russia development index 2013-2014

8/10/2019 Russia Development Index 2013-2014

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RUSSIA DEVELOPMENT

INDEX 20132014

Expert Opinion Poll

of the Valdai Discussion Club

Moscow, October 2014

valdaiclub.com


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Russia Development Index 20132014

3 EXPERT OPINION POLL OF THE

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB

The Valdai International Discussion Clubheld its fifth annual poll of Russian and

foreign experts on changes in Russiasdomestic policy and economy, societaldevelopment, and position in the world.The results are used to produce the Rus-sia Development Index, also known asthe Valdai Index.

Based on the results of the August2014 poll, the overall value of theindex stands at 0.2, continuing thenegative trend observed in previousyears. This trend has been exacerbated

by the Ukraine crisis and the informa-tion war unleashed against Russia in

response.

The Ukraine crisis accounts for the starkdifferences in assessments offered byexperts from NATO and non-NATOcountries. Their diametrically opposedviews on Russias development are afunction of both geographical and politi-cal proximity.

In 2014, the negative trend for views ofthe Russian political systembegan to

0,4

0,3

1,1

0,1

0

0,2

0,9

0,8

0,4

0,4

0,4

0,1

0,8

0,4

0,9

0,4

0,4

0,2

Russia Development Index: Expert opinionpoll of the Valdai Discussion Club

Module 1. The Russian political system

Module 2. The Russian economy

Module 3. The Russian human dimension

Module 4. Russian science and the countrysinnovative development

Module 5. Russia in the system of national,regional and global security

Module 6. Russian diplomatic activityon the international scene

Module 7. Russias openness to the world

Module 8. Soft power

NATO Non-NATO

Overview of Poll Results


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4 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

level off: the resultant value is still nega-tive (0.1) but it is clearly better than itwas last year (0.3).

This change is due primarily to improvedassessments of the Russian president:86% of respondents said that he hadincreased his influence within the politi-cal system, 52% agreed that policy devel-opment and implementation had become

more efficient, and 91% noted that heenjoys greater public trust. The generalindicator for the president is 1.5. Clearly,Vladimir Putins reputation as a strongleader has helped him against the back-drop of foreign political instability andrisks at home.

At the same time, views of all other com-ponents of the political system are uni-formly negative the Government, Par-liament, political parties, the opposition,and civil society. Although the majority

of experts did not point to any significantchanges in their activities and role, nega-tive ratings exceeded positive ratings.

The opposition outside of the politi-cal system received the lowest marks.Its influence, effectiveness and publictrust were judged to be in decline by67.1%, 59.5%, and 64.5% of respondents,respectively. Two years ago, roughly thesame percentage of experts stated thatall these indicators were on the upswing.

In addition, the opposition outside ofthe political system is the only elementof the political system whose index wasbelow 1, bottoming out at 1.1. The sur-veyed experts were not optimistic aboutthe development of civil society either,with many noting a decline in respect forhuman rights and civil liberties.

As was to be expected, the majority of the

experts evaluating changes in Russiaspolitical system pointed to the Ukrainecrisis. One expert summed up the generalimpression shared by numerous respon-dents: There has been a substantialincrease in the influence of the presidentin most areas of public life, includinga definite improvement in public trust.This seems to be mainly due to the eventsin Ukraine, while there has not been asubstantial increase in the efficiency ofpolicy development and implementation,especially with respect to economic and

political reforms. The rest of the politicalsystem seems to be undergoing a periodof stagnation.

The lowest marks were given in theeconomic module (0.8 comparedto 0.3 last year). Macroeconom-ic indicators were rated at 1. This isexplained by Ukraine-related sanctionsagainst Russia and the general growth oftensions in relations with some interna-tional partners.

The Russian political system

1,6

1,2

0,8

0,4

0 201 0 201 1 201 2 201 3 201 4

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,3

0,1

Russia Development Index

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0

0,1

0,2

0,3

2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014

0,2 0,1

0,2

0 0,2


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5EXPERT OPINION POLL OF THEVALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB

The majority of experts noted a consider-able worsening of the Russian investmentclimate: 84.8% say the level of Russiasintegration in the global economy hasdeclined, 76% believe that the Russianmarket has become more introverted,over 80% hold that the Russian economyhas lost some of its promise for directand portfolio investments, and 82.3%believe the business climate has dete-

riorated. Last year, the majority believedthat these indicators were at the samelevel.

