et al. distinguish between two approaches to the public sphere in recent research: a civic participatory approach and a public discourse approach (2005: 140-141). In short, the former focuses on the influence of individuals and groups on the policy process. For us the second approach is more important.

‘In this approach, the public sphere is interpreted as a field of communication that is accessible to mass publics. In this perspective, civic activities become part of the public sphere to the degree that they are represented in public communication, primarily in the mass media (Ibid., 140).

The two important elements are the need to communicate with a mass public, and that the primary way to do this is through the mass media. The importance of the mass media is a result of the scale of modern society. The consensus on legitimacy arises in public discourse and this discourse needs to reach a large population, certainly in the case of the EU. In this situation, the mass media have become the drivers and arenas of public discourse (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 2).

The mass media are in a unique position to enhance people’s cognitive awareness of European political processes, and, inasmuch as they function both at a mass level within and across EU member states, they are indispensible for instilling democratic practices into public life within the emerging European political order (Ibid.).

People also indicate that they think the mass media is important for them to create an opinion (Eurobarometer. In: Bursens and Baetens 2004: 7). The mass media is recognized as the source of public discourse and an important source for the creation of public opinion. The mass media is even more important with respect to international issues. This is how the EU is perceived (Peter, Semetko

60 EMEDIATE 2009: 261 Habermas’ original ideal account of the public sphere is as follows: ‘A realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a political body … citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion … about matters of general interest’(Habermas 1974: 49; In: Ward 2004: 13).


and De Vreese 2003: 306; Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 9).62 People though are dissatisfied with the amount of information provided on the EU (Eurobarometer. In: Bursens and Baetens 2004: 7).

There is though an important fallacy that has to be addressed. From the account above one might be lead to assume that once informed people will see the light, so to say, and embrace the EU (Mak 2002: 230). This is an idealistic view of the process: the idea that once presented with the facts people will rationally make the right (democratic) choice is in the words of Stanley Fish: “contradicted by the whole of human history”.63 Politicians though can and should influence the public discourse (Middelaar 1999; Siedentop 2000), but they have to take into account sentiments and opinions among the population. They cannot simply state the facts and expect people to follow rather they have to convince and to do this use rhetoric. If democratic political elites lose touch with the general public, there is a real danger of resentment among the latter with the political order as a whole. This creates space for populists to take advantage of the disillusionment of the public with the ‘political elite that do not understand them’. As already discussed in the introduction, the political elites’ consensus on the EU and lack of ‘selling it’ might form part of the explanation for the rise of the anti-European parties in the last European elections.

4.2 – Is there a European Public Discourse?Politicians have a role in ‘selling’ the EU through the mass media – if they chose to off course. The question is though in which mass media? A problem for the EU might be that there is no overarching mass media (Bursens and Baetens 2004: footnote 10) and thus no European discourse.64 One seems forced to look at the national discourses and in specific the national mass media systems (Bursens and Baetens 2004: footnote 10; Liebert and Trentz 2008: 2).

This though is less problematic than might think at first. In this research, we will analyse newspapers and most Member States’s national newspapers are in a financial crisis (Oosterbaan and Wansink 2008: 34-61).65 They are dependent on advertisers, which judge a newspaper on its sales. Jürgen Habermas talks in this regard about the colonisation of the public sphere by the market. Yet, paradoxically this market dependence, which is meant as a criticism, because it leads to biased coverage66, might partially contribute to the emergence of a European public discourse. More and more European newspapers publish articles from other European newspapers. This consumes less time and costs less than writing them oneself; both are very valuable commodities for newspaper companies. One might thus describe the European public discourse as slowly emerging (Peters et al. 2005: 152).

Another important consequence of the market dependence is that newspapers become dependent upon contributions by politicians. Serious journalists see this as the beginning of the end of quality journalism and to some extent they might be right. For politicians this means that if they are capable of delivering an interesting story then it is very likely to be printed. This is not to suggest politicians should control newspaper, that would be a very dangerous development indeed, but neither

62 The exception are highly educated people and those with an interest, who will search for themselves (Perse 2001: 93). These groups though are a minority of society.63 Fish in Tegenlicht: Partijtje vrijheid (Counterlight: Game of Freedom). Accessible via: http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/index.php/aflevering?aflID=9543383&md5=72057d510243f03a18f3eab2abe8600d (accessed June 21, 2009).64 The one European newspaper – The European – perished in 1998 and there are no other media within the EU, which is widely read, watched or listened to. For information on The European, see: http://norumbega.co.uk/2008/06/30/the-european/ (accessed May 12, 2009). And for a thorough account of EU media policy, which includes policy about regulation of European media companies, see Ward (2004).65 The insight into the problems of the media companies were also addressed in a masterclass by Tarik Ramadan followed for this research. 66 A problem for example is that ‘[the] tabloid press and private TV channels in particular [stand] accused of personalisation, political bias and lack of independence and pluralism’ (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 2).



are politicians as dependent on the mass media as they are sometimes made out to be (Oosterbaan and Wansink 2008: 120-131).

4.3 – The Mass Media: A Positive or Negative Influence on Legitimacy?The relationship between the mass media and the EU’s legitimacy is the final subject of this chapter. Since newspapers and television reach a vast audience, they are an almost indispensible means for politicians to get their message across. As already mentioned the mass media’s functioning is criticised. Let us see how they cause their own deficits, but also how one can overcome them.

There are several ways in which the mass media is a flawed mediator and may contribute to the legitimacy deficit. Bursens and Baetens distinguish three ‘media deficits’.67 First, there is a knowledge deficit. The EU is largely unknown to the public, which leads to an inability to evaluate or a tendency to favour negative evaluations of its legitimacy.68 Secondly, the motivational deficit, which means that if the EU is not presented as relevant, people will not be motivated to act in anyway – whether voting or seeking information. Thirdly, there is the comprehension deficit. This is a specific form of knowledge, namely whether people actually understand the European political system. The three deficits are closely related. To a certain extent the comprehension is part of the knowledge deficit and the motivation deficit a result of those two.

Fortunately, Bursens and Baetens develop several ways in which these media deficits can be overcome. First, there should be more EU-coverage – quantity – and on a more regular basis – regularity. Secondly, episodic and thematic coverage should be a balanced. Thirdly and fourthly, coverage should present the EU policies and the EU institutions in more detail. Finally, there should be more nationalised and personified coverage (2004: 12-14; 27). The first two methods are more focussed on news-coverage than editorials, although the quantity of contributions can be influenced.

The EU’s novel system of governance with its complex decision-making procedures, institutional design, terminologies and its distance from the people are hard to ‘sell’ (De Vreese 2003: 65-67). ‘Mass media coverage remains useless if people don’t read, hear, remember or understand the information offered by newspapers’ (Bursens and Baetens 2004: 13). According to many scholars, the EU will catch more attention if becomes more comprehensible and is presented attractively (c.f. Ibid., 14). The question is how to formulate such a message (Perse 2001: 132).69 The two final methods might offer a solution for the third and fourth requirement. First, give the EU ‘a face’ – personification – and secondly, explain the consequences for the national situation – nationalisation.

In conclusion: The mass media is clearly not a perfect mediator. It has shortcomings – possible biased coverage and media deficits – but also offers opportunities – the emerging European public discourse. Further, there are ways to overcome the inherent media deficits. The question is whether contributors to the public discourse use these methods in their contributions and whether they actually work.

67 The term ‘media deficits’ is not used by Bursens and Baetens.68 Many scholars agree that a lack of knowledge is ‘an indispensable aspect of legitimacy’ (c.f. Bursens and Baetens 2004: 10-11). The fallacy that informing automatically leading to acceptance is looming on the background of this argument, but one could say a comprehensible framework needs to be sold in order to gain acceptance.69 The staatssecretaris [junior minister] of Internal Affairs of the Netherlands remarked this difficulty is also apparent within the Netherlands: People often perceive government as monolithic, even though there is a local, provincial and national level. They are judged as though they are one. This analysis is from a speech made at Het Congres van de Vereniging der Landelijke Bestuurskunde 2009.


Chapter 5 – Methodology: From Strategy to HypothesesThe methodological issues concerning this research are addressed in this chapter. First, the research strategy is introduced. Then the methods of inquiry are presented including a description of the actual research process. This is followed by a discussion of its reliability, validity and limitations and how these issues were addressed. Finally, the concepts from the theoretical framework are operationalised and three hypotheses formulated.

5.1 – The Research StrategyThe strategy chosen is a comparative case study. This is a multiple-case study, which ‘investigates a particular contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context’ by comparing the findings of several cases (Yin 2009: 18-19). The focus is the (implicit) conceptualisation of legitimacy in discourse when assessing the EU’s legitimacy and the consequences for the evaluation thereof. The locus is the public discourse within three countries: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France. The three main reasons for selecting70 these three countries were, first of all, that they are all Member States of the EU. Secondly, the three countries (would) have voted no in the referendum on the ‘Constitution for Europe’, which indicates a perceived legitimacy deficit. Thirdly, they represent different political-administrative cultures, which could lead to differences in perspectives. This is Siedentop’s analysis (2000), in which he compares the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Germany is replaced by the Netherlands, because in this way the perspective of a relatively small country is included. This is a defensible replacement, because the German and Dutch attitude toward the EU and administrative culture are comparable (Ibid.).

5.2 – The Methods of InquiryThe main source of evidence into the EU’s legitimacy deficit are opinionated articles published during two periods of two year in two national newspapers per case.71 This is a proven source for the analysis of public discourse (e.g. Bursens and Helsen 2004; Liebert and Trentz 2008; Peters et al. 2005). Articles from the national newspapers (mass media) are a type of document. This source has the following strengths and weaknesses (Yin 2009: 102):

Strength WeaknessesStable – can be reviewed repeatedly Retrievability – can be difficult to find

Unobtrusive – not created as a result of the case study

Biased selectivity – if collection is incomplete

Exact – contains exact names, references, and details of an event

Reporting bias – reflects (unknown) bias of author

Broad Coverage – long span of time, many events, many settings

Access – may be deliberately withheld

Figure 5.1: Strengths and Weakness of Documentation

70 On the issue of selecting cases for research into the EU Haverland argues: ‘To be sure, even orthodox quantitative methodologists concede that the text book selection rule – random selection – is often not desirable … as it may negatively affect the substantive relevance of the subject … Hence the intentional selection of cases is often a wise thing to do (Haverland 2003: 3-4).71 In comparison to other research the scope is relatively large. Peters et al. analyse five newspapers in different countries for five periods of two weeks (2005: 142-143). Bursens and Baetens use more newspapers per ‘part’ of Belgium for their qualitative analysis, but only analyse one week (2004: 14-15). Liebert and Trentz analyse fourteen countries, including Turkey, but limit their sample to a maximum of 40 articles per country (2008: 5-8).


‘Public discourse, however, represents only a specific segment of public communication. Research on public discourse focuses not on information, or ‘news’, but on public commentary, interpretation, and debate’ (Peters et al. 2005: 141; Emphasis in original). The aim of the research is to analyse public discourse therefore only opinionated articles were selected.

The articles were retrieved from two periods of two years. Period one runs from the first of January 2000 till the first of January 2002 and period two from 30th of May 2004 till the same date two years later: 2006. A major ‘EU event’ took place in the middle of each period. In period one the Euro was introduced (January 1, 2001) and in period two France (May 29, 2005) and the Netherlands (June 1, 2005) voted no to the Constitution for Europe.

For each case two qualitative newspapers72 were analysed during both periods. For the Netherlands the newspapers were the NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant. The Independent and The Guardian were selected for the United Kingdom. And finally for France Le Figaro and Libération were analysed. The newspapers were selected on the basis of Oosterbaan and Wansink (2008).73

The newspapers were accessed via the databank: Academic Nexus Lexus.74 A keyword search was performed in this databank during both periods in all six newspapers.75 Access was thus not an issue. Further, a pilot search was conducted for both periods in the Dutch newspapers, which verified that retrievability was not a problem either.

The first method of inquiry is a quantitative content analysis. The articles were subject to a close-reading analysis. During this process observations on the legitimacy of the EU were extracted from the articles. These articles and observations were coded, which we will return to in more detail in the operationalisation. This quantitative data was entered into the statistical analysis computer program SPSS version 17 in order to accurately calculate relevant statistics.

A possible method for determining significance is the Pearson Chi-squire. This task is a relatively simple with the help of SPSS. Almost always the result was: p is less than 0,05 even less than 0,005, and thus significant. This though feels like an empty ‘victory’ for it stays unclear, which facet is related to which evaluation? And whether this relationship is strong? Instead of any of the possible significance tests a different approach was taken. The distribution of judgements within the facets is compared to the distribution of judgements within the overall discourse.

For example, the distribution of observations in the Dutch discourse with regards to the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy is 70% negative and 30% positive – This is not the case, but for argument’s sake let us say it is. We then turn to the two dimensions. We find that of the observations using a universalist concept of legitimacy 80% is negative and only 20% is positive, whilst of the observations conceptualising legitimacy using a nationalist concept 60% is negative and 40% is positive. Then we can conclude that both conceptualisations lead to a negative perception, but observations using a universalist dimension are more negative than expected, whilst those using a nationalist dimension are less negative than expected.

The analysis might show an author’s bias, but more importantly it might not be completely reliable, because of the ‘transformation’ of qualitative data into quantitative data. A metaphor might help explain the use and possible shortcomings of a quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis of the articles might be compared to coding 500 portrait-pictures. One analyses the hair colour, skin colour and eye colour of each picture. After analysis one ends up with 1500 observations in ‘groups’

72 Qualitative newspapers stand out among mass media for they ‘care about the public sphere’ and function as a public forum to stimulate debate about public affairs (Oosterbaan and Wansink 2008: 171-172). 73 Oosterbaan and Wansink focus on the Dutch case, but also did research on the situation in other European countries (2008: 47-61; 179-189). 74 Academic Lexus Nexus is accessible for students and employees of the Erasmus University Rotterdam via the Erasmus University Library. Accessiable via: http://academic.lexisnexis.nl/eur/.75 For the keyword search result of all three countries, see Appendix C.



of three. This quantitative approach was the only way to effectively deal with such a large number of observations, but how does one know the data is reliable?

Maybe the combination black, yellow, black is very common and this might lead one to suspect that the population contains a high percentage of people of Asian descent, but during the data analysis it became clear though that the vast majority was, for example, Japanese. Further, people might have dyad their hair – whose hair is originally blue? – in which case the percentage of people of Japanese descent might be even higher than the statistics indicate. The quantitative data was too abstract and thus dismissed these conclusions. In order to prevent such a misrepresentation and check whether the quantitative results are reliable, they are placed back into context.

This brings us to the second method of inquiry: the qualitative content or narrative analysis. After presenting the quantitative data, some flesh will be put back onto the bones, so to say, by placing the data in its original context. During the close-reading and SPSS codification process notes were made – mental, digital and in ink – on the qualitative differences between the discourses, which form the basis of this analysis.

The third method of inquiry is the secondary analysis, which Robson describes as: “[the] analysis of data already collected in some other than the present study” (2002: 552). Other researchers have written on the subject in journals, books, and other forms of academic work (Babbie 2001; Robson 2002). This method will add to the reliability of the empirical findings by comparing them to other researchers’ results.

Finally, the researcher has participated in one congress – ‘Festival der Bestuurskunde 2009: Democratie tussen Wal en Schip’ organised by ‘Vereniging voor Bestuurskunde’ on February 12, 200976 –, one master-class on ‘The role of the media’ by Tarik Ramadan at the Erasmus University Rotterdam on March 27 and April 3, 2009, and one public gathering on the European elections – ‘Kieswijzer Live’ at the Arminius Church, Rotterdam on May 27, 2009. During these events several unstructured, but very insightful conversations took place with stakeholders and scholars with regards to legitimacy, the EU and the role/crisis of the media. These findings are only used for purposes of triangulation.

5.3 – Any Limitations? On Reliability and ValidityThe reliability and validity of the research are also important to discuss. Reliability focuses on the accuracy of measurements and whether the research is repeatable. The qualitative nature of the data means the repeatability is low, yet the method triangulation helps overcome the problems associated with the accuracy of the findings. Also the use of multiple data sources per case – two newspapers per country – increases the accuracy. Thus reliability as repeatability might be low, but the accuracy is high, because of the use of method and data triangulation (Yin 2009: 116). This means that the overall conclusions in similar research will be in line with our findings, thus the reliability of the research is secured.

Validity has two forms: internal and external. Internal validity is concerned with the fact whether one is actually researching what one wants to be researching. The use of multiple methods – method triangulation – and different perspectives on the same data set – theory triangulation – are ways to overcome this limitation. The internal validity is thus safeguarded by these forms of triangulation.

The external validity or the so called generalisability is concerned with whether the results can be generalised to a greater group of cases? Investigating multiple cases, in this case three, is positively correlated to the external validity. On the other hand, the uniqueness of the countries might call the generalisability into question. Then again the inclusion of multi-level governance in the framework might prove insightful for research into the legitimacy of nation-states or other governmental actors

76 For information, see http://festival.bestuurskunde.nl/home (accessed June 20, 2009).



inhabited in networks. Still, the uniqueness of the problem, the EU’s legitimacy deficit, makes the external validity low, and one should be very careful when making any universal statements based on this research.

Finally, awareness of the different pitfalls concerning reliability and validity is essential in overcoming them. Common sense is a good guide, and also Bruce Berg (1989: 124) advice to be honest seems an ethical and practical advice in this regard.

5.4 – The Operationalisation The theoretical framework gives us several important concepts to operationalise for the analysis of the perception of legitimacy in public discourse. Subsequently, the codification process is outlined. Then the analytical framework is discussed, and finally three hypotheses are derived from the theoretical framework.

The codification process went systematically as follows: Each retrieved article was given a unique tag: the publishing date, the newspaper, and the country. Then it was closely read and all the observations on the EU’s legitimacy or lack thereof were summarised for further analysed later on. After reading the complete article, it was assessed on whether it is supportive of the European project as a whole and whether it takes the reality of multi-level governance into account.77

The individual observations were analysed more thoroughly. Each short description of the statement was coded with its publishing date, newspaper and country in order to give it a unique tag. Then it was determined whether an observation is positive or negative about the EU’s current legitimacy. Thus if the observation advocates change then the judgment is negative. Thereafter the perspective on legitimacy was analysed based on the three facets of legitimacy. And finally, it was established whether an observation takes multi-level governance into account.78

5.4.1 – The Analytical FrameworkThe operationalisation of the analytical framework is described in the following paragraphs. We will walk through the different elements starting with the facets. The first facet is the dimension of an observation, thus whether it uses a universalist or nationalist concept of legitimacy. The republicanisms are nowadays enshrined in mongrel concepts, so it is important to have a clear picture of them. Once again therefore the defining features of the republicanisms are:

Universalist Republicanism Nationalist RepublicanismHumanist Nationalist

De-Territorial TerritorialPeople Raison d’État

Democratic Institutions Commercial InterestsRule of Law Militaristic

Figure 5.2: The Features of the Two Republicanisms

77 See Appendix A – Codification Format Articles78 See Appendix B – Codification Format Arguments



The dimensions are further operationalised in combination with the second facet. The second facet is the distinction between the components of legitimacy: input, throughput and output. The components are useful in assessing the influence of the idea of constitutional representative democracy, but also for further exposing the mixed heritage in main stream democratic theory. The operationalisation of the components divided within the dimensions looks as follows:

Input Throughput Output

NationalistThe NationSovereignty

EfficiencyExpertise

TradeMilitary

Power/Influence

UniversalistDemos

Popular MandatePopular Support

TransparencyLegality

PeaceHuman Rights

Figure 5.3: The Operationalisation of the Dimensions and the Components

Now let us take a closer look at the boxes in ‘Figure 5.3’. In the nationalist input category falls Scharpf’s thick identity or national identity, this could display itself as loyalty to the nation-state. Also the idea of sovereignty falls into this category, both when used to defend against further loss of state powers or in defence of self-government of a nation. This category can also be applied to the European level, for example if people argue for the emergence of a European nation. The universalist input is concerned with the ‘thin’ identity or demos linked to popular mandate and support. This category includes support for the European institutions, but also the democratic ‘level’ of these institutions.

