leibniz's interpretation of neo-confucianism david e...

Leibniz's Interpretation of Neo-Confucianism

David E. Mungello

Philosophy East and West, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Jan., 1971), pp. 3-22.

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David E. Nungello Leibniz's interpretation of Neo-Confucianism

From his early youth, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) developed an interest in China. In approximately 1666, at the age of twenty, he read G. Spizel's De Re Litteraria Sinensium Commentarius (Leiden, 1660), and soon afterwards, Fr. Athanasius Kircher's China Monumentis Illustrata (1667). H e discovered Andreas Miiller's attempt to construct a Key to Chinese in 1679.' He apparently read Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (1687) in the year of its p~blication.~ The latter constituted a Jesuit attempt to translate excerpts from several of the Chinese classics such as the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Analects, and to summarize Confucius's teachings. How- ever, the reports from the missionaries in China were carefully edited by Du Halde and other Jesuits in Paris to cast Confucianism into a form more amenable to the belief in God and the immortality of the soul.

E. R. Hughes postulates the existence of some close resemblances in Leibniz's own theories and in Confucius Sinarum Philosophus and thereby suggests that Leibniz was directly influenced by the book. Though admitting the difficulty of specifying the influence, Hughes notes that the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence shows Leibniz's concepts of "simple substance" and "preestablished harmony" (or "the hypothesis of concomitance") in the universe to have been formed between 1686 and 1690; that is, during the time when he was reading Confucius Sinarum Philosophus. In particular, Hughes calls attention to several classical phrases translated from the Chinese into Latin, such as the opening sentence of the Great Learning: " 'The rational nature of man imposed by Heaven is conformed to nature' (i.e. the nature of men and the nature of things.)" Such statements, Hughes contends, appealed to deist-leaning minds of seventeenth century E ~ r o p e . ~

The years 1686-90 actually represent the period of the correspondence between Leibniz and Arnauld, a disciple of Descartes, through an intermediary, Ernst, Landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels. The Landgrave, himself a former Protestant, saw the possibility of a prize conversion in winning Leibniz to Catholicism and sought the aid of the somewhat reluctant and aged Arnauld. The influence of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus upon Leibniz's thought that

David E. Mungello is a graduate sfudent at the University of California, Berkeley. AUTHOR'SNOTE:Portions of the following paper were read as part of a panel on Nee-Confucianism at the A S P A C (Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast) Conference held dtiring June 1970 at Oaztepec, Mexico. I am indebted to Jay Bishop, Jr. for his many hours of effort i reproducing the drawing of the Former Heaven hexagram order. 1Donald F. Lach, "Leibniz and China," Journal of the History of Ideas VI, no. 4 (Oct. 1945), 437. 2 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, 4 vols. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1956),XI, 497. 3 See E.R. Hughes, The Great Learning and the Mean in Action (New York: E. p. Dutton & Co., 1943), pp. 12-18.

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Hughes postulates must, at least in terms of this correspondence, be tempered by the fact that concepts such as simple substance and the hypothesis of concomitance are frequently discussed in letters dated 1686; that is, a year prior to the publication of this Jesuit compilation on Chinese thought. There- fore, the germs for the development of many of the key terms in Leibniz's system-apart from the monads, which were to await elaboration in the Monadology (1714)-were present prior to Leibniz's reading Confucius Sinarum Philo~ophus.~

Leibniz's formal treatises in the area of his interests are both restricted in number and limited in length. The dearth of his public-in contrast to his private-writings contributed to an initial misunderstanding of his concepts which persisted until significant portions of his private correspondence had been published posthumously. This limitation is probably due to several causes, two of which may have been his diversity of interests and the burdens of official duties which kept his time divided. Another cause may have been the hesitation of the diplomat toward publishing controversial ideas. Andreas Miiller's interest and persistence in producing a Key to Chinese had brought on accusations of heresy and his dismissal from the court of the Great Elector in 168SV6 The example may have pressed firmly on Leibniz's mind. Another motivating factor is suggested by W. H. Barber, who points to Leibniz's severe disappointment over Arnauld's negative reaction to article 13 of his summarized Discourse on Metaphysics, which had been forwarded to Arnauld from the Landgrave in 1686.6 T o Leibniz's chagrin, Arnauld considered the proposition to be fatalistic-a criticism not without its controversial overtones. To Barber, Leibniz's reaction embodied a turning point in that afterward he would defer the possibility of being an influential thinker in order to increase the chances for success in his quest for religious reunion. Toward this end, he limited his published writings and omitted many of the logical proofs which might have aroused antagonism instead of con~onance.~In short, Leibniz turned to ecumenicalism.

