Leonardo

Comments on "The Evolution of Italian Painting: A Quantitative Investigation of Trends inStyle and Content from the Late Gothic to the Rococo Period"Author(s): Harold J. McWhinnieSource: Leonardo, Vol. 20, No. 2, Special Issue: Visual Art, Sound, Music and Technology (1987),pp. 210-211Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1578363 .

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processes. As this has not been confirmed by neurological research, it tends to be regarded as highly speculative and is sometimes cited as the Achilles' heel of gestalt theory. Thus, if one intended to present gestalt psychology in an un- favorable light, it would be expedient to focus almost exclusively on isomorphism while ignoring the lasting and more valuable findings with which it is identified in virtually every definition except Carrier's.

2. In Carrier's essay, we are told that "psychologists studying perception today are not especially concerned with gestalt psychology". This is true, since gestalt psychology is an historical phenomenon which flourished 50 years ago. On the other hand, Carrier does not mention that virtually all of the findings of gestalt psychology (excepting the one that he dwells on, isomorphism) have been absorbed by subsequent schools of psychology. In other words, among psychologists studying perception today, each and every one makes use of psychological principles which were initially championed by gestalt psychology.

3. To my knowledge, Carrier's essay is the only synopsis of gestalt psychology that omits the "principles of perceptual organization", including such factors as figure/ground, similarity grouping, proxi- mity grouping, continuity, closure, et cetera. If Carrier is not consciously aware of these perceptual principles, he employs them naively whenever he writes: printing his essay in black ink on white paper, by clustering letters to formulate words, by indenting paragraphs, and so on. In the education of an artist, as distinct from the training of philosophers and art historians, these principles of perceptual organi- zation-also known as 'unit forming factors' or 'design principles'-are studied in the freshman year. That we unavoidably see the world in accordance with these principles would appear to be confirmed by the universality of visual camouflage (both natural and military), which is the deliberate use of these laws for deceptive purposes.

Roy R. Behrens Ballast Quarterly Review

113 West Gaston Savannah, Georgia 31401 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS

processes. As this has not been confirmed by neurological research, it tends to be regarded as highly speculative and is sometimes cited as the Achilles' heel of gestalt theory. Thus, if one intended to present gestalt psychology in an un- favorable light, it would be expedient to focus almost exclusively on isomorphism while ignoring the lasting and more valuable findings with which it is identified in virtually every definition except Carrier's.

2. In Carrier's essay, we are told that "psychologists studying perception today are not especially concerned with gestalt psychology". This is true, since gestalt psychology is an historical phenomenon which flourished 50 years ago. On the other hand, Carrier does not mention that virtually all of the findings of gestalt psychology (excepting the one that he dwells on, isomorphism) have been absorbed by subsequent schools of psychology. In other words, among psychologists studying perception today, each and every one makes use of psychological principles which were initially championed by gestalt psychology.

3. To my knowledge, Carrier's essay is the only synopsis of gestalt psychology that omits the "principles of perceptual organization", including such factors as figure/ground, similarity grouping, proxi- mity grouping, continuity, closure, et cetera. If Carrier is not consciously aware of these perceptual principles, he employs them naively whenever he writes: printing his essay in black ink on white paper, by clustering letters to formulate words, by indenting paragraphs, and so on. In the education of an artist, as distinct from the training of philosophers and art historians, these principles of perceptual organi- zation-also known as 'unit forming factors' or 'design principles'-are studied in the freshman year. That we unavoidably see the world in accordance with these principles would appear to be confirmed by the universality of visual camouflage (both natural and military), which is the deliberate use of these laws for deceptive purposes.

Roy R. Behrens Ballast Quarterly Review

113 West Gaston Savannah, Georgia 31401 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS

processes. As this has not been confirmed by neurological research, it tends to be regarded as highly speculative and is sometimes cited as the Achilles' heel of gestalt theory. Thus, if one intended to present gestalt psychology in an un- favorable light, it would be expedient to focus almost exclusively on isomorphism while ignoring the lasting and more valuable findings with which it is identified in virtually every definition except Carrier's.

2. In Carrier's essay, we are told that "psychologists studying perception today are not especially concerned with gestalt psychology". This is true, since gestalt psychology is an historical phenomenon which flourished 50 years ago. On the other hand, Carrier does not mention that virtually all of the findings of gestalt psychology (excepting the one that he dwells on, isomorphism) have been absorbed by subsequent schools of psychology. In other words, among psychologists studying perception today, each and every one makes use of psychological principles which were initially championed by gestalt psychology.

