atelicity intentionality

7/28/2019 Atelicity Intentionality

1/31

1

(A)telicity and intentionality1

Ilse Depraetere, UMR 8163 STL, Universit de Lille III

To be published inLinguistics 45 (2007)

abstract

This article argues for a treatment of telicity which gives due space to intentionality, i.e. which

recognises the role intentionality may play in establishing the mutually manifest inherent or natural

endpoint crucial to the definition of telicity. Sentences with numerical NP objects and foradverbials

are shown not to be automatically telic. It is only if the constituents in question are contextually given

as inherent endpoints that they are [+telic], intentionality being one of the extra-linguistic factors that

may bring about telicity.

1. Introduction

The concepts oftelicity and atelicity are commonly used to refer to two fundamentally different

situation types. While the labels are always associated with presence vs. absence of endpoints in some

way, the definition ofendpoints is not uniform. The following is a selective survey of ways in which

telicity has been defined:2

(1) Binnick (1991:192): The definition of telicness must take into account that what is crucial isnot that there be a potential culmination of the actual process described, but rather that the

phasic structure of the situation include a culminatory phase distinct from mere termination.3

(italics mine)

Dahl (1981:81): A situation, process, action, etc. or the verb, verb phrase, sentence, etc.

expressing this situation etc. has the T property iff

(DEFINITION 1, S.G. Andersson 1971) it is directed toward attaining a goal or limit at

which the action exhausts itself and passes into something else


2/31

2

(DEFINITION 2, Comrie 1976) it leads up to a well-defined point behind which the

process cannot continue.

Declerck (1991:121): Telic expressions have a natural end-point, a telic expression involves

reference to a non-arbitrary point of completion towards which the action tends to proceed and

beyond which it cannot continue.

Dowty (1991:567): Telic predicates have an incremental theme.

Filip (1999:16): On the most general level of classification, two main classes of verbal

predicates and sentences are distinguished: events, which are telic or quantized, and states and

processes, which are atelic or cumulative.

Garey (1957:106): Telic verbs are verbs expressing an action tending towards a goal.

Krifka (1992:30): A verbal expression is atelic if its denotation has no set terminal point (e.g.,

run), and it is telic if it includes a terminal point (e.g., run a mile).

Lascarides (1991:423): Event sentences describe culminations, and some of them are also

associated with prior processes that led to the culmination.

Michaelis (1998:17): Telic situations are events with goal states.

Smith (1997:19): Telic events have a change of state which constitutes the outcome, or goal, of

the event. () To avoid agentive connotations, I will say that telic events have a natural final

endpoint, or intrinsic bound. () Atelic events have arbitrary final endpoints. The

syntactic evidence for atelic event turns on the notion of completion, which involves the

interaction of duration and change of state. (1997:42)

Van Valin and Lapolla (1997:93): The feature telic has to do with whether a verb depicts a

state of affairs with an inherent terminal point or not.

Although the definitions are indicative of differences in relative weight attributed to semantic and

syntactic criteria, there is a consensus among researchers that the property of telicity is determined by

the multi-layered interaction between the lexical semantics of the verb and different syntactic factors,


3/31

3

which has led e.g. Verkuyl (1993) to use the term aspectual composition. Numerous studies have, for

instance, been devoted to the influence of object NPs on (a)telicity, a unanimous conclusion being that

mass or bare plural NPs establish atelic predicates (John drank beer/glasses of wine), while count NPs

establish telic predicates (John drank a/the glass of wine). Relatively little attention has been paid

though to numerical NPs of the kind as in eat 10 cakes, drink 5 bottles, the few analyses explicitly

referring to such predicates presenting them as telic propositions (cf. e.g. Filip 1997, Krifka 1992,

Ramchand 1997, Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2002:273, Smith 1997:29). The compatibility of

sentences with either aforadverbial or an in-adverbial also features prominently in the situation types

literature as a test to determine the atelic/telic nature of the predicate (John drank a glass of wine in 30

seconds (John drank a glass of wine = telic) vs.John drank wine for 30 seconds (John drank wine =

atelic)). However, base cases such as John stayed in the room for 30 minutes, seemingly

unproblematic and telic, are virtually absent in previous research. It is my aim to take a closer look at

these less commonly discussed cases in this article.

More in general, I would like to look at the effect of intentionality, a pragmatic notion, on

(a)telicity. I would like to present some descriptive evidence that shows that extra-linguistic factors,

such as intentionality, can play a decisive role in determining the telic character of particular

predicates and should accordingly be given their due place in the list of factors affecting (a)telicity.

While I agree that lexical semantics and syntax are crucial to (a)telicity,4 it is my contention that

pragmatics also needs to be taken into account and is the decisive factor in classifying predicates such

as John ate 10 cakes and John stayed in the room for 30 minutes, which I do not believe are

unambiguously telic. The hypothesis defended relates to the subclass of telic utterances that contain

(a) transitive dynamic verbs (run three rounds, write an essay, etc.) and (b) stative or dynamic

(in)transitive verbs combined with a durational for-PP. Telicity is defined as follows: a sentence is

telic if the situation (as it is represented in the sentence) is represented as having an inherent (natural

or intended), mutually manifest endpoint beyond which the situation (as it is represented in thesentence) cannot continue. (cf. e.g. Depraetere 1995)

I will first give of survey of the different ways in which the influence of pragmatic factors

(including the extra-linguistic context) features in previous research on aspectuality (cf. e.g. Hay et al


4/31

4

1999, Olsen 1994), one of the findings being that intentionality, or at least agentivity, is orthogonal to

telicity. I will then describe some phenomena that cannot be accounted for unless there is scope for

intentionality in (a)telicity: the inherent endpoint associated with telicity in the original and genuine

sense of the word (cf. e.g. Garey 1957) needs to contextually given, and in a number of cases, the

identification of such an endpoint is dependent on the mutual manifestness (Sperber and Wilson

1995:39)5 of an intention to achieve a certain aim by one of the discourse participants. So while I

would not want to question in the least the importance of syntax and (lexical) semantics on (a)telicity,

I would like focus on the importance of the pragmatic level, with space for the influence of (mutually

manifest) intentions.

2. Pragmatics and aspectuality

In the literature, the possible influence of the (linguistic and extra-linguistic) context on aspectual

classification is basically centred on three issues: (a) temporal interpretation of discourse (2.1.), (b)

verb classification (2.2.1), (c) agentivity and telicity (2.2.2 and 2.2.4).

2.1. Contextually established temporal boundaries

In discussions that deal with the temporal interpretation of discourse, it has been pointed out that

temporal boundaries may be established by the context and result in a shift of reference time. The

following examples illustrate the temporal shift brought about by our knowledge of the world:

(2) John was watching television when he fell asleep. (Dowty 1986:59)(3) At around five-fifteen the tall boy in the jerkin came out of Geigers with an umbrella and went

after the cream-coloured coup. When he had it in front Geiger came out and the tall boy held

the umbrella over Geigers bare head. He folded it, shook it off and handed it into the car.

(Couper-Kuhlen 1987:24)

(4) James entered the room, shut the door carefully switched off the light. It was pitch dark aroundhim, because the Venetian blinds were closed. (Hinrichs 1986:68)


5/31

5

It is beyond doubt that it is contextual information (i.e. real-world knowledge about falling asleep (2),

folding an umbrella (3),switching off the light(4)) that puts an end to the situation of watching (in (2))

and of holding the umbrella (in (3)), or alternatively makes it clear that a new situation comes about

(in (4)), and in this way triggers temporal progression. (cf. also e.g. Hamann 1991:429)

However, these examples are not directly relevant to the present discussion because, as I have argued

in e.g. Depraetere (1995) (1996a), the temporal endpoint identified in these discussions is of a

different nature: it is a factual boundary, which is associated with boundedness rather than telicity.

