teleonomic functions and intrinsic intentionality: dretske’s theory as a test case

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Cognitive Systems Research 8 (2007) 15–27

Teleonomic functions and intrinsic intentionality: Dretske’s theoryas a test case

Action editor: Mark Bickhard

Itay Shani

Department of Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, Private Bag 3, Wits 2050, South Africa

Received 19 May 2006; accepted 10 June 2006Available online 24 August 2006

Abstract

Fred Dretske’s theory of indicatory functions [Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge, MA:MIT/Bradford; Dretske, F. (1994). A recipe for thought. Originally published as ‘‘If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How ItWorks.’’ In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest studies in philosophy: Vol. 19. Reprinted in D. J. Chalmers (2002) (pp.468–482).] is undoubtedly one of the more ambitious attempts to articulate a sound naturalistic foundation for an adequate theory ofintentional content. In what follows I argue that, contrary to Dretske’s explicit intentions, his theory fails a crucial adequacy test – that ofaccounting for mental content as a system-intrinsic property. Once examined in light of the first-person perspective of an embodied psy-chological agent, I argue, it becomes clear that neither ‘indication’, nor ‘function’, as used by Dretske, can be consistently applied. Dre-tske’s theory of indicatory functions is, thus, doubly incoherent. It is then argued that the problems identified here stretch far beyondDretske’s specific theory – covering the better part of contemporary attempts to naturalize content. I conclude by suggesting that thesegeneral problems of representation, exemplified so vividly in Dretske’s theory, also testify to the inadequacy of the quest to reduce tel-eological phenomena (function and purpose) to predominantly mechanistic variables.� 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Dretske; Epiphenomenalism; Function; Indication; Intrinsic intentionality; Self-organization; Teleology; Teleonomy

1. Introduction

Contemporary research on mental content is dominatedby the persuasion that an adequate account of intentional-ity, that property of mental states whereby they representconditions (objects, properties, events, processes, places,and situations – both real and imaginary) external to them-selves, ought to be naturalistic. Call this the naturalistic cri-

terion.1 Most workers in the field (though by no means all

1389-0417/$ - see front matter � 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2006.06.001

E-mail address: [email protected] For our present purpose, it is enough if we understand the naturalistic

criterion as requiring that intentionality be explained as an integral part ofthe natural world, without invoking entities or processes that cannot be sointegrated. For an overview of naturalism emphasizing its integrativeaspect see Hooker (1995); for a comprehensive overview of naturalisticapproaches in epistemology and philosophy of science see Kitcher (1992).

of them) adhere to an additional adequacy criterion: Anappropriate naturalistic explanation of mental content isone that explains the intentionality of a mental state asan intrinsic property of the system in which it is embedded.In pain of explanatory regress, the idea goes, mental statescannot derive their intentionality from some externalsource (an interpreter, programmer, observer, and soforth); they must be intentional on their own right. Call thisthe intrinsicality criterion.2

2 On the distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality see, forexample, Haugeland (1981), Searle (1992, pp. 78–82), and Shani (2005).Adherents of the intrinsicality criterion include, among others, Bickhard(1993), Block (1990), Fodor (in Dennett, 1987, p. 288), Harnad (1990), andMillikan (1989). A notable critic of the intrinsicality criterion is Dennett(1987, 1996).

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16 I. Shani / Cognitive Systems Research 8 (2007) 15–27

In his book Explaining Behavior (1988) Fred Dretskesets himself the ambitious task of articulating a theory ofmental content that satisfies both criteria. In addition, Dre-tske hopes to satisfy another important requirement: thatthe theory will explain how the contents of mental statesare relevant for behavior. Call this the ‘causal relevance cri-terion’. Dretske’s strategy is to explain the content of men-tal states in terms of their indicatory functions. Thereduction of content to indicatory function is meant toachieve this tripartite goal of satisfying the naturalistic cri-terion, the intrinsicality criterion and the causal relevancecriterion.3

Recently, Dretske’s claim to satisfied the causal rele-vance criterion has been intensively criticized (Baker,1991; Bickhard, 2003; Block, 1990; Kim, 1991; Saidel,2001; Stampe, 1990). The central charge against Dretskeis that his theory identifies the properties that determinethe contents of mental states with historical propertieswhile mental causation, on the other hand, depends onpresently effective properties. This unfortunate feature ofthe theory, the critics argue, yields the discouraging conse-quence that the contents of mental states are inert at thetime intentional actions are taking place. The ultimateresult, then, is that it is not in virtue of their contents thatmental states are causally relevant for behavior – the con-tent-constitutive properties of mental states areepiphenomenal.

In this paper, I would like to pursue a path far less trot-ted, however, and to concentrate on Dretske’s failure tosatisfy the intrinsicality criterion.4 While the epiphenome-nalism charge targets the failure of Dretske’s theory toaccount for the causal efficacy of content, I will attemptto establish the claim that in addition, and contrary to Dre-tske’s explicit purpose, his theory falls short of sustainingintrinsic intentionality. Thus, I argue that neither Dretske’snotion of ‘indication’ (see Section 3), nor his notion of‘function’ (Section 4), can do the work they are expectedto do, namely, sustain a notion of mental representationthat makes functional, and epistemic, sense from the first-person perspective of a genuine cognitive agent. On closeexamination, then, it becomes clear that Dretske’s ‘‘recipefor thought’’ (Dretske, 1994) is, at best, a recipe for derived

intentionality, and that it does not account for the possibil-ity of intrinsically functioning, intrinsically informative,mental states. It is then argued (in Section 5.2) that the epi-phenomenalism of Dretske’s theory is but a mirror imageof this basic failure to model intentionality as a system-intrinsic phenomenon. In addition, I argue (Section 5.1)that the charges advanced against Dretske can be extrapo-

3 As mentioned in the next section, there exists yet another criterionDretske aims to satisfy – the ‘misrepresentation criterion’.

4 This is not to suggest that the problem remained completely unnoticed,however, Bickhard (2003), for example, pays attention not only to theepiphenomenalism, but also to the intrinsicality problem immanent inDretske’s theory. My discussion of the intrinsicality criterion and itssignificance owes much to Bickhard’s work, there and elsewhere.

lated so as to apply, with equal force, to the majority ofcurrently existing attempts to naturalize mental content.Dretske’s failure to satisfy the intrinsicality criterion is,then, but a special case of theoretical malfunctioning ona more general scale. More positively, I indicate (in Section5.3) how these problems might be avoided by taking anovel approach towards the question of representation,in particular by taking representation to be an emergentaspect of dynamic self-governing. The paper concludes(Section 5.4) with the diagnostic suggestion that the failureto satisfy the intrinsicality criterion, as exemplified in Dre-tske’s theory, is related to a neglect to pay attention to theirreducible role played by self-organization in the construc-tion of biological and mental functions. Far from beingcoincidental, such neglect, I argue, is shared by many andis motivated by a general metaphysical commitment to amechanistic picture of reality, a commitment which leavesno room for genuine self-organization and self-governing,and, ipso facto, no room for genuine function and purpose(biological or mental). It follows that in order to solve theintrinsicality problem, and to secure a place for teleologicalphenomena within the general order of things, we need totake a fresh look at this deep-seated commitment.

