public transport policy in singapore (a long view)

Public Transport Policy in Singapore

Paul BarterDirector, Reinventing Transport

and Adjunct Professor, LKY School of Public Policy, National University of [email protected]

www.reinventingparking.org www.reinventingtransport.org

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.reinventingparking.org/

http://www.reinventingtransport.org/

Summary

Transit-oriented planning

Constraint of cars

Bus improvements history

Urban rail

Public transport integration efforts

Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport

POLICY CONTEXT: TRANSIT-ORIENTED PLANNING

3Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport

Forty years of transit-oriented strategic planning


The transit-oriented plan predated mass transit

A 1969-71 planning process resulted in the highly transit-oriented 1971 Concept Plan

Dense New Towns along major corridors and a strong city centre

But final decision on MRT only in the early 1980s after a debate

Arguably, MRT became essential because of the Concept Plan


1991

2001

1971

POLICY CONTEXT: TDM AND CONSTRAINT OF CARS


Singapore has had a tough TDM ‘bargain’ that faced up to the spatial constraints

• to keep the arteries moving for commerce

• cars remain out of reach of ~60% of households

Since 1974, strict policies to slow car ownership

and traffic growth

• speed and convenience for motorists• improving public transport

In return for this ‘sacrifice’ (either

expensive car or no car)


Usage-based tools played a

role: But ownership restraint has been more significant

Vehicle Quota System (VQS)

Parking unbundled in HDB

ARF, excise duty and road tax

Fuel tax

Parking restraint (for a time)

ALS then ERP

Archives and Oral History Department Singapore

ALS = Area Licence Scheme (manual cordon pricing system)

ERP = Electronic Road Pricing (congestion charging with variable prices)

ARF = additional Registration Fee (currently 100% of cost of car)

HDB = public housing


Strict constraint of car ownership and pricing of usage predate mass transit by 12 years

Late 1960s: congestion; unreliable buses; pirate taxis; rapidly rising car ownership

1972: vehicle purchase & ownership taxes raisedmotorisation drastically slowed

major bus improvements (govt. intervention)

1974: Manual cordon pricing + bus lane network debate over MRT versus bus

1980s: Further tax hikes; Expressway network very small until mid

1980s Very high bus ridership; MRT opens 1987


Slowed traffic growth had many benefits

Revenue

Road space to allocate to alternatives

Time to gradually improve infrastructure without traffic crisis

Less urgency on road capacity (just one short section of expressway in Singapore until 1980s)

Retain and grow the market for buses and metro

Political power of motorists limited and delayed


But troubling side-effects of car constraint too

Sunk cost effect for motorists

Some tendency to take public transport customers for granted


BUS IMPROVEMENTS 1970S - 1990S


Bus Regulation in SingaporeSingapore’s bus system has always been privately owned and has been shifting slowly (step-by-step) to the left on this diagram

Bus regulatory options (diagram by Paul Barter)

Public monopolies

Proactive planning

with service contracts

Well-regulated

Franchises

Passive franchises

Deregulation

Government takes much responsibility

for outcomes

Compatible with ambitious integration

Government takes little

responsibility for outcomes

Incompatible with integration

Competition for the market possibleCompetition in

the marketPaul Barter, Reinventing Transport

Singapore’s buses pre 1935

Singapore Traction Company (STC) – private but initially with monopoly in urban core (trams until 1926 then trolley buses and diesel buses until bankruptcy in 1971)

‘Mosquito buses’ (1910 or so to 1935) - 7-passenger vehicles

- little or no regulation until mergers in 1935 into 10 ‘Chinese’ bus companies

- initially served rural areas beyond STC domain


Source: Archives and Oral History Department Singapore

Singapore’s buses 1935 - 1973

Ten ‘Chinese’ companies (1935-1970) – route monopolies with fare regulation but weak and little-enforced service obligations (“passive franchises”)

Pirate taxis (especially in 1960s and 70s) - illegal, unregulated; - cherry-picking opportunity due to poor bus service, which further undermined it

Three consortia (1970-1973) - merged Chinese bus companies, still under “passive franchise” arrangements (and STC went bust)


A Changi Bus Company Limited bus. Image credit: Yeo Hong Eng (via http://wwwyeohongeng.blogspot.sg/2012/11/buses-of-singapore-in-50s-60s-and-70s.html)

Singapore’s buses 1973 - 2008

1973 - : SBS regulated bus monopoly

1982 - : SBS and TIBS (now SMRT) – monopolies serving distinct regions

– regulated by Government (by quasi-

independent Public Transport Council since 1987)

• Fare regulation (balanced)

• Quality of Service Standards

• PTC approved route change requests

Successful approach for almost 4 decades but now reaching its limits?


On-road priority efforts

Kerb-side bus lanes since 1974

All-day bus lanes (7.30am-8pm) since 2005

Now 23km of full-day bus lanes and 155km of normal bus lanes

Since 2008: Give way to buses exiting bus bays (extending gradually to more and more bus bays)

Singapore has both all-day (as here) and peak-only bus lanes


Image credit: Flickr user Merlijn Hoek

Image credit: http://www.oneshift.com/articles/news.php?artid=4839Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport

URBAN RAIL: MRT SINCE 1987


Image source: Wikimedia Commons user Vsion

Singapore urban railThe initial MRT system opened in 1987. This is the 1989-1996 system.

