not just another arms deal: the security policy ... · charly salonius-pasternak researcher the...

Not just aNother arms deal

Charly salonius-Pasternak FIIa BrIeFING PaPer 112 • september 2012

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

112

the seCurIty PolICy ImPlICatIoNs oF

the uNIted states sellING

advaNCed mIssIles to FINlaNd

• Finland’s decision to acquire advanced semi-stealthy Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles(JASSM)fromtheUnitedStatesismuchmorethananarmsdeal–ithassignificantpoliticalandregionalmilitaryimplications.

• FinlandisonlythesecondcountrytobeapprovedforJASSM.NoNATOcountryhaseverreceivedsuchapproval.ThissuggestssomethingabouttheclosenessoftherelationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandFinland,aswellassomethingabouthowtheUnitedStatesseesEuropeanandregionaldefencearrangements.

• In thewebofmultilateral,multinationalandbilateral relationships thatFinland isweavingtoenhanceitssecurity,theUSrelationshipisakeycable.

• The JASSM acquisition significantly changesFinland’s ability todisrupt enemyactivities, bothwithinFinlandandbeyonditsborders.Despitebeingaconventionalweapon, itwillserveasadeterrent.

• Finnishdecision-makershavea responsibility tounderstandboth the implicationsof thenewcapabilities,andtoensurethatthecontinueddevelopmentoftheFinnishDefenceForcesisnotinhibitedduetomisunderstandingsofwhatamoderndefencerequiresandconsistsof.

Not just aNother arms deal

FIIa Briefing Paper 112

september 2012

the seCurIty PolICy ImPlICatIoNs oF the uNIted

states sellING advaNCed mIssIles to FINlaNd

Global security research programme

the Finnish Institute of International affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

Charly salonius-Pasternak

researcher


the FINNIsh INstItute oF INterNatIoNal aFFaIrs 3

In early March 2012 Finland decided it wouldpurchase advanced Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-offMissiles (JASSM) from the United States.ThecombinationofupgradedF/A-18(Hornet)fightersandsemi-stealthymissileswillprovideanewandimportantcapabilityfortheFinnishDefenceForces.However,itwouldbeamistaketoviewthismerelyasanarmsdeal.Itismuchmore,andhassignificantpolitical andmilitary implications.The deal is anotablesecuritypolicywinforFinland.

The deal itself has been discussed for a decade,but should be viewed as the culmination of twodecadesofworkbyFinnishandAmericanofficialsto build a strong partnership between FinlandandtheUnitedStates.1FewpeopleinFinlandareawareofthedepthofcooperationbetweenthetwocountries,andhowithasblossomedsincetheearly1990s,whenFinlandbeganprocurementoftheF-18Hornet.ThedealalsosuggestscertainthingswithregardtoUSthinkingaboutEuropeanandregionaldefencearrangements.Thedealdoesnotchangethestrategicmilitarybalanceintheregion,butitdoespositively impact Finland’s military capabilitiesvis-à-visRussia.TheprocurementofJASSM alsorequiresFinnishdecision-makerstodrivefurther

1 Thispapergreatlybenefitsfromanumberofinterviewswith

bothcurrentandformerFinnishandAmericanmilitaryand

defenceofficials.However,allopinions,analysisandconclu-

sionsarestrictlytheauthor’s.

changestothedefenceforces,andgivesthemnewoptionsanddecisionstomakeinconflictsituations.

The result of decades-long cooperation:

new capabilities for an experienced Air Force

The immediate impetus for Finland seekingadvancedlonger-rangestrikeweaponscanbefoundintheearly2000swhentheFinnishDefenceForcesconductedananalysisofthebestmixofweaponsandplatformsforalong-range(interdiction)strikecapability(hundredsofkilometres).Inadditiontoheavyrocketlaunchers,anair-to-groundcapabilityandspecialoperationsforces(SOF)wereseenasapartoftheoptimalmixofplatformsandweapons.The2004securityanddefencepolicywhitepapersetagoalfortheairforcetodevelopanair-to-groundcapability2, with the capability being added toapproximatelysixtyF-18C/DHornetsby2016,asapartoftheirMid-lifeUpgrade2(MLU-2)process.