3. To my knowledge, Carrier's essay is the only synopsis of gestalt psychology that omits the "principles of perceptual organization", including such factors as figure/ground, similarity grouping, proxi- mity grouping, continuity, closure, et cetera. If Carrier is not consciously aware of these perceptual principles, he employs them naively whenever he writes: printing his essay in black ink on white paper, by clustering letters to formulate words, by indenting paragraphs, and so on. In the education of an artist, as distinct from the training of philosophers and art historians, these principles of perceptual organi- zation-also known as 'unit forming factors' or 'design principles'-are studied in the freshman year. That we unavoidably see the world in accordance with these principles would appear to be confirmed by the universality of visual camouflage (both natural and military), which is the deliberate use of these laws for deceptive purposes.

Roy R. Behrens Ballast Quarterly Review

113 West Gaston Savannah, Georgia 31401 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS

processes. As this has not been confirmed by neurological research, it tends to be regarded as highly speculative and is sometimes cited as the Achilles' heel of gestalt theory. Thus, if one intended to present gestalt psychology in an un- favorable light, it would be expedient to focus almost exclusively on isomorphism while ignoring the lasting and more valuable findings with which it is identified in virtually every definition except Carrier's.

2. In Carrier's essay, we are told that "psychologists studying perception today are not especially concerned with gestalt psychology". This is true, since gestalt psychology is an historical phenomenon which flourished 50 years ago. On the other hand, Carrier does not mention that virtually all of the findings of gestalt psychology (excepting the one that he dwells on, isomorphism) have been absorbed by subsequent schools of psychology. In other words, among psychologists studying perception today, each and every one makes use of psychological principles which were initially championed by gestalt psychology.

3. To my knowledge, Carrier's essay is the only synopsis of gestalt psychology that omits the "principles of perceptual organization", including such factors as figure/ground, similarity grouping, proxi- mity grouping, continuity, closure, et cetera. If Carrier is not consciously aware of these perceptual principles, he employs them naively whenever he writes: printing his essay in black ink on white paper, by clustering letters to formulate words, by indenting paragraphs, and so on. In the education of an artist, as distinct from the training of philosophers and art historians, these principles of perceptual organi- zation-also known as 'unit forming factors' or 'design principles'-are studied in the freshman year. That we unavoidably see the world in accordance with these principles would appear to be confirmed by the universality of visual camouflage (both natural and military), which is the deliberate use of these laws for deceptive purposes.

Roy R. Behrens Ballast Quarterly Review

113 West Gaston Savannah, Georgia 31401 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS

The focus of my reply to Rudolf Arnheim was on Arnheim's theory of art, not, as Behrens implies, on a general discussion of gestalt psychology. For that reason, most of his informative discussion is quite beside the point. My goal was not to

The focus of my reply to Rudolf Arnheim was on Arnheim's theory of art, not, as Behrens implies, on a general discussion of gestalt psychology. For that reason, most of his informative discussion is quite beside the point. My goal was not to

The focus of my reply to Rudolf Arnheim was on Arnheim's theory of art, not, as Behrens implies, on a general discussion of gestalt psychology. For that reason, most of his informative discussion is quite beside the point. My goal was not to

The focus of my reply to Rudolf Arnheim was on Arnheim's theory of art, not, as Behrens implies, on a general discussion of gestalt psychology. For that reason, most of his informative discussion is quite beside the point. My goal was not to

discredit gestalt psychology, but to point to the ways in which gestalt psychology as presented by Arnheim does not, so I argued, adequately address the issues presented in my article, which Arnheim so kindly took the time to discuss.

As for the claim that gestalt psycho- logists have dropped reference to iso- morphism, I would note that Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 50-1) presents a traditional statement of that doctrine. As for the claim that present-day psycho- logists use the principles of gestalt psychology, I would call attention to Herbert Simon's denial that perception of three-dimensional figures is "'holistic' in any simple sense" (Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought, New Haven and London, 1979, p. 359) and the account of perception to be found in Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco, 1976). That we make figure/ground distinctions and the other discriminations mentioned by Behrens is a fact known long before the creation of gestalt psychology; how to explain this capacity is an issue worth study. My point, simply, is that the ways gestalt psychology talks about these capacities, at least as we find in Arnheim's books, do not provide a productive mass of understanding visual art. Behrens' reply would be more effective could he demonstrate how a psychologist might provide the art historian with ways of describing paintings.

David Carrier Department of Philosophy

CArnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS: CONCERNING ISOMORPHISM

Roy R. Behrens' observations on the abiding usefulness of the gestalt principles in artistic theory and practice should be supplemented by a comment on 'iso- morphism'. This concept is not limited to the relation between perceptual pheno- mena and the corresponding neurological processes. It refers to any structural analogy between patterns located in different media, and in this broader sense it is of central relevance to gestalt theory itself as well as to its applications in the arts. When one tries to understand how the melodic and harmonic patterns of music or the motions of a dancer convey

discredit gestalt psychology, but to point to the ways in which gestalt psychology as presented by Arnheim does not, so I argued, adequately address the issues presented in my article, which Arnheim so kindly took the time to discuss.

