Applying the Multiple-Streams Framework in a Sub-National Setting:

An Analysis of the Michigan Emergency Manager Law in Detroit

by

Calvin Higgins, Jr.

AN ESSAY

Submitted to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences,

Wayne State University,

Detroit, Michigan

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTERS OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

May of 2014

MAJOR: Public Policy

APPROVED BY:

Adviser Date

2nd

Reader Date (if necessary)

2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to acknowledge my Masters Essay Advisor, Professor John Strate for his

guidance on this paper and Professor Brady Baybeck who has assisted me on this topic.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

INTRODUCTION 5

POLICY PROCESS FRAMEWORKS 7

THE MULTIPLE-STREAMS FRAMEWORK 17

Problem Stream

Policy Stream

Political Stream

Policy Entrepreneur

Policy Window

LITERATURE ON MULTIPLE-STREAMS 21

Garbage Can Model

Criticism and Support

Advancing the Kingdon Model

DETROIT’S GARBAGE CAN MODEL 23

Detroit’s Problem Stream: An Overall Perspective

The Citizens’ Perspective

The City’s Perspective

The State’s Perspective

Detroit’s Policy Stream

City Officials

Citizens

Non-Government Organizations

The Media

State Officials

Political Stream

Policy Entrepreneur

Policy Window

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 43

REFERENCES 46

4

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

1. 25

2. 25

5

INTRODUCTION

The public policy process is long and complicated. Sabatier (2007) argues that the

process involves multiple actors, lengthy time spans, multiple programs, multiple levels

of governments, lengthy debates, deeply held values and interests, large amounts of

money and sometimes authoritative coercion. Unfortunately, there is no widely accepted

general theory to explain the complexity of the policy process. The search for a general

theory has resulted in the construction of numerous frameworks.

In his seminal work on policy theories, Sabatier (2007) identified nine theoretical

frameworks capable of explaining different aspects of the policy process--Advocacy

Coalition Framework (ACF), Institutional Rational Choice, Large-N Comparative,

Multiple-Streams (MS), Policy Diffusion, Policy Networks, Punctuated-Equilibrium,

Social Construction and Stages Heuristic. Of the nine frameworks, six focus almost

exclusively on the policy process at the national level, with the exceptions being ACF,

Institutional Rational Choice, and Policy Diffusion (Berry and Berry 2007, 224;

Zahariadis 2007, 80).

In this paper, I look to advance the body of research on the public policy process by

examining the policy process at the sub-national rather than the national level.

Specifically, I examine the policy process leading to the enactment of Michigan's Public

Act 436, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, also referred to as the Emergency

Manager Act, as a policy to address Detroit’s financial problems. I show that Detroit’s

problem was not due to a single cause but to intertwining financial and urban problems

that affected Detroit’s ability to provide basic government services to its citizens.

6

Among the nine frameworks identified by Sabatier, which best explains the policy

process resulting in the Emergency Manager Act? I argue that five help to explain the

policy process leading to this law: the Multiple-Streams framework, the Punctuated-

Equilibrium framework, the Social Construction framework, the Large-N Comparative

framework and the Policy Diffusion framework. These frameworks each address

somewhat different questions about the policy process, discussed below. For example, the

Multiple-Streams framework looks at how new policies get adopted--that is, how do

problems reach the governmental agenda and become linked with particular policy

options? How are such policy options, then, able to navigate through the political process

and get adopted?

To preface my argument, I conduct a brief overview of the nine different frameworks.

I then narrow my attention to the Multiple-Streams framework. I review the scholarly

literature on this framework. I then use this framework, in a section titled "Detroit's

Garbage Can Model,” to examine the policy process leading to the Emergency Manager

Act. The section looks at the problem, solution, and political streams. With respect to

the Emergency Manager Act, I identify the relevant policy entrepreneur, and factors

relevant to the opening of a "policy window," defined as a period of time, usually brief,

when there is a confluence of the three streams. I conclude that the Multiple-Streams

framework is the most useful among these nine different frameworks for explaining the

Emergency Manager Act. Further, I advise that other scholars will profit from using this

framework to conduct their own research at the sub-national level.

7

POLICY PROCESS FRAMEWORKS

Sabatier’s (2007) Theories of the Policy Process discusses nine theoretical

frameworks in an effort to bring some order to understanding the complexity of the

policy process. What, indeed, do these frameworks amount to? The Advocacy Coalition

Framework (ACF) explains the policy process to be the result of actions motivated by the

core policy beliefs of participants within distinctive policy subsystems. The Institutional

Rational Choice framework explains the policy process as a result of institutional rules

that shape the behavior of individuals who are motivated by material self-interest. The

Large-N Comparative explains policy commonalities or differences across large numbers

of jurisdictions. The Multiple-Streams (MS) framework, metaphorically, describes the

policy process as a chaotic soup of problems, policies and politics that on occasion

become coupled thereby providing a policy entrepreneur(s) with an opportune time or

policy window to enact new policy. The Policy Diffusion framework explains the spread

of policies across political jurisdictions as a result of the emulation or copying of policies

adopted earlier in other jurisdictions. The Policy Networks framework explains the policy

process as a result of informal, decentralized and horizontal interaction among a group of

network participants. The Punctuated-Equilibrium framework argues that the policy

process is marked by long periods of incremental policy change suddenly interrupted by a

major policy change. The Social Construction framework, with a focus on social welfare

policy, explains such policy by studying the narratives or stories that become attached to

client populations. The Stages Heuristic framework explains the policy process by

breaking it down into a series of stages--agenda setting, policy formulation and

legitimation, implementation, and evaluation. Although Sabatier (2007, 8) notes that this

8

framework does identify distinctive stages of the policy process that require explanation,

he argues that it does not meet the criteria of a scientific theory since it is entirely

descriptive.

What relevance, if any, are each of these frameworks to the enactment of the

Emergency Manager Act as a solution to Detroit’s problems with governance and

finances? Sabatier and Weible (2007, 189-192) set out the Advocacy Coalition

Framework (ACF) to better understand a policy process that deals with “wicked

problems--those involving substantial goal conflicts, important technical disputes, and

multiple actors from several levels of government.” The foundation of the ACF is the

policy subsystem. Its most prominent members are actors who specialize in the problem

area, sometimes referred to as technocrats who have strong and shared beliefs and are

motivated to translate those beliefs into actual policy. Furthermore, the ACF policy

actors, because of the authority they derive from their expertise, believe that they are

capable of influencing the selection of a particular policy option. The ACF framework is

most relevant to policy issues that are technical, such as environmental policy where

scientists have considerable influence.

The problems of Detroit, however, are not of this nature. They are chronic and

include an extraordinarily lengthy list. They include crime problems: armed robberies,

auto thefts, car hijackings, dog fighting, drug houses and drug sales, home invasions,

homicides, illegal dumping, larcenies, littering and loitering around party stores, gang

activities, youth gun violence, and the scrapping of abandoned homes. They include

health problems: a diabetes epidemic, obesity, lead poisoning, teen-age pregnancy, and

infant mortality. They include issues of neighborhood blight and infrastructure:

9

abandoned and burned out houses and commercial structures, large tracts of vacant land,

wandering pit bulls and feral dogs, broken and non-working street lamps, broken

sidewalks, broken water mains and illegal dump sites. There are problems with the

public schools: safety issues for students walking to school, low test scores, falling

public school enrollments, school violence, and high school dropouts. Residents have

difficulty securing healthy food, with very few full-service grocery stores within the city

(the food desert). City services are mediocre to poor. There is slow police response

time; emergency medical service is slow; there is very little recycling; snow plowing of

residential streets is delayed; water mains can take weeks to get repaired; public

transportation is inadequate. There are chronic problems in collecting property taxes and

water bills from the many unemployed and poor residents. Over the years, many elected

public officials and political appointees have been charged and convicted of crimes

related to a "pay to play" political culture. The middle class faces the high costs of life

in the city: a resident income tax if they work in the city, a very high property tax

millage, high property insurance, high auto insurance, the extra costs of home security

measures, and the costs of private/parochial school tuition if children are not sent to

public schools. Many middle class residents have abandoned the city, moving to the

suburbs. There is also, of course, the long-standing problem of the "de-industrialization"

of Detroit, the loss of high-paid manufacturing jobs, and resulting unemployment and

poverty.