TheofficialpressreleasebytheFinnishMinistryofDefenceprovidesthebasicoutlineofthedeal:foratotalcostof€178.5million,FinlandistoreceiveAGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles,necessarymodifications to aircraft software, test

2 Suomenturvallisuus-japuolustuspolitiikka2004,Valtio-

neuvostonselontekoVNS6/2004,pages110-111.

joint air-to-surface stand-off missile (jassm) moments before penetration into test target. Photo: lockheed martin Corporation. Copyright 2012.


missiles, technical documentation and training.3Thepressreleasedoesnotstatethenumberoflivemissiles, but multiple public sources place thisnumberatseventy.TheforeignmilitaryarmssalesnotificationbytheUSDepartmentofDefensetotheUSCongressprovidessomeadditionaldetails,which

3 MinistryofDefencepressreleases:”Suomihankkiipitkän

kantamanilmasta-maahanohjusjärjestelmän”,1March.2012

and”JASSM-ohjustenmyyntilupaYhdysvaltainkongressin

käsittelyssä”,3November2011.

arekeytounderstandingthedeeperpoliticalandmilitary implicationsofthedeal.Thenotificationstates that inadditiontothe70missiles,Finlandwillreceive“2testvehicles,supportandtestequip-ment,publicationsand technicaldocumentation,personnel training and training equipment,USGovernmentandcontractorengineering,technicaland logistics support services, and other relatedelementsoflogisticalandprogramsupport”.4Thedealsuggestsanumberofthingsaboutthebilateralrelationship, aboutUS perspectiveson theBalticSeaandEuropeandefencearrangements,andhassome military-political implications for Finnishdecision-makers.

Finland + JASSM: Strengthening European defence

and helping to secure NATO’s northern flank

TheUnitedStateshasincreasinglysoughttogetitsEuropeanalliestotakeonmoreresponsibilityfortheirowndefenceandregionalsecurity.WhileFin-landisnotaNATOmember,itsgeographicallocationandEUmembershipmakeitanimportantpartofEuropeandefenceand,fromanAmericanperspec-tive apart of theoverall solution tomakeup forgeneralEuropeanunderinvestmentindefence.Atthesametime,Washingtonrecognizesthatitsowninterestsandprestigedictatethatitstandbehindthe mutual defence commitments it has made.SimplegeographicalrealitiesmakeitharderfortheUnitedStatestokeepitsalliancecommitmentsintheBalticSearegionthaninmanyotherplacesintheworld.

WhenEstonia,Lithuania,LatviaandPolandjoinedNATO,theyexpectedexplicitplansfortheirmutualdefence byNATO.When it became clear by 2007thatnosuchplanswerebeingdeveloped,acrisisdevelopedwithintheAlliance.ThewarinGeorgiain2008andRussianexercisessimulatingtheinvasionofaBalticseacountryheightenedthepressureonNATOtodevelopcontingencyplansforthedefenceofPoland,Latvia,LithuaniaandEstonia.TheUnitedStatesandNATOrespondedbyholdinganumberofmilitaryexercisesin2009and2010todemonstrate

4 Thenoticeisavailableonmultiplesites,forexamplethrough

theFederalRegister,athttps://www.federalregister.gov/

articles/2011/11/04/2011-28546/36b1-arms-sales-notification

JASSM in a box: What it’s for and the technical risks involved

the joint air-to-surface standoff missile was

designed to fly using indirect routes through

advanced air defence systems, striking medium-

hardened, soft or area targets. the missile is

relatively slow, flying at a maximum 0.8 mach,

and therefore relies on low-observable (semi-

stealthy) design and flight profiles which seek to

actively avoid detection and attack by a target’s air

defence systems. Whether it can actually penetrate

advanced layered and networked air defence

systems is unclear.

Finland generally procures only proven technology,

so the decision to procure JASSM suggests an

increased acceptance of risk. the operational

effectiveness of JASSM has not been demonstrated,

neither through operational testing nor through

use in actual combat operations1. the reliability of

the missiles is also a question mark, although it is

above 80% currently, and is expected to exceed

the target of 90% by lot 11 in 2013. this suggests

Finland should ensure that the missiles it receives

are from as late a lot as possible, preferably lot

11 or later. a thorough expansion of the JASSM-

programme in 2008 has made its future very

different; it has gone from a $2.2 billion 11-year

programme (and 2400 missiles) to a $7.1 billion

28-year programme for around 4900 missiles.