The throughput distinction is based on March and Olsen’s distinction between the logic of consequence and appropriateness (1989). Nowadays, democratic theory often seems to incorporate both logics and places them on equal footing.79 This distinction serves us well. Nationalist throughput legitimacy relates to the demands of the logic of consequence. Important are economic demands, like effectiveness and in relation to this the best people will take the best decisions: expertise. The logic of appropriateness makes demands on a universalist normative basis. Transparency is demanded by the idea of democracy and legality by the rule of law.

Nationalist output focuses on the state’s interests. Their primary interests lie in the realm of real politics, like trade interests, strategic military interests and having power. The universalist output ultimately focuses on the humanist goal of peace for all people, but on a more realistic scale to safeguard and where possible spread peace and human rights.

The final facet of legitimacy to be operationalised is the model distinction. The models focus on the question whether the EU should be legitimised through the institutions of the Member States or its own institutions directly elected by the entire European population or at least by the populations. This distinction is operationalised as follows:

Direct Legitimacy Indirect LegitimacyEuropean Parliament National Heads of StateReferenda TreatiesEuropean Senate National ParliamentsElected President Appointed Commissioners

Figure 5.4: The Operationalisation of the Models

79 Victor Bekkers pointed out this double logic and more importantly the reference to non-democratic logic as if it were democratic in his introduction speech for Het Congres van de Vereniging der Landelijke Bestuurskunde 2009 and a personal communication.



‘Figure 5.4’ shows us that the current EU system of governance is mixed, because elements of both models are to more or lesser extent in place. This more or lesser extent is important for the analysis, because, for example, the European parliament already exists, but a complaint might be that it has too little power. Others might argue that the role of the national parliaments is too insignificant.

This facet is meant to analyse the role of these models on the perception of EU’s legitimacy, but also to analyse whether people can get to grips with the idea of multi-level governance. This brings us to the operationalisation of whether multi-level governance is taken into account. This analysis was added, because the model analysis is imperfect. The level of analysis – article or observation – is irrelevant for the operationalisation. Three primary features are established based on the definition of multi-level governance in the theoretical framework. Only if an article or observation takes all three features into account is it coded ‘positively’.

1. Actors from multiple tiers of government are active in nested negation,2. They are interdependent, because of the Verflechtung of issues3. Finally, both governmental and non-governmental actors play a role

This framework for understanding legitimacy is at the same time parsimonious as comprehensive. Admittedly, all categorisations are artificial and it is certainly possible to analyse more facets or make further distinctions within the current facets. This though would lead to a far too complex framework for a useful analysis.

5.4.2 – Hypothetically SpeakingBefore turning to the empirical findings three hypotheses are formulated on the basis of the theoretical framework, which will help us flesh out important issues. First, the European political elites are trying to tackle, what they have coined, the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’. The democratic deficit is operationalised as a lack of legitimacy based on universalist principles. This analysis might effect the focus of the discourse. The first hypothesis assumes the elites are right in their analysis and thus it goes as follows:

H1: The EU only has a democratic deficit.

The second theoretical chapter focussed on the influence of ideas of democracy and governance on the assessment of legitimacy. The two heritages of Hont have largely disappeared in mainstream and academic discourse on democracy. Mongrel concepts are often given a democratic or neutral interpretation even when they represent nationalist republican values. The most prominent idea of democracy is that of the constitutional representative democracy. Its legitimacy is traditionally strong in the realm of input and throughput legitimacy.

The other subject of chapter three was governance. Multi-level governance is in itself a new reality, which has not yet established a clear relationship to legitimacy. Many scholars therefore use the more familiar distinction of direct legitimacy based on the model of a nation-state and indirect legitimacy based on the model of an international regime. Neither of these models though fully matches the reality of the EU.

Van Nispen en Posseth (2007: 261) distinguish multi-level governance from multi-level government. The latter perspective represents the idea that the EU is just another level of government. Let us assume that the legitimacy of the EU is assessed in accordance to this perspective, thus in line with the mainstream principles of the constitutional representative democratic nation-state. In short, the EU’s legitimacy is assessed as though it is a nation-state, but is off course not explicitly referred to as such. In terms of conceptualisation of legitimacy, that is to say no distinction is made between universalist and nationalist dimensions and a focus on input, throughput, and direct legitimacy.



The second hypothesis will assume that the actual reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit is a mismatch in perception between theoretical conceptualisation in accordance to the idea of multi-level government and the reality of multi-level governance. The hypothesis thus goes as follows:

H2: The reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit is that it is perceived as a political order of multi-level government and thus its legitimacy is assessed as such leading to a mismatch with reality.

Finally, in chapter four, the public discourse and the mass media were analysed. The mass media play a prominent role in the public discourse in modern society. As we saw their role is assessed as flawed and could therefore contributed to the EU’s legitimacy deficit. The final hypothesis states that the mass media shortcomings contribute to the legitimacy deficit and thus reads as follows:

H3: The EU’s legitimacy deficit is increased by the mass media.


Chapter 6 – The Dutch DiscourseAfter several theoretical chapters we arrive at the first empirical chapter. In this chapter, the findings of the Dutch discourse80 are presented. We start by looking at the general search results. The next section investigates the relationship between the facets of legitimacy and the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. The third part of the chapter assesses whether multi-level governance is taken into account both on the level of articles and observations. Finally, an overview is presented of the entire discourse in which the perceptions of the EU’s legitimacy are analysed.

6.1 – General FindingsWe start with the keyword search results. In Het NRC Handelsblad (NRC), the search resulted in a total of 49 articles. The articles were distributed equally among the periods: 24 in period one and 25 in period two. The close-reading analysis resulted in 301 observations, of which 144 were found in period one and 157 in period two.81

The search for articles in De Volkskrant resulted in 39 articles. There were 18 hits in period one. The same keywords in period two resulted in 21 articles. The close-reading analysis of De Volkskrant articles resulted in 211 observations. The majority of the observations, 122 to be exact, were found in period two and 89 observations in period one.82

Before analysing the judgement of the EU’s legitimacy, let us see what the general position toward the European project as a whole is in the articles. The data are clear: both Dutch newspapers are supportive of the European project as a whole. All articles in the NRC are positive except for one (April 30, 2004). There are three negative articles in the Volkskrant, two in period one (December 15, 2000 and June 14, 2001) and one in period two (May 26, 2005).

The general judgement of the EU is thus overwhelmingly positive, but this positivity is not reflected in the appreciation of its legitimacy. Most of the observations in the Dutch discourse evaluate the EU’s legitimacy negatively.

Table 6.1: Dutch Distribution of JudgementsJudgement/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Positive 17,2% 19,7% 18,6%

Negative 82,8% 80,3% 81,4%

6.2 – Facets and Judgements of Legitimacy The general perception is supportive of the EU, but the evaluation of its legitimacy is overwhelmingly negative. Now let us investigate how the conceptualisation of legitimacy influences the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy.

6.2.1 – Dimensions and Judgements of LegitimacyThe first facet we will analyse is the dimension. More than half the observations in both periods use a universalist concept of legitimacy to assess the EU. A nationalist concept is used by the rest 80 See appendix C, table C.1 for a complete overview of the Dutch keyword search results, appendix D for the list of the articles and appendix E for the overall frequency tables.81 One might wonder about the average number of observations per article, but this is a misleading figure. Take for example the NRC¸ which has an average of 6 observations per article during the first period, but one article has as many as 13 observations – May 23, 2000 –, whilst two have as little as 2 observations – November 30, 2000 and October 11, 2000. 82 The decrease in number of observations is disproportionate compared to the number of articles. There is no clear explanation for this disproportional decrease, but possible explanations can be methodological in nature, but might just as well be the result of differences in newspaper style or other factors related to the newspaper.


observations, except for a small number of observations, which combine both dimensions in their assessment. This marginal category is not being included in the rest of the analysis, except for its in tables. All marginal contributions from now will on only be mentioned at the start of the analysis and then largely ignored.

Table 6.2: Dutch Distribution of Dimensions Dimension/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Universalist 52,2% 56,9% 54,9%Nationalist 45,1% 38,7% 41,6%

Both 2,6% 4,3% 3,5%

Let us now analyse the distribution of evaluations within dimensions. There was no major shift in the distribution between the periods, but as we will see this is not the case for all facets and discourses. Overall, the overwhelming majority of the observations which use a universalist conceptualisation come to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Those observations that rely on nationalist concept of legitimacy more often lead to a positive evaluation in comparison, but still are more often negative.

Table 6.3: Dutch Dimension * Judgement CrosstabulationDimension/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative Evaluation

Universalist 10,7% 89,3%Nationalist 25,8% 74,3%

Both 55,6% 44,4%

To establish whether there is a relationship between dimensional conceptualisation and the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy we will compare the category’s distribution to the national distribution (Table 6.1: The overall percentage). This comparison shows that a universalist conceptualisation leads more often to a negative evaluation than the average Dutch observation. Those, on the other hand, that use a nationalist conceptualisation leads less often to a negative evaluation than one would expect based on the distribution of judgements within Dutch discourse.

6.2.2 – Components and Judgements of LegitimacyA focus on different components of legitimacy might also impact the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Most observations focus on input legitimacy in the Netherlands. In period one, observations focussing on throughput legitimacy come in second place and those focussing on output legitimacy in third place. They switched places in period two. Overall, the majority of the observations focus on input legitimacy, output legitimacy is the focus of almost a fifth of the observations, whilst the least observations focus on throughput legitimacy.

Table 6.4: Dutch Distribution of ComponentsComponent/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Input 67,4% 62,4% 64,6%Throughput 18,0% 13,6% 15,6%

Output 14,6% 24,0% 19,7%

The distribution of evaluations within components is stable. Overall, those observations that focus either on input or throughput legitimacy are very likely to lead to a negative perception of the EU’s legitimacy. Most observations that focus on output legitimacy lead to a positive evaluation. We will



see that this, a non-marginal category with more observations with a positive than a negative assessment of the EU’s legitimacy, is a unique result.

Table 6.5: Dutch Component * Judgement CrosstabulationComponent/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative Evaluation

Input 10,6% 89,4%Throughput 10,0% 90,0%

Output 51,5% 48,5%

Observations that focus either on input or throughput legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation than the average Dutch observation. Those that focus on output legitimacy are a completely different story. They lead much more often to a positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the national average.

6.2.3 – Models and Judgements of LegitimacyThe final facet of legitimacy is the use of a certain model of political order and related types of legitimacy. The distribution of observations using the different models (or not using them) to assess the EU’s legitimacy is stable, except for an increase in the number of observations that focus on direct legitimacy in period two. Overall the majority of observations focus on direct legitimacy. About a fifth of the observations do not use a model of a political order to assess the EU’s legitimacy. Indirect legitimacy is the focus of just over a tenth of the observations and a marginal number of observations combine both models.

Table 6.6: Dutch Distribution of ModelsModel/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Neither 25,8% 19,0% 22,1%Direct 58,8% 67,0% 63,3%

Indirect 13,3% 12,2% 12,7%Both 2,1% 1,8% 2,0%

Observations that focus on direct legitimacy are most often negative in their evaluation. Also observations not using any model often lead to a negative evaluation, whilst observations focussing on indirect legitimacy lead less often to a negative evaluation, they are though more often negative than positive in their evaluation.

Table 6.7: Dutch Model * Judgement CrosstabulationModel/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative Evaluation

Neither 24,8% 75,2%Direct 12,7% 87,3%

Indirect 33,8% 66,2%Both 40,0% 60,0%

If we compare the distribution within models to the average distribution of evaluations we get a somewhat different story. Those observations focussing on direct legitimacy are more often negative in their evaluation than the Dutch average. On the other hand, observations that do not use any model or focus on indirect legitimacy are less likely to lead to a negative evaluation compared to the national average.



6.2.4 – Conclusions on Facets and Judgements of LegitimacyThere are three important conclusions. First, the categories with the most observations lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the average Dutch observation. In the same order as presented above, these are a universalist conceptualisation, a focus on input legitimacy and a focus on direct legitimacy. In two cases – universalist conceptualisation and a focus on direct legitimacy –, the category leads the most often to a negative evaluation in comparison to the other categories within the facet. Observations focussing on throughput legitimacy are the most often negative, but the difference with those focussing on input legitimacy is marginal: both very often lead to a negative evaluation.

Secondly, both the number of observations using a combination of both dimensions and those combining both models to assess the EU’s legitimacy are marginal.

Finally, of all the categories with more than a marginal number of observations there is only one perspective that leads more often to a positive evaluation than a negative evaluation, namely those focussing on output legitimacy.

6.3 – Multi-level GovernanceThe third element of the analysis is whether the reality of multi-level governance is taken into account in articles and observations. First the articles, four articles in the NRC (July 5, 2000, July 11, 2001, October 9, 2004 and March 4, 2005) and only one article in the Volkskrant (December 29, 2001) take multi-level governance into account. This brings the NRC to 92% not taking it into account and the Volkskrant 98%. It is though not always apparent whether the author is aware of it.

Very few observations take multi-level governance into account. There was no important shift between the two periods and the numbers speak for themselves: Only 11 out of 512 observations take it into account and again awareness of it when they did can be seriously doubted.

Table 6.8: Dutch Distribution of Multi-level GovernanceMLG/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Yes 3,0% 1,4% 2,1%No 97,0% 98,6% 97,9%

6.4 – Overview of the Legitimacy DiscourseIn the final part of the chapter we will look at the discourse as a whole or rather at the discourse in all its detail and complexity. The observations are distributed among two criteria. First, what kind of perspective83 on legitimacy is used in the observations, and secondly, does this lead to a positive or negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy.

The analysis of this overview focuses primarily on perceptions84 with more than 26 observations, which is more than 5% of the entire number of observations.85 They are the focus, because these perceptions are common in the discourse. The Dutch discourse is relatively stable. Only the number of observations that use a nationalist concept of legitimacy focus on throughput legitimacy based on no model of political order, which leads to a negative evaluation dropped from 5,2% to 1,8%. All other perceptions that were influential were so in both periods. Before we turn to the discussion let us first have a look at the overview:

Table 6.9: Dutch Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive Negative

83 Here a perspective refers to the (implicit) conceptualisation based on all three facets of legitimacy without leading to a certain evaluation.84 Here a perception refers to a perspective combined with an evaluation.85 5% of 512 is 25,6



Evaluation EvaluationUniversalist Input Neither 6 10

Direct 6 177Indirect 2 5

Both 1 2Throughput Neither 1 5


Both 0 2Output Neither 4 3


Both 1 0Nationalist Input Neither 6 33






Both 0 0Both Input Neither 0 1






Both 1 0

Analysis shows us that there are four perceptions with more than 26 observations. 86 In order of size they are:

86 The cells marked with yellow.



1. universalist, input, direct, negative with 34,6% (117),2. nationalist, input, neither, negative with 9,2% (47),3. universalist, throughput, direct, negative with 6,8% (35), and4. nationalist, input, direct, negative with 6,4% (33).

Let us take a closer look at these perceptions. The only element they have in common is that the different perspectives of legitimacy all lead to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. The dimensional conceptualisation is evenly divided among these perceptions: two all. Three perceptions focus on input legitimacy, one on throughput and none of them focus on output legitimacy. Finally, three perceptions focus on direct legitimacy and one does not use any model of legitimacy. Indirect legitimacy is not focussing on any of them.

Three final remarks on the overview are in place. First, more than a third of all observation are characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy, which leads to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Secondly, although none of the possible perceptions with a nationalist conception of legitimacy and a focus on output legitimacy characterise 26 observations or more, all the perceptions with this combination of facets taken together account for more than a tenth of the observations. Finally, the perspective characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy combined with a focus on output and direct legitimacy leads to the highest number of observations with a positive evaluation.


Chapter 7 – The British DiscourseIn this chapter, the analysis of the British newspapers is presented.87 The chapter follows the same structure as the previous chapter.

7.1 – General FindingsThe Independent published consistently, but less than either Dutch newspaper. 18 articles were published in both periods; this brings the total number to 36. In period two, 91 observations were found, whilst there were ‘only’ 84 observations in period one. The reason for this inconsistency is unclear, but the finding is not highly disturbing, because difference is not large and of little consequence for the research as a whole. 175 observations were observed in total in The Independent.

The Guardian published more articles, namely 41. In period one 22 articles were found, whilst the same search in period two lead to only 19 articles. The decrease is explained by the fact that period one included a number of short letters by readers. Their ‘shortness’ also explains why the number of observations stayed largely the same – 122 in period one and 123 in period two. The total of observations in The Guardian is thus 245.

The British discourse is supportive of the European project. The Independent only had three articles with a negative judgement of the European project – two during period one (August 4, 2000 and August 5, 2000) and one during the second period (May 23, 2005). The Guardian had only one negative article, which was in period 2 (June 3, 2005). This might deviate from what one expected from the British discourse, but the reason for this will be addressed in discussion of the findings.

The evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy is generally poor, like in the Netherlands. The British discourse is more positive during the second period, but overall the majority of the observations evaluate the EU’s legitimacy negatively.

Table 7.1: British Distribution of Judgements Judgement/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Positive 18,0% 22,4% 20,2%Negative 82,0% 77,6% 79,8%

7.2 – Facets and Judgements of Legitimacy Let us now turn to the relationship between the different facets and the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy in order to investigate which categories contribute to the legitimacy deficit.

7.2.1 – Dimensions and Judgements of LegitimacyFirst, the role of the two dimensions in the perception of the EU’s legitimacy is examined. In both periods, a universalist concept of legitimacy is used by most observations. In the second period, the number of observations that use either dimension is almost the same. They are ‘kept a part’ by a marginal number of observations, which combine both dimensions in their assessment.

Table 7.2: British Distribution of Dimensions Dimension/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Universalist 55,8% 50,0% 52,9%Nationalist 42,2% 49,1% 45,7%

Both 1,9% 0,9% 1,4%

87 See appendix C, table C.2 for a complete overview of the British keyword search results, appendix F for the list of the articles and appendix G for the overall frequency tables.


Unlike in the Dutch discourse there are some shifts worth mentioning in the British discourse. Almost all observations that are characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy lead to a negative evaluation in period one (93,9%), but in period two they are less often negative (79,4%). Those observations assessing the EU’s legitimacy using nationalist concepts are more often negative in their evaluation in period two than in period one (66,7% to 75,2%). Overall, the majority of observations characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy lead to a negative evaluation. Those using a nationalist concept are more often negative than positive in their evaluation, but less negative than the former.

Table 7.3: British Dimension * Judgement CrosstabulationDimension/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative Evaluation


Both 16,7% 83,3% If one compares the observations with a universalist conceptualisation to the average British observations (Table 7.1; The overall percentages) then it becomes clear that it is more negative than the average. A nationalist conceptualisation, on the other hand, leads to a more positive assessment of the EU’s legitimacy compared to the national average.