However the negative trend in the econ-omy is influenced by some domesticfactors, too. As one expert noted: Prom-ised reforms have not been undertaken,the state continues to play a large (andperhaps even growing) role in economiclife, and small business creation hasstagnated or declined. Reliance on highoil prices and on the cushion provided

by various reserve funds has reducedthe effect of these trends, but many Rus-sian economists have pointed to the lackof investment in education, health, andinfrastructure as likely to have a long-term negative impact on future growth.

In fact, a near majority of respondents(49.4%) believe that the economy hasbecome less diversified (although 34.2%are of the view that nothing has changed).Meanwhile, 59.5% think that economic

modernization measures have becomeless effective, and 57% predict a bleakfuture for Russias balance of payments.

The performance of certain economicsectors is also worrisome. Unlike lastyear, none of the sectors has demon-strated an upward trend in the view ofthe experts surveyed.

Given the decline in most indicators,the positive value for the Russianhuman dimension (0,1) providessome encouragement. The last time itwas positive was in 2010, followed bynegative results in 2011 and 2012 (0.3),and a value of zero in 2013. At the sametime, many experts noted how regionalvariations in Russia complicated theirassessments.

Standard-of-living indicators have large-ly remained the same. However, opin-

ion is split almost evenly on feeling ofsafety/security, with 34.2% claiming adecline, 27.8% seeing no change, and34.3% noticing some improvement. Noserious changes have been recorded onthe environment, healthcare and pov-erty/prosperity.

A considerable number of experts see anegative trend in education, although themajority believes that education indica-tors have remained at the same level.

The Russian economy

1,2

0,8

0,4

0 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14

0,10,1 0,3

0,8

0

The Russian human dimension

0,6

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0

0,1

0,2

2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014

0,10,3

0,3

00,1


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6 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

The most progress is evident in ideol-ogy and politics, as observed in com-ments by experts who withheld commenton other areas. The respondents werealmost unanimous in their assessmentof the level of patriotism: 96.2% of thosepolled pointed to Russians enhancedfeelings of national pride. According tothe poll, the level of mutual trust and thelevel of good will, support to compatriots

and compassion in society have grown,while the general cultural level remainsunchanged.

At the same time, experts claim that Rus-sians feel less free and are less tolerant.Naturally, all these changes are linked toevents in Ukraine. Crimeas reunificationwith Russia has contributed significantlyto the resurgence of patriotism. In hiscommentary on these developments, oneexpert points to dangerous new tenden-cies: Russia has experienced a surge

of patriotic feelingbut there has beenvery little discussion or debate aboutthe cost of intervention and reconstruc-tion (if we are speaking about Ukraine),about how displaced people will be caredfor when their needs will compete withthe needs of the Russian population, orabout the burden that sanctions (includ-ing the ban on imports of foodstuff)will impose on the Russian consumer.The level of tolerance for those express-ing other opinions whether about the

annexation of Crimea and the invasionof Ukraine or the growing restrictions onpolitical expression and the media hasdecreased markedly both on official lev-els and in society.

There were no substantial changes forRussian science and the countrysinnovative development.The major-ity of experts see no change in the com-

petitiveness of Russian higher educa-tion, post-graduate and doctoral pro-grams (44.3%), the creative potentialof academics/scientists (36.7), the cre-ative potential of engineers (39.2%),infrastructure incentives for innovation(38%), venture investment in R&D proj-ects (31.6%), the existence of competi-tive innovation projects (35.4%), and theextent to which R&D results are appliedin the economy (39.2%).

Experts also believe that the business

community is less willing to engage inventure investment: 35.4% note a decline,25.3% see no change, 25.8% see progress,and 16.5% did not express an opinion.Like last year, the lowest indicator isassociated with brain drain: 49.4% ofrespondents believe that Russia contin-ues to lose researchers and scientists.