1 GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(2010):“DODNeeds

toReassessJointCruiseMissileCostsbeforeStarting

NewProductionPhase”GAO-11-112,page8.Thiswas

verifiedtostillbethecaseinlatespring2012.


Alliance solidarity and capabilities.5 Ultimately,formalcontingencyplanswereagreedonin2010,underthenameEagleGuardian.

TakingcooperationwithFinlandtoanewlevelsug-geststhattheUnitedStates,andmorespecificallytheUSEuropeanCommandCommander(EUCOM)andNATO SupremeAllied Commander – Europe(SACEUR)Admiral JamesStavridis,clearlyunder-stands the security policy dynamics involved intheunlikely situation thatNATO’snorth-easternbordersmustbemilitarilydefended.FinlandandSwedenwould unavoidably have roles to play insucha situation–whetherornot theyaremem-bersofNATObecauseoftheirEUmembershipandunderstandingsoftheLisbonTreaty.Moreover,inFinland’s case, it is unlikely that even a declara-tionof“neutrality”wouldenableFinlandtoavoidbecoming involved if a military conflict startedbetweenNATOandRussia.

Though thenotification toCongress includes thestandarddisclaimerthat theJASSMdealdoesnot“affect the basic military balance in the region”,Finland’s acquisition of JASSM does significantlyincreaseitsdeterrenceanddefencecapabilitiesvis-à-vis Russia. Indirectly, this strengthensNATO’snorth-easterncornerbyremovingonevariablefromEUCOM’scalculations:Russia’sabilitytoinvadeFin-landoruseFinnishterritorytoadvanceitsgoalsisseverelydiminishedandFinlandgainsthecapabilitytocomprehensivelycloseallsurroundingsealanes.

Finland’snewcapabilitiesarealsointerestingfromaNordiccooperationandArcticperspective.Finnish,SwedishandNorwegianfighterplanestraintwotothreetimesamonthoverLaplandineachother’sairspace.WithFinland gaining an air-to-groundcapability,allthreecountriesnowhaveincentivestoexpandtrainingtoincludemultinationalair-to-groundexercises.Fromamilitary-strategicpointofview,theentireNordicregion(‘flank’fromtheUSperspective)caninthemid-termfuturebecometoalargeextentsecure–ifNorway,SwedenandFinlandallcontinuethereorganizationsoftheirrespective

5 Examplesinclude:BalticEagleforexercisingtheBaltic

BattalionoftheNRFin2009,BALTOPS2009,LoyalArrow

2009,BalticHope2009,SabreStrike2010,AmberHope,and

BalticHost2010.

armedforces,anddevelopmultinationalcapabilities(notjustinteroperability).

ThedeepeningofcooperationbetweentheUnitedStatesandFinlandalsospeaksforthepragmatismoftheUnitedStatesinenhancingEuropeanmilitarycapabilitiesandultimatelystrengtheningmultilat-eralorganizationssuchasNATO.IftheUnitedStatescanincreaseanindividualEuropeanstate’smilitarycapabilities throughbilateral cooperation, itwillincreasinglyopttodoso.Aclearhopeisthatthiscooperationwillmakeregionalcooperation,attheNordiclevel,evenmorefruitful.

Being ready to sell JASSM to Finland before anyEuropeanNATOmemberisindicativeoftwochangesin how theUnited States sees European securitydynamics:Firstly, theUnitedStates is interestedinsupportingthebuildingofcapabilities,notonlyinstitutions. Secondly, the US increasingly seesNATO as a part of a broaderweb of actors inter-ested inEuropeanpolitical, securityandmilitarycooperation.

Don’t ask don’t tell: the mutually beneficial

yet opaque Finnish-US bilateral relationship

FinlandandtheUnitedStateshaveastrong,deep-eningandmutuallybeneficial,yetslightlyopaquerelationship. In thewebofmultilateral,multina-tional and bilateral relationships that Finland isweavingtoenhanceitssecurity,theUSrelationshipisakeycable.TheJASSMdealservesasanadditionalsignof,andresultof,howstrongthebilateralUS-Finnish relationship is.Cooperationbetween theUnited States and Finland is extensive, and hasexpanded intoanumberofareasduring thepasttwodecades.6

Inthefieldofpersonneleducationandtraining,theUnitedStatesannuallysendssoldierstobetrained

6 Thedevelopmentofcooperationcanbeseenintheneed

toagreetoandsigndifferenttypesofofficialagreements,

MemorandaofUnderstandingandtechnicalagreements.