With this lengthy list of problems, there is little or no possibility of a single advocacy

coalition with a shared belief system emerging that is capable of addressing, let alone

understanding, these problems and their interconnections and formulating a “grand”

10

policy solution for Detroit. They are all “wicked” problems to be dealt with, if at all, one

by one, using whatever solutions appear to the City’s elected public officials, at the time,

to be most promising. The ACF may be relevant, however, to issues regarding City

finances. Think-tanks such as the Citizens Research Council of Michigan (CRC), and

the Mackinac Center for Public Policy (MCPP), the city’s finance director, the city’s

auditor, and state level officials for years have called attention to, and shared their

concerns about, the City’s finances. These actors, however, do not and have not shared a

common outlook or shared belief system.

Sabatier (2007, 9) points out that Institutional Rational Choice is the most fully

developed and the most used of all the frameworks. It is sometimes referred to as the

Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD). As an analytical tool, IAD

tries to predict individual and group patterns of behavior within an institutional setting. It

asks whether or not the outcome occurred because of the institutional setting and the rules

that prevailed and would a different outcome have occurred under alternative institutional

arrangements (Ostrom 2011, 12-16)? The IAD framework has proved useful primarily in

the analysis of institutions and individuals that are involved in seeking cooperative

solutions to problems (E. Jones 2003 as cited in Ostrom 2007, 51). Some examples

include the development of partnerships among public agencies (Lubell et al. 2002;

Heikkila and Gerlak 2005 as cited in Ostrom 2007, 51) and the role of entrepreneurship

in collective action (Kuhnert 2001 as cited in Ostrom 2007, 51). The relevance of IAD

for the Emergency Manager Act as implemented in Detroit is to contribute to a better

understanding of the interactions between the Governor, the state legislature, the

emergency manager, the elected public officials and residents of Detroit. To what degree

11

did the appointment of an emergency manager create inducements to seek cooperative

solutions?

Blomquist (2007, 261) describes the Large-N Comparative framework (20 cases or

more) as useful in finding commonalities and differences among the policies of different

governing entities. These reveal clues about how the policies are generated and changed.

In 1975, New York City faced a financial crisis equal to Detroit’s present financial crisis.

In a small-N comparative study (n=2), the CRC (2012a, 4) found that both financial

crises were triggered by cash flow insolvency and that their respective recovery plans

were similar in that each state exercised long-term transfer of power to a state-dominated

board with extensive authority over city finances and operations. The report posits that

the transfer of power is the reason for the success of the New York City plan. A

comparison involving only one or a few cases is well below the 20 or more cases required

for using the Large-N comparative method; however, comparison with a few cases may

be useful, at least anecdotally, in identifying what has and has not worked elsewhere,

thereby giving Detroit public officials at least a few clues about what it takes for a

successful recovery. The Great Recession that began in 2007 resulted in great economic

stress for many municipalities that still lingers today. In 2012, within a two-week span,

three California cities moved to file for bankruptcy protection. By the end of the year,

nine others had declared financial emergencies (Pew Charitable Trusts 2013). Currently,

19 states have enacted laws allowing the state government to intervene when a

municipality is declared in a financial crisis1. The Pew study found that intervention

practices vary among the 19 states. Depending on the state, a state will designate a

receiver, an emergency manager, a state agency head, or financial control board. The

1 The states are CT, FL, IL, IN, ME, MA, MI, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, TN, and TX.

12

intervener is allowed to choose among options that include the restructuring of debt and

labor contracts, raising taxes and fees, offering state-backed loans and grants, providing

technical advice, and even dissolving the local government. Some states are more

aggressive (Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island) in their

interventions. Local governments often accept state intervention begrudgingly. It is rare

for a local government to seek bankruptcy protection from a court. A rise in

municipalities declaring financial emergencies throughout the United States has opened

the potential for more robust comparative research.

Zahariadis (2007) describes the Multiple-Streams (MS) framework as a policy

process that leads to new policy through the required coupling of a problem, a policy

solution and favorable politics. When a coupling occurs, a policy window opens,

creating a favorable time for a policy entrepreneur to promote their favored policy

solution. The MS framework also addresses the agenda-setting process--how public

officials come to identify problems and recognize them as needing to be attended to and

acted on. The MS framework appears capable of explaining Detroit’s emergency

manager policy process since, as will be argued below, there is clear evidence of coupling

occurring.

Berry and Berry (2007) describe the Policy Diffusion framework as a method to look

at how policy spreads throughout political jurisdictions (usually states) through emulation

or diffusion. States are able to enact and implement successful policies that have already

been tried out in other jurisdictions and have been shown to work. Kingdon (1995, 141)

argues that policy diffusion plays a significant role in the policy process and that usually

there is nothing new under the sun. He posits that past problems remain around to be

13

studied and solutions remain around to be improved upon or discarded. Such is the case

with Detroit’s many problems and the policies it has adopted over time in an effort to

address them. Detroit is not alone in dealing with financial and urban problems. Cities

such as New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and St. Louis have also faced equally

challenging problems and have formulated, reformulated, rejected and accepted ideas,

alternatives and proposals. The Policy Diffusion framework appears capable of

explaining how the City over the years has tried out many policy ideas that have been

adopted earlier by other cities facing similar problems. The Emergency Manager Act is

state level policy, however, so for diffusion theory to be relevant there would need to be

evidence that adoption of this policy at the state level was due to some understanding by

state level public officials that the approach had been tried in other states and had

worked.

Adam and Kriesi (2007, 131) describes the Policy Networks framework as a policy

subsystem concept that defines the policy process as part of an informal, decentralized

and horizontal process. The strength of Policy Networks is that it includes a diversity of

actors who are from governmental and private and non-profit sectors (Adam and Kriesi

2007, 147). Organizations such as the non-profit Detroit Crime Commission, an

organization that partners with Detroit police officials and government officials to lessen

the burdens of government and the citizens of the southeast Michigan area by facilitating

the prevention, investigation and prosecution of crime. The Detroit Recovery Project, a

private non-profit organization that partners with government and non-government

organizations to support recovery that strengthens, rebuilds, and empowers individuals,

families and communities who are experiencing co-occurring mental illness, and

14

substance use disorders. However, just like advocacy groups, policy networks face

Detroit’s “wicked” problems that make it difficult for a host of policy networks to

formulate a “grand” policy solution for Detroit.

Baumgartner and Jones (1991) set out the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework to

explain why policies undergo only incremental change through long, stable periods but

then during chaotic times undergo rapid change. Problem definition is a key element in

the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework; a different understanding of a problem can lead

to growing acceptance of a new solution and to the rapid ascent of an issue onto the

agenda. The Punctuated-Equilibrium framework, unlike some other frameworks, helps to

account for a policy process that involves both policy stasis and rapid policy shifts (True,

Jones and Baumgartner 2007, 156). The Emergency Manager Act is a clear example of a

non-incremental policy change. Thus, the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework may be

useful in explaining the policy process that led to it.

In the Social Construction framework, Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that target

populations acquire popular images and that these images form the basis for deciding

who receives the benefit or burden of a policy. This, Schneider and Ingram contend,

makes social construction a powerful influence on both the policy agenda and the actual

policy design. Target groups are socially constructed into four types: Advantage Groups

--politically powerful and positively constructed groups (e.g. AARP); Contender Groups

--politically powerful and negatively constructed groups (e.g. unions); Dependent Groups

--politically weak and positively constructed groups (e.g. abused women and children);

and Deviant Groups--politically weak and negatively constructed (e.g. criminals). It is

policymakers who formulate policy based upon such social constructions, and what they

15

are doing at times goes unnoticed by the public. However, for the social construction

theory to be relevant to explaining the Emergency Manager Act, there would need to be

evidence that Michigan's public officials have slotted the residents and leadership of

Detroit into one of these four target groups. There is evidence that some Michigan

policymakers, indeed, have put Detroit into the deviant category, strongly believing that

Detroit's black political leaders are incapable of effectively governing a large city. One

has to look no further than comments by Oakland County Executive L. Brooks Patterson

in a recent New Yorker Magazine interview titled “Drop Dead, Detroit!” (Williams

2014). However, more research is needed to determine if state legislators were motivated

by a similar social construction of Detroit in deciding to formulate the Emergency

Manager Act and vote in favor of it.

The Large-N Comparative, the Multiple-Streams framework, the Policy Diffusion

framework, the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework, and the Social Construction

framework appear to be relevant to explaining different aspects of Detroit’s emergency

manager policy process. The Multiple-Streams framework is especially relevant to

explaining the process leading to the Emergency Manager Act. For a long period of time,

there was no focusing event, no extraordinary financial emergency, to give immediate

salience to the City's financial difficulties. The City was able to patch problems and

"kick the can down the road." It issued debt, ignored long term health care and pension

obligations, and hoped for a turnaround in the City’s economy. It was business as usual.