Positive change was observed in statefinancing for science: 38.3% note animprovement in this area, 30.4% believe

Russia in the system of national,

regional and global security

0

0,4

0,8

1,2

1,6

2,0

2 01 0 20 11 2 01 2 2 013 2 01 4

1,0

0

0,10,3

0,4

Russian science and the countrys

innovative development

0,12

0,10

0,08

0,06

0,04

0,02

0

201 0 2 011 201 2 2 013 20 14

0,1

0 0

0 0


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7EXPERT OPINION POLL OF THEVALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB

funding has remained at the same level,and 19% claim that there has been adecline.

As a result, Russian science remains atthe same level for the fourth time in thefive-year history of the poll. Experts citedthe traditionally high level of Russianscience and the governments efforts tomodernize scientific infrastructure. Butthey also warned of dangers inherent inthe politicization of science and pointedto the more attractive conditions availableto scientists abroad. Both these factors, intheir view, contribute to brain drain.

The module on Russia in the system

of national, regional and globalsecurityhas demonstrated consistentlypositive results (0.4), not once venturinginto negative territory in five years.

It is noteworthy that, despite the directbearing of the Ukraine crisis on Rus-sias external security, experts focused onother factors in this section, such as Rus-sias stance on developments in Syria, thegrowing threat posed by Afghanistan asWestern forces begin to withdraw, and

the continuing modernization of the Rus-sian Armed Forces.

Despite the overall positive dynamics ofthe military indicator, experts cited aconsiderable deterioration in a numberof parameters resulting from the Ukrainecrisis. These include external bordersecurity (59.5%), Russia as a potentialthreat to peace (45.6%), Russia as a guar-antor of international security (52%),and military cooperation with foreigncountries (62%).

An overwhelming majority of respon-dents note positive changes in suchparameters as the level to which theRussian Armed Forces are equipped withmodern weapons (89.9%), the level ofadvanced military R&D projects (69.6%),professional qualities of officers andcommanders (70.9%), professional qual-ities of Russian soldiers (67.1%), the abil-ity to quickly respond to a threat fromabroad (78.5%), the ability to respond

to a threat which arises within Russia(51.9%), the ability to conduct operationsoutside Russia (83.5%), and the ability tocombat a terror threat (82.3%).

An all-time low was recorded on the issueof Russian diplomatic activity, withthis years indicator standing at 0.5.At the same time, many experts observethat trends are moving in opposite direc-

tions in the Western and non-Westernworlds. While there are serious tensionsin Russias relations with the EU and theUSA, and Russias influence on decision-making in Western organizations hassunk to a critical level, Moscows coop-eration with the rest of the world hasonly intensified.

Roughly equal numbers of respondentssee Russias international influence asdeclining (45.6%) and growing (49.4%),which is also true for Russias mediation

efforts to resolve international conflicts(46.8% vs. 43.1%).

Many experts note that the Ukraine crisishas overshadowed positive Russian ini-tiatives, such as its role in nuclear nego-tiations with Iran and its efforts to settlethe crisis in Syria, as well as its assis-tance during the withdrawal of Westernforces from Afghanistan. Western media,which dominates global media, not onlydemonizes Russia in the West, it influ-

Russian diplomatic activity

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1,0

1,2

201 0 201 1 201 2 201 3 201 4

0,8

0,2 0,1

0,2

0,5


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8 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

ences mass perceptions in other regions,Asia included. It is not surprising, there-fore, that the majority of respondentssee a marked decline in the perceptionof Russia abroad (75.8%) and in Russiasdiplomatic initiatives indicator (48.2%).

Given the suspension of Russias G8membership in March 2014, its entirelylogical that the overwhelming majority

of respondents (93.7%) believe its role inthat organization had diminished. Risingtensions in relations with the West havealso impacted Russias cooperation withthe G20, OECD, OSCE and the Councilof Europe, as noted by 59.4%, 62%, 62%and 86% of respondents, respectively.The situation in the CIS, of which Ukrainewas a member before March 2014, is onlyslightly better: 40.5% of respondentspoint to a decline, 26.6% see no change,and 31.6% believe it has improved. Abouthalf of respondents (48.1%) assess Rus-

sias UN involvement as unchanged, 33%as diminished and 19.1% as increased.

The majority of respondents rateas unchanged or expanded Moscowsinvolvement in the SCO (44.3% and49.4%), APEC (45.6% and 34.2%) andCSTO (49.4% and 29.2%).

