stacey pomales 1983 lawsuit - marion co. fl

JS 44 (Rev. 12/12) CIVIL COVER SHEETThe JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except asprovided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for thepurpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

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’ 1 U.S. Government ’ 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEFPlaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State ’ 1 ’ 1 Incorporated or Principal Place ’ 4 ’ 4

of Business In This State

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’ 110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY ’ 625 Drug Related Seizure ’ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 ’ 375 False Claims Act’ 120 Marine ’ 310 Airplane ’ 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 ’ 423 Withdrawal ’ 400 State Reapportionment’ 130 Miller Act ’ 315 Airplane Product Product Liability ’ 690 Other 28 USC 157 ’ 410 Antitrust’ 140 Negotiable Instrument Liability ’ 367 Health Care/ ’ 430 Banks and Banking’ 150 Recovery of Overpayment ’ 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS ’ 450 Commerce

& Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury ’ 820 Copyrights ’ 460 Deportation’ 151 Medicare Act ’ 330 Federal Employers’ Product Liability ’ 830 Patent ’ 470 Racketeer Influenced and’ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability ’ 368 Asbestos Personal ’ 840 Trademark Corrupt Organizations

Student Loans ’ 340 Marine Injury Product ’ 480 Consumer Credit (Excludes Veterans) ’ 345 Marine Product Liability LABOR SOCIAL SECURITY ’ 490 Cable/Sat TV

’ 153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY ’ 710 Fair Labor Standards ’ 861 HIA (1395ff) ’ 850 Securities/Commodities/ of Veteran’s Benefits ’ 350 Motor Vehicle ’ 370 Other Fraud Act ’ 862 Black Lung (923) Exchange

’ 160 Stockholders’ Suits ’ 355 Motor Vehicle ’ 371 Truth in Lending ’ 720 Labor/Management ’ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) ’ 890 Other Statutory Actions’ 190 Other Contract Product Liability ’ 380 Other Personal Relations ’ 864 SSID Title XVI ’ 891 Agricultural Acts’ 195 Contract Product Liability ’ 360 Other Personal Property Damage ’ 740 Railway Labor Act ’ 865 RSI (405(g)) ’ 893 Environmental Matters’ 196 Franchise Injury ’ 385 Property Damage ’ 751 Family and Medical ’ 895 Freedom of Information

’ 362 Personal Injury - Product Liability Leave Act Act Medical Malpractice ’ 790 Other Labor Litigation ’ 896 Arbitration

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Other ’ 550 Civil Rights Actions’ 448 Education ’ 555 Prison Condition

’ 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement

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’ 1 OriginalProceeding

’ 2 Removed fromState Court

’ 3 Remanded fromAppellate Court

’ 4 Reinstated orReopened

’ 5 Transferred fromAnother District(specify)

’ 6 MultidistrictLitigation

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause:

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’ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTIONUNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:JURY DEMAND: ’ Yes ’ No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY (See instructions):

JUDGE DOCKET NUMBERDATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 12/12)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44

Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers asrequired by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, isrequired for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk ofCourt for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both name and title.

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Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

STACEY POMALES

Plaintiff, Civil Action No.

v .

CHRIS BLAIR, in his official capacity as

SHERIFF OF THE MARION COUNTY

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; LISA AZURE,

THOMAS NEWBANKS, and JARRETT

LEEDY in their individual capacities.

Defendants.

___/

COMPLAINT

PLAINTIFF STACEY POMALES (“Pomales” or “Plaintiff”) sues Chris Blair (“Blair”

or “Defendant(s)”); Lisa Azure (“Azure” and/or “Defendant(s)”); Thomas Newbanks

(“Newbanks” and/or “Defendant(s)”); and Jarrett Leedy (“Leedy” and/or “Defendant(s)”), and

states the following in support of this complaint:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This is a 42 U.S. Code § 1983 federal civil rights case under the First, Fourth,

Fifth, and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution as applied to the States under

the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment for the Defendants’ individual and

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collective personal, malicious, willful, and unlawful violations under color of state law of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to free speech, protection against unreasonable search and

seizure of Plaintiff’s liberty and personal property, and procedural due process, and Florida state

law tort claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

2. Defendants committed these unlawful violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional and

state rights under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton,

and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of civil rights

under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution as well as for the state law tort claims of malicious prosecution, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and defamation per se.

4. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims which arose from the same common

nuclei of facts.