As for the claim that gestalt psycho- logists have dropped reference to iso- morphism, I would note that Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 50-1) presents a traditional statement of that doctrine. As for the claim that present-day psycho- logists use the principles of gestalt psychology, I would call attention to Herbert Simon's denial that perception of three-dimensional figures is "'holistic' in any simple sense" (Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought, New Haven and London, 1979, p. 359) and the account of perception to be found in Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco, 1976). That we make figure/ground distinctions and the other discriminations mentioned by Behrens is a fact known long before the creation of gestalt psychology; how to explain this capacity is an issue worth study. My point, simply, is that the ways gestalt psychology talks about these capacities, at least as we find in Arnheim's books, do not provide a productive mass of understanding visual art. Behrens' reply would be more effective could he demonstrate how a psychologist might provide the art historian with ways of describing paintings.

David Carrier Department of Philosophy

CArnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS: CONCERNING ISOMORPHISM

Roy R. Behrens' observations on the abiding usefulness of the gestalt principles in artistic theory and practice should be supplemented by a comment on 'iso- morphism'. This concept is not limited to the relation between perceptual pheno- mena and the corresponding neurological processes. It refers to any structural analogy between patterns located in different media, and in this broader sense it is of central relevance to gestalt theory itself as well as to its applications in the arts. When one tries to understand how the melodic and harmonic patterns of music or the motions of a dancer convey

discredit gestalt psychology, but to point to the ways in which gestalt psychology as presented by Arnheim does not, so I argued, adequately address the issues presented in my article, which Arnheim so kindly took the time to discuss.

As for the claim that gestalt psycho- logists have dropped reference to iso- morphism, I would note that Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 50-1) presents a traditional statement of that doctrine. As for the claim that present-day psycho- logists use the principles of gestalt psychology, I would call attention to Herbert Simon's denial that perception of three-dimensional figures is "'holistic' in any simple sense" (Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought, New Haven and London, 1979, p. 359) and the account of perception to be found in Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco, 1976). That we make figure/ground distinctions and the other discriminations mentioned by Behrens is a fact known long before the creation of gestalt psychology; how to explain this capacity is an issue worth study. My point, simply, is that the ways gestalt psychology talks about these capacities, at least as we find in Arnheim's books, do not provide a productive mass of understanding visual art. Behrens' reply would be more effective could he demonstrate how a psychologist might provide the art historian with ways of describing paintings.

David Carrier Department of Philosophy

CArnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS: CONCERNING ISOMORPHISM

Roy R. Behrens' observations on the abiding usefulness of the gestalt principles in artistic theory and practice should be supplemented by a comment on 'iso- morphism'. This concept is not limited to the relation between perceptual pheno- mena and the corresponding neurological processes. It refers to any structural analogy between patterns located in different media, and in this broader sense it is of central relevance to gestalt theory itself as well as to its applications in the arts. When one tries to understand how the melodic and harmonic patterns of music or the motions of a dancer convey

discredit gestalt psychology, but to point to the ways in which gestalt psychology as presented by Arnheim does not, so I argued, adequately address the issues presented in my article, which Arnheim so kindly took the time to discuss.

As for the claim that gestalt psycho- logists have dropped reference to iso- morphism, I would note that Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 50-1) presents a traditional statement of that doctrine. As for the claim that present-day psycho- logists use the principles of gestalt psychology, I would call attention to Herbert Simon's denial that perception of three-dimensional figures is "'holistic' in any simple sense" (Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought, New Haven and London, 1979, p. 359) and the account of perception to be found in Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco, 1976). That we make figure/ground distinctions and the other discriminations mentioned by Behrens is a fact known long before the creation of gestalt psychology; how to explain this capacity is an issue worth study. My point, simply, is that the ways gestalt psychology talks about these capacities, at least as we find in Arnheim's books, do not provide a productive mass of understanding visual art. Behrens' reply would be more effective could he demonstrate how a psychologist might provide the art historian with ways of describing paintings.