2. Dretske’s theory of indicatory functions

The theory offered in chapter 4 of Explaining Behavior isproposed as an improvement over Dretske’s earlier theoryof mental content presented in his book Knowledge and the

Flow of Information (1981, see his 1986 for an early versionof the new account). In his earlier book, Dretske formu-lated the canonical account of what came to be known as‘Information Semantics’ (IS). The basic insight of IS tiescontent individuation to information and information tolawful, or counterfactual supportive, indication. A signals is said to carry the information that ‘a is F’ if, and onlyif, it (lawfully, counterfactually) indicates that ‘a is F’. Indi-cation is, in turn, explained by recourse to the notion ofreliable correlation: a condition (state, event) C1 indicatesanother condition C2, if, and only if, C1 is reliably corre-lated with C2 (typically via a causal connection).

However, as early as his 1981 account Dretske was wellaware of the limitations of this reductivist program. Reduc-ing semantic content to strictly information theoretic termsyields a conception of meaning too far removed fromordinary mental content, as commonly conceived, to dojustice to some of its core characteristics. In particular,Dretske came to realize that IS is not well poised to solvethe problem of misrepresentation. Reliable correlation is afactive notion whereas representation is normative. A cor-relation may obtain or may not obtain, but it cannotobtain properly or improperly. By contrast, one could rep-resent adequately as well as inadequately, one could, forexample, say, or think, something that is wrong, providean inaccurate description, assume a misguided assumption,etc. Consequently, the ability to explain the possibility ofmisrepresentation, of representational error, must be

I. Shani / Cognitive Systems Research 8 (2007) 15–27 17

considered an additional adequacy criterion for theories ofintentionality (call this ‘the misrepresentation criterion’).For all its elegance, a pure information theoretic semanticsis ill equipped to handle the problem of misrepresentation.5

Dretske’s solution to this chronic inability to accountfor misrepresentation within the confines of a pure IS the-ory, was to incorporate his (information theoretic) accountof natural signs within a teleonomic, functional, theory ofcontent. The basic idea is that what confers on a naturalsign the status of a fully accredited representation (a‘belief’, as Dretske puts it) is the fact that it has the function

of indicating what it naturally indicates. More precisely,Dretske’s idea can be schematically represented as follows.An inner state C constitutes a belief to the effect that ‘o isF’ if, and only, if

(i) C reliably indicates that o is F.(ii) There is a system S, of which C constitutes a func-

tional proper part, such that C’s function in S is toindicate that ‘o is F’.

An additional core assumption of this basic model isthat what elevates C from a mere natural sign to the rankof a functional indicator is the fact that

(a) C has been selected, via a learning process, to play aspecific causal role in S. And

(b) C was selected to play the role it does because of itsindicatory properties (i.e., in virtue of being a naturalsign).

These basic assumptions, then, are already present in thetheory defended in Knowledge and the Flow of Information,but they are developed to full maturity in Explaining

Behavior.6

Unlike the earlier theory, Dretske’s latter theory is bio-logically oriented and its kernel consists of an articulatedattempt to explain mental contents as a subspecies genreof biological functions. In a nutshell, Dretske’s proposalconsists of the idea that the key towards a successful natu-ralization of mental content lies in identifying the contentof mental states with their indicatory functions. Dretskeargues that in order for an inner state to possess intrinsic

5 Even Fodor, who disapprove the appeal to biological functions as ameans of solving the misrepresentation problem, had to thicken his owninformation-theoretic account of content with auxiliary assumptions (i.e.,his celebrated asymmetrical dependency principle) in order to deal with theproblem (see Fodor, 1987, 1990).

6 Dretske’s early solution to the problem of misrepresentation (1981,chap. 8) was abundantly criticized (a notable example is Fodor (1984)),and it was not before long that he himself renounced it (for a sympatheticappraisal, however, see Sterelny 1990, chap. 6). Dretske’s latter account(1988, 1994) differs from the account presented in Knowledge and the Flow

of Information in two primary respects: it includes an improved account ofthe learning process involved in the acquisition of inner states withindicatory functions, and it explicitly identifies indicatory functions as abiological functions.

content, to be causally relevant for behavior, and to satisfythe misrepresentation criterion, it is not enough that it willbe indicative. Rather, the state must function as an indica-tor, and must do so for the system in which it is embedded.

His concern with the causal relevance criterion leadsDretske to insist that ‘‘the fact that something has mean-ing’’ be ‘‘a causally relevant fact about that thing’’ (1988,p. 80). More precisely, Dretske deals with the causal rele-vance problem by postulating that what a mental state isdoing, its current causal role in the system, must be suchthat it is causally explained, in part, by what the state indi-cates, i.e., by its semantic value. Suppose, then, that C, amental state, causes some motor output M. If we ask whatis the immediate, triggering, cause of M, says Dretske, ourcausal explanation will not refer to C’s semantic propertiesbut, rather, to its physical, neurophysiological, properties.What, then, is the causal relevance of C’s semantic charac-ter? Dretske answers that its relevance lies in the fact that itpartakes in a causal explanation explicating why C is wiredin the system’s mental economy in such a way that, undersome definite circumstances, it triggers M. In short, C’ssemantic profile is causally relevant for behavior in thesense that it is a structuring cause of the C!M connec-tion: the fact that C indicates F is (partly) responsible forthe crystallization of the C!M triggering causal pattern(see Fig. 1). When this happens, when C gets a handle onthe steering wheel of behavior and establishes itself as atriggering cause of M, and does so in virtue of the fact thatit indicates F, then, Dretske argues, C acquires the functionof indicating F, and thereby represents F.

In this way Dretske also hopes to satisfy the intrinsical-ity criterion and the misrepresentation criterion. First, byacquiring an indicatory function within the system, S, inwhich it is embedded, C also acquires an intrinsic semanticsignificance. Second, since C’s function is to indicate F andnot, say, G, a tokening of C in the presence of G wouldqualify as a misrepresentation.

At this juncture, there are two things that need to beemphasized about Dretske’s interpretation of the elusivenotion of ‘function’. First, according to Dretske, ‘function’

Triggering Cause

C M

Indication

FStructuring Cause

Fig. 1. Structuring cause (adapted from Dretske (1988)).


is a diachronic, rather than a synchronic, notion. Namely,what makes an inner state C function as an F indicator fora system S is not the fact that indicating F is C’s presentcausal role in S; rather, what makes C function as an Findicator is the fact that it has been selected for performingthe causal role it currently performs in virtue of the factthat it indicated F. Dretske’s notion of function is thusselection dependent, in a way that resembles other teleo-nomic theories of content such as Millikan (1989). Second,Dretske concentrates on an ontogenetic, rather than a phy-logenetic, modeling of function. That is, he is not con-cerned with the selection of traits on an evolutionarytime scale, but, rather, with the developmental selectioncharacteristic of individual learning processes. In thisrespect, his theory differs significantly from Millikan’s.