We should once again note, as the expertsthemselves did, that there are significantregional variations in Russian foreign

policy, and therefore the general indica-tor is not fully reflective of the reality.Its negative value is due to the fact thatRussias relations with the West are indecline, while the Western communitysinternational role is still considerable.But there are other countries with whichRussia continues to deepen cooperation.

Like its international engagement,

Russias openness to the world hasdeclined in the index, dropping to 0.5after a slight uptick last year.

While the majority of respondentsdeclined to comment on this point, thefew who did mentioned the direct andindirect influence of the sanctions againstRussia and the Ukraine crisis as a whole.As one respondent explained, Attitudestowards foreigners are influenced bystatements from the center and what isshown in the media, and what has been

said or shown in past months is almostentirely negativeThe attitude towardsRussian citizens abroad has not beenaffected, since most people understandthat Russian policies, with which theremay be disagreement, are not decidedby tourists or students, and, in general,the same is also true about Americans/Europeans traveling in Russia.

According to 45.5% of respondents, thereare fewer Russians traveling abroad. At

Russias openness to the world

0,3

0,2

0,1

0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14

0,2

0,1

0,1

0,1

0,5

Soft Power

0,6

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014

00,2

0,2

0,1 0,2


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the same time, 46.8% of experts believethat the inflow of foreigners to Russiahas remained unchanged. Many (53.2%)believe that Russian attitudes towardforeigners have become more negative,as have foreign perceptions of Russiancitizens (82.3%).

The vast majority of experts (82.3% com-pared to 65.4% in the last poll) say thatRussia is regarded as a progressively lessopen country. Many (46.8%) also believethat the accessibility of information onRussia to foreign citizens has declined,but 25.3% are certain that it is the sameor even higher.

Influenced by international tensions andthe Ukraine crisis, the soft powermod-ule stands at 0.2 in 2014 (down from0.1 last year). The 2014 Olympic Gamesin Sochi, meant to improve Russiasimage in the world, were quickly over-

shadowed by subsequent internationalevents.

While the majority of indicators in thismodule remain at the same level, 67.1%of experts say that the appeal of Russiascultural and civilizational models hasbeen tarnished, and 62% of respondentssay the same of Russias appeal as a placeof permanent residence.

Understandably, the national ideaparameter has grown considerably (62%),and yet the experts warn about potentialpitfalls. One said that the developmentof Russias National Idea seems to havebecome more and more an expression of

Russian Exceptionalism a developmentwhich is quite ironic given the nega-tive attitudes expressed about AmericanExceptionalism, and which is also mak-ing neighboring countries more nervousabout Russias intentions.


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10 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

CONCLUSION

Although last year was certainly exceptional due to the dramatic surge in internationaltensions and Russias involvement in the Ukraine crisis, the indicators for the eightmain Russia development parameters are, on the whole, consistent with the trend ofprevious years.

There is a continuing economic decline that to some extent has been exacerbated byEU and US sanctions against Russia, Moscows response measures, and the long-termconcerns this has stoked. But experts also pointed to some internal factors, such ascorruption, lack of support for small businesses, excessive government regulation,overreliance on extractive industries, etc. Stagnation in the scientific sphere does notinspire optimism either.

Despite a slight improvement in living standards, the lack of economic growth over thelong term is likely to affect indicators in this area as well. If this trend is not reversed,Russias international position is likely to decline. Russia must back up its politicaltools and military might (as confirmed by the poll results) with meaningful economicsuccess.

The experts believe that the key to change lies with the Kremlin. The presidents great-er influence and unprecedented level of public trust make him the one figure capableof making the necessary course correction.


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Influence within thepolitical system

Efficiency of policydevelopment and implementation

Public trust

No change

% %%

1,3

0,0

5,1

6,3

7,6

38,0

40,51,3

5,1

6,3

10,1

22,8

21,5

22,8

7,63,8

2,5

0,0

2,5

2,5

16,5

31,6

43,01,3

Very substantial deterioration

Substantial deterioration

Slight deterioration

Slight improvement

Substantial improvement

Very substantial improvementDont know/ Cant assess

1.1. The President

% %%

5,1

19,0

20,3

30,4

13,9

7,6

0,0

3,8

5,1

19,0

17,7

35,4

13,9

5,1

1,3

2,5

6,3

8,9

13,9

38,0

22,8

5,1

2,5

2,5




Slight improvement


Very substantial improvement

Dont know/ Cant assess

No change

Influence within the

political system

Efficiency of policy

development and implementation

Public trust

1.2. The executive branch 1.2.1. The Prime Minister

1.The Russian political system


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12 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