Endpoints may indeed be of (at least) two kinds (cf. e.g Declerck 1989 and 1991, Declerck and Reed

to appear), which matches a dual conceptual distinction between, on the one hand, telicity vs. atelicity,

a distinction that hinges on the presence or absence ofpotential inherent endpoints (ontological

aspect, situation-template (Declerck and Reed: to appear)), and, on the other hand, boundedness vs.

unboundedness, a distinction based on the presence or absence of factual, arbitrary endpoints

(actualisation aspect (Declerck and Reed: to appear)).6 In such an approach, the sentence in (5) is

bounded and telic, that in (6) is unbounded and telic.

(5) I wrote an article on telicity in 1995. (bounded and telic)(6) I am writing an article. (unbounded and telic)In a similar way, the italicized clause in (7) is atelic and unbounded, that in (8) is atelic and bounded.

(7) She was in the attic when I arrived. (unbounded and atelic)(8) She forgot time while she was filing through her childrens photo albums. She was in the attic

for three hours. (bounded and atelic)

The etymology of tlos, which includes an element of meaning like end, purpose orgoal (cf. e.g.

Peters 1967, Waanders 1984) is also a telling reminder of the kind of endpoint that is involved in

telicity. As will be clear from some of the aspectual definitions in (1), telic endpoint is sometimes

used rather loosely: it does not necessarily catch the original meaning of the term, and even if it does

at first sight, the discussions that follow the definitions very often take a mere factual boundary as a

sufficient criterion for telicity. While this may reflect a conscious choice (cf. e.g. Filip 2000), 7 the

failure to distinguish clearly between (un)boundedness and (a)telicity implies that one is no longer in a

position to explain accurately a number of data, as will be shown below. (cf. also Depraetere 1995,


6/31

6

1996a) As I see it, the defining criterion of telicity is the presence of an inherent (natural or intended),

mutually manifest (Sperber and Wilson 1995:39) endpoint. Once that endpoint has been reached, the

situation as it is represented in the sentence cannot continue any more. It is crucial to realise that the

endpoints of a telic situation are potential endpoints: no matter whether there is actualisation or not,

i.e. no matter whether the sentence represents the situation as reaching/having reached the inherent or

intended endpoint (cf. e.g. (5)) or not (cf. e.g. (6)), it remains a fact that it is mutually manifest and this

is what telicity is about.8 In other words, the endpoint that is characteristic of telic predicates is not a

post hoc factual endpoint but one that is mutually manifest as soon as the situation is referred to.

(Un)boundedness relates to whether or not the situation is described as having reached a temporal

boundary. A sentence is bounded if there are linguistic signals that indicate that the situation has

reached a boundary, irrespective of whether that boundary constitutes an inherent (possibly an

intended) endpoint or not.9

2.2. Volition and intentionality

The effect of the extralinguistic category of intentionality and volition features in discussions of

situation types (verb classes) (2.2.1) and in discussions on thematic roles and their importance for

telicity (2.2.2 and 2.2.5).10, 11

2.2.1. From the early aspectual (pre- case grammar) days onwards (cf. e.g. Ryle 1949), the less than

perfect match between volition and Achievement verbs has been referred to. Smith (1997:31) uses

the term purely lucky Achievements to refer to Ryles examples find, win, etc. (1988 (1949):125,

144-146), which are not compatible with the adverb deliberately in spite of the fact that Achievements

are typically associated with the semantic role of [+ volitional] Agents.12

More in general, the influence of the context on Aktionsart category is also clear from examples like

She doesnt know me vs.Apparently, my neighbour isnt knowing us again. (Schopf 1984:247). Schopf

explains that whereas know is a state verb in sentences like the former, it testifies to willentliches


7/31

7

Verhalten [intentional behaviour] in the latter case. A lot of stative verbs (I think youre right.) can

indeed get, the context permitting, an activity reading (Im thinking of you night and day.) or a process

reading (Im understanding the problem better and better.). (cf. e.g. Bach 1981, Quirket al1985:202,

Huddleston and Pullum 2002:167)

2.2.2. While volitional involvement (Dowty 1991:572) or intention (cf. e.g. Lakoff 1977:248,

Haegeman 1994:49, Nishimura 1993: 518) is readily associated with the thematic role of agent, it has

been pointed out that not all agents answer that requirement.13 For instance, the (animate) subjects of

what Levin (2000:420) calls verbs of substance emission such as sneeze, vomit,14 and other verbs of

bodily process like yawn, are readily associated with the semantic role of agent although the agent

does not appear to have the property [+ volitional]. In a related context, Verkuyl uses the apparent

tautology voluntary agency (Verkuyl 1993:38). Cruse (1973) also points to the need of setting up

subclasses within the category of doers; agentiveness being but one of four (next to volitive,

effective, initiative) features that establish reference to a doer: volitive is present when an act of will

is stated or implied (1973:18), agentive is present in any sentence referring to an action performed

by an object which is regarded as using its own energy in carrying out the action (1973:21). (Cf. also

e.g. Van Valin and Lapolla 1997:119-120) In Van Valin and Wilkins (1999) it is argued convincingly

that the role of effector, roughly the dynamic participant doing something in an event (1999:291) is

more basic than that of agent, agentivity arising as a result of an agent implicature. Following Holisky

(1987), it is shown how the semantic role of effector can be contextually enriched so as to establish

agentivity.Larry killed the deer(1999:309) is said to be neutral with respect to whether the actor is an

agent or not. While the default reading is one in which Larry is agent, a reading that is brought out by

adding for instance, intentionally, the addition ofaccidentally cancels the (implicated) default reading.

In other words, rather than considering intentionality as a defining feature of agents in general, with

the complication that certain agents do not have that characteristic, they opt for an approach in which

agents constitute a subclass (dependent on the feature of intentionality) of the more basic role of

effector.


8/31

8

2.2.3. Before taking a closer look at the link between agentivity, intentionality and telicity, I would

like to develop in more detail an aspect about telicity that is vital to the argumentation in this article.

More in particular, I would like to take up the notion of inherentendpoint referred to in 2.1 and

apply it to examples with transitive dynamic verbs with an object NP that contains a numerical NP. As

pointed out in 2.1., a fact that I believe has been insufficiently stressed in the literature is that in order

for a predicate to qualify as telic, the discourse participants need to be able to conceptualise the

situation referred to in a particular predicate as having an inherentendpoint: as soon as the situation

has started and as soon as the situation is referred to, it is mutually manifest what its potential endpoint

is.15

In the case of dynamic verbs that are subcategorized for a multiple numerical object NP that is

affected, constructed or consumed theme (e.g. eat 3 apples, write 5 books), the most likely way in

which the boundary referred to by a quantified NP will be identified as an inherent endpoint is when it

is understood to be part of a plan of one of the discourse participants. If it is in the scope16 of the

discourse participants intention, it will be immediately visible as the potential endpoint of the

situation.

In order to prove this hypothesis, we need to start by stating the obvious: a number is the result of a

counting process. It will be clear that counting can only be completed when the situation is over, so

unless a particular number is fixed as a (predetermined) target, a numerical NP is not likely to be

considered an inherent endpoint. The difference in telic potential of different types of object NP

becomes particularly clear when we consider a set of progressive dynamic sentences with an object NP

that is affected, constructed or consumed theme and examine how automatic the assignment of the

function of potential inherent endpoint to a NP with a singular indefinite article, a singular definite

article, a singular numerical NP object, a multiple numerical NP is:

(9) a. Look! Hes killing a chicken!b. (context: language class, teacher showing a picture and asking questions about it) A: What is

this? B: Its a chicken. A: Whats the man doing? B: Hes killing the chicken.

c. ?? Look! Hes killing one chicken!


9/31

9

d. Look! * Hes killing five chickens! (acceptable only if it is clear from the context that

exactly five chickens will be killed, for instance, if there is a cage with five chickens to be

killed)17,18

(10) a. Look! Hes smoking a cigarette! (I thought he didnt smoke.)b. Look! Hes smoking the cigarette! (context: teenager has been fiddling with a cigarette

which has been left on the table. After a while, he lights it and he starts smoking.)

c. ?? Look! Hes smoking one cigarette!

d. Look! * Hes smoking five cigarettes! (acceptable only if we envisage a context in which

the number is fixed before the situation begins, for instance, a betting context in which one

has to smoke five cigarettes in, for instance, a certain amount of time)

Dynamic telic sentences can normally be used in the progressive whose function it is to refer to the

middle of the event (ongoing event convention, Smith 1997:89), in which case the beginning and end

of the situation are out of focus.19 The fact that some of the closely related sentences with quantified

NPs in (9) and (10) are questionable or acceptable only on a particular reading implies that they are

not (straightforwardly) telic.