It is a widespread phenomenon among plants and ani-mals that a behavior M is triggered by an inner state C thatwas naturally selected for (in virtue of) indicating an exter-nal condition F. In noctuid moths, for example, there existsan evolutionarily established contingency pattern betweenbat sensing and bat avoidance behavior. Still, Dretskeargues, such an evolutionarily shaped (genetically deter-mined) pattern does not confer on C the status of a belief

whose content is F. In order to qualify as a belief (henceas a genuine mental state), it must be the case that the factthat C indicates F will actually partake in an individualprocess of behavioral modification, culminating in the crys-tallization of C as a cause of M. Such a qualification rulesout simple tropistic, and instinctive, behavior but it is per-fectly satisfied by a relatively simple process of operantlearning.7

Thus, consider a rat that learns to press a bar (M) when,and only when, a certain tone (C) is heard. The correlationbetween enacting M upon hearing C, and the rewardingexperience of feeding, leads to the crystallization of abehavioral pattern in which hearing the tone becomes acause of, or a switch for, the behavioral output. In thislearning process, Dretske argues, C is recruited as a causeof M, because of what it indicates about F, the externalcondition on which the success of M depends. The learningprocess selects C as a cause of M, and does so in virtue ofthe fact that C indicates F. The indicatory profile of C,thus, becomes a structuring cause of the C!M contin-gency pattern. C ‘‘gets a hand on the steering wheel’’ (Dre-

7 Dretske’s main reason for denying that natural selection confers onindividual indicatory states the status of a belief seems to be this. Ifreasons (intentional attitudes) are to qualify as causes, they must be thecauses of individual actions. But natural selection, Dretske argues, doesnot explain individual actions; it only explains why certain types of causaldependencies between inner states and behavioral outputs exist (they wereselected). Thus, Dretske concludes, ‘‘one must look to systems whosecontrol structures are actually shaped by the kind of dependency relationsthat exist between internal and external conditions. The places to look forthese cases are places where individual learning is occurring, places whereinternal states acquire control duties or change their effect on motor outputas a result of their relation to the circumstances on which the success ofthis output depends (1988, p. 95).’’

tske, 1988, p. 101) due to the fact that it indicates F;indicating F becomes its function.

This, then, is how Dretske accounts for mental contentin terms of indicatory functions. In the remaining partsof the paper I shall try to establish the conclusion that,Dretske’s contention notwithstanding, his theory does notsatisfy the intrinsicality criterion. I shall argue that neitherDretske’s notion of function, nor his notion of indication,are consistent with a system-intrinsic conception of mentalcontent. Dretske’s theory, then, is doubly incoherent. First,I argue that mental states cannot be intrinsically indicative

(or, intrinsically informative) in virtue of being indicative inDretske’s sense. Second, I argue that, contrary to Dretske’sproposal mental states cannot function as intrinsic indica-tors of external conditions in virtue of having been selected

for so indicating. I call these problems the first, and the sec-ond, incoherence problems, respectively.

3. The first incoherence problem: mental states cannot be

intrinsically indicative (or informative) in virtue of being

Dretske-indicators

As we have seen, Dretske accounts for indication interms of reliable correlation. What makes C informativeof F, then, is the fact that it ‘‘locks onto’’ to (encodes) F.The problem with this idea is that it rests on an irreconcil-able third-person conception of ‘information’. From thefirst-person perspective of the psychological agent thatowns C, the fact that this inner state corresponds to F isepistemically vacuous, it is simply insufficient to generateknowledge of F. No matter how reliable the correspon-dence between F and C is, S, the psychological agent, canonly access F via C (or some other mental states). Unlikean external observer, S cannot observe the correspondencefrom both ends and use the fact that it obtains as an inde-pendent source of knowledge. In the absence of suchknowledge, however, the situation is analogous to havingan access to the symbol string ‘‘ -.’’ without knowing thatit is the Morse code correspondent of ‘‘N’’: no knowledgeof ‘‘N’’ can be miraculously gained merely in virtue of thefact that the correspondence obtains. If the fact that C cor-responds to F is epistemically vacuous, however, if it yieldsno intrinsically available information to the effect that it isF that C stands for, then it cannot be taken as constitutive

of C’s being F-informative.An analogous way to state the problem is this. The fact

that C encodes F is an extrinsic fact about C in the sensethat, in itself, it makes no difference to the internal causalstructure of the representation.8 Thus, C would be exactlythe same even if, instead of corresponding to F, it were tocorrespond to F 0, or even to nothing at all (note that the‘‘ -.’’ Morse code would be exactly as it is even if it werenot paired with the character ‘‘N’’). If C’s indicatory profile

8 The relation between C and F is, as it were, an external relation (formore on the distinction between external and internal relations, and on itssignificance for theories of content, see Bickhard (2003)).


makes no difference to its internal causal makeup, however,then – since whatever C does it does in virtue of its causalpowers – the fact that C possesses this particular indicatoryprofile can bear no impact on the manner in which it inter-acts with other mental structures (C 0, C00. . .) in S’s cognitivespace. But then the difference between C � F and, say,C � F 0 (where ‘ � ’ stands for ‘reliably corresponds to’) isnot a difference that can be detected elsewhere in the sys-tem, and hence not a difference that makes a difference tothe ongoing flow of S’s cognitive activity. As before, theupshot is that the mere fact that C corresponds to F doesnot engender information that can be used, let alone con-sciously apprehended, from the first-person perspective ofthe system itself.

Now, one may attempt to resist this ‘‘argument fromextrinsicality’’ by holding that it misrepresents the ideabehind Dretske’s appeal to the notion of a structuringcause. Recall that, according to Dretske, the indicatoryproperties of mental states are causally relevant for behav-ior not because they act as efficient, triggering, causes but,rather, because, and insofar as, they become structuring

causes of established neuro-motor contingency patterns.What the argument from extrinsicality shows, the rejoindergoes, is that mental states cannot function as triggeringcauses in virtue of being Dretske-indicators, but since thispoint is conceded by Dretske right at the outset it canhardly be considered an effective criticism of his position.

Moreover, the idea behind the assumption is that F canbecome a structuring cause within S’s mental economy is,precisely, that it cannot be arbitrarily replaced with otherpotential correspondents (F 0, F00. . .). F being a structuringcause of C!M implies (a) that this contingency patternhas been selected due to the fact that past activations ofit reliably corresponded with the presence of F; and (b) thatsuch past correspondences proved rewarding enough tomotivate the selection. Correspondingly, suppose F 0 is anon-nourishing obnoxious substance; then the activationof a C!M contingency pattern in the presence of F 0

would result in a non-rewarding experience, which will,in turn, activate a feedback learning process selectingagainst future activation of this contingency pattern. Is itnot a mistake, then, to maintain that C’s indicatory profilebears no impact on the manner in which it interacts withother mental states?

The first objection, I believe, carries little weight.Regardless of Dretske’s intentions, the question in frontof us is whether his theory succeeds in accommodatingthe first-person perspective of real psychological subjects,and the argument from extrinsicality suggests that it doesnot. If this failure is due to Dretske’s assumption that theonly sense in which the semantic properties of mental statesmight be causally relevant is by virtue of acting as structur-ing causes, then so much the worse for the assumption.