5. Venue is proper in this judicial district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b) and M.D. Fla. Loc. R. 1.02 (c). Defendants’ primary employment is in this district and

division, and Defendants’ independent and collective malicious and unlawful violations under

color of state law of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights giving rise to the claims herein accrued

within this district and division.

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6. At all material times, Defendants committed these unlawful violations under

color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful

disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff Stacey Pomales is a Florida resident residing within this Court’s

jurisdiction.

8. Defendant Chris Blair is now and has been at all material times Sheriff of Marion

County, Florida, and the constitutional officer of Marion County Sheriff’s Office. Blair is

ultimately responsible for supervision, direction, control, and training of all Marion County

deputies and the Marion County Sheriff’s Office.

9. Defendant Lisa Azure is now and has been at all material times a Marion County

deputy sheriff. Azure at all times relevant hereto was acting in and continues to act under color

of state law.

10. Defendant Thomas Newbanks is now and has been at all material times a Marion

County deputy sheriff. Newbanks at all times relevant hereto was acting in and continues to act

under color of state law.

11. Defendant Jarrett Leedy is now and has been at all material times a Marion

County deputy sheriff. Leedy at all times relevant hereto was acting in and continues to act under

color of state law.

12. Defendant John Doe, whose true name is currently unknown, is now and has been

at all material times a Marion County deputy sheriff. Doe at all times relevant hereto was acting

in and continues to act under color of state law.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

13. On or around April 5, 2014, Azure, Newbanks, and Leedy went to the 15600

block of Southwest 15th Avenue in Ocala, Florida, within Marion County, FL. Azure, Newbanks,

and Leedy were driving marked Marion County Sheriff’s Office patrol vehicles and wearing

Marion County Sheriff’s Office uniforms and equipment, including weapons and restraint

devices. Defendants identified themselves as Marion County deputies and acted under Blair’s

constitutional authority. The purported reason for Defendants’ visit to this location was a large

party. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit A.

14. Plaintiff was a guest at this party, but Plaintiff did not own the land or house

where the party was located. Plaintiff had no control over the party or other citizens at the party.

15. Azure, Newbanks, and Leedy, upon arrival, unlawfully stopped vehicles and

shouted at the partygoers; profanely daring partygoers to come out to the road so Azure,

Newbanks, and Leedy could arrest those partygoers.

16. When Plaintiff’s spouse verbally and peacefully protested Defendants’ activities

that Plaintiff believed to be unprofessional and unconstitutional, Defendants arrested Plaintiff’s

spouse.

17. Plaintiff video-recorded Defendants’ arrest of Plaintiff’s spouse and then asked

Defendants for Defendants’ badge numbers and why Defendants arrested Plaintiff’s spouse.

18. Plaintiff complied every time Defendants ordered Plaintiff to move away from

Defendants. Plaintiff is even on video telling other partygoers to move away from Defendants.

19. When Plaintiff continued to exercise Plaintiff’s free speech rights to protest

Defendants’ activity peacefully, Azure, Newbanks, and Leedy then arrested Plaintiff for

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Resisting without Violence, § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012) even though Plaintiff clearly stated

Plaintiff merely wanted information and was only attempting to discuss the issue with Azure.

20. Azure charged Plaintiff with two counts of Resisting without Violence, § 843.02

Fla. Stat. (2012) despite the video evidence depicting only one chronological event.

21. Plaintiff’s verbal First Amendment free speech activity in no way interfered with

Defendants’ ability to conduct any investigation.

22. Defendants curtailed Plaintiff’s free speech and stifled it even though Plaintiff

was not inciting imminent lawlessness or doing anything but voicing Plaintiff’s opposition to

Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff disturbed no one but Defendants with Plaintiff’s peaceful protest of

Defendants’ actions. Defendants never alleged in the criminal case that Plaintiff’s words or

actions caused an unlawful disturbance or incited imminent lawlessness.

23. Video evidence of Plaintiff’s arrest shows Defendants were the only ones inciting

the crowd gathered to watch Defendants arrest Plaintiff. Azure, in particular, shouted several

times to the crowd that was demanding a rationale for Defendants’ arrest of Plaintiff, “Who’s

next? Who’s next? Who’s next? Who’s next? Those cameras don’t scare us! Who’s next to go to

jail?”

24. Despite Defendants’ individual and collective aggressive behavior, the crowd

never turned violent, and was in many ways, highly respectful to Defendants.