These examples show indeed that even when the number of referents involved is the same (i.e. a single

one: (a): a, (b): the and (c): 1), the different determiners affect the likelihood of a sentence being

understood as telic. Sentences with a definite or indefinite article object NP appear to be automatically

understood as telic; explicit or contextual reference to intentionality is not required. In order to answer

the question why it is that sentences with an (in)definite singular NP that is affected, constructed or

consumed theme, unlike those with a single numerical NP, are automatically telic, we need to look at

differences in degree of mutual manifestness of a potential inherent endpoint. As soon as we have

some evidence (for instance, if someone takes out a cigarette and a lighter or (slightly more

lugubriously) if someone gets hold of a chicken and a pair of scissors or a hatchet) we will easily

conclude that the process about to be started is that of smoking a cigarette or killing a chicken. In other

words, the chicken (the cigarette) or a chicken (a cigarette) is contextually given.20 We may be

mistaken (someone may be about to burn a cigarette or clip a chickens wings), but that is a different


10/31

10

problem that is not at stake here.21 We readily accept a default situation in which an item is created,

consumed or affected (even though the evidence on which that concept is based may be limited).

The situation of taking out a lighter and a cigarette will less likely induce us to conclude that someone

is about to smoke exactly one or five cigarettes. We need more evidence to conceptualise such a

situation and one way in which this evidence may be provided is by indicating that the referents of the

NP are in the scope (cf. footnote 16) of an intention (context a): We will be aware that the situation is

that ofsmoking five cigarettes (orkilling five chickens) when it is made clear from the beginning that

this number is a target to be reached. John smoked five cigarettes is telic and bounded. John smoked

five cigarettes is atelic and bounded in a context like the following (context b): when the situation of

smoking (or killing) is over, we can count the cigarette stubs (dead animals) and conclude: John

smoked five cigarettes (John killed five chickens). In this case,five cigarettes is the result of an after-

the-fact counting process. It constitutes the factual boundary to the situation (actualisation aspect),

but it is not the inherent endpoint (ontological aspect).

The (un)acceptability of the progressive is dependent on whether we find ourselves in context (a)

rather than (b): in the former case, it is possible to use the progressive, in the latter, it is not. There is a

factual boundary to both the situations as they are described in the non-progressive sentence, i.e. they

are both bounded, but this does not mean that they are both telic. On reading (b), the sole function of

the numerical NP is to establish a boundary to the situation. The addition of the progressive, which

represents the situation as ongoing and therefore leaves the beginning and end of the situation out of

focus, makes the sentence uninterpretable because of the tension between the [+ bounding] operator

(i.e. the multiple numerical NP) and the [- bounding] operator (i.e. the progressive). On reading (a),

there is no such problem of incompatibility as the numerical NP, apart from bounding the situation,

also has the function of indicating the inherent endpoint. It retains the latter (but not the former)

function when the progressive is used.

John smoked five cigarettes. Context (a) Context (b)

Factual boundary + +


11/31

11

Inherent endpoint + -

Bounded + +

Telic + -

Progressive acceptable? + -

The progressive can only be used if the numerical NP constitutes an inherent boundary, i.e. if the

sentence in which it occurs is telic. In this case, the numerical NP retains its function as inherent

endpoint, but it no longer bounds the situation. It is important to point out that I do not claim that the

progressive is ruled out on reading (b) because the sentence is atelic, but rather because of the

incompatibility between an unbounding operator (the progressive) and a bounding operator (the

numerical NP).22 If the function of the numerical NP is not restricted to bounding the situation, but

constitutes a telos (inherent endpoint), there is no such clash between the progressive and the

numerical NP: the sentence is telic but the inherent endpoint is not represented as having been reached

(i.e. the sentence is unbounded). The line of reasoning developed here is meant to prove that the

presence of a numerical NP does not automatically justify the conclusion that the sentence is telic.

The questionable acceptability of the progressive sentences with a single numerical NP (cf. (9b),

(10b)) or rather the particular context required to use them felicitously can be explained along similar

lines: whether the reference be to one (1) or several items (e.g. 5), unless there is immediately

accessible evidence about the number of items that will be involved in the situation, a single numerical

NP is not automatically given as inherent endpoint. It is rather more naturally associated with a post-

hoc counting process. Once the killing or smoking starts, it is evident that it will stop after exactly one

cigarette or chicken only if there is an intention to do so that is mutually manifest. In other words, the

sentences in (9b) and (10b) as well are only acceptable if there are contextual clues that show that one

chicken orone cigarette is part of a plan in some way.

Comries (1976) observations are also revealing in this context: he argues that given an appropriate

context, sentences that are typically considered to be atelic can be given a telic interpretation:

Imagine, for instance, a singing class where each of the pupils is required to sing a certain set

passage; then the verb sing on its own, in this context, may be taken to mean sing the set passage, so


12/31

12

that from John is singing it will not follow that John has sung (Comrie 1976:46) (Cf. also Dowty

1979:61, Smith 1997:53). Two conclusions may be drawn from this quote: (a) First, it is the context of

utterance that determines how a situation referred to by a particular sentence is conceptualised or

understood. Comries example is even more extreme than our chicken and cigarette examples

because the object NP is understood and not explicitly mentioned. Still, given the appropriate evidence

(i.e. context) available, the speaker may be induced to conceptualiseHe sangasHe sang a song. (b)

Secondly, it is the clear (i.e. mutually manifest) presence of the intention to perform a particular song

or to reach a clearly-stipulated endpoint (realised by an elided NP in this case) that establishes the telic

reading. (cf. e.g. also Dowty 1979:61, Olsen 1994:364)

To sum up, the hypothesis defended is that a sentence with a numerical NP that is affected, consumed

or constructed theme is telic only if it is mutually manifest that the numerical NP is an inherent

endpoint. This means that it is impossible to determine, out of context, whether a NP like 4 cigarettes

or1 cigarette (that functions as affected, constructed or consumed theme) will establish telicity or not.

In other words, we do not take sides with e.g. Krifka (1992), Ramchand (1997), Smith (1997:29) when

they claim that sentences with numerical NPs are straightforwardly telic.

2.2.4. Verkuyl (1993) also refers to transitive sentences with multiple numerical object NPs, but the

question of whether such sentences are telic or not is not raised, because of the way in which

terminative aspect is defined: it simply implies reference to a boundary (inherent in the verb or

realised by a subject or an object NP) and accordingly, the non-progressive variants of the sentences

discussed so far all have terminative aspect. Verkuyl also deals with progressive examples of the type

He is drawing three circles (1993:318-327); the acceptability of such sentences is taken for granted, so

it seems. On various occasions (cf. esp. 1993: 36-38), he insists that considerations about agentivity

should not be confused with Continuous Tense Criteria to classify situations: Vendlers criterion

Progressive Form23 turns out to be actually focussed on some unclear concept of agentivity

(1993:39).24 Applying that remark to what precedes, it might be objected that a similar mistake is

made in the previous section, as my examples might be said to point to a constraint on the use of the

progressive, rather than pertain to a characteristic of telic sentences. However, it should be clear that


13/31

13

we do not use the incompatibility with the progressive as a diagnostic to distinguish telic and atelic

sentences. We start from the observation that telic dynamic transitive verb sentences are compatible

with the progressive (in its ongoing event convention), and that the presence of a multiple numerical

NP is usually taken as a sign that a sentence is telic, from which it follows that such sentences should

be compatible with the progressive. However, it appears that the progressive cannot be used in certain

numerical NP sentences (usually looked upon as telic sentences), which proves that the boundary

which the NP establishes is not always an inherent endpoint. In other words, what we refute is that the

mere presence of such a NP can be used as a diagnostic test to determine the Aktionsart category to

which a sentence belongs.25 Verkuyl need not explain the constraint on the progressive, as he is not

faced with it: he takes it for granted that all examples of the typeJohn ate three cakes are compatible

with the progressive. We readily accept Verkuyls claim that John ate three cakes is terminative and