7.2.2 – Components and Judgements of LegitimacyThe focus on different components might impact the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy and it is therefore the focus of this sub-chapter. Most observations in both periods focus on input legitimacy. The number of observations focussing on output legitimacy comes in second place. The focus on this component of legitimacy actually increases in the second period at the cost of the other components. Throughput legitimacy is consistently the focus of the least number of observations.

Table 7.4: British Distribution of ComponentsComponent/Period Period One Period Two Overall


Output 18,4% 33,6% 26,2%

The distribution of evaluations within different components is relatively stable. Overall those observations focussing on throughput legitimacy lead most often to a negative evaluation, but observations focussing on input legitimacy are almost as often negative. When observations focus on output legitimacy they are also mostly negative in their evaluation, but much more often positive compared to the other two components.

Table 7.5: British Component * Judgement CrosstabulationComponent/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative evaluation


Output 37,3% 62,7%

Observations that focus on either input or throughput legitimacy are much more likely to result in a negative evaluation than the British average. Those that focus on output legitimacy, on the other hand, are much more likely to end up positive in comparison.



7.2.3 – Models and Judgements of LegitimacyThe impact of different models of legitimacy on the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy is the subject of the following paragraphs. Most observations focus on direct legitimacy when evaluating the EU’s legitimacy. Observations not using any model and those focussing on indirect legitimacy struggle for second place. Overall more observations do not use a model, but difference is minimal. Only a marginal number of observations combine both models in order to evaluate the EU’s legitimacy.

Table 7.6: British Distribution of ModelsModel/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Neither 18,4% 28,0% 23,3%Direct 50,0% 53,7% 51,9%

Indirect 29,1% 16,8% 22,9%Both 2,4% 1,4% 1,9%

The distribution of a particular model and the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy only knew one development worth mentioning. Observations focussing on indirect legitimacy more often lead to a positive evaluation in period two than before (13,2% to 35,0%). Overall, observations that focus on direct legitimacy lead most of the time to a negative evaluation. Those not using any model or with a focus on indirect legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation than a positive one, but less compared to those focussing on direct legitimacy.

Table 7.7: British Model * Judgement CrosstabulationModel/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative Evaluation

Neither 26,5% 73,5%Direct 12,4% 87,6%

Indirect 29,2% 70,8%Both 50,0% 50,0%

An observation focussing on direct legitimacy leads more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the British average. Those not using a model of a political order or focussing on indirect legitimacy are more positive than the national average.

7.2.4 – Conclusions on Facets and Judgements of LegitimacyThe first conclusion is that, like in the Netherlands, each category within a facet with the most observations leads more often to a negative evaluation than the national average. Those are again a universalist conceptualisation, a focus on input legitimacy and a focus on direct legitimacy. Both a universalist conceptualisation and a focus on direct legitimacy are the most negative categories within their respective facets. Again the exception is a focus on input legitimacy, because those observations focussing on throughput legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation, but the difference is marginal.

Secondly, both the number of observations using both dimensions and those trying to combine models of political orders are only marginal in their contribution.

Finally, all the categories, that are not marginal, lead more often to a negative evaluation than to a positive one. The British discourse is thus negative on all accounts, so to say.

7.3 – Multi-level GovernanceNow for the role multi-level governance plays in the British discourse. The Guardian is the only newspaper with articles that take multi-level governance into account. Both articles are found period



one (June 29, 2000 and June 18, 2001). Overall this translates 95,2% of all the articles not acknowledging the reality of multi-level governance. The percentage is 100% for The Independent, because none of the 35 articles take it into account.

The number of observations that take multi-level governance into account is even lower. Only one observation takes it into account. The numbers thus speak even louder for themselves in the British than in the Dutch discourse. The mismatch between the number of articles and observations is the result of authors often not being aware of multi-level governance, even when they do take it into account.

Table 7.8: British Distribution of Multi-level GovernanceMLG/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Yes 0,5% 0,0% 0,2%No 99,5% 100,0% 99,8%

7.4 – Overview of the Legitimacy DiscourseIn the British discourse any perception with 21 or more observations are perceived as common perceptions.88 The British discourse though is not very stable. There are some shifts that warrant mentioning before we turn to the overview.

The percentage of observations of the EU’s legitimacy characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and indirect legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation went from 8,3% to 4,2%. Also the percentage of observations characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on throughput and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation went down from 7,8% to 2,8%. Finally, observations characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and indirect legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation declined from 6,3% to 1,9%.

There were also shifts in the opposite direction. The percentage of observations characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation increased from 4,4% to 7,0%. Further, the percentage of observations characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on output legitimacy and not using a model of political order leading to a negative evaluation went from 2,9% to 9,3%. The same perception but with a focus on direct legitimacy knew a similar increase from 2,9% up to 9,0%. With these shifts fresh in our mind, let us now than now turn to the table of the overall discourse.

Table 7.9: British Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationUniversalist Input Neither 2 7





Direct 3 8

88 5% of 420 is 21



Indirect 1 1Both 0 0

Nationalist Input Neither 4 18Direct 3 24


Throughput Neither 0 10Direct 1 2


Output Neither 11 26Direct 8 21


Both Input Neither 0 1Direct 0 2


Throughput Neither 0 0Direct 0 0


Output Neither 0 1Direct 0 0


Six perceptions are encountered with 21 or more observations. In order of size they are:

1. universalist, input, direct, negative with 26,7% (112),2. universalist, input, indirect, negative with 6,2% (26),3. nationalist output, neither, negative with 6,2% (26),4. nationalist, input, direct, negative with 5,7% (24),5. universalist, throughput, direct, negative with 5,2% (22), and6. nationalist, output, direct, negative with 5,0% (21).

These perceptions have in common that all perspectives lead to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Both dimensional conceptualisations are applied three times. Further, three perceptions focus on input, two on output and one on throughput legitimacy. Finally, four perceptions focus on direct legitimacy, one does not use any model and one focuses on indirect legitimacy.

Three remarks to finish the analysis with. First, most observations are characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation, though less than in the Dutch discourse. Secondly, the perceptions that combine a nationalist concept of legitimacy and a focus on output legitimacy together form just over a fifth of the entire discourse. Finally, the perspective that leads to the highest number of positive observations uses a nationalist concept of legitimacy and focuses on input and indirect legitimacy.


Chapter 8 – The French DiscourseThe final discourse is the French one. The findings of the French newspapers Le Figaro and Libération are presented in the same way as the previous discourses.89

8.1 – General FindingsBoth French newspapers published only a few articles during period one. Libération was a low point in the search efforts with only 4 articles and Le Figaro was no success either with 13. These limited findings turned out not to be the result of unsuitable keywords or some other methodological error, as one might think, because in the second period the same keywords turned up more articles than The Independent published all together. In period two, Le Figaro published 31 and Libération 27 articles. The total number of articles was 44 for Le Figaro and 31 for Libération.

The content analysis of the articles from Le Figaro lead to 86 observations in period one and 220 in period two. This brings the total number of observations in Le Figaro to 306. Libération’s four articles contained 18 observations. The second period compensated for this meagre result with 165 observations. Libération had 183 observations in total, which is more than The Independent.

The French newspapers were the most negative in their overall judgement of the EU. Le Figaro published three negative articles: two in period one (July 15, 2000 and December 12, 2000) and one in period two (March 2, 2005). Libération is more negative with three articles as well – one during period 1 (May 4, 2001) and two during period 2 (March 17, 2005 and June 1, 2005) –, but on a smaller population. This brings the percentages to 93,3% of the articles positive in Le Figaro, whilst in Libération 91,7% is positive.

The observations’ evaluation of legitimacy is once again opposite to the general judgement of the European project. For most observations are negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. No major shifts took place between the periods. Overall, the French percentage of negative evaluations lies between the Dutch and British percentage.

Table 8.1: French Distribution of Judgements Judgement/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Positive 17,3% 19,7% 19,2%Negative 82,7% 80,3% 80,8%

8.2 – Facets and Judgements of Legitimacy As in the previous discourses the EU is supported as a whole, but most observations are negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Thus we turn once again to the different facets to see what role each category plays in the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy.

8.2.1 – Dimensions and Judgements of LegitimacyAs in the previous discourses we will first investigate the role dimensional conceptualisation plays in the EU’s legitimacy deficit. More than half the observations use a universalist conception of legitimacy. A nationalist conceptualisation characterises most of the other observations, but, like in the other discourses, there is also a marginal number of observations that combine both dimensions.

Table 8.2: French Distribution of Dimensions

89 See appendix C, table C.3 for a complete overview of the French keyword search results, appendix H for the list of the articles and appendix I for the overall frequency tables.


Dimension/Period Period One Period Two OverallUniversalist 56,7% 58,2% 57,9%Nationalist 41,3% 38,7% 39,3%

Both 1,9% 3,1% 2,9%

The impact of the dimensions on the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy is stable. Observations characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy lead the most often to a negative evaluation. Those using a nationalist conception also lead mostly to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy, but less often in comparison.

Table 8.3: French Dimension * Judgement Crosstabulation Dimension/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative Evaluation


Both 35,7% 64,3%

If we compare the distribution within the categories to the French average (Table 8.1; The overall percentage) we find something interesting. The universalist conceptualisation of legitimacy is more often negative than the French average, whilst a nationalist perspective is more positive. This is in line with the other discourses, but the difference is only very marginal, respectively 1,9% more negative and 1,6% more positive, unlike the other discourses where the universalist conceptualisation is much more negative and nationalist conceptualisation is much more positive.

8.2.2 – Components and Judgements of LegitimacyThe role of the different components within the French discourse is the next subject of analysis. The French focus shifts away from throughput legitimacy to more observations focussing on both input and output legitimacy in period two. Overall, just over half the observations focus on input legitimacy. Nearly a third of the observations focus on output legitimacy and the rest of the observations on throughput legitimacy.

Table 8.4: French Distribution of Components Component/Period Period One Period Two Overall


Output 27,9% 32,5% 31,5%

The distribution of judgments within the components is next, but first some important shifts. The observations that focus on throughput legitimacy were more often negative in period two (an increase of 10,4%). Those focussing on output legitimacy, on the other hand, become more often positive (18,8%). Overall, observations focusing on output legitimacy lead most often to a positive evaluation compared to the other focuses, but still most observations are negative. The observations focussing on throughput legitimacy lead the most often to a negative evaluation, but also those focussing on input legitimacy are often negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy.



Table 8.5: French Component * Judgement Crosstabulation Component/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative evaluation


Output 32,5% 67,5%

Now let us compare the distribution within different components to the French average. A focus on throughput legitimacy leads more often to a negative evaluation than average. To a lesser extent so does a focus on input legitimacy. Like in the other discourses, observations focussing on output legitimacy lead more often to a positive observation compared to the national average.

8.2.3 – Models and Judgements of LegitimacyThus we arrive at the final facet: the models and their relationship to the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. The discourse is relatively stable in this regard. A majority of observations, more than half, focus on direct legitimacy. Just over a quarter of the observations do not use a model of a political order to assess the EU’s legitimacy. In third place come observations that focus on indirect legitimacy. And finally a marginal number of observations combine both models of political order.

Table 8.6: French Distribution of Models Model/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Neither 25,0% 25,7% 25,6%Direct 55,8% 57,4% 57,1%

Indirect 17,3% 15,8% 16,2%Both 1,9% 1,0% 1,2%

The distribution of evaluations within different models is the same in both periods. Overall, the majority of observations that focuses on direct legitimacy lead to a negative evaluation. Those focussing on indirect legitimacy are also often negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Those not using a model of political order are the least often negative in comparison, but they are overall more often negative than positive.

Table 8.7: French Model * Judgement Crosstabulation Model/Judgement Positive Evaluation Negative Evaluation

Neither 35,2% 64,8%Direct 12,9% 87,1%

Indirect 16,5% 83,5%Both 16,7% 83,3%

Compared to the average French distribution of judgments, only observations that do not use a model lead less often to a negative evaluation. Those focussing on direct legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation than the French average. These two findings are in line with the other discourses. The French discourse stands out, because observations with a focus on indirect legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation than the French average. In the other discourses, a focus on indirect legitimacy means a more positive evaluation than the national average.



8.2.4 – Conclusions on Facets and Judgements of LegitimacyIn the French discourse, once again the category with the most observations – a universalist conceptualisation, a focus on input legitimacy, and a focus on direct legitimacy – lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the national average. Again both a universalist conceptualisation and a focus on direct legitimacy lead the most often to a negative evaluation within their facet, and also again a focus on throughput legitimacy leads more often to negative evaluation then a focus on input legitimacy.

Secondly, also in line with the other discourses observations using either both dimensions in their conceptualisation of legitimacy or combing both models are rare.

Thirdly, all non-marginal categories in the French discourse lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than a positive one.

Fourthly, the relationship between dimensional conceptualisation and evaluation is much more in line with the national expectation than in the other discourses where the use of universalist concept of legitimacy is clearly more negative and nationalist ones more positive than the national average.

The final conclusion comes from the model-judgement relationship. Observations with a focus on indirect legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the national average. This is interesting, because it sets France apart from the other discourses where such a focus leads to a more positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the national average.

8.3 – Multi-level GovernanceThe third part of the analysis is whether or not multi-level governance is taken into account in the discourse. Libération is the only newspaper with an article that takes multi-level governance into account (March 14, 2006). This brings the percentage of articles that do not take it into account for Libération to 96,9%. Le Figaro does not have any articles ‘with multi-level governance’, thus their percentage of observations is 100% ‘negative’.

The observations percentages are even lower. In period one, only 1 observation takes multi-level governance into account, but clearly not consciously, because there is not a single article that did. In period two, 5 observations were found that take it into account. So also in the final discourse the numbers speak for themselves.

Table 8.8: French Distribution of Multi-level Governance MLG/Period Period One Period Two Overall

Yes 1,0% 1,3% 1,2%No 99,0% 98,7% 98,8%

8.4 – Overview of the Legitimacy DiscourseIn the French discourse perceptions with 24 or more observations are seen as common.90 There were some shifts between the two periods worth mentioning. The percentage of observations characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on output legitimacy and not using a model of political order leading to a negative evaluation went from 5,8% to 4,9%. Its counterpart focussing on direct legitimacy declined from 6,7% to 3,6%. On the other hand, the percentage of perceptions characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation increased from 4,8% to 8,1%. Now for the overview of the French discourse, which looks as follows:

90 5% of 489 is 25,45



Table 8.9: French Facets * Judgement Crosstabulation Facets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationUniversalist Input Neither 9 14






Both 0 0Nationalist Input Neither 2 13






Both 0 1Both Input Neither 0 0






Both 0 0



Four perceptions characterise more than 24 observations. In order of size these are:

1. universalist, input, direct, negative with 26,8% (131),2. nationalist, input, direct, negative with 7,4% (36),3. universalist, throughput, direct, negative with 5,3% (26), and4. nationalist, output, neither, negative with 5,1% (25).

Like in the previous discourses the only element they have in common is their negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Further, the dimensional conceptualisations are evenly divided among the most common perceptions: two universalist and two nationalist. With regards to the components, two perceptions focus on input, one on throughput and also one on output legitimacy. Finally, three perceptions focus on direct legitimacy, whilst one does not use any model of political order and none focus on indirect legitimacy.

We finish the analysis of the French discourse with three final remarks. First, the perception characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation is once again the most common, but it is not as large as in the Dutch discourse. Secondly, much like in the Dutch discourse, many observations use a nationalist concept of legitimacy in combination with a focus on output legitimacy, but because it is more evenly divided it does not show at first glance. Finally, the perspective with the most positive observations is characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on output legitimacy and does not use any model of a political order.


Chapter 9 – From Numbers to Narratives

Isn’t it striking that we are all aware of the cultural diversity of Europe, yet political Europe we perceive as a larger version of our home country?

Frans Timmermans 91

In this chapter, the findings of the empirical research are discussed. The first part – the numbers – is a comparison of the statistics from the previous three chapters. It will follow roughly the same structure as those chapters. The second and third part – the narratives – are a ‘translation’ of the quantitative data back to qualitative data. In part two, the similarities are placed in context followed by the national differences in part three. In the final part, we will return to the hypotheses formulated in chapter five. On the basis of the discussion of the findings we will be able to test the hypotheses to see whether or not they are correct.

9.1 – NumbersThe quantitative analysis is a means to come to grips with a large amount of data. In what follows the aim is to paint a comprehensible picture of the main similarities and differences between the discourses. Therefore minor discrepancies are beyond the scope of this discussion, as are the exact percentages. First, the empirical findings are compared and then they are ‘grouped’ into similarities and differences.

9.1.1 – General FindingsThe rate of publication is stable in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but the former published more than the latter. France shows a clear increase: In period one, less is published than in the United Kingdom, but in the second period, more than in the Netherlands.

The overall judgements in the articles and observations show the same pattern in all three discourses. They are supportive of the European project, but negative in their assessment of the EU’s legitimacy.

9.1.2 – Facets and Judgements of LegitimacyWe start with the similarities between the discourses before turning to the national differences. In all three discourses, the same categories within the facets are the most common and they are more often negative in their evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than their national average. The categories are a universalist conceptualisation, a focus on input legitimacy and a focus on direct legitimacy. Both a universalist conceptualisation and a focus on direct legitimacy lead the most often to a negative evaluation compared to the other categories within the facet. A focus on input legitimacy though is always outflanked by a focus on throughput legitimacy, but not by much.

A second similarity is that both conceptualisations using both dimensions or combining both models of political order are rare in all three discourses.

Thirdly, all categories, except the marginal ones just mentioned above, lead more often to a negative than a positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. The only exception to the rule is found in the Dutch discourse, where a focus on output legitimacy leads more often to a positive evaluation.

Some differences have come forward in the similarities above, but there are two more differences that warrant attention. Both are from the French discourse: First, the judgement of the EU’s legitimacy seems to be unrelated to the dimensional conceptualisation of legitimacy, because the

91 ‘Is het niet frappant, dat wij ons allemaal bewust zijn van de culturele diversiteit van Europa, terwijl wij het politieke Europa zien als het eigen land in het groot?’ (Volkskrant November 27, 2001).


percentages diverge only minimally from the French average. In the other discourses, a universalist conceptualisation leads more often to a negative evaluation than the national averages, whilst a nationalist one leads much more often to a positive evaluation.

Secondly, observations focussing on indirect legitimacy lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than the national average, unlike the Dutch as the British discourse, where such a focus leads more often to a positive evaluation than the national average.

9.1.3 – Multi-level GovernanceThe number of articles that take the reality of multi-level governance into account is the same in all the discourses: it is almost non-existent. The number of observations that take multi-level governance into account is the largest in Dutch discourse with 97,7% not taking it into account! With numbers so outspoken there is little left to say.

9.1.4 – The Overall Legitimacy DiscoursesThe overall discourses are similar in three ways. First of all, the most common perceptions of legitimacy are all negative in their evaluation. Secondly, in all three discourses, the perception using a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation characterises more than a quarter of all observations. In the Dutch discourse, more than a third of the observations is characterised as such. The third similarity is that perceptions characterised by a nationalist conceptualisation with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation and those characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on throughput and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation are both common in all three discourses.

Next to these similarities there are also several differences between the discourses. The Dutch discourse clearly focuses on input legitimacy. There are two findings that support this, namely the aforementioned number of observations characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation. Furthermore, three of the four most common perceptions focus on input legitimacy. On the other hand, the Dutch often evaluate the EU’s legitimacy on the basis of a nationalist conceptualisation in combination with a focus on output legitimacy.

