Soviet Foreign Policy Under Stalin

• Stalin and Lenin sought to mobilize anti-Versailles powers against Britain and France – so even Hitler was regarded as a potential ally.

• In 1934, after Hitler’s destruction of the KPD, a turn about took place.

Soviet Foreign Policy Under Stalin

• Even after Hitler dropped the Rapallo Agreement with the USSR, trade with Germany remained at earlier levels, not dropping until 1936. Soviet imports remained high to 1937. German staff at Tomka chemical weapons

facility, USSR, 1928.

Comintern Policy Under Stalin

• Just as Stalin controlled Soviet domestic policy, so too did he control that of the Comintern.

• He forced the organization to adopt an uncompromising position against even social democrats – which the Comintern called “social fascists.” They were vilified even more than right wingers.

Comintern Under Stalin

• In Germany the KPD (German Communist Party) was directed to join with the Nazis in attacking the Weimar Republic.

• When, in 1933, the Social Democrats made one last attempt to woo KPD support against Hitler, the KPD replied: “the Nazi’s take power. Then in four weeks the whole working class will be united under the leadership of the Communist Party. They were fatally wrong. The KPD were the first party destroyed by the Nazis.

Maxim Litvinov(17 July 1876 – 31

December 1951) was a Russian-Jewish

revolutionary and prominent Soviet diplomat.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the

Soviet Union In office

21 July 1930 – 3 May 1939

Litvinov’s Foreign Policy• To gain protection from the threat of Germany,

Stalin began to play a much more active role in world affairs.

• In 1934, the USSR joined the League of Nations (1 year after Germany & Japan left). This represented a significant shift away from previous Soviet opinion of the League of Nations. As the threat from Japan and Germany to the USSR increased, the USSR was willing to work with the League of Nations, which was based on the concept of collective security.

Litvinov’s Foreign Policy• In 1935, as Hitler had just remilitarized the Rhineland, which was in

direct defiance to the Treaty of Versailles, and an apparent threat to France. The USSR signed the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This treaty was very complicated and watered down, but it did diplomatically produce a threat of a two front war for Germany. Hitler used this pact to announce that Germany would be remilitarizing.

• The shift in USSR foreign policy and a new favorable stance toward the belief in collective security largely came due to the opinion of Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov. Litvinov, a Russian Jew. Litvinov believed in a much more western-oriented foreign policy. It was under Litvinov’s tenure as Foreign Minister that the USSR entered the League of Nations (he was representative from 1934-1938), became recognized by the USA, became involved in the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War, and worked on forming closer relations to France and Britain.

• The USA recognized the USSR in 1934.

• Both countries agreed to stop hostile propaganda against the other.

• For the USA this was to stop communist agitation in Depression era America.

• The Soviets hoped to use the USA to counter the Japanese in the Far East.

Soviet Foreign Policy Under Stalin

• Even after Hitler dropped the Rapallo Agreement with the USSR, trade with Germany remained at earlier levels, not dropping until 1936. Soviet imports remained high to 1937.

• Military cooperation continued to 1935.

German staff at Tomka chemical weapons facility, USSR, 1928.

The Popular Front• However, as early as 1933,

Litvinov began to distinguish between capitalist governments for the fist time.

• On February 6, 1934, the French Communist Party was still cooperating with the Far Right. 6 days later they turned completely around and began working with the Socialist trade unions against the Far Right.

• In November, the formation of a Popular Front Government with the Socialists was proposed.

The Popular Front

• In May, 1935 a Franco-Soviet Pact was signed – providing mutual support if a 3rd party attacked either.

• In the same month, a Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact was signed.

The Popular Front

• In July and August of 1935, the Comintern also adopted the idea of the Popular Front.

• They advocated cooperation with any group – rightist or leftist – to oppose Fascist or Japanese militarist aggression.

The Popular Front

• Popular Front governments were elected in France, Spain and Chile.• However, cooperation between Socialists and Communists remained

shaky and non-communists in all of these countries were deeply suspicious of the communists.

The Popular Front

• In France, the government of Leon Blum lasted only a year.

• French Conservatives and rightists sometimes used the slogan “Better Hitler than Leon Blum.”