John was eating three cakes is not. What we are trying to account for though is why it is not always

possible to add the progressive marker to such sentences in order to refer to the middle of the

situation and as far as I can see, Verkuyls account does not provide us with the necessary tools to

explain the constraint observed. If one does away with distinction between Aktionsart classes and

aspect, and replaces them by aspectuality, it seems to me that one rids oneself of the key that can help

us to solve the riddle: it is the presence or absence of an inherent endpoint (and hence telicity) that is at

the basis of the constraint observed. It will be clear that the explanatory relevance of the distinction

between (un)boundedness and (a)telicity comes again to the fore. (cf. e.g. Depraetere 1995, cf. also

Declerck and Reed (to appear))

2.2.5. In recent research on agentivity and telicity (and unaccusativity), it has been argued that

agentivity is orthogonal to telicity (cf. e.g. Dowty 1991, Levin and Rapaport Hovav 1996:299). Given

that intentionality characterises the prototypical agent, one may wonder whether there is no

contradiction between the hypothesis defended here (in which intentionality brings about telicity) and

the claim that non-agentive as well as agentive situations may be telic. There is no contradiction

involved, and this becomes clear when we pin down the common ground between the topics involved

in the discussions:


14/31

14

- Agentive as well as non-agentive situations may be telic. We do not challenge that hypothesis.

- In the semantic role literature, the question whether all agents are [+ intentional] or [+ volitional] has

been dealt with and it has led e.g. Van Valin and Wilkins (1999) to distinguish between agents and

effectors. These discussions are focussed on the link between the extra-linguistic category of

intentionality (and control) and a semantic role. We have presented some of the approaches, but we

have not challenged any particular claim.

- We have looked at dynamic sentences (with human subjects) with numerical NPs. The presence of

such a constituent is commonly thought to be indicative of telicity. We have challenged that point of

view and given evidence that shows that in the examples given, it is only if the numerical NP is in the

scope of an intention that the sentence is telic. Whether that means that the Subject performs the role

of Agent more prototypically in such a case is interesting, but ultimately not the key question we aim

to address.

In other words, we do not aim to refine the definition of agentivity, we do not generalise in the sense

that intentionality is a conditio sine qua non for telicity; rather, we have focussed on ways in which the

inherent endpoint associated with telicity may be identified. Our discussion is meant to show that

certain types of quantified constituents (numerical NPs, andforadverbials (cf. section 3) in particular

contexts) do not automatically result in telicity. In the examples discussed here, the constituents in

question will be associated with the function of an inherent endpoint only if they are in the scope of a

mutually manifest intention. There is therefore no contradiction between the claim that agentivity is

orthogonal to telicity and the hypothesis that in certain contexts, intentionality determines telicity.

As pointed out in 2.2.2, the mutual manifestness of an inherent endpoint to the situation (be there

reference to a volitional agentive, a non-volitional agentive26 or a non-agentive situation) is crucial

to the definition of telicity. This inherent endpoint may be mutually manifest in a number of ways. To

indicate just a few:

(a) Sometimes, the lexical semantics of a verb (e.g. find, sneeze, explode) are sufficient to allow the

conceptualisation of an inherent endpoint,

(b) In other cases, a PP may refer to an inherent boundary (He drove the car into the garage).


15/31

15

(c) To take up Comries example again, the contextual knowledge shared by a number of discourse

participants may be such that the inherent endpoint is mutually manifest without it being explicitly

mentioned: he sangmay be understood as he sang a song.

(d) In the case of dynamic transitive verbs subcategorized for an object NP that is affected, constructed

or consumed theme, the object NP is likely to assume the function of inherent endpoint fairly

automatically, provided there is reference to the default situation in which the definite article NP or

indefinite article NP is contextually given as the natural endpoint to the situation (e.g. drink a glass of

wine, read the book).

(e) NPs with cardinal numbers by their very nature (number can only be determined once the situation

has come to an end) are less likely to be contextually given, which explains why they can only

function as inherent endpoints when they are in the scope of a mutually manifest intention.

In other words, rather than challenging the claim that agentivity is orthogonal to telicity, the

argumentation developed here serves to underline the importance of the visibility of a mutually

manifest endpoint and the part played in this process by extra-linguistic factors such as intentionality.

3. Intentionality, telicity andfor-adverbials

As pointed out in the introduction, the compatibility of a clause with either a foradverbial or an

in adverbial is often used as a diagnostic for (a)telicity/(un)boundedness (John drank a glass of wine in

30 seconds (John drank a glass of wine = telic) vs.John drank wine for 30 seconds (John drank wine

= atelic).27 However, the question of how to classify base cases with a foradverbial has received less

attention. Given that the quantified PP in e.g.He worked in the garden for five hours or in She was in

the garden for three hours puts a temporal boundary to the situation of working, it may hypothesised

that sentences like these are likely to be considered as telic/bounded by most researchers. Taking into

account the previous discussion, it will be clear that we believe such sentences are telic only if the


16/31

16

adverbial is in the scope of a mutually manifest intention. In other words, these sentences also show

that intentionality can be decisive in establishing (a)telicity.

I will again use the ongoing event progressive as a test: if all non-progressive (dynamic)

sentences with a for adverbial are telic, it should always be possible to add the progressive marker

(given an appropriate context in which the use of the progressive is justified), since dynamic telic

sentences are compatible with the progressive. However, in dynamic examples with durational for

adverbials, the progressive as a marker that focuses on the middle of the situation can only be added if

the adverbial is in the scope of the intention. In other words, we can draw a similar conclusion to that

in section 2.2.3: theforadverbial does not automatically constitute an inherent endpoint and therefore,

a sentence with aforadverbial is not automatically telic.28 Let us take the sentence in (11) as a starting

point:

(11) (said by John) I marked exam papers for two hours.I would like to argue that this sentence is not necessarily telic (or derived telic (Smith 1997)). It is

certainly bounded, in the sense that there is a factual endpoint to the situation of correcting, which is

marked by the adverbial. Whether the situation is telic or not depends on whether or not the boundary

is contextually given as an intended (and therefore inherent) endpoint, which here boils down to

determining whether or not it was Johns intention to mark papers for two hours. If John has to mark

500 exam papers during the Easter break, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which he decides

to make that task digestible by sacrificing a number of hours every day. On that interpretation, we

could envisage the following utterance:

(12) I ended up with a pile of 500 papers to correct. I wanted to get this marking business over anddone with as soon as possible so I decided to mark copies for two hours every day during the

Easter break. The first day I that was marking exam papers for 2 hours, my son came in and

asked whether I wanted to play cards with him. (intentional reading)

In this example,for two hours is the intentional endpoint that has not been reached yet when Johns

son enters the room. In (13), on the other hand, the adverbial is a temporal boundary but not an

inherent endpoint. The presence of on the one hand a constituent that establishes a temporal boundary


17/31

17

(the adverbial) and on the other hand the progressive marker, which typically leaves beginning and

endpoints out of focus and therefore has an unbounding effect, results in unacceptability:

(13) I ended up with a pile of 500 copies to correct. I wanted to get this marking business over anddone with so sat down immediately. *I was marking exam papers for 10 hourson endwhen

Mary came in and asked whether I wanted to go out for coffee. (non-intentional reading)

A pseudo-cleft construction brings out the difference between the two interpretations:29

(14) telic interpretation (11): What he did was: mark exam papers for two hours.atelic interpretation (12): What he did for ten hours was: mark exam papers.

