searle, intentionality, and the future of classifier intentionality, and the future of classifier...

Download Searle, Intentionality, and the Future of Classifier Intentionality, and the Future of Classifier Systems ... John R. Searle ... Good Stuff from Intentionality Searle goes on to talk

Post on 26-May-2018




0 download

Embed Size (px)


  • Illinois Genetic Algorithms LaboratoryDepartment of General EngineeringUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbana, IL 61801.

    Searle, Intentionality, and theFuture of Classifier Systems

    David E. GoldbergIllinois Genetic Algorithms Laboratory

    University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbana, IL 61801

  • 1980 v. Now

    Remember thinking how cool LCSswere.

    Just apply them to gas pipelinesand voila, all AI problems ofWestern Civilization would besolved.

    Started to ask John for examplesof successful application.

    Found out that I was in themiddle of an interesting idea, nota working computer program.

    John H. Holland (b. 1929)

  • Roadmap

    Are we happy with LCSs? Whats Searle got to do with it. Revisiting the Chinese room. Art Burkes had it right. Designing a conscious computer. Searlean program for LCSs:

    Computational consciousness not impossible. From consciousness to intentionality. Intentionality and beyond.

    What are we missing? What should we do?

  • Are We Happy With LCSs?

    Have made progress: Increasingly competent, solve hard problems

    quickly reliably and accurately. Principled manner.

    But dont seem very intelligent: Do what we tell them. Not autonomous in any serious sense. Our discussions are largely technical. Are we focused on right problems?

  • Whats Searle Got to Do With It?

    Mill Prof of Philosophy of Berkeley. Philosopher of language and mind. Early work took off from Austins work on

    speech acts. Searle is Darth Vader of artificial

    intelligence. Notorious Chinese Room argument has

    always puzzled me. In many ways, Searle is high philosophical

    priest of emergence. Rejects dualism & materialism. Couldnt understand how he could miss

    possibility of more than mere systacticaltranslation.

    John R. Searle (b. 1932)

  • The Chinese Room Argument

    Strong AI is not possible on a computer. Monolingual English speaker in a room with

    Chinese writing (story) 2nd Chinese symbols (questions) Instructions in English for relating first set of symbols

    to second. 3rd set of Chinese symbols (answers)

    English speaker does not understand Chinese evenif answers are indistinguishable from those ofChinese speaker.

  • Cracks in the Chinese Room

    Mind, Language & Society,Basic Books, 1998, p. 53.

    When I say that the brainis a biological organ andconsciousness a biologicalprocess, I do not, of course,say or imply that it wouldbe impossible to produce anartificial brain out ofnonbiological materials.

  • More Searle

    The heart is also a biological organ, and thepumping of blood a biological process, but it ispossible to build an artificial heart that pumpsblood. There is no reason, in principle, why wecould not similarly make an artificial brain thatcauses consciousness.

    Searle was complaining about direct approach tointelligence.

    Without consciousness and intentionality therecannot be intelligence.

    How do we create an intelligent, conscious being?

  • Arthur Burks Had Interesting Take

    Robots and FreeMinds, University ofMichigan, 1986.


  • Chapter 5: Evolution and Intentionality

    The course of biological evolution from cellsto Homo sapiens has been a gradualdevelopment of intentional systems fromdirect-response systems.

    The [intentional] system contains a model ofits present status in relation to its goal andregularly updates that model on the basis ofthe information it receives. Finally, it decideswhat to do after consulting a strategy, whichhas value assessments attached in to variousalternative courses of action.

  • CS-1 Had Bio/Psycho Roots

    CS-1 had reservoirs forhunger and thirst (Holland& Reitman, 1978).

    Schemata processorspaper had reservoirs, too(Holland, 1971).

    CS-1 worked in mazerunning task.

    But design was Lockean. Tabula rasa for everything

    except rule firing,apportionment of credit,and rule discovery.

    Is this enough? Thesis: Cant take shortcut

    around consciousness andintentionality.

  • So You Want a Conscious Computer

    What does this mean? Consciousness is complex, emergent

    phenomenon. How can we design it? Dont throw pieces together and hope for

    the best. My experience: Emergent phenomena

    emerge when (a) key elements are presentand (b) system tuned properly.

    Consider more Searle.

