searle, intentionality, and the future of classifier systems

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Illinois Genetic Algorithms Laboratory Department of General Engineering University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Urbana, IL 61801. Searle, Intentionality, and the Future of Classifier Systems David E. Goldberg Illinois Genetic Algorithms Laboratory University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Urbana, IL 61801 [email protected]

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Page 1: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Illinois Genetic Algorithms LaboratoryDepartment of General EngineeringUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbana, IL 61801.

Searle, Intentionality, and theFuture of Classifier Systems

David E. GoldbergIllinois Genetic Algorithms Laboratory

University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbana, IL 61801

[email protected]

Page 2: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

1980 v. Now

Remember thinking how cool LCSswere.

Just apply them to gas pipelinesand voila, all AI problems ofWestern Civilization would besolved.

Started to ask John for examplesof successful application.

Found out that I was in themiddle of an interesting idea, nota working computer program.

John H. Holland (b. 1929)

Page 3: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Roadmap

Are we happy with LCSs? What’s Searle got to do with it. Revisiting the Chinese room. Art Burkes had it right. Designing a conscious computer. Searlean program for LCSs:

– Computational consciousness not impossible.– From consciousness to intentionality.– Intentionality and beyond.

What are we missing? What should we do?

Page 4: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Are We Happy With LCSs?

Have made progress:– Increasingly competent, solve hard problems

quickly reliably and accurately.– Principled manner.

But don’t seem very intelligent:– Do what we tell them.– Not autonomous in any serious sense.– Our discussions are largely technical.– Are we focused on right problems?

Page 5: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

What’s Searle Got to Do With It?

Mill Prof of Philosophy of Berkeley. Philosopher of language and mind. Early work took off from Austin’s work on

speech acts. Searle is Darth Vader of artificial

intelligence. Notorious Chinese Room argument has

always puzzled me. In many ways, Searle is high philosophical

priest of emergence. Rejects dualism & materialism. Couldn’t understand how he could miss

possibility of more than mere systacticaltranslation.

John R. Searle (b. 1932)

Page 6: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

The Chinese Room Argument

Strong AI is not possible on a computer. Monolingual English speaker in a room with

– Chinese writing (story)– 2nd Chinese symbols (questions)– Instructions in English for relating first set of symbols

to second.– 3rd set of Chinese symbols (answers)

English speaker does not understand Chinese evenif answers are indistinguishable from those ofChinese speaker.

Page 7: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Cracks in the Chinese Room

Mind, Language & Society,Basic Books, 1998, p. 53.

“When I say that the brainis a biological organ andconsciousness a biologicalprocess, I do not, of course,say or imply that it wouldbe impossible to produce anartificial brain out ofnonbiological materials.”

Page 8: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

More Searle

“The heart is also a biological organ, and thepumping of blood a biological process, but it ispossible to build an artificial heart that pumpsblood. There is no reason, in principle, why wecould not similarly make an artificial brain thatcauses consciousness.”

Searle was complaining about direct approach tointelligence.

Without consciousness and intentionality therecannot be intelligence.

How do we create an intelligent, conscious being?

Page 9: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Arthur Burks Had Interesting Take

Robots and FreeMinds, University ofMichigan, 1986.

“Tonight I willadvocate the thesis: AFINITEDETERMINISTICAUTOMATON CANPERFORM ALLNATURAL HUMANFUNCTIONS.”

Page 10: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Chapter 5: Evolution and Intentionality

“The course of biological evolution from cellsto Homo sapiens has been a gradualdevelopment of intentional systems fromdirect-response systems.”

“The [intentional] system contains a model ofits present status in relation to its goal andregularly updates that model on the basis ofthe information it receives. Finally, it decideswhat to do after consulting a strategy, whichhas value assessments attached in to variousalternative courses of action.”

Page 11: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

CS-1 Had Bio/Psycho Roots

CS-1 had reservoirs forhunger and thirst (Holland& Reitman, 1978).

Schemata processorspaper had reservoirs, too(Holland, 1971).

CS-1 worked in mazerunning task.

But design was Lockean. Tabula rasa for everything

except rule firing,apportionment of credit,and rule discovery.

