may 2016 safety briefing

Safety BriefingMay 2016

Welcome to the advance-TRS May 2016 Safety Briefing.

• Close Calls......................................................................................................... 3

• Worksafe Procedures...................................................................................... 3

• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)........................................................... 4

• New Life Saving Rules..................................................................................... 5

• Safety Bulletins................................................................................................. 6

• Important Contact Information ..................................................................... 12

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Close CallsNo matter where you work, reporting Close Calls is vital to improving safety. If you see something with the potential to

cause harm, raise the alarm on site and make it safe. If it is not safe to continue work then stop. Once the hazard has

been removed or made safe, ensure that you report it.

Worksafe (Refusal to Work)

Important NumbersBusiness Hours Emergency Number

01483 361 061Out of Hours Emergency Number

07930 384 505CIRAS

0800 4 101 101

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Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)All persons on or near the line and on the lineside shall wear at least the following PPE:

• High visibility upper body clothing with reflective tape which complies with BS EN ISO 20471: 2013 and

Railway Group Standard GO/RT3279.

• High visibility lower body clothing to BS EN ISO 20471:2013 and Railway Group Standard GO/RT3279.

• A safety helmet which complies with BS EN 397: 2012.

• Safety footwear which complies with BS EN ISO 20345: 2011, provides support to the ankle, includes

mid-sole protection and has a protective toe cap. Where used, steel or other conductive toe caps shall

be covered.

All contractors must:

• Wear appropriate PPE as defined by the client.

• Inform advance Training & Recruitment Services of any damage, deteriation or lack of PPE.

• Report any and all PPE that is ill-fitting.

• Ensure that all PPE is used, cleaned and stored in accordance with all health and safety guidelines.

• Invoke Worksafe procedures for any ill fitting, inadequate or lack of PPE.

Safe behaviour is a requirement of working for Network Rail.These Rules are in place to keep us safe and must never be broken.We will all personally intervene if we feel a situation or behaviour might be unsafe.

Our Lifesaving Rules

For more information about our Lifesaving Rules go to safety.networkrail.co.uk/LSR

July 2014

We will always comply with our Lifesaving Rules

Always be sure the required plans and permits are in place, before you start a job or go on or near the line.

Always test before applying earths or straps.

Never undertake any job unless you have been trained and assessed as competent.

Always use equipment that is fit for its intended purpose.

Never work or drive while under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Never assume equipment is isolated – always test before touch.

Never enter the agreed exclusion zone, unless directed to by the person in charge.

Working responsibly

Working with electricity

Driving

Working at height

Working with moving equipment

Never use a hand-held or hands-free phone, or programme any other mobile device, while driving.

Always obey the speed limit and wear a seat belt.

Always use a safety harness when working at height, unless other protection is in place.

A3_NR_LSR_Poster_01.indd 1 01/08/2014 14:42

Safe behaviour is a requirement of working for Network Rail.These Rules are in place to keep us safe and must never be broken.We will all personally intervene if we feel a situation or behaviour might be unsafe.

Our Lifesaving Rules

For more information about our Lifesaving Rules go to safety.networkrail.co.uk/LSR

July 2014

We will always comply with our Lifesaving Rules

Always be sure the required plans and permits are in place, before you start a job or go on or near the line.

Always test before applying earths or straps.

Never undertake any job unless you have been trained and assessed as competent.

Always use equipment that is fit for its intended purpose.

Never work or drive while under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Never assume equipment is isolated – always test before touch.

Never enter the agreed exclusion zone, unless directed to by the person in charge.

Working responsibly

Working with electricity

Driving

Working at height

Working with moving equipment

Never use a hand-held or hands-free phone, or programme any other mobile device, while driving.

Always obey the speed limit and wear a seat belt.

Always use a safety harness when working at height, unless other protection is in place.

A3_NR_LSR_Poster_01.indd 1 01/08/2014 14:42

Robel orbital hand tamper failure

Issued to: All Network Rail line managers, safety professionals and RISQS registered contractors

Ref: NRA 16/03

Date of issue: 13/04/2016

Location: Finsbury Park DU

Contact: Rashid Wahidi, Head of Plant and T&RS

Overview

On 3 April 2016 a report was received regarding afailure to the shaft of a 62.05 Robel orbital hand tamper whilst consolidating ballast at New Barnet.

This failure resulted in a wrist injury to the operator. Following investigation it has been identified that the weld around the base of the shaft had cracked resulting in a catastrophic failure of the weld.

The possibility of a future failure to unmodified equipment presents a significant risk to operator safety. Therefore all users and maintainers must quarantine all unmodified tampers (figure 1) immediately.

