200681793

PIED 3565 Terrorism: Concepts, Debates, Cases

“Critically assess the effectiveness of Israel’s policy of targeted killings”

Word Count: 3282

Seminar Tutor: Dr Lars Berger

The increasing casualty rate amongst Palestinian civilians, and the continued

terrorist presence in Israeli controlled territory, has understandably called into

question the effectiveness of Israel’s counter-terrorism policy of targeted

killing. However, it would be too simplistic to declare this practice as either

effective or ineffective as much of the literature over the part two decades has

tended to do. This is because there is a far broader debate to be had over

efficacy than that purely based on statistical analysis of loss and gains, and

indeed evidence shows that targeted killing has both weakened and

strengthened the operational capacity of Palestinian terrorist organisations

(Goldings, 2011). In analysing arguments on both sides of the polarised

spectrum, this essay will seek to show that whilst targeted killing cannot be

said to be an effective measure on its own, as part of a wider counter-

terrorism mandate, it’s effectiveness is reliant on a range of factors.

Although not a unique phenomenon of Israeli counter-terrorism measures

before the advent of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (or Second Intifada), the level of

violence that erupted following the visit of Ariel Sharon to Temple Mount on

28th September 2000 resulted in Israel “openly pursuing” (David, 2003, p.111)

a policy of targeted killing to curb the threat posed by Palestinian terrorism

(Boyden et al., 2009). Although no official definition of targeted killing exists

under international law (Alston, 2010), it can be understood as “premeditated

acts of lethal force employed… to eliminate specific individuals outside their

custody” (Masters, 2013). The pursuance of this policy was first

acknowledged by Israel following the successful assassination of senior Fatah

Tanzim activist Hussein Abayat on 9th November 2000, and since then such

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state sanctioned operations have become a prominent feature of the Arab-

Israeli conflict (Blum and Heymann, 2010; Lesh, 2007).

To understand why it is that Israel has so consistently and openly relied upon

targeted killing as a method of counter terrorism, we must consider the type of

terrorist threat that the state faces. For many Palestinian groups, such as

Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the

Islamic Jihad, suicide bombings have predominantly been their “weapon of

choice” (Landau, 2007, p. 10) in attacks against Israel. For example, between

the years 2000-2007, 140 suicide bombings resulted in the deaths of 542

people (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Rather unsurprisingly,

Kaplan, Mintz and Mishal have asserted suicide bombings to be the “leading

cause of death from terrorism in Israel” (2006, p. 557), and thus targeted

killing is essentially used as a pre-emptive strike against those suspected of

planning to carry out suicide missions on Israeli soil (Jacobson and Kaplan,

2007).

Issues surrounding the definition of ‘effective’

The crux of this debate arguably boils down to a question of definition; how

are we to define effectiveness, and does the practice of targeted killing align

with our perceptions of this definition. According to the Oxford Dictionary,

‘effective’ can be defined as “successful in producing a desired or intended

result” (Oxford University Press, 2014). What then is the desired or intended

result of targeted killing? Is it, for example, simply the assassination of those

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suspected of planning to carry out acts of terrorism in the near future, or is

there a longer-term aim of reducing terrorist groups’ operational capabilities.

Depending on the definition favoured by any given academic, politician,

military leader or journalist, their perception of the effectiveness of Israel’s use

of targeted killing will differ accordingly, and it is because of this that opinion

remains resolutely polarised.

Looking first at the assumption that the intended result of targeted killing is the

death of suspected terrorists planning imminent attacks, as is the criterion of

the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in permitting such operations (Harel and Alon,

2002), it is arguably hard to deny that the practice is effective. Even if the

individual (or individuals) targeted do not die as a result of the attack but are

seriously injured, then it could be said that the immediate threat posed to

Israel’s national security has been negated, at least on a tactical level

(University of Surrey, 2012). However, this presupposes that every instance

of targeted killing produces the desired result. Targeted killing by nature is

not a precise science, as it involves a certain degree of the unknown.

Although stringent rules set out by the Israeli judicial authority require a

considerable amount of intelligence to be gathered before an operation is

sanctioned (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007), there is no guarantee that the ‘hit’

will be successful.