The British discourse takes an interest in input legitimacy, but stands out, because it emphasises output legitimacy to a much larger extent than the others. Two often encountered perceptions focus on output legitimacy compared to none in the Netherlands and one in France. Further, legitimacy is more often assessed using nationalist concept of legitimacy than in the other discourses. Finally, the British discourse is the only one in which one of the most common perceptions focuses on indirect legitimacy.

The French discourse does not actually stand out as much as it falls in-between the other two. On the one hand, it shares the Dutch emphasis on input legitimacy to some extent; on the other hand, one of the most often encountered perceptions focuses on output legitimacy, which places it more in line with the British discourse.

Finally, when it comes to the most common positive perceptive on the EU’s legitimacy the discourses differ. A perspective characterised by a universalist conception of legitimacy focussing on output and direct legitimacy leads to the most positive observations in the Netherlands. The British have the most positive perceptions when they use a perspective characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and indirect legitimacy. Finally, the French are most often positive when using a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on output legitimacy and does not use any model of political order.



9.1.5 – The Grouping of the NumbersIn this part, the empirical findings presented above are systematically ‘grouped’ in similarities and differences. The similarities, except for the first one, are grouped on the basis of the hypotheses. This is done for clarity as well as to accommodate answering the hypotheses later on. The differences are divided along national boundaries. The groupings form the basis for the narrative approach, which will take a closer, qualitative look at these ‘groups of numbers’.

First up are the similarities. The first similarity is that in all three discourses we find overall support for the European project, but a very negative evaluation of its legitimacy. This seems to indicate the EU’s legitimacy deficit.

Secondly, all the non-marginal categories lead more often to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy than a positive one. The categories that are used most often lead more often to a negative evaluation than the national average. These categories are the ones associated with the idea of a universalist, democratic deficit – a universalist conceptualisation, a focus on input legitimacy and a focus on direct legitimacy. Another finding supporting the hypothesis of a democratic deficit is that the most common perception in all three discourses is characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy focussing on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation. Finally, in all the discourses a negative perception of the EU’s legitimacy based on a universalist conceptualisation focussing on throughput and direct legitimacy is common.

The third group of similarities indicate a mismatch between the perception of multi-level government and the reality of multi-level governance. First, all the categories lead more often to a negative than a positive evaluation. In this regard, the distribution of observations conceptualising legitimacy on the basis of either dimension is rather balanced. Thus both dimensions influence the discourses and both lead more often to a negative evaluation than a positive one. Furthermore, in all three discourses a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation characterises many observations. Finally, none of the discourses takes the reality of multi-level governance into account.

The ways in which the discourses differ from one another are as follows: The Netherlands stands out in three important ways. First, there is more emphasis on input legitimacy than in the other discourses. Secondly, the focus on and positive evaluation of the EU’s output legitimacy. Finally, the most articles were published in the Netherlands.

The British, on the other hand, published the lowest number of articles. Although input legitimacy clearly matters and is problematic, there is much more focus on output legitimacy, although its evaluation is not much better. Finally, a perspective of legitimacy with a focus on indirect legitimacy is more important in the British discourse.

Finally, the French discourse knows a dramatic rise in publications. Further, France seems to fall in-between the other two discourses with a mixed emphasis on input and output legitimacy. On the other hand, the discourse stands out, because the dimensions are more in line with the national average than in the other discourses and the indirect model leads more often to negative evaluation than the national average.

9.2 – Similar Narratives or Not?The Americans have a saying: ‘There are lies, damn lies and statistics.’ Statistics are the worst kind of lie, because they have an aura of objectivity and truth. Numbers can tell us a story, but they can also hide parts of it. In order to show that the empirical findings are reliable qualitative translations will follow. These qualitative translations are referred to as narratives in order to differentiate them from discourses, for both the numbers and the narratives present the same discourses. We start with the narrative behind the similarities.



9.2.1 – General Support and a Legitimacy DeficitThe first similarity is the general support for the European project, but a very negative evaluation of its legitimacy. The reason for this mismatch becomes clear later on. In both the Dutch and the French discourse the support for the European project might not come as a surprise, but the British support might be, because they are generally acknowledged as Euro-sceptics.

It is true that the statistics give a skewed image of the overall British discourse. Most British articles describe the United Kingdom as ‘a nation of Euro-sceptics’ and the mass media as ‘unchallenged anti-EU journalism’ (Guardian May 30, 2001). This indicates a negative view of the European project in general. Here we encounter the first mass media contribution in a perceived biased media.

The reason for this skewed image is the selection of British newspapers. The centrist-left leaning Independent and leftwing Guardian are both pro-European newspapers. Newspapers mainly publish editorials and other opinionated articles that are in line with their ideology (Oosterbaan and Wansink 2008: 154-162), thus in this case the newspapers favour pro-European articles. Dismissing the findings for this reason would be pre-mature, because, as we will see, the discourse in the newspapers will show an essentially different pro-Europeanism than in the Netherlands and France. Further, the misrepresentation of the British discourse as pro-Europeanism will be corrected in the British narrative later on.

9.2.2 – The Diversity of the Democratic DeficitThe second ‘group’ of similarities we just discussed seem to indicate that the three discourses recognize a universalist democratic deficit. The most prominent indicator is the many perceptions characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation. This perception seems to indicate a lack of direct influence and/or representation of the European people and/or the lack of power of their representative institutions. As a Dutch commentator puts it:

If one believes in a future with an actual European Political Union ... then the goals should be more powers for the European Parliament; an expansion of the number of issues that are discussed, so that it becomes more important; introduction of referenda; European, thus not national, lists for the elections of the European parliament; direct election of the president of the European commission. In short, the creation of an actual federation (Volkskrant October 17, 2001).92

But more lies hidden behind this type of perception then the democratic deficit described above. This is merely one of three ‘themes’ leading to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy based on a universalist conceptualisation with a focus on input and direct legitimacy.

Another line of reasoning, which is closely related to the interpretation above, is that Brussels or the EU is too far away or too technocratic for people to identify with or ‘[t]he sense that the EU's institutions are increasingly remote, that decisions affecting the lives of citizens are made by unaccountable bodies’ (Independent October 5, 2000). The difference is that this observation does not automatically imply that direct mechanisms of legitimacy need to be introduced in order to solve this. This federalist argument has an indirect counterpart: the Gaullist solution. Their solution is to increase the role of national parliaments (indirect legitimacy), but we will return to this position in the narratives of both France and the United Kingdom.

92 ‘Geloof je in de toekomst van een echte Europese Politieke Unie ... dan gaat het om zaken als grotere bevoegdheden voor het Europees Parlement; uitbreiding van de onderwerpen die aan de orde komen, zodat nog meer op het spel staat dan nu al het geval is; invoering van referenda; Europese, dus geen nationale, lijsten voor de verkiezingen van het Europees Parlement; directe verkiezing van de voorzitter van de Europese Commissie. Dan gaat het kortom, om de vorming van een echte federatie.’



On a different note, one might interpretate the observation that the EU is ‘too far away’ as a lack of identification or of a ‘thick’ identity, rather than of popular mandate and accountability. Then the problem is nationalist rather than universalist in nature: identification instead of democratisation. The commentators though often do not acknowledge this interpretation. They relate the gap to democratic ideas of popular mandate and direct representation as described above. This though is not a necessary conclusion and as we will see not the only conclusion drawn in discourse either.

The second ‘hidden’ theme is the quality of the debate on Europe. In all the discourses there are complains about the quality of the debate. This argument is made in general (e.g. Volkskrant October 17, 2001), aimed specifically at government – ‘The weakness of the campaign of parties who defend the "yes", [is] their lack of enthusiasm’ (Libération May 10, 2005)93 –, or the mass media – ‘The media [...] was not present’ (Figaro May 21, 2005).94 In the Netherlands and France this argument takes the shape of complains about a lack of clarity, lies and/or the lack of an organised ‘no’ in the debate on the EU-constitution. In the British discourse, complains about the mass media also focus on clarity and deceit, the latter in the form of observations (some might say accusations) of Europhobia: ‘The phobic press, after all, has decided on its story already [and it cannot] moderate its inexhaustible campaign to mislead the British public’ (Guardian December 5, 2000).95 The difference is they complain about the lack of a well organised yes-campaign on EU issues rather than a no-campaign. (Here the pro-European of the British newspapers play a role.)96

Now for another element of the democratic deficit: throughput legitimacy. It is judged as ‘unaccountable and illegitimate’ (Guardian January 29, 2000). Furthermore, comprehensibility and openness are seen as problematic: ‘[The] complex decision-making procedures [should be] simplified’ (Volkskrant November 21, 2001).97 This argument is most often raised as a technical argument with regards to enlargement and in support of the constitution. One argument within this category shines by its absence: legality. In none of the discourses is the EU described as juristically illegal. Corrupt yes, but the actual institutions are not seen as illegal.

Another factor worth pointing out is the limited focus on throughput legitimacy. Although, important for the ideal of constitutional democracy (and those [scholars] active in public administration) it seems to play a very limited role in the general discourse on the EU’s legitimacy. This might indicate that it is unimportant in comparison or that there is no problem! For legitimacy surfaces when it is disputed. Admittedly, the former is more likely than the latter.98

9.2.3 – The Tension between Nationalist Government and Multi-level GovernanceThe findings above might fit the universalist, democratic mould, but the third group of similarities are more in line with the hypothesis of ‘multi-level government’. They give rise to the idea that the EU also lacks a common ‘thick’ identity, which is not a universalist, but a nationalist republican demand. We already saw this aspect come up in the fact that ‘too far away’ might also be interpretated as a lack of identification: a nationalist interpretation. Let us analyse the evidence for this hypothesis.

93 ‘La faiblesse de la campagne des partis qui défendent le oui, leur manque d'enthousiasme.’94 ‘Les médias, […] n'en faisaient pas trop.’95 Euro-commissioner Peter Mandelson: ‘The problem is that, on Europe, much of the British media is caught in an Eighties Thatcherite time warp. It goes something like this. Britain will always be isolated in Europe. The EU is a Franco-German plot. The Continentals want to do away with the nation state and build a centralised federal superstate. British prime ministers all start by saying they want to put Britain at the heart of Europe and end up being pushed to the sidelines. And most exciting of all: Europe breaks British governments’ (Independent July 4, 2000).96 Siedentop in this regard sees the lack of choice for voters on the subject of the EU as a danger for ‘deprived centrist voters of any real choice, leaving opposition […] for the extremes’ (2000: 218).97 ‘complexe besluitvorming te vereenvoudigen’98 This is in line with Van Nispen and Posseth analysis that input and output are substantial legitimacy, but throughput is merely procedural (2007: 224). Merely is their qualification.



The common perception characterised by a nationalist conceptualisation with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation takes two forms. On the one hand, there is the argument that the EU needs a national identity. The lack thereof leads to the call for a common identity based on a shared heritage. This idea is also often dismissed: ‘Europe's identity cannot be based on a glorified heritage celebration’ (Guardian June 15, 2005). Although, there are also some who argue the EU does have such a shared heritage, for example Dutch prime-minister Jan Peter Balkenende, who argues: ‘The European Union is, in its essence, a value community’ (Figaro May 24, 2005).99

On the other hand, the perception represents also an approach from the national level to the EU’s legitimacy. Several French authors argue that nation(-states) form the natural democratic order – ‘the nations are the natural spaces for democracy’ (Figaro July 15, 2000)100 or ‘[a]t the heart of the chasm of misunderstanding: the nation. It is for the people the natural framework for democratic expression’ (Libération June 9, 2005).101 Democratisation, let alone federalisation, is from this perspective an attack upon the naturally sovereign democracies of Europe. This French argument explicitly combines both versions of republicanisms in a single argument against further democratisation. This shows that a ‘corruption’ of democratic theory has taken place.

Throughput legitimacy also has a nationalist conceptualisation, although it is not very prevalent it is important to address here in relation to its universalist counterpart. The main concern is ‘making [the EU’s] existing system capable of functioning efficiently’ (Independent July 3, 2000). Like the universalist conception of throughput legitimacy, it is often used with regards to the governability of an enlarged EU. Here both arguments tend to get a more territorial flavour to them, for at times they result in arguments against membership of Turkey. The idea of a common European cultural heritage plays a role in this – ‘Turkey is not European not in its geography, not in its history and not in its culture’ (Figaro January 26, 2005).102

In order to answer the hypothesis on multi-level government and governance it is also important to investigate the latter’s role in discourse. The numbers seem to indicate an almost complete lack of awareness and they are spot on! For that matter, if one would exclude accounts in which multi-level governance is used almost by accident or at least the author is unaware of it then the numbers would turn out even lower.103

The exception that proves the rule is found in the Dutch discourse. Dutch staatsecretaris104 of European Affairs Dick Benschop explicitly refers to multi-level governance when he introduces the concept of Network Europe (Volkskrant December 29, 2001). It is meant as a description and defence of the EU, but the concept does not catch on, as the numbers show.

In this regard, the first similarity is interesting as well. Part of Europe’s paradox of being supported in general, but perceived as illegitimate might be the result of this lack of ‘realism’ in discourse. People might want to support the idea of Europe as a peaceful and prosperous community, but cannot make sense of the current political system. They understand its results and uses – a focus on output legitimacy leads the most often to a positive evaluation of all components – and in a sense understand it uniqueness, but seem unable to grasp the big picture, which is different from any political order familiar to them. We will return to this later on in more detail.

99 ‘ ... l'Union européenne est, dans son essence, une communauté de valeurs.’ The same contribution is found in the Volkskrant (December 7, 2004).100 ‘ ... les nations sont les espaces naturels de la démocratie.’101 ‘Au coeur de cet abîme d'incompréhension: la nation. Celle-ci est pour le peuple le cadre naturel de l'expression démocratique.’102 ‘La Turquie n'est européenne ni par sa géographie, ni par son histoire, ni par sa culture.’103 This is in line with Trentz and Liebert finding that the multi-level, poly-sector dimensions of the EU-system of governance are missing in discourse (2008: 14).104 Junior minister



9.3 – The Three Discourses as NarrativesLet us now examine the national discourses. These narratives place the numerical differences in their context. They will demonstrate that a quantitative analysis is a very useful and reliable means for presenting differences in qualitative data. Further, these narratives will reveal several other aspects that would not have come forward in the numbers alone, but that are important for our understanding of the EU’s legitimacy deficit in people’s perception.

9.3.1 – The Dutch Debate: Infighting FederalistsThe Dutch seem to accept the EU as a necessity for a small country in a globalised world. Leaving the EU ‘would mean exchanging shared sovereignty for virtual sovereignty, from reality to fantasy’ (NRC June 27, 2000).105 This accounts for the positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy when focussing on output as well as the higher number of publications on the EU.106 This consensus could also explain why there is no single perception focussing on output legitimacy with many observations, because the necessity of the EU to further Dutch interests is widely accepted. More specific, the EU is defended by its historical and current ability to spread peace and prosperity across the European continent. The left do criticise Europe for being too liberal and not social and green enough and after the rejection of the constitution they called upon the leaders within the EU to ‘now go to work on proposal for a more democratic, social and green Europe’ (Volkskrant June 25, 2005).107

The second characteristic is the emphasis on input legitimacy that leads to a negative evaluation. This emphasis is the result of a ‘federalist consensus’, because there are no actual opponents to EU-cooperation and to some extend federalisation. The Dutch rightwing parties – the conservative-liberals (VVD) and Christian-democrats (CDA) – are staunch supporters of the EU.

Former Euro-commissioner VVD’er Frits Bolkenstein describes the EU’s problems as follows: ‘The Lisbon-train pulls to many carts. That is why it keeps driving slower. The EU should concentrate on a limited number of aspects, primarily the increase of competiveness (NRC February 7, 2005).108 He does not fear supranational institutions, but too much Europe, which to some extend is the VVD’s position on national issues as well: a small state and a free market.

The CDA perceive the EU as a value community in line with their views on the Netherlands. Some Dutch parties on the (centre-)left also see Europe as a values community: ‘[The cornerstone is] respect for the values of the EU. In that sense the borders are not physical, and not an inevitable fact, but they are determined by the measure in which one can and wants to be part of the value community which the EU is’ (NRC February 7, 2005).109 There is though clear difference with the CDA for the latter focus on religious heritage rather than universal, humanist values.

The Dutch electorate though is Euro-sceptic, which might actually be the result of the federalist consensus. There is (one should say was) no real no-camp. The pro-European elite struggle with the growing Euro-sceptic sentiments among the people – ‘The interest of the Dutch, but also of other Europeans for Europe is at an all time low’ (Volkskrant October 17, 2001).110 The solutions are further democratisation, a temporary stop to further expansion/integration – ‘The EU should “hold its

105 ‘... zou neerkomen op het inwisselen van gedeelde soevereiniteit tegen virtuele soevereiniteit, van werkelijkheid tegen schijn’. This article by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens is also published in the Guardian (October 4, 2004).106 The number of articles are an indicator of the importance of an issue, see Liebert and Trentz (2008: 9). 107 ‘nu gaan werken aan voorstellen voor een democratischer, socialer en groener Europa’108 ‘De Lissabon-trein trekt namelijk te veel wagons. Daarom rijdt hij steeds langzamer. De EU moet zich concentreren op een beperkt aantal aspecten, hoofdzakelijk ter verhoging van de concurrentiekracht’109 ‘... respect voor de waarden van de EU. In die zin zijn grenzen niet fysiek, en geen vaststaand gegeven, maar worden zij bepaald door de mate waarin men deel kan en wil uitmaken van de waardengemeenschap die de EU is.’110 ‘De interesse van Nederlanders, maar ook van andere Europeanen voor Europa is op een dieptepunt aanbeland.’



position for a moment”’(Volkskrant June 3, 2005)111 – , or to convince ‘the people’ that the EU does not endanger the national identity or even is itself a ‘value community’ of which we are a part (Volkskrant December 7, 2004).112 None of these solutions though seems to strike a chord with the electorate.

Finally, there is much discussion about the exact finalité politique. Most prominently feature: the policy competences for the tiers of government (What the Germans call a Kompetenzenkatalog) and the type of economy the EU should aspire to be. These discussions often stay vague and unspecific, except if the article focuses on the subject rather than the EU.

In conclusion, the Dutch discourse is a kind of federalist infight. Most parties participating in the discourse agree that the Netherlands’ future lies in Europe, but what the exact form should be is the real question. The right wants a small state and a free-market, whilst the left see Europe as a way to promote social(-economic) justice at home and across the globe, thus they want a state to control the market. The people though are struggling with the far away structures of the EU and they do not seem to be swayed by either prospect.

9.3.2 – The British Struggle: Europhobes versus Gaullists In the debate and solution for the EU’s legitimacy deficit, the British discourse could not be any different from the Dutch. Europe is less important as indicated by the smaller number of articles published, but also there is no real British federalist position. The main federalist contributions are by foreign dignitaries, like Joschka Fischer and José Manuel Barroso (Respectively: Independent May 16, 2000 and Independent December 12, 2005).

The first group in the British discourse are the Europhobes. They are represented by the conservative party, United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) and the majority of the mass media, but also Labour and Green parliamentarian are part of this group (Independent May 19, 2005). One commentator paints the following picture of Britain’s future:

After rejecting the single currency in a referendum and following several more years of increasing isolation, Britain cuts its ties with the European Union and applies for membership of Nafta, the North American free trade agreement. Some supporters of ever closer links between the English speaking nations take the fantasy one stage further and envisage the UK as the 51st and most powerful state of the union. (Guardian June 30, 2000).

