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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Demographic Profile of Sudan

Sudan has two distinct major culturesArabic-speaking and non-Arabic

speakingwith hundreds of ethnic and tribal divisions and language groups

between them, which makes effective collaboration among them a major

problem.

Population Statistics Achieving good counts of the population is difficult in

Sudan, because conducting a census is difficult. In Sudan's 1993 census, the

population was calculated at 25 million. No comprehensive census has been

carried out since that time due to the civil war. Current estimates range from 37

million (Unites Nations estimate) to 40 million (CIA estimate).

The government of Southern Sudan (led by the former SPLM resistance

movement) has accused the central government of deliberately manipulating the

census in oil-rich regions such as the Abyei district, on the border between north

and south Sudan. The population count is a determining factor for the share of

wealth and power each part of Sudan receives. (See: Naivasha Agreement)Another complication is the Southern Sudanese refugees in the north. The

central government inhibits their return, and when a census is performed, they

could be seen as northerners.

Population: 45,047,502 (July 2011 est.)

Year Population Rank Percent Change Date information

200320042005200620072008200920102011

38,114,16040,187,48640,187,48641,236,37839,379,35840,218,45641,087,82543,939,59845,047,502

323030293231293029

-5.44%0.00 %2.61 %-4.50 %2.13 %2.16 %6.94 %2.52 %

July 2003 estJuly 2005 est.July 2005 est.July 2006 est.July 2007 est.July 2008\ est.July 2009 est.July 2010 est.July 2011 est.

Source: CIA World factbook

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Age Structure

0-14 years: 42.1% (male 9,696,726/female 9,286,894)15-64 years: 55.2% (male 12,282,082/female 12,571,424)

65 years and over: 2.7% (male 613,817/female 596,559) (2011 est.)

Population Growth Rate

2.484% (2011 est.)

YearPopulation growth

rateRank

PercentChange

Date ofInformation

2008

200920102011

2.13

2.142.52.48

56

483227

-

1.47 %16.82 %-0.80%

2008 est

2009 est2010 est2011 est

Definition: The average annual percent change in the population,

resulting from a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths and the balance

of migrants entering and leaving a country. The rate may be positive or

negative. The growth rate is a factor in determining how great a burden

would be imposed on a country by the changing needs of its people for

infrastructure (e.g., schools, hospitals, housing, roads), resources (e.g.,

food, water, electricity), and jobs. Rapid population growth can be seenas threatening by neighboring countries.

Birth rate

36.12 births/1,000 population (2011 est.)

Death rate

11 deaths/1,000 population (July 2011 est.)

Net migration rate

-0.29 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2011 est.)

YearNet Migration

rateRank

PercentChange

Date ofInformation

2008200920102011

0.670.630.05-0.29

626269127

--5.97 %

-92.06 %-680.00 %

2008 est2009 est2010 est2011 est

Definition:This entry includes the figure for the difference between the

number of persons entering and leaving a country during the year per

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1,000 persons (based on midyear population). An excess of persons

entering the country is referred to as net immigration (e.g., 3.56

migrants/1,000 population); an excess of persons leaving the country asnet emigration (e.g., -9.26 migrants/1,000 population). The net migration

rate indicates the contribution of migration to the overall level of

population change. High levels of migration can cause problems such as

increasing unemployment and potential ethnic strife (if people are coming

in) or a reduction in the labor force, perhaps in certain key sectors (if

people are leaving).

Urbanization

urban population: 40% of total population (2010)

rate of urbanization: 3.7% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

Sex ratio

at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female

15-64 years: 1.01 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 1.05 male(s)/female

total population: 1.03 male(s)/female (2011 est.)

Infant mortality rate

total: 68.07 deaths/1,000 live births

male: 68.77 deaths/1,000 live births

female: 67.34 deaths/1,000 live births (2011 est.)

Life Expectancy at Birth

Total population: 55.42 years

Male: 54.18 years

Female: 56.71 years (2011 est.)

Total Fertility Rate

4.84 children born/woman (2011 est.)

HIV/AIDS - Adult Prevalence Rate

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1.1% (2009 est.)

HIV/AIDS - People Living With HIV/AIDS

260,000 (2009 est.)

HIV/AIDS - deaths

12,000 (2009 est.)

Major Infectious Diseases

Degree of risk: very high

Food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A

and E, and typhoid fever

Vectorborne diseases: malaria, dengue fever, African trypanosomiasis

(sleeping sickness)

Water contact disease: schistosomiasis

Respiratory disease: meningococcal meningitis

Animal contact disease: rabies

Note: highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been identified in thiscountry; it poses a negligible risk with extremely rare cases possibleamong US citizens who have close contact with birds (2009).

Nationality

Noun: Sudanese (singular and plural)

Adjective: Sudanese

Ethnic groups

Black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1%

Religions

Sunni Muslim 70% (in north), Christian 5% (mostly in south and

Khartoum), indigenous beliefs 25%

B. Sudan Geographic Profile 20111

1 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html

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Location

Northern Africa, bordering the Red Sea, between Egypt and Eritrea.

Geographic coordinates

15 00 N, 30 00 E

Map references

Africa

Area

Total: 2,505,813 sq km

Land: 2.376 million sq km

Water: 129,813 sq km

Area - comparative

Slightly more than one-quarter the size of the US

Land boundaries

Total: 7,687 km

Border countries: Central African Republic 1,165 km, Chad 1,360 km,

Democratic Republic of the Congo 628 km, Egypt 1,273 km, Eritrea 605

km, Ethiopia 1,606 km, Kenya 232 km, Libya 383 km, Uganda 435 kmCoastline

853 km

Maritime claims

Territorial sea: 12 nm

Contiguous zone: 18 nm

Continental shelf: 200 m depth or to the depth of exploitation

Climate

Tropical in south; arid desert in north; rainy season varies by region (Aprilto November)

Terrain

Generally flat, featureless plain; mountains in far south, northeast and

west; desert dominates the north.

Natural resources

Petroleum; small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc,

Tungsten, mica, silver, gold, hydropower

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Land use

Arable land: 6.78%

Permanent crops: 0.17%

Other: 93.05% (2005)

C. SUDAN ECONOMIC PROFILE

Since 1997, Sudan has been working with the IMF to implement

macroeconomic reforms including a managed float of the exchange rate and

a large reserve of foreign exchange. A new currency, the Sudanese Pound,

was introduced in January 2007 at an initial exchange rate of $1.00 equals 2

Sudanese Pounds. Sudan began exporting crude oil in the last quarter of

1999 and the economy boomed on the back of increases in oil production,

high oil prices, and significant inflows of foreign direct investment until the

second half of 2008. The Darfur conflict, the aftermath of two decades of civil

war in the south, the lack of basic infrastructure in large areas, and a reliance

by much of the population on subsistence agriculture ensure much of the

population will remain at or below the poverty line for years to come despite

rapid rises in average per capita income. Sudan's real GDP expanded by5.2% during 2010, an improvement over 2009's 4.2% growth but significantly

below the more that 10% per year growth experienced prior to the global

financial crisis in 2006 and 2007. While the oil sector continues to drive

growth, services and utilities play an increasingly important role in the

economy with agriculture production remaining important as it employs 80%

of the work force and contributes a third of GDP. In the lead up to the

referendum on southern secession, which took place in January 2011, Sudan

saw its currency depreciate considerably on the black market with the CentralBank's official rate also losing value as the Sudanese people started to hoard

foreign currency. The Central Bank of Sudan intervened heavily in the

currency market to defend the value of the pound and the Sudanese

government introduced a number of measures to restrain excess local

demand for hard currency, but uncertainty about the secession has meant

that foreign exchange remains in heavy demand.