The second objection is, however, more serious, and itdeserves a more thoroughgoing consideration. To repeat,the argument from extrinsicality purports to show thatsince corresponding to F is an extrinsic fact about C this

fact is not reflected in C’s causal makeup and, perforce,cannot, in itself, affect the manner in which C interacts withother mental states within the system’s cognitive network.It then drives at the conclusion that, since, from the first-person perspective, information must be available in theform of discernible ‘‘news of difference’’ (Bateson, 1979),correspondence relations are insufficient to generate infor-mation that could be effective from such a perspective.

The second objection challenges one of the premises ofthe argument, namely, the assumption that the fact that aC � F relation obtains cannot, itself, affect the manner inwhich C interacts with other mental states within S’s cogni-tive network. The apparent refutation consists in the factthat the existence of such an indicatory relation is, presum-ably, a structuring cause of C!M. If ‘‘C is recruited as acause of M because of what it indicates about F’’ (Dretske,1988, p. 101), then, presumably, indicating F does trans-lates into a specific effect on the manner in which C inter-acts with other components in the network.

What the objection fails to notice, however, is the mis-leading nature of the suggestion that C is selected as acause of M because of what it indicates about F. Recall thatthe selection process to which Dretske refers is a learningprocess, and, as such, a process in which the system itselfis an active participant. It is the system’s ability to respondto signals (negative or positive, feedback or feedforward)with novelty – with novel neural configurations and noveldispositions for behavior – which makes learning possible,and which underpins the selective recruitment of some con-tingency patterns over others. But if the system itself medi-ates the selection it follows that, whatever it may be, thatwhich causes C to be selected as a cause of M must besomething about C that the system can sense and value,something that can motivate a selection. This is even moreconspicuous given Dretske’s explicit assumption that selec-tion, via operant learning, for particular causal roles is thekey to the solution of the intrinsicality problem (see Section2): if, as we now see, such a selection operates on variationsthat the system itself must be able to discern, from its ownperspective, then the properties that are directly relevantfor selection must be properties that can be so discerned.Yet, this is precisely what cannot be done when it comesto C’s property of being in perfect correspondence to F:nothing in this property per se can motivate internalselection.

In order for there to be a selection favoring a systematicactivation of C!M, in correlation with F’s presence, it isnot enough that C � F obtains, and that C gets to cause Mwhen F obtains; rather, what makes such positive selectionpossible is the fact that activating C!M in F’s presenceyields rewarding internal outcomes, outcomes which thesystem can appreciate (i.e., recognize and evaluate) fromits own perspective. To put it otherwise, although F is, inDretske’s words, a condition ‘‘on which the success of Mdepends’’ (ibid.), knowledge of the successfulness of theact depends on the availability of internal outcomes deliv-ering the good news. And since selecting M as a typical

9 For more on the distinction between upstream and downstreamsignaling see Collier and Hooker (1999). For the distinction betweenreactive and enactive approaches to the mind see, for example, Newton(2000).


behavior in F-infested environments causally depends onsuch knowledge it follows that it is the internal outcomesthat are directly responsible for the selection.

The point, then, is that, in order to affect the manner inwhich C interacts with other components in the network soas to produce successful adjustments (successful learning),correspondence is insufficient. For that, we need correspon-dence and internal interaction outcomes, and it is the out-comes, and not correspondence per se, which motivateC’s recruitment as a cause of M. Thus, considered on itsown merits the fact that C reliably corresponds to F bearsno traces which could be discerned elsewhere in the system,it yields no news of difference that make a difference, noinformation to work with.

To recapitulate, what both arguments (the epistemicvacuity and the extrinsicality argument) show is that Dre-tske’s assumption that reliable indication is constitutive ofsemantic significance is untenable. If it were, than the merefact that C is a Dretske-indicator of F would have been suf-ficient for making it intrinsically informative for S, pro-vided that it is appropriately wired in S’s cognitivemakeup. But what the arguments show, is that the onething that the postulation of a symbol-world correspon-dence relation does not explain is how any symbol couldfunction, intrinsically, as a representation in virtue of thefact that it stands in such correspondence relations to someexternal items – no matter how well it is wired in the sys-tem. This, then, is the first incoherence problem (for moreon the epistemic incoherence of informational encodingssee Bickhard, 2000b, 2003; Edelman & Tononi, 2000, chap.11; Shani, 2005). The gist of the critique advocated here isalso hinted in Piaget’s argument against ‘‘copy’’ theories ofknowledge (1970, p. 15).

4. The second incoherence problem: mental states cannot

function as intrinsic indicators of external conditions in virtue

of having been selected for their indicative properties

But the problems with Dretske’s proposal run deeperthan the commitment to an epistemically untenable notionof indication. I shall now argue that not only is Dretske’snotion of indication unsuitable for the task of accountingfor intrinsic intentionality, his notion of function is equallyinept.

The import of the first incoherence problem is that thenotion of ‘‘indication’’ Dretske employs fails the intrinsi-cality criterion and that for this reason, and on Dretske’sown terms, it is ill suited to serve the purpose of articulat-ing an adequate naturalistic account of mental content.This means that if a theory of content is to employ the term‘indication’ as an useful explanatory construct (and whynot? After all, representation presupposes some form ofindication. . .) it must cast into it a different sense.

An useful hint as to what such a concept may be can befound in Dretske’s stock example of the rat that learns topress a bar upon hearing a certain tone. When the rat inthis experimental setting learns to press a bar in response

to a sound stimulus, it learns to associate the stimulus,and the behavioral output, with anticipation of feeding.There is, then, a sense in which the stimulus, once so asso-ciated, indicates the prospect of feeding, indicates the like-lihood of such an interaction outcome.

Interpreting ‘indication’ in this sense is conspicuouslyopposite to Dretske’s own interpretation. As we have seen,Dretske uses the term to denote reliable covariance, of thesort exemplified by natural signs, where the signal invari-ably follows the external condition it is said to indicate.Under this interpretation, indication is reactive, consistingof an ‘‘upstream,’’ signified-item-to-sign, arrow. By con-trast, on the alternative interpretation suggested here ‘indi-cation’ is essentially proactive (or, enactive); it implies ananticipation of possible future interaction outcomes hencean opposite ‘‘downstream,’’ sign-to-signified-item, arrow.9

No doubt, a commitment to such an alternative notionof indication entails its own questions and problems. Inparticular, it raises the question how can the rich textureof our ordinary representations of the world around usbe constructed out of such seemingly primitive, and thor-oughly action-oriented, information (while Akins, 1996; isa skeptic, detailed attempts to provide a positive solutionto the problem are suggested in Bickhard (1993) & Shani(in press)). However, insofar as the intrinsicality criterionis concerned, the alternative on offer carries a clear advan-tage: unlike the property of being in reliable correlationwith a given external item, the property of anticipatingan interaction outcome is internally accessible, and, as such,it can, and do, affect the internal selection of contingencypatterns.

Thus, for example, encounters with a nutritious foodof type F yield different internal outcomes than, say,encounters with samples of the obnoxious substance Gin the simple sense that, when completed, they leavethe system in one final state rather than in another –say, X rather than Y. Suppose now that, as in the ratexperiment, the possibility of arriving at X is associatedwith the occurrence of a certain stimulus C in the sensethat, when C occurs, it becomes possible for the systemto engage itself in an action that yields X (by doingM, for example). Before long, the system may come toanticipate X upon C’s occurrence, and (given X’s desir-ability) to engage itself in behavior conducive to X. Inother words, C may come to proactively indicate X. Itis worth noticing that in this case it is one internal state,C, that indicates another internal state, X; and sinceboth states are, as it were, written in the flesh, the prob-lem of accounting for the first-person significance of theindication becomes tractable.