The point of this quote is not to show how unrealistic some Europhobes are, but rather to indicate how far removed the British are from any Dutch conception of the possibility and desirability of a European federation. Most British people have a sincere, whether realistic or not, fear of what William Hague, former leader of the conservative party, describes as: ‘sliding down a slipway to a superstate’ (Independent December 12, 2000).113

On the other hand, there are the pro-Europeans represented primarily by the then Labour prime-minister Tony Blair. Blair’s position though is not federalist either, rather he argues for Europe as a way to further Britain’s interests in a globalised world. ‘[Blair] is a modern Gaullist’ ( Guardian May 3, 2001). He is clearly aware of this as the following anecdote illustrates: ‘When one official murmured during a Downing Street meeting on the speech that one passage's emphasis on nation states seemed "rather Gaullist", Blair gave him the thumbs up sign. "De Gaulle," he replied. "Top

111 De EU “pas op de plaats maakt”112 ‘... onze waardengemeenschap’113 There are also party political motivations involved: ‘Cameron continues to use "Europe" as a touchstone of his loyalty to the party's Europhobic right’ (Guardian March 2, 2006). Cameron is often called a ‘caring’ (left) conservative and he needs Europe to bind the hardcore rightwing of his party. In the current EU election he has pulled the Conservatives out of the European Peoples Party (EPP-ED), because they are to pro-European.



man"’ (Independent October 5, 2000). The two men differ in one regard: Blair does not value mercantilism, but its Anglo-Saxon counterpart: free-trade. Still, the EU is a means to national ends.

It is this position that accounts for the many positive observations characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and indirect legitimacy – ‘To Blair […] the Council of Ministers […] is the EU's democratic core’ (Independent October 5, 2000). The EU is thus already indirectly legitimated. If democratisation is needed it should be achieved through ‘a second chamber of the European Parliament to be made up of national parliamentarians to stop the EU overstepping its powers’ (Independent May 29, 2001). A focus on output legitimacy often leading to a negative evaluation is also partially explained by Blair’s Gaullism. The EU is too expensive and more importantly it focuses on the wrong issues. It should be ‘a "superpower [military and economic interests] not a superstate"’ (Guardian October 7, 2000). For as Blair puts it: 'The question that is being debated by the people of Europe is how do you, in this era of globalisation, make our economies strong and competitive?' (Independent June 3, 2005).

The selected pro-European newspapers also in part explain that negative evaluation. They contain editorials that try to make the case for Europe. They try to convince the British public by pointing out the missed opportunities of not being at the heart of Europe, which makes the evaluation of the output more often negative than in the Netherlands. An interesting absentee in the discourse is the EU as the historical bringer of peace and prosperity to the continent, but then again Great-Britain was ‘victorious’ in World War Two and might see itself in this role. The EU is recognized by some as the bringer of peace in the ‘neighbourhood’.

As one might notice reference is often made to Tony Blair. This is because personification of positions is very common. This might be the result of the British political system, which is more person-orientated. The United Kingdom is ‘[s]teeped for centuries in winner-take-all juices’, which also influences media coverage. The British results in Brussels are approached as an international organisation, in which ultimately everything depends on the national heads of state. ‘National victory and/or defeat seems to be the only basis on which most Brits can understand events (Guardian December 12, 2000). This makes the comprehension of the EU’s complex decision procedures hard.114

There are two important elements that further differentiate the British discourse from the Dutch. First, the British discuss more specific policy issues, most prominently their own rebate: ‘[T]here can only be movement on the rebate if there are equivalent advances in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy’ (Independent June 16, 2005). This brings us the second difference, which can be summarised as: What are the French doing? Europe is France for the British. Both British positions fear being trapped in a social-market designed by the French and ‘British critics most object to [the constitution], as being typically French’ (Guardian May 26, 2006).

The British discourse is a struggle for the heart and minds of the British people between Europhobes and Gaullists. The former anxiously fear submerging in a European superstate, whilst the latter see the EU as a way to further British interests in a globalised world. The tacit consent is that neither wants to sacrifice British parliamentary sovereignty, but their different analyses of the chances and dangers for the United Kingdom within the EU results in different positions.

9.3.3 – The French Dilemma: Gaullists versus FederalistsFrance falls in-between the other two discourses with a mixed emphasis on input and output legitimacy. This position is explained by the fact that it combines one position from each discourse: the Dutch federalist position and the British Gaullist position. This in turn explains that there are fewer observations characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct

114 According to this logic Britain would come out the winner much more than other countries, even more so with QMV (Guardian June 5, 2001), but in the eyes of winner-take-all sovereignty every loss is a complete defeat of the system (Guardian December 12, 2000).



legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation then in the Netherlands and why there is more emphasis on output legitimacy than in the Netherlands, yet less than in the United Kingdom.

The French discourse also stands out in several respects. The most remarkable finding is the almost complete absence of articles in period one and then the sudden and dramatic increase in period two. Larry Siedentop argues that the Euro was a French idea to keep German power in check after reunification. The constitutional treaty though is perceived as a Anglo-Germanic half-breed with bits and pieces from both federalism and free-market ideology, both of which are opposed to the French (administrative) culture of étatism (2000: 137-140). From this perspective, the introduction of the Euro would not trigger French anxieties, but the constitutional treaty is a completely different story. The French see themselves as the leaders of Europe, but their influence is gradually declining or as Timothy Garton Ash puts it: “[They] fear an enlarged EU with Paris no longer in the driving seat” (Guardian May 26, 2006).

Let us turn to the first position in the discourse: the Gaullist position. They perceive, a contraire to their British counterpart, the EU as more and more problematic. Gaullist were fine with Europe when in was ‘theirs’, but they are now turning away from it. They argue that democracy is naturally structured on the national level in the nation and cannot be moved to the European level.

But regardless of the magicians. The room is empty, but they continue their magic tricks in front of a virtual European people. Because there is no European people, but only peoples in Europe, rooted in national histories, language, culture, policies, attached to what we call a nation where democracy is exercised and where identity is based, which is manifested in sovereignty (Figaro March 2, 2005).115

A political order needs a political will, which can only exist on the national level. This explains to some extend why a nationalist conceptualisation of legitimacy does not lead more often to a positive evaluation like in the other discourses.

Federalists, on the other hand, seek to legitimize the EU through further democratisation. They perceive the EU as a means to protect France ‘from the effects of globalisation’ (Figaro December 14, 2001)116, but also as a way to ‘play a role in the international political arena’ (Figaro May 19, 2005)117 and form an opposing power to the USA. This is the reason for many positive evaluations of the EU’s legitimacy assessed with nationalist concept of legitimacy and a focus on output legitimacy, but not using any model of political order. This ‘essentially’ Gaullist bid for power knows a more humanist version, which aims to promote peace and social justice (e.g. Figaro June 21, 2005). The EU is ‘a supranational space of peace, democracy and prosperity’ (Libération October 20, 2004)118, which in turn explains why a universalist conceptualisation is more positive than in other discourses. Federalists want the EU ‘to pursue the construction of a Europe that protects its citizens, beyond the free market, using tax policies, social and environmental conclusions' (Libération October 12, 2005).119

In Libération, there is another analysis of the EU’s legitimacy deficit, namely the French political system itself personified by former Gaullist president Jacques Chirac. He is seen as having too much power, being unaccountable and on top of that his policy choices are disliked – [He pushed through] without taking into account the opinion of the parliamentary majority, the liberalization of energy market and the pension system a few weeks before the presidential election. The result of such 115 ‘Mais peu importe aux illusionnistes. La salle est vide, mais ils continuent leurs tours de magie devant un peuple européen virtuel. Car il n'y a pas de peuple européen mais des peuples en Europe, enracinés dans des histoires nationales, une langue, une culture, des politiques, attachés à ce qu'on appelle une nation, lieu où s'exerce la démocratie, où se fonde l'identité, où se manifeste la souveraineté.’116 ‘... face aux effets de la mondialisation.’117 ‘... jouer un rôle en vue sur la scène politique international.’118 ‘... un espace supranational de paix, de démocratie et de prospérité.’119 ‘ ... s'atteler à la construction d'une Europe qui protège ses citoyens, par-delà le grand marché, à partir de politiques fiscales, sociales et environnementales concertées.’



irresponsibility is impressive’ (Libération June 4, 2005).120 This internal dissatisfaction then reflects poorly on the European level of governance, which is the reason for the negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy when focussing on indirect legitimacy.

French commentators are critical of the EU for being too Anglo-Saxon, specifically the constitution. One of the most prominent figures is former prime-minister and potential presidential candidate, Laurent Fabius from the Parti Socialiste121, who moved away from his party-line to the no-camp calling ‘for a “reorientation of European politics”’ (Libération May 19, 2006).122 This is further interesting, because as we saw in the United Kingdom the argument for fearing Europe is exactly the opposite: Europe is too French and thus too socialist.

The French are alike to the British in two respects. First, they also focus on national political figures, which might relate to the powerful position of the president within their political system. Secondly, they return the favour of distrust. The distrust of the British is most apparent in their fear of an ‘a-social’ economic model and their hope ‘to put an end to neoliberal policies’ (Libération March 23, 2005).123

The French dilemma seems to boil down to how to deal with their loss of power in the EU. This may explain both the sudden interest in the EU and why French Gaullists are turning away from Europe. The federalists, on the other hand, keep believing in the EU. The leftwing federalist might support further democratisation as a way to get around the conservative president. Either way the French are trying to get to grips with their future in Europe in one way – Gaullist – or another – federalist.

9.4 – Speaking Hypothetically AgainThese were the numbers and narratives. One might see the numbers as a skeletal overview of the discourses pointing toward several similarities and differences. The narratives showed the reliability of several similarities and the differences, but also exposed some hidden diversity. The skeletons thus got bodies, but now the most important issues have to be fleshed out in order to answer our central research question. In order to flesh out these issues we will test the three hypotheses.

9.4.1 – The Democratic Problem of Nationalist IdentificationThe first hypothesis tests whether the European political elites are right to coin the term ‘democratic deficit’.

H1: The EU only has a democratic deficit.

In terms of the Hontian framework one would expect, if the hypothesis is true, that the vast majority of observations use a universalist conception of legitimacy and lead to a negative evaluation. In the narratives, this would translate into a focus on issues, like representation, popular support, participation and transparency.

First, let us consider the case in support of this hypothesis. In all three discourses, the majority of the observations were universalist rather than nationalist in their conceptualisation of legitimacy and these universalist perspective leads more often to a negative evaluation than the national averages. Furthermore, perceptions characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation are the most common in all three discourses.

120 ‘... sans tenir compte de l'avis de sa majorité parlementaire, la libéralisation du marché énergétique et du régime des retraites à quelques semaines de l'élection présidentielle. Le résultat de tant d'irresponsabilité est impressionnant.’121 The French social-democrats122 ‘... une "réorientation des politiques européennes’123 ‘... de mettre un coup d'arrêt aux politiques néolibérales’



Also common are similar perceptions, but with a focus on throughput rather than input legitimacy. We also encountered the democratic deficit in the narratives. The EU is perceived as being ‘too far away’ from its citizens and measures are proposed to overcome this problem, like more power to the European parliament, more referenda, a senate of national parliaments and more transparent procedures.

Still, we will have to reject this hypothesis. First of all, many perceptions in all three discourses use a nationalist concept of legitimacy for the problem to just be democratic. For although admittedly perceptions using a nationalist conceptualisation lead more often to positive evaluations than universalist ones, the majority of evaluations are negative. In this regard the large number of observations characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation is an indicator of a different problem.

The narratives made this other deficit clearer. The ‘too far away’ argument is the crux of the matter. It is often given a democratic interpretation, but the evidence suggests one should actually interpretate this as a problem of identification. This makes the problem nationalist rather than universalist in nature. This interpretation is recognized by some commentators within the discourses. Some of them want to convince ‘the public’ that the EU is not a threat to their national identity or for that matter their national sovereignty, whilst others see Europe’s democratisation as an ‘unnatural’ undertaking.

A short side way into the academic literature is enlightening. The idea of a European nation or thick identity is rejected by many scholars (e.g. Scharpf 1999: 9; Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 380).124 There is one important discussion in this regard: Can one actually distinguish between the people as nation and as demos? Both scholars (e.g Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 9) and commentators – the Dutch social-liberals, who see Europe as a ‘democratic-value community’ – seem to think so. Admittedly, there is nothing ‘natural’ about the nation’s link to democracy. Hont’s reconstruction of the process shows they became related through power-politics. Some authors point to the fact that the ‘national nation’ was created by the state and then leap to the assumption that the demos can thus be distinguished from the nation (Brubaker 1992; Fuchs 2000: 230; In: Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 10).

Although the premise is largely right, the idea of separation or that this process can be repeated for the EU clearly underestimates the uniqueness and magnitude of this accomplishment in the first place. Nationalism is a historical success story in its ability to bind people to the ‘far away’ national state and one might wonder whether this feat can actually be repeated on an even further away European scale with less symbols of sameness to work with.125 All politics is local, but the states through the idea of the nation – sameness – were able to make people identify and even commit to the ‘far away’ level of governance that became the nation-state (Scharpf 1999: 8). As Fareed Zakaria argues one does not fall in love with liberal constitutionalism, in other words a democratic state, therefore it needs to be associated with a cultural identity.126 Further, nowadays people acknowledge

124 There are some proponents, for example Siedentop (2000).125 As Van Middelaar observes the ‘German road’, as he calls seeking legitimacy by creating a European nation, was tried, but it failed (2009). The one symbol of sameness might be not being Muslim, which then explains the resistance to Turkey’s membership, but as said earlier, there are more reasons that play a role in this position. On the other hand, there are many integrated Muslims in Europe making the idea of ‘non-Muslimness’ as a European characteristic questionable in itself.126 In Tegenlicht: Het dilemma van de democratie (Counterlight: The dilemma of democracy): Accessible via http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/index.php/aflevering?aflID=5654897&md5=ac87ff6d3e7222bc6e600d5eb4889d8c (accessed June 21, 2009); One might assume if nationalism would disappear national interests would fade away and in its slipstream also the balancing act. Viroli argues the nation (as a cultural entity) would not have to disappear, but would have to be depoliticized (2002: 86). Still one may wonder whether this is at all possible if one needs a cultural identity to support ‘far away’ institutions.



that a mere political notion is not enough to embrace a state (WRR 2007: 103). Therefore, the distinction between demos and nation has become purely conceptual (Yack 2001: 220).127

In the discourses, there were three groups relying on the idea of national sovereignty: the British Europhobes and Gaullist and the French Gaullist. Their position is partially inspired by state interests, but they also seem to recognize that the people identify and are loyal to the nation-state. In the one discourse where there is no such position, the Dutch discourse, we find a disillusioned electorate, mainstream politicians struggling with a message for the electorate and recently the rise of populist politicians that play into exactly this vacuum. The hypothesis is thus rejected, because the EU’s legitimacy deficit is not democratic, but rather the result of too little identification.

9.4.2 – Government or Regime, but not GovernanceThe second hypothesis goes as follows:

H2: The reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit is that it is perceived as a political order of multi-level government and thus its legitimacy is assessed as such leading to a mismatch with reality.

In the theoretical framework, we saw the importance of the idea of constitutional representative democracy and the distinction between nation-states and international regimes. Many people perceive the EU as a political order of multi-level government (or federation in the making). In terms of legitimacy this means the use of both dimensional conceptualisations and a focus on the input and throughput components of legitimacy and a focus on direct legitimacy. This though will logically lead to a mismatch with the reality of multi-level governance and therefore the perception of a legitimacy deficit.

The case for this hypothesis is strong. All three discourses show a preference for a focus on input and direct legitimacy with a balance between the two dimensional conceptualisation and often a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. A focus on throughput legitimacy is a bit more often negative than one on input legitimacy in its evaluation, but the former is the least important component in the discourses. In the narratives, this translates into problems with the representation as well as identification and with the transparency as well as the efficiency of procedures. All are perceived as reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit. The EU is thus perceived as ‘simply’ another layer of government.

Further, it is very clear that none of the discourses take the reality of multi-level governance into account: this was proven in the numbers as well as in the narratives. Both elements of the hypothesis are proven and thus one might assume that a reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit is the mismatch between theoretical standards and reality. Unfortunately, the second hypothesis is also rejected, because it is incomplete.

Although the Dutch and French federalist perceive the EU as a level of government or want it to become one (and one might argue the British Europhobes fear it exactly for this reason), this is only half the story. For the Gaullist, both British and French, and Europhobes the EU is and should be primarily an international regime. This is also the way the British press reports on the EU. Observations based on categories most related to this perspective – a nationalist conceptualisation, a focus on output legitimacy, a focus on indirect legitimacy and/or not using any model – lead more often to a positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy, but still they are overall more often negative than positive. The reasons are that from this perspective, the EU-institutions are already too large and they

127 The artificial distinction was emphasised for methodological reasons, but Hont’s mongrel concepts show us that in modern democratic discourse the people, the nation, and the state have become almost intrinsic linked. Even when they are ‘objectively’ speaking not, they are perceived as such.



address the wrong issues – (economic) superpower not superstate is their motto. This is actually more in line with people’s expectations. They want the EU to tackle these issues and the environment (Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 7-9). Further, this view cannot logically address the need for more democracy. The EU already has more direct and indirect legitimacy than any international regime. Identifications should be with the nation-state, because the EU should not and will not become a state. In other words, a deficit arises from this perspective and it is also the result a mismatch of the theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy and reality.

The mismatches between the theoretical demands of multi-level government, but also of an international regime and the reality of multi-level governance are both reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit. These mismatches might very well account for the paradox of people’s support for the European project, but its weak legitimacy. They support an ideal version, but are not theoretically equipped to handle the reality of multi-level governance. This is problematic, because it is very unlikely that the EU will revert back to just an economic union or become a full-fledged federation anytime soon (and the desirability of both can be doubted).

9.4.3 – The Mass Media’s Shortcomings: Apparent and Acknowledged Now for the final hypothesis:

H3: The EU’s legitimacy deficit is increased by the mass media.

The discourses were different and clearly influenced by ‘local’ political discussions. A European public discourse has yet to fully emerge and therefore it seems the EU has twenty-seven discourses. The EU’s legitimacy deficit takes on different forms in the discourses. In line with the idea of an emerging public sphere it should be noted that some articles were published in national discourses from foreign commentators, but the contribution is much smaller than the national contribution. This is in line with other research (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 19; Peters et al. 2005).

The three potential media deficits – knowledge, motivation and comprehension – were present to some extent. The lack of knowledge and comprehension of the EU’s system of multi-level governance are apparent. They might lead to a motivational deficit in two ways. On the one hand, if the EU is set standards of legitimacy based on a model of multi-level government, which it cannot reach then the EU will always be perceived as undemocratic. On the other hand, if the EU is seen as an international regime it is perceived as too intrusive and meddling in sovereign matters.

These contributions of the mass media to the EU’s legitimacy deficit are apparent, but the shortcomings of the mass media are also acknowledged in discourse. In all three discourses complains are voiced about the quality of the debate. The debate or specifically the politicians and mass media are perceived as bias and/or unorganised. They are even accused of deliberately misleading the public. There mass media thus increase the EU’s legitimacy deficit

Now for the methods which could help overcome these problems. They do not paint a much better picture. Quantity – the numbers of articles – does not seem to influence the evaluation of the EU, and one might even argue it increases when legitimacy is questioned as in the French discourse. EU-policy and institutions are often only mentioned rather than explained let alone made comprehensible: the discussions stay vague and abstract. Personification is important in both countries with powerful heads of state – the United Kingdom and France –, but the positive effect can seriously be doubted as shown in the case of Chirac. Further, there are almost no European faces in the discourse.