The Popular Front

• Worse still, in Spain, their Popular Front government faced armed insurrection from Franco’s right wing alliance.

• Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Spain provided arms and men to the Nationalist rebels.

The Popular Front

• The Spanish Civil War presented Stalin with a dilemma.

• Should it intervene directly or abandon the Popular Front government?

• In 1936, it decided to offer help to the Spanish Government.

The Popular Front

• With the Fascists offering assistance, while the British and French insisted on non-intervention, the struggle favoured the Nationalists.

• To make matters worse, Communists and Socialists struggled with each other within the Republican government.

The Popular Front

• In November, 1938 Stalin decided to cut his losses.

• Aid ceased.• The International

Brigades (foreigners who signed up to fight against the fascists) were withdrawn.

The Popular Front• Though Spain was lost, the

Soviets did score propaganda success through its involvement.

• Anti-fascists everywhere noted that the USSR was the only government that was prepared to help the republicans

• Communist support was never stronger in the West than during this time.

• A shift in foreign policy• From wariness of the West – to active

engagement in world-order politics• Less ideology, more pragmatism• Non-aggression pacts• Development of trade and economic relations

with all countries• After Hitler’s coming to power – campaign for

collective security

BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PURGE

• In 1933, Stalin launched purge of party members– Cut membership by 33%– Partly the result of desire to rid

party of drunks, degenerates, self-seekers, and the lazy

• Had been done before– Also result of desire to get rid

of rank-and-file members who might one day support Stalin’s rivals

– Accomplished with little bloodshed

SERGE KIROV

• Communist Party had become unpopular by 1933– Even growing dissent within the

party itself• Some wanted to modify pace of

Five-Year Plans, improve living standards, and even replace Stalin

– Stalin wanted to execute all dissidents

• Blocked by Serge Kirov and four other members on the Politburo

– Kirov was party head from Leningrad

Stalin and Kirov

MURDER OF KIROV• Kirov was biggest threat to Stalin

– Popular, handsome, and Russian

• Kirov shot to death at Leningrad party headquarters in December 1934 by young party member– Stalin may have been behind crime

• Stalin blamed Kirov’s murder on a conspiracy made up followers of Zinoviev and Trotsky– Announced that persons accused of “preparing

terroristic acts” would be arrested and executed

• No appeal, no rights of defense• Carte blanche for mass judicial murder

THE GREAT PURGE TAKES OFF

• Non-Communists suffered the most from the executions that followed Kirov’s death

• Communists also arrested and imprisoned– Kamenev and Zinoviev

arrested

• Purged communists replaced by reliable young flunkies– Two of the most famous were

Nikita Khrushchev and Laurentii Beria

Beria

Krushchev

The trial of Kamenev and Zinoviev

• Both men were put on public trial in Moscow, charged with the murder of Kirov, and plotting to overthrow the Soviet State

• Both men pleaded guilty, and read their confessions out in court

• They were executed along with 14 other men accused of terrorist activities

ESCALATION• Local Communist Party organizations

receive letter in 1936 stating that too many “Trotskyite-Zinovievite monsters, enemies of the people, spies, provocateurs, diversionists, white guards, and kulaks” still existed and ordered that they be unmasked and punished– Signal for a mass orgy of

denunciations, confessions, arrests, and executions

• Fate of those denounced was always the same– Made to confess, always found

guilty, fired from job, and then deported to labor camp

Lubyanka heaquarters of the

secret police

NIGHTMARE• Zinoviev, Kamenev, and 14 others put on trial in

August 1936 for murder of Kirov– All confessed, implicated others, and were

executed• Bukharin and other former leaders met same fate• Army was then purged

– Including General Tukhachevsky, commander in chief of Red Army

– 80% of all colonels and 90% of all generals were purged

• Leadership of Young Communist League, factory managers, foreign communists, Civil War veterans, ex-Mensheviks, ex-SRs, friends of Kirov, and even workers were all purged– Once someone denounced you, no defense was

possibleGeneral Tukhachevsky

3 of the 5 Soviet Marshals were liquidatedMikhail Tukhachevsky, Vasily Blyukher and Aleksandr Yegorov

THE END• An estimated one to ten million

people died during Great Purge

• In 1938, Stalin suddenly stopped the purges– Blamed head of secret police,

Nicholai Yezhov, for the excesses of the purges and had him executed

• Replaced by Beria– Pace of arrests slowed (although

they never completely stopped) and some labor camps inmates were released

– New members recruited into partyNicholai Yezhov

• Images of executed or imprisoned people were doctored to remove them from photos, giving the impression that they did not exist. The person removed here is Yezhov.