David Carrier Department of Philosophy

CArnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS: CONCERNING ISOMORPHISM

Roy R. Behrens' observations on the abiding usefulness of the gestalt principles in artistic theory and practice should be supplemented by a comment on 'iso- morphism'. This concept is not limited to the relation between perceptual pheno- mena and the corresponding neurological processes. It refers to any structural analogy between patterns located in different media, and in this broader sense it is of central relevance to gestalt theory itself as well as to its applications in the arts. When one tries to understand how the melodic and harmonic patterns of music or the motions of a dancer convey their expressive meaning with such striking immediacy, the isomorphic relation between the shapes and colors perceived and the meanings transmitted by them is the only base from which a concrete analysis of practical examples can be

their expressive meaning with such striking immediacy, the isomorphic relation between the shapes and colors perceived and the meanings transmitted by them is the only base from which a concrete analysis of practical examples can be

their expressive meaning with such striking immediacy, the isomorphic relation between the shapes and colors perceived and the meanings transmitted by them is the only base from which a concrete analysis of practical examples can be

their expressive meaning with such striking immediacy, the isomorphic relation between the shapes and colors perceived and the meanings transmitted by them is the only base from which a concrete analysis of practical examples can be

undertaken. The same is true for the spontaneous symbolism of compositional patterns in painting, sculpture and architecture. I myself have spent a lifetime demonstrating by any number of examples how this most effective tool allows us to deal with the interaction of form and content in the arts.

Behrens is correct in saying that the particular neurological mechanisms pro- posed by W. K6hler on the basis of his experiments have led to controversy. This does not mean that the general notion of an isomorphic relation between the processes of perception and those taking place in the nervous system should be discarded. To me it has always seemed most economical to assume that when experiences are subject to gestalt principles, their physiological correlates will turn out eventually to be gestalten also. Beyond that, we had better leave the nervous system to the experts.

Rudolf Arnheim 1113 South Seventh Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN PAINTING: A

QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION OF TRENDS IN STYLE AND CONTENT FROM THE LATE GOTHIC TO THE ROCOCO

PERIOD"

While an article on empirical aesthetics (Leonardo 19, 217-222, 1986) is welcomed in a journal such as Leonardo, I have some comments or observations not only about Martindale's noble efforts but about empirical research in the arts as well. My problems with Martindale's paper are both conceptual and methodological.

Methodological Concerns

Since many of the research workers in this field are psychologists, they use students from Psychology 100 classes, students who are by definition naive subjects. Should not some comparisons be made with subjects from art, design and art history classes? I question the relevance of those theories of empirical aesthetics that are based upon the responses of naive subjects only. George Dickie at the University of Illinois made these same observations in a paper

undertaken. The same is true for the spontaneous symbolism of compositional patterns in painting, sculpture and architecture. I myself have spent a lifetime demonstrating by any number of examples how this most effective tool allows us to deal with the interaction of form and content in the arts.

Behrens is correct in saying that the particular neurological mechanisms pro- posed by W. K6hler on the basis of his experiments have led to controversy. This does not mean that the general notion of an isomorphic relation between the processes of perception and those taking place in the nervous system should be discarded. To me it has always seemed most economical to assume that when experiences are subject to gestalt principles, their physiological correlates will turn out eventually to be gestalten also. Beyond that, we had better leave the nervous system to the experts.

Rudolf Arnheim 1113 South Seventh Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN PAINTING: A

QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION OF TRENDS IN STYLE AND CONTENT FROM THE LATE GOTHIC TO THE ROCOCO

PERIOD"

While an article on empirical aesthetics (Leonardo 19, 217-222, 1986) is welcomed in a journal such as Leonardo, I have some comments or observations not only about Martindale's noble efforts but about empirical research in the arts as well. My problems with Martindale's paper are both conceptual and methodological.

Methodological Concerns

Since many of the research workers in this field are psychologists, they use students from Psychology 100 classes, students who are by definition naive subjects. Should not some comparisons be made with subjects from art, design and art history classes? I question the relevance of those theories of empirical aesthetics that are based upon the responses of naive subjects only. George Dickie at the University of Illinois made these same observations in a paper

undertaken. The same is true for the spontaneous symbolism of compositional patterns in painting, sculpture and architecture. I myself have spent a lifetime demonstrating by any number of examples how this most effective tool allows us to deal with the interaction of form and content in the arts.

Behrens is correct in saying that the particular neurological mechanisms pro- posed by W. K6hler on the basis of his experiments have led to controversy. This does not mean that the general notion of an isomorphic relation between the processes of perception and those taking place in the nervous system should be discarded. To me it has always seemed most economical to assume that when experiences are subject to gestalt principles, their physiological correlates will turn out eventually to be gestalten also. Beyond that, we had better leave the nervous system to the experts.

Rudolf Arnheim 1113 South Seventh Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN PAINTING: A

QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION OF TRENDS IN STYLE AND CONTENT FROM THE LATE GOTHIC TO THE ROCOCO

PERIOD"

While an article on empirical aesthetics (Leonardo 19, 217-222, 1986) is welcomed in a journal such as Leonardo, I have some comments or observations not only about Martindale's noble efforts but about empirical research in the arts as well. My problems with Martindale's paper are both conceptual and methodological.