The long accepted understanding was that the City’s financial difficulties were only

temporary; a result of national economic forces beyond its control, and that over time the

local economy would recover. Only recently and reluctantly were local public officials

16

able to see that this understanding was terribly mistaken. As often happens with a

pending financial crisis, there's a cash crisis, with money running out to pay employees,

debt payments, and other bills. Some still argue that all of the City's financial difficulties

stem from a swap deal that the City negotiated years earlier that soured when interest

rates dropped sharply. There's some truth to that claim, but the City's overall financial

difficulties are longstanding, as is evident from a careful analysis conducted by the CRC

(2013). The old understanding had to give way to a new understanding that the City’s

financial difficulties were chronic and largely insoluble without the wholesale

restructuring of city government operations, the rewriting of union contracts, and even

bankruptcy.

The Multiple-Streams framework has been criticized for its lack of productive

scholarship at the sub-national level (Zahariadis 2007, 80). This paper is an effort to fill

that gap. I begin by detailing the origins of the Multiple-Streams framework with Cohen,

March, and Olsen’s (1972) “garbage can model.”

17

THE MULTIPLE-STREAMS FRAMEWORK

The Multiple-Streams framework originates in Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972)

“garbage can model” that was developed to explain organizational decision making

during times of ambiguity and conflict. The garbage can model posits that organizations

make decisions during these conflicting times by the coupling of problems and solutions

that have been dumped by participants into a garbage can full of choice opportunities

(Robinson & Eller, 2010). Kingdon (1995), with only slight modifications, adopted

Cohen, March and Olsen’s garbage can model to explain government agenda-setting and

policy making at the national level. Kingdon’s garbage can model posits that government

policy choices are the result of the coupling of the three independent streams – problem,

policy or solution, and political--affording a policy entrepreneur an open policy window.

Specific details of the role of the three streams, the coupling process, and the policy

entrepreneur and policy window follow in the next subsections.

Problem Stream

A problem is an issue that catches the attention of policymakers and has become

salient enough that it has to be addressed. According to Kingdon (1995), a

problem/issue garners the attention of policymakers through various mechanisms. One

mechanism is the focusing event. For example, in 2009, General Motors (GM) filing for

bankruptcy garnered immediate public and media attention and became a focusing event

for the Obama administration. Prior to its 2009 bankruptcy filing, GM was a company

marred in financial trouble with declining sales and billion dollar losses. Requests for

government assistance were denied (Vlasic and Herszenhorn 2008). In the midst of the

worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, President Obama and members of

18

Congress feared the economic disaster that would accompany the collapse of GM, auto

dealerships, suppliers, and the entire U.S. auto industry. Industry and media reports

suggested that a bankruptcy of this magnitude would result in catastrophic job losses, and

significant disruption in the financial markets. GM was too important to the U.S.

economy. It was too big to fail. The federal government needed to intervene in GM’s

bankruptcy to insure it would survive beyond bankruptcy. The issue of GM's survival

climbed to the top of the governmental agenda. The Obama administration put forth, and

pushed for, a reorganization plan that included billions of dollars in bailout money.

Kingdon (1995) argues that not every problem or issue equally arises to the attention of

policymakers and that every focusing event is of the scale of GM’s bankruptcy. For

example, the need for adequate public transportation in Detroit has been an issue in

Detroit for years, sometimes eliciting powerful and emotional debates and feedback from

local residents, but has yet to result in a policy that would result in a comprehensive and

adequate public transportation system.

Policy Stream

The policy stream flows independently of the problem stream and is described by

Kingdon (1995, 116) as a primeval soup that consists of a wide range of ideas,

alternatives, and proposals that are generated by the policy community. This policy

community is composed of researchers from the academia, officials from government and

non-government organizations, and individuals from public and private interest groups.

Kingdon (1995, 122-123) tells us that the policy community is continuously proposing,

judging, altering, reconsidering, rejecting or accepting ideas or alternatives that are in

different stages of development, thereby, indicating a kind of Darwinian struggle within

19

the policy stream. From the policy stream will emerge the solution to the problem

existing in the problem stream. What waits now is a favorable political stream.

Political Stream

The political stream also flows independently of the problem and policy streams and

is composed of public moods that indicate to policymakers a need for a change in policy.

This public mood may reflect the views of interest groups that engage in both inside and

outside lobbying in order to pressure on policymakers to change policy. Interest groups

can apply pressure that blocks policymakers from making policy change. The election

cycle and activities associated with it, such as raising campaign money, fending off

primary challengers, and delaying unpopular policy decisions such as increasing taxes,

change the policy agenda priorities of policymakers (Kingdon, 1995). A favorable

political environment is needed to allow the coupling of the problem, policy, and political

stream. This coupling is done by the policy entrepreneur.

Policy Entrepreneur

Kingdon (1995, 179) argues that it is a policy entrepreneur(s) who is willing to invest

their time, energy, reputation and sometimes money to couple the three independent

streams into a policy choice. Kingdon’s policy entrepreneur is similar to a private

sector business entrepreneur who seeks, finds and markets innovative products (Mintrom,

2000). The policy entrepreneur can be an elected official or a non-elected person. It can

be someone in government or belonging to a non-governmental organization.

Regardless, they are someone who possesses an understanding and stake regarding what

they are proposing, are politically connected and are persistent (Mintrom 2000, 180-181).

20

Kingdon (1995) describes the policy entrepreneur as lying in wait for the opening of a

policy window so that he or she can join the three streams into a policy choice. However,

Mintrom (2000, 45) suggests that it is better to see a policy entrepreneur as someone who

makes deliberate efforts to draw the attention of decision makers to given problems and,

wherever possible, to force agenda change.

Policy Window

According to Kingdon (1995), a policy window provides policy entrepreneurs the

opportune time to couple the three independent streams into a policy choice that

addresses a problem or issue. The policy window or opportune time can occur regularly,

cyclically, and predictably, for example during policy/program renewals or budget

cycles, or unpredictably because of a problem’s position on the agenda rising, or because

of changes in the political stream (Kingdon, 166). Kingdon argues that once a policy

window opens, it does not stay open long.

21

LITERATURE ON MULTIPLE-STREAMS

Kingdon’s theory is recognized as excellent for explaining agenda setting and

policymaking at the national level (Bendor, 2001; Durant & Diehl, 1989). In his theory,

he uses the garbage can model as a metaphor to explain governmental agenda setting and

policymaking

Garbage Can Model

As previously indicated, Kingdon (1995) slightly modified Cohen et al.'s (1972)

garbage can model to explain government’s policy making process. Instead of the four

components of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities, Kingdon

constructed a model of three independent streams of problem, policy and politics moving

within the garbage can waiting to be coupled by a policy entrepreneur(s), thereby opening

up a policy window. Zahariadis’ (2007, 68) assumes that the number of problems/issues

addressed by policymakers is limited due to bounded rationality and time constraints

limit the range and number of alternatives to consider. A number of political scientists

(Bendor 2001; King 1985; Mucciaroni 1992; Sabatier 2007) have accepted this theory as

one that has significantly contributed to the understanding of the agenda-setting process

in policy making.

Criticism and Support

Scholars have criticized Kingdon’s model, and in particular its adoption of Cohen,

March and Olsen’s (1972) original garbage can model. These scholars argue that the

model lacks a theoretical foundation, includes unrealistic assumptions and is ambiguous

about the policy process (Bendor, 2001; King, 1985, Zahariadis, 2007). Bendor (2001)

and Murcciaroni (1992) question whether or not Kingdon’s three streams were

22

independent of each other. Mucciaroni concludes that Kingdon’s model was “overly

indeterminate” in part because of Kindgon’s view that the three streams were

independent of each other. In spite of these faults, Muciaroni (1992, 482) believes that

Kingdon “captured much of the complexity, fluidity, and unpredictability of agenda-

setting.” While Robinson and Eller (2010) note that Kingdon succeeded in describing

and explaining the dynamics of the individual streams, and Bendor (2001) and Zahariadis

(2007) applaud Kingdon, arguing that his approach is both theoretically driven, and

empirically validated.

Advancing the Kingdon Model

With Kingdon’s (1995) model being generally accepted as theoretically sound,

researchers still criticized the theory for it being restricted to the national level.

Zahariadis (2007, 80) noted that Kingdon failed to encourage the use of his model

beyond the national level. There have been attempts, nevertheless to apply Kingdon’s

model to other countries. In Britain, France and Germany, it has been used to study

privatization policies (Zahariadis 1995, 1996); and in Greece it has been used to study

foreign policy (Zahariadis 2005). There has been only limited application of the

Multiple-Streams framework at the sub-national level (see McLendon 2003 and

Westervelt, 2001 as cited in Zahariadis 2007, 80; Robinson 2010).