25. Azure, who had a Facebook social media account at the time Defendants arrested

Plaintiff, and for some time thereafter, changed her Facebook profile picture to Plaintiff’s and

Plaintiff’s spouse’s “mug shots,” and the accompanying picture referred to Plaintiff and

Plaintiff’s spouse as “monsters.” See Plaintiff’s Exhibit B.

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26. Defendant’s seized Plaintiff’s cellular phone as “evidence” despite lacking any

nexus to a crime or probable cause to believe Plaintiff’s cellular phone contained the fruits of a

crime. In fact, Plaintiff’s cellular phone contained only exculpatory evidence that is highly

unfavorable to Defendants. Defendants refused to return Plaintiff’s cellular phone until Plaintiff

allowed the Marion County Sheriff’s Office to review the video contained within its memory.

27. On May 28th, 2014, The State Attorney’s Office for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of

Florida formally entered a nolle prosequi for Plaintiff’s criminal charge. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit

C.

28. When the Florida Legislature passed § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012), the Legislature

gave law enforcement officers unfettered discretion to decide when citizens violate this statute

by not narrowing the defintion of what constitutes “resisting without violence” or “obstructing

without violence.” Nothing in the statute defines or addresses verbal protests of law

enforcement activities when officers are in public.

29. Defendants applied § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012) with unbridled discretion in the

instant case, allowing Defendants to arrest Plaintiff without probable cause and merely for

Plaintiff’s lawful exercise of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to free speech to video-record

and protest State action peacefully.

30. Defendants have willfully and maliciously under color of state law,

unconstitutionally caused Plaintiff to suffer physical and emotional harm, permanent injury,

social embarrassment, reputational damages, and loss of liberty and property.

COUNT I: § 1983 CLAIM OF SUPPRESSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTED

FREE SPEECH AGAINST DEFENDANT AZURE

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31. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding

paragraphs in this complaint.

32. Defendant personally, maliciously, and under color of state law deprived Plaintiff

of Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which are

secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s

exercise of the constitutional right of free speech to video-record and protest government activity

of great public interest of which Plaintiff disapproved and protested peacefully without

interferring with the State’s investigation.

33. Defendant failed to conduct herself as would a reasonably prudent law

enforcement officer and obey firmly established law.

34. In depriving Plaintiff of these rights, Defendant committed these unlawful

violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless,

wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.

35. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be

redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.

COUNT II: § 1983 CLAIM OF SUPPRESSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT

PROTECTED FREE SPEECH AGAINST DEFENDANT NEWBANKS






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38. Defendant failed to conduct himself as would a reasonably prudent law









COUNT III: § 1983 CLAIM OF SUPPRESSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT

PROTECTED SPEECH AGAINST DEFENDANT LEEDY









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COUNT IV: § 1983 CLAIM OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF

PLAINTIFF’S LIBERTY AND PROPERTY AGAINST DEFENDANT AZURE



48. Defendant personally, recklessly, maliciously, and under color of state law

deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s liberty rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by assisting and

directing Defendants to maliciously and unconstitutionally detain, handcuff, arrest, and

incarcerate Plaintiff without a warrant or any probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed

any crime.

49. Defendant failed to conduct herself as would a reasonably prudent law



deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s property rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United


directing Defendants to maliciously and unconstitutionally deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s

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personal property without a warrant or any probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed any

crime or that Plaintiff’s property, a cellular phone, had any nexus to or contained the fruits of

a crime.

51. In depriving the Plaintiff of these rights, Defendant committed these unlawful





COUNT V: § 1983 CLAIM OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF

PLAINTIFF’S LIBERTY AND PROPERTY AGAINST DEFENDANT NEWBANKS








any crime.





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a crime.








COUNT VI: § 1983 CLAIM OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF

PLAINTIFF’S LIBERTY AND PROPERTY AGAINST DEFENDANT LEEDY








any crime.



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a crime.








COUNT VII: § 1983 CLAIM OF FIFTH AMENDMENT DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL

AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AGAINST DEFENDANT AZURE



66. Defendant personally, maliciously, and under color of state law deprived

Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by personally,

recklessly, maliciously, and unconstitutionally seizing and retaining the Plaintiff’s personal

property without any probable cause, warrant, or judicial review.

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67. Defendant gave Plaintiff no means of contesting the unconstitutional seizure of

Plaintiff’s cellular phone, and even when Defendant should have known these actions were

illegal and unconstitutional.

68. Defendant’s “double-charging” of Plaintiff further demonstrates malice and

violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution.

69. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would

and obey firmly established law.