Methodological Concerns

Since many of the research workers in this field are psychologists, they use students from Psychology 100 classes, students who are by definition naive subjects. Should not some comparisons be made with subjects from art, design and art history classes? I question the relevance of those theories of empirical aesthetics that are based upon the responses of naive subjects only. George Dickie at the University of Illinois made these same observations in a paper

undertaken. The same is true for the spontaneous symbolism of compositional patterns in painting, sculpture and architecture. I myself have spent a lifetime demonstrating by any number of examples how this most effective tool allows us to deal with the interaction of form and content in the arts.

Behrens is correct in saying that the particular neurological mechanisms pro- posed by W. K6hler on the basis of his experiments have led to controversy. This does not mean that the general notion of an isomorphic relation between the processes of perception and those taking place in the nervous system should be discarded. To me it has always seemed most economical to assume that when experiences are subject to gestalt principles, their physiological correlates will turn out eventually to be gestalten also. Beyond that, we had better leave the nervous system to the experts.

Rudolf Arnheim 1113 South Seventh Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN PAINTING: A

QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION OF TRENDS IN STYLE AND CONTENT FROM THE LATE GOTHIC TO THE ROCOCO

PERIOD"

While an article on empirical aesthetics (Leonardo 19, 217-222, 1986) is welcomed in a journal such as Leonardo, I have some comments or observations not only about Martindale's noble efforts but about empirical research in the arts as well. My problems with Martindale's paper are both conceptual and methodological.

Methodological Concerns

Since many of the research workers in this field are psychologists, they use students from Psychology 100 classes, students who are by definition naive subjects. Should not some comparisons be made with subjects from art, design and art history classes? I question the relevance of those theories of empirical aesthetics that are based upon the responses of naive subjects only. George Dickie at the University of Illinois made these same observations in a paper published more than 20 years ago that was entitled "Is Psychology Relevant to Art?" The questions posed in Dickie's paper seem to be more than relevant to Martindale's research. A second problem is, why select artists based on listings in an

published more than 20 years ago that was entitled "Is Psychology Relevant to Art?" The questions posed in Dickie's paper seem to be more than relevant to Martindale's research. A second problem is, why select artists based on listings in an

published more than 20 years ago that was entitled "Is Psychology Relevant to Art?" The questions posed in Dickie's paper seem to be more than relevant to Martindale's research. A second problem is, why select artists based on listings in an

published more than 20 years ago that was entitled "Is Psychology Relevant to Art?" The questions posed in Dickie's paper seem to be more than relevant to Martindale's research. A second problem is, why select artists based on listings in an

Commentaries Commentaries Commentaries Commentaries 210 210 210 210

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art directory? Criteria for selecting artists could be made on historical or stylistic criteria. There does not seem to me to be anything incorrect about selection of artists and works on grounds other than some purely quantitative criterion like the one used in this study.

Are not too many periods and styles of art presented? Since Martindale has used 22 different scales upon which the subjects made judgments would it have not been better to limit the periods of art covered to, for instance, the high Renaissance? I do wish, however, to commend Martindale for his use of artworks other than those from the twentieth century, which in my judgment is an over-tested period of art.

Theoretical Concerns

Since Martindale has addressed stylistic concerns it might have been better to use as subjects individuals with some know- ledge about that which they were asked to make judgments. By his own data, his subjects knew almost nothing about art. Should he not at least try to compare the ratings of his naive subjects with those with some artistic knowledge?

He makes the following statement: "With repeated presentations, a work of art loses its arousal potential because of habituation. Eventually, this will lead to a decrease in preference, since preference is dependent upon arousal potential." This is a most curious statement, for it hypothesizes the opposite of what those concerned with education in the arts might advance as a theoretical position. It would seem that the basis of most courses in art appreciation is towards more not less exposure to art.

Martindale further states: "Thus suc- cessive artists are under constant pressure to increase the arousal potential of their works in order to counter the effects of habituation." While the above statement may be an interesting thesis, one doubts that its merit can be proved by quantitative studies such as the one by Martindale.

Martindale does deserve credit for advancing some questions of historical and aesthetic interest but I believe those questions might be better tested by groups of knowledgeable rather than naive subjects. He has addressed issues and used complex scales which require some degree of knowledge about art, which according to his own data his subjects did not possess.

art directory? Criteria for selecting artists could be made on historical or stylistic criteria. There does not seem to me to be anything incorrect about selection of artists and works on grounds other than some purely quantitative criterion like the one used in this study.

Are not too many periods and styles of art presented? Since Martindale has used 22 different scales upon which the subjects made judgments would it have not been better to limit the periods of art covered to, for instance, the high Renaissance? I do wish, however, to commend Martindale for his use of artworks other than those from the twentieth century, which in my judgment is an over-tested period of art.