It might seem that proactive indications are limited tothe system’s interior and, therefore, that they are ill suited


to represent the external world, yet such a judgment is pre-mature. Notice that X, the indicated interaction outcome,depends not only on the system’s actions but also on theenvironment: F-infested environments will support the pos-sibility of arriving at X, while G-infested environments willfail to do so. In other words X, and the actions capable ofyielding X, dynamically presuppose F’s existence: a success-ful arrival at X, via M, ontologically depends on the envi-ronment ‘‘cooperating’’ by manifesting the properties thatconstitute F (the availability of food), and an X-conducivebehavior presupposes such a ‘‘cooperation.’’ There is asense, then, in which X implicitly categorizes some environ-ments as X-type environments, environments in which this

interaction outcome is in fact possible.10 Thus, indicatingthe availability of an interaction outcome is also, indirectly,an indication that the environment supports this outcome:indicating X is indirectly, and implicitly, an indication of F.

However primitive, such categorizations or predications,constructed within the system as structural changesbrought about by interactions, provide the system withvaluable information about its external surroundings;information that might be false, should the environmentfail to ‘‘cooperate,’’ and whose falsity might be detected,should the interaction fail to achieve the expected outcome.With the emergence of complex webs of interconnectedindications the power, articulation, and scope of theknowledge at the system’s disposal, and its ability to learnfrom its own successes and failures, may grow exponen-tially.11 Finally, note that, unlike Dretske’s passive corre-lates, the environmental conditions dynamicallypresupposed by proactive indications are internally (i.e.,essentially) related to those indications: X could not bethe internal outcome that it is if it were it not for F.12 Thus,while attending to the internal, first-person, components ofrepresentation, this alternative, proactive, model of indica-tion seems well poised to address the question how repre-sentational knowledge relates to the external world.

But, although substituting this action-oriented notion ofindication for Dretske’s original proposal solves the firstincoherence problem, Dretske’s theory of content facesanother major obstacle, an obstacle that cannot be

10 For more on implicit indication and dynamic presupposition seeBickhard (2000b, 2003).11 The idea that knowledge of the external world is literally constructed

as structural effects brought about by interactions can be found, in oneway or another, in the writings of otherwise diverse thinkers such asDamasio (1999), Edelman and Tononi (2000), Gibson (1979), Maturanaand Varela (1980), and Piaget (1954).12 This may seem unfair to Dretske given that he, too, is presupposing

that the availability of F is necessary for C’s being what it is; however, thepoint is that, on Dretske’s account, C is F-informative because, and only

because, of the correspondence between the two, and, as mentioned inSection 3, correspondence per se does not affect the properties manifestedby the correspondents. By contrast, on the assumption that informationabout the external world is constituted by dynamic interactions it followsthat the intrinsic properties of an environment are constitutive of theintrinsic properties manifested by the internal states representing thatenvironment.

amended merely by inducing this (in my opinion) necessarysubstitution. For no matter what notion of indication youcare to employ, no mental state can function as intrinsicindicator in virtue of satisfying the conditions that, accord-ing to Dretske, grant it a functional status. In other words,Dretske’s notion of function is a veritable blind alley on itsown merit.

As mentioned before, despite the fact that Dretske’sindicatory functions are modeled on a developmental,rather than an evolutionary, time scale the model he offersis teleonomic, or selection-dependent.13 This means, thatwhat confers a functional status on an indicatory state,is not the causal role performed by that state, but the factthat it has been selected (via learning) for playing thisrole. Yet this selection-based explanation of indicatoryfunctions yields a notorious circularity problem: as weshall see shortly, in order to be selected as an F-indicator,C must first function as an F-indicator; so, rather thanconstituting its status as an intrinsic functional indicator,C’s selection as an F-indicator presupposes such intrinsicfunctioning.

Consider, again, Dretske’s example of the rat that learnsto press a bar (to do M) upon hearing a certain tone (uponundergoing a perceptual state C). On Dretske’s account, Cacquires the function of indicating F (the availability offood) only after the C!M contingency pattern has beensolidified. Yet, this gets things backwards. Recall that whena rat learns to press a bar in response to a sound stimulus itlearns to associate the stimulus, and the possible behavioraloutput, with anticipation of feeding, an interaction out-come towards which, under normal conditions, the animalis motivated. Without the anticipation, there is no basis formotivational arousal, and without such motivational andemotional factors there is no basis for appraisals of failureor success, hence, no basis for learning.14 But if hearing thesound invokes anticipation of feeding, which in turn exertscontrol on the rat’s behavior, then it transpires that Calready functions as an X-indicator, and derivatively asF-indicator, prior to, and in a way that is presupposedby, the successful termination of the learning process.Thus, C’s selection as an F-indicator presupposes a selec-tion-independent notion of functional (functionally useful)indication.

To reassure ourselves of the validity of this claim, I sug-gest we examine it in the light of two key parameters: cau-sal efficacy and normativity.

13 Teleonomic theories of content are known by other names too, e.g.,‘teleological’, ‘etiological’, ‘historical’ or ‘proper function’ theories. Mychoice of the term ‘teleonomic’ is explained in the concluding section.14 In recent years there is a growing acknowledgment of the essential role

played by motivational and emotional factors in learning and othercognitive processes see, for example, Bickhard (2000c), Christensen andHooker (2001), Damasio (1994), Edelman and Tononi (2000), Faw (2000),Mook (1996), Montague, Dayan, Person, and Sejnowski (1995).

15 The distinction between selection of a trait and selection for (i.e., invirtue) of a trait is due to Sober (1984).


• Causal efficacy: To begin, note that all the causal tasksperformed by C in the post-selection period are essen-tially in place prior to the establishment of a standard-ized C!M connection. C’s selection for the task ofindicating whatever it is that it indicates is but a stampof approval on a successful performance that takes placebefore the learning process achieves its closure, yet theperformance itself remains essentially unaltered. But ifperforming all the causal tasks (including all the causallyindicative tasks) of the post-selection period at the pre-selection phase is not enough to confer on C the statusof a functional indicator it seems inevitable to concludethat the functional relations Dretske hypothesizes areepiphenomenal.

• Normativity: Invoking functions in attempts to explainrepresentation is a popular move among naturalists lar-gely because it carries a promise of accounting for thenormative dimension of representation, including, inparticular, the possibility of misrepresentation. As wesaw in Section 2, Dretske is no exception. Yet the claimthat selection constitutes functionality, hence normativ-ity, is rather dubious. Even prior to its selection as aninvariant cause of M, there is a clear sense in whichC’s causing M, thereby leading to interactions bent onyielding X, is good for S (the system): sure enough, con-suming nutrients is essential for S’s survival and healthyfunctioning. By indicating that X is likely to be realized(hence indicating that F is about to obtain), and that Mis likely to lead to such a realization, C contributes to S’swell being. Such a contribution carries normative signif-icance for S, since in order to maintain its viability, itssurvival and ongoing self-maintenance, the system mustmake sure that the conditions on which its viabilitydepends continue to hold, and whatever contributes tothe satisfaction of those conditions is intrinsically goodfor the system.