70. In depriving Plaintiff of these due process rights, Defendant committed these

unlawful violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in

reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.



COUNT VIII: § 1983 CLAIM OF FIFTH AMENDMENT DENIAL OF

PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AGAINST DEFENDANT

NEWBANKS






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Constitution.








COUNT IX: § 1983 CLAIM OF FIFTH AMENDMENT DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL

DUE AND SUBSTANTIVE PROCESS AGAINST DEFENDANT LEEDY






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Constitution.








COUNT XI: STATE TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AGAINST

DEFENDANT AZURE



87. Defendant, under color of state law, personally, recklessly, maliciously, and

unconstitutionally and without the barest scintilla of probable cause, maliciously prosecuted

Plaintiff, commencing and continuing a criminal judicial proceeding against Plaintiff.

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88. The State of Florida made a bona fide termination of that judicial proceeding.

See attached hereto Plaintiff’s Exhibit C.

89. Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

90. Defendant acted with malice and under color of law.

91. Plaintiff suffered general and special damages conforming to the law.

92. Defendant committed the tort of malicious prosecution under color of state law

in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of

Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.




redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.

COUNT XII: STATE TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AGAINST

DEFENDANT NEWBANKS









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COUNT XIII: STATE TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AGAINST

DEFENDANT LEEDY











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COUNT XIV: STATE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT AZURE



114. Defendant committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and

willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.

115. The Plaintiff’s emotional distress was and is severe in nature.

116. Plaintiff suffered severe social and personal embarrassment, pain, suffering,

and emotional distress at the time of Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and afterward.





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COUNT XV: STATE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT NEWBANKS













COUNT XVI: STATE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT LEEDY






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COUNT XVII: STATE TORT OF DEFAMATION PER SE AGAINST DEFENDANT

AZURE



132. Defendant committed the state tort of defamation per se under color of state

law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of

Plaintiff’s human rights, safety, and property.

133. Defendant accused Plaintiff of committing a misdemeanor when absolutely no

probable cause existed that Plaintiff did anything other than exercise Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights to free speech under the United States Constitution.

134. Defendant published this defamation to numerous third parties.

135. Defendant described Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s spouse as “monsters” on

Defendant’s Facebook Page and coupled this defamatory statement with Plaintiff’s booking

photograph.

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136. Plaintiff need not prove damages to recover under the state claim of

defamation per se. Damages are assumed under Florida common law.



COUNT XVIII: STATE TORT OF DEFAMATION PER SE AGAINST DEFENDANT

NEWBANKS





Plaintiff’s human rights, safety, and property rights.









COUNT XIX: STATE TORT OF DEFAMATION PER SE AGAINST DEFENDANT

LEEDY

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COUNT XX: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 MONELL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BLAIR AS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICER OF MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE



151. Blair’s written and unwritten policies and customs of Marion County Sheriff’s

Office encouraged, caused, and/or enabled Defendants to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional and

state rights.

152. Blair is responsible for Defendants’ supervision, training, and discipline as

well as Defendants’ actions through Blair’s policy-making powers and personnel decisions,

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and there is an obvious need Blair to have trained and train all Defendants on First

Amendment rights and clearly established law to protest law enforcement actions peacefully.

153. Blair has failed to train Defendants adequately on First Amendment rights and

ensure citizens can protest law enforcement actions peacefully without fear of arrest.

154. Blair has failed to train Defendants on Fourth Amendment rights and enact

safeguards against unconstitutional searches and seizures despite clearly established law.

155. Blair has failed to train Defendants on Fifth Amendment rights and enact

safeguards against denial of procedural and substantive Due Process despite clearly

established law.

156. Blair has failed to train Defendants on Eighth Amendment rights and enact

safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment despite clearly established law.

157. Blair has and continues to demonstrate reckless, callous, and bad faith

indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional and state rights.

158. Only irrational, imprudent, irresponsible, and unreasonable executive agencies

of municipalities and political subdivisions would fail to train its law enforcement officers on

the constitutional law issues concerning and arising out of § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012).

159. Blair had and has an affirmative duty to ensure all Defendants, including Blair,

know and obey firmly established laws. Proper supervision, training, and discipline are

paramount to protecting Plaintiff’s and all other citizens’ constitutional and state rights.

160. Blair failed and continues to fail to safeguard citizens’ constitutional rights,

freedoms, and liberties interests by not properly training, supervising, and disciplining

Defendants as well as all other Marion County Sheriff’s Office deputies.