Tampers fitted with the modified reinforced shaft (figure 2) can remain in use following thorough inspection around the weld and flange area looking for signs of cracking and deformation.

Immediate action required

All Robel 62.05 orbital tampers are to be inspected prior to their next use. The visual inspection should focus on the weld and flange areas of the shaft.

Immediately quarantine all Robel 62.05 orbital tampers that are not fitted with the modified shaft (figure 1) and return them to the supplier pending modification.

Robel 62.05 orbital tampers with a shaft modified with a reinforced collar (figure 2) and confirmed as undamaged may return to service.

Copies of Safety Advices are available on Safety Central.

Part of our group of Safety Bulletins

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Stanley TJ10 lifting jack - cracking


Ref: NRA 16/04


Location: Nationwide

Contact: Rashid Wahidi, Professional Head of Plant and T&RS

Overview

During an inspection of a Stanley TJ10 lifting jack, cracking was identified approximately 5mm from the elbow at the foot of both sides of the lifting face. [Reference: NIR-Online (8250): NIR 3237 Initial Stanley TJ10 10T Hydraulic Rail Jack Defect]

Subsequent jacks were quarantined by the user with Dye Penetrant Non Destructive Testing (NDT) completed. This testing identified significant numbers of the named equipment as damaged due to cracking.

There is a risk that the damage identified could cause a catastrophic failure when lifting rail, causing severe injury to operators and personnel within the immediate area.


All users and maintainers of the equipment must quarantine all Stanley TJ10 lifting jacks immediately.

A competent fitter must complete Dye Penetrant NDT to identify any failure in the indicated area.

All equipment that has crack indication faults should remain quarantined and be returned to the supplier for repair.

Upon completion of Dye Penetrant NDT, equipment not identified as unserviceable can be returned to service.



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Burnt hydraulic hoses on Permaquip HSM70 Hydro Stressor


Ref: NRA 16/05


Location: Reading

Contact: Rashid Wahidi, Professional Head of Plant and T&RS

Overview

During an inspection of a Permaquip HSM70 Hydro Stressor a fitter identified burn damage to the hydraulic pressure hoses at the coupling end of the equipment; the equipment was being held in a ready to use stored area.

The damage had compromised the integrity of the outer covering leaving the metal hose braiding exposed.

There is a risk that the damage identified could cause the hoses to burst under pressure causing severe injury to operators and personnel within the immediate area.


All users and maintainers of the equipment must complete a full inspection of the hoses that are fitted to the Permaquip HSM70 Hydro Stressor for any burn or other visible damage to the hoses, as these are pressure hoses. Minor scuffs and abrasions are allowed however, if the examiner is unsure as to the integrity of the hose then it shall be quarantined, reported and inspected by a qualified fitter.

Equipment identified as unserviceable must be labelled, quarantined and not be issued for use before such time as new parts are fitted. Equipment identified as serviceable can continue to be utilised.

All faults should be reported to the equipment supplier so that repairs can be undertaken by a competent fitter.



Collision between two trains at Plymouth station

Issued to: All Network Rail line managers and RISQS registered contractors

Ref: NRB 16/06


Location: Plymouth Station

Contact: Tim Leighton, General Manager

Overview

At approximately 15:30 on Sunday 3 April 2016, a GWR service (the 13:39 Penzance - Exeter St. Davids) collided at approximately 15mph with the rear of a stationary train (GWR 15:42 Plymouth - London Paddington) in platform 6 of Plymouth station.

Both trains had been re-platformed due to the lift being serviced on platforms 7 & 8 at Plymouth, alternative station working arrangements had been in operation

After agreeing to re-platform the first train from platform 8 to platform 6, the Signaller arranged to signal the Penzance to Exeter service (booked platform 7) into the occupied platform 6 under permissive working arrangements to enable easier access for passengers to change from one train to the other.

The passenger service formed by 2 class 150 units collided with the stationary train in the platform resulting in casualties on board the class 150 train, some of whom had to attend hospital.

There had been insufficient space to fully accommodate the second train in the platform. A full industry investigation is being undertaken.

Note: Permissive Working permits more than one train to be in the same signal section on the same line at the same time and can apply to some platforms.

Discussion Points

Whilst we are investigating the causes of this incident please discuss the following with your teams:

When alternative methods of working are initiated, how do you evaluate risks to avoid unintended consequences?

What guidance or reference information do you provide for when plans change or to support staff who are expected to use their judgement?

How are location specific instructions or methods of operation evaluated and communicated to all relevant personnel?

Note - a Significant Operations Alert (WR030416) has also been issued for Operations Staff in relation to permissive working factors.