1. Industries

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Oil, cotton ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, sugar, soap distilling,

shoes, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, armaments, automobile/light

truck assembly

2. Agriculture - products

Cotton, groundnuts (peanuts), sorghum, millet, wheat, gum arabic,

sugarcane, cassava (tapioca), mangos, papaya, bananas, sweet

potatoes, sesame; sheep, livestock.

3. Exports - commodities

Oil and petroleum products; cotton, sesame, livestock, groundnuts,

gum arabic, sugar

4. Imports - commodities

Foodstuffs, manufactured goods, refinery and transport equipment,

medicines and chemicals, textiles, wheat.

5. Exchange rates

Sudanese pounds (SDG) per US dollar - 2.36 (2010), 2.32 (2009),

2.1 (2008), 2.06 (2007), 2.172 (2006).

D. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Sudan was a collection of small, independent kingdoms and

principalities from the beginning of the Christian era until 1820-21, when

Egypt conquered and unified the northern portion of the country. However,

neither the Egyptian nor the Mahdist state (1883-1898) had any effective

control of the southern region outside of a few garrisons. Southern Sudan

remained an area of fragmented tribes, subject to frequent attacks by slave

raiders. Taking advantage of dissatisfaction resulting from Ottoman-Egyptian

exploitation and maladministration, the Mahdi led a nationalist revolt

culminating in the fall of Khartoum in 1885. The Mahdi died shortly thereafter,

but his state survived until overwhelmed by an invading Anglo-Egyptian force

under Lord Kitchener in 1898. While nominally administered jointly by Egypt

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and Britain, Britain exercised control, formulated policies, and supplied most

of the top administrators.

Sudan achieved independence on January 1, 1956, from the United

Kingdom and Egypt under a provisional constitution. This constitution was

silent on two crucial issues for southern leaders--the secular or Islamic

character of the state and its federal or unitary structure. However, the Arab-

led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a

federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that launched

17 years of civil war (1955-72).

In 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud seized power and pursued a policy of

Arabization and Islamicization for both North and South Sudan that

strengthened Southern opposition. General Abboud was overthrown in 1964

and a civilian caretaker government assumed control. Southern leaders

eventually divided into two factions, those who advocated a federal solution

and those who argued for self-determination, a euphemism for secession

since it was assumed the south would vote for independence if given the

choice.

Until 1969, there was a succession of governments that proved unable

either to agree on a permanent constitution or to cope with problems of

factionalism, economic stagnation, and ethnic dissidence. These regimes

were dominated by "Arab" Muslims who asserted their Arab-Islamic agenda

and refused any kind of self-determination for southern Sudan.

In May 1969, a group of communist and socialist officers led by Colonel

Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, seized power. A month after coming to power,

Nimeiri proclaimed socialism (instead of Islamism) for the country and

outlined a policy of granting autonomy to the South. Nimeiri in turn was the

target of a coup attempt by communist members of the government. It failed

and Nimeiri ordered a massive purge of communists. This alienated the

Soviet Union, which withdrew its support.

Already lacking support from the Muslim parties he had chased from

power, Nimeiri could no longer count on the communist faction. Having

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alienated the right and the left, Nimeiri turned to the south as a way of

expanding his limited powerbase. He pursued peace initiatives with Sudans

hostile neighbors, Ethiopia and Uganda, signing agreements that committed

each signatory to withdraw support for the others rebel movements. He then

initiated negotiations with the southern rebels and signed an agreement in

Addis Ababa in 1972 that granted a measure of autonomy to the South.

Southern support helped him put down two coup attempts, one initiated by

officers from the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan who wanted for their

region the same privileges granted to the south.

However, the Addis Ababa Agreement had no support from either the

secularist or Islamic Northern parties. Nimeiri concluded that their lack of

support was more threatening to his regime than lack of support from the

south so he announced a policy of national reconciliation with all the religious

opposition forces. These parties did not feel bound to observe an agreement

they perceived as an obstacle to furthering an Islamist state. The scales

against the peace agreement were tipped in 1979 when Chevron discovered

oil in the south. Northern pressure built to abrogate those provisions of the

peace treaty granting financial autonomy to the south. Ultimately in 1983,

Nimeiri abolished the Southern region, declared Arabic the official language

of the South (instead of English) and transferred control of Southern armed

forces to the central government. This was effectively a unilateral abrogation

of the 1972 peace treaty. The second Sudan civil war began in January 1983

when southern soldiers mutinied rather than follow orders transferring them to

the North.

April 1985, while out of the country, Nimeiri was overthrown by a

popular uprising in Khartoum provoked by a collapsing economy, the war in

the south, and political repression. Gen. Suwar al-Dahab headed the

transitional government. One of its first acts was to suspend the 1983

constitution and disband Nimeiris Sudan Socialist Union.

Elections were held in April 1986, and a civilian government took over

power. There were tentative moves towards negotiating peace with the south.

However, any proposal to exempt the south from Islamic law was

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unacceptable to those who supported Arabic supremacy. In 1989, an Islamic

army faction led by General Umar al-Bashir mounted a coup and installed the

National Islamic Front. The new governments commitment to the Islamic

cause intensified the North-South conflict.

The Bashir government combined internal political repression with

international Islamist activism. It supported radical Islamist groups in Algeria

and supported Iraqs invasion of Kuwait. Khartoum was established as a base

for militant Islamist groups: radical movements and terrorist organizations like

Osama Bin Ladens al Qaida were provided a safe haven and logistical aid in

return for financial support. In 1996, the UN imposed sanctions on Sudan for

alleged connections to the assassination attempt on Egyptian President

Mubarak.

The policy of the ruling regime toward the South was to pursue the war

against the rebels while trying to manipulate them by highlighting tribal

divisions. Ultimately, this policy resulted in the rebels uniting under the

leadership of Colonel John Garang. During this period, the SPLM/A rebels

also enjoyed support from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda. The Bashirgovernment's "Pan-Islamic" foreign policy, which provided support for

neighboring radical Islamist groups, was partly responsible for this support for

the rebels.

The 1990s saw a succession of regional efforts to broker an end to the

Sudanese civil war. Beginning in 1993, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia,

Uganda, and Kenya pursued a peace initiative for the Sudan under the

auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), but

results were mixed. Despite that record, the IGAD initiative promulgated the

1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) that aimed to identify the essential

elements necessary to a just and comprehensive peace settlement; i.e., the

relationship between religion and the state, power sharing, wealth sharing,

and the right of self-determination for the south. The Sudanese Government

did not sign the DOP until 1997 after major battlefield losses to the SPLA.

That year, the Khartoum government signed a series of agreements with

rebel factions under the banner of "Peace from Within." These included the

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Khartoum, Nuba Mountains, and Fashoda Agreements that ended military

conflict between the government and significant rebel factions. Many of those

leaders then moved to Khartoum where they assumed marginal roles in the

central government or collaborated with the government in military

engagements against the SPLA. These three agreements paralleled the

terms and conditions of the IGAD agreement, calling for a degree of

autonomy for the south and the right of self-determination.