Thefirst,signedin1991(SopS95/1991)isabasicdocument.

Additionalagreementsfollowedinthemid-1990sandearly

2000s,withthemostrecentonesbeingsignedin2010(SopS

95/2010)andmostrecentlyanoverallagreementonR&D

cooperation(HE5/2012vp).


at a range of different Finnish units, includingthe Finnish Defence Forces International Centre(FINCENT).FinnishofficersattendbothshortandlongcoursesatUSacademiesandstaffcollegesaswellasservingasfellowsatprestigiousuniversitiessuchasHarvard.Duringthepastfewyears,thefirstFinnish soldiers have been trained to operate asJointTacticalAirControllers(JTACs)tocoordinateair-to-groundattacks.FinnishsoldiersalsoserveinregionalcommandssuchasCENTCOM,andpartici-pateinanumberofinternationalexercises.Lackingitsowntankerfleet,theFinnishAirForcehasalsoworkedwithUSAirForceEurope(USAFE)tocertifyFinnishpilotsforaerialrefuelling.

The two countries also cooperate increasingly inresearch and development, with Finland (andGermany) contributing expertise to a project tounderstandhowaluminum-hulledships react tobattlefieldstresses,suchasmineortorpedoexplo-sions.ThenewclassofFinnishNavysurfacevessels(Laivue2020)willalsobenefitfromUSexperienceswiththeLittoralCombatShip(LCS)anditsmissionmodules.Finland’sefficientapproachtodevelopingandprocuringmaterielmayevenbenefithowfutureLCSmissionmodulesarebuilt.

The veil of secrecy that coversmuch of the coop-erationis,however,notable.Thisspeaksformutualtrust,strongdisciplineandacultureofsecrecyonboth sides. Cooperation is rarely discussed in anydetail,making it difficult to assess the potentially

positiveandnegativeconsequencesofanincreasinglyclose relationship.ThesilencealsohighlightshowpoliticallysensitiveextensivecooperationwiththeUnitedStatesstillis.However,despitesomepublicmisgivingsaboutclosecooperationwithsuperpow-ers,Finnishcivilservantsandahandfulofpoliticianshaveworkedfortwodecadestodeveloparelationshipwhichisbuiltontrustandamutualdesiretoachieveconcreteresultsandmilitarycapabilities.ThefactthatFinlandhasbecomeonlythesecondcountryinaddi-tiontotheUnitedStatestoaddJASSMtoitsinventoryistestamenttothesuccessofthiswork.

The odds are changing: Finland’s improving

military capabilities vis-à-vis Russia7

Thedecision to procure JASSM will improve Fin-land’sdefenceanddeterrencecapabilities.Inbothphysicalandconceptualterms,JASSMexpandsthereach of the armed forces beyond Finland’s bor-ders and laterallywithinFinland.Tounderstandwhy JASSM so significantly increases Finland’s

7 Thoughblatantlyobvious,itcannotbeemphasizedenough

thatneitherFinlandnorRussiahasanythingtogainfrom

militaryconflictsbetweenthetwocountries.Theeconomic

tiesbetweencitizensofbothcountriesareextensiveandmu-

tuallybeneficial,andculturalandsocialtiesareflourishing.

Itwouldbeatragedyifthispositiveoveralltrendweretobe

reversed.

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��Figure 1: extended reach: the ranges of russian air defence

systems (s-300 and s-400) which can cover most of

Finland and approximate range of JASSM if fired from

within Finnish borders. Graphic by Kauko Kyöstiö.


capabilitiesvis-à-vis Russia,itisnecessarytocon-siderwhen,how,whyandtowhatendFinland’sdefencebenefitsfromthephysicalincreaseinrangeatwhichitcanstrikeanddisruptenemyunits.