Nor will it do to maintain that understanding functions,and functional normativity, in terms of contribution to themaintenance of an organic whole illuminates only prag-matic aspects of normativity but that it fails to shed lighton the alethic (truth-related) aspects which preoccupy Dre-tske. Rather, this selection-independent notion of functionrelates directly to the problem of misrepresentation. Recallthat, on the proactive model, representational error occurswhen the environment falls short of supporting the interac-tion possibilities indicated by a given intentional state, thatis, when it does not manifest the properties that sustain thesuccess conditions of the anticipated interaction outcome.Representational error, then, is, first and foremost, a defi-ance of expectation; it constitutes a hindrance to the sys-tem’s Sisyphic effort to make its way in the world; itconstitutes a functional failure. Thus, misrepresentation isa specific form of malfunctioning in as much as the pros-pects indicated by a misrepresenting intentional state areungrounded, making that state ill-equipped to contributeto the system’s collective effort to maintain itself, and to

orient itself in its social and natural environments. More-over, it is precisely because it constitutes a malfunction,because it defies expectations and hinders prospectiveself-regulation, that error can be detected via negative feed-back, and that corrective measures utilizing such feedbackmight ensue. Finally, note that nothing in this explanationrequires selection to account for the emergence of misrep-resentation; representational error is totally constituted incurrent system states and in current dynamic patterns ofsystem–environment interactions.

Thus, our alternative account of functions, and of func-tional indication, enables us to concur with Dretske’s claimthat representation is a specific form of function, an emer-gent sub species genera of, naturalistically explicable, bio-logical phenomena. At the same time, it denies Dretske’scontention that indicatory functions are selection-depen-dent, thereby avoiding epiphenomenalism and the circular-ity inherent in the idea that selection constitutes functionalrelations.

Taking a broader look at the problem in front of us – theincoherence of selection-based explanations of indicatoryfunctions – we may note that the same lesson applies, muta-tis mutandis, to selection-based theories of function in gen-eral, and, in particular, to the popular view that naturalselection confers functional status on biological traits.According to selection-based theories, it is only after therehas been a selection ‘‘for’’ a trait T that T can be consideredfunctional; selection constitutes functionality, and func-tional normativity.15 But this obscures the fact that, in orderto be selected, T must first contribute to the adaptability, orecological competence, of certain individuals such thatthese individuals will perform, on average, better than otherconspecifics and, as a result, will have an improved fitnessrate. Such contribution to individual ecological perfor-mance is presupposed by selection and therefore, on painof regress, cannot be explained as its outcome; and yet, itis functional and normative par excellence.

First, note that, in this case too, all the causal capacitiesthat the selection-based explanation ascribes to T in thepost-selection period are already at play at this pre-selectionstage. Consider an example. Some marine invertebrates(e.g., rotifers, barnacles, and bryozoans) developed an irre-versible adaptive response to predation. Usually, that is,under normal conditions, they take the form of a typicalmorph but when exposed to nearby predators they can rap-idly, and irreversibly, change their appearance into an alter-native, atypical, morph, or to produce progenies with suchnon-standard appearance. The predator-induced morphlowers mortality rate in predator infested environmentsand thus has a higher fitness in those environments, but inpredator free environments it is has lower fitness (Dukas,1998). According to selection-based theories such as Milli-kan’s (1984, 1989) the structures responsible for these


defense strategies in the tiny marine creatures has the func-tion of protecting the creatures because they were selectedfor doing so. But this obscures the fact that in order to beselected ‘‘for’’ the task, the relevant causal structures musthave already been at work – serving their owners by reduc-ing mortality rate in predator-infested environments.

The moral, then, is that the adaptive performance to beselected is already there in its entirety prior to the culmina-tion of the selection process (first the performance, then thereward. . .). But, if performing all the causal tasks of thepost-selection period at the pre-selection period is notenough to confer on T the status of a functional trait, then,as in Dretske’s case, epiphenomenalism seems inevitable(cf. Christensen & Bickhard, 2002a; Saidel, 2001).

Second, since in this pre-selection stage T is useful to theorganisms in which it is embedded it already carries norma-

tive significance for those organisms. Thus, consider themanifestation of, and reaction to, alarm signals such as tailsplashing in beavers’ populations, or various vocalizationsin vervet monkeys. These signals, and their characteristicmodes of usage, were selected because they proved to beuseful, ecologically competent, patterns of behavior, con-tributing to the survival and stable sustenance of individu-als and populations. But the usefulness of such signals intheir contexts of application constitutes a normativedimension that is, again, selection-independent. There is aclear sense in which it was good for beavers to splash theirtail and for vervet monkeys to make their calls even beforethese behaviors were selected across the populations. It fol-lows that selection presupposes normative relations, and,insofar as selection-based accounts appeal to selection asthe putative source of norms, they are inconsistent.16

It transpires, then, that the problems of epiphenomenal-ism, and of normative inconsistency, that haunt selection-based theories of biological functions stem from a neglectof a crucial fact about biotic evolution. Natural selectionoperates on variability in individual (or group) perfor-mance between systems that already possess a degree offunctional organization, and that are already equippedwith inner states capable of making some contribution tothe incessantly self-preserving (i.e., functional) causal orga-nization of their owners. To put it otherwise, in order to bea participant in the game of natural selection you have tobe able to reproduce, maintain homeostasis, and competefor resources; but a physical system, which must, andcan, maintain itself via resource acquisition, self-recupera-tion and self-reproduction – an autonomous agent – isalready a clear exemplar of a functional system.17

16 Various authors have made the claim that selection based theories offunction presuppose a more fundamental, selection-independent, notionof function. Examples that may be cited here are Bigelow and Pargetter(1987), Bunge and Mahner (1997, chap. 4), Christensen and Bickhard(2002a, 2002b), McIntosh (2001), and Stotz and Griffiths (2002).17 For some accounts of autonomous agency see Bickhard (2000a),

Christensen and Hooker (2000), Gibson (1994), Kauffman (2000),Smithers (1995), and Ulanowicz (1986).

Defenders of selection-based theories of function mightrespond by arguing that such functional systems are ulti-mately assembled by the operation of natural selection onsimple, non-functional, template replication mechanisms,hence that, in the final analysis, selection does generatefunctions. Yet, significant developments in the last decadesin the study of biological systems as complexly organizeddynamical systems put this standard neo-Darwiniandogma to doubt. As is intimated in the works of Eigen(1971), Kauffman (1993, 1995), Margulis (e.g., Margulis& Sagan, 1986), Maturana and Varela (1980), and others,the very emergence of life presupposes holistic self-mainte-nance of the sort exemplified by collectively autocatalyticmacromolecules. The point is that such self-maintainingsystems – predating the emergence of the double helix –were already functionally organized and capable of prebi-otic evolution. On this view, then, self-organization playsan essential, irreducible, role in the construction of biolog-ical order. As Kauffman puts it

‘‘[M]uch of the order in organisms, from the origins oflife itself to the stunning order in the development of anewborn child from a fertilized egg, does not reflectselection alone. Instead, much of the order in organisms,I believe, is self-organized and spontaneous. Self-organi-zation mingles with natural selection in barely under-stood ways to yield the magnificence of our teemingbiosphere. We must therefore expand evolutionary the-ory (2000, p. 2).’’