% %%

1,3

11,4

15,2

45,6

15,2

6,3

2,5

2,5

3,8

15,2

15,2

43,0

10,1

6,3

3,8

2,5

3,8

6,3

15,2

40,5

16,5

8,9

5,1

3,8




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.2.2. The Russian Government

% %%

1,3

2,5

22,8

38,0

17,7

1,3

0,0

16,5

1,3

6,3

21,5

40,5

10,1

2,5

0,0

17,7

1,3

2,5

16,5

41,8

20,3

1,3

0,0

16,5




Slight improvement




No change

n uence w t n t e

political system

c ency o po cy


u c trust

1.2.3. The regional executive branch (Plenipotentiary Representatives,Governors, Mayors)

% %%

6,3

11,4

15,2

40,5

19,0

2,5

1,3

3,8

8,9

16,5

16,5

40,5

8,9

1,3

1,3

6,3

7,6

8,9

20,3

39,2

13,9

2,5

1,3

6,3




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.3. The legislative branch 1.3.1. The State Duma


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% %%

3,8

8,9

12,7

49,4

13,9

3,8

1,3

6,3

6,3

8,9

8,9

58,2

6,3

2,5

1,3

7,6

5,1

6,3

11,4

54,4

11,4

3,8

1,3

6,3




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.3.2. The Federation Council

% %%

1,3

5,1

16,5

51,9

11,4

2,5

0,0

11,4

1,3

10,1

15,2

49,4

8,9

2,5

0,0

12,7

1,3

7,6

15,2

46,8

13,9

2,5

0,0

12,7




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.4. The judicial system 1.4.1. The courts of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court

% %%

1,3

3,8

11,4

59,5

5,1

1,3

0,0

17,7

1,3

3,8

8,9

59,5

6,3

2,5

0,0

17,7

0,0

2,5

8,9

62,0

6,3

1,3

0,0

19,0




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.4.2. The Constitutional Court


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14 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

% %%

10,1

7,6

3,8

39,2

11,4

1,3

0,0

26,6

7,6

5,1

3,8

49,4

6,3

1,3

0,0

26,6

7,6

5,1

3,8

49,4

6,3

1,3

0,0

26,6




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.4.3. Arbitration tribunals, the Supreme Arbitration Court

% %%

6,3

10,1

25,3

27,8

22,8

7,6

0,0

0,0

7,6

11,4

27,8

35,4

8,9

7,6

0,0

1,3

7,6

10,1

25,3

26,6

22,8

6,3

0,0

1,3




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.5. Political parties and the political system 1.5.1. The ruling party

% %%

8,9

16,5

24,1

36,7

11,4

1,3

1,3

0,0

11,4

12,7

29,1

40,5

5,1

1,3

0,0

0,0

10,1

10,1

24,1

45,6

5,1

2,5

0,0

2,5




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.5.2. Parliamentary opposition


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% %%

15,2

29,1

22,8

22,8

2,5

0,0

1,3

6,3

13,9

30,4

15,2

30,4

1,3

1,3

1,3

6,3

11,4

31,6

21,5

25,3

2,5

1,3

0,0

6,3




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.5.3. Extra-parliamentary opposition

% %%

8,9

16,5

29,1

29,1

13,9

1,3

1,3

0,0

15,2

19,0

30,4

20,3

12,7

1,3

1,3

0,0

10,1

8,9

26,6

35,4

16,5

1,3

1,3

0,0




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.6. The role of civil society 1.6.1. Civil society development level

% %%

2,5

5,1

25,3

41,8

16,5

5,1

1,3

2,5

5,1

11,4

24,1

36,7

12,7

5,1

1,3

3,8

0,0

1,3

13,9

54,4

16,5

6,3

3,8

3,8




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.6.2. The electoral process


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16 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

% %%

5,1

34,2

26,6

20,3

10,1

2,5

0,0

1,3

3,8

19,0

30,4

30,4

13,9

0,0

1,3

1,3

8,9

16,5

20,3

36,7

15,2

0,0

0,0

2,5




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.6.3. The role of non-governmental organizations