Jacobson and Kaplan (2007) have identified two prominent reasons as to why

targeted killing operations will not always work to counteract an imminent

threat. Firstly, it is entirely possible for a targeted killing to “miss the terrorists

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targeted altogether” (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007, p. 776), as was the case

when the IDF launched a failed attempt on the life of Hamas militant Ashraf

Ferwana in October 2006 (Myre, 2006). Furthermore, whilst you may be

successful in preventing an individual from carrying out a specific attack, the

“chance of thwarting others is much lower” (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007,

p.775). This is because if the planning of an attack was in its final stages, it is

likely that the act can be performed without the deceased (Jacobson and

Kaplan, 2007, p.776). It is also unlikely that the target would be the only

person planning to execute an attack over a specific period, and so their

death may do little to reduce the immediate threat (Jacobson and Kaplan,

2007, p.776). Thus the effectiveness of targeted killings in countering an

impending attack is wholly dependant on the success of the mission itself, and

the hope that any planned attack is isolated and in its primitive stages.

Proponents of targeted killing have also asserted that the effectiveness of the

tactic can be measured in its ability to undermine terrorist groups operational

capabilities. The removal of key players within a terrorist organisation has

been identified by some as being fundamental to a group’s demise, with

Goldings describing this as the “incapacitation effect” (2011, p. 6). By

eliminating the “upper echelons” (Goldings, 2011, p. 8) of a terrorist group, not

only do they “lose effectiveness and focus (and) become prone to infighting”

(Mannes, 2008, p. 40), but they also lose their organisational and financial

epicentre (Byman, 2006). However, according to an empirical study

conducted by Jordan, in order for this incapacitation effect to take hold, these

targeted killings must be directed at those at the highest level and not low

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level commanders or militants (Jordan, 2009). Where high-ranking leaders

were the targets of lethal force, the terrorist organisation crumbled 54% of the

time as opposed to 33% when the targets were low to mid ranking leaders

(Jordan, 2009, p. 736). Israel’s targets have largely been low-mid level

members of terrorist groups as they are most likely to be the ones to carry out

attacks. Thus targeted killings could be of far greater benefit in terms of

effectiveness if a greater number of the terrorist elite were targeted.

Many sceptics of targeted killing argue that it is not an effective counter-

terrorism measure at all, and that instead it is counterproductive; instead of

reducing the terrorist threat, targeted killing actually increases the risk posed

to Israeli citizens through the unintentional promotion of revenge attacks and

recruitment of new extremists (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007). For instance, at

the height of the Second Intifada, whilst the number of targeted killings

increased to prevent terrorist attacks, the number of Israeli deaths from

terrorist acts also increased. Ganor has described this link between offensive

action and revenge attacks as the ‘boomerang effect’, as terrorists may justify

future attacks by linking them with “the offensive actions carried out against

them” (2005, p.143).

The so called ‘martyrdom effect’ also suggests the same outcome; the death

of a terrorist at the hands of the enemy is likely to lift them to “near mythic

status” (Hunter, 2009, p.64), triggering a desire for vengeance and “fostering

an on-going cycle of violence” (Hunter, 2009, p.64). The prospect of this

deadly repercussion was highlighted by the senior Palestinian security official

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Muhuammed Dhalan, who stated that those who sanction the killing of the

terrorist elite should “turn the page and should sign off on killing 16 Israeli’s”

(Byman, 2006). However, whilst the number of suicide bombings may

increase, it does not necessarily follow that the number of Israeli deaths will

also increase. For example, following the targeted killing of former Hamas

founder Ahmed Yassin in 2004, Stahl calculated that although the number of

attacks increased by 299, the “total number of deaths decreased severely” by

27 (Stahl, 2006, p.63). Therefore, whilst Israel should not shy away

completely from a policy targeted killing, as this may render them passive and

invite a bombardment, decision makers must take into account whether any

benefit gained will be undermined by an appetite for revenge (Ganor, 2005).

The impact of law and morality

The question over the morality of targeted killing has long troubled the Israeli

administration. Should a counter terrorism policy be seen as effective at

achieving its aims despite the risk that civilian casualties may result?

Unsurprisingly, the response from the international community has largely

been that of condemnation and outrage when innocent civilians have become

victim to targeted killings. Although this is an unintentional result, it

nevertheless questions whether these tactics are precise enough in their

application to merit the name ‘targeted’ killing. At the height of the Second

Intifada in 2002 and 2003, Harel calculated the ratio of civilians to targets

killed to be 1:1, and thus named this particularly bloody era in the Palestinian-

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Israeli conflict as the “dark days” due to its high civilian death rate (Harel,

2007).