Finally, nationalisation only seems to lead to a positive evaluation in the Netherlands: a small country in a globalised world. In the case of United Kingdom, the majority think they can survive on their own. The rebate has for example become part of their national pride, because it symbolises a



victory over the continent and Europe’s dependence on them. If they are forced to give it up this might lead them to turn away from the EU rather than toward it.128 The French find themselves out of ’the driver’s seat’, thus in the near future trying to play the national interest card will probably play out negatively, except maybe with socialist/green federalists with whom the idea of a green and social Europe might catch on.

All in all, the mass media are flawed mediators, whom increase the EU’s legitimacy deficit. This is both apparent and actually acknowledged in the discourses. The solutions to overcome the mass media’s shortcomings though do not seem to work and some actually have the opposite effect. This hypothesis is proven and thus accepted.

128 Altough if this happens it might help in the long run, because the British might come to understand their dependence on the EU, but that is another matter.


Chapter 10 – The Reasons: The Denial of Identity and Reality

Although usually couched in terms of sovereignty and national identity, the real question at the heart of the Europe debate has always been one of political economy.

David Clark129

We should see Brussels for what it is: a way of tackling problems in common, settling disputes between traditionally fractious neighbours and applying the rule of law to agreements that have been entered into. It serves British interests, and if we didn't have it, we would have to invent it.

Timothy Garton Ash130

The European Union is the result of a project that started out as a way to address the problems of a ‘broken’ continent and it has grown into the means of dealing with issues arising from a complex and interdependent world. The European level of governance though lacks legitimacy and to understand why and possibly help overcome this situation we have analysed the discourse on the EU’s legitimacy in three Member States. This brings us to the central research question:

What are the reasons for the European Union’s legitimacy deficit and how can this deficit be overcome?

10.1 – Determining the Reasons for the Deficit The answers to the research questions are the first step toward answering the first part of the central research question. Step two is a reflection on the answers to hypotheses. These two steps give us the answer to the first part of the central question.

10.1.1 – The Diverse DeficitsFirst to refresh our memories the research questions are:

1. How is the modern nation-state legitimised?2. What are the different facets that form the legitimacy of a political order?3. What is the influence of the mass media on the legitimacy of a political order?4. How will the EU’s legitimacy deficit be investigated?5. How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in the Netherlands?6. How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in the United Kingdom?7. How is the EU’s legitimacy perceived in the public discourse in France?8. What are the similarities and differences between these public discourses?

The first question was answered by approaching legitimacy from a historical perspective. Legitimacy is a consensus among the governor(s) and governed on the right to rule. The modern nation-state’s legitimacy is the result of a mixture of universalist republicanism, which includes ‘unbound’ democratic principles, and nationalist republicanism, which territorialised and divided people along state lines.

On the basis of the second question, three different facets were distinguished to the legitimacy of a political order: dimensions (universalist and nationalist), components (input, throughput and output) and models (direct and indirect). In theory and (national) reality both dimensions, input,

129 Guardian September 5, 2005130 Guardian June 5, 2001


throughput and direct legitimacy play an important role in the legitimation of the nation-state. This combination applied to the EU is the perspective of multi-level government, but in reality the EU is emerging as a political order of multi-level governance: a possible mismatch between the (implicit) theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy and reality came in sight.

The third research question made us take a closer look at the role of the mass media. The legitimacy of a political order is a consensus, which is mainly established through public discourse. In modern society, the mass media is the mediator that brings the public discourse to the majority of the people, but its role is critised. Several shortcomings can increase the EU’s legitimacy deficit, but there are also ways in which they can be overcome.

The fourth research question is methodological. The EU’s legitimacy deficit was investigated by analysing the articles published in the two national, quality newspapers in three countries during two periods of a year on the role of different facets play in perception and the influence thereof on the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Also three hypotheses were formulated on the basis of the theoretical framework.

In answer to the fifth, sixth, seventh research question, we saw that the Dutch elites perceive the legitimacy deficit from the perspective of (future) federalisation, but the people are not convinced of its legitimacy. The British fear the superstate perspective. One group seems sure this will not happen – the Blairight Gaullists –, whilst the others fear submerging in a future superstate – the Europhobes. The traditional proponents of the EU in France, the Gaullist, are becoming Euro-sceptics. They supported the EU for as long as it was ‘theirs’, but now perceive it as a threat to their sovereignty: political power. The French federalists perceive the EU’s legitimacy deficit as a result of too little democratisation and too many Anglo-Saxon liberal policies.

The eighth research question lead to a comparison of the three discourses. Even though there are the similarities, the specific analysis and debate on the deficit differs per country and even within countries. There are different perceptions of the deficit in the countries and therefore it might be more accurate to refer to the EU’s legitimacy deficits.

10.1.2 – Identity, Reality and the Mass Media The three hypotheses uncovered several insights into the reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit. First, the EU might have a democratic deficit from the federalist perspective, because they interpretate the lack of support as a lack of popular mandate. Therefore they call for more (direct) democracy and transparency. On the basis of Hont’s analysis a different interpretation of the problem is possible, which is more in line with the findings. The lack of support is not the result of a lack of democracy, but a lack of identification. The state is not easily cared for, but through nationalism nation-states create(d) a feeling of sameness and representation that nurtured attachment to the state. The democratic deficit is a (federalist) misinterpretation of the gap between the EU and its citizens. 131 When people say the EU is too far away: They are not primarily, if at all, calling for more influence or participation, but that they cannot identify with it. This explains why the EU is often perceived as (a) foreign (invader). This lack of identification means the EU’s legitimacy deficit is a ‘nationalist deficit’

The national identity is a powerful means to raise support for the state, but it is now the cause of a clash between state-interests and the population. These two elements of nationalist republicanism 131 Jürgen Habermas’ ideal of European constitutional patriotism (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 2) plays an important role in this misinterpretation. Habermas’ constant call for more democracy only seems to widen the gap. It displays the same dynamic of Reagan’s tax policy. The idea was lowering taxes will lead to higher revenues. When asks for an explanation for the low tax revenue he responded that taxes were obviously not low enough. Further, Habermas’s source of inspiration seems to be the United States of America, bus as Siedentop, based on Alexis De Tocqueville‘s Democracy in America, points out the very divided States share(d) four important characteristics: focus on local government, the same religion, the same language and juristic administration-culture. Furthermore, there were no old established nation-states in the new world to start out with either (Siedentop 2000).



find themselves at odds with one another on the subject of the EU. The state’s interests lie in the EU, but ‘the national identity’ feels threatened. One could ironically conclude that the ‘monster of nationalism has turned against its master: the state.’

The relationship though is more complex. On the one hand, the EU is necessary to solve the problems the people want to have solved, but at the same time the nation cannot identify with this ‘instrument’. On the other hand, the states need the EU to stay influential and competitive in a global age, but at the same time, the nation-states do not want surrender their power and claim their national sovereignty. The (nation-)state and the nation(/people) will find themselves aligned and opposition when it comes to the EU depending on the issue. The national identity and national sovereignty will thus emerge/be invoked or not depending on the situation.

This brings us to the second hypothesis. The EU is an emerging political order of multi-level governance, but this reality and its possible implications for the (theoretical) conceptualisation of legitimacy are almost completely absent from the discourse. This absence has two sides to it. On the one hand, there is the multi-level government perspective or those who want the EU to become a federal (super)state. The problem is the EU is not a level of government, and it is not very likely to become a federation any time soon either. First of all, the heads of states are unlikely to transfer all their authority – state power132 –, and secondly, as the nationalist deficit shows those governed do not and probably will not any time soon accept this new authority. National identities are still strong, and their denial could be harmful and even dangerous.133 See here the two elements of nationalist republicanism and their complex relationship emerge again. Further, the constant reference to EU as a future federation and putting its legitimacy to utopian tests carries with it the danger of disillusionment among the ‘federalist’ electorate and inspiring fear among the Europhobes.

On the other hand, the EU perceived as simply an international regime leads to a deficit as well. For ‘regimists’, the will of that nation is expressed through national parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore the EU is, should, and cannot be anything but an international regime.134 This perspective plays more to the strengths of the EU with a focus on performance, but then again the EU is not an international regime either. The results of this perspective are complains about too much institutionalisation, which in turn are (unrealistically) interpretated as the start of a European superstate. Furthermore, too much interference in sovereign matters becomes a concern. This will likely lead to unconditional, irrational Euro-scepticism stemming from the fear of being ‘invaded by Brussels’. Finally, complains about democratisation cannot logically be addressed from this perspective, because for ‘regimists’ the EU already is ‘too democratic’. On the other hand, this perspective can do more justice to the ‘nationalist deficit’, because identification stays with the nation-state.

The analysis of the EU as less than a federation, but more than a regime is spot on. Yet, the EU is perceived as either one rather than neither. Both models are applied, but the theoretical conceptualisations of legitimacy behind them are not able to address the reality of multi-level governance. As just argued they could actually have very undesirable results, because we are going to keep this source of authority in the foreseeable future. The lack of realism leads to a ‘reality deficit’.

The final hypothesis is the only one supported by this research. The EU’s legitimacy deficit is indeed increased by the mass media’s shortcomings. It is important to stress the different acknowledged and apparent shortcomings seem to increase rather be a reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit. Further, some of the methods for overcoming the shortcomings are not used – explaining EU-132 As one academic with regards to the Open Method of Coordination observed: ‘[T]he most obvious solution of transferring autonomy to the European level proved impracticable since member states were particularly reluctant to give up control’(Bekkers et al. 2007: 249-250).133 ‘[I]dentities and loyalties could return with a vengeance’ (Siedentop 2000: 220).134 One might question whether these politicians actually believe this or use it to legitimise the EU; probably it is a bit of both.



policy and institutions – and some that are used have the opposite effect – quantity, personalisation, and nationalisation. Finally, the lack of a European public discourse helps to keep differences between the Member States in place.

10.1.3 – Not a Democratic Deficit, but a Nationalist and Reality DeficitThis brings us to the answer to the first part of the research question:

What are the reasons for the European Union’s legitimacy deficit?

In the introduction the idea of the democratic deficit was called into question. Yet, in political, public and surprisingly quit often academic discourse, the EU’s legitimacy deficit is referred to as a democratic deficit. This label ‘democratic deficit’ is inadequate and actually misleading to describe the EU’s legitimacy deficit.135

The first reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit is the ‘nationalist deficit’. Or the fact that people do not identify with the EU as they do with their nation-state. Nationalism, in particular the symbol of sameness the national identity, is still strong and leads people to perceive the EU as foreign. This though is primarily a problem for federalists, who will have to start taking people’s national identity into account or else get even further Euro-detached populations. For Gaullist and Europhobes this attachment to the nation-state is useful to rally support to protect state powers and resist further ‘Europeanisation’ when they see fit.

The second reason is the ‘reality deficit’. The fact that neither the perspective of multi-level government nor international regime can justify and explain – legitimise – the emerging system of multi-level governance.136 For the former, the EU has to federalise or at least for now democratise. They are the inventors of the ‘democratic reading’ of the legitimacy deficit. The idea of closing the gap through democratisation or even federalisation is unrealistic, because it misinterprets the deficit and underestimates the importance of nationalist concepts in the legitimacy of the far away (nation-)state. The lack of sameness between Member States’ populations and the rootedness of national loyalties nowadays make the creation of such legitimacy for the EU problematic. Furthermore, it underestimates the resolve of states to cling to their power.

Those who perceive the EU as an international regime might have a better understanding of the nature of legitimacy or are more indoctrinated by it. Either way, also this position leads to problems for the EU’s legitimacy, because the EU is more ‘than a regime’. First, it leads to the misconception that the EU is too influential or the start of a superstate. Secondly, the Member States need the EU for its economic competiveness, problem solving capabilities, but also a safeguard against conflict on the European continent. This cannot be achieved without some supranationlisation. The national politicians need Europe to retain power, but are unwilling to forfeit all their power. In a sense they want to stay in the ‘driver’s seat’.137

Finally, one of the, if not the, most important mediators of public discourse in our large scale, modern societies are the mass media. They have become a necessity for the creation of a consensus on a large scale. Yet, we have seen the mass media only seem to increase the EU’s legitimacy deficit and this is even acknowledged in the discourses. Furthermore, because there is not one public discourse, but many discourses the EU’s legitimacy deficit is actually interpretated differently in each discourse.

135 Rinus van Schedelen argues that in most regards the EU is more democratic than the Member States (Kieswijzer Live, the same point is made in footnote 10).136 One might wonder whether it is even still in place on the national level of governance, which Ulrich Beck implies with the nation-state is a zombie category (2002). Then again nationalism might be the glue that is holding the national level together.137 One might wonder whether Dutch politicians pushing for more QMV is not a way for a small country to attain more power in Europe rather than pushing toward a European superstate.



In conclusion, the perception of the legitimacy deficit differs in each country, but they do have reasons in common for the deficit. First, there is the lack of identification of people with the EU, which makes the deficit is nationalist rather than democratic. Secondly, the EU is and in the near future will stay a political order of multi-level governance. The theoretical conceptualisations of legitimacy however do not match this reality. This reality deficit is another reason for the deficit. Finally, the mass media increase the deficit, but they do not create it.

10.2 – Dealing with the DeficitNow that we have seen the reasons for the legitimacy deficit how can it be tackled? Thus, we arrive at part two of the central research question:

how can this deficit be overcome?

Understanding is prerequisite if one hopes to overcome any problem. The EU’s policy discourse might mislead one to think that the problem of the EU’s legitimacy is democratic in nature, but as we have seen this is not the case. The first recommendation is concerned with the diversity and the role of personification for the EU’s media policy. The second recommendation focuses on how to legitimise the reality of the EU as a political order of multi-level governance with national identifications.

10.2.1 – Lost in Translation? Or the Facelessness of the EUIn the introduction Joschka Fischer describes the European level of governance as a ‘faceless, soulless Eurocracy in Brussels’ (2000: 1). The quote is somewhat paradoxical, because the problem of the EU’s facelessness is assessed by one of its few public faces. Fischer and the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso are the only two public faces of the EU. One might expect the Swedish DG of Communication, Margot Wallström, to be active, but she only made one contribution to the discourses (Le Figaro August 11, 2005).

In all three discourses, the EU is perceived as too far away and people cannot connect with the complex institutions. A more active media policy with its own ‘European faces’ might very well establish a direct form of legitimacy.138 Plan D was a policy initiative meant to create such legitimacy in the aftermath of the two no’s to the constitution, but a very recent policy brief indicates such a communication policy is still not in place (EMEDIATE 2009: 1). Luuk van Middelaar’s analysis139

further underlines the need for European faces. The EU is searching for a public, but in order to attract a public one needs recognisable actors. Yet, there are no recognisable actors, thus the EU has to put ‘players on stage’, so to say.

There are three main reasons to further favour European faces over of national ones. First, national politicians are not seen as European, thus they will at best provide indirect legitimacy. Secondly, these national politicians could actually have a negative effect on the EU’s legitimacy, like Jacques Chirac. And thirdly, there is no reason to assume national politicians are or will stay pro-European, as we saw with the British Europhobes and French Gaullists.

Then the problem presents itself of a script for these actors. As we saw the perception of the deficit depends on local circumstances. The saying ‘all politics is local’ is once again proven to be true. Therefore the most important element of the script is its adaptability to the national circumstances: the story has to connect with the publics. An intelligent media policy should be developed that takes into account these local differences. The question looming here is what should the crux of this adaptable story be? 138 The EU has a ‘communication deficit’. The idea of ‘faces’ is in line with a policy brief from February 2009, that calls for visualisation of the EU (EMEDIATE 2009).139 This analysis was given in a public speech based on his recently published De Passage naar Europa (The Passage to Europe; 2009) and later explained in further detail in a personal communication.



10.2.2 – How to Legitimise a Political Order of Multi-level Governance?The one thing that is clear is that the current discourse is counterproductive for the EU’s legitimacy. The main concern for the European political elites and all others interested in creating legitimacy for the EU is to start influencing/carrying public discourse in a realistic manner.

First, one should try not to represent the EU as either an international regime or a federation (to be), because neither is likely to happen any time soon. One should strive to create support for the current institutional design of the EU for in broad strokes it is the only realistic model. Further democratisation, let alone federalisation, is not a solution, because democratic legitimacy is not the actual problem. On a different note, as Robert Cooper argues, the EU’s ultimate aim should not be the abolishment of the nation-states – by replacing them with a new state140 – but the taming of those states (2007: 66). The EU will also not devolve back to an economic union – it is more likely to implode. Multi-level governance is thus the system to be sold to the public. One should appreciate this reality and the reality that people have national identities. One cannot simply wish the latter away, think to replace or even combine it with a European identity. For that matter, there is no European (national) identity or ‘demos’ identity. The latter has never existed separately for institutions as ‘far away’ as the EU.

Secondly, there is no silver bullet for the EU’s legitimacy deficit, but introducing the reality of multi-level governance into discourse is good and necessary start (for now). This is not an exercise in informing the public, but in rhetoric and leadership. The introduction of a novel concept into public discourse is not an easy task. As we saw in the Dutch discourse the notion of Network Europe disappeared almost as quickly as it came. The problem is the inherent complexity of the system and the necessity of an attractive and comprehensible message to connect with a passive audience (Perse 2001: 132). The process thus will take time.

Thirdly, another problem lies in the fact that there is no (philosophical fundament for the) conceptualisation of legitimacy for the EU’s system of multi-level governance. Here in lies a task for academics. As Matheson explains legitimacy has a dual task: explaining and justifying authority and the social order. Scholars should not start with an ideal and then come to an institutional design, rather they should analyse the reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit (in discourse) and the reality and possible future development of the political system. In order to form a new consensus, reality and theory have to converge once again in people’s perceptions. Therefore they should be active and attentive to the public discourses within the EU. The novel conceptualisation of legitimacy should thus be ‘sellable’. This can lead to a legitimation of the European level of governance for the long run. The European Commission, but also other interested parties, should allocate funding toward this kind of academic research. In order to have something to say, the European political elites will have to put their money where their mouth is (or actually not yet is).

140 One might argue persuasively that the creation of a new nation-state on the federal level is not even a desirable development.


Propositions

1. Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholders.

2. Nationalism has not left the European continent.

3. The discourses prove: even supranational politics are local politics.

4. The EU is a faceless order.

5. The democratic deficit is a misinterpretation.

6. More federalisation will lead to less identification.

7. Democratic improvement? No, Europe needs a reality check.

8. The mass media distort both willingly and by accident.

9. The incoherency of Gaullism fits the reality of the EU.

10. Timothy Garthon Ash is right: [The EU] if we did not have it we would have to invent it!

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Appendix A – Codification Format Articles

Code/Category

Date Newspaper Country Judgement MLG

0 Does not apply. No

1The date of publication

NRC Handelsblad The Netherlands

Positive Yes

2De Volkskrant The United

KingdomNegative

3 The Independent France4 The Guardian5 Le Figaro6 Libération

Appendix B – Codification Format Arguments

Code/Category Date Newspaper Country Argument0 Does not apply. Does not apply.