In September 1931 rogue officers planted a bomb near a railway in Mukden to justify a Japanese invasion of

Manchuria

Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in

February 1933 because it would not recognize

Manchukuo

In the 1920s France developed alliances with Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia

The Maginot Line (built 1930-34) reflected

declining interest in Eastern European

alliances

The original plan was adopted jointly with Belgium, but that country soon reverted to neutrality.

Louis Barthou French Minister

of Foreign Affairs d. 1934

was a devout supporter of

Franco-Soviet alliance against the Nazi threat.

Prime Ministers of France after Hitler came to power on 31 January 1933

Ivan MaiskiiSoviet Ambassador

to London 1932-1943

A former Menshevik who feared he

might be killed if he were not a success.

Appeasement• Stalin tried to get

Western support against the Fascists, but with little success.

• During the 1938 Sudeten crisis, Stalin offered to back up the Czechoslovakian government against a threatened German attack.

Appeasement• Britain and France agreed

to discuss the future of Czechoslovakia with Germany and Italy in September, 1938.

• Neither the Czechs nor the Soviets were invited.

• Stalin drew the conclusion that the West could not be relied upon to resist Hitler.

Neville Chamberlain, the PM of GB in Munich

Stalin uninvited intruding Munich talks

Chamberlain Peace in our time

Edouard Daladier

at Munich he betrayed both Czechoslovaks

and the Soviets

The Sudetenland (bright purple)

Appeasement• When Hitler tore

up his 1938 agreement and occupied the remainder of the Czech portion of Czechoslovakia in the Spring of 1939, Stalin again noted Western inaction.

Appeasement Ends• After March, 1939,

British attitudes shifted.• Britain and France

opened up talks with the Soviets, hoping to form an alliance against Hitler.

• There was little the West could offer Stalin except that the Soviets would do most of the fighting and that they would not be rewarded with any territory for doing so.

Allied Military Mission to Moscow, 1939

German Expansion, 1936-1939

Viacheslav Molotov

became the minister of

Foreign Affairs of USSR in May 1939, replacing Jewish Maxim

Litvinov.

German Foreign Minister

Ribbentrop & Molotov sign

pact

The Nazi-Soviet Pact, 23 August 1939• Hitler had far

more to offer. • The Germans

would divide Eastern Europe between them, and there would be no need to fight.

Nazi-Soviet Pact• Hitler now

had a free hand in Europe.

• Stalin thought that the capitalists would now fight a long, drawn-out struggle, while the USSR built its strength while staying out of the conflict.

Soviet supplies getting ready for shipment to Germany

Stalin had also problems in the Far East against the imperialism of Japan

Problems in the Far East

Japanese aggression in China (Manchukuo) Fighting on Mongolian border

Threat of 2-front war

The Nazi-Soviet Pact• Stalin could not have

been more wrong.• He was convinced Hitler

would not attack him for years.

• When Hitler did strike, Stalin was unready. The Soviets had abandoned their old pre-war defense works for new forward positions in readiness for new offensive plans.

• Soviet forces were caught completely unprepared.

Winter War Dec 1939-March 1940- inflict heavy damage & casualties on Soviets

- convinced Germans of Soviet military weakness

The start of Operation Barbarossa; the Wolf enters the Bear’s Den

• Invasion of the Soviet Union was not only inevitable, but imminent by June 1941. There was sufficient evidence, warnings, and leaks to confirm the fact that Hitler was planning a massive operation in the east, but despite the warnings and messages from his allies, German defectors, and his own spies (Richard Sorge operating in Tokyo) Stalin refused to acknowledge the threat of invasion and dismissed them all as an “elaborate provocation”.