E. End to the Civil War

In July 2002, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A reached anhistoric agreement on the role of state and religion and the right of southern

Sudan to self-determination. This agreement, known as the Machakos

Protocol and named after the town in Kenya where the peace talks were held,

concluded the first round of talks sponsored by the IGAD. The effort was

mediated by retired Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. Peace talks

resumed and continued during 2003, with discussions focusing on wealth

sharing and three contested areas.

On November 19, 2004, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A

signed a declaration committing themselves to conclude a final

comprehensive peace agreement by December 31, 2004, in the context of an

extraordinary session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in

Nairobi, Kenya--only the fifth time the Council has met outside of New York

since its founding. At this session, the UNSC unanimously adopted

Resolution 1574, which welcomed the commitment of the government and

the SPLM/A to achieve agreement by the end of 2004, and underscored the

international communitys intention to assist the Sudanese people and

support implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement. In keeping

with their commitment to the UNSC, the Government of Sudan and the

SPLM/A initialed the final elements of the comprehensive agreement on

December 31, 2004. The two parties formally signed the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005. The U.S. and the international

community welcomed this decisive step forward for peace in Sudan.

F. Comprehensive Peace Agreement

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The 2005 CPA established a new Government of National Unity and the

interim Government of Southern Sudan and called for wealth-sharing, power-

sharing, and security arrangements between the two parties. The historic

agreement provides for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops from southern

Sudan, and the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. It also stipulated

that by the end of the fourth year of an interim period there would be elections

at all levels, including for national and southern Sudan president, state

governors, and national, southern Sudan, and state legislatures. These

elections were held in April 2010. On July 9, 2005, the Presidency was

inaugurated with al-Bashir sworn in as President and John Garang, SPLM/A

leader, installed as First Vice President of Sudan. Ratification of the Interim

National Constitution followed. The Constitution declares Sudan to be a

democratic, decentralized, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and

multi-lingual State.

On July 30, 2005, the charismatic and revered SPLM leader John

Garang died in a helicopter crash. The SPLM/A immediately named Salva

Kiir, Garangs deputy, as First Vice President of the Government of National

Unity and President of the Government of Southern Sudan. Implemented

provisions of the CPA include the formation of the National Legislature,

appointment of Cabinet members, establishment of the Government of

Southern Sudan and the signing of the interim Southern Sudan Constitution,

and the appointment of state governors and adoption of state constitutions.

The electoral law paving the way for national elections was passed in July

2008, and elections were held at six levels in April 2010. Laws governing the

Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda and the popular consultations in

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were passed in December 2009, and the

parties agreed in February 2010 to begin demarcation of the north-south

border.

New CPA-mandated commissions have also been created. Thus far,

those formed include the National Electoral Commission, Assessment and

Evaluation Commission, National Petroleum Commission, Fiscal and

Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission, and the North-South Border

Commission. The Ceasefire Political Commission, Joint Defense Board, and

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Ceasefire Joint Military Committee were also established as part of the

security arrangements of the CPA.

With the establishment of the National Population Census Council, a

population census was conducted in April/May 2008 in preparation for

national elections that took place from April 11-15, 2010. The results from the

census were released in early 2009. The CPA mandates that a referendum

be held no later than January 2011, giving southerners the opportunity to vote

either for unity within Sudan or separation, and that a parallel referendum be

held for the people of Abyei to determine whether they wish to remain in the

North or join the South.

Progress has been achieved during the last 5 years, though

implementation of some CPA requirements has been slow, and there are still

major issues that need to be addressed. The issue of the boundaries of Abyei

was finally resolved through arbitration in The Hague concluding in July 2009,

and both sides have accepted the arbitration decision. The Abyei boundary

has not been demarcated, however. In August 2009, in conjunction with

discussions facilitated by the United States, the two CPA parties signed an

agreement charting a path forward on 10 points critical to implementation of

the CPA. The parties continue to work through issues related to CPA

implementation.

National elections took place from April 11-15, 2010. The elections were

largely peaceful. However, there were widespread irregularities reported

during the polling and counting periods, as well as serious restrictions on

political space in both north and south leading up to and during the elections.

The NCP and SPLM won the overwhelming majority of the electoral races,

and incumbent presidents were elected for the Government of Sudan and the

autonomous Government of Southern Sudan.

G. Darfur

In 2003, while the historic north-south conflict was on its way to

resolution, increasing reports began to surface of attacks on civilians,

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especially aimed at non-Arab tribes in the extremely marginalized Darfur

region of Sudan. A rebellion broke out in Darfur, led by two rebel groups--the

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality

Movement (JEM). These groups represented agrarian farmers who are

mostly non-Arabized black African Muslims. In seeking to defeat the rebel

movements, the Government of Sudan increased arms and support to local,

rival tribes and militias, which have come to be known as the "Janjaweed."

Their members were composed mostly of Arabized black African Muslims

who herded cattle, camels, and other livestock. Attacks on the civilian

population by the Janjaweed, often with the direct support of Government of

Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), have led to the death of hundreds of thousands

of people in Darfur, with an estimated 2 million internally displaced people

and another 250,000 refugees in neighboring Chad.

A series of UNSC resolutions in late March 2005 underscored the

concerns of the international community regarding Sudan's continuing

conflicts. Resolution 1590 established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for

an initial period of 6 months and decided that UNMIS would consist of up to

10,000 military personnel and up to 715 civilian police personnel. It requested

UNMIS to coordinate with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to

foster peace in Darfur, support implementation of the CPA, facilitate the

voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, provide

humanitarian demining assistance, and protect human rights. The resolution

also called on the Government of Sudan and rebel groups to resume the

Abuja talks and support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur,

including ensuring safe access for peacekeeping and humanitarian

operations.

Following the UNSC resolutions and intense international pressure, the

Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan resumed negotiations in

Abuja, Nigeria in early 2006. On May 5, 2006, the government and an SLM/A

faction led by Minni Minawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

Unfortunately, the conflict in Darfur intensified shortly thereafter, led by rebel

groups who refused to sign. In late August government forces began a major

offensive on rebel areas in Northern Darfur. On August 30, the Security

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Council adopted UNSCR 1706, authorizing the transition of AMIS to a larger

more robust UN peacekeeping operation. To further facilitate an end to the

conflict in Darfur, President Bush announced the appointment of Andrew S.

Natsios as the Special Envoy for Sudan on September 19, 2006.

In an effort to resolve Sudans opposition to a UN force, UN Secretary

General Kofi Annan and African Union Commission Chair Alpha Oumar

Konare convened a meeting of key international officials and representatives

of several African and Arab states in Addis Ababa on November 16, 2006.

The agreement reached with the Government of Sudan provided for

graduated UN support to AMIS culminating in the establishment of a joint

hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur. International efforts in

2007 focused on rallying support for DPA signatory and non-signatory rebel

movements to attend renewed peace talks, and on finalizing plans for the

joint AU/UN hybrid operation. UN Security Council Resolution 1769 was

adopted on July 31, 2007, providing the mandate for a joint AU/UN hybrid

force to deploy to Darfur with troop contributions from African countries. The

Joint AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was to assume authority from AMIS

in the field no later than December 31, 2007.