1The date of publication

NRC Handelsblad The Netherlands 50 word description

2De Volkskrant The United

Kingdom3 The Independent France4 The Guardian5 Le Figaro6 Libération

Code/Category

Judgement Component Dimension Model MLG

0 None None Neither No1 Positive Input Universalist Indirect Yes2 Negative Throughput Nationalist Direct3 Output Both Both

Appendix C – Keyword Search Results

Table C.1: Keyword search results for the Netherlands

KeywordsNRC

Period 1 Period 2Volkskrant

Period 1 Period 2Legitimiteitscrisis

1 [ -1] 3 [-1] 0 0

Democratisch tekort

7 [ -1] 6 [-1] 7 8

Democratisch deficiet

0 0 0 1

Toekomst van de EU

3 5 2 [-1] 4 [-1]

Democratisch Europa

3 10 4 9

Soevereiniteit + EU + problem!

14 [-2] 4 [-1] 6 0

Table C.2: Keyword search results for the United Kingdom

KeywordsThe Independent

Period 1 Period 2The Guardian

Period 1 Period 2legitimacy crisis 0 0 0 0democratic deficit 2 4 5 4

future of the EU 0 5 [-1] 3 3future of Europe 9 8 12 10

Democratic Europe 7 2 2 1

sovereignty+EU 0 0 0 1

Table C.3: Keyword search results for France

KeywordsLe Figaro

Period 1 Period 2Libération

Period 1 Period 2crise de légitimité

0 1 0 0

déficit démocratique

9 13 2 8 [-1]

l’avenir d’UE 0 0 0 0l’avenir d’Europe

3 3 0 2

Europe démocratique

1 14 2 9 [-1]

souveraineté 0 0 0 10


+ UE


Appendix D – Dutch Articles

Het NRC-Handelsblad – Period 1

Keywords: Soevereiniteit + EU + Problem!

1. December 13, 2001. ‘Belgen maken in Laken zelfde fout als wij in Maastricht’, Arend Jan Boekestijn.

2. October 26, 2001. ‘Europa, dat is nu voor alles Parijs-Londen-Berlijn’, Mark Eyskens.

3. July 11, 2001. ‘Lokaal bestuur moet invloed krijgen op Europese besluiten’, Dr. J.W. Sap.

4. March 1, 2001. ‘Exodus’, Roel Janssen.

5. July 6, 2000. ‘Europadebat klinkt als orkest zonder dirigent’, Ben van der Velden.

6. July 5, 2000. ‘Nederland moet pal staan voor open EU’, P. Verloren van Themaat

7. July 1, 2000. ‘Ons Europa’, Jacquis Chirac.

8. June 27, 2000. ‘Renovatie EU-huis moet doorgaan ; Verscheidenheid is nu al een probleem’, Michel Barnier.

9. June 15, 2000. ‘Europa loopt vast in klassieke federatie’, Hubert Vedrine.

10. May 23, 2000. ‘Kom maar op, Joschka Fischer!’, Pierre Lellouche.

11. May 20,2000. ‘Europa heeft nieuwe grondslagen nodig’, Joschka Fischer

12. May 19, 2000. ‘Europese Federatie zal het einddoel zijn’, J.H. Sampiemon

Keywords: Democratisch Tekort

13. September 6, 2001. ‘Onwil en apathie’.

14. November 30, 2000. ‘”Parlement te weinig betrokken bij Europa”'.

15. October 7, 2000. ‘“EU is een pacificatieproject zonder weerga' ; Staatssecretaris Benschop wil meer flexibiliteit in Europa.”, Joop Meijnen and Floris van Straaten.

16. September 11, 2000. ‘Referendum is een klap in het gezicht van Centraal-Europa’, Bert Wiskie.

17. July 3, 2000. ‘Nieuwe verzoening Frankrijk en Duitsland is heilloze weg’, Bob van den Bos.


18. February 12, 2000. ‘Zielloos, leiderloos, richtingloos ; Europa dreigt in de uitbreiding te Verdrinken’, Kees Versteegh and Michele de Waard.

Keywords: Toekomst van de EU

19. June 30, 2001. ‘Europa 3’, M.A.M. Chr. Koning

20. June 27, 2001. ‘De EU moet aangeven waar ze heen wil’, Ben van der Velden.

21. July 31, 2000. ‘Fischer wil terecht een doorzichtige Europese Unie’, E.P. Wellenstein.

Keywords: Democratisch Europa

22. April 9, 2001. ‘Kok verbreekt politieke stilte over Europa’, Paul Kapteyn.

23. September 28, 2000. ‘Koersval van euro maakt discussie over Europa urgent’, Jeffrey Gedmin.

24. June 28, 2000. ‘Plan voor meer openbaarheid in EU schiet tekort’, Max van den Berg and Marja Wagenaar.

Keyword: Legitimiteitscrisis

Complete Overlap

De Volkskrant – Period 1


1. December 11, 2001. ‘Belofte EU-hervorming is vals ; Burgers worden misleid over uitbreiding EU’, Bob van den Bos.

2. September 19, 2001. ‘Aanslagen VS dwingen Europese integratie af’, Geert-Jan Bogaerts.

3. September 6, 2001. ‘Zal Wim Kok Europa naar remise leiden?’, Geert-Jan Bogaerts.

4. February 17, 2001. ‘Europa wil te veel en kan te weinig ; Uitbreiding leidt tot stagnatie en desintegratie’, M.C. Brands.

5. July 7, 2000. ‘Een klein Europa past Nederland niet’, Andre Roelofs.

6. March 18, 2000. ‘Tot Europa veroordeeld’, Arie Elshout.




7. December 29, 2001. ‘De stille kracht van de euro ; Het initiatief hoort na 1 januari niet bij de politiek te liggen, maar bij de burgers’, Fokke Obbema.

8. November 21, 2001. ‘Tweede Kamer moet zich tegen “Nice” keren’, Michiel van Hulten, Lousewies van der Laan and Elly Plooij-van Gorsel.

9. June 14, 2001. ‘Leefbaar Europa’, Marcel van Dam.

10. December 30, 2000. ‘Meer minder’

11. December 16, 2000. ‘Graaien in Europa’, Geert-Jan Bogaerts, Arnout Brouwers and Arie Elshout.

12. December 15, 2000. ‘Europa loopt vast’, Ronald Plasterk.

13. September 16, 2000. ‘Democratie zonder grenzen’, Hans Wansink.

Keywords: Toekomst van Europa

14. July 1, 2000. ‘Top van Nice komt misschien te vroeg voor Europa’, Geert-Jan Bogaerts.


15. December 20, 2001. ‘Euro moet politiek nog worden waargemaakt ; Geloofwaardigheid hangt af van Europese politieke unie’, Arjo Klamer and Laurent van der Maesen.

16. October 17, 2001. ‘Zonder politiek geen Europees debat’, Arjo Klamer and Jacek Magala.

17. November 27, 2000. ‘Tijdbom onder de Europese integratie’, Frans Timmermans.

18. November 23, 2000. ‘Europa ontbeert macht om markt in toom te houden ; Fischer biedt een oplossing waar Kok en Schroder zwijgen’, Paul Kapteyn.

Het NRC-Handelsblad – Period 2


1. May 21, 2005. ´“Europa is markt zonder staat” ; Socioloog Kapteyn hekelt gebrek aan democratie in EU’, Michele de Waard.

2. May 17, 2005. ‘Europa: aanpassen of opzouten’, Sjoerd de Jong.

3. May 4, 2005. ‘Stop groteske uitspraken over Europese Grondwet’, Ben van der Velden.



4. April 30, 2005. ‘Europa is best belangrijk, maar waarom eigenlijk?’, Jolanda van der Lee.

5. March 31, 2005. ‘Het sloopwerk is al begonnen’, J.L. Heldring.

6. October 30, 2004. ‘Volksvertegenwoordigers brengen eenheid in Europa’, Maarten Huygen.

7. October 28, 2004. ‘Macht aan gekozenen’.

8. October 23, 2004. ‘Europa is een succes, jammer dat het niet democratisch is ; Grondwetsdeskundige Joseph Weiler’, Kees Versteegh.

9. July 24, 2004. ‘De ongekozen wortel; Nieuwe Stemregels binnen Europese Grondwet zijn Oneerlijk’, Bob van den Berg.

10. June 3, 2004. ‘Eigenbelang in EU is zwaktebod’, Sjerp van der Vaart.


11. September 24, 2005. ‘De stelling van Jeremy Rifkin: de crisis van Europa biedt kansen. Organiseer teach-ins.’ Jeremy Rifkin.

12. June 3, 2005. ‘Europa takelt niet af, maar is juist stabiel ; Kiezers waren verstandiger dan ze dachten’, Andrew Moravcsik.

13. March 4, 2005. ‘Tien keer 'nee' tegen Europese Grondwet ; Als er te hard wordt geduwd, kan de EU wel eens onderuitgaan’, John Gillingham.

14. October 9, 2004. ‘Een rem is nodig op Europese wetgeving’.

15. June 25, 2004. ‘Frans idee van Europa staat op het spel’, Larry Siedentop.

Keywords: Toekomst van de EU

16. October 4, 2005. ‘EU geeft lidstaten juist macht terug ; Burgers schrikken van succes Europese eenheid, niet van haar mislukking’, Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens.

17. June 24, 2005. ‘Op een tweesprong’

18. June 16, 2005. ‘“Europa voor markt en milieu”; Prominente leden van het nee-kamp over de toekomst van de EU’, Robert Giebels, Egbert Kalse, Kees Versteegh and Derk Walters interview Harry van Bommel, Andre Rouvoet, Willem Bos and Ronald Plasterk.

19. February 7, 2005. ‘Europese grondwet verdient alle steun ; Debat Brinkhorst en Bolkestein over de toekomst van de EU’, L.J. Brinkhorst and F. Bolkenstein.

20. June 8, 2004. ‘Verdeel stemmers niet in doelgroepen’, Huub Pellikaan and Joop van Holsteyn.




21. July 11, 2005. ‘Een beter Europa is een bescheidener Europa’, Atzo Nicolai.

22. May 17, 2005. ‘Geef Europa gewicht in de wereld ; Drie redenen om voor de Europese Grondwet te kiezen’, Javier Solana.

23. April 30, 2005. ‘Een (nieuwe) opstand der burgers dreigt’.

Keyword: Legitimiteitscrisis

24. May 29, 2006. ‘Nationale staten moeten Europese Unie dragen’, Eimert van Middelkoop.

25. May 6, 2006. ‘Zoek een nieuwe balans, maar houd het 'wij'-denken in stand You the people: hoe nu verder met Europa’, Geert Mak.

De Volkskrant – Period 2

Keywords: Democratic Deficiet

1. May 26, 2005. ‘Een referendum over de politiek’, Marcel van Dam.


2. November 29, 2005. ‘Europa is het leukste deel van de wereld’, Yoeri Albrecht.

3. June 25, 2005. ‘Nee tegen Grondwet EU biedt links kansen ; Zorg over Europese democratie moet uitgangspunt zijn’, Tiny Kox, Leo Platvoet and Diederik Samsom.

4. June 10, 2005. ‘Wereldorde’, Gotinchem Cees Pieters.

5. May 31, 2005. ‘Ja-kamp in paniek ; Haagse berichten’, Hans Wansink.

6. May 30, 2005. ‘Grondwet kan nadelen markt iets verzachten’, Paul Kapteyn.

7. April 15, 2005. ‘Waardeer het referendum en stem voor de EU-Grondwet ; Met een vaste voorzitter krijgt Europa een gezicht’, Jan Willem Sap.

8. January 4, 2005. ‘Europese samenwerking schiet weinig op met Grondwet ; Betekenis van referenda is vrij gering Laat landen die verder willen coalitie vormen’, Paul Kapteyn.

9. December 7, 2004. ‘Om Europese identiteit behoort geen hek ; Mobiliteit wordt belemmerd door ingewikkelde regels’, Jan Peter Balkenende.

10. June 5, 2004. ‘Zonder debat krijgt Europa geen vorm’, Paul Kapteyn.



11. October 8, 2005. ‘Europa’s januskop’, H.J. Schoo.

12. June 11, 2005. ‘Schaf het Europarlement af ; De kiezers hebben het eindstation van Europa helder in beeld gebracht’, Arnout Brouwers.

13. June 7, 2005. ‘Aan politieke verdeeldheid van Europa moet een einde komen ; Een liberaal Europa is niet noodzakelijk minder sociaal’, Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu.

14. May 28, 2005. ‘Het alternatief voor Poetins macht ; Oost-Europa verwacht van de EU eerlijke rechtspraak, bescherming en aanpak van corruptie’, Olaf Tempelman.

15. October 28, 2004. ‘Europees Parlement bewijst democratie geen dienst’, Michael Zeeman.

16. September 11, 2004. ‘Geen burgerschap zonder democratie A vooralsnog ; Europa Er zit een gat in Europa en we lopen er een met een grote boog omheen’, Marjolijn Februari.

17. June 9, 2004. ‘Meer of minder Europa?’, Anet Bleich

18. June 5, 2004. ‘Hou op met die geloofstaal ; Europa “Europa en macht? Eerder gedeelde onmacht.”’, Paul Brill and Bert Lanting.

Keywords: Toekomst van Europa

19. July 7, 2005. ‘SP blijft over EU liever nationale trom roeren. Of niet? ; Levensvatbare euro gaat ten koste van eigen beleidsvrijheid’, Joost Lagendijk.

20. June 9, 2005. ‘“Met sterke kopgroep komt Europa verder” ; Europa, hoe nu verder?’, Fokke Obbema.

21. June 3, 2004. ‘Bot: Brussel moet taken teruggeven aan EU-lidstaten’, Phillipe Remarque.


Appendix E – The Dutch Frequency Tables

Table E.1: Period 1 Dutch Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal

Universalist Input Neither 3 9 12Direct 2 78 80

Indirect 1 4 5Both 0 2 2Total 6 93 99

Throughput Neither 0 2 2Direct 0 14 14


Output Neither 1 0 1Direct 2 1 3


Nationalist Input Neither 2 16 18Direct 4 22 26






Both Input Neither 0 0 0Direct 0 1 1





Indirect 0 0 0


Both 0 0 0Total 3 0 3

Table E.2: Period 2 Dutch Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal


















Indirect 1 0 1Both 1 0 1



Total 5 3 8

Table E.3: Overall Dutch Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal





















Total 8 3 11



Appendix F – British Articles

The Independent – Period 1

Keywords: Future of Europe

1. June 14, 2001. ‘When you look to the future of Europe, don’t forget us in the east; ‘This is politics on a grand scale, quite different from the opening up of the club to already affluent nations’, Robert Soltyk.

2. May 30, 2001. ‘Election 2001: Prodi raises the stakes with call for new EU tax’, Stephen Castle and Andrew Grice.

3. May 29, 2001. ‘Election 2001: Analysis – very French, very dull but little to fear in the Jospin plan’, John Lichfield.

4. May 28, 2001. ‘Leading article: Read between the lines of mr Jospin’s Euro-rhetoric’.

5. January 24, 2001. ‘Leading article: Listen to mr Fischer, and think harder about Europe’.

6. December 12, 2000. ‘Mr Blair has helped Britain to find a role in Europe; ‘This country needs to demonstrate its seriousness as a European player by joining the single currency’, Donald Macintyre.

7. July 4, 2000. ‘Media: The press’s distorted coverage of Europe must stop; ‘the continental media appears to be are one event; The British at a completely different one’, Peter Mandelson.

8. July 3, 2000. ‘Letter: Chirac’s “Hard Core”’, Richard Corbett MEP.

9. May 16, 2000. ‘Podium: Apologies to the UK, but “federal” is the only way; Taken from the speech on the future of Europe delivered by the German foreign minister, at Berlin’s Humboldt university’, Joschka Fischer.

Keywords: Democratic Europe

10. May 8, 2001. ‘Letter: A democratic Europe’, Terry Bishop.

11. December 13, 2000. ‘Letter: Europe of Regions’, Margaret Leach.

12. December 5, 2000. ‘Letter: A democratic Europe’, John S Jones.

13. December 6, 2000 (originally: December 5, 2000). ‘Letter: A democratic Europe’, Andrew Duff MEP.



14. August 3, 2000. ‘Letter: Democratic Europe’, Ruth Lea.

15. August 4, 2000 (originally: August 3, 2000). ‘Letter: Democratic Europe’, Rae Street.

16. August 5, 2000 (originally: August 3, 2000). ‘Letter: Democratic Europe’, Glyn Ford MEP.

Keywords: Democratic Deficit

17. October 6, 2000. ‘Leading article: The European debate may be moving Britain’s way’.

18. October 5, 2000. ‘Mr Blair’s new, practical plans for Europe’s future; ‘When an official complained that tomorrow’s speech was Gaullist, Blair replied: “De Gaulle? Top name”’, Donald Macintyre.

The Guardian – Period 1


1. May 3, 2001. ‘Comment & Analysis: Winning the referendum is the beginning, not the end: Blair must sell a vision of Europe, as well as the euro, to the voters’, Hugo Young.

2. January 29, 2001. ‘Comment & Analysis: Inside Europe: Schmoozing in Berlin’, Ian Black.

3. December 12, 2000. ‘Comment & Analysis: Everyone was a winner at the battle of Nice: For once, it wasn't a contest between Britain and the rest’, Hugo Young.

4. December 8, 2000. ‘Comment & Analysis: France versus the mighty Americans: They want a transformed Europe to moderate US dominance’, Martin Woollacott.

5. December 5, 2000. ‘Comment & Analysis: Forget Florida, it's Nice we should be worried about: There is little cause for optimism at this week's EU summit’, Hugo Young.

6. December 2, 2000. ‘Opinion and Letters: More whine, Francois?: John Prescott did his best but the French are not merely different, they are deluded’, John O'Farrell.

7. November 27, 2000. ‘Comment & Analysis: Bush or Gore, it will be tough bananas for Europe: We must accept that American interest is shifting away from us’, Peter Preston.

8. June 30, 2000. ‘Comment & Analysis: We need vigour and rigour at the heart of Europe: New European institutions must foster an inclusive democracy’, Martin Woollacott.

9. June 29, 2000 (originally: June 30, 2000). ‘Policy and Politics: Will Europe's mix 'n' match gamble work?: Politicians remain confident they can muddle along together despite different visions for the future. But hard choices are inevitable’, Larry Elliott.



10. December 12, 2001. ‘Leading Article: Hearken to Laeken: A real chance to make Europe work’.

11. December 3, 2001. ‘Comment & Analysis: With God on our side: Ian Black: Inside Europe’, Ian Black.

12. July 26, 2001. ‘Comment & Analysis: They risk their place in history if they balk: Labour's landslide was a mandate on Europe. There can be no retreat’, Hugo Young.


13. September 10, 2001. ‘Comment & Analysis: Does anyone in Britain still care about central Europe?: In Prague, doubts grow about our commitment to EU enlargement’, Peter Preston.

14. May 1, 2001. ‘Germany wants EU integrated in 10 years: Schroder sees no alternative to enlarged union’, John Hooper and Kate Connolly.

15. October 7, 2000. ‘Europe des patries: Mr Blair's version: do your own thing’.

16. October 8, 2000 (originally: October 7, 2000). ‘Commentary: Can a touch of pragmatism bring Europe into new focus?’ Hugo Young.

17. January 29, 2000. ‘The trouble with Europe; It is reform that will save the project’.

Keywords: Future of the EU

18. June 18, 2001. ‘Comment & Analysis: The Gothenburg summit: Bosses in the driving seat: Protesters may have made the headlines, but corporations wield the power’, Madeleine Bunting.

19. June 5, 2001. ‘Comment & Analysis: The euro will bring down our prices. So stop fretting: The union gives us power where we would otherwise have none’, Chris Huhne.

20. May 30, 2001. ‘Comment & Analysis: Election watch: What a promising start: The Tories are already colluding in their own defeat in a euro referendum’, Hugo Young.