% %%

0,0

10,1

19,0

40,5

15,2

2,5

0,0

12,7

1,3

12,7

12,7

48,1

10,1

2,5

0,0

12,7

3,8

8,9

17,7

45,6

10,1

0,0

1,3

12,7




Slight improvement




No change


political system



Public trust

1.6.4. The role of the Russian Public Chamber


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%

5,1

20,3

59,5

3,8

2,5

5,1

0,0

3,8

Macroeconomic

parameters




Slight improvement




No change

2.1. Macroeconomic parameters(GDP trends, external debts, the trade balance and inflation)

% %%

0,0

6,3

40,5

25,3

11,4

3,8

1,3

11,4

2,5

15,2

26,6

26,6

12,7

5,1

1,3

10,1

2,5

13,9

40,5

15,2

12,7

5,1

1,3

8,9

Financial servicesInnovation industriesProducing and

Processing industries

Extraction industries

%

1,3

2,5

32,9

35,4

12,7

5,1

1,3

8,9

2.2. Development of economic sectors

2.The Russian economy


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18 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

% %%

1,3

8,9

39,2

34,2

8,9

2,5

1,3

3,8

2,5

16,5

40,5

24,1

6,3

3,8

1,3

5,1

2,5

8,9

45,6

22,8

3,8

5,1

1,3

10,1

Level of diversification

of the economy

The efficiency of measures

taken to modernize the economy

Russias balance of

payments forecast




Slight improvement




No change

2.3. Economic modernization

Level of Russias integration

in the global economy

The Russian markets

openness

Investment attractiveness

(direct investment)

% %%

15,2

35,4

34,2

7,6

3,8

1,3

0,0

2,5

11,4

30,4

34,2

11,4

7,6

2,5

0,0

2,5

24,1

36,7

24,1

0,0

5,1

3,8

0,0

6,3




Slight improvement




No change

2.4. The Russian investment climate

Investment attractiveness

(portfolio investment)

Tax legislation

development level

Business climate

% %%

20,3

38,0

24,1

3,8

2,5

5,1

0,0

6,3

1,3

10,1

21,5

43,0

12,7

2,5

0,0

8,9

12,7

32,9

36,7

6,3

5,1

3,8

0,0

2,5




Slight improvement




No change


19/32




Environment Public health Feeling of safety/security

% %%

0,0

1,3

11,4

62,0

15,2

3,8

0,0

6,3

0,0

2,5

16,5

41,8

29,1

2,5

0,0

7,6

3,8

11,4

19,0

27,8

20,3

12,7

1,3

3,8




Slight improvement




No change

3.1. Living standards

Poverty level Prosperity level

% %

1,3

2,5

21,5

43,0

25,3

1,3

0,0

5,1

0,0

3,8

20,3

46,8

19,0

3,8

1,3

5,1




Slight improvement




No change

3.The Russian human dimension


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20 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