Theoretical Concerns

Since Martindale has addressed stylistic concerns it might have been better to use as subjects individuals with some know- ledge about that which they were asked to make judgments. By his own data, his subjects knew almost nothing about art. Should he not at least try to compare the ratings of his naive subjects with those with some artistic knowledge?

He makes the following statement: "With repeated presentations, a work of art loses its arousal potential because of habituation. Eventually, this will lead to a decrease in preference, since preference is dependent upon arousal potential." This is a most curious statement, for it hypothesizes the opposite of what those concerned with education in the arts might advance as a theoretical position. It would seem that the basis of most courses in art appreciation is towards more not less exposure to art.

Martindale further states: "Thus suc- cessive artists are under constant pressure to increase the arousal potential of their works in order to counter the effects of habituation." While the above statement may be an interesting thesis, one doubts that its merit can be proved by quantitative studies such as the one by Martindale.

Martindale does deserve credit for advancing some questions of historical and aesthetic interest but I believe those questions might be better tested by groups of knowledgeable rather than naive subjects. He has addressed issues and used complex scales which require some degree of knowledge about art, which according to his own data his subjects did not possess.

art directory? Criteria for selecting artists could be made on historical or stylistic criteria. There does not seem to me to be anything incorrect about selection of artists and works on grounds other than some purely quantitative criterion like the one used in this study.

Are not too many periods and styles of art presented? Since Martindale has used 22 different scales upon which the subjects made judgments would it have not been better to limit the periods of art covered to, for instance, the high Renaissance? I do wish, however, to commend Martindale for his use of artworks other than those from the twentieth century, which in my judgment is an over-tested period of art.

Theoretical Concerns

Since Martindale has addressed stylistic concerns it might have been better to use as subjects individuals with some know- ledge about that which they were asked to make judgments. By his own data, his subjects knew almost nothing about art. Should he not at least try to compare the ratings of his naive subjects with those with some artistic knowledge?

He makes the following statement: "With repeated presentations, a work of art loses its arousal potential because of habituation. Eventually, this will lead to a decrease in preference, since preference is dependent upon arousal potential." This is a most curious statement, for it hypothesizes the opposite of what those concerned with education in the arts might advance as a theoretical position. It would seem that the basis of most courses in art appreciation is towards more not less exposure to art.

Martindale further states: "Thus suc- cessive artists are under constant pressure to increase the arousal potential of their works in order to counter the effects of habituation." While the above statement may be an interesting thesis, one doubts that its merit can be proved by quantitative studies such as the one by Martindale.

Martindale does deserve credit for advancing some questions of historical and aesthetic interest but I believe those questions might be better tested by groups of knowledgeable rather than naive subjects. He has addressed issues and used complex scales which require some degree of knowledge about art, which according to his own data his subjects did not possess.

More than 50 years ago the American educator and philosopher Thomas Munro in his book Towards a Scientific Aesthetic set an agenda for studies in aesthetic preference. Martindale deserves great credit for moving ahead and addressing

More than 50 years ago the American educator and philosopher Thomas Munro in his book Towards a Scientific Aesthetic set an agenda for studies in aesthetic preference. Martindale deserves great credit for moving ahead and addressing

More than 50 years ago the American educator and philosopher Thomas Munro in his book Towards a Scientific Aesthetic set an agenda for studies in aesthetic preference. Martindale deserves great credit for moving ahead and addressing

issues that Munro many years ago set forth as an agenda for empirical work in aesthetics. Only one wishes that he would pay more attention to art and less to psychology.

Harold J. McWhinnie Department of Housing and Design

Department of Curriculum and Instruction University of Maryland

College Park, MD 20742 U.S.A.

REPLY TO McWHINNIE: HOW SHOULD ART HISTORY BE

STUDIED?

Harold McWhinnie has raised several issues concerning empirical studies of the arts that may have occurred to other readers who are not familiar with the goals and methods of such studies. The concern of aesthetics and art history is not with physical works of art per se but with such works as they are created, perceived, understood and appreciated by human minds. It is difficult to understand how one could seriously question whether psychology is relevant to such enterprises. For various reasons, art theorists have often felt free to make up their own theories of mind rather than drawing upon scientific psychology. Such an approach is ill-advised, since such common-sense theories are apt to be incorrect.

In questioning the importance of habituation, McWhinnie himself illustrates this problem. The phenomenon of habituation-a stimulus looses impact value with repeated presentations-is quite well established by a large number of experiments. In the face of this evidence, uninformed opinions of art educators are not of the slightest relevance. McWhinnie goes on to state that my evolutionary theory of art history is interesting but cannot be proved by quantitative studies. Of course, scientific theories are never proved. Rather, we gather evidence-if possible, of a quanti- tative nature-that is supportive of them. The evolutionary theory could certainly be investigated in a qualitative manner. However, it would have taken a book rather than a short article to present the results of such an investigation.