On July 14, 2008 the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal

Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced that he was seeking an arrest

warrant for President Bashir for allegedly masterminding genocide, war

crimes, and crimes against humanity in Darfur. In order to move quickly to

find a solution to the violence in Darfur under the pressure of a possible ICC

indictment, Sudan opened the Sudan Peoples Initiative in October 2008. The

conference brought together many Darfur rebel groups with the government

for a conference to explore solutions and how to better implement the existing

framework of the DPA. It culminated in the announcement of a unilateral

Darfur ceasefire, which was reportedly violated within days of the declaration.

On March 4, 2009 the ICC announced that it was issuing an arrest

warrant for President Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The

three-judge panel that issued the warrant did not feel there was enough

evidence to include the crime of genocide on the warrant. In response to the

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ICC indictment, the Government of Sudan expelled 13 international non-

government organizations (NGOs) and closed down three Sudanese NGOs,

which severely hindered international humanitarian aid efforts in Darfur.

Despite the warrant for his arrest, Bashir has traveled freely to a number of

countries in Africa and the Middle East since his indictment.

In early 2009, the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator

Djibril Bassole convened talks in Doha, Qatar, between the Government of

Sudan and several Darfuri rebel groups, most notably JEM. Although JEM

and the government signed a goodwill agreement in February 2009, talks

collapsed in May over prisoner swaps and humanitarian access. Throughout

the summer of 2009, the AU-UN mediation team worked individually with the

parties and civil society to prepare for a new round of negotiations, while

President Barack Obamas Special Envoy to Sudan, Major General (Ret.) J.

Scott Gration, supported these efforts by working to unify a number of

splintered rebel factions in preparation for negotiations, and pressing the

government to commit to a new round of talks. In November 2009, the

mediation team organized a series of meetings in Doha between the parties

and Darfuri civil society in an effort to better represent the voices of the

Darfuri people in the peace process.

H. Ethnic and Culture

Sudans population is one of the most diverse on the African continent.

Within two distinct major cultures--Arab and black African--there are hundreds

of ethnic and tribal subdivisions and language groups, which make effective

collaboration among them a major political challenge.

The northern states cover most of the Sudan and include most of the

urban centers. Most of the 30 million Sudanese who live in this region are

Arabic-speaking Muslims, though the majority also uses a non-Arabic mother

tongue--e.g., Nubian, Beja, Fur, Nuban, Ingessana, etc. Among these are

several distinct tribal groups: the Kababish of northern Kordofan, a camel-

raising people; the Jaalin and Shaigiyya groups of settled tribes along the

rivers; the semi-nomadic Baggara of Kordofan and Darfur; the Hamitic Beja in

the Red Sea area and Nubians of the northern Nile areas, some of whom

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have been resettled on the Atbara River; and the Nuba of southern Kordofan

and Fur in the western reaches of the country.

The southern region has a population of around 8 million and a

predominantly rural, subsistence economy. Except for a 10-year hiatus,

southern Sudan has been embroiled in conflict, resulting in major destruction

and displacement since independence. The conflict has severely affected the

population of the South, resulting in over 2 million deaths and more than 4

million people displaced between 1983 and 2005. The Southern Sudanese

practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although Christian missionaries

have converted some. The South also contains many tribal groups and many

more languages than are used in the north. The Dinka--whose population is

estimated at more than 1 million--is the largest of the many black African

tribes in Sudan. The Shilluk and the Nuer are among the Nilotic tribes. The

Azande, Bor, and Jo Luo are Sudanic tribes in the west, and the Acholi and

Lotuhu live in the extreme south, extending into Uganda2

Meanwhile, the period of the 1990s saw a growing sense of alienation in

the western and eastern regions of Sudan from the Arab center. The rulers inKhartoum were seen as less and less responsive to the concerns and

grievances of both Muslim and non-Muslim populations across the country.

Alienation from the "Arab" center caused various groups to grow sympathetic

to the southern rebels led by the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army

(SPLM/A), and in some cases, prompted them to flight alongside it.

I. Religion

In 1881, a religious leader named Muhammad ibn Abdalla proclaimed

himself the Mahdi, or the "expected one," and began a religious crusade to

unify the tribes in western and central Sudan. His followers took on the name

"Ansars" (the followers) which they continue to use today and are associated

with the single largest political grouping, the Umma Party, led by a

descendant of the Mahdi, Sadiq al Mahdi. Sudan has been at war with itself

for more than three-quarters of its existence. Since independence, protracted

conflict rooted in deep cultural and religious differences have slowed Sudans

2 ibid

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economic and political development and forced massive internal

displacement of its people. Northerners, who have traditionally controlled the

country, have sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam despite

the opposition of non-Muslims, southerners, and marginalized peoples in the

west and east. The resultant civil strife affected Sudans neighbors, as they

alternately sheltered fleeing refugees or served as operating bases for rebel

movements.

in 1983, Nimeiri abolished the Southern region, declared Arabic the

official language of the South (instead of English) and transferred control of

Southern armed forces to the central government. In September 1983, as

part of an Islamicization campaign, President Nimeiri announced that

traditional Islamic punishments drawn from Sharia (Islamic Law) would be

incorporated into the penal code. This was controversial even among Muslim

groups. Amputations for theft and public lashings for alcohol possession

became common. Southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north were

also subjected to these punishments.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sudan, Whats Happened?

1. Political Conclict based ethnic and Religion

In 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud seized power and pursued a policy of

Arabization and Islamicization for both North and South Sudan. in 1983,

Nimeiri abolished the Southern region, declared Arabic the official language of

the South (instead of English) and transferred control of Southern armed

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forces to the central government. In September 1983, as part of an

Islamicization campaign, President Nimeiri announced that traditional Islamic

punishments drawn from Sharia (Islamic Law) would be incorporated into thepenal code. This was controversial even among Muslim groups. Amputations

for theft and public lashings for alcohol possession became common.

Southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north were also subjected to

these punishments.In 1989, an Islamic army faction led by General Umar al-

Bashir mounted a coup and installed the National Islamic Front. The new

governments commitment to the Islamic cause intensified the North-South

conflict.The Bashir government combined internal political repression with

international Islamist activism. Could be said that since independence from the

UK in 1956, political and military regimes favoring Arabic-Islamic governments

have dominated national politics.

2. Natural Resources Conflict

Natural resources are embedded in a shared social space where complex

and unequal relations are established among a wide range of social actors.

Those actors with the greatest access to power are also best able to control

and influence natural resource decisions in their favor (Peet and Watts 1996),

thus paving the ground for conflict to take place.Natural resources are subject

to increasing scarcity due to rapid environmental change, increasing demand,

and their unequal distribution. Natural resources are used by people in ways

that are defined symbolically. Land, forests, and waterways are not justmaterial resources people compete over, but are also part of a particular way

of life (pastoralism, farming, ranching, fishingetc.), an ethnic identity, and a

set of gender and age roles. Such symbolic dimensions of natural resources

lend themselves to ideological, social, and political struggles that have

enormous practical significance for the management of natural resources and

the process of conflict management. Three types of resource-based conflicts

in the country:

among pastoralists themselves, especially in the dry season and in years of

severe shortage;

between pastoralists and settled populations; and

between pastoralists and large-scale agricultural projects established on

land customarily claimed by pastoralists.