These examples strengthen the hypothesis formulated earlier on about the importance of intentionality

for telicity: sentences with durationalforadverbials only result in telicity if it is mutually manifest that

the adverbial is in the scope of the intention. In Smiths terminology (1997:113), we might say that

the adverbial is an inner adverbialin (11), whereas it is an outer adverbialin (12).30

Examples with adverbials are particularly helpful to prove that endpoints should not automatically be

seen as inherent endpoints and are therefore not automatically markers of telicity. The reason for this

is probably that intuitively, we are more inclined to agree that the duration of a situation can only be

determined once the situation is over is posterior to the situation, unless we decide on its duration

before the situation starts. From this it follows that out of context we cannot tell whether the presence

of an adverbial likefor three hours establishes a telic reading or not.

4 Countering counterexamples

4.1. In this section, I would still like to mention some examples, which, at first sight, appear to refute

the hypothesis that it is impossible to combine a constituent (e.g. a foradverbial or a numerical NP)

whose sole function it is to establish a factual boundary with an (ongoing event) progressive marker,

which by default establishes an unbounded reading. Let us start with an example with aforadverbial:

(15) A: Why is daddy so cranky?


18/31

18

B: He marked exam papers for two hours yesterday. The students' bad marks make him feel

depressed. (atelic and bounded)

Let us assume that in this example, for two hours is not in the scope of the intention and that He

marked exam papers for two hours is atelic and bounded. (As a matter of fact, we do not have

sufficient contextual information in (15) to make that decision). So far, example (15) does not

challenge the hypothesis that a sentence with a for-adverbial is not automatically telic. The fact that

this bounded sentence is compatible with a progressive marker is somewhat more problematic:

(16) A: Why is daddy so cranky?B: He was marking exam papers for two hours yesterday. The students' bad marks make him

feel depressed.

Example (16) appears to challenge the other hypothesis we put forward, namely that it is impossible to

add a progressive marker to a bounded atelic sentence, i.e. to a sentence with a foradverbial whose

sole function it is to bound the situation (cf. (13)), as there will be a clash between the progressive

marker, which brings about unboundedness, and the adverbial, which establishes a temporal boundary.

However, as (16) shows, the addition of the progressive does not result in unacceptability. Our

hypothesis is not falsified: the example in (16) is indeed different (from those in (12) and (13))

because there is reference to the whole period of two hours of correcting. In (12) and (13), the

progressive is used to focus on the middle of the situation (of correcting for a number of hours), and

the beginning and the end of the situation are off screen, as Jackendoff (1996) puts it. This is not the

case in (16). The progressive is not used in its ongoing event convention (Smith 1997:89), but rather to

stress the fact that for a full two hours, the person in question was marking papers. As the progressive

does not have its usual unbounding effect, there is no clash with the foradverbial. I would argue that

the sentence in (16) is still bounded, even though the progressive is used. The adverbial makes the

situation of marking exam papers bounded and constitutes the variable that is filled by a value (a

situation). Put more informally, a kind of frame is established by for two hours, a frame that is filled

by the activity of correcting: no matter whether we use the progressive or not, the sentence remains

bounded. (cf. Depraetere and Reed 2000:112-113) This brings up the issue of the hierarchy among the

factors that contribute towards establishing (un)boundedness and the interaction between them.31


19/31

19

4.2. The following set of examples also seems to question the hypothesis defended:32

(17) Unintentionally John is killing five chickens by putting rat poison round the farmyard.(18) (context: John has begun to clear out the empty boxes in the building.) John is unknowingly

driving away three families of pigeons by his spring cleaning.

(19) (context: John is nervously smoking without noticing what hes doing. I say:) You aresmoking two packs a day, arent you?

These examples combine markers which I have argued are incompatible: an adverb that clearly shows

there is no intention involved (unintentionally, unknowingly), the progressive (ongoing event

convention) and a numerical NP. However, I do not believe they falsify my hypothesis:

(a) The sentence in (17) is not judged as 100% acceptable by the native speakers that I consulted.

Indeed, in the context given, it is clear that John intends to kill (i.e. murder) animals by putting poison

(admittedly, it is the wrong ones that get killed). The fact of adding unintentionally is therefore likely

to result in a semantic contradiction. Another reason why the acceptability is questionable is that in

(17), there is insufficient contextual information available that leads to the identification of a mutually

manifest inherent endpoint that warrants the assertion that exactly five chickens will be killed. One

suggestion by an informant to change the sentence into Unintentionally John is killing these five

chickens by putting rat poison round the farmyard to make it acceptable, is rather telling. The addition

of these serves to identify a contextually given boundary (i.e. it is no longer information that is

retrieved once the killing process is over), in which case the progressive can more easily be added (cf.

p.11).

(b) A first observation on the example in (18) is that there is not necessarily reference to a sequence of

events: the situations of the families of pigeons being driven away are likely to overlap, while in the

examples discussed in section 2, the referents are involved separately (one after the other) in what

constitutes a sequence (cf. footnote 17). Moreover, as has been pointed out before (p.4, p.17, p.18),

while intentionality can be one way of making an endpoint mutually manifest as an inherent endpoint,

other kinds of contextual information may also perform that function. For instance, we can envisage a

context in which it is mutually manifest to the discourse participants that there live three families of


20/31

20

pigeons in the house and that the enthusiasm with which John is cleaning is such that any animal

living in the house will be driven out. While 3 families of pigeons is not in the scope of the

subjects intention, it is all the same given as an inherent endpoint.33

It is inherent in the nature of contextual information that it is difficult to make generalisations about

the way in which it may make inherent endpoints mutually manifest. This observation as such does not

falsify the claims we have made in this article; the examples discussed definitely show that

intentionality is one, but not necessarily the only contextual player when it comes to establishing

mutually manifest inherent endpoints.34 In the following telic non-agentive example, for instance, the

inherent endpoint cannot by the very nature of the subject be intentional, but it all the same has to

be contextually given in order for the progressive to be used felicitously, e.g. it might be uttered while

someone is looking at a thermometer:

(20) The lake is cooling four degrees. (Hay et al1999:133)(c) The sentence in (19) is neither problematic for our hypothesis. In this example, the progressive is

not used to refer to the middle stage of the process of smoking two packs on a particular occasion, but

rather to the recurrent situation or (temporary) habit of smoking two packs a day. If we change a day

into today, i.e. if there is reference to a single situation, it seems that the sentence is only acceptable if

it is understood as some kind of ironic remark on the incurable behaviour of a cigarette addict to

whom the speaker somehow attributes an intention to smoke two packs.

5 Conclusion

One conclusion to the discussion is that it is important to bear in mind the true nature of the telos,

i.e. the inherent endpoint originally associated with telicity: an endpoint is inherent only if it can be

conceptualised as being the natural endpoint of the situation referred to by the discourse participants,

i.e. when it is mutually manifest. When an affected, constructed or consumed Direct Object theme has

a single referent,35 the identification of this NP as the potential built-in endpoint is more automatic

than when there is more than one referent involved in the form of a multiple numerical NP (or when a

singular referent is referred to in a single numerical NP). In the latter case, the speaker requires more


21/31

21

extensive evidence in order to accept the fact that, as soon as the situation has started, the numerical

NP constitutes an inherent endpoint. (A similar remark applies to sentences with a for adverbial.)

Explicit reference to an intention may contribute to the identification of a mutually manifest endpoint.

In other words, the presence of a numeral NP or a for PP does not automatically imply that the

sentence is telic, the sentences will only be recognised as such if there is sufficient contextual

information available that identifies the NP or the PP as a mutually manifest inherent endpoint. This

approach has explanatory value: it helps to explain why a progressive marker in its ongoing event

convention can only be added to a dynamic sentence if the multiple numerical NP or the foradverbial

does not only bound the situation but also makes it telic. The discussion confirms the view expressed

in Depraetere (1995) that it is necessary to distinguish (a)telicity and (un)boundedness, because they

have different roles to play in explaining aspectual and temporal phenomena.


22/31

22

References

Bach, Emmon. (1981). On time, tense, and aspect: an essay in English metaphysics. In Radical

Pragmatics, P. Cole (ed.), 63-81. New York: Academic Press New York.

Binnick, Robert.I. (1991). Time and the verb. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruyndonx, Jim. (2001). The expanded form in British English. Meanings and constraints. A corpus-

illustrated description. Ph.D. KULeuven.