This paper attempts to add to Kingdon’s body of research by determining if the

Multiple-Streams concept can be applied at the sub-national level. Specifically, I will

determine if the Emergency Manager Act in Detroit is supportive of the Multiple-Streams

framework.

23

DETROIT’S GARBAGE CAN MODEL

Detroit’s Problem Stream: An Overall Perspective

Detroit’s problems include seemingly innumerable complex, interacting, and

compounding issues that together have become interwoven into a financial and urban

crisis. Detroit’s problems were of such a magnitude that the City today is unable or

barely able to supply basic services to its residents. For a very long time, no definitive

focusing event occurred to push Detroit’s financial and other problems to the forefront of

either the City's or the State of Michigan's agenda; however, multiple sources gave

notice to both City and State policymakers that problems were mounting that could not be

ignored for long. Past policies had failed to solve Detroit's problems, and current ones

were also failing.

Historians and scholars such as Thomas Sugrue (1996) and Edward Glaeser (2011)

argue persuasively that Detroit’s problems were first manifest with the onset of

deindustrialization in the years following World War II. It was at this point that Detroit

began to see a decline in its war-time industry. This deindustrialization brought about

financial instability, declining employment, and increasing crime and poverty. Bomey

and Gallaher (2013) argue that financial instability as a result of declining tax revenues

led to the decrease in resources for public safety and education.

There is ample research showing that problems such as those experienced by Detroit

can develop into an urban crisis. (See Hipp and Yates 2011; and Flango and Sherbenou

1976 for studies on poverty; Cantor and Land 1985, Arvanites and Defina 2006; and

Kleck and Chiricos 2002 for studies on unemployment; Machin, Marie, and Vujic 2011,

2012; LeBlanc and McDuff 1993, and Maguin and Loeber 1996 for studies on low

24

education achievement). Virtually all indicators point to a very stark urban crisis in

Detroit. Detroit’s violent crime rate ranks among the highest in Michigan and the U.S.

Data from the FBI Uniform Crime Report (2012) shows that Detroit had a violent crime

rate of 2,133 per 100,000 population, compared to 455 per 100,000 for the state and 387

per 100,000 population for the nation. Detroit’s unemployment rate is one of the highest

in Michigan and the U.S. Statistics compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012)

show that Detroit has an unemployment rate of 18.6 percent compared to Michigan’s

average of 9.1 percent and the U.S. average of 8.1 percent. U.S. Census Bureau (2007-

2011) data shows that 36.2 percent of Detroiters live in poverty compared to 15.7 percent

for Michigan and 14.3 percent for the U.S. Detroit’s illiteracy rate stands at 47 percent

compared to a 23 percent illiteracy rate for the U.S. (Detroit Literacy Coalition, n.d). In

education, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) shows that in 2011

Detroit’s fourth graders scored an average of 203 in mathematics achievement tests and

191 in reading achievement tests, compared to 233 in mathematics and 211 in reading for

similarly large cities and 240 in mathematics and 221 in reading for national average

(NCEC, 2011).

Indicators also point toward a persistent financial crisis in Detroit that is interwoven

with its urban crisis. According to Bomey and Gallagher (2013), Detroit’s population

began to steadily decline in the 1950s, post-World War II. Figure 1 shows that Detroit’s

population dropped from 1.8 million citizens in 1950 to 713,777 citizens in 2010. Bomey

and Gallagher (2013) further suggest that as a result of Detroit’s depopulation, property

values and tax revenues also declined (Figure 2).

25

(Figure 1) (Figure 2)

Bomey and Gallagher cite statistics that show the City of Detroit’s revenue in today’s

dollars fell 40 percent from 1962 to 2012. The City's response to its declining revenue

was to enact new taxes or increase existing taxes so that it could cover service costs and

union benefits; however, Bomey and Gallagher claim that this too contributed to

Detroit’s declining population and deindustrialization by driving residents to the suburbs

and driving businesses overseas. The declining revenue contributed to Detroit’s

diminishing capacity to provide basic public services to its citizens.

Bomey and Gallagher (2013) also point to failed financial policies as contributing to

Detroit’s financial crisis. In particular, Bomey and Gallagher point to former Mayor

Kwame Kilpatrick’s 2005 $1.44-billion pension obligation reduction deal. This deal

included the city selling pension obligation certificates of participation to fund the city’s

pension funds and buying derivatives at a locked rate of six percent. The deal failed

when the interest rates dropped sharply and the stock market collapsed which led the city

26

to pledge its casino tax revenue as collateral. This left the city owing $2.8 billion for

principal, interest and insurance payments over the next 22 years, which represented

nearly one-fifth of the city’s debt (Bomey and Gallagher, 2013). The opportunity cost

associated with this debt is seen as contributing to the city’s inability to provide and

sustain essential public services, such as police, fire and adequate public transportation to

its citizens.

Bomey and Gallagher (2013) argue that Detroit’s policymakers’ failure to exercise

foresight and to act immediately to address the causes of deficits contributed to Detroit’s

financial crisis. They cite the example that from 1994 to 2001, Detroit’s political leaders

failed to decrease the city’s workforce to match the decline in population and the need for

city services. Bomey and Gallagher (2013, 9) point out that there was a 46% increase in

health care spending between 2000 and 2012 during the time that the city’s general

revenue declined by twenty-percent.

The Citizens’ Perspective

As stated in the previous section, Detroit has had a high violent crime rate and it

remains, despite the rate falling over time, as the biggest concern of its citizens. In a

2012 poll conducted by the by The Detroit News that asked Detroit residents to rank their

concerns, nearly 58 percent of Detroit’s residents ranked crime and safety as their largest

concern followed by unemployment at 12.8 percent, public transportation at 3.5 percent,

and the lack of city services at 3.2 percent (The Detroit News 2012). Unless city officials

adequately address Detroit’s crime problem, its efforts to address its other problems will

fail.

27

The City’s Perspective

There is clear evidence that City-level policymakers recognized that Detroit was in

the midst of a longstanding financial and urban crisis that was affecting the city’s ability

to provide basic services to its residents. In a 2013 State of the City Address, Mayor

Dave Bing placed blame on Detroit’s past financial mismanagement as the reason for

Detroit’s current problems. Mayor Bing emphasized that he inherited a $322 million

accumulated deficit, in addition to $13.8 billion in long-term liabilities. This impeded the

City’s ability to provide basic city services, such as health services for its residents, job

placement, human services, public lighting, public safety, and public transportation (City

of Detroit 2013a).

A statement by Detroit City Councilman André Spivey also indicates that Detroit’s

City Council recognized that Detroit’s financial problems were affecting its ability to

provide basic services. In a 2012 statement addressing a state-required consent

agreement between the city and the state, Councilman Andre Spivey stated “a need for

cooperation in moving Detroit towards fiscal stability with an emphasis on improving the

delivery of city services” (City of Detroit 2012a).

The State’s Perspective

In 2012, Governor Snyder dispatched a Financial Review Team to analyze and report

back on Detroit’s financial condition. The Team concluded that Detroit was under a

severe financial crisis based on the following: (1) Detroit continued to experience a

significant depletion of cash and projected a cumulative cash deficit in excess of $100

million by the end of the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2013; (2) Detroit had not

experienced a positive year-end fund balance since fiscal year 2004 and that its General

28

Fund deficit was $326.6 million in fiscal year 2012 and would have accumulated a deficit

of $936.8 million if the city had not issued long-term debt; (3) the City’s long-term

liabilities, including unfunded actuarial accrued pension liabilities and other post-

employment benefits, exceeded $14 billion (State of Michigan, 2013a).

Feedback from multiple sources gave notice to the state's policymakers that current

and past policies were failing; however, it was the feedback from Governor Snyder’s

Financial Review Team that finally caught the attention of state legislators in Lansing,

the state capitol. Detroit's problems moved from the list of problems that were in need of

general attention to the list of problems that were in need of immediate attention.

Kingdon (1995, 3-4) defines the former as an agenda, a list of problems that

policymakers are paying some serious attention at any given time and the latter as a

decision agenda, a list of problems that are up for an active decision.

For many years, Detroit’s problems have been highly visible as gauged by such

indicators of urban pathology as high unemployment, high crime, poverty, high illiteracy

and low education achievement. Moreover, trends in financial indicators such as

declining property values, declining tax revenue and long-term/high risk borrowing

furnished evidence of financial problems and likely financial crisis for Detroit. These

financial problems diminished Detroit’s ability to provide basic government services that

were essential to public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.