One such attack carried out during 2002 was that against Hamas official

Salah Shahada. Whilst Shahada was indeed assassinated, and thus the

mission in terms of its desired result was clearly a success, the one tonne

bomb used to carry out the targeted killing also took the lives of thirteen

Palestinian civilians, ten of those children and infants (Stein, 2003, p.132).

Although an extreme statistic, Stein argues that civilian casualties is a “natural

consequence” (2003, p.132) of this form of lethal force. However, this is not

to say that the civilian death rate has been at a constant throughout the last

two decades of the conflict. Although 175 of the 251 Palestinians killed by

targeted attacks up until December 2011 were civilians (Goppel, 2013, p.34),

Dershowitz has highlighted how there are peaks and troughs in the number of

civilians killed throughout different points of the conflict (2011).

Using statistics published by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Dershowitz

stresses how the number of civilians hurt by targeted killings decreased to

one in every 30 operations carried out by the IDF in 2011, a significant

improvement from the figures seen in 2002-2003 (2011). Dershowitz is

critical of the lack of reporting of these instances of improvements in the

media, stating that “silence in the face of improvement is misleading”, and that

disproportionate criticism of Israel’s policy of targeted killing is unfounded

(2011). Indeed, compared to the targeted killing practices of the United

Kingdom, the United States and Russia, fewer civilians have died as a result

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of Israel’s policy than that of the three superpowers (Dershowitz, 2011).

However, whilst there have been improvements in the precision of targeted

killings throughout the course of the conflict, this does not absolve the policy

of the indiscriminate lethal force it can wage on civilians. ‘Target’ by definition

means “a person… selected as the aim of the attack” (Oxford University

Press, 2014); if civilians who are not selected as the aim of the attack die as a

result of the targeted killing, then the exercise cannot be said to be truly

effective in achieving the desired end, regardless of whether the target of the

operation has died.

Criticism has also centred on the legality of Israel’s policy of targeted killing.

This largely revolves around the debate as to whether terrorists should be

defined as civilians or combatants, as for targeted killing to be legal, they must

be the latter (David, 2003). David argues unequivocally that if terrorists pose

a legitimate threat to Israeli security, they should be considered as

combatants, “regardless of whether they wear a uniform” (David, 2003,

p.114). Indeed, the Unites States seems to share this stance, as a Pentagon

official commenting on targeted killing operations carried out on al-Qaeda

operatives stated that “if we find an enemy combatant, then we should be

able… to take military action against them” (Risen, 2002).

However, many reject the notion that terrorists can be combatants, and

instead believe that they must be considered as civilians. This argument is

more convincing, as by definition, terrorists do not fully align with the

characteristics required to be categorised as combatants; although there is

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undoubtedly a chain of command within terrorist groups and members are

likely to be armed, they are not an armed force of a state or a militia of a

political group, and do not possess uniforms. This is not to say that terrorists

should enjoy the same protection under international law as those who do no

wrong. Instead, once a civilian participates in hostilities, they then become

“legitimate targets under Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol” (Stein,

2003, p.129). Stein argues that as targeted killings are carried out against

civilians, Israel must provide evidence that they were “participating in

hostilities” at the time of the attack (Stein, 2003, p.130). Without such

evidence, which the Human Rights Council has stated has never been

publicly disclosed by the Israeli government (Alston, 2010), then one can

arguably assume that Israel’s policy of targeted killings are illegal (Stein,

2003). By blurring the line between justifiable and illegal, Israel continues to

show itself in an unfavourable light in the eyes of the world, and thus targeted

killing cannot be seen as effective in promoting Israel as a moral beacon in

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Socio-political considerations

Social and political factors can be seen as key in driving the effectiveness of

Israel’s policy of targeted killing. For Israeli citizens who have long had to

endure relentless attacks by Palestinian militants, targeted killing may provide

a sense of retribution and revenge. David (2003) has developed a

sophisticated reasoning as to why targeted killing is an effective method of

appeasing the Israeli population. Although the IDF declared in 2002 that no

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targeted killing can be carried out as an act of vengeance, since targets are

decided upon by the government according to certain standards, the “issue of

arbitrary revenge is resolved” (David, 2003, p.122); it is those who plan and/or

have carried out attacks on Israeli citizens, so in killing them the “desire for

revenge from both families of the victims and the society at large is met”

(David, 2003, p.122). This also satisfies a desire for retribution, as those who

carry out atrocious crimes against Israeli civilians receive the ultimate

punishment. Furthermore, Hafez and Hatfeld (2006) discuss how targeted

killing placates Israeli citizens at times of intense conflict by “signal(ling) the

state’s determination to fight terrorism” (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006, p.378).