To conclude, the upshot of the arguments advanced inthis section is that selection does not, and cannot, consti-tute the ultimate explanation of functional organizationand functional normativity. But if the emergence of func-tions, and of functional normativity, cannot be attributedsolely to selection processes, then, as a special case, it fol-lows that mental states cannot acquire indicatory functionsmerely in virtue of having been selected for their indicatoryproperties. This, then, is the second incoherence problem.

5. Some theoretical implications

It is time to take stock. The discussion that followsexamines the conclusions that can be derived from thearguments advanced in the last two sections. In addition,a special emphasis is given to some broader implicationsthat might be drawn, using extrapolation and further anal-ysis, from these more direct conclusions and that seem tobe theoretically significant for the general project ofexplaining representational phenomena. These includeinsights into existent pitfalls, and hints at the prospectsfor a brighter future.

5.1. Intrinsicality and the incoherence arguments:

extrapolating beyond Dretske’s theory

I have argued that Dretske’s attempt to satisfy theintrinsicality criterion fails. The reasons for the failure,


however, go well beyond Dretske’s own theory of indica-tory functions. The moral of the second incoherence argu-ment is that there is a problem with the very idea thatfunctions, and functional normativity, are selection-depen-dent. If the argument is cogent, then selection-basedtheories of function presuppose a more fundamental, selec-tion-independent, notion of function, and the consequencesfor the thriving industry of explaining functions, and, a for-tiori, representational functions, in terms of selection aredire.

As for the first incoherence argument, the implicationsare even broader. If the argument is sound, it not onlyshows that information semantics is ill equipped to dealwith the problem of intrinsic intentionality, it also casts ashadow on the entire enterprise of accounting for contentin terms of correspondence, or encoding, relations, therebytaking to task almost all of the contemporary naturalisticsemantics.

5.2. Intrinsicality and causal efficacy

Moreover, we are now in a position to observe the con-nection between the popular charge against Dretske to theeffect that his theory implies epiphenomenalism, and ourown findings. From this vantage point of view, the epiphe-nomenalism of Dretske’s theory is a mirror image of thebasic failure to explain intentionality as a system-intrinsicphenomenon. The link between intrinsicality and epiphe-nomenalism is intuitive enough. For a representation tobe system-intrinsic is for it to be capable of functioning asa representation for the system in which it is embedded.That is to say, if C is a representation embedded in a sys-tem S, and if C’s content is P, it must be the case that Ccan function as a representation for S in virtue of its con-tent; C’s content must be functionally available to S andit must be capable of making a difference, a causal differ-ence, to S’s thought and action. A theory whose prescrip-tions for content individuation yield contents that can beneither accessed nor used by their owners is a theory whosecontent assignments are necessarily causally inert, henceepiphenomenal. Conversely, a theory whose prescriptionsfor content individuation yield causally inert contents nec-essarily fails to explain intentionality as a system-intrinsicproperty.

5.3. A hint on how to approach a solution to the incoherencetangles

The popularity of teleonomic, selection-based accountsof function and representation stems, to a large extent,from the fact that many scientifically minded thinkers(e.g., Dawkins, 1976; Dennett, 1987; Pinker, 1997) believeit to be the only respectful way whereby the question ofpurposeful behavior may be approached. Similarly, thepopularity of encoding-based accounts of content is rootedin the persuasion that this is the only way whereby thequestion of representation may be approached. But if the

arguments presented here are along the right track, wehad better look for alternatives. A not too careful readingbetween the lines of this critical essay reveals that it alreadycontains the seeds of a possible alternative. For it offers, inpassing

(a) thinking of function in terms of making systematic

contribution to the maintenance of an organic whole

instead of in terms of selective history, and(b) thinking of indication (hence representation) in terms

of anticipation of (possible) interaction outcomes

rather than in terms of reliable correlation.

Nor is this alternative a mere hypothetical program.Proponents of a dynamic systems approach to mental phe-nomena called ‘interactivism’ (Bickhard, 1993 and else-where; Christensen & Hooker, 2000) have developed, inconsiderable detail, a theoretical account of representa-tional content incorporating these basic insights (alongwith significant theoretical tenets borrowed from complex-ity theory, developmental psychology, ecological psychol-ogy, pragmatism, phenomenology and more). On a moregeneral scale, it may be mentioned that contemporary cog-nitive science witnesses a steady growth in the popularity ofembodied, and action-oriented, theories of mind manifest-ing a significant degree of approximation to the ideasdefended here (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, Thomp-son, & Rosch, 1991; are but two of the more familiar exam-ples). Although it is my conviction that this alternative wayof looking at the problem of mental representation pos-sesses a decisive advantage over more popular theoriessuch as Dretske’s in that it offers a coherent solution tothe intrinsicality problem, the paper’s modest aim was sim-ply to show how, and why, Dretske’s own solution fails.Therefore, within the confines of the present discussion, Irefrained from making a fully systematic attempt toexplain, and defend, the interactive program.

5.4. Intrinsicality and self-organization: or, why attempts to

reduce teleology to mechanistic causation are bound to fail

Having concentrated on the difficulties enfolded in Dre-tske’s position, I would like to conclude with a generalobservation regarding the connection between Dretske’sfailure to respect the intrinsicality criterion and his neglectto take note of the constitutive role played by self-organiz-ing dynamics in the construction of functions, and of func-tional indications.

In discussing the two incoherence problems, I arguedthat the failure to model either indication, or function, assystem-intrinsic phenomena stems from a neglect of theirinherently dynamic, self-organizing, character. Functions,I argued, ought to be understood as contributions to theself-organizing dynamics of an autonomous organic whole,and indications ought to be explained as functions of a spe-cial sort whose contribution to autonomy consists of envi-ronmentally sensitive, anticipatory, action-guidance. It is

18 Ironically, it is in contemporary physics itself that the mechanisticparadigm ultimately breaks down, a fact that seems to have gone beyondthe radars of those who espouse its application to biological, andintentional, phenomena.


with this picture in mind, I concluded, that we may hope toovercome the difficulties faced by the traditional approachto function and representation, of whom Dretske is, with-out a doubt, a particularly well-spoken representative. Inthe remaining pages I shall argue that there is a reason, adeeply seated metaphysical reason, behind the reluctanceof the traditional approach to take advantage of self-orga-nization in attempting to account for biological, and men-tal, phenomena. As before, I argue that Dretske’s theorycan be used as a telling example.