His interest in China intensified in 1685 when Louis XIV entered France

4 The Leibniz-Amauld Correspondence, ed. and trans. H. T. Mason (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), pp. xi-xiii. 6 Donald F. Lach, "The Chinese Studies of Andreas Miiller," Journal of the American Oriental Society 60, no. 4 (Dec. 1940), 564-565. OArticle 13 of the summarized Discourse on Metaphysics states: "Since the individual concept of each person contains once for all everything that will ever happen to him, one sees in it the a priori proofs or reasons for the truth of each event, or why one event has occurred rather than another. But these truths, though certain, are nevertheless contingent, being based on the freewill of God and of creatures. I t is true that there are always reasons for their choice, but they incline without necessitating!' (Quoted and translated in Mason, The Leibnix-Arnauld Correspondence, p. 5.) 7 W. H. Barber, Leibniz in France: From A m u l d to Voltaire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 13-17.

into the missionary effort by dispatching to China six French Jesuits, some of whom were to become the primary European interpreters of Chinese cul- ture. In 1697 Leibniz published the first edition of Novissima Sinica [The Latest News from China], which represents his only public statement on China.8 All else must be gleaned from correspondence and such private documents as his marginalia in books on China.

Between 1610 and 1742, a controversy arose over how Christianity should interpret the ancient rites practiced in China, particularly those involving ancestor worship and Confucius. The success of the Jesuit policies in seeking compromise through a looser interpretation of Catholic dogma had not only aroused the envious wrath of the other orders, but was accompanied by the growth of anti-Jesuit feeling among the Jansenists, Ultramontanists, and later, the philosophes in eighteenth century France.

Essentially, the Rites issue resolved itself into a question of how adaptable the Chinese, particularly Confucian, religious practices were to Christianity. The dominant position of the Jesuits, first developed by Matteo Ricci (1552- 1610), deemphasized the exegetical writings of Chu Hsi, Wang Yang-ming, and others. Instead, it emphasized the original Confucian canon which originated ca. the sixth to fourth centuries B.C. and, going back to the third millenium B.c., stressed legendary Chinese such as Pan Ku (the creator), Fu Hsi (the inventor of civilized society), Shen Nung (father of agriculture), Huang-ti (the first legendary emperor), Yao, Shun, and Yii. Based upon classical references to these legendary figures and upon the Confucian canon, the Jesuit position concluded that a monotheism similar to that of Jehovah's time had emerged in ancient China.9

A more extreme interpretation of the Jesuit view was put forth by the Figurists, who included among the Jesuits in China Frs. Bouvet, Focquet, and Premare. Their view, which they associated with the I Ching [Book of Changes], held that Fu Hsi was not a Chinese, but the original Lawgiver of all mankind.1° This Lawgiver set forth all knowledge, that is, the Ancient

8 Leibniz himself wrote only the preface to the Novissima Sinica. The text consists of contributions almost exclusively from Jesuits in China, including Suarez, Verbiest, Grimaldi, Thomas, Gerbillon, and-in the second edition (1699)-Bouvet. See Donald F. La&, The Preface to Leibnia' Novissima Sinica: Commentary, Translation, and Text (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1957), pp. 3-4. 9 Arnold H. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarh: The Jesuits at the Court of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), p. 121. 10The Figurists maintained that this same Lawgiver is recognized by many different societies, though with differing names. These include Fu Hsi (Chinese), Hemes Trismegistus (Egyptians and Greeks), Hennoch or Enoch (Hebrews) and Zoroaster

Law, whose remnants were passed down in the geometrical representations of the pa kuaa (eight trigrams). Leibniz's correspondence with Bouvet indicates that he was not only familiar with the Figurist view, but may in fact have been a formative influence in shaping the theory.ll

One might say that the essential Jesuit position on the Rites, defended both from China and in Europe, was less extreme than that of the Figurists and yet did assert a belief in the existence of the Ancient Law, that is, monotheism, in ancient China which had since been debased by Taoist and Buddhist sects. Confucianism then represented the corpus of monotheistic remnants. The worship of ancestors did not conflict with Christian doctrine in that the Chinese ceremony-and in this Leibniz specifically agreed-was essentially of a political and social, not religious, significance. It was therefore not idolatry. Such was the basic position developed by Ricci and maintained essentially intact by the Jesuits in the face of some internal dissent throughout more than a century of debate. The opposition pointed to the objectionable contribution of English and French deism toward Jesuit liberalism and maintained the strict position whereby the Chinese unawareness of revelation and redemption made them heathens. For a number of reasons, including strong anti-Jesuit pressures, Rome conclusively rejected the Jesuit position in 1742.