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161. Blair’s callous, reckless, wanton, and malicious actions under color of state

law before, during, and after this loss, has caused Plaintiff to suffer and continue to suffer the

damages Plaintiff has described.

162. Blair unlawfully deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional and state rights,

and did so under color of state law in bad faith, with malicious purpose, and in callous,


163. Blair, through the Marion County Sheriff’s Office, has explicitly adopted,

endorsed, and defended Defendants’ individual and collective unconstitutional actions against

Plaintiff.

164. The Marion County Sheriff’s Office has a well-documented history of

engaging in civil rights abuses that have culminated in successful lawsuits.

165. These deprivations under color of state law are actionable under and may be


RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the following relief:

A. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding

paragraphs in this complaint,

B. Trial by jury on all issues so triable;

C. General and special compensatory damages;

D. Punitive damages;

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E. Award to Plaintiff of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in

connection with this action from the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988;

F. Pretrial interest on compensable attorney’s fees;

G. Injunctive relief declaring § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012) to be facially and as

applied unconstitutional because it grants Florida law enforcement officers unfettered

discretion; and,

H. Such further and different relief as is just and proper or that is

necessary to make the Plaintiff whole.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

with the Federal Clerk of the Court for the Middle District of Florida using the CM/ECF system,

which will send notification of such filing to all persons registered for this case, including the

Defendants’ counsel(s).

s/Christopher R. Dillingham II, Esq.

__________________________

Plaintiff’s Counsel

FL Bar Number 98382

The Dillingham Law Firm PLLC

900 Plymouth Sorrento Road #593

Plymouth, FL 32768-0593

Email: [email protected]

Phone: 407-463-3506

Offices: Apopka

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I electronically filed today, on June 10, 2014 the foregoing

DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT A

14009185

REPORT NUMBER

Marion GountySheriff's OfficeINCIDENT REPORT

NARRATIVE

REPORTED BY 5'I96 MURE, LISA REPORTFILED 0410612014

ON 4-5-14 AT APPROXIMATELY 2330 HOURS, WRITER AND DEPUTY NEWBANKS, ID 5715, RESPONDED TO THE 15600BLOCK OF SW 16 AVENUE, IN REFERENCE TO A COMPLAINT OF A LARGE PARTY.

UPON ARRIVAL, THREE SUBJECTS WERE LOCATED WITH MARIJUANA REFERENCE TO THIS AGENCY'S CASE NUMBER 514-09175. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION, WRITER WAS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE TWO PARTY GOERS MOVETHEIR VEHICLES FROM THE ROADWAY, DUE TO THEM BLOCKING TRAFFIC. WHILE INSTRUCTING PERSON TO DO SO, THEDEFENDANT, JASON POMALES, APPEARED FROM THE CROWD AND ADVISED NO ONE HAD TO LISTEN TO WRITER AND NO

ONE HAD TO MOVE THEIR VEHICLES. BOTH DEPUTIES TOLD DEFENDANT JASON POMALES SEVERAL TIMES TO WALKAWAY AND NOT TO INTERFERE, WHICH HE FAILED TO COMPLY. BOTH DEPUTIES STARTED WALKING TOWARDSDEFENDANT JASON POMALES TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE LAW OF ABIDING OUR COMMANDS AND DEFENDANT JASONPOMALES YELLED, SEVERAL TIMES, TO GET OFF PRIVATE PROPERTY, DUE TO HAVING NO LAWFUL RIGHT TO BE AT THELOCATION. AS WRITER WAS EXPLAINING TO DEFENDANT JASON POMALES, WE WERE INVESTIGATING AN OPEN HOUSEPARTY WHERE A COVER CHARGE WAS BEING COLLECTED TO ENTER THE PARTY, THE DEFENDANT KEPT ARGUING WITHWRITER;THEREFORE, WRITER TOLD DEFENDANT JASON POMALES TO WALK AWAY OR HE WOULD BE ARRESTED, THEDEFENDANT STATED HE DID NOT HAVE TO LISTEN TO WRITER. WRITER TOLD DEFENDANT JASON POMALES HE WASUNDER ARREST AND PLACED HIM INTO HANDCUFFS.