Conflicts over access to land and its resources have evidently increased

dramatically during the last few decades. Evidence from N. Kordofan State

tells us that natural resource based conflict is the most dominant form of

conflict in the State. It is found that all the 23 recorded conflicts in 2001-02

were involving pastoralists. Partners to the conflict were:

Pastoralists Vs Farmers (55%)

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Pastoralists Vs Native Administration (16%)

Pastoralists Vs GOS (16%)

Pastoralists Vs Farmers Vs N. Administration (7%)

Pastoralists Vs Diary Producers (3%)

Pastoralists Vs Local Councils (3%)

3. Abused of Power: Use Of Force to Civilian in Darfur

In 2003, while the historic north-south conflict was on its way to

resolution, increasing reports began to surface of attacks on civilians,

especially aimed at non-Arab tribes in the extremely marginalized Darfurregion of Sudan. A rebellion broke out in Darfur, led by two rebel groups--the

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality

Movement (JEM). These groups represented agrarian farmers who are mostly

non-Arabized black African Muslims. In seeking to defeat the rebel

movements, the Government of Sudan increased arms and support to local,

rival tribes and militias, which have come to be known as the "Janjaweed."

Their members were composed mostly of Arabized black African Muslims who

herded cattle, camels, and other livestock. Attacks on the civilian population by

the Janjaweed, often with the direct support of Government of Sudan Armed

Forces (SAF), have led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people inDarfur, with an estimated 2 million internally displaced people and another

250,000 refugees in neighboring Chad. At least two hundred thousand people

are dead in the Darfur region alone. Some were killed during armed attacks.

Many others died from disease and malnutrition. Thousands of women and

girls have been systematically raped. Villages throughout the region have

been burned to the ground. Meanwhile, the impact of the continuing conflict is

staggering. More than 90,000 civilians have been killed in fighting. A further

200,000 are dead from malnutrition, disease and other conflict-related causes.

Thousands of women and girls have been systematically raped. Villages

throughout the region have been burned to the ground. Entire communities

have lost their livelihoods.

In March 2005, the UNSC referred the Darfur situation to the

International Criminal Court (ICC). Having issued arrest warrants for a

government minister and the Janjaweed commander in 2007, the ICC issued

warrants for President Omar al-Bashir himself, initially for war crimes and

crimes against humanity in 2007, and finally also for genocide in July 2010.

4. Refugees and IDPs

Over 2.3 million people, including one million children, have either fled

their homes or been displaced by the conflict. A further 200,000 people live as

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refugees on the Chad border or inside Chad. They have been joined by some

140,000 internally displaced Chadians, the victims of cross-border attacks by

Janjiwidand similar armed groups within Chad. Both IDP (internally displacedpeople) and refugee camps are targets for attacks and recruitment of child

soldiers.

Refugees (country of origin): 157,220 (Eritrea); 25,023 (Chad); 11,009

(Ethiopia); 7,895 (Uganda); 5,023 (Central African Republic)

IDPs: 5.3 - 6.2 million (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region)

(2007)

5. Regional Security

The effects of Sudan's almost constant ethnic and rebel militia fighting

since the mid-20th century have penetrated all of the neighboring states; as of

2006, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic

of the Congo, and Uganda provided shelter for over half a million Sudanese

refugees, which includes 240,000 Darfur residents driven from their homes by

Janjawid armed militia and the Sudanese military forces; Sudan, in turn,

hosted about 116,000 Eritreans, 20,000 Chadians, and smaller numbers of

Ethiopians, Ugandans, Central Africans, and Congolese as refugees; in

February 2006, Sudan and DROC signed an agreement to repatriate 13,300

Sudanese and 6,800 Congolese; Sudan accuses Eritrea of supporting

Sudanese rebel groups; efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with

Ethiopia proceed slowly due to civil and ethnic fighting in eastern Sudan; the

boundary that separates Kenya and Sudan's sovereignty is unclear in the

"Ilemi Triangle," which Kenya has administered since colonial times; Sudan

claims but Egypt de facto administers security and economic development of

Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary; periodic violent skirmishes

with Sudanese residents over water and grazing rights persist among related

pastoral populations along the border with the Central African Republic

6. Referendum and Post Referendum

The implementation of all three major mechanisms to end conflict, the

CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement, has

been unsatisfactory, largely due to the resistance of al-Bashirs ruling NCP. As

agreed in the CPA, multiparty elections were held in Sudan in 2010 and a

referendum on Southern independence is planned for January 2011. The

referendum result is independe of South Sudan.

B. BENEFICIARIES

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1. Government Of North Sudan and Sudan Political Group3

The National Congress Party, currently the ruling party, has its roots in

the National Islamic Front, an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood

movement in Egypt in the 40's. The Umma Party is the political organization

of the Islamic Ansar Sect. The party is led by Sadiq al-Sidiq Abdel Rahman

al-Mahdi, who served as Prime Minister in all coalition governments between

1986 and 1989, the last period of parliamentary democracy in the Sudan. The

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), based on the Khatmiyyah sect, is led by

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani. He is also the leader of the National

Democratic Alliance, a loose coalition of political parties, labour unions and

individuals who oppose the ruling party and The Popular National Congress

(PNC) was created by Hassan al-Turabi in June 200 after his expulsion from

the National Congress. In the South the SPLA/M dominates. There are

several parties representing the interest of Southern Sudanese in Northern

Sudan. These include the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP) and the

United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). There are a number of smaller

religious, pan-Arabist and progressive parties, including the Communist Party

of the Sudan, the Baath Party, the Republican Brothers and the Justice Party.

2. Government of South Sudan

The Government of Southern Sudan Missions Abroad derives their

mandate from Article 46 of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, which

states that4:

The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) shall establish, develop and

maintain good relations and cooperation with foreign governments, Foreign

Non-governmental organizations and associations for mutual advantage intrade, investment, culture, sports, education, credit, loans, grants, technical

assistance and other fields of development Cooperation.

The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has prioritized peace

building and reconciliation of all the communities in Southern Sudan to heal

3 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-political-groups.htm,diakses tanggal 30 Maret 2011 pukul 15.004http://www.gossmission.org/goss/index.php?

option=com_content&task=view&id=6&Itemid=12 diakses tanggal 30 Maret2011 pukul11.00

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the wounds and remedy the consequences of several decades of strife dating

as far back as the pre-colonialism age.Southern Sudan is just emerging from

the devastating effects of several wars in which its societal fabrics were

broken; wealth plundered; and human resource decimated through slavery.

GOSS is working on rehabilitating the traumatized people to redirect their

energies towards nation building and not just survival. GOSS shall working on

replacing the culture of violence, developing trust and confidence the people

and their abilities in an effort to regenerate social capital in the country, to

creating a healthy and safe environment for the people. In other hand, GOSS

shall negotiating with NCP on the critical post-referendum issues on matters

such as citizenship, security arrangements, international treaties and

agreements which Sudan is party to as well as financial, economic and

natural resources management like the water of the Nile and oil. GOSS shall

to deal with the above issues after in-depth consultations within the SPLM

party structures which set the agenda of the new government following the

April 2010 elections in which the party emerged triumphant. Once more, he

elucidated the strategic goals of the current government as leading the

people of Southern Sudan peacefully through the Interim period; ensuringsecurity and peace in Southern Sudan; building the capacity of GOSS to

provide services to the people; diversify the economy to reduce its

dependence on oil revenues; delivery of social services and amenities to the

people5.