This, as Plaw describes, gives the Israelis a “sense of efficacy in the face of a

relentless threat”, and thus targeted killing can be seen as an effective

method of reassurance (Plaw, 2008, p. 182).

According to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the ultimate aim is to

“make peace” (Sales, 2014) with the Palestinians. Why then are targeted

killings continuing to be used when this offensive strategy runs contrary to this

desired end in two ways; firstly, using lethal force in Palestinian territory is

likely to encourage retaliation and lesson any appetite for peaceful discussion,

and secondly, any subsequent increase in attacks on Israeli soil is equally

likely to dent any enthusiasm for negotiation with the Palestinians. This can

be seen as a cyclical phenomenon, as when the level of violence increases

on both sides of the border, appetite for political process simultaneously

decreases. For example, during the Second Intifada where targeted killing

featured prominently and terrorist attacks in Israel remained high (Fisher,

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2014), those who “strongly oppose & somewhat oppose” negotiations

between Israel and Palestine rose from 18.1% in October 1999 to 51.9% in

October 2002 (Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, 2014). This is a

staggering statistic, and it highlights the fragility of public aspirations for

negotiation. Thus in a situation where there is a ultimate desire to open a

political dialogue, targeted killing with not be effective in helping gather public

support for this notion.

Israel’s wider counter terrorism mandate

Given the notoriety of targeted killing, it is unsurprising that this particular

aspect of Israel’s counter terrorism policy has come under such scrutiny. For

the reasons outlined throughout this essay, when one considers targeted

killing as a policy on its own, it cannot be said to be particularly effective.

However, it would be a mistake not to consider, albeit briefly, targeted killing

within the context of Israel’s wider counter terrorism mandate. Whereas

targeted killing provides an offensive measure of “last resort” (Byman, 2006),

the arrest and detention of terrorists can be seen as a more placid defensive

method of intervention. Indeed the tactics of targeted killing and arrest go

hand in hand, as before any hit can be authorised, all reasonable steps must

have been taken to exhaust non-lethal measures first (Alston, 2010).

The arrest and detention of terrorists is preferable as it allows the Israelis the

opportunity to gather intelligence from those apprehended. Furthermore, if

the terrorist elite are captured and sentenced, the martyrdom effect is less

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likely to take place due to the demoralising effect that incarceration can have

on terrorist groups. However, as Goldings (2011) points out, arresting

suspects is not always as easy as it seems. At times the Palestinian

Authority “refuses to give us suspected terrorists”, sometimes going so far as

to inform them of the impending arrest (Goldings, 2011, p.4). Furthermore, in

trying to arrest a suspect in an urban area there is a risk that riots and

violence may result (Goldings, 2011, p.4). This is why these counter terrorism

methods marry so well, as they can compensate for the others flaws. If

attempts to arrest an individual yield no positive results, targeted killing may

be used as a final resort in order to prevent further terrorist activity. The

effectiveness of targeted killing increases within the context of a broader

framework of less lethal means, as it provides the Israeli government with an

alternative should defensive counter terrorism measures fail.

Conclusion

Given the continuing level of violence between Israel and militant groups

operating from within Palestinian territory, the widespread use of targeted

killing by Israel has certainly not achieved strategic success in combatting

terrorist attacks against its citizens or enabling an environment in which

political dialogue can proceed.  At the tactical level, specific operations have

probably degraded the military capability of individual organisations but this

effect has been both limited and short term, particularly where the targets

were not members of the terrorist “elite”.  Whilst Israel’s use of targeted killing

has domestic support, indiscriminate strikes leading to high casualty rates

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amongst “non-combatants” has certainly affected Israel’s standing within the

wider International community, even amongst her closest friends, this is a

very significant negative.  Although Israel can justify the use of targeted killing

when less lethal means have failed, the policy is a barrier to any meaningful

political dialogue without which a longer term negotiated solution cannot be

developed and the cycle of violence will therefore continue.

.

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