Copies of Safety Bulletins are available on Safety Central


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Train and tractor collision

Issued to: All Network Rail line managers and RISQS registered contractors

Ref: NRB 16/07


Location: Hockham Road UWC, Anglia Route

Contact: Darren Cottrell, Head of Level Crossing Safety

Overview

On Sunday 10 April 2016, the 12:04 Norwich to Cambridge service collided with a tractor at Hockham Road user worked level crossing near Thetford in Norfolk.

The train sustained significant damage especially to the driving cab, but did not derail. The tractor driver was airlifted to hospital after being ejected from the tractor and suffering multiple fractures. The train driver had cuts to his hand but escaped more serious injury by leaving his driving position before the impact. Four of the 135 passengers on board the train suffered minor injuries as the farm machinery subsequently collided with the side of the 3-car train.

Hockham Road is a 'hybrid' level crossing, combining a user worked crossing (for authorised vehicles) and a public footpath right of way. The line speed at the location is 90mph.

The method of working currently in use at the crossing requires a vehicle user to telephone the signaller to gain permission to cross. The tractor driver did call and was authorised to cross.

An overlay Miniature Stop Light system previouslyoperating at the crossing was temporarily decommissioned in October 2015. Network Rail isworking with the supplier to address design concerns by August 2016.

The incident is under investigation by British Transport Police, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch and the Office of Rail and Road in addition to the industry formal investigation.

The investigations will include consideration of the design of the crossing, changes to its method of working and the interface with the signaller in Cambridge signalling centre.

Discussion Points

Whilst we are investigating the causes of this incident please discuss the following with your teams:

What more could be done to limit the risk of errors at crossings where users are required to ask signallers' authority to cross?

How can we most effectively involve staff and Trades Unions in improving our risk management?

How can you maintain high quality safety critical communications in your business area?

What ideas do you have to identify newways to keep ourselves, colleagues, passengers and the public who interface with level crossings safe?

Copies of Safety Bulletins are available on Safety Central


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Audience: Rail Automation

Safety Bulletin Subject: Adherence to procedure

Bulletin No: 141 /Mar 2016

Wire tracing incident - (Operation Location Case) During January 2016, 2 contractors working for Siemens Rail Automation Holdings were tasked with tracing wires in a location cabinet on the Farnworth Tunnel project (as part of Recovery Identification Works). As they were undertaking the task a different wire was disturbed and came away from its connection (WAGO) in the terminal block. As the testers could clearly see where the wire came from they placed it back in the terminal block and secured it back in place, the contractors then set about tracing the circuit wire with the intention of informing the Signaller which equipment was affected. As they were tracing the wire, the Signaller received a call from a train driver stating that a Signal aspect was seen to be flickering (most restrictive Aspect) , the signaller then contacted the testers at the location cabinet and was informed by the contractors that a wire had come loose. The following is an extract of the Signal Works Testing - NR/L2/SIG/30014/A110 (Issue 4) that must be followed: 4.6.3 Accidental Wiring Disturbances in Working Circuits In the event of a blown fuse or broken link in a working circuit, the Tester shall report the details to the signaller, and reinstate the fuse or link in co-operation with the signaller and the maintainer. Following reconnection the affected circuit shall be retested to confirm its integrity. The Tester in Charge shall also be informed as soon as possible. In the event of a dislodged or disconnected wire in a working circuit, the Tester shall immediately report the details to the signaller and the Tester in Charge. If it is possible to positively identify where the wire came from then the Tester in Charge can authorise a module 3B Functional Tester to reinstate the wire in co-operation with the signaller and the Maintainer. The Tester in Charge shall confirm the Tester fully understands the consequences of this reinstatement prior to authorising the reinstatement. Following reconnection the affected circuit shall be retested to confirm its integrity. The details of any disturbances, subsequent remedial action and testing shall be recorded on a Test Log. NOTE: If the signaller advises that any accidental disturbance has affected the normal operation of trains, then the disturbance is considered to be an incident. If necessary the requirements of NR/L2/SIG/10064 section NR/GI/B004 (Preservation of Evidence after Accidents and Incidents) shall apply.

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Business Hours Emergency Number 01483 361061Out of Hours Emergency Number 07930 384505Rail Industry Confidential Reporting 0800 4 101101

e-mail: [email protected]

Tel: +44 (0) 1483 361 061

Fax: +44 (0) 1483 431 958

Registered Address

Suite 3, Stamford House, 91 Woodbridge Road, Guildford, Surrey, GU1 4QD

www.advance-TRS.com

may 2016 safety briefing

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