• Stalin’s refusal to acknowledge the impending war, his purging of the Red Army Officer Corps between 1937-38 (Kennedy-Pipe 43), and the relative unpreparedness (for Blitzkrieg tactics), lack of training and experience of the Red Army, as well as possessing outdated vehicles, tanks and airplanes at the start of the war, all led to initial sweeping victories for the Nazi War Machine in the Soviet Union during the first few months of the war.

The Red Bear awakens . . . eventually• When news of the invasion reached Stalin, he still firmly believed that disaster could be

averted through negotiations, and he staunchly refused to allow artillery crews to open fire on the advancing Germans.

• When Stalin finally realized how critical the situation had become, he became traumatized and suffered a nervous breakdown: “The Dictator’s behaviour in the wake of the initial attack has been well documented. Gromyko recalls that Stalin was convinced that Hitler would honour the treaty. This view is reinforced by others, who also tell of Stalin’s shock and breakdown at the timing, if not the substance, of the German ‘betrayal’”.

• It wasn’t until July 3rd that Stalin finally addressed the Soviet people of the current state of affairs resulting from Hitler’s treachery. His speech involved nationalist rhetoric, calling for the destruction of the fascist invaders, implementation of ‘scorched-earth’ policy, and the creation of a partisan unit to guard and defend the motherland; despite his temporary lapse and breakdown, Stalin had awakened and transformed into the national leader that the Russian people could empathize and appeal to, someone who could assure them of victory.

• Regardless of the initial success of Operation Barbarossa in the first few months of the invasion, it was ultimately a failure by the end of 1941: the Germans ground to a halt just outside the gates of Moscow by November of the same year, and despite the better judgment and wisdom of his experienced generals and officers, Hitler was against a blitzkrieg strike at Moscow, instead, he ordered all three armies to “advance simultaneously, giving priority to a breakthrough in the south”.

• The loss of initiative against Moscow, combined with the onset of winter, the arrival of Zhukov to organize and coordinate the defense of the Russian capitol, and the failure to get Japan involved in the war against the Soviet Union, made Operation Barbarossa a failure.

1943: The Tide Turns• By 1943 the war in the Eastern front had changed: The

Red Army was more experienced, better equipped, and highly motivated to halt and crush the German invaders.

• The Battle of Stalingrad which ended with the surrender of the German Sixth army, and the first German field marshal of the war (Friedrich Paulus) on January 31st 1943, was the first turning point for the Red Army.

• However, while the destruction and surrender of the Sixth army was a severe loss, it was in no way a fatal blow to the Wehrmacht: as ‘Operation Citadel’ would show, the Germans were still capable of mounting large scale offensives across the vast Russian landscape.

• Approximately six months later, the Germans launched Operation Citadel to overwhelm the Kursk salient, and the largest ground battle in history began. Having received intelligence reports from allies, the Soviets were well prepared this time, and they entrenched themselves to meet the Germans head on: “The salient, an area about half the size of England, was stuffed with armour and infantry and awaited the next move”.

• On July 5th 1943, the 9th army and 4th Panzer division spearheaded the assault, thinking they could overwhelm the Soviet defenses with another blitzkrieg strike. Instead, they were met with fierce resistance in the form of tank traps, entrenched anti-tank infantry divisions, improved T-34 tanks, and Russian reserves ready to be called in for counter-attacks. After suffering countless setbacks, Op. Citadel was abandoned on July 13th, and the Wehrmacht suffered its most costly and severe defeat.

The Yalta Conference: Feb. 4-11, 1945• Meeting of the Big Three for discussion and cooperation over the future of Europe

following the defeat of Nazi Germany. • At the time of the conference, the Red Army was within 40 miles of Berlin, while

the Allied forces in the west were recovering from the ‘Battle of the Bulge’ in the Ardennes. Roosevelt himself informed Stalin that Eisenhower did not intend to cross the Rhine until March (Kennedy-Pipe 69).

• Stalin actually made it clear to Zhukov that he wanted Berlin taken as quickly as possible in February; however, on February 6, Stalin cancelled the demand, having received assurances from Churchill and Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would be guaranteed its own occupation zone in Germany after the war (Kennedy-Pipe 72).