In an Institute forDefenseAnalysesDeepAttackWeaponsMixStudyfromSeptember2001,weaponswith long standoff ranges, such as JASSM, werefoundtobemosteffectiveinearlyphasesofacon-flict,whenoppositionairdefencesweremosteffec-tive.ThisisonereasonwhyJASSMissoimportantforFinland.Russiahasthebestintegratedairdefencesystem(IADS)intheworld.AsFigure1indicates,8whenthemostadvancedS-300andS-400systemsarepositionedtoprotecttwoofRussia’smoststra-tegictargets,St.PetersburgandtheKolaPeninsula,theiroperationalrangescoveralmostallofFinland’sairspace.InanymilitaryconflictthiswouldcreateproblemsforFinland,andtheFinnishAirForceinitseffortstodenyairsuperioritytoopposingforcesandsupportfriendlyforcesthroughair-to-groundattacks; it would alsomake it harder to receiveassistancefrompotentialallies.JASSMislikelytobedeployed todegrade thecapabilitiesof these sys-tems.However,itcanandinamilitaryconflictmostlikelywouldbeusedforatleasttwoothertypesofmissions.

JASSMcanalsobedeployedtointerdictalandattackinorintoFinland.ThelimitednumberofJASSMsug-geststhatotherweapons,suchastheJSOW(JointStandoffWeapons,AGM-154), JDAM (JointDirectAttackMunition)andevenheavyrockets(ATACMS)arebettersuited todisruptingandbluntingsuchattacks.Thethird,andsignificantmissiontypeforwhichJASSMcouldbeusedistoplaceabroadrangeoftheopponent’sassetsunderthreat.TheincreaseinphysicalrangeatwhichtheFinnishmilitarycanstrikeincreasesthenumberoftargetsthatcanbeattackedand“preventstheenemyfromestablishingsanctuarieswithinwhichitsmilitaryforcesaresafefromattack”.9Thismeansthatanopponentcannot

8 S-300andS-400sitelocationsandrangeringsarebasedon

datafromIMINT&Analysisblogandits“SAMSiteOverview”

file,availableathttp://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/

worldwide-sam-site-overview.html.ThankyoutoSean

O’Connorforthesiteandpermissiontousethedata.

9 Nicholls,DavidJ.(2000)“CruiseMissilesandModernWar

–strategicandtechnologicalimplications”,p.3.Centerfor

StrategyandTechnology,AirWarCollege,AirUniversity.

safelykeephigh-valueassetswithin300-400kmoftheFinnishborder.Thissimplefactraisesthecostof anymilitary operation aimed against Finland.ItalsomeansFinlandcantargeteconomicallyandpolitically importantenemyassets. It is for thesereasons that JASSM is frequently described as akynnysasejärjestelmä(threshold-raisingweaponssystem)–inotherwords,itisadeterrent.

New choices for decision-makers:

defending Finland beyond its borders

ThenewcapabilitiesFinlandisacquiringdemandthatdecision-makersbegin tograpplewith theirmilitary-political implications. The upgradedF/A-18 and JASSM combination, as well as theupcomingATACMSupgradestoFinland’sMultipleLaunchRocketSystem(MLRS),providetheFinnishDefenceForceswithamulti-prongedinterdictionstrikecapability.Thecapabilitiescouldbeusedtostrikemilitary,economicorpoliticalassetswithoutwhich the enemy cannot (without significantlymoreeffort)reachthegoalsofitsoperations.Here,itisessentialforFinnishdecision-makerstorecog-nizethatinanyrealisticscenariotheenemy’suseofmilitaryforceagainstFinlandwouldsimplybeameanstoagreaterend.

Keeping this in mind, Finnish decision-makersmustconsiderinadvancewhethertheywouldbewillingtostrikeassetswhichareviewedasstrategicbyanopponent.OtherquestionsFinnishpoliticaldecision-makerswouldhavetoconsiderare:

1. Isitpossibletostrikeatonlystrategicmilitarytargets,andleaveeconomicandpoliticalonesuntouched?

2. Howdoweidentifywhichtargetswouldbesemi-strategic;thissuggeststargetsthatareconsideredregionallyimportant(butnotexistential)bytheenemyandwhichareusedagainstFinland.