General education standards Professional/vocational

education standards

% %

2,5

1,3

25,3

44,3

13,9

6,3

0,0

6,3

2,5

2,5

19,0

44,3

17,7

6,3

0,0

7,6




Slight improvement




No change

3.2. Education standards

Level of national pride,

patriotism

Sense of freedom Level of mutual trust

% %%

0,0

0,0

0,0

1,3

11,4

55,7

29,1

2,5

1,3

10,1

38,0

26,6

12,7

7,6

1,3

2,5

0,0

8,9

20,3

35,4

19,0

12,7

1,3

2,5




Slight improvement




No change

3.3. Ideology and politics

% %%

0,0

3,8

2,5

22,8

41,8

20,3

7,6

1,3

8,9

17,7

25,3

27,8

16,5

1,3

1,3

1,3

0,0

5,1

10,1

65,8

8,9

6,3

1,3

2,5

Level of good will, support

to compatriots, compassion

Tolerance level Cultural level of

the population




Slight improvement




No change


21/32




% %%

0,0

3,8

16,5

44,3

24,1

3,8

0,07,6

0,0

2,5

20,3

36,7

22,8

7,6

0,010,1

0,0

1,3

12,7

39,2

12,7

8,9

0,025,3

Competitiveness of Russian

higher education, post-graduate

and doctorate courses

The creative potential

of academics/scientists

The creative potential

of engineers




Slight improvement



No change

% %%

0,0

1,3

24,1

32,9

21,5

3,8

1,3

15,2

0,0

0,0

16,5

38,0

12,7

7,6

1,3

24,1

0,0

7,6

27,8

25,3

17,7

5,1

0,0

16,5

Infrastructure incentives

for innovation

Tax incentives

for innovation

The business communitys

willingness to be involved

in venture investment




Slight improvement




No change

4.Russian science and thecountrys innovativedevelopment


22/32


22 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

% %%

0,0

10,1

21,5

31,6

11,4

5,1

1,3

19,0

5,1

10,1

34,2

26,6

11,4

5,1

1,3

6,3

0,0

5,1

13,9

30,4

30,4

6,3

1,3

12,7

Venture investmentin R&D projects

The brain drain The level of statefinancing for science




Slight improvement




No change

% %

0,0

3,8

24,1

35,4

12,7

6,3

1,3

16,5

0,0

3,8

19,0

39,2

11,4

3,8

1,3

21,5

The existence of competitive

innovation projects

The extent to which R&D results are applied

in the economy/mechanisms governing the

commercialization of scientific innovations




Slight improvement




No change


23/32




% %%

10,1

16,5

32,9

16,5

11,4

8,9

1,3

2,5

0,0

0,0

1,3

7,6

64,6

21,5

3,8

1,3

0,0

0,0

1,3

12,7

54,4

8,9

6,3

16,5

External border secur ity Level to wh ich the Russ ianArmed Forces is equipped

with modern weapons

Level of advancedmilitary R&D projects




Slight improvement




No change

% %%

0,0

0,0

1,3

10,1

55,7

11,4

3,8

17,7

0,0

0,0

1,3

13,9

50,6

12,7

3,8

17,7

0,0

0,0

0,0

8,9

46,8

19,0

12,7

12,7

roess ona qua t es o

officers and commanders

ro essona qua t es

of Russian soldiers

ty to quc y respon

to a threat from abroad




Slight improvement




No change

5.Russia in the system ofnational, regional andglobal security


24/32


24 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

% %%

0,0

0,0

1,3

34,2

29,1

16,5

6,3

12,7

0,0

0,0

0,0

8,9

41,8

27,8

13,9

7,6

0,0

0,0

2,5

34,2

38,0

10,1

5,1

10,1

Ability to respond to a threat

which arises within Russia

Ability to conduct

operations outside Russia

Ability to combat

the terror threat




Slight improvement




No change

% %%

13,912,7

19,0

26,6

6,3

6,3

6,3

8,9

16,515,2

20,3

19,0

12,7

6,3

5,1

5,1

13,931,6

16,5

16,5

11,4

5,1

2,5

2,5

Military cooperation

with foreign countries

and organizations

Russia as a guarantor of

international security, including

peacekeeping missions

Russia as a potential

threat to peace

Ability to conduct

a global war

%

0,01,3

8,9

38,0

22,8

10,1

3,8

15,2


25/32




6.Russian diplomatic activity onthe international scene

% %%

8,9

21,5

15,2

5,1

17,7

22,8

8,9

0,0

11,4

21,5

13,9

10,1

24,1

7,6

11,4

0,0

2,5

10,1

17,7

30,4

17,7

12,7

6,3

2,5

Russias international influence Mediation work to resolveinternational conflicts

Involvement ininternational aid efforts




Slight improvement




No change

6.1. General assessment of the Russian foreign policy

% %

36,7

26,6

16,5

3,8

7,6

3,8

5,1

0,0

8,9

16,5

22,8

12,7

17,7

12,7

7,6

1,3

Perception of Russia

abroad

Russias diplomatic

initiatives




Slight improvement




No change


26/32


26 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

% %%

68,4

17,7

7,6

3,8

1,3

0,0

1,3

0,0

6,3

25,3

27,8

26,6

7,6

1,3

3,8

1,3

17,7

17,7

26,6

29,1

2,5

2,5

2,5

1,3

Participation in the G8 Participation in the G20 The Organization for

Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD)




Slight improvement




No change

6.2.