Image credit: Wikimedia Commons user Calvin Teo


Singapore urban railMRT system (and “LRT”) today and near future

Originally from http://www.lta.gov.sg/projects/proj_maps_rail_l.htmPaul Barter, Reinventing Transport

http://www.lta.gov.sg/projects/proj_maps_rail_l.htm

Singapore’s funding of public transport

(oversimplifying a little)

MRT investment from taxation general revenue (but large % of land is state-owned so significant land value increment captured presumably)

MRT operations from fares (This is also a criterion for construction decisions. But there has been a recent shift: now achieving operating cost-recovery for the whole network is the test.)

Bus investment AND operations from fares (so arguably bus system is underfunded relative to rail. However, recent overcrowding in both rail and bus has prompted a “one off” injection of S$1.1billion)


Urban Rail proposed for 2030


PUBLIC TRANSPORT INTEGRATION EFFORTS AND REGULATORY DILEMMAS


‘Connective’ versus ‘Direct’ Public Transport Networks

• More frequent with SAME resources (in this example, 3 high-frequency lines versus 9 low-frequency lines)

• Connections are a feature not a bug

• Lower total travel time, despite connections!

• Simpler network: easily understood and remembered

The Connective

Network achieves

Based on a diagram in the excellent book, “Human Transit” by Jarrett WalkerPaul Barter, Reinventing Transport

Strong Integration Efforts

Bus interchanges co-located with MRT stations (gradually improved)

Ticketing (stored value) and information integration (from 1989 via TransitLink joint venture)

Transfer rebate (initially S$0.25 then transfer penalty eliminated in 2010)

Covered walkways from bus stops to MRT stations and such like


Tampines: a significant walk between bus interchange and MRT

Woodlands: bus interchange directly below MRT station (Image credit: Flickr user xcode)

Remaining integration shortcomings

Operators’ reluctant to offer information on rival’s services (now partially rectified by LTA)

TransitLink progress stalled

No system-wide season passes until recently (and still limited)

Long bus headways and poor bus-stop locations make bus-bus transfers unattractive

Lack of readable bus maps


Singapore’s bus network is complex Difficult to convey connections on a map

But difficult to improve further

with this regulatory approach

Simpler, connective

network

Bus headways need to be

shorter

Waiting time is huge

influence on passenger trip speed

Connective network

forces more transfers

Short headways

make transfers less

painful

Simpler network enables shorter

headways!


Singapore’s buses since 2008 and looking ahead

2007 review was critical of half-hearted integration

Elimination of transfer penalty

LTA took over bus line planning

Towards competitive tendering?

Moving to the left on the diagram above (in order to more easily enable ambitious integration and a connective network approach)

… but how far will Singapore go and how fast?Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport

?

Connective networks for buses too?

“Competently designed transit networks often consist of trunk lines with frequent service and separate feeders, even when both sections are served by buses…”

Vukan Vuchic, Transportation for Livable Cities, 1999, p. 210


A major intersection in Hamburg’s suburbs

(Kollau Strasse and Vogt Wells Strasse)

Bus stops close to intersection

Easy to make bus-bus connections here

30

Bus stop 1 Bus stop 2

Bus stop 3

Bus stop 4

Bus stop 3Bus stop 1Bus stop 2


Singapore bus stops far from intersectionsWithout bus stops close to corners it is difficult to create a grid of bus lines


Towards a London/Scandinavian/Seoulmodel for Singapore?

This is my preferred option but time will tell

Government agency plans bus lines and schedules

High level of ‘system unity’ (connective network aim)

Government takes revenue risk (gross-cost contracts with performance incentives)

London. Photo by David Hawgood and licensed for reuse under this Creative Commons LicencePaul Barter, Reinventing Transport

http://www.geograph.org.uk/profile/560

http://www.geograph.org.uk/profile/560

http://www.geograph.org.uk/reuse.php?id=2753619

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/

Why is public transport regulatory

reform important for

Singapore?

I advocate a shift to a London/Scandinavian

model

In Singapore

case, NOT

about getting

small gains in

efficiency

To allow more ambitious

connective networks


Overview of Singapore public transport improvements

1970s and since

• Transit-oriented Concept Plan 1971• Bus consolidation (SBS) 1973• Professional management for SBS 1973• Bus lane network 1974

1980s and since

• MRT opens 1987 then expands• Efficient bus franchise system is consolidated (two operators for benchmarking)

1990s and since

• Strong integration efforts circa 1995 (eg common ticketing)• Bus service standards raised• North East Line MRT

2000s and since

• New bus priority initiatives• Circle line and further rapid MRT expansion underway• Distance fares (eliminating transfer penalty)• Land Transport Authority (LTA) takes over bus line planning from operators


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