WHILE WALKING THE DEFENDANT TO WRITER'S PATROL VEHICLE, A LARGE CROWD FORMED AROUND THE DEPUTIES.SEVERAL PARTY GOERS WERE YELLING AND SCREAMING AT THE DEPUTIES. SEVERAL TIMES, ALL DEPUTIES GAVEVERBAL COMMANDS FOR THE CROWD TO DISPERSE. CO.DEFENDANT STACEY POMALES, REFUSED TO LISTEN TO

COMMANDS TO BACK AWAY FROM DEPUTIES. CO-DEFENDANT STACEY POMALES CONTINUED TO STAND AND YELL ATWRITER, DEMANDING TO KNOW WHY THE DEFENDANT WAS BEING ARRESTED. CO DEFENDANT POMALES WALKEDAROUND DEPUTY'S PATROL VEHICLE WHERE DEFENDANT POMALES WAS. SHE HAD TO BE TOLD TO BACK AWAY FROMWRITER'S PATROL VEHICLE. WRITER DID TELL TO THE CO-DEFENDANT, THE DEFENDANT IS AN ADULT AND SHE NEEDEDTO BACK AWAY FROM THE SCENE OR SHE WOULD BE ARRESTED ALSO, AT WHICH TIME, SHE FAILED TO COMPLY. THECO-DEFENDANT LEANED AGAINST DEPUry NEWBANKS' PATROL VEHICLE AND CONTINUED TO DISOBEY COWANDS TO

BACK AWAY FROM THE PATROL VEHICLE. WRITER TOLD HER AGAIN AND WHEN SHE DID NOT COMPLY, WRITER TOLDHER TO TURN AROUND AND PLACED HER HANDS BEHIND HER BACK BECAUSE SHE WAS ALSO UNDER ARREST, WHENWRITER GRABBED THE CO-DEFENDANT'S LEFT HAND, SHE TOOK A STEP BACK AND ATTEMPTED TO PULL OUT OFWRITER'S GRIP SAYING "NO.'' THE CO-DEFENDANT WAS SECURED INTO HANDCUFFS AND PLACED IN THE BACK OF

DEPUTY NEWBANKS' VEHICLE.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IT APPEARED THE CO-DEFENDANT WAS VIDEO RECORDING THIS ENTIRE INCIDENT;THEREFORE,HER CELL PHONE WAS COLLECTED AS EVIDENCE. DEPUTY NEWBANKS PLACED THE CELL PHONE INTO LATENT LOCKERAT THE SOUTHWEST DISTRICT OFFICE.

WHILE ON THE WAY TO THE MARION COUNTY JAIL, THE DEFENDANT TOLD WRITER ''YOU ARE MESSING WITH THEWRONG GUY TONIGHT.' 'YOU ARE GOING TO BE SORRY.'' 'YOU BETTER BE REALLY SCARED." AND STATED HE WASGOING TO REPORT ME TO 'COPBLOCK". THE DEFENDANT ADVISED HE PROTECTS OTHERS FROM WRITER AND 'THUG"DEPUTIES. THE DEFENDANT STATED HE WOULD HAVE WRITER'S HEAD AND HER JOB AND PREPARE FOR AN "I.4.'(TNTERNAL AFFAIRS).

WRITER DELIVERED THE DEFENDANT TO THE MARION COUNTY JAIL WITHOUT INCIDENT.

CASE STATUS: CLOSED BY ARREST

TIME: 0435-0441 I IBC 521 1

TIME: 1957-20AYNCll5209 - AMENDED

Pintecl 4/9/2014 2:34 28 PM FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 4

DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT B

DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT C

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY

STATE OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 2014-MM-002738-AAGENCY #: MCSO S149185

VS.

STACEY A POMALES/CHARGE: I RESIST LAWENFORCEMENT OFFICER W/OUTVIOLENCE; II RESIST LAWENFORCEMENT OFFICER W/OUTVIOLENCE

ANNOUNCEMENT OF NO INFORMATION

Comes now the State of Florida, by and through its undersigned Assistant State Attorney, and

announces that it will file no information in the above entitled cause based on the following grounds:

Under the facts and circumstances of the case the likelihood of conviction at trial is minimal.

DATED this the 28th day of May, 2014.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above has been furnished to Christopher RDillingham II, 900 Plymouth Sorrento Rd #593, Plymouth, FL 32768-0593, by hand or mail deliveryor electronic service this 28th day of May, 2014.

BRAD KINGSTATE ATTORNEYFIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

BY /s/ Melissa Amy Thibeault Assistant State Attorney Fla. Bar # 0085513 110 N.W. 1 Ave, Suite 5000st

Ocala, FL 34475 (352) 671-5800 [email protected]

M-2014-17119

Filing # 14144528 Electronically Filed 05/28/2014 02:01:50 PM

stacey pomales 1983 lawsuit - marion co. fl

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