Is this enough? Thesis: Can’t take shortcut

around consciousness andintentionality.

Page 12: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

So You Want a Conscious Computer

What does this mean? Consciousness is complex, emergent

phenomenon. How can we design it? Don’t throw pieces together and hope for

the best. My experience: Emergent phenomena

emerge when (a) key elements are presentand (b) system tuned properly.

Consider more Searle.

Page 13: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Shooting for C Not Crazy

Shooting for GA competence was crazy. Have accomplished. How:

– Considered essential elements.– Built qual/quant theories of how they worked.– Designed until limits of performance achieved.

Can do the same forconsciousness/intentionality!!

Page 14: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Searle’s Greatest Hits

Mind as biological phenomenon. Function of consciousness. Features of consciousness. How the mind works: Intentionality. The good stuff comes from intentionality:

Language & other institutional fact. What are we missing?

Page 15: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Mind as Biology

Consciousness is the primary feature ofminds.

3 features of consciousness:– Inner: in body and in sequence of events.– Qualitative: certain way they feel.– Subjective: first person ontology (does not

preclude objective epistemology).

Enormous variety of consciousness: smell arose, worry about income taxes, suddenrage about driver, etc.

Page 16: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Functions of Consciousness

What does it do? What is survival value? What doesn’t it do for our species? Consciousness is central to our survival. All actions a result of conscious thought

followed by action.

Page 17: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Consciousness, Intentionality, & Causation

Represent world, and act on representations. Intentional causation: Not billiard ball causation. Not all consciousness intentionally causal, but much

is. Should be best understood; are we not in touch

with it always? Descartes’s error. Yet difficult to describe: Can describe objects,

moods, thoughts, but not C itself. Problems:

– Not itself an object of observation (consciousnessobserves but is not observed).

– Tradition of separating mind/body: dualism.

Page 18: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Features of C

1. Ontological subjectivity.2. C comes in unified form. Thinking and feeling go on

at same time in same field of C: Vertical & horizontal.3. C connects us to world (Tie to intentionality).4. C states come in moods.5. Always structured.6. Varying degrees of attention.7. C is situated.8. Varying degrees of familiarity.9. Refer to other things10. Always pleasurable or unpleasurable

Page 19: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

How the Mind Works: Intentionality

Primary evolutionary role of C is to relateus to environment.

Cannot eliminate intentionality of mind byappealing to language; alreadyintentionality of the mind.

Searle: Urge to reduce it to something elseis faulty.

DEG: As designers we need to reduce it tosomething and then find conditions ofemergence among those things.

Page 20: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Intentionality as Biology

Thirst, hunger as basic, causing desire todrink or eat.

Once this granted, camel nose under thetent, intentions based on other sensory.

Isn’t reality “confirmed” by our “success” inachieving intentional goals over and overagain.

Page 21: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Structure of Intentional States

Intentionality as way mental states are directed atobjects & states of affairs.

Can be directed at things that don’t exist? How can this be? Distinguish between type of intentional state and

content. Content: rain; Types: hope, believe, fear rain. Structural features:

– Direction of fit– Conditions of satisfaction

Page 22: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Direction of Fit

Term: from Austin, foreshadowed by Wittgenstein,examples Anscombe.

Anscombe’s lists:– Shopping list: Beer, butter, bacon. Husband matches

world to list.– Detective’s list: Follows shopper, “beer, butter,

bacon,” matches list to world.

Not all intentional states like this: e.g. when youare sorry, assume match between mind and world.Intentional state is null.

Page 23: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Conditions of Satisfaction

Beliefs can be true or false. Goals can be achieved or not. Easier to understand in terms of speech acts. Have 5 illocutionary points or types:

– Assertive: commit to the truth.– Directive: direct hearer to do something.– Commissive: speaker promises to do something.– Expressive: speaker expresses opinion about state of

the world.– Declarations: speaker creates something with

utterance.

Page 24: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Intentional Causation

Intend to move body body moves:Example of intentional causation.

Differs from billiard ball or Humean causation. Self-referential: intend to move body, body moves

because I intended then intentional causation. Critical to distinguishing natural versus social

sciences. Intentional explanations not deterministic: Could

have done otherwise gap is free will.