Comrie, Bernard. (1976).Aspect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Couper-Kuhlen, Elisabeth. (1987). Foregrounding and temporal relations in narrative discourse. In

Essays on Tensing in English. Vol I. Reference Time, Tense andAdverbs, Alfred Schopf (ed.), 6-

29. Tbingen: Niemeyer.

Cruse, R.A. (1973). Some thoughts on agentivity,Journal of Linguistics 9, 11-23.

Dahl, sten. (1981). On the definition of the telic-atelic (bounded non-bounded) distinction. In

Syntax and semantics 14: Tense and aspect, P.J. Tedeschi, and A. Zaenen. (eds.), 79-90. New

York: Academic Press.

Declerck, Renaat. (1979). The progressive and the imperfective paradox, Linguistics and Philosophy

3, 267-272.

Declerck, Renaat. (1989). Boundedness and the structure of situations, Leuvense Bijdragen 78,275-

304.

Declerck, Renaat. (1991). Tense in English. Its structure and use in discourse. London and New York:

Routledge.

Declerck, Renaat and Susan Reed. (to appear). The English Tense System. (The Grammar of the

English Verb. Vol.1) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Depraetere, Ilse. (1995). On the necessity of distinguishing between (un)boundedness and (a)telicity,

Linguistics and Philosophy 18, 1-19.

Depraetere, Ilse. (1996a). Foregrounding in relative clauses,Linguistics 34, 699-731.

Depraetere, Ilse. (1996b). Some observations on the likelihood of past tense situations still being the

case at the time of speaking,ITLReview of applied linguistics 113-114, 335-348.


23/31

23

Depraetere, Ilse. (1996c). The tense system in English relative clauses. A corpus-based analysis.

Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Depraetere, Ilse. (2000).Bornage, temps et aspect. Document de synthse (HDR). Lille III.

Depraetere, Ilse and Susan Reed. (2000). The present perfect progressive: constraints on its use with

numerical object NPs,English Language and Linguistics 4(1), 97-114.

Dowty, David R. (1977). Toward a semantic analysis of verb aspect and the English imperfective

progressive,Linguistics and Philosopy 1, 45-77.

Dowty, David R. (1979). Word meaning and Montague grammar: the semantics of verbs and times in

generative semantics and in Montagues PTQ. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Dowty, David R. (1986). The effect of aspectual class on the temporal structure of discourse:

pragmatics or semantics?,Linguistics and Philosophy 9, 37-61.

Dowty, David R. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection,Language, 67, 547-619.

Engelberg, Stephan. (2001). The semantics of the progressive. In Proceedings of the 2001 conference

of the Australian Linguistic Society, C.Allen (ed.), 1-8. Nordlinger, Rachel and Adam Saulwick.Filip, Hana. (1997). Integrating Telicity, Aspect and NP Semantics: The Role of Thematic Structure.

InFormal Approaches to Slavic Linguistics, Volume III. The College Park Meeting 1994, Jindrich

Toman (ed.),61-96.Ann Arbor Michigan Slavic Publications.

Filip, Hana. (1999).Aspect, eventuality types and nominal reference. New York and London: Garland

publishing.

Filip, Hana. (2000). The Quantization Puzzle. In Events as grammatical objects, from the combined

perspectives of lexical semantics, logical semantics and syntax, James Pustejovsky and Carol

Tenny (eds.), 3-60. Stanford: CSLI Press.

Garey, Howard. (1957). Verbal aspect in French,Language 33, 91-110.

Gosselin, Laurent and Jacques Franois. (1991). Les types de procs: des verbes aux prdications,

Travaux de linguistique et philologie 29, 19-86.

Haegeman, Liliane. (1994) (second edition). An introduction to government and binding theory.

Oxford: Blackwell.


24/31

24

Hamann, Cornelia. (1991). Semantics and Pragmatics - the case of temporal conjunctions,

Linguistische Berichte 136, 403-437.

Hay, Jennifer, Christopher Kennedy and Beth Levin. (1999). Scalar structure underlies telicity in

degree achievements, In SALT IX, L. Matthews and D. Strolovitch (eds.), 127-144. Publications

Ithaca.

Hinrichs, Erhard W. (1986). Temporal anaphora in discourses of English, Linguistics and Philosophy

9, 63-82.

Holisky, Dee Ann. (1987). The Case of the Intransitive Subject in Tsova-Tush (Batsbi), Lingua 71,

103-32.

Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey Pullum. (2002). The Cambridge grammar of the English language.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackendoff, Ray. (1996). The proper treatment of measuring out, telicity, and perhaps even

quantification in English,Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 14, 305-354.

Jayez, Jacques. (1999). Imperfectivity and progressivity: the French imparfait. In Semantics and

Linguistic theory IX, Tanya Matthews and Devon Strolovitch (eds.), 145-162. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press.

Krifka, Manfred. (1992). Thematic relations as links between nominal reference and temporal

constitution. In Lexical Matters. Ivan Sag and Anna Szablocsi (eds.), 29-53. Manlo Park (Calif):

CSLI.

Lakoff, George. (1977). Linguistic Gestalts. In Papers from the thirteenth regional meeting Chicago

Linguistic Society, W.A. Beach, S.E. Fox and S. Philosoph (eds.), 236-287.

Lascarides, Alex. (1991). The progressive and the imperfective paradox, Synthese 87, 401-447.

Levin, Beth. (2000). Apsect, lexical semantic representation and argument expression. InProceedings

of the 26th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. L.J. Conathan, J. Good, D.

Kavitskaya, A.B. Wulf, A.C.L. Yu (eds.), 413-429. An Arbor, Michigan: Sheridan Book, Inc.

Levin, Beth and Malka Rappaport Hovav. (1996). Unaccusativity. At the syntax-lexical semantics

interface. Cambridge, Mass and London: the MIT Press.


25/31

25

Michaelis, Laura. (1998). Aspectual grammar and past-time reference. London and New York:

Routledge.

Mittwoch, Anita. (1988). Aspect of English aspect: on the interaction of perfect, progressive and

durational phrases,Linguistics and Philosophy 11, 203-254.

Moens, Marc. (1987). Tense, aspect and temporal reference. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of

Edinburgh.

Mourelatos, Alexander P.D. (1978). Events, processes and states. In Syntax and semantics. Volume 14.

Tense and aspect, Philip J. Tedeschi and Annie Zaenen (eds.), 191-212. New York: New York

Academic Press.

Nishimura, Yoshiki. (1993). Agentivity in Cognitive Grammar. In Conceptualizations and Mental

Processing in Language, Richard A. Geiger and Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn (eds.), 488-530. Berlin and

New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Olsen, Mari Jean Broman. (1994). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Lexical Aspect Features, Studies

in the Linguistic Sciences 24, 361-375.

Peters, Francis Edwards. (1967). Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon. New York: New

York University Press.

Quirk, Randolph, Sydney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, Jan Svartvik. (1985). A comprehensive

grammar of the English language. London and New York: Longman.

Ramchand, Gillian C. (1997).Aspect and predication. Oxford: Clarendon.

Rappaport Hovav, Malka and Beth Levin. (2002). Change of State Verbs: Implications for Theories of

Argument Projection. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics

Society, J. Larson and M. Paster (eds.), 269-280. An Arbor Michigan: Sheridan, Inc.

Ryle, Gilbert. (1988) (1949). The concept of mind. London: Penguin.

Schopf, Alfred (1984).Das Verzeitungssystem des Englischen und seine Textfunktion. Tbingen: Max

Niemeyer Verlag.

Smith, Carlota S. (1997) (second edition). The parameter of aspect. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

publishers.


26/31

26

Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. (1995) (second edition).Relevance. Communication and cognition.

Oxford: Blackwell.

Van Valin, Robert D. and Randy J. LaPolla. (1997). Syntax: structure, meaning, function. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Van Valin, Robert D. Jr. and David P. Wilkins. (1999). The Case for Effector: Case Roles, Agents,

and Agency Revisited. In Grammatical Constructions, Masayoshi Shibatani and Sandra A.

Thompson (eds.), 289-232. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Vendler, Zeno. (1967).Linguistics in philosophy. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press.