21. May 4, 2001. ‘Parliament cracks EU secrecy, but new access rules have big catches’, Ian Black.

22. November 8, 2000. ‘Leading article: No place for Mr Haider: Austria would do better to ditch him’



The Independent – Period 2


1. December 12, 2005. ‘The Monday Interview: Jose Manuel Barroso, European Commission president – “Britain brings a lot to the European Union but it should also accept that it gains a lot”’, Stephen Castle.

2. September 14, 2005. ‘Letter: Why the EU must welcome Turkey’, John Green.

3. June 16, 2005. ‘Mr Blair is the last man to want a European Confrontation; Although he will get one’, Steve Richards.

4. June 4, 2005. ‘Liberal Capitalism invades the EU’, Steve Brickle.

5. May 23, 2005. ‘Why our politicians prefer fear to analysis’, Andreas Whittam Smith.

6. May 19, 2005. ‘A campaign with a winning message and a complete lack of self-confidence’, Steve Richards.

7. April 28, 2005. ‘Does Blair want France to vote “yes”?; At least it would give him a grand and dramatic issue on which to end’, Adrian Hamilton.

8. November 29, 2004. ‘French lessons in holding a Euro Referendum; If France were to reject the constitution, then the concept would’, Andreas Whittam Smith.


9. June 22, 2005. ‘Stop blaming these “elites” for Europe’s chaos’, Mary Dejevsky.

10. June 3, 2005. ‘The voters of Europe are demanding more democracy, not more free markets’, Johann Hari.

11. May 31, 2005. ‘The romantic symbolism of the superstate is defeated. Blair can now fight for his vision; Signing up for all that waffle about pluralism would have kept alive’, John Rentoul.

12. October 30, 2004. ‘Leading article: Sincere Europeans should strive to make this treaty a reality’.


13. June 20, 2005. ‘Leading article: The EU can still be pulled back from the brink'.

14. May 24, 2005 (originally: May 23, 2005). ‘Leading article: EU constitution: It is time for Europe’s supporters to speak up’.



15. May 20, 2005. ‘The president who let down his nation’, Denis Macshane.

16. November 23, 2004. ‘I made the right choices for European Commission, says Barroso’.


17. June 19, 2005. Deadlock! Disaster! A plague of boils! Actually it’s better than that’, John Rentoul.

18. December 18, 2004. ‘From the independent archive: 26 March 1997 from a leading article on the 40th anniversary of the European Union’.

The Guardian – Period 2


1. September 5, 2005. ‘Comment & Analysis: Britain's claim to economic superiority is built on sand: Any 'Anglo-social' features to be admired are borrowed from Europe’, David Clark.

2. June 27, 2005. ‘Interview: Practical European who will need a strong constitution: Jackie Ashley meets Douglas Alexander, Europe minister’, Jackie Ashley.

3. June 18, 2005. ‘Interview: Big beast's battle: Gunter Verheugen, vice-president enterprise and industry, European commission’, David Gow.

4. June 3, 2005. ‘Future of Europe: What do no votes mean for the union?: Voters have clearly rejected closer union and Europe will start to unravel, says Larry Elliot’, Larry Elliott.

5. June 4, 2005 (originally: June, 3, 2005). ‘Future of Europe: Don't jump to conclusions - the French and Dutch voted no for lots of different reasons, says Martin Kettle’, Martin Kettle.

6. May 31, 2005. ‘The future of Europe: Analysis: What next? Summit to decide treaty's fate’.

7. October 23, 2004. ‘Comment & Analysis: Strength in numbers: Martin Jacques Despite globalisation, nation states show no sign of going into decline’, Martin Jacques.

8. March 2, 2006. ‘Comment & Debate: Backwards not forwards: David Cameron is a Tory moderniser, but on Europe he's locked into a Battle of Britain mentality’, Caroline Jackson.

9. February 18, 2006. ‘Saturday: Reply: Letters & Emails: Report does not affect Europe’s GM rules’, Peter Power.

10. February 4, 2006 Saturday. ‘Saturday: LOOSE ENDS: Whatever happened to ... the EU constitution referendum?’.




11. October 4, 2005. ‘Comment & Debate: Nationalism has now become the enemy of Europe's nations: If the EU were abolished, we would have less control over our affairs. There is no refuge in a cultural security blanket’, Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens.

12. May 26, 2005. ‘Comment & Analysis: Votez oui, malgre tout: The French may vote no out of fear. They should vote yes, for their own sake and ours’, Timothy Garton Ash.

13. February 22, 2005. ‘Comment & Analysis: A bitter harvest: Europe's bureaucrats have caved in to American pressure over GM, but the decision can be overturned’, Sue Mayer and Robin Grove-White.


14. June 15, 2005. ‘Comment & Analysis: A new kind of Europe: The EU crisis gives it the chance to shape an identity and global role independent of the US’, Jonathan Steele.

15. June 3, 2005. ‘Comment & Analysis: Europe's secure, well-paid leaders have caused the crisis: The public must be convinced that the EU is a safeguard against globalisation’, Robin Cook.

16. June 1, 2005. ‘Comment & Analysis: Last man standing: According to the optimists, events in France have left a Blair-shaped hole right at the heart of Europe’, Jonathan Freedland.

17. June 11, 2005 (originally: June, 1). ‘How crisis helps Blair - and Brown: Britain Rivals in accord over dealing with EU’, Michael White.


18. June 2, 2005. ‘Future of Europe: World briefing: A lesson from the voters that must be heeded’, Simon Tisdall.

Keywords: Sovereignty + EU

19. April 14, 2005, ‘Comment & Analysis: For a Pax Europeana: Can we fold the remains of the Ottoman empire into a new European empire?’, Timothy Garton Ash.



Appendix G – The British Frequency Tables

Table G.1: Period 1 British Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal





















Total 0 0 0

Table G.2: Period 2 British Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal





















Table G.3: Overall British Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal





















Appendix H – French Articles

Le Figaro – Period 1

Keywords: Déficit Démocratique

1. December14, 2001. ‘Les Quinze, la convention et la transparence; Un moment presque révolutionnaire...’, David Martin.

2. July 2, 2001. ‘ Une certaine idée de l'Europe’, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski.

3. July 3, 2001 (originally: 2 July, 2001). ‘Europe: incident de parcours’, Philippe Herzog.

4. June 1, 2001. ‘Dirigeants et propriétaires face aux nécessaires restructurations; Deux stratégies d'entreprise pour les Etats européens’, Jean-Jacquis Rosa.

5. December 7, 2000. ‘Les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des Quinze se retrouvent à partir d'aujourd'hui sur la Côte d'Azur; Commerce : un droit de veto obsolète’, Pascal Lamy.

6. December 6, 2000. ‘A la veille du sommet des Quinze à Nice; Bruxelles et le déficit démocratique’, Michel Vauzelle.

7. July 26, 2000. ‘Bruxelles face aux accusations récurrentes d'interventionnisme débridé; La Commission, bouc émissaire désigné’, Pierre Bocev and Bérengère Mathieu de Heaulme.

8. July 15, 2000. ‘Les enjeux de la charte européenne des droits fondamentaux; La laïcité à la française menacée’, Georges Sarre.

9. January 25, 2000. ‘L'Europe éclaboussée’.

Keywords: l’Avenir d'Europe

10. August 1, 2001. ‘Le fond de l’air est frais; Craintes et désir d'Europe’, Jean d’Omesson.

11. December 12, 2000. ‘Après le laborieux sommet des Quinze à Nice; Le jeu du mistigri’, Charles Pasqua.

12. February 14, 2000. ‘S'il y a scandale, il n'est pas en Autriche, mais dans le projet d'admission de la Turquie; Quand Vienne était le bouclier de l'Occident’, Dominique Venner.

Keywords: Europe Démocratique

13. March 1, 2001. ‘A l'aube du XXIe siècle, quelle ambition pour la France ?; Imprimer notre sceau au nouvel ordre mondial’, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.



Libération – Period 1

Keywords: Europe Democratique

1. May 4, 2001. ‘10 mai 1981 : l'illusion lyrique; Politiques’, Alain Duhamel.

2. December 6, 2000. ‘L'Europe 'anti' en quatre familles’, Christian Losson and Hervé Nathan.


3. December 5,2000 ‘L'international; Emilio Gabaglio, 63 ans. Italien, il dirige la Confédération européenne des syndicats, qui manifeste demain à Nice.’, Hervé Nathan.

4. February 16, 2000. ‘Le grand ménage européen de Prodi. Le président de la Commission veut réformer les institutions en profondeur.’, Jean Quatremer.

Le Figaro – Period 2


1. June 21, 2005. ‘Reconstruire sur un champ de ruines; Pour avoir perdu une bataille, l'Europe n'a pas perdu la guerre’, Michel Habib-Deloncle.

2. June 13, 2005. ‘Plaidoyer pour un rajeunissement de la scène politique; Considérant que l'optimisme et l'ouverture, la clairvoyance et le courage ne sont plus représentés’, Adriano Farano.

3. June 3, 2005. ‘Bruxelles fourmille de plans « B », « C » et « D » ; Les parlementaires passent au crible les solutions pour sortir de la crise par les votes français et néerlandais’, Alexandrine Bouilhet.

4. May 26, 2005. ‘De l'Europe des Apôtres à l'Europe de l'union politique; Une nouvelle avancée démocratique et sociale’, Lucien Sergent.

5. May 20, 2005. ‘Christine Boutin réclame l'instauration de la VIe République; L'ancienne candidate à l'Élysée prône une assemblée constituante européenne’, Guillaume Tabard and Sophie Huet.

6. May 19, 2005. ‘L'Union vaut bien un débat de société; « Quelle Europe Voulons-Nous? » Une série du « Figaro »’, Didier Reynders.

7. April 12, 2005. ‘La grande illusion du non; « Quelle Europe Voulons-Nous? » Une série du « Figaro »’, Jean-Louis Debré.

8. March 2, 2005. ‘L'Union des illusionnistes; « Quelle Europe Voulons-Nous? » Une série du « Figaro »’, Max Gallo.

9. January 25, 2005. ‘Démocratisons la construction européenne; Les enjeux de la campagne référendaire sur la Constitution’, Arnaud Montebourg.



10. December 4, 2004. ‘Et maintenant la gauche européenne...; Après le référendum interne du Parti socialiste français’, Gaëtan Gorce, Jean-Louis Bianco, Gilles Savary and Béatrice Marre.

11. October 18, 2004. ‘Le PS dans l'impasse de l'« Europe sociale »; Les socialistes divisés sur le futur Traité constitutionnel’, François Miquet-Marty.

12. July 16, 2004. ‘La fin du « déficit démocratique »; la décision du chef de l'Etat d'organiser un référendum sur la Constitution’, Thierry Chopin.

13. June 19, 2004. ‘Europe: du déficit électoral au déficit économique’, Yves Messarovitch.


14. June 29, 2005. ‘Poursuivre autrement l'intégration; Prendre en compte le concret et la diversité pour continuer d'avancer’, Jean Prieur.

15. May 28, 2005. ‘Croire en un nouvel élan; «Quelle Europe voulons-nous ?» Une série du «Figaro»’, Gerhard Schröder.

16. May 29, 2005 (originally: May 28, 2005). ‘La vraie cible du non; L'extrême gauche attise une peur infondée et illégitime’, Alain Lancelot.

17. January 31, 2005. ‘Le « non » pour afrmer une autre ambition’, Chantal Robin-Rodrigo, Joël Giraud, Emile Zuccarelli.

18. December 13, 2004. ‘Badinter : « L'adhésion de la Turquie serait une décision aberrante ! »; L'ancien garde des Sceaux, pour qui la candidature d'Ankara n'est pas recevable, dénonce l'absence d'un débat en France’, Baudouin Bollaert and Alexis Lacroix.

19. December10, 2004. ‘Le bloc-notes’, Ivan Rioufol.

20. October 11, 2004. ‘Constitution européenne : un débat salutaire; Alors que le projet de traité constitutionnel divise la gauche et la droite françaises’, Henri Weber.

21. September 24, 2004. ‘L'Europe sans la France ?; Alors que le débat sur le traité constitutionnel divise les principales formations politiques françaises’, Brice Hortefeux.

22. August 4, 2004. ‘L'Europe en rupture de communication avec les peuples; En contrepoint au débat sur l'adoption de la Constitution’, Dominique Wolton.

23. May 21,2005. ‘Wolton : «L'Europe, un enjeu populaire»; Quelle communication politique sur le traité constitutionnel ?’, Dominique Wolton.

24. May 18, 2005. ‘L'Europe à besoin d'une France visionnaire; « Quelle Europe voulons-nous? » Une série du « Figaro »’, Romano Prodi.

25. May 7, 2005. ‘Plaidoyer pour les valeurs européennes; « Quelle Europe voulons-nous? » Une série du « Figaro »’, Hans-Gert Poettering.



26. May 8, 2005 (originally: May 7, 2005). ‘Un goût affligeant de déjà vu, déjà entendu; " Quelle Europe voulons-nous?" En 1954, la France disait non à la CED’, Francis Rosenstiel.

27. April 1, 2005. ‘Oui au libéralisme !; « Quelle Europe voulons-nous? » Une série du « Figaro »’, Guy Sorman.

Keywords: L’Avenir d’Europe

28. June 2, 2005. ‘« L'Europe, miroir des états d'âme »; James C. Kennedy, professeur de l'université d'Amsterdam, donne son point de vue’, François Hauter.

29. May 24, 2005. ‘L'Europe des valeurs partagées; « Quelle Europe voulons-nous?» Une série du « Figaro »’, Jan Peter Balkenende.

30. January 26, 2005. ‘Jack Lang - Philippe de Villiers : du oui-oui au non-non; La campagne référendaire sur la Constitution et la controverse sur la Turquie’, Baudouin Bollaert, Marie-Laure Germon and Alexis Lacroix.

Keywords: Crise de Légitimité

31. August 11, 2005. ‘Communiquer sur l'Union, mission impossible ?; De la nécessité de reprendre le dialogue pour poursuivre la construction’, Margot Wallstrom.

Libération – Period 2

Keywords: Souveraineté + UE

1. March 14, 2006. ‘L'Europe, une puissance douce; Décryptage d'une construction plus encline à penser ses normes qu'à s'imposer par la force.’, Jean Quatremer.

2. June 16, 2005. ‘Europe, non à l'extinction du débat.; Les partisans du oui doivent se réconcilier avec les millions de citoyens démoralisés s'ils veulent crédibiliser leur action.’, Denis Baupin.

3. June 9, 2005. ‘Un non, porteur d'avenir; Des Etats généraux de la gauche devraient permettre la confrontation des idées d'où pourrait surgir un projet qui soit à la hauteur des espérances d'un peuple souverain.’, Jean-Pierre Chevènement.

4. June 2, 2005. ‘Notre défaite et ses lendemains; La réunification ne doit pas se faire sous l'hégémonie idéologique des partisans du non, qui n'offre aucune perspective de gouvernement crédible.’, Joël Roman.

5. June 3, 2005 (originally: June 2, 2005). ‘"Le fossé qui s'élargit entre les nantis et les autres est un vrai débat"; Evènement 1. Europe. Rinus van Schendel, professeur de sciences politiques à Rotterdam’, Nathalie Dubois.

6. June 1, 2005. ‘Game, set and match.’, Alain Duhamel.



7. May 12, 2005. ‘Le non, ce vote d'impuissance.; Les politiques nationales n'ont pas protégé le salarié contre la financiarisation mondiale.’, Dominique Boullier and Yann Moulier-Boutang.

8. March 23, 2005. ‘Le non, complice de l'Europe libérale’, Alain Duhamel.

9. November 9, 2004. ‘La vérité du "non européen"; Si l'on suit Chevènement sur la Constitution, il s'agirait plutôt d'un détricotage de l'Europe que d'un nouveau départ.’, Alain Bergounioux.

10. October 26, 2004. ‘Europe: pour un non républicain; Le rejet du projet de "Constitution européenne" donnerait sa chance à une Europe des nations volontaires, unies sur un projet d'indépendance et de solidarité.’, Jean-Pierre Chevènement.


11. June 5, 2005 (originally: June 1, 2005). ‘Vos réactions à l'éditorial de Serge July sur la victoire du non’.

12. May 10, 2005. ‘Le oui, un pas vers la démocratie; Avec la Constitution, les lois ne pourront plus être adoptées sans l'accord du Parlement.’, Matthieu Lemoine.

13. April 25, 2005. ‘Le non, dernier outil pour une Europe démocratique; Le traité constitutionnel enferme en lui, intrinsèquement, la méfiance envers les peuples, le doute envers les processus démocratiques.’, Olivier Palluault.

14. March 17, 2005. ‘Un non au nom de l'Europe; Démocratie, politique, travail, logement... des secteurs où la démocratie sera bradée.’, Dominique Rousseau.

15. October 20, 2004. ‘La Turquie dans l'UE, oui si...; L'Europe devrait proposer à Ankara une voie rigoureuse vers la démocratisation.’, Kendal Nezan.

16. October 12, 2004. ‘Le courage de dire non; Pour les Verts, Européens convaincus, le référendum doit offrir l'occasion de mettre un frein aux forces économiques qui augmentent la précarité et la pauvreté.’, Francine Bavay, Martine Billard, Alima Boumediene, Jacques Boutault, Didier-Claude Rod and Bernard Guibert.

17. September 20, 2004. ‘Europe: oui quand même; La gauche ne doit pas rejeter la Constitution mais se mobiliser pour une République européenne.’, Stefan Collignon and Pierre Moscovici.

18. July 19, 2004. ‘Europe: la gauche doit changer de méthode; Plutôt qu'un débat simpliste sur le référendum, les socialistes devraient s'atteler à définir une stratégie adaptée à cette deuxième étape de l'édification européenne.’, Henri Weber.


19. May 29, 2006. ‘"Il y a eu une prise de conscience sociale"; Evènement 1. Europe. Laurent Fabius, seul présidentiable noniste du PS, croit à une alternative politique.’, Renaud Dely and Marc Semo.



20. December 14, 2005. ‘Le Parlement européen est-il associé au mandat du commissaire au Commerce ?; Sommet de l'OMC. Question à... Caroline Lucas eurodéputée verte britannique’, Christian Losson.

21. June 6, 2005 (originally: June 1, 2005). ‘La Ve République anti-Europe; A l'origine du non, la faiblesse de nos institutions, l'irresponsabilité du Président...’, Paul Alliès.

22. April 7,2005. ‘Les juges souverains; Avec la Constitution, la Cour de justice de l'UE pourrait se transformer en Cour suprême.’, Antoine Vauchez.

23. March 23, 2005. ‘Cette Constitution, non merci.; Il faut voter contre le néolibéralisme à l'européenne et le recul organisé de la démocratie.’, Jacques Nikonoff.

24. March 19, 2005. ‘Constitution européenne: oui ou non?; Une semaine sur les forums de www.liberation.fr.’

25. June 15, 2004. ‘L'Europe sanctionnée’, Serge July.

Keywords: L’Avenir d’Europe

26. October 15, 2005. ‘Ceuta, Melilla: la mort à nos portes; Une semaine sur les forums de www.liberation.fr.’

27. December 13, 2004. ‘Arménie, devoir de mémoire’, Vincent Duclert.


Appendix I – The French Frequency Tables

Table I.1: Period 1 French Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal


















Indirect 0 0 0


Both 0 0 0Total 0 0 0

Table I.2: Period 2 French Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal





















Total 3 6 9

Table I.3: Overall French Facets * Judgement CrosstabulationFacets/Judgement Positive

EvaluationNegative

EvaluationTotal





















Total 3 6 9


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