Page 25: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Good Stuff from Intentionality

Searle goes on to talk about language andinstitutional facts (money, college degrees,etc.).

Disappointment with LCS is it can’t get tothe good stuff.

Can’t do language. Can’t form contracts. Can’t create new institutional fact.

Page 26: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Construction of Social Reality

Need to clarify observer-independent &observer-dependent features of the world.

Need 3 new elements:– Collective intentionality.– Assignment of function.– Constitutive rules

Page 27: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Observer Independent v. Dependent

Many features of the world independent ofour observations of them: observerindependence.

Many observer dependent: Something acharacteristic because of observerjudgment, but not relative to others.

OI vs. OD more important than mind-body. DEG aside: Isn’t it dualism in the back door

though?

Page 28: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Collective Intentionality

Need the notion of “we intend together.” Attempts to reduce to individual intention are

complex. Existence of biological organisms with collective

intentionality suggests CI is a primitive. DEG aside: Are social insects intentional in Searlean

sense? Could be that social affiliation is primitive,certain behaviors hard wired. Then, CI results from(a) naming the group, (b) attributing intention to it(as-if intentionality), and (c) treating the as-if asreal.

Page 29: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Assignment of Function

Use of objects as tools:– Monkey uses stick to get banana.– Man sits on rock.

Physical existence facilitates function, butfunction is observer relative.

All function assignment is observer relative.

Page 30: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Constitutive Rules

How to distinguish between brute facts andinstitutional facts.

Types of rules:– Some rules regulate: “Drive on right side of road.”– Some rules regulate and constitute: Rules of chess

both regulate conduct of game and create it.

Constitutive rules have form: X counts as Y in C. “Move two and over one” counts as a knight’s

move in Chess.”

Page 31: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Simple Model of Construction of Social Reality

Strong thesis: All institutional reality explained by 3things:– Collective intentionality.– Assigned function wall keeps people out

physically, but low fence or boundary marker keepspeople out by convention.

– Constitutive rules. Money example: Evolution from valuable

commodity to fiat currency. Institutional reality powerful: X counts as Y in C can

be iterated and stacked forming powerful networkof institutional facts.

Page 32: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

What Are We Missing?

Do not have C-machines. Searle’s 10:

1. Ontological subjectivity.2. C comes in unified form.3. C connects us to world.4. C states come in moods.5. Always structured.6. Varying degrees of attention.7. C is situated.8. Varying degrees of familiarity.9. Refer to other things10. Always pleasurable or unpleasurable

Page 33: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Unity Missing

Can argue that we have vertical unity inmessage board.

Do not have horizontal unity. My first proposal recommended

modifications to permit time series. Modifications to rules. Modification to the boards.

Page 34: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Moods & Pleasant/Unpleasant Missing

This is big. Emotions are “engagement with the world”

(Solomon). Necessary for judgment and values. Don’t want a simulation. Emotions:

– Physiological component– Judgmental component

Page 35: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Other Things Missing

Attention Gestalt structure Situatedness & familiarity Refer to other things (may have this)

Page 36: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

What Should We Do?

Stuff we’ve gotten right: Sensors, association,models (anticipation), learning

Can’t continue to work on same thing. No serious architectural changes proposed to LCS.

Why? Need:

– Emotions: As judgments, source of values, andarbiter of attention.

– Multiple boards: As source of difference andsimilarity. Main hope of quality of consciousness &unity.

– Center of intention rooted in “biological needs.”

Page 37: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

How Do We Break This Down?

Tough problem. If C is complex building block,

what are minimal essentialelements to achieve.

How do we know we’ve achievedit (first person ontology, thirdperson epistomology)?

Sets of tests and experiments. What theory needed to set

parameters of C? Not unlike approach that cracked

innovation

Page 38: Searle, Intentionality, and the  Future of Classifier Systems

Summary & Conclusions

Have accomplished quite a bit in classifiersystems.

Many of our questions are technical. Deeper questions about whether we’re

attacking the right questions. Need consciousness and intention to get

the “good stuff” of intelligent behavior. Wrestling with Searle’s categories not a bad

place to start.