• The main concerns and points of interest throughout the Yalta conference can be broken down into three categories:– The Polish Question– The future of Germany and the “Declaration on Liberated Europe”– The conditions for the entry of the Soviet Union into war with Japan

• The creation of the United Nations Organization was also discussed at the Yalta conference, but its importance was relatively low in comparison with the other three points, especially the future of Poland and Germany. Furthermore, the issue was generally agreed upon, with Stalin accepting the veto mechanism and reducing his demand of the number of general assembly seats for the Soviet Union from 15 to 3 (Nation 153).

The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences

Contention and Cooperation amongst the Titans

Yalta cont’d• The issue of Poland was of crucial significance for all three

powers. Poland was, after all, the reason why France and England declared war on Germany, and as such, it was a crucial point of interest between the two sides in the conference. Out of the eight meetings in the Yalta conference, seven of them involved the question of Poland, and four key aspects were discussed: – A formula for establishing a single provisional government for Poland.– How and when to hold free elections– Possible solutions to the future of Poland’s frontiers, both in the east

and the west– Steps designed to safeguard the security of the Soviet rear (Petro and

Rubinstein 48)

• Why was Poland such a significant point of conflict between the two sides?– For Stalin, Poland was a vital security interest that would act as an essential buffer zone

in the event of another invasion from the West. For Stalin and the Russian people, the Second World War had left a permanent scar on their outlook of life, especially considering the unprecedented figures and costs that the war had exacted on the Soviet Union (LaFeber 20).

– For Roosevelt, the future of Poland was a crucial factor for the future of Eastern and Central Europe, and Harriman (American ambassador to Russia) warned Roosevelt that “Stalin must not be allowed to establish “Totalitarianism” in Soviet-occupied territories,” and that unless they were willing to live in a Soviet-dominated world, they should do everything they can to economically assist states that were naturally friendly to them (LaFeber 17).

• Regarding Germany, the Big Three discussed the nature of how Germany should be dealt with after their unconditional surrender (which was agreed upon by all three heads) and how it would be partitioned to allow for a free and democratic Europe. Points of conflict were raised regarding the form of reparations that were to be paid out to the Soviet Union, and the inclusion of France into the partition system.

• Stalin was angered by the notion of France joining in the partition of Germany because of their poor performance in resisting and fighting Germany throughout the war. As for reparations, Stalin wanted to either destroy or relocate German industry to prevent them from dominating Europe in the future. He argued two points: that 80% of Germany’s industrial capacity should be dismantled, leaving the rest in control of the Allies; and that Germany would pay back the Soviet Union in reparations for the devastation that it caused during the war (Kennedy-Pipe 73).

The Far East: the secret protocol• The American delegation was also concerned with the entrance of the Soviet Union into the

war with Japan.• Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan under certain conditions:

– The preservation of the status quo in the Mongolian People’s Republic– The return of lost territories and rights that Russia had lost to Japan after the war of 1904-5, namely

the return of Southern Sakhalin and the annexation of the Kurile Islands– The restoration of former Russian economic privileges in Manchuria– The internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval

base of the Soviet Union restored (Petro and Rubinstein 49). • Roosevelt, with the advice and influence from Admirals Nimitz and King, and Generals

Marshall and McArthur, accepted the conditions under which Stalin proposed he would enter into war against Japan. The reasoning behind the need for Soviet entrance into the war was that it would take another eighteen months to defeat Japan after the defeat of Germany, and that the invasion of mainland Japan would cost America dearly in terms of casualties and resources (Petro and Rubinstein 49).

• These concessions gave the Soviet Union a greater commanding presence in the far east, greater than what they originally had prior to 1904. Ironically enough, three months after the defeat of Germany, the U.S.A. found itself in a position capable of bringing Japan to its knees without the aid or assistance of the Soviet Union (Petro and Rubinstein 49).

The results of Yalta: success or failure?• On the question of Poland, Stalin was resolute and unshakable in his insistence of its strategic importance

to the Soviet Union, and the maintenance of the pro-communist Lublin committee as the de facto government of Poland. Despite minor concessions and compromises made by Stalin to appease Roosevelt and Churchill on incorporating some pro-Western Poles in the government, the fact remained that Poland was securely within the Soviet sphere of influence; “the agreement was so elastic the Russians could stretch it from Yalta to Washington without breaking it” (LaFeber 16).