3. Biilligerent South Sudan

a. SPLM (South People Liberalitation Movement)

SPLM which at present has been transformed into a political party

should be able to cooperate with other political parties in building

democracy and good governance in South Sudan. In addition, the SPLM

must also participate and contribute in the preparation of the permanent

constitution of South Sudan as a substitute for Sudan Interim Institution

5http://www.gossmission.org/goss/index.php?

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b. Sudan-Chad: Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)6

In January 2011, the director of the National Security and

Intelligence Services, Mohammed Atta, claimed that JEM, under pressure

in Darfur, had positioned forces in several areas in Southern Sudanin

Western Bahr el Ghazal state, north-east of Raja town, and near the

border with the Central African Republic. He said senior JEM

commanders including Suleiman Sandal, Ahmad Bakhit, Mahdi Hassab al

Rasoul, and Awad Nur Osher were with the forces in the South; others,

including Arko Suleiman Dahiya and Hashim Haroun, were in the remote

Kafia Kingi triangle, a contested area between Northern and Southern

Sudan. Although currently administered by South Darfur state, the triangle

is claimed by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) as part of the

South.

On 1214 November 2010, according to a UN source, government

planes continuously bombed a village on the Southern Sudan border. The

village, Kiir Adhan, lies on the southern side of the Kiir River, which acts

as the border between Northern Bahr el Ghazal and South Darfur states.

On 13 November, planes bombed a second Southern area, Aweil North,

seriously injuring at least eight civilians. Khartoum said it was targeting

'major groups' belonging to JEM that were trying to enter the South with

GoSS assistance. It said the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had

assisted JEM in the evacuation of its troops and treatment of its wounded.

JEM denied having moved forces to the South. But sources in the

South told UN officials that 75 wounded JEM fighters were taken to a newhospital 20 km east of Kapoeta town. On the eve of the South's self-

determination referendum in January 2011, GoSS President Salva Kiir,

seeking to ensure peaceful partition of the country, said Darfur rebels

would not be permitted in territory under his control. Although it was not

immediately clear whether JEM had moved its forces out of the South,

there were no more reports of government bombardments of the South. In

6

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February 2010, JEM signed a 'framework agreement' with the Sudanese

government at the Doha talks. The agreement commit both sides to a

cessation of hostilities and a prisoner release, and set an agenda for

substantive talks, including on a permanent ceasefire. The agreement

soon collapsed, with both sides accusing the other of not respecting it. In

May, JEM withdrew from Doha, accusing Khartoum of not seeking peace.

In August its (nominal) secretary for political affairs, Adam Ali Shogar, was

arrested after reportedly reaching a secret agreement with Khartoum.

Shogar had joined JEM from the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in 2009,

despairing of SLA divisions. All efforts to convince JEM to return to Doha

have failed. Despite the losses it has suffered, including of senior

commanders, JEM remains the strongest rebel force on the battlefield. It

is rethinking its military strategy in the light of the expectation that

Southerners will vote for independence in January 2011, cognizant that

the international community opposes any action that will destabilize the

referendum.

4. United States

United States (U.S.) has its own interests in the Sudan peace. In 1979

Chevron Oil Mining Company found levels of Crude Oil in Southern Sudan.

To respond the threats to U.S. national interests in the 1990s, the Clinton

administration imposed sanctions on Sudan in the form of isolation in various

international forums. Previously, In 1995, President Jimmy Carter on the

grounds open humanitarian aid, to mediate a ceasefire between the SPLA

and the government of Sudan. In mid-2001, Senator John Danforth was

appointed by George Bush Jr., as a presidential envoy for seeking peace

between the north-south, Danforth also seeks support for the settlement of

the Sudan conflict to regional countries and donor countries such as Egypt,

Kenya, Britain, Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy and Canada. But

these efforts failed because Danforth resistance by local residents.

Beside, the U.S. also seek sanctions outside the UN as a boycott of

Sudanese oil and restricting access to Sudanese oil vessel at the port of the

United States and Europe because the Chinese resistance against the U.S.

led UN sanctions. Penalties are given turned out to have even more to extend

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the war and failed to remedy the situation. In 2005 the United States also

played an active role as a facilitator for the CPA.

5. African Union7

In response to UN Resolution No. 1564, the African Union designated

by the United Nations to conduct conflict resolution in Darfur uses custody

troops to maintain security and stability in the region that has been hit by the

conflict. African Union immediately responded by forming a special agency

known as The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS was first introduced in

2004, with the number 150 soldiers, and by mid-year 2005, the number

added by 7000 soldiers. Under UN Resolution No. 1564, in addition to

pointing the African Union to resolve the conflict in Darfur is also included

cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

To support the peace agreement between the Government of Sudan

and rebel groups, on January 9, 2005, AMIS and the parties involved in

conflict Sudan jointly conduct humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians,

promote human rights. But on March 24, 2005, the Security Council (DK), the

UN issued Resolution No. 1590 containing the situation in Darfur is a threat to

international peace and security

On March 10, 2006, the UN Security Council decided to extend the

AMIS mission in Darfur during the 6 months to 30 September 2006 as stated

in UN Resolution No. 1706 and on 2 October, the African Union to extend the

AMIS in Darfur has not been stable due to the situation in conflict areas,

which in its development carried out until 31 December 2006 and continued

until June 30, 2007. Up to July 2007, the UN Security Council finally issuedUN Resolution No. 1979 states that the AMIS in Darfur has been completed

and will be replaced by UNMIS on 31 December 2007.

6. United Nations

7 Darfur History, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?

id=ar&yr=2009&c=SDN, diakses tanggal 2 April 2010. diakses tanggal 30 Maret2011 pukul 15.17

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To help settle the crisis, UN formed a Disaster Assistance Response

Team (DART) for Darfur, although delayed by the Sudanese government. In

addition, the United Nations also issued Resolution 1564 that the contents of

economic sanctions on Khartoum if the government would not cooperate. But

these sanctions have even more to weaken the defense of Darfur to protect

civilians. UN Security Council issued eight resolutions for the Sudan that is:

1. Resolution No. 1812 dated April 30, 2008 concerning Security Council

extends mandate of UNMIS Until 30 April 2009, with the intention to

renew it for Further periods;

2. Resolution No. 1828 dated 31 July 2008 on the Security Council extends

the the mandate of UNAMID for a Further 12 months to 31 July 2009.;

3. Resolution No. 1841 dated 15 October 2008 on the Reports of the

Secretary-General on the Sudan;

4. Resolution No. 1881 dated July 30, 2009 on the Security Council votes

unanimously extending the mandate of African Union- United Nations

Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for one year;

5. Resolution No. 1891 dated 13 October 2009 on the Security Council

extends mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring the Darfur arms

embargo;

6. Resolution No. 1919 dated April 29, 2010 concerning Security Council

extends mandate of UN Mission in Sudan for one year, Until 30 April

2011;

7. Resolution No. 1935 dated July 30, 2010 on the Security Council renews

mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

(UNAMID) for 12 months;

8. Resolution No. 1945 dated 14 Oct 2010 on Noting Increased Violence in

Darfur, Security Council Renews Mandate of the Panel of Expert

Monitors8

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UN sends a special mission to Sudan that UNMIS (United Nations Mission in

Sudan) with a mandate9:

To support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,

To facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment,

the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and

humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security

conditions;

To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in cooperation

with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing

humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination;

To contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in

Sudan , as well as to co-ordinate international efforts towards the protection of

civilians , with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally

displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMIS's

capabilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related

organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

7. China

China controls 40% of Sudan's petroleum sector. So far, China always

opposed the UN sanctions on Sudan. U.S. sanctions and the UN have even

more to strengthen the China-Sudan relations, as evidenced by the transfer of

Sudan to 60% of export to China and the rest to other Asian countries. In

addition, sanctions can only strengthen anti-Western movements that buzz by

some Arab League countries. In view of the Chinese, any sanction imposed

on Sudan is seen as a war against China's national interests, given the

significance of Sudan's oil to China and therefore worsen US-China relations.