If we are to conduct a scientific study of art history, how should we proceed? McWhinnie is dissatisfied with the quantitative methods I used in selecting artists to be studied. Would he have

issues that Munro many years ago set forth as an agenda for empirical work in aesthetics. Only one wishes that he would pay more attention to art and less to psychology.

Harold J. McWhinnie Department of Housing and Design

Department of Curriculum and Instruction University of Maryland

College Park, MD 20742 U.S.A.

REPLY TO McWHINNIE: HOW SHOULD ART HISTORY BE

STUDIED?

Harold McWhinnie has raised several issues concerning empirical studies of the arts that may have occurred to other readers who are not familiar with the goals and methods of such studies. The concern of aesthetics and art history is not with physical works of art per se but with such works as they are created, perceived, understood and appreciated by human minds. It is difficult to understand how one could seriously question whether psychology is relevant to such enterprises. For various reasons, art theorists have often felt free to make up their own theories of mind rather than drawing upon scientific psychology. Such an approach is ill-advised, since such common-sense theories are apt to be incorrect.

In questioning the importance of habituation, McWhinnie himself illustrates this problem. The phenomenon of habituation-a stimulus looses impact value with repeated presentations-is quite well established by a large number of experiments. In the face of this evidence, uninformed opinions of art educators are not of the slightest relevance. McWhinnie goes on to state that my evolutionary theory of art history is interesting but cannot be proved by quantitative studies. Of course, scientific theories are never proved. Rather, we gather evidence-if possible, of a quanti- tative nature-that is supportive of them. The evolutionary theory could certainly be investigated in a qualitative manner. However, it would have taken a book rather than a short article to present the results of such an investigation.

If we are to conduct a scientific study of art history, how should we proceed? McWhinnie is dissatisfied with the quantitative methods I used in selecting artists to be studied. Would he have

issues that Munro many years ago set forth as an agenda for empirical work in aesthetics. Only one wishes that he would pay more attention to art and less to psychology.

Harold J. McWhinnie Department of Housing and Design

Department of Curriculum and Instruction University of Maryland

College Park, MD 20742 U.S.A.

REPLY TO McWHINNIE: HOW SHOULD ART HISTORY BE

STUDIED?

Harold McWhinnie has raised several issues concerning empirical studies of the arts that may have occurred to other readers who are not familiar with the goals and methods of such studies. The concern of aesthetics and art history is not with physical works of art per se but with such works as they are created, perceived, understood and appreciated by human minds. It is difficult to understand how one could seriously question whether psychology is relevant to such enterprises. For various reasons, art theorists have often felt free to make up their own theories of mind rather than drawing upon scientific psychology. Such an approach is ill-advised, since such common-sense theories are apt to be incorrect.

In questioning the importance of habituation, McWhinnie himself illustrates this problem. The phenomenon of habituation-a stimulus looses impact value with repeated presentations-is quite well established by a large number of experiments. In the face of this evidence, uninformed opinions of art educators are not of the slightest relevance. McWhinnie goes on to state that my evolutionary theory of art history is interesting but cannot be proved by quantitative studies. Of course, scientific theories are never proved. Rather, we gather evidence-if possible, of a quanti- tative nature-that is supportive of them. The evolutionary theory could certainly be investigated in a qualitative manner. However, it would have taken a book rather than a short article to present the results of such an investigation.

If we are to conduct a scientific study of art history, how should we proceed? McWhinnie is dissatisfied with the quantitative methods I used in selecting artists to be studied. Would he have preferred that I select artists on subjective grounds-e.g., how well I liked them, how well they fit with my theory? Nonscientific investigations of art history are often profoundly misleading because

preferred that I select artists on subjective grounds-e.g., how well I liked them, how well they fit with my theory? Nonscientific investigations of art history are often profoundly misleading because

preferred that I select artists on subjective grounds-e.g., how well I liked them, how well they fit with my theory? Nonscientific investigations of art history are often profoundly misleading because

unsystematic 'pick and choose' methods of selection are used: periods with many interesting artists are overemphasized, whereas other periods are virtually ignored. The result is a sort of discon- tinuous history in which 'great men' are presumed to influence each other directly across sometimes vast historical voids. This can hardly be what actually happened in art history.

McWhinnie is disturbed that I asked naive subjects to provide me with ratings of the paintings that I studied. The reason I used naive subjects was that I wanted ratings that would be as objective as possible. Trained subjects are likely to give responses that are distorted by their training. For example, they are likely to see mannerist paintings as contorted because they have been taught to look for contortion in such paintings. By the same token, they may overlook contortion in Renaissance paintings because it is not 'supposed' to be there. Thus, in a study of the sort that I conducted, trained subjects were avoided for a definite purpose. McWhinnie is correct that psychologists often use naive subjects in their studies of art. Such people are, of course, easy to find, and this is sometimes the only reason they are used. As often as not, though, there is a good reason that they are used. We should be more careful to point out to interdisciplinary audiences what this reason is.