Verkuyl, Henk. (1993). A Theory of aspectuality. the interaction between temporal and atemporal

structure. Cambridge Series in Linguistics 64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Verkuyl, Henk. (2001).Aspectual composition: surveying the ingredients. Available from http://www-

uilots.let.uu.nl/conferences/Perspectives_on_Aspect/P_o_A_index.html

Vetters, Carl. (1996). Le mode daction: une catgorie linguistique ou mtaphysique? ,Le langage et

lhomme, 31, 323-342.

Waanders, Frederik M. J. (1984).History of telos and teleo in ancient greek. Amsterdam: Grner.

Williams, Christopher. (2002). Non-progressive and progressive aspect in English. Fasana: Schena

Editore.

1 I am very grateful to Beth Levin, Christopher Pin and Susan Reed, for commenting on one of the earlier

versions of the text. I also wish to thank the two anonymous referees for their observations. Thanks to H. Borer,

S. Engelberg, H. Filip, B. Levin, F. Martin and M. Lemmens for directing my attention to particularly relevant

publications.

2 Cf. Dahl (1981) and Filip (1999:53) for a good survey of the labels used to refer to this Aktionsart distinction.3 Anticipating the discussion about (un)boundedness and (a)telicity in section 2.1 and 2.2.3, it is interesting to

add that Binnick points out one should not confuse effective (coincidental) boundedness and inherent

boundedness (1991:191).4 I will not attempt to summarize previous research about these aspects: it is vast and it is therefore impossible to

be do justice to the findings in a summary. I recognize the important role that is played by semantics and syntax,

but I will focus on the pragmatic level in this article.5 To be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or inferable. (Sperber and Wilson 1995:39)6 Cf. Depraetere (1995) for further evidence for the necessity of distinguishing between (a)telicity and

(un)boundedness. Cf. Depraetere (2000) for a survey of the linguistic markers that affect the representation of a


27/31

27

situation as (un)bounded and (a)telic. Declerck and Reed (to appear) also provide a detailed description of the

difference that is at stake.7 Filip (2000) explicitly points out that she uses the term telic to refer to all verbal predicates that entail some

delimitation in their semantic structure, regardless of its nature and regardless whether they have animate or

inanimate, human or non-human subjects. (2000:4) [emphasis mine] and in doing so opts for an approach which

is different from that in e.g. Garey (1957) and Depraetere (1995), whose definitions are closer to the

etymological sense of the word. (2000:3-4)8 It has often been pointed out (cf. e.g. Dahl 1981, Declerck 1989, Smith 1997) that (a)telicity is a notion that

applies to representations of situations and not to situations as such. For instance, an extralinguistic situation of

writing a letter may be referred to by means of the atelic Shes writingas well as by the telic Shes writing a

letter. For convenience, I will use both the label telic situation or telic predicate to refer what in more

accurate terms is the telic representation of the situation in a predicate. In other words, I do not follow Vetters

(1996), for instance, who argues that situation types should not be looked upon as linguistic categories; they aremetaphysical or extra-linguistic categories. His conclusion is based on the observation that none of the tests

traditionally used to distinguish situation types are fully waterproof: ces catgories sont indpendantes des tests

heuristiques traditionellement proposs [these categories are independent of the heuristic tests traditionally

used]. The fact that syntactic tests do not always provide clear indications for Aktionsart class does not justify

assigning them a metaphysical or extra-linguistic status. As Gosselin and Franois (1991) point out, une

prdication est en effet le corrlatif linguistique d'une conceptualisation de procs, ce qui implique qu'il y a une

interprtation de le ralit extrieure [a predicate is indeed the linguistic correlate of the conceptualisation of a

situation, which implies that there is an interpretation of reality]. Situation types are indeed a categorisation of

extra-linguistic information, but it is reality moulded into a linguistic form. From that point of view, we are not

concerned with a classification of extra-linguistic situations as such, but with an interpretation of situations as

they are perceived and expressed by means of a linguistic form by a particular speaker.9 Even though it is not the purpose to examine the distinction between (un)boundedness and (a)telicity in detail

here, I would still like to add that the use of a past tense does not automatically imply that the situation is

bounded. While a past tense sentence that refers to a state (She was in the kitchen a minute ago.) may give rise to

an implicature that the situation referred to is no longer the case at the moment of speaking, the semantics of the

past tense as such do not explicitly communicate that the situation is bounded. Cf. Depraetere (1996b) for a

detailed discussion of this issue.10 Obviously, it is impossible to summarize this field of research. (Cf. e.g. Van Valin and Wilkins (1999) for an

excellent survey of approaches to agentivity, cf. also Nishimura 1993) I will highlight a few findings that are

particularly relevant to the topic under discussion, but it will become clear in section 2.2.4 that it is not the

category of agentivity as such that needs to be refined in order to account for the data mentioned in this article or

to explain why intentionality is important for telicity.11 Note that we understand volition and intentionality in the way they are defined by Van Valin and Wilkins

(1999) volition is a property of entities which manifest non-conscious basic acts of will (such as a baby crying

for milk), and intention is a property which requires consciousness of wills, and ability to plan (1999: 313).

This distinction is not always made in the literature: volition is sometimes used as a synonym of control or

intention. When this is the case, volition has been put in inverted commas


28/31

28

12 Van Valin and Lapolla (1997: 95) point out that, when applying this diagnostic test for Achievement verbs, it

is crucial to avoid adverbs which require a controlling subject () In selecting adverbs for this test, it is

necessary to test their compatibility with involuntary verbs like shiverand with verbs likeshake which can have

an inanimate subject.13 Note that the verbs mentioned in section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are either intransitive (sneeze, yawn, etc.), transitive

(e.g.find) or pseudo-transitive (e.g. win).14 Note that Levins class also includes verbs with inanimate subjects.15 At first sight, this sentence might seem to be suggesting that I am talking about a classification of extra-

linguistic situations (whose endings are or are not mutually manifest to the discourse participants) and am

therefore contradicting the point made in footnote 8, i.e. telicity is a notion that applies to linguistic expressions

that refer to situations. The contradiction is only apparent. Having, for instance, decided to refer to a situation of

singing a song by means of the utterance Shes singing(cf. Comries example on page 14), it has to be mutually

manifest to the discourse participants that sing in this particular context means sing a songand is thereforetelic.16 Note thatscope is used in the non-technical sense in this text.17 I will focus on the sequential interpretation of the numerical NP (one after the other) and disregard the other

possible reading in which the referents are simultaneously (either literally or not) involved in one situation.18 Cf. Jayez (1999:151) for a similar point.19 Admittedly, this is a rather informal characterisation of the progressive. For the purposes of this article,

however, we indeed need only appeal to the characterising feature of the progressive commonly captured by

means of the label ongoingness. For more elaborate treatments of the progressive, cf. e.g. Bruyndonx (2001),

Lascarides (1991), Mittwoch (1988), Williams (2002).20 It will be clear that the indefinite article and the definite article are used in different contexts, but that need not

concern us here.21 In his 1977 imperfective paradox article, Dowty (1977:59) writes that agents normally have an intention to

produce a certain result when they begin their actions. He points out that there is a problem in the sense that

agents are not always certain as to their exact goals. His example is that of John starting to draw, being

undecided as to whether it is a unicorn or a horse that he is going to draw. For Dowtys analysis of the

progressive, this is problematic, as it suggests that bothJohn is drawing a horse andJohn is drawing a unicorn

are true at the same moment. Smith (1997:26) also touches upon the problem that people may change their mindwhile they are doing something or that we may misinterpret situations: In such cases the speaker makes a

judgment about the kind of situation that is going on, including the intentions of participants (1997:26). (Cf.

also Smith 1997:83). However, while admitting that we may misjudge the situation, it remains a fact that we

read peoples minds by attributing particular intentions to them. In doing so we are constrained by what we see

but whether the descriptions are ultimately true or false is not important in this context. Cf. also e.g. Declerck

(1979:272).22 Cf. e.g. Engelberg (2001) and Naumann and Pin (1997) for observations on intention and the progressive.23 There is reference to the syntactic test Vendler (1967) uses to distinguish on the one hand, Activities and

Accomplishments, which are compatible with the progressive, and States and Achievements, on the other, which

are not. Verkuyl (1993:35-38) lists a set of examples which falsify that hypothesis.