9

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III. ANALYZING

Every since its independence, Sudan was embroiled in two prolonged civil

wars during most of the remainder of the 20th century. These conflicts were

rooted in northern economic, political, and social domination of largely non-

Muslim, non-Arab southern Sudanese. Despite the fact that Sudan has the most

variety in number of ethnics and tribes, conflict in Sudan mostly based on

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economic matters. The competition for gain access to natural resources marking

this constant ethnic and rebel militia fighting since the mid-20th.

A. The Political Economy of Natural Resources-Based Conflict in

Sudan10

Natural resources are subject to increasing scarcity due to rapid

environmental change, increasing demand, and their unequal distribution.

Natural resources are used by people in ways that are defined symbolically.

Land, forests, and waterways are not just material resources people compete

over, but are also part of a particular way of life (pastoralism, farming,ranching, fishingetc.), an ethnic identity, and a set of gender and age roles.

Such symbolic dimensions of natural resources lend themselves to

ideological, social, and political struggles that have enormous practical

significance for the management of natural resources and the process of

conflict management. Three types of resource-based conflicts in the country:

among pastoralists themselves, especially in the dry season and in years

of severe shortage;

between pastoralists and settled populations; and

between pastoralists and large-scale agricultural projects established on

land customarily claimed by pastoralists.

This study focuses on natural resource-based conflicts and the extent to

which competition gives rise to serious conflict and the ways such conflicts

are addressed in three geographical locations in the country: Northern Darfur,

Northern Kordofan and the Upper Nile States, all of which are conflict ridden

areas. The objective of the study is to investigate the organic linkages

between land tenure and local-level conflict with the aim of identifying

medium and long-term policies for conflict resolution, enhancement of peace

culture and promotion of sustainable community governance.

10 Paper The Political Economy of Natural Resources-Based Conflict in SudanBy Omer A. Egemi and Sara Pantuliano. (Conflict is an inten se experience incommunication and in traction with transformative potential. For margin al

groups seeking to redress injustices or extreme inequities in resourcedistribution, conflict is an inherent feature of their struggle for change.

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The study argues that conventional assumption that local-level conflicts

emanate from ethnic, religious or cultural differences is limited in scope and is

rather misleading. In Sudan, as elsewhere in contemporary Africa, natural

resource scarcity, as argued here, is the most important factor behind local-

level conflicts. However, ethnic and other sociocultural dimensions usually

come into play, especially when a conflict persists. In a prolonged conflict,

when the initial causes have faded away, abstract, ideological ethnicity can

become a material and social force, and change from consequence to

apparent cause of such conflicts (Suliman 1999).

The study also claims that the conflict types identified by Abu Sin are not

exhaustive and they expanded to include conflict between agrarian producers

and the state itself. Mohamed Salih (1999) correctly holds that under

situations of increased competition, issues of ecology are interlinked with

questions of human rights, ethnicity, and distributive justice.

Resource scarcity, however, is not necessarily a natural process as the

neo-Malthusians seek to demonstrate. It is rather a structural process having

its roots in the established socio-economic structures that deprive the poor of

both effective demand and political influence (Rees 1985). The study arguesthat despite the huge land size of Sudan, scarcity of the rainlands for primary

production systems (pastoralism and dry farming) has become increasingly

felt and perceived by resource users. This scarcity is a structurally created

process directly related to dualism in land-use policy and the contradiction

between customary and statutory tenure arrangements, under conditions of

population growth and increased climatic tendency towards aridity. The root

causes of resource scarcity and the related conflict, as the study seeks to

demonstrate, is to be traced back to the early 1970s with the passage of lawswhich undermined the control of local authorities and communities over the

resources of the land and reorienting the national economy towards heavily

capitalized export agriculture (Duglas 2000). This situation has been pushed

to a logical extreme during the 1990s.

The study specifically claims that the abolition of customary rights to land

and the dissolution of social institutions embedded in it brought about, in

1970, through the introduction of the Unregistered Land Act and abolition of

the Native Administration system, respectively, have set the foundation for

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conflict over natural resources while setting in motion major economic and

social disruptions in the rainfed sector. The 1970 Act, a de facto

nationalization, transferred all of the rainlands to the government, which

means heavy cuts in rural communities rights to land and inducement of

resource scarcity. The Act, together with the distorted and confused

devolution of powers between the Central Government and the regions under

the present Federal (decentralization) system, have also given rise to land

claims with conflicting sources of legitimacy and contradictory outcomes

regarding who can establish access to and control over land. This is believed

to have brought about sharp swings in the land available especially for

pastoralists, thereby suggesting an intensifying resource scarcity, competition

and conflict over land between pastoralists and farmers and among

pastoralists themselves. The situation is suggested to be triggered and

sustained by the absence of effective institutional arrangements for resource

management and conflict resolution, distorted governance and the appalling

poverty under situations of accelerating environmental degradation, frequent

episodes of drought and population growth.

B. Nature of Resource-Based Conflict in Sudan

Conflicts over access to land and its resources have evidently

increased dramatically during the last few decades. Evidence from N.

Kordofan State tells us that natural resource based conflict is the most

dominant form of conflict in the State. It is found that all the 23 recorded

conflicts in 2001-02 were involving pastoralists. Partners to the conflict were:

Pastoralists Vs Farmers (55%)

Pastoralists Vs Native Administration (16%)

Pastoralists Vs GOS (16%)

Pastoralists Vs Farmers Vs N. Administration (7%)

Pastoralists Vs Diary Producers (3%)

Pastoralists Vs Local Councils (3%)

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The introduction of costly fishing technology and the monopoly over

fish trade by merchant capital are other forms of interventions that are

obliterating the native customary fishing rights. Another type of conflict in the

Sobat Basin is over cultivation and grazing rights. The conflict is brought

about by the eastwards movement of Lou-Nuer during the dry season to the

Sobat River and to the country bordering the Pibor River. This movement is

presumably an outcome of an increasing pressure of human and animal

populations over natural resources, and the desire for better fishing, which

the rivers provide.

C. General Discussion

Empirical investigation suggests that competition over scarce natural

resources is the root cause of local level conflict and that this scarcity is a

structurally induced process created by the interaction among six broad level

issues, under a situation of population increase and a climatic tendency

towards more drier conditions. Those issues were:

Conflicting claims of access to land;

Increased pressure on land due to prevalent development policies;

Civil war;

Ambiguity in laws governing access to land;

Distorted local governance;

Weak institutional arrangements and structures for conflict management

and transformation.