As we shall see shortly, Dretske’s appeal to a selection-dependent account of function, and of functional indica-tion, reflects a deep theoretical commitment to the idea thatan adequate naturalistic explanation of teleological phe-nomena must conform to a mechanistic outlook of reality.A consistent adoption of the mechanistic image of reality,however, leaves no room for genuine self-organizationand, as a result, no room for explaining functions in gen-eral, and representational functions in particular, as sys-tem-intrinsic phenomena. Indeed, the commitment to theidea that the only naturalistically acceptable kinds of expla-nations are explanations that refer to mechanistic modes ofproduction and becoming (or, at the very least, that pre-suppose strictly mechanical processes at the relevant levelof ‘‘implementation,’’ or ‘‘realization’’) has the inevitableeffect that, in the final account, all teleological phenomenaare rendered illusionary. Attempts to redeem our teleolog-ical intuitions by making telos conform to the mechanisticframework are plenty and here again, as we shall see, Dre-tske is a loyal representative, but the rift between telos andmechanism is such that these attempts manage to salvageno more than a faint apparition of genuine function andpurpose. I therefore propose, that by taking seriously theidea that function and representation ought to be explainedin predominantly self-organizational terms, we are obligedto reconsider our all too sweeping commitment to themechanistic view of the world and to take a fresh look atthe role of telos in nature.

The theory presented in chapter four of Explaining

Behavior constitutes a deliberate attempt to provide a nat-uralistic foundation for a viable account of mental content.The hub of the theory is the idea that the key towards asuccessful naturalization lies in identifying mental repre-sentation as a kind of biological function, which functionis in turn explained by reference to selective history. Theo-ries of content that hinge on this idea are often referred toas ‘teleological’ (e.g., Papineau, 1991), but a closer exami-nation reveals that, for reasons that are far from trivial,the euphemism ‘teleonomic’ is a more appropriate choice.

The term ‘teleonomy’ was proposed by Pittendrigh(1958, p. 394) as a substitute for the traditional, morefamiliar, term ‘teleology.’ Teleology, as commonly con-ceived, is the study of ends or final causes – the explanationof phenomena by reference to goals, or purposes. As such,it carries with it connotations of the Aristotelian worldviewwhich was repudiated with the advent of modern science.On the mechanistic worldview extracted from classical

dynamics there is no place for final causes; and purposive,or seemingly purposive, behavior must ultimately bereduced to efficient, mechanistic, causation. It is oftenmaintained that one of Darwin’s remarkable achievementswas that his theory of the evolution of species by way ofnatural selection made such a reduction feasible. Darwin’stheory, the idea goes, provided the means for explainingthe purposive behavior, and design-like organization,found in nature in terms of the mechanisms governingmutation, variation, and selection. The seeming teleologyof biological phenomena could now be explained in termscompatible with the mechanistic modes of explanationcharacteristic of the physical sciences.18 The upshot of sucha reductive explanation is that the appearance of purpose-fulness in nature is exactly that – an appearance, the resultof nature’s laborious and opportunistic blind tinkering.The term ‘teleonomy’ – especially as adapted by Monod(1971) and Mayr (1992) – was meant to cover precisely thistype of explanation, namely, to account for apparently pur-posive structures, functions, and behaviors as evolutionaryadaptations, which could, in the final analysis, be analyzedinto their ultimate mechanistic components. In the wordsof Richard Dawkins, ‘‘in effect, teleonomy is teleologymade respectable by Darwin (1982, p. 294).’’

It is clear that Dretske’s theory is teleonomic in spirit, ifnot in its letter. As mentioned throughout the paper, theunderlying working assumption of Dretske’s account isthat what confers a functional status on indicatory statesis the fact that they were selected for their indicatory prop-erties. Since such an account essentially reduces intention-ality to indicatory function, the implication is that theapparent purposefulness of intentional states is simply theresult of nature’s cunning blind tinkering – the same logicunderlying Pittendrigh’s introduction of ‘teleonomy’ as asubstitute for the debunked term ‘teleology.’

The epistemic incoherence of Dretske’s teleonomic the-ory of content, and especially the fact that it presupposesan untenable explanation of the emergence of system-intrinsic functions (representational or otherwise), givesgrounds for suspecting that the problem might be symp-tomatic of a more general fault, namely, that it might haveto do with the idea that teleology could be reduced toteleonomy.

In more than one place, Dretske compares the task ofexplaining purposeful behavior and design-like organiza-tion in nature to that of explaining a work of engineering(1988, pp. 96–97; 1994). The comparison is illuminating.To begin, note that there is an obvious disanalogybetween engineered, or otherwise manufactured, artifactsand naturally constructed biological systems: all natural-ists believe that only the formers are the products of intel-

ligent design. Nevertheless, advocates of teleonomy insist


also on the existence of a manifest analogy: both are made

to appear purposeful, both are structured as if they pos-sess a telos. The word ‘made’ is revealing; it implies thatthe functional organization of the system is dictated by anexternal agency. Such an external agency might be intelli-gent, but it need not be so. So long as the end product issecured it matters not whether the designing agency isintelligent or blind, natural or unnatural, final or efficient.Now, clearly an artifact is a system whose organization isshaped from without; but the interesting point is that so isthe case with a mechanistically tinkered-together contrap-tion. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of a mech-anistic explanation is that it accounts for the behavior ofthe system under scrutiny completely in terms of externalagencies – the impact of other bodies, the operation offorces, etc. (cf. Bohm, 1957; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984;Rosen, 1991; Ulanowicz, 2000). The bottom line is thata mechanical device – whether naturally formed or artifi-cially contrived – does not partake in the making of itsown organization.

It transpires, then, that the communality between intel-ligent design and teleonomy is that both of them presup-pose external formation while excluding self-organization.Proponents of mainstream reductionism often assume thatthe only alternatives to mechanism are vitalism or, worsestill, supernatural intelligent design. Yet, the dilemma isfabricated in that it ignores the possibility of a self-orga-

nized purposive dynamics. This is not merely a logical quib-ble. The recent decades have seen a rapid advancement inthe study of complex, dynamically non-linear, systems ofvarious levels of manifested complexity, and a remarkableincrease in our understanding of the self-organized aspectscharacterizing their emergence and behavior. Such devel-opments leave a place for more than a shred of optimismregarding the prospects of accounting for function and pur-pose in primarily self-organizational terms.

One of the fascinating features of this newly emergingtheoretical approach to the study of function and purposein nature is that it offers a getaway from the need to choosebetween the Scylla of intelligent design and the Charybdisof a mechanistic ‘‘natural design.’’ While the intelligentdesign solution has been amply criticized for implying asupernatural interference in the order of things, it has oftenbeen overlooked that a mechanistic solution implies analmost equally unsettling conclusion. For, as mentionedabove, on a strictly mechanistic explanatory frameworkbiologically evolved function and purpose are, in the finalanalysis, mere appearances – they are, as it were, mere as

if phenomena. But if function and purpose could beexplained by reference to the process dynamics characteris-tic of open, self-organized, systems, then there might beroom for a less suspicious approach towards the prospectof explaining genuinely telelological phenomena as an inte-gral part of nature. Such integration would amount to thereestablishment of telos within the natural order of things,in a way that implies neither supernatural manipulation,nor eliminative reductionism.

Needless to say, a more elaborate exploration of thebearings of these recent developments in complex systemsresearch on the potential rehabilitation of teleologydeserves a separate treatment.

Acknowledgements

I thank Amir Horowitz and the audience at the 2005 an-nual colloquium of the Israeli Philosophical Association inHaifa, where an early draft of the paper has been read.

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