  • Shooting for C Not Crazy

    Shooting for GA competence was crazy. Have accomplished. How:

    Considered essential elements. Built qual/quant theories of how they worked. Designed until limits of performance achieved.

    Can do the same forconsciousness/intentionality!!

  • Searles Greatest Hits

    Mind as biological phenomenon. Function of consciousness. Features of consciousness. How the mind works: Intentionality. The good stuff comes from intentionality:

    Language & other institutional fact. What are we missing?

  • Mind as Biology

    Consciousness is the primary feature ofminds.

    3 features of consciousness: Inner: in body and in sequence of events. Qualitative: certain way they feel. Subjective: first person ontology (does not

    preclude objective epistemology).

    Enormous variety of consciousness: smell arose, worry about income taxes, suddenrage about driver, etc.

  • Functions of Consciousness

    What does it do? What is survival value? What doesnt it do for our species? Consciousness is central to our survival. All actions a result of conscious thought

    followed by action.

  • Consciousness, Intentionality, & Causation

    Represent world, and act on representations. Intentional causation: Not billiard ball causation. Not all consciousness intentionally causal, but much

    is. Should be best understood; are we not in touch

    with it always? Descartess error. Yet difficult to describe: Can describe objects,

    moods, thoughts, but not C itself. Problems:

    Not itself an object of observation (consciousnessobserves but is not observed).

    Tradition of separating mind/body: dualism.

  • Features of C

    1. Ontological subjectivity.2. C comes in unified form. Thinking and feeling go on

    at same time in same field of C: Vertical & horizontal.3. C connects us to world (Tie to intentionality).4. C states come in moods.5. Always structured.6. Varying degrees of attention.7. C is situated.8. Varying degrees of familiarity.9. Refer to other things10. Always pleasurable or unpleasurable

  • How the Mind Works: Intentionality

    Primary evolutionary role of C is to relateus to environment.

    Cannot eliminate intentionality of mind byappealing to language; alreadyintentionality of the mind.

    Searle: Urge to reduce it to something elseis faulty.

    DEG: As designers we need to reduce it tosomething and then find conditions ofemergence among those things.

  • Intentionality as Biology

    Thirst, hunger as basic, causing desire todrink or eat.

    Once this granted, camel nose under thetent, intentions based on other sensory.

    Isnt reality confirmed by our success inachieving intentional goals over and overagain.

  • Structure of Intentional States

    Intentionality as way mental states are directed atobjects & states of affairs.

    Can be directed at things that dont exist? How can this be? Distinguish between type of intentional state and

    content. Content: rain; Types: hope, believe, fear rain. Structural features:

    Direction of fit Conditions of satisfaction

  • Direction of Fit

    Term: from Austin, foreshadowed by Wittgenstein,examples Anscombe.

    Anscombes lists: Shopping list: Beer, butter, bacon. Husband matches

    world to list. Detectives list: Follows shopper, beer, butter,

    bacon, matches list to world.

    Not all intentional states like this: e.g. when youare sorry, assume match between mind and world.Intentional state is null.

  • Conditions of Satisfaction

    Beliefs can be true or false. Goals can be achieved or not. Easier to understand in terms of speech acts. Have 5 illocutionary points or types:

    Assertive: commit to the truth. Directive: direct hearer to do something. Commissive: speaker promises to do something. Expressive: speaker expresses opinion about state of

    the world. Declarations: speaker creates something with


  • Intentional Causation

    Intend to move body body moves:Example of intentional causation.

    Differs from billiard ball or Humean causation. Self-referential: intend to move body, body moves

    because I intended then intentional causation. Critical to distinguishing natural versus social

    sciences. Intentional explanations not deterministic: Could

    have done otherwise gap is free will.

  • Good Stuff from Intentionality

    Searle goes on to talk about language andinstitutional facts (money, college degrees,etc.).

    Disappointment with LCS is it cant get tothe good stuff.

    Cant do language. Cant form contracts. Cant create new institutional fact.

  • Construction of Social Reality

    Need to clarify observer-independent &observer-dependent features of the world.

    Need 3 new elements: Collective intentionality. Assignment of function. Constitutive rules

  • Observer Independent v. Dependent

    Many features of the world independent ofour observations of them: observerindependence.

    Many observer dependent: Something


View more >