Customary land tenure systems in the three areas, as elsewhere in the

Sudan, are in a state of gradual disintegration as a result of the pressure of

commercial circles, arbitrary measures of powerful groups and the

development of exploitative tenure systems, especially since 1970, the year

that witnessed the birth of the Unregistered Land Act (URLA). The 1970

URLA abolished customary rights of land use and transferred the ownership

of all unregistered lands (all of Sudans rainlands) to the state. The Act

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applies countrywide, even in places (the South) that have or had no previous

system of land registration (Dewit 2001). The Act effectively enabled the

government to implement its development policy based on the horizontal

expansion of the agricultural sector, both the irrigated and rainfed

mechanized. By 1999, the total area under mechanized farming reached 17.2

million feddan compared to 2.0 million in 1970/71, an increase of 606%. In

addition, upon facilitation by the Investment Act 1998, vast tracts of land have

been allotted to private capital investments, including foreign capital. The

result has been widespread local conflict among the various stakeholders.

This was exacerbated by the abolishment of the system of Native

Administration in 1970-1, which used to act as an important institution for

regulation of land and management of conflicts over it. Despite its

reinstatement since the late 1980s, the N.A. system has remained weak and

ineffective in settling disputes, managing grazing resources and facilitating

seasonal mobility. The rapid pace towards the market economy and

commercialization of land- use brought a new dimension to the problem. The

symbiotic relations that previously existed between pastoralists and farmers

have been replaced by competition and collectivism by individualism.Resource scarcity for both the pastoralists and farmers have been

accentuated by the prolonged periods of drought and widespread

environmental degradation, especially in N. Darfur and N. Kordofan, a

situation that forced camel pastoralists to move towards the savanna belt

where large concentration of population competing for an already dwindling

resource base has taken place. Environmental degradation and drought have

also inspired farmers to expand their agricultural fields to compensate for

their declining yields and real incomes.

The escalation of the civil war in Southern Sudan and the expansion of

the war zone and insecurity further north and the resultant large population

movements have also undermined adaptive patterns and contributed

significantly to the shrinking of geographical space for the operation of the

pastoral economy and congregation of population in small geographical

space, thus adding to an already intensive pressure on land. Oil in the

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pastoral areas of the south and the political conflicts around it also recognized

it as in important factor in the generation of local conflict.

The distorted local governance and the absence of effective

institutional arrangements for conflict resolution and natural resource

management have further reinforced the environment of local-level conflict.

Although the process of decentralization in Sudan has created greater

closeness of the administration to local communities and more opportunities

for participation in development decisions, the experience is still faced with

many difficulties. Significant among these are:

The division of responsibilities between the federal and state governments

is confusing in many aspects. This has resulted in conflicting decisions

over land use and the encroachment of the federal government on the

states natural resources.

The clear legislative gap in the field of pastoral resources conservation

and development;

Absence of land register for agricultural land forests and pastures.

Conflicts over jurisdiction between the federal ministries of agriculture and

livestock;

Technical and financial institutional weaknesses.

Because economic problems is the main cause of the conflict in Sudan,

the best solution offered is the improvement of the economic situation of

course the people of Sudan. To achieve this goal, in ways that can be done is

by strengthening the governance for the organization to carry out its functions

including the welfare of its people. PCA can be the first step and then be

followed by the formation of a strong government and have legitimacy. It is

very important, because only government that has legitimacy was the one

who will be able to perform the functions of government.

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D. Alternative Strategy for Sudan

1. South Sudan Provisional Government

Form a provisional government whose main duty to prepare for South

Sudan independence with all the elements of the government of a sovereign

State. There are some things that are emergencies which is the duty of

provisional government l for independence, namely:

1. Shaping Institution National Election Committee in charge of preparing

and carrying out elections in South Sudan in order to form a

permanent government of a sovereign;

2. Establish a Commission or the National Security Council composed of

the Military in charge of maintaining the defense and State Security

and police in charge of maintaining public order;

3. Creating a conducive situation for refugees and IDP's in their area and

then guarantee and ensure that the basic rights of refugees and IDP's

are met, including the empowerment of the economically fit the 1951

Geneva Convention on Refugees;

4. Applying the principle of non discrimination in carrying out

administration

2. Permanent Government of Southern Sudan

Observing the competition tribal conflict in southern Sudan between the

Dinka tribe (the largest tribe in southern Sudan), Nuer, and the tribe Shiluk,

then formed a new government must create a non-departmental bodies

whose membership consists of representatives of various tribes in southern

Sudan. The agency is independent and its main task is to accommodate

different views and interests among the tribes. Other permanent government

task is to continue with the CPA's mandate to form a variety of institutions

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including the national petroleum commission, fiscal and financial allocation

and monitoring commission, political ceasefire commission, joint defense

board, the military joint ceasefire committee. Further mapping concrete steps

to repatriate the refugees on the actual social life with a starting point in

conditions of physical and intangible infrastructure. Related to this, need to

set up a special working committee, which focuses attention on these

refugees. Permanent government is also in the long term need to create an

economy of empower economic actors in the smallest sector as the economic

base to build post-referendum. But in this case must be understood that

building a healthy economy must work together with good governance or

good governance. Therefore a permanent government should run the

government with good governance based on a system that has been

selected.

3. North Sudan Government

North Sudan government should restore the social, economic and political

country's post conflict. Revitalize the essential infrastructure before people

repatriate the refugees to a normal social life. Ensuring the economicsustainability by empowering people in all the economic sectors that had

stopped because of the prolonged conflict.

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CONCLUSION

A. Sudan Conflict

1. Political Conflict based ethnic and Religion

2. Natural Resources Conflict

3. Abused of Power: Use Of Force to Civilian in Darfur

4. Refugees and IDPs

5. Regional Security

6. Referendum and Post Referendum

B. Alternative Strategy for Sudan

1. South Sudan Provisional Government

a. Shaping Institution National Election Committee in charge of preparing

and carrying out elections in South Sudan in order to form a

permanent government of a sovereign;

b. Establish a Commission or the National Security Council composed of

the Military in charge of maintaining the defense and State Security

and police in charge of maintaining public order;

c. Creating a conducive situation for refugees and IDP's in their area and

then guarantee and ensure that the basic rights of refugees and IDP's

are met, including the empowerment of the economically fit the 1951

Geneva Convention on Refugees;

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d. Applying the principle of non discrimination in carrying out

administration

2. Permanent Government

Observing the competition tribal conflict in southern Sudan between the

Dinka tribe (the largest tribe in southern Sudan), Nuer, and the tribe Shiluk,

then formed a new government must create a non-departmental bodies

whose membership consists of representatives of various tribes in southern

Sudan. The agency is independent and its main task is to accommodate

different views and interests among the tribes. Other permanent government

task is to continue with the CPA's mandate to form a variety of institutions

including the national petroleum commission, fiscal and financial allocation

and monitoring commission, political ceasefire commission, joint defense

board, the military joint ceasefire committee. Further mapping concrete steps

to repatriate the refugees on the actual social life with a starting point in

conditions of physical and intangible infrastructure. Related to this, need to

set up a special working committee, which focuses attention on these

refugees. Permanent government is also in the long term need to create an

economy of empower economic actors in the smallest sector as the economic

base to build post-referendum. But in this case must be understood that

building a healthy economy must work together with good governance or

good governance. Therefore a permanent government should run the

government with good governance based on a system that has been

selected.

3. North Sudan Government

North Sudan government should restore the social, economic and

political country's post conflict. Revitalize the essential infrastructure before

people repatriate the refugees to a normal social life. Ensuring the economic

sustainability by empowering people in all the economic sectors that had

stopped because of the prolonged conflict.

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sudan-institutional building fix

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