• Even when Roosevelt attempted to decrease the ‘elasticity’ of the compromise in Poland through his “Declaration of a Liberated Europe” it was amended by Stalin and eventually accepted by Roosevelt himself (LaFeber 16).

• Despite the gains that Stalin was able to pull out from the Yalta conference, there were still some issues and demands that were either compromised or rejected. The issue of reparations from Germany was left unresolved; a Reparation Committee was established, but there was no unanimous decision amongst the big three as to what the exact sum of reparations was to be set at (Nation 152).

• Furthermore, Stalin had to accept the role of France in post-war Germany as a concession to Churchill for giving him Poland as a buffer zone. Churchill argued that ‘France was as important to Great Britain as Poland was to the USSR (Nation 152).

• The Americans achieved their goals of getting the Soviet Union involved in the war against Japan, as well as setting up the basic foundations for the United Nations and the voting methods to be used in the Security Council (Petro and Rubinstein 48).

• In the end, the big three made compromises that would ensure mutual cooperation until the end of the war, and set the stage for a post-war peace following the defeat of Japan.

• The results of the Yalta conference can be seen as a success to an extent, in the form of cooperation between the three heads of the most powerful states in the world. It is especially impressive considering the fact that cooperation was achieved despite their opposing ideological interests:

– “The Yalta negotiators confronted numerous conflicts of interest, but a mutual willingness to compromise ultimately allowed the vital concerns of all participants to be accommodated” (Nation 152).

The Controversy behind Yalta• The results of the Yalta conference have sparked many debates and theories regarding a variety of issues,

ranging from the division of Europe to the treachery of the Soviet Union in failing to uphold its end of the bargain. Some claim that Eastern and Central Europe, along with parts of the far East, were sold out to Stalin, in return for recognition of American and British interests in Western Europe and Asia.

• This theory, however, ultimately fails. The agreements that were made concerning the control and influence over certain parts of Eastern and Central Europe were a reflection of the reality of the situation that encompassed the area following the Soviet thrusts into Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland throughout the course of the war: “if anything, what happened at Yalta was an attempt by the West to mitigate the reality of the Soviet control in the East” (Kennedy-Pipe 69).

• The reality of Yalta was both an affirmation of regional power politics and self-interested goals, as well as the desire to establish a peaceful and stable post-war setting that would accommodate all three powers: “what occurred at Yalta was a classic negotiating process characterized by hard-bargaining and mutual concessions . . . An encounter in which they prized agreement by traditional negotiation as preferable to unilateral action which might undermine the international stability” (Nation 153).

• When the Soviet Union intervened in the political affairs of Rumania two weeks after the Yalta conference, Roosevelt alleged that Stalin had fallen back on his word regarding the ‘Declaration of Liberated Europe.’ However, the case for Rumania was easily ripped apart by Molotov, and despite American dissatisfaction, the fact remained that Rumania was an integral part of the Soviet sphere of influence over Eastern Europe (LaFeber 17). Moreover, Churchill himself turned a blind eye to the events occurring in Rumania in return for Stalin’s non-intervention in Greece.

• These would inevitably affect the policies and politics that would be discussed at the conference in Potsdam in July 1945, following the defeat of Nazi Germany.

The Potsdam Conference: July 17 – August 1, 1945

• Occurring five months after the Yalta conference, the meetings in Potsdam revolved around some similar issues, but the context of the conference, and the actors, had changed dramatically.

• Germany had been defeated, Roosevelt was dead and replaced by Truman, the policies and concessions of Yalta were being questioned, and the successful testing of the atomic bomb would ultimately change the fate of the post-war world.

Objectives of Potsdam• The primary goals of the conference was to come to terms over three important issues that

were left unresolved from Yalta; the fate of former Nazi satellite states (especially Italy), the borders of Poland, and the question of reparations, which was the subject of much debate and contestation between all three sides (Yergin 114).

• The issue of reparations was contested between the two sides when the Americans and British argued that payments were to be made first to the creditors (American and British bankers), while Molotov argued that the Soviets required initial payments to offset the huge scale of destruction and devastation Germany had caused to the Soviet Union (Yergin 114).