29/31

29

24 Rather challengingly, he goes on: Vendler seems to follow here the linguistic tradition which coined the term

Aktionsarten for the phenomena at issue: the ways actions are conceived of. This term itself suggests agentivity

plays an important role. However, important for what? Human actions are extremely important for philosophers.

But are they linguistically important as well? The answer should be negative, I think. It is a rather bad habit of

linguists to choose mainly sentences pertaining to animate beings such as John and Mary, or Jack and Jill, at the

expense of non-animacy. However, the concept of agentivity may overlap greatly with the concept of processes

ongoing in time, because most of the time we speak about human actions. But this does not mean at all that these

concepts can be equated (1993:39-40).25 The view that a multiple numerical Object NP automatically makes a situation telic seems indeed to be often

taken for granted in the aspectual literature (cf. p. 2-3). Previous discussions of sentences with such quantifiers

tend to be focussed on the possible interpretations of e.g. He knocked on the door three times (one knock on the

door on different occasions or three knocks on one single occasion) (cf. e.g. Mourelatos 1978:205, 209) or of

even more complex cases like Three boys lifted four boxes. (cf. e.g. Jackendoff 1996:344, Verkuyl 2001:10-11)26 Van Valin and Wilkins (1999) would qualify the role as that of effector rather than agent if there is no

volition involved.27 It might be objected that the hypothesis defended is problematic because the widely accepted diagnostic in/for

test does not appear to yield adequate results. It is well-known that telic predicates are compatible with in

adverbials (I read the book in two days/*for two days), while atelic predicates typically combine with for

adverbials (He read for two days/*in two days). Applied to the hypothesis defended here, John smoked 10

cigarettes, on its atelic reading should not be compatible with an in adverbial, which it is all the same: John

smoked 10 cigarettes in five minutes is acceptable both on the telic (bounded) reading and on the atelic

(bounded) reading. In other words, the in/fortest predicts thatJohn smoked 10 cigarettes is a telic predicate on

any (i.e. intentional or not) reading. A first observation is that the for/in test applied to progressive telic

predicates also fails to produce adequate results: while everybody would agree that eat an apple is telic, this does

not appear to follow from ??I am eating an apple in ten minutes. The in/fortest is also problematic when applied

to punctual predicates (cf. e.g. Moens 1987). Obviously, the examples discussed in this article are not the only

ones to which the in/for test is not an entirely waterproof diagnostic (cf. e.g. Depraetere (1996c:17-24) for a

survey of diagnostic Aktionsart tests and their limitations). Therefore, it is not unlikely that just as the

questionability of??I am eating an apple in ten minutes does not invalidate the claim that eat an apple is telic,

the acceptability ofJohn smoked 10 cigarettes in five minutes does not necessarily invalidate the hypothesisdefended in this article (i.e.John smoked 10 cigarettes is not necessarily telic). More in general, it might also be

asked whether the in/for test is not a diagnostic for (un)boundedness (actualisation aspect) rather than

(a)telicity, which is an issue that is beyond the scope of this article.28 As regards the effect offoradverbials on Aktionsart classes, Smith (1997) is (to my knowledge) the lonely

defender of the idea that depending on their status of inner or outer adverbial, they will or will respectively not

result in telicity. Smith distinguishes between natural endpoints (telic situations) and arbitrary endpoints (atelic

situations). The Principle of External Override is used to explain why, for instance, the addition of a for

adverbial turns an Activity (He played soccer) into a telic sentence (He played soccer for three years) (1997:23-

24). (cf. also Michaelis 1998 for a similar point of view) As I see it, it is a bit of a misnomer to say that He

played soccer for three years is telic, because, given no evidence to the contrary, the endpoint is arbitrary and


30/31

30

therefore does not automatically answer the criterion of natural endpoint associated with a telic sentence.

Admittedly, Smith would use the term derived Accomplishmentto refer to the sentence with the adverbial, which

makes it clear that it is not a straightforward telic example (, which presupposes a change of state in Smiths

framework), but it seems to me that two distinct notions are conflated all the same.29 Verkuyl (1993:276) uses the pseudo-cleft construction in a different, events and intervals context, i.e. to

bring out the readings ofHe hit Miles six times. What he did was hit Miles six times, implies that there is one

event in which there are subevents (most probably six); What he did six times was hit Miles means that there are

six events. Verkuyl (1993:14) explicitly states that in the absence of a sufficiently articulated theory of adverbial

modification he wishes to restrict himself to the composition of inner aspect, i.e. the relationship between a verb

and its arguments. Accordingly, sentences with foradverbials that are arguments of the verb (cf. e.g. (11)) are

not in the scope of his discussion.30 Smith (1997:114) writes: Mary went to Paris for three days for three weeks may be paraphrased as: Mary

went to Paris with the plan or intention of staying for three days, but actually stayed for three weeks. The three-week duration is an intensional property of the idealized situation, independent of its actual unfolding in time. In

other words, the inner adverbial specifies a property of the situation type. The outer adverbial gives the temporal

location of the situation. () On the basis of this (Mary slept for three hours) and many other examples, we

conclude that a single adverbial of duration does not indicate the desired or intended length of a situation. Thus

single durative adverbials have only the external interpretation. However, they must be compatible with the

telic/atelic value of the situation type, which involves its internal structure. I am not quite sure whether this

claim is compatible with Smiths suggestion (cf. footnote 28) that a sentence like He played soccer for three

years is derived telic in the sense that the adverbial turns the Activity into an Accomplishment. This seems hard

to match with the stipulation that single durative adverbials have only the external interpretation and that the

adverbial should be compatible with the telic/atelic value of the sentence, as the role performed by the

adverbial is exactly that of changing the Aktionsart. Smith also points out that Adjectives in Adjectival Phrases

of the typeMary took a three-hour walkare of the inherent type as well; they indicate the planned or intended

length of the event (1997:121)31 Cf. Depraetere (2000, esp 29-30) for modest initiatives to that effect. It will be clear that the interaction

between the different operators enter into a so-called compositional approach to aspectuality. (cf. e.g. Verkuyl

1997)32

I am very grateful to Liliane Haegeman, Ruth Huart, John Osborne, Susan Reed, Christopher Williams, fordiscussing these examples with me. My comments have been largely inspired by their observations, but it is clear

that they do not hold any responsibility for possible flaws in the argumentation.33 C. Williams points out that both (17) and (18) become more easily acceptable when couched in a narrative

with an omniscient narrator who knows in advance the exact number of chickens or families of pigeons affected

by the (completed) action which is still in progress when it is being described. In other words, the so-called

counterexamples show that while intentionality may be an important factor that helps to establish inherent

endpoints, other kinds of contextual information may also perform that function. The outcome is in any case the

same: the numerical NP is understood as the built-in endpoint.

34 Hay et al(1999) point out that real-world knowledge can help us decide whether a verb like lengthen is telic

(as in The tailor almost lengthened my pants) or atelic (as in The teacher almost lengthened the exam.) In their


31/31

article, the authors show that the telicity of a particular DA [degree achievement] can be, and often is, derived

through a process of conversational implicature, indicating that the aspectual properties of a particular predicate

often cannot be completely specified in terms of formal (semantic or syntactic) features (1999:129). This is one

of relatively few texts in which the level of pragmatics is explicitly integrated into the discussion of aspectuality

(context-dependent telicity (136)) (cf. also Olsen 1994). Although the authors seem to be using telicity in the

sense of what I would call boundedness and focus on degree achievements, their account seems to point in the

same direction: the discussion of the role of contextual/pragmatic information in determining telicity is

particularly important, as it indicates that (a)telicity cannot be fully specified by the linguistic form, either

semantically, or, as has more recently been argued, syntactically (138).35 that is referred to by means of a singular indefinite or definite (rather than a numerical) NP, cf. p 9.

atelicity intentionality

Documents