Colin Martindale Department of Psychology

University of Maine Orono, ME 04469 U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON EDITORIAL OPINIONS: LEONARDO VOL. 19,

No. 1 (1986) AND LEONARDO VOL. 19, No. 2 (1986)

The integration of art, science and technology is not a popular ideology, in general terms, with the art establishment in Britain today. The same "fragmentation and specialization of knowledge [which] seem[s] to conspire against any one individual contributing significantly to more than one domain .. ." [1] also deters and hinders the exchange of ideas in art and science. The structuring of the system of subject choices in Britain, from secondary school onwards, invites and encourages the channelling of ideas in one specific direction. Traditionally

unsystematic 'pick and choose' methods of selection are used: periods with many interesting artists are overemphasized, whereas other periods are virtually ignored. The result is a sort of discon- tinuous history in which 'great men' are presumed to influence each other directly across sometimes vast historical voids. This can hardly be what actually happened in art history.

McWhinnie is disturbed that I asked naive subjects to provide me with ratings of the paintings that I studied. The reason I used naive subjects was that I wanted ratings that would be as objective as possible. Trained subjects are likely to give responses that are distorted by their training. For example, they are likely to see mannerist paintings as contorted because they have been taught to look for contortion in such paintings. By the same token, they may overlook contortion in Renaissance paintings because it is not 'supposed' to be there. Thus, in a study of the sort that I conducted, trained subjects were avoided for a definite purpose. McWhinnie is correct that psychologists often use naive subjects in their studies of art. Such people are, of course, easy to find, and this is sometimes the only reason they are used. As often as not, though, there is a good reason that they are used. We should be more careful to point out to interdisciplinary audiences what this reason is.

Colin Martindale Department of Psychology

University of Maine Orono, ME 04469 U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON EDITORIAL OPINIONS: LEONARDO VOL. 19,

No. 1 (1986) AND LEONARDO VOL. 19, No. 2 (1986)

The integration of art, science and technology is not a popular ideology, in general terms, with the art establishment in Britain today. The same "fragmentation and specialization of knowledge [which] seem[s] to conspire against any one individual contributing significantly to more than one domain .. ." [1] also deters and hinders the exchange of ideas in art and science. The structuring of the system of subject choices in Britain, from secondary school onwards, invites and encourages the channelling of ideas in one specific direction. Traditionally

unsystematic 'pick and choose' methods of selection are used: periods with many interesting artists are overemphasized, whereas other periods are virtually ignored. The result is a sort of discon- tinuous history in which 'great men' are presumed to influence each other directly across sometimes vast historical voids. This can hardly be what actually happened in art history.

McWhinnie is disturbed that I asked naive subjects to provide me with ratings of the paintings that I studied. The reason I used naive subjects was that I wanted ratings that would be as objective as possible. Trained subjects are likely to give responses that are distorted by their training. For example, they are likely to see mannerist paintings as contorted because they have been taught to look for contortion in such paintings. By the same token, they may overlook contortion in Renaissance paintings because it is not 'supposed' to be there. Thus, in a study of the sort that I conducted, trained subjects were avoided for a definite purpose. McWhinnie is correct that psychologists often use naive subjects in their studies of art. Such people are, of course, easy to find, and this is sometimes the only reason they are used. As often as not, though, there is a good reason that they are used. We should be more careful to point out to interdisciplinary audiences what this reason is.

Colin Martindale Department of Psychology

University of Maine Orono, ME 04469 U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON EDITORIAL OPINIONS: LEONARDO VOL. 19,

No. 1 (1986) AND LEONARDO VOL. 19, No. 2 (1986)

The integration of art, science and technology is not a popular ideology, in general terms, with the art establishment in Britain today. The same "fragmentation and specialization of knowledge [which] seem[s] to conspire against any one individual contributing significantly to more than one domain .. ." [1] also deters and hinders the exchange of ideas in art and science. The structuring of the system of subject choices in Britain, from secondary school onwards, invites and encourages the channelling of ideas in one specific direction. Traditionally accepted combinations of subjects do little to help. Maybe this is inevitable. The concepts of synthesis seem to be far from the norm here.

"Artists working with contemporary science and technology clearly are

accepted combinations of subjects do little to help. Maybe this is inevitable. The concepts of synthesis seem to be far from the norm here.

"Artists working with contemporary science and technology clearly are

accepted combinations of subjects do little to help. Maybe this is inevitable. The concepts of synthesis seem to be far from the norm here.

"Artists working with contemporary science and technology clearly are

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