• On matters of former satellite states there was also a failure of negotiations: when asked if Stalin would normalize relations with Italy, Stalin responded by basically asking Truman and the American government to normalize relations with Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. As Byrnes noted, however, Truman could not recognize the three Eastern European states, not with their current governments at least (Yergin 114).

• Finally, on the question of Poland’s frontiers, there too existed conflict. The American delegation in particular, feared that by giving more land to Poland, they were effectively constraining and damaging Germany’s potential economic and industrial rebirth (Yergin 115).

• Despite a complete failure of negotiations in the initial phase of the Potsdam conference, Yergin argues that there would eventually be renewed, and successful, attempts at resolving these disputes in the near future, thanks in part to the successful testing of the most destructive weapon invented by man.

The Atom Bomb and its political impact on post-war Europe and the

world• The atom bomb fundamentally changed the outlook, ambitions and goals of the

American delegation at the conference in Potsdam. The fact that America possessed a weapon more powerful than anything ever invented by man gave Truman an undeniable sense of superiority, and greater impatience, throughout the rest of the proceedings following successful confirmation of the bombs testing (Yergin 115).

• However, despite the change in attitude, Truman, and Byrnes in particular, pressed for a quick end to the conference by proposing a package deal that would serve the interests of the Soviet Union, Britain and America. A solution was offered on the issue of reparations, and Byrnes noted that if Stalin accepted the compromise on reparations, than the West would accept concessions on matters of territorial interest for the Soviet Union in the East, so long as interests over Italy and the West were respected by Stalin (Yergin 117).

• The logic behind a quick end to the conference was based on the strategic importance of constraining Soviet expansion and ambition in the far East, especially in Japan. With the Atom Bomb, America no longer needed Soviet assistance to crush Japan because an invasion was no longer necessary (Yergin 116).

The Atom Bomb cont’d• Why did the bomb suddenly change the ambitions and goals for Truman and allow

the American delegation to make concessions for the Soviet Union that were, up until that point, inconceivable? The answer lies in a statement made by General McArthur in response to the Atomic Bomb: “Well, this changes warfare!” Indeed, as Yergin notes, the leap in technological warfare “was a dismal promise to make geography meaningless” (Yergin 120).

• Before the bomb, concerns for the security of Eastern and Central Europe were dependant on conventional methods of warfare. The Bomb practically eliminated those barriers by making it possible to impose security on any location in the globe.

• Thus, while it could be argued that the bomb was an important factor that allowed the Big Three to make compromises and concessions that served their self-interests, the fact remains that the bomb inevitably resulted in a deep sense of insecurity (Yergin 120).

• When Truman first hinted to Stalin on July 24th that America possess a weapon of unimaginable power, Stalin responded, in an unflinching manner, that he hoped they would use it to its full potential against Japan (Nation 162).

Results of the Potsdam Conference: success or failure?

• Compromise was made to increase the frontiers of Poland, pushing it westward up to the Oder-Neisse line. In return, a demand for a fixed sum compensation out of Germany’s industry was dropped by Stalin. Instead, it was agreed upon by the Big Three that reparations would be extracted out of their own occupation zones, with the Soviet Union being allowed an additional 15% of ‘unnecessary’ capital equipment out of Western zones in return for raw materials and foodstuffs from the East, and an additional 10% with no exchange (Yergin 117-18).

• Regarding the spheres of influence over Europe, the common approach was to let each side retain their separate interests in their own zones, for lack of a better approach: “Because they could not agree on how to govern Europe, they began to divide it” (Yergin 118).

• Thus, the fate of Eastern Europe was left in the hands of the Soviet Union, while Italy remained in the hands of the Western powers (Yergin 118).

• Like Yalta, the Potsdam conference can be seen as a success in the form of mutual cooperation between the two emerging superpowers of the world. Despite their radically polarized perspectives and ambitions, Truman and Stalin, with the help of their aides and advisors, were able to hammer out a post-war environment that left both sides relatively satisfied.

• However, like Yalta, Potsdam can also be seen as a failure due to some of the controversies that arose shortly after its conclusion. The weight of the Atomic Bomb had cast an uncertain future for the balance of power in not only Europe, but of the world.