3. Toavoidadrawn-outanddestructivewar,arewepreparedtodepleteJASSM,ATACMSandJSOWstoresinanefforttopreventanopponentfrominitiallymarshallingitsforces?

The history of Finnish decision-making suggeststhat Finnish politicians would not use the new


strategic-strikecapabilityinapre-emptivemanner,oreven inthe initialstagesofamilitaryconflict;eventhoughthiscouldinsomesituationsactuallythemosteffectivetimetousethenewcapabilities.

Not having possessed such deep-strike capabili-tiespreviously,Finnishdecision-makersalsoneedtobeeducatedonthetheoriesofairpowerwhichundergirdtheoperationalplanningforanduseofweapons suchas JASSM.Themostnotable risk isthatthe(predominantlyUSAirForce)viewonthestrategicimpactsofbombinganditsoffshootEffectsBasedOperations(EBO)aremisunderstood,andamechanisticviewofwarfareisadoptedbyFinnishdecision-makers.Sincethe1920s,airpowertheo-ristshavearguedthattheprecisionapplicationofairpowertoanenemy’sweakpointswouldresultinvictory,orastrategicresult.Themorethaneightdecadesofhistorythathaveensuedsincesuggestthatitisverydifficulttoidentifythespecificstra-tegic assetswhich thedestructionofwouldalterthebehaviourofanopponent.Everythingfromdif-ferentculturalperceptionstoapotentiallyrapidlychanging regional contextmake identifying suchkeystrategicpointsachallenge.

Though conflict seems distant, decision-makersmustnowgrapplewiththeconceptualandpotentialpoliticalchallengesofusinganewclassofweaponswhichprovidesnewcapabilities.Thepotentialdeci-sionsmustbeconsiderednow,andintegratedintocontinuallyevolvingmilitaryplans.PoliticiansmustalsounderstandhowthenewcapabilitiesandthenewstrategiestheyenablemustbereflectedintheongoingreformoftheFinnishDefenceForces.

Conclusions and implications:

JASSM – a game-changer for Finnish defense

TounderstandthemyriadimplicationsoftheJASSMacquisition it is necessary to grasp that Finlandisnot justbuyingaweaponoraweaponssystem,butagame-changingcapability.The United States wants Finland to have certain capabilities and JASSM allows those capabilities to be developed. Ultimately,touseadvancedweaponssuchasJASSMtotheirfullestpotentialrequires jointoperationsandadvanced intelligenceand targetingcapabili-ties.Finlandhasanadvancedintelligencegather-ingsystem.Jointoperationsbetweenthedifferentbranchesofthemilitaryandadvancedtargetingare

somethingthemilitarymustcontinuetodevelopduringthenextdecade.

Forexample,theFinnishAirForceandArmymustbe able to use their strike assets simultaneously,whiletheFinnishNavyprovidesanti-aircraftpro-tection.GroundingtheairforcebecausetheArmyisusingATACMSisnotnecessary,butrequiresahighlevelofcoordination–andpractice.Thedynamicbattlefield and a limited number of JASSM andATACMSmakesitimperativethatthesametargetsarenotunnecessarily struckmultiple timeswithvaluableordinance.

Itisnotonlythemilitarythatmustdevelopitsjointoperational capabilities; politicians must under-standthatplanningforjointoffensiveoperationsinthedefenceofFinlandisnecessary10.ThecutsintheFinnishdefencebudgethavealreadyforcedmanytoconsideranewwhatdefendingFinlandmeansinthe21stcentury;acontinuousdialogueandcommunica-tionsflowisnownecessary,sothatnewcapabilitiesarenotwastedduetoalackofunderstandingaboutthetypeofchangesthatareneeded.

Advanced targeting is the third pillar of usingadvanced weapons such as JASSM to their fullpotential.Whileseeminglyatechnicalquestion,itprovidessomeinsightintothepoliticalimplicationsoftheUnitedStatesprovidingacapability,andnotjustaweapon,forFinland.

FinlandwilluseamixofassetstoselecttargetsforJASSMstrikes.SomeJASSMtargets,suchasstandingmilitaryheadquartersandbridgescanbetargetedwithminimaleffort.Inanycase,theF/A-18Hornetswhichcarrythemissileareunlikelytothemselvesbe responsible for targeting; other entities willprovide real-time targeting information or coor-dinatesfortargetsthatcontinuallyre-locate.Thisinformationcouldcomefromotherflyingplatforms,ground-basedcontrollersorotherelectronicintel-ligencesources.Currentflyingplatforms,whethermannedorunmanned,wouldbeunlikelytosurvivealengthyflightdeepintodefendedenemyterritory.