Kingdon (1995, 94) argues that some problems are not always self-evident and need a

push from a focusing event to capture the attention of policymakers. For years, no

definitive focusing event appeared to push Detroit’s problem to the forefront of City and

State level policymakers’ agendas however; the threat of the City running out of cash,

29

and especially the feedback from a financial review team, finally caught the attention of

Governor Snyder, a Republican and the key policy maker at the state level in a

Republican controlled state legislature. He moved Detroit’s problems from the state

government's general agenda to its decision agenda.

Detroit’s Policy Stream

Detroit’s policy stream appears similar to Kingdon’s (1995) description of the policy

primeval soup of ideas, alternatives, and proposals that came from many different

political corners.

City Officials

In 2009, as a newly elected Mayor of Detroit, Dave Bing proposed a three pillar

Urban Restructuring Plan to (1) Improve the Quality of Life; (2) Create Financial

Stability; and (3) Address Long-Term Liabilities (City of Detroit 2013a ). The plan

would improve the quality of life through (a) a public safety initiative that would

redeploy and reassign police officers to high crime areas, address youth violence,

increase the salaries and benefits of fire personnel, purchase new fire equipment, and

increase the use of technology in public safety; (b) improve public transportation through

increased efficiency and on-time service; (c) improve public lighting by creating a public

lighting authority, installing 3,000 new lights and repair damaged street lights; (d)

improve recreation facilities by launching a plan for active and safe recreation centers,

keeping all recreation centers open and available to residents and to re-open Belle Isle

Aquarium through public-private partnership; and (e) address blight by demolishing

nearly 6,700 abandoned neighborhood structures, launching a public private partnership

with Blight Authority, and demolishing the former Brewster/Douglas public housing site.

The plan would create financial stability by (a) enacting revenue enhancement initiatives;

30

(b) enacting cost savings initiatives; and (c) identifying future cost saving initiatives. The

plan would address Detroit’s long-term liabilities, such as its general fund debt

obligations, pension unfunded liabilities and retiree medical unfunded liabilities.

In his 2013 State of the City Address, Mayor Bing noted some of the

accomplishments of his Urban Restructuring Plan (City of Detroit 2013b). In four years,

the City’s spending was reduced from $1.4 billion to $1.1 billion. To cut costs, City

services such as the Health Department, the Workforce Development Department and the

Human Services Department were privatized. Public transportation was improved

through the implementation of his “415 Plan” that guaranteed bus service every fifteen

minutes at the four busiest bus routes. Public safety was improved through the hiring of

100 additional police officers and the re-opening of eight mini-police stations in the

neighborhoods. Nearly 6,700 vacant properties were demolished. More than 5,000 new

jobs were brought to Detroit. A Regional Transportation Authority was formed to

coordinate the M-1 light rail system. In other cost saving measures, Mayor Bing

negotiated and reached significant concessions with Detroit’s labor unions (Detroit Free

Press 2012). However, for all of his accomplishments, Mayor Bing’s plans were judged

by Governor Snyder and the state legislature to be insufficient in addressing Detroit’s

problems.

A Financial Stability Agreement between the City of Detroit and the State of

Michigan was proposed and agreed upon by Mayor Bing, state officials and city council

members, albeit not unanimously (City of Detroit 2012b). The agreement gave greater

oversight of Detroit’s financial matters to state officials in exchange for not appointing an

emergency manager. The agreement required, among other things, the creation of a

31

financial advisory board, and the City renegotiating with the labor unions in order to

extract deeper concessions than previously agreed upon. In return, the State would

commit resources in support of initiatives such as those outlined in Mayor Bing’s Urban

Restructuring Plan that created jobs and improved the quality of life for Detroiters (City

of Detroit 2012a).

Another proposal centered on the dispute over $220 million in revenue sharing that

the City of Detroit argued it is owed by the State of Michigan. While the facts remain in

dispute and beyond the scope of this paper, the City of Detroit proposed to use the

revenue sharing money to address its fiscal crisis.

Citizens

I was unable to find a grand comprehensive list of ideas, plans, or proposals put forth

by the residents of Detroit to address Detroit’s problems. The reason for this is the lack

of an advocacy coalition. There appears to be no individual or civic organization capable

of understanding the complexity of Detroit’s problems and formulating a grand policy

solution. One thing for certain is that Detroiters were not in support of any plan or

proposal to take away the authority of Detroit's elected public officials to govern the city.

I later cite a poll where 69% of Detroit’s residents did not support the appointment of an

Emergency Manager in Detroit.

Non-Government Organizations

Non-Government Organizations (NGO) also contributed to Detroit’s soup of ideas,

alternatives, and proposals. One such organization that contributed was the Mackinac

Center for Public Policy (MCPP), a nonpartisan research and educational institute

dedicated to improving the quality of life for all Michigan residents by promoting sound

32

solutions to state and local policy questions. The MCPP, located in Midland, Michigan,

is a "conservative" think-tank generally advocates for policy options that reduce the size

and cost of state and local governments, that cut government regulation and red tape, and

that employ market based solutions, such as privatization of publicly owned assets and

contracting. The MCPP assists policy makers, scholars, business people, the media and

the public by providing objective analysis of Michigan issues. The goal of all MCPP’s

reports, commentaries and educational programs is to equip Michigan citizens and other

decision makers to better evaluate policy options. In a Detroit-specific report published

in 2000 titled Michigan Privatization Report, the MCPP suggested the following cost

saving measures: (1) Contract out the operation of the Detroit Department of

Transportation (DDOT) at a savings estimated to be $60 million annually; (2) Sell

Detroit’s electrical power system to an investor owned utility for an estimated price

between $301 million to $501 million; (3) Sell Cobo Hall; (4) Sell the water system for

an estimated price between $1.775 billion and $2.285 billion or contract out the

management of the water system for an estimated annual savings of $47.2 million; (5)

Contract out the collection of garbage for an annual savings of $6.4 million; (6) Privatize

building inspections, permits and licenses at an estimated annual savings of $5.1 million;

(7) Sell Belle Isle for an estimated $370 million and an annual savings of $6.6 million in

care and maintenance costs (MCPP 2011).

The Citizens Research Council of Michigan (CRC), with offices in Livonia and

Lansing, Michigan, is another non-partisan think-tank that conducts policy research on

issues affecting state and local governments in Michigan. The organization has published

numerous reports over the years on issues affecting Detroit. Most relevant are its reports

33

on the financial situation of the City, such as the effects of the population on major

revenue sources (CRC 1989); the fiscal condition of Detroit (CRC 2010); downsizing

Detroit (CRC 2012b); and city revenues (CRC 2013).

The public universities in Michigan, especially the big three research universities that

include the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and Wayne State

University, provide a home to numerous institutes, centers, and research scholars who

have conducted research on the city's many problems. For example, the Center for

Urban Studies of Wayne State University over the years has engaged in a number of

collaborative efforts with the City, an example being the Urban Safety Program. The

Urban Safety Program works with community organizations and government agencies on

collaborative projects that address persistent public safety-related issues. The program

conducts research on “best practices” and model programs, analyzes crime and

community data, and provides technical assistance to community organizations and

government agencies.

In the soup of policy ideas, it's often difficult or impossible to trace the lineage of any

particular policy idea, but the universities in Michigan no doubt have been the seed bed

of many new ideas later considered by both local and state policy makers.

The Media

Several politically attuned journalists were contributors to Detroit’s primeval soup of

ideas, alternatives and proposals. Detroit Free Press editor Stephen Henderson

suggested that the state takeover Detroit’s debt in exchange for a voice in future funding

decisions. He also proposed that the city rid itself of the ownership and management of

the water department, that serves almost all of the large metropolitan area, and the

34

management of park services (Henderson, personal communication, January 31, 2013).

Detroit Free Press staff writer John Gallagher proposed that non-profits, universities

and urban planners, and not city government, should solve Detroit’s urban blight problem

(Gallagher, personal communication, January 24, 2013). Tax increases and long-term

borrowing were proposed and sometimes used to address Detroit’s financial problem

(Bomey and Gallagher, 2013)

State Officials

State officials have made significant contributions of ideas, alternatives, and

proposals to Detroit’s policy soup. They ranged from doing nothing to a full state take-

over of Detroit. The following overview is not an exhaustive listing of what state

officials have come up with to address Detroit's ills, but it does represent some that the

state's policymakers have seriously considered.

For state legislators, perhaps the most controversial of all ideas was the notion that

the state should intervene and take any kind of action to save Detroit. Many legislators,

especially Republicans, saw Detroit as a hopeless case, deeply mired in the muck of

problems that were the result of decades of incompetent and corrupt leadership. The city

was an embarrassment to the rest of the state.