Conclusion: the stage is set for the Cold War

The conferences held at Yalta and Potsdam can be argued to have laid the foundations for the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. The short-term considerations that were achieved at both conferences reflected the self-interested objectives that the Big Three had in mind for their respective spheres of influence. The principle factor that guided the conferences was based on mutual cooperation to end the war, and the desire for peaceful co-existence in the post-war period. By Yalta, the Soviet Union stood as a military superpower that was more than capable of finishing Germany off on her own. The concessions made by Churchill and Roosevelt was a reflection of this reality. Consequently, Truman and the American delegation, fearful of the threat that the Soviets posed on all of Europe, were determined to take a hard-line approach to curtail Soviet interests and ambitions, at least until the advent of the bomb. And while the Cold War was practically inevitable with the introduction of the bomb, it seemed, for a short while, that diplomacy and co-existence was possible, and that after witnessing the most destructive, costly, horrific, and inhumane war in history, peace was perhaps somewhat plausible. The use of the bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, shattered that vision, and the consequent political and ideological struggles of the following year between the two superpowers made the Cold War an inevitable consequence.

Rokossovsky and ZhukovThe two top generals who won the war in the east.

Both of them were Tsarist NCOs. Rokossovsky suffered in the Stalinist torture chambers before the

war.

Yalta Conference, February 1945

Casablanca, January 1943

Roosevelt first suggested insisting

that the Axispowers surrender unconditionally.

Churchill, taken by surprise, disliked that

idea as involving a likely prolongation of

the war.

The "Big Three" at the Tehran Conference28 November – 1 December 1943

The Percentages agreement, also known as the "Naughty document", was an alleged agreement between Soviet

premier Joseph Stalin and British prime minister Winston

Churchill about how to divide southeastern Europe into

spheres of influence. September 1944

Why was the USSR victorious?• Outnumbered Axis forces • Russian winter – repeatedly upset Nazi plans (1941 - 42, 1942 – 43)• Resilience & determination of the Russian people (over 17 million killed, but they

still fought on!) – ‘Borodino spirit’ – fostered by Stalin’s successful propaganda campaigns to raise morale, inc. not persecuting the Church (prepared to use any means to give the Russians the will to fight on)

• Strong leadership – Stalin (civil) & Zhukov (military) – Zhukov was largely given a free hand by Stalin in conducting the war, unlike Hitler who constantly meddled in military plans - Red Army reorganised effectively into modern fighting force with specialist units - ‘Tank Armies’; ‘Shock Armies’; partisans behind enemy lines; massed artillery formations - after damage of the Purges, Winter War & initial disaster of 1941.

• Terror among civilians and soldiers enforced by the NKVD & Death to Spies – ultimately the Soviet peoples had to fight even if they did not want to.

• Hatred of Nazis (sworn enemies of Communism) – especially after the atrocities committed against Soviet civilians.

• T34 tank – a decisive weapon – mass-produced – best tank of the war• Industrial production continued in the east – 1300 factories moved from the war

zone to the new industrial areas beyond the Urals e.g. Magnitogorsk.• Aid from the western allies – intelligence reports from UK, (code-breaking carried

out by ULTRA) and industrial products from USA (Lend-Lease Agreement from 1941) – maintained Soviet war production.

Europe 1946

Stalin in 1945Stalin in 1945 Under his leadership the USSR had won WWII (1945 – adopted

the title Generalissimo to stress his part in ultimate victory). The Red Army had advanced into the heart of Europe – How did Stalin’s priorities now change?

Creating a truly Communist society remained the stated goal of the USSR, but the entrenched power of Stalin & the Communist Party made this impossible.

‘Socialism in One Country’ could no longer be the rationale for Soviet policy – the USSR’s conquest of much of eastern and central Europe meant it was no longer the only Socialist state in the world. It had become a ‘superpower’ whose military might made it a far greater threat to its Capitalist neighbours than the USSR of the 1920s and 30s.

A huge amount of Soviet territory had been devastated by the Nazi invasion. Reconstruction of the Soviet economy was now necessary.

Stalin’s position as leader was secure (although he was no less paranoid) – he no longer exercised strict control over political appointments (everyone in high office owed their position to him anyway), but he maintained his supremacy through intrigue, cold-bloodedly fostering suspicion, fear and rivalry among his subordinates.