10 Thisalsoappliestocyberoperations.Thoughitmaybe

politicallyconvenienttoartificiallyseparatedefensiveand

offensivecybercapabilities,itmakeslittlesenseinthereal

world–andonlyservestoincreaseinefficiencyintight

budgetarytimes.


ForthepastdecadeFinlandhasemphasizedtrain-ingforspecialoperationsforces(SOF),withthegoalofinsertingthemintoenemyterritorytoprovidetargetinginformation.Currently,FinlandhasverycapableSOFunitsthatprobablycouldprovidesometargeting information–aswellasastrongdirectactioncapability.So,usingspecialoperationsforcestotargetJASSMispossible,butextremelysensitivepolitically:consideringthatJASSMismostusefulintheinitialphasesofaconflict,wouldFinlandreallysendSOFunitsdeepintoenemyterritorytoidentifytargetsunlessawarhadalreadystarted?

This suggests that additional methods of target-ingareavailable. Electronic interceptsandotherdomestic intelligence sources must be includedas potential methods of targeting. Most intrigu-ingly,elementsof the JASSM agreement, and theacknowledged potential of targeting JASSMwithothermethods,indirectlysuggeststhatintheeventofacrisisthatescalatedtotheuseofmilitaryforce,Finlandwouldat leasthave theability to receiveandutilizeexternallyprovidedtargetingdata.IftheUnitedStatesandFinlandhaveagreedtoeventhepotentialofsuchdetailed intelligencesharing,aswellasaresupplyofmissiles(whichwouldpartiallyexplainthelowinitialpurchase),therelationshipis,globallyspeaking,atrulyuniqueone.

Fromadefenceperspective,therelationshipenablesFinlandtovaultfromusingColdWareratanksartil-leryandmassinfantrytodegradeenemyforcesinFinland,topotentiallystopping(oratleastseverelyweakening)anattackbeforeitentersFinnishterri-tory.Likeeveryrelationship,thisonealsocarrieswithitnegativepotential.TheFinnishAirForce,andairdefenceingeneral,isincreasinglyreliantonthebenevolenceoftheUnitedStates.Thelogicofpath-dependencyalsobeginstodictatefutureweaponsandsystemsprocurementchoices (here theF-35JointStrikeFightercomestomind).ThepotentialforFinlandtofeelpressuretoatleastpoliticallysupportotherUSactionsisalsolikelytogrow.

IftheFinnishmilitarydoesdeveloptruejointcapa-bilities by 2020 and properly integrates the newcapabilitiessuchasJASSMintoitsarsenalandplans,Finland’smilitarysituationwillbebetterthanitisnow.ForRussia,theacquisitionoftheseadvancedcapabilitiesbyFinlandisadouble-edgedsword:itismaydelayFinland’sapplicationtobecomeamem-berofNATO,butatthecostofadrasticallyimproved

abilitybyFinland towithstandand respond toabroaderrangeofmilitarystrikesandpressure.

The strengtheningbilateral relationshipwith theUnited States has improved Finland’s defence.AdesiretodeepenthatbilateralrelationshipsuggeststhatFinlandknows that evenNATOmembershipbyitselfwouldnotbesufficientforFinnishdefenceneeds;rather,Finlandneedsawebofmultilateral,multinational and bilateral relationships for itssecurity. Italsosuggests thatclear-eyedrealismdrivesFinnishsecuritypolicythinking:thatFinlandknowsthatitisstilltheUnitedStatesthatservesastheEuropeanbulwark(andproviderofguarantees)against potential external aggression; and, thatNATO isanecessarybutnotsufficientcomponentforbroaderEuropeandefence,mainlybecausemostEuropeanstateshaveignoredtheirowndefencefortoolong.


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IsBN 978-951-769-351-6

IssN 1795-8059

Cover photo: laC scott Woodward / Commonwealth of

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language editing: lynn Nikkanen

the Finnish Institute of International affairs is an independent

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