There were really two questions. First was the question of whether or not the State

should intervene at all in Detroit. The second was whether any intervention should

involve a State political takeover or a State monetary bailout. I've addressed the issue of a

political takeover by the state throughout this paper, but what about the proposal to use

state dollars to bailout Detroit? There was little or no chance of Republican Governor

Snyder and either the Republican controlled House or the Republican controlled Senate

35

giving serious consideration to this option. Indeed, Republican Governor Snyder,

Republican Senate Majority Leader Richardville and Republican House Speaker Bolger

made it clear throughout that a state bailout of any municipality was not an option. In

support of the Emergency Manager Act, Governor Snyder stated that the use of the

Emergency Manager Law “will ensure residents are not cut off from basic services and

protect taxpayers from having to bailout [emphasis added] municipalities that fail to take

action” (State of Michigan, n.d2). In a press conference with Senate Majority Leader

Richardville and House Speaker Bolger on the issue of Detroit retiree pensions, Governor

Snyder again made it clear on the bailout issue when he stated, “We will not participate

in a bailout…” (State of Michigan, n.d3).

Was a federal bailout a possibility? There was no chance of a federal bailout, even

with a Democrat, President Obama, in the White House. Partisan polarization in

Washington in President Obama's second term was extreme, with House Republicans

opposing virtually every presidential initiative. There was little sympathy and support in

the House for a bailout of Detroit. Many in the House were still angry about the bailout a

number of years earlier of General Motors. The House, under control of the Republicans,

would not have considered such legislation. Public opinion was no help here. A

Quinnipiac University poll showed that only a bare majority of 51% of Democrats

supported a federal bailout while 73% of Republicans opposed a federal bailout (Bevan

2013).

With the presence of a financial crisis still looming and virtually no chance of a state

or federal bailout, it was the Emergency Manager Act that ascended to the top of

Governor Snyder’s decision agenda. In March 2013, the Republican controlled state

36

legislature with the urging of Republican Governor Snyder enacted PA 436 of 2012, the

Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, a financial management policy to address

Detroit’s financial and governance problems. The Emergency Manager Act gives the

governor the authority to appoint an Emergency Manager to replace elected officials of a

municipality where a financial emergency has been declared. In the City of Detroit’s

case, Governor Snyder declared a financial emergency after an appointed financial

review team found Detroit to in a financial crisis.

A brief overview of the history of the Emergency Manager Act (Hohman 2012)

shows that the Emergency Manager Act dates back to 1988 when PA 101 was passed

following the court-ordered receivership of the City of Ecorse, Michigan. As a result of

the court-order, a receiver was appointed and given broad authority over the city’s elected

leaders to set budgets, control finances, sell assets, hire workers, close positions, and

negotiate contracts and collective bargaining agreements. However, the receiver was

unable to alter existing collective bargaining agreements or other contracts between the

city and its workers. In order to prevent any future court-ordered receiverships, the

Michigan legislature enacted PA 101 of 1988 that authorized the state to identify and

review local governments under financial stress and appoint an Emergency Financial

Manager (EFM)2. In 1990, Michigan legislators superseded PA 101 with PA 72, which

expanded the Emergency Manager Act to cover financially distressed school districts.

In 2011, PA 72 was superseded by PA 4 which carried with it clarifications to PA 72

and was significant in expanding the powers of the Emergency Manager to amend

existing collective bargaining agreements and other contracts between the city and its

2 The title Emergency Financial Manager was first used in PA 101 but was subsequently changed to

Emergency Manager in PA 436. Both continued to be used interchangeably, however for this paper I will

use the title Emergency Manager.

37

workers. However, in 2012, PA 4 was nullified by Michigan voters via the ballot, thus

returning the EM's authority back to what it was under PA 72. In response to the

nullification of PA 4, the Michigan legislature enacted PA 436 in 2012 that superseded

PA 72. PA 436 was significant in expanding the Governor’s authority to intervene earlier

when a local government is under a financial crisis (State of Michigan, 2013b).

The authority, purpose, and the intent of the Emergency Manager Act are spelled out

in the statutory language. The purpose of Emergency Manager Act is to return financial

stability to a municipality so that it is able to provide basic government services that

support the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.

Beginning with Section 3, Paragraph (a), PA 436 states that:

The fiscal accountability of local governments is vitally necessary to the

interests of the citizens of this state to assure the provision of necessary

governmental services essential to public health, safety, and welfare

Paragraph (c) that states:

That the fiscal stability of local governments is necessary to the health, safety,

and welfare of the citizens of this state and it is a valid public purpose for this state to

assist a local government in a condition of financial emergency

Section 9, Paragraph 2 empowers the Governor to replace elected officials with the

appointment of an Emergency Manager, it states:

Upon appointment, an emergency manager shall act for and in the place

and stead of the governing body and the office of chief administrative

officer of the local government

Section 10 empowers the Emergency Manager to govern, it states:

An emergency manager shall issue to the appropriate local elected and

appointed officials and employees, agents, and contractors of the local

government the orders the emergency manager considers necessary to

accomplish the purposes of this act

38

An order issued under this section is binding on the local elected and appointed

officials and employees, agents, and contractors of the local government to whom

it is issued

Public sector labor unions have tried repeatedly to challenge the Emergency Manager

Act. Legal challenges have failed. Political challenges, such as in 2012 when unions

were successful in nullifying PA 4 through a ballot initiative, did not bring lasting

success (Hohman, 2012).

In the next section, I analyze Detroit and the State of Michigan's political streams to

see how conducive they were to being coupled with the problem and policy streams.

Political Stream

Kingdon (1995) argues that the main components of the political stream are the

public mood for policy change, organized political forces that are able to apply pressure

for policy change or block policy change and election activities that can change the

policy priorities of policymakers. In Detroit’s political stream, the overall public mood

in Michigan was in favor of the Emergency Manager Act; organized political forces were

unable to block policy change; and election activities played no significant direct role in

the political stream.

In March 2013, a poll conducted by the Marketing Resource Group (MRG) and the

Inside Michigan Politics (IMP) showed large majorities of likely voters statewide (67%)

in Michigan and in metropolitan Detroit (71%) (mainly suburbs outside Detroit)

supporting an Emergency Manager, but only a minority (41%) of likely voters in the city

of Detroit (MRG, 2013). The split along geographic lines appears to have had little

impact on Governor Snyder's decision to appoint an Emergency Manager in Detroit.

This is explained by the fact that Republican Governor Snyder is a statewide official who

39

was elected with only a small number of his votes coming from largely African-

American (83%) and Democratic Party controlled Detroit. In the last general election in

2010, Governor Snyder received only 5 percent of Detroit’s votes (City of Detroit, 2010).

Michigan labor unions' success in repealing PA 4 through an initiative was only

temporary. The Michigan legislature, ignoring this initiative vote, in the following "lame

duck" session enacted PA 436, which significantly expanded the Governor’s authority to

intervene when a municipality is facing a financial crisis (Hohman, 2012).

Of Kingdon’s (1995) third element in the political stream, I found evidence that

election activity played an indirect rather than direct role in moving Detroit’s financial

and urban problems to the top of Governor Snyder’s decision agenda. Kingdon (1995,

153) posits that agenda change occurs when an incumbent in the position of authority

changes his or her agenda priorities or a newly elected official brings in new priorities.

As a newly elected Governor in 2010, Snyder had his own agenda. He campaigned under

a 10-point plan to “Reinvent Michigan.” That 10-point plan was to (1) Create more and

better jobs; (2) Leverage the new tax system; (3) Reinvent Michigan’s government; (4)

Retain Michigan’s young people; (5) Restore Michigan cities; (6) Enhance Michigan’s

national and international image; (7) Protect Michigan’s environment; (8) Revitalize

Michigan’s educational system; (9) Reinvent Michigan’s health care system; and (10)

Win through Relentless Positive Action (State of Michigan, nd1). Detroit, at the time of

Snyder’s election, was a piece of a much larger state problem, such as a $1.5 billion

structural deficit, a drained "rainy day" fund and a Michigan Business Tax that he felt

was job killing (State of Michigan, n.d1). As indicated before, Detroit’s financial and

urban problems were manifest well before Snyder took office in 2010, and the focus of

40

his election campaign was not directly tied to fixing Detroit, but fixing Detroit was part

of his overall plan to “Reinvent Michigan.”

The political stream appeared to be favorable for Governor Snyder to enact the

Emergency Manager Act in Detroit. The overall public mood in Michigan for its use in

Detroit was favorable. Michigan labor unions, staunchly supporting the Democratic

party, were helpless in thwarting the enactment by a Republican Governor and a

Republican controlled legislature of PA 436. Republicans in the state legislature, holding

majorities in both chambers, and representing largely safe Republican districts, where

many of their supporters were hostile to Detroit, knew that there would be no electoral

repercussions from voting in favor of PA 436. The Governor’s agenda, already getting

enacted and implemented in his first term, included restoring Michigan’s cities. All three

streams now seem ready for coupling by a policy entrepreneur upon the opening of the

policy window. In the next section, I identify the policy entrepreneur and how he

managed to couple the three streams.

