Meeting Report

The Moscow World Conference on Climate Change,

Moscow, 30 Sept – 3 Oct 2003

President Putin’s speech opening the World Conference on Climate Change, Moscow, on 29 September,

was greeted with varied reports and mixed emotions – but the most prominent were confusion and

frustration. The same, indeed, could be said of reactions to the conference overall. History may judge it

differently.

The background itself was indicative. President Putin’s announcement at the Genoa G8 summit in 2001

that Russia would host a climate change conference in 2003 came out of the blue. Any hopes at the time

that Russia was thinking of making this the annual COP negotiating meeting for that year – perhaps

planning it to be the first conference after Kyoto entered into force – were sorely disappointed. Yet the

shadow of Kyoto ratification hung over the whole affair, from its inception to its culmination –

seemingly looming ever larger precisely because of its absence.

Those expectations overlooked the fact that the origins of the conference lay with Yuri Izrael, President

Putin’s science advisor and long-time Kyoto sceptic. He wanted a conference on science – the Third

World Conference on Climate Change, following those of 1979 and 1990 – untrammeled by all the

politicking and economese that surrounds Kyoto (though even the previous WCCCs did play an

important political role). The EU struggled to include the word ‘Kyoto’ anywhere in the resolution that

Russia introduced to get UN backing for the conference. Some wonder if Izrael’s own calculation is that

he and the Russian science community stand to gain more from a US-led international science

programme than anything under Kyoto. Questioning of motives never seems far from the minds of

westerners trying to understand Russian affairs.

In the event, President Putin’s opening speech was masterful in its ambiguity. To listen to the media

reports, anyone would think he had rejected Kyoto, a la Bush, such is the power of dashed expectations.

The closest translation seems to be that ‘Russia is preparing ratification and we will take a decision

when we are ready’. At least as interesting, though is what followed.

First, President Putin stayed through the following half dozen speeches by dignitaries, opened by an

angry – some considered provocative – response by Joke Waller-Hunter, the head of the UNFCCC

Secretariat. He re-entered the fray afterwards, using humour to reassure that he didn’t accept the

Climate Policy 3 (2003) 475–477

doi:10.1016/S1469-3062(03)00127-X

‘climate-change-is-good-for-Russia’ line but emphasizing that Russia would take its own decision in its

own time, thank you.

The next few days saw a parade of science papers from Russia and worldwide, with a host of activities

‘on the side’. The science spanned the boring, the brilliant and the just bizarre, but certainly brought

forward new analyses of possible impacts on Russia. One thing that emerged is that despite Yuri Izrael’s

dominant political position in Russian science, there is no party line. Some papers brought forward

theories that bear little relationship to anything westerners recognize as sound science. Others rested

squarely on the mainstream understanding, and it became clear that many Russian scientists are deeply

worried about the long term implications of climate change.

My overall view of the conference is more positive than some, who were aghast at some of the

antediluvian science paraded. Frankly it is healthy that such analysis, which has long been circulating

in Russia, has now been brought to the surface where it can be properly debated. Also the side events

made it clear that there is a significant voice of Russian civil society, including regions, now pressing

for ratification; and that most of big business, and most ministries of the government, also support it.

From a policy perspective perhaps the most interesting follow-on and counter to this was the

intervention by Prof. Illirionov, President Putin’s economic advisor. At short notice, he appeared on the

Wednesday and posed ten questions – eight of them on the science – which he said needed answers. He

returned to the conference on the Friday to listen to answers prepared by some of the top IPCC

scientists attending the conference, following which he reiterated concerns about some of the issues and

added a host of additional, economic concerns. He followed this up with a press conference in which he

essentially presented his complete intellectual case against ratification. He combined scientific

scepticism with the perceived futility of an agreement that now sets caps on neither the US nor

developing countries, queried who would buy the surplus Russian allowances, and articulated concern

about the long-run economic implications for Russia of CO2 control.

In economic terms it was a very neo-classical view, taking little note of climate impacts, innovation

perspectives, or the political dynamics of trying to build a global response and maintain business

momentum. Yet disappointment at the content overlooks the bigger picture. Few people at such a level

have ever put together such comprehensive presentation on climate change (and I sensed his personal

touch throughout). The fact that some of his material was drawn from a US lobbyists presentation

misses the point: Illirianiov has a reputation for independence of thought and he has the authority and

intellect to use what he wants if he finds it plausible. Yet on the science he took little notice of the

IPCC’s answers in practice, suggesting a pretty fixed attitude.

Over-arching was the desire to show that Russia is engaging in a serious, high-level debate and is not

going to take a decision just because the Europeans – or anyone else – press them to do so. He was

reacting with resentment to the implication that Russia is just prevaricating without reason, by

presenting – perhaps at Putin’s request – what he saw as legitimate questions. He perceived the Russian

surplus almost as a short-term ‘bribe’ which should not deflect its position on a major strategic

question. In short, it was a presentation of pride, from a top-level economist in a country that is entering

resurgent economic growth and regaining a sense of its rightful place: ‘there are real issues here and

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you might not agree with my view but give us the credit of being a serious nation debating a serious

decision’ was his undertone. And Russia will decide on its own timescale, not anyone else’s.

So what does this mean for Kyoto and the international effort? The run-up to the conference was full of

rumours that Russia was demanding more guarantees of foreign investment under Kyoto’s ‘flexible

mechanisms’, suggesting that the Kremlin is still seeking to eke out more concessions before finally

doing the deed. The irony is that it is probably Russia that will lose most from the continuing

uncertainties and delay. With 119 countries having ratified Kyoto at the latest count, the prospect of

further delay of unknown duration means that their most plausible option is simply to go ahead

regardless. Indeed, increasing numbers are saying that they will abide by the terms of the Treaty even if

Russia were to back away – the EU’s position on this now also being joined by Canada, as well as most

developing countries. Almost every day now the trade press reports another deal under the terms of

Kyoto’s international investment mechanisms, as countries faced by a shortfall start to build up

emission allowances, and companies hedge against emerging domestic controls.

But the Kremlin’s reported demand for investment guarantees does imply a classical disconnect

between old-style international politicking and the realities of the market in carbon emission reductions

that is established under Kyoto. President Putin may want western governments to assure more clean

investment under Kyoto – but under the terms now agreed it is western companies that control that, not

their governments. And companies listening to Putin’s speech may conclude that Russia is still not

ready. Those companies seeking secure, low cost investments that will guarantee emission credits, can

and will go elsewhere – and already are going, to countries that have already ratified Kyoto and are

putting in place the institutions to attract clean investment and to verify the resulting emission reduction

credits. The greatest irony is that whilst Putin’s statement, and the WCCC overall, is sufficient to keep

the Kyoto process going, it is Russia that may lose most from the continued delay – and seeking more

investment guarantees is not going to change that.

At the same time, the WCCC was a kind of catharsis. It offered the world a glimpse into the internal

Russian debate on climate change, highlighting how different culturally it has been from that in the

west, but also exposing the arguments to international scrutiny. And it helped to raise that debate to the

highest working levels in Russia – closing the disconnect between subterranean debates on the details

and the diplomatic international lobbying of the President. My own best guess would be that if the

Parties at COP9 press ahead with Kyoto, then early in the New Year – after the Duma election, and

before the Presidential elections – Putin could announce that he is handing Kyoto on to the new Duma

for the final leg. To be safe, I should caveat with the famous words of Churchill: ‘I cannot forecast to

you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.’ But just possibly, the

engagement engendered by the WCCC will have helped to make that just a little less true in the future.

Michael Grubb

Note. An abbreviated version of this report also appears in Environmental Finance

Meeting Report 477