% %%

0,0

0,0

5,1

44,3

34,2

3,8

11,4

1,3

0,0

1,3

13,9

45,6

25,3

1,3

7,6

5,1

2,5

19,0

19,0

26,6

17,7

3,8

10,1

1,3

The Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO)

The Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC)

The Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS)




Slight improvement




No change

% %%

15,2

13,9

32,9

17,7

12,7

2,5

3,8

1,3

2,5

6,3

10,1

49,4

16,5

5,1

7,6

2,5

29,1

31,6

25,3

8,9

0,0

2,5

2,5

0,0

The Council of EuropeThe Collective Security

Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Participation in Organization

for Security and Cooperation

in Europe (OSCE) activities

Participation in UN activities

%

1,3

8,9

22,8

48,1

12,7

1,3

5,1

0,0


27/32




7.Russias openness to the world

% %%

2,5

10,1

32,9

35,4

10,1

3,8

3,81,3

0,0

1,3

25,3

46,8

16,5

3,8

2,53,8

3,8

12,7

36,7

26,6

11,4

5,1

1,32,5

citizens are free to travel

internationally

citizens are free to travel

within Russia

attitude toward foreign

citizens




Slight improvement



No change

% %%

8,9

21,5

43,0

13,9

6,3

5,1

1,3

0,0

15,2

38,0

29,1

6,3

8,9

1,3

1,3

0,0

7,6

13,9

25,3

25,3

19,0

5,1

1,3

2,5

Foreign perception

of Russian citizens

Foreign perception of Russia

as an open country

Accessibility of information

on Russia to foreign citizens




Slight improvement




No change


28/32


28 MOSCOW, OCTOBER

% %

2,5

6,3

27,8

35,4

13,9

1,3

1,3

11,4

2,5

3,8

21,5

38,0

11,4

1,3

1,3

20,3

Openness and accessibility of

representatives of federal government

bodies to foreign citizens

Openness and accessibility of

representatives of regional government

bodies to foreign citizens




Slight improvement




No change


29/32




8.Soft power

% %%

12,7

29,1

25,3

15,2

8,9

6,3

2,5

0,0

1,3

11,4

8,9

24,1

29,1

20,3

3,8

1,3

2,5

2,5

11,4

15,2

26,6

27,8

7,6

6,3

The attractiveness ofRussias cultural and

civilizational models

The extent to whichRussias political values are

reflected in its foreign policy

The national idea(values that predominate

nationwide)




Slight improvement




No change

% %%

2,5

8,9

24,1

46,8

16,5

0,0

1,3

0,0

11,4

19,0

31,6

22,8

11,4

0,0

1,3

2,5

0,0

10,1

29,1

44,3

8,9

0,0

1,3

6,3

Foreign perception

of Russian emigrants

Russias attractiveness

as a place of permanent

residence

The global popularity

of Russian culture

The global role of the

Russian language

%

1,3

2,5

20,3

50,6

21,5

1,3

1,3

1,3


30/32

Description and methodology

In August of each year, the Valdai International Discussion Club polls experts on Russia,with the results forming the basis of the Russia Development Index (also known as the

Valdai Index). The index reflects Russias development dynamics relative to the preced-ing year, with values varying from -3 to +3, where -3 represents serious deterioration,+3 means considerable improvement, and zero shows no change.

The general index is calculated on the basis of eight modules: the Russian Political System,the Russian Economy, the Russian Human Dimension, Russian Science and the CountrysInnovative Development, Russia in the System of National, Regional and Global Security,Russian Diplomatic Activity on the International Scene, Russias Openness to the World,and Soft Power. Each module includes sets of parameters on which experts are asked toassess Russias progress. For example, the economic module contains MacroeconomicParameters, Development of Economic Sectors, Economic Modernization, and the RussianInvestment Climate. Each of these may also include a number of sub-categories.

The large number of evaluation criteria provides more accurate results, as divergenttrends can be observed within a single set, e.g. rapid progress in one area and stagnationin another.

The focus group for the 2013/2014 Index included 359 participants of the Valdai Interna-tional Discussion Clubs conferences held in different years. The poll involved 79 respon-dents from 23 countries: Austria, Armenia, Brazil, Hungary, the UK, Germany, India, Italy,Iraq, Iran, China, Mexico, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Slovakia, theUSA, Ukraine, Finland, France, Switzerland, and Japan. The share of foreign respondentswas 67%.


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russia development index 2013-2014

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