Policy Entrepreneur

As previously indicated a policy entrepreneur is someone who can invest a

considerable amount of their time, energy, and reputation to couple the three streams.

Mintrom (2000, 68) insists that the definition of policy entrepreneur must clearly

distinguish between those who should and those who should not be conferred the title.

Mintrom (2000, 152) argues that policy entrepreneurs may include only those who

introduce policy innovations that result in policy change. I take Mintrom’s position a

step further and argue that policy entrepreneurs should also include those, who by their

actions (e.g. acquiring knowledge, persuading others, mobilizing supporters, steering

41

legislation, obtaining budget), are able to introduce, enact, and even oversee the

implementation of new policies

To summarize, Detroit’s problem stream consisted of a series of complex and

compounding issues that were interwoven into a financial and urban crisis. Its policy

stream was made of up of many ideas, alternatives and proposals ranging from an Urban

Restructuring Plan, using revenue sharing dollars, selling off city assets, privatizing city

operations, using non-profits, universities and urban planners to fight urban blight, state

and federal bailout, and State intervention via the Emergency Manager Act. A supportive

public mood, diminished resistance from fatigued and largely defeated and powerless

labor unions, and little public opposition outside the city of Detroit made the political

stream favorable for the Emergency Manager Act. It was Governor Snyder who coupled

the three streams upon the opening of the policy window. It was Governor Snyder who

possessed the legal authority, along with the state legislature, to enact the Emergency

Manager Act, and it was he who had the executive authority to implement it in Detroit.

Policy Window

Kingdon (1995) argues that a policy window can be opened by a compelling problem

and once opened it provides policy entrepreneurs the opportune time to join the three

independent streams into a policy. I point toward February 19, 2013, as the date that the

policy window opened. It is this date that the financial review team declared Detroit to

be in a financial emergency. This is what gave the legal authority to Governor Snyder to

apply the Emergency Manager Act to the City of Detroit. It was the opportune time to

couple the three streams. On March 25, 2013, Governor Snyder appointed an Emergency

42

Manager, Kevin Orr, to address Detroit’s financial problems and return stability to the

city so that it would be able to provide basic government services to its citizens.

43

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The public policy process is a complex process that is carried out on multiple levels

(e.g. international, national, and subnational) by a multitude of individuals and

organizations. Unfortunately, there is no single general theoretical framework that can

explain the complex world of the public policy process (Smith and Larimer 2009, 15).

Today, policy scholars understand and explain different aspects of the public policy

process through the use of nine theoretical frameworks: Advocacy Coalition Framework

(ACF), Institutional Rational Choice, Large-N Comparative, Multiple-Streams (MS),

Policy Diffusion, Policy Networks, Punctuated-Equilibrium, Social Construction and

Stages Heuristic. It is important to repeat, however, that these frameworks are not

mutually exclusive. They each address somewhat different aspects of the policy process

and are helpful for addressing some, but not all of those aspects. Most researchers have

conducted studies of the policy process at the national level; however, there are many

reasons for wanting to better understand how sub-national governments enact the policies

that they do. Two questions immediately come to mind: How does the policy process at

the sub-national level differ from that at the national level? Can results at the national

level be generalized to the sub-national level?

This paper has examined the policy process at the sub-national level using the case

study of the enactment and implementation of a law enabling the appointment of an

emergency manager to address severe financial and governance problems in Detroit,

Michigan. Five of the nine theoretical frameworks – Large-N Comparative, Multiple-

Streams, Policy Diffusion, Punctuated-Equilibrium,and Social Construction – are

relevant in explaining this policy choice. For this paper, I applied the Multiple-Streams

44

framework to a single case at the sub-national level, finding that it does indeed help

explain what happened.

Ample information from State of Michigan records, City of Detroit records,

newspaper articles, books, government records and statistics, non-government records

and statistics provided feedback to State of Michigan policymakers that Detroit’s

problem was an intertwined financial and urban crisis that greatly diminished the capacity

of the City to solve its own problems. The "last straw" was a financial review report that

was sufficient for Governor Snyder to elevate Detroit's financial problems from his

general agenda to his decision agenda.

There is ample evidence of a primeval soup of policies. Information from State of

Michigan records, City of Detroit records and personal communication show many

examples of the ideas, alternatives, and proposals to "fix" Detroit and its finances.

Ultimately, it was PA 436, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act or the

Emergency Manager Act, that was chosen by Governor Snyder as the policy of choice to

address Detroit’s governance problem. As indicated above, emergency manager laws

were not new to Michigan, but had been around for some time, even though earlier

versions were judged by both the Governor and a majority of state legislators to lack the

authority needed to get the job done in the case of Detroit.

According to data collected from polls and non-government organizations, public

opinion favored the decision to enact the Emergency Manager Act as a policy to address

Detroit’s problem. Furthermore, Governor Snyder possessed the legal authority along

with the Republican controlled legislature to enact the Emergency Manager Act. The

political situation was favorable. It was the Governor who finally coupled this law as a

45

solution to Detroit’s problem, and he became the policy entrepreneur. Records from the

State of Michigan show that on February 19, 2013, Detroit’s policy window opened when

a financial review team declared a financial emergency in Detroit, therefore, providing

the opportune time for Governor Snyder to couple the three streams and provide his

selection of PA 436 as the policy to address Detroit’s problem.

This paper used a qualitative analysis to describe and explain a significant case study

of public policymaking using the Multiple-Streams framework. To truly add to the body

of work that advances the Multiple-Streams framework, however, I advise conducting a

quantitative analysis that includes a sample of cases of policy making at the sub-national

level.

46

REFERENCES

Adam, Silke and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2007. “The Network Approach.” In Theories of the

Policy Process, 2nd

ed. ed. Paul A. Sabatier, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 129-

154.

Arvanites, Thomas M. and Robert H. Defina. 2006. Business Cycles and Street Crime.

Criminology,Vol. 44, No. 1. 139-164.

Baumgartner, Frank R. and Bryan D. Jones. 1991. Agenda Dynamics and Policy

Subsystems. The Journal of Politics, Volume 53, Issue 4 (Nov., 1991), 1044-

1074.

Bevan, Tom. 2013. Dems Favor Federal Bailout of Detroit, But Majority of Public

Opposed. Real Clear Politics.

http:www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/08/02/dems_favor_federal_bailout_

of _detroit_public_does_not_119482.html. (April 12, 2014).

Bendor, Jonathon 2001. Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research

Program. American Political Science Association, Vo1 95, No, 1. 169-190

Bomey, Nathan and Johan Gallaher. 2013. How Detroit Went Broke: The Answers May

Surprise You – and Don’t blame Coleman Young. The Detroit Free Press.

http://www.freep.com/interactive/article/20130915/NEWS01/130801004/Detroit-

Bankruptcy-history-1950-debt-pension-revenue. (October 3, 2013)

Berry, Frances S. and William D. Berry. 2007. "Innovation and Diffusion Models in

Policy Research." In Theories of the Policy Process.2nd

ed. ed. Paul A. Sabatier.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 223-260.

Blomquist, William. 2007. "The Policy Process and Large-N Comparative Studies." In

Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd

ed. ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO:

Westview Press. 262-289

Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012. Local Area Unemployment Statistics.

http://www.bls.gov/lau/. (April 6, 2013)

Cantor, David and Kenneth C. Land. 1985. Unemployment and Crime Rates in the post-

World War II United States: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.

American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Jun., 1985). 371-332.

City of Detroit. 2010. November 2, 2010, General Unofficial Election Results.

www.detroitmi.gov/.../elections/2010Elections/November%2002,

%202010%20General%20%20Unofficial%20Election%20Results.P (December

10, 2013)

47

City of Detroit. 2012a. Statement on “No” Vote Against Consent Agreement with State of

Michigan. www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/legislative/Spivey/Statement-

Consent Agreement.pdf. (April 9, 2013)

City of Detroit. 2012b. Financial Stability Agreement between the State of Michigan and

the City of Detroit.www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/mayor/pdf/Financial

Stability Agreement.pdf. (April 9, 2014)

City of Detroit. 2013a. City of Detroit-Restructuring Plan Executive Summary: Mayor’s

Implementation Progress Report.www.detroitmi.gov/.../

Executive%20Summary%20of%20Mayor%20Bing%20Progress%20Report

(April 23, 2013)

City of Detroit. 2013b. 2013 State of the City Address.

www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/mayor/State of the City/Mayor Bing’s 2013

State of the City Address.pdf. (April 10, 2014).

Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 1989. Effects of Population on Major of Revenue

Sources in Detroit. http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/1980s/1989/rpt291.pdf.

(April 15, 2014).

Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2010. The Fiscal Condition of the City of

Detroit. http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2010/rpt361.pdf (April 15,

2014).

Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2012a. State Oversight: The New York

Approach. http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2012/note2012-02.pdf

(April 12, 2014). 1-4.

Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2012b. Downsizing Detroit.

http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2012/DTE_Downsizing_Detroit_05-

17-12.pdf. (April 15. 2014)

Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2013. Detroit City Government Revenues.

http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2013/rpt382.pdf. (April 15, 2014)

Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. A Garbage Can Model of

Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly 17, No. 1.

“Detroit Chiefs Plead for Aid.” 2008. The New York Times, November 19.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/business/19auto.html (April 8, 2014)

“Detroit Financial Crisis Timeline.” 2012. The Detroit Free Press, December 6.

http://www.freep.com/article/20121206/NEWS01/312060219/Timeline. (April

11, 2014)

48

Detroit Literacy Coalition. (n.d.) Frequently Asked Questions.

http://www.detroitliteracy.org/faq.html (March 8, 2013)

Durant, Robert F and Paul F. Diehl. 1989. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy:

Lessons from the U.S. Foreign Policy Arena. Journal of Public Policy, 9(2), 179-

205. doi: 10.2307/4007243

Federal Bureau of Investigation 2012. UCR: Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by

State by City. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-

in-the-u.s.-

2011/tables/table8statecuts/table_8_offenses_known_to_law_enforcement_michi

gan_by_city_2011.xls (April 3, 2013)

Flango, Victor E. and Edgar L. Sherbenou 1976. Poverty, Urbanization, and Crime.

Criminology,Vol. 14, No. 3. 331-346

Gallagher, J. (Guest Speaker). 2013. Wayne State University (January 24, 2013)

Glaeser, Edward. 2011. Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us

Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier. London: Penguin Press

Henderson, S. (Guest Speaker). 2013. Wayne State University (January 31, 2013)

Hipp, John R. and Daniel K Yates. 2011. Ghettos, Thresholds and Crime: Does

Concentrated Poverty Really Have An Accelerating Increasing Effect on Crime?

Criminology, Vol. 49. 955-990.

Hohman, James. 2012. Proposal 1 of 2012: The Referendum on Public Act 4. Mackinac

Center of Public Policy, Oct. 22, 2012. http://www.mackinac.org/17804,

(June 3, 2013)

Ingram, Helen, Anne L. Schneider and Peter DeLeon. 2007. “Social Construction and

Policy Design.” In Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd

ed. ed. Paul A. Sabatier,

Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 93-126.

King, Anthony. 1985. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Boston by John W.

Kingdon Review. Journal of Public Policy, 5(2), 281-283. doi: 10.2307/3998335

Kingdon, John. W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. (Updated 2nd

ed.).

Illinois: Pearson

Kleck, Gary and Ted Chiricos. 2002. Unemployment and Property Crime: A Target-

Specific Assessment of Opportunity and Motivation as Mediating Factors.

Criminology, Vol. 40, No. 3. 649-680.

49

LeBlanc, Marc, Evelyn Vallieres, and Pierre McDuff 1993. The Prediction of Males’

Adolescent and Adult Offending from School Experience. Canadian Journal of

Criminology. October 1993. 459-478.

Machin, Stephen, Olivier Marie, and Vujic, Suncica. 2011. The Crime Reducing Effect of

Education. The Economic Journal, 121 (May) 463-484.

.

Machin, Stephen, Olivier Maire, and Vujic, Suncica. 2012 . Youth Crime and Education

Expansion. German Economic Review, 13(4). 366-384.

Mackinac Center for Public Policy. 2011. Detroit Exhausts Its Options.

www.mackinac.org/16045 (April 9, 2014)

Maguin, Eugene and Rolf Loeber. 1996. Academic Performance and Delinquency. The

University of Chicago. 145-264.

Marketing Research Group. 2013. Statewide Poll: Overwhelming Support for

Emergency Financial Manager for Detroit

http://mrgmi.com/2013/03/statewide-poll-overwhelming-support-for-emergency-

financial-manager-for-detroit/ (December 9, 2013).

Mintrom, Michael. 2000. Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice. Georgetown

University Press.

Mucciaroni, Gary. 1992. The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A

Critique. Polity, Vol.24, No. 3 (Spring 1992). 459-482.

National Center for Education Statistics. 2011. 2011 Trial Urban District Snapshot

Report: Detroit Public Schools. http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/ (April 12, 2013)

Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. “Institutional rational choice: An assessment of the Institutional

Analysis and Development Framework.” In Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd

ed, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 21-64.

Pew Charitable Trusts. 2013. The State Role in Local Government Financial

Distress: As Cities Confront Financial Challenge, States Weigh Whether to Help

Them Pull Through. http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/the-state-role-in-

local-government-financial-distress-85899492075. (April 11, 2014).

“Poll: Crime Drives Detroiters Out; 40% Expect to Leave Within 5 Years.” 2012. The

Detroit News October 9.

http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20121009/METRO01/2100903369. (April 9,

2014 )

50

Public Act 436 of 2012. http://search.michigan.gov/search?affiliate=mi-

som&query=pa%20436.

Robinson, Scott. E . and Warren S. Eller 2010. Participation in Policy Streams: Testing

the Separation of Problems and Solutions in Subnational Policy Systems. Policy

Studies Journal, 38(2), 199-215. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2010.00358.x

Sabatier, Paul A. 2007. Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd

ed. Boulder, CO: Westview

Press

Sabatier, Paul A. and Christopher M. Weible. 2007. “The Advocacy Coalition

Framework: Innovations and Clarifications.” In Theories of the Policy Process,

2nd

ed. ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 189-220.

Schneider, Anne and Ingram, Helen. 1993. Social Construction of Target Populations:

Implications for Politics and Policy. American Political Science Review, Vol. 87,

No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 334-347.

Smith, Kevin B and Christopher W. Larimer. 2009. The Public Policy Theory Primer.

Boulder CO: Westview

State of Michigan. n.d1. Meet the Governor.

http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-57579---,00.html (April 13, 2014)

State of Michigan. n.d 2. Emergency Manager Legislation Will Give State Early

Warning of Impending Trouble, Help Local Governments.

http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,1607,7-277-57577-252799--

,00.html (April 13, 2014)

State of Michigan, n.d3. Governor Snyder, Senate Majority Leader Richardville, House

Speaker Bolger Announce Proposal to Protect Detroit Retiree Pensions.

http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277--320046--,00.html. (April 13,

2014)

State of Michigan. 2013a . Report of the Detroit Financial Review Team

http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/0,4679,7-121-1751_51556-298259--,00.html .

(May 8, 2013)

State of Michigan. 2013b. Emergency Manager Information

http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/0,1607,7-121-1751_51556-201116--

,00.html. (May 8, 2013)

Sugrue, Thomas J. 1996. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in

Postwar Detroit. 2nd

ed. New Jersey: Princeton University Press

51

True, James L., Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2007. "Punctuated-

Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in American

Policymaking." In Theories of the Policy Process; 2nd

ed. ed Paul A. Sabatier,

Boulder, CO: Westview. . 97-115.

Unites States Census Bureau. 2010. Detroit (city) QuickFacts.

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html (March 8, 2013)

United States Census Bureau. (2007-2011). State & County QuickFacts.

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. (March 8, 2013)

Vlasic, Bill and David M. Herszenhorn. 2008. Detroit Chiefs Plead for Aid. The New

York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/business/19auto.html. (April 8,

2014)

Williams, Paige. 2014. “Letter from Michigan: Drop Dead, Detroit!” The New Yorker,

January 27

Wright, Bradley.R.Entner., Avshalom Caspi, Terrie E. Moffitt, and Phil A. Silva. 1999

Low Self-Control, Social Bonds, and Crime: Social Causation, Social Selection

or Both? Criminology, Vol. 3. 479-514.

Zahariadis, Nikolaos and Christopher S. Allen. 1995. Ideas, Networks, and Policy

Streams: Privatization in Britain and Germany. Review of Policy Research, 14(1-

2). 71-98.

Zahariadis, Nikoloas. 1996. Selling British Rail An Idea Whose Time Has Come?

Comparative Political Studies, 29(4). 400-422.

Zahariadis, Nikoloas. 2005. Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institution, &

Greek Foreign Policy. Peter Lang.

Zahariadis, Nikolaos. 2007. "The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations,

Prospects." In Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd

ed. ed. Paul A. Sabatier.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 65-92.