A second aspect of the Rites controversy concerned the possibility of deriving Chinese equivalents for key Christian concepts. Basing his conclusions on the classical Chinese texts, Ricci derived the controversial position that the Chinese did have a concept equivalent to the Christian God in the form of shang-tP (literally, "the above ruler"). Opposition to the 'shang-ti =God' equation came from a subordinate of Ricci's by the name of Fr. Nicholas Longobardi. Basing his opinion for the most part on Neo-Confucian commentaries, Longobardi maintained the absence of any true conception of God in either modern or ancient China.12 As with the Rites question, the dominant Jesuit position-that of Ricci-was rejected in the papal ruling of 1742.

(Persians). Actually, Hennes Trismegistus was invented by certain second or third century A.D. Romans who identified him with the Egyptian god Thoth, scribe to the gods, measurer of time, inventor of number and language, and god of learning and magic. Consequently, Hermes Trismegistus became known as the founder of alchemy and other occult sciences and the inventor of talismans. He was also associated with the early Judaic prophets such as Moses. See Francis A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hemzefic Tradition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 1-19. 11See section IVB of this paper. Cf. also Lach, "Leibniz and China," pp. 443-444, and Rowbotham, p. 123. 12 Though initially condemned by the Jesuit leadership, Longobardi's views were eventually rendered into French and published in 1701 under the title of Traite szlr Quelques Points de la Religion des Chinois. Soon afterwards another voice, Franciscan Father A. de Sainte-Marie, joined the dissent and, utilizing the commentaries and emphasizing Chinese ceremonial usage rather than doctrine, as did Longobardi, came essentially to the same conclusions as the latter. His findings were eventually also published in French in 1710

One of the difficulties in understanding Leibniz's interpretation of the Rites question stems from what appears to be a contradictory element. T o begin with, Leibniz agrees with Ricci's conclusion on the Rites question and rejects the Longobardi view.13 Then, however, he proceeds to reverse, or at the very least, mix the order of the literature from which the respective positions were drawn. Whereas Ricci had drawn his conclusions from limiting himself to the classical texts, Leibniz seems to lean toward the employment of terminology and concepts taken from both the classical texts and the Neo-Confucian commentaries, but with a slight emphasis on the latter; that is, precisely the area which Ricci rejected and Longobardi stressed. Such terms as t'ai chic, lid, and to a lesser extent, ch'ie, which Leibniz employs in discussing the shang-ti translation problem, are distinctly products of eleventh and twelfth century Neo-Confucian development. It is doubtful that any of these terms were employed by the legendary rulers. Confucius used them rarely, if at all, and in no case would they have then carried the semantic resonance which they had acquired by the eleventh and twelfth centuries.14 On the other hand, by the eleventh century a term like shang-ti had evolved to a point where most of the anthropomorphic- theistic qualities had been lost and the term had become more of a figurative equivalent for the Neo-Confucian li.

The degree to which Leibniz mixes the Neo-Confucian terminology with what seems to be the earlier theistic conception of shang-ti is evident in the following passage. Leibniz states :

Li, Ki [ch'i] and Taikie [t'ai-chi] are only modes of the ultimate substance which is called (Xangti) Schangti [shang-ti], that is to say, the King from on high, or else, the Spirit governing Heaven. . . . So, if Xangti and Li are the same thing, we have every reason to give to God the name of Xangti. And Father M. Ricci was not wrong in maintaining that the ancient Sages of China recognized and honored a Supreme Being called Xangti, King on High, and Spirits below Him as High Ministers, so that they did have knowledge of the true God. . . .15

as Traite sur quelques points importans de la Mission de la Chine. See Rowbotham, pp. 132 and 31811, and Needham 11, 501. 13 The sources for deriving Leibniz's opinions on the matter include (a) his marginal notations regarding Longobardi and de Sainte-Marie in the Kortholt edition of his miscellaneous papers published in 1735 and (b) a long letter sent in 1716 to M. Nicholas de Remond, an official associated with the Duke of Orleans. The letter appears in its entirety in Ludovia Dutens, ed., Leibniz Opera Omnia (Geneva, 1741), IV, 161. Part of the letter is translated by Lach in "Leibniz and China," p. 450, and its title page is reproduced in Needham 11, Fig. 49. See also Needham 11, 500-502, for discussion of the letter. 14 The term li is a partial, though not complete, exception to this lack of usage. Certain of Confucius's near-contemporaries such as Mencius, Hsiin-tzu, Mo-tsu, and Chuang-tzu did employ li, but its meaning carried only the substructur~special ly in terms of metaphysics-upon which its later development was built. Ch'i was employed in a different meaning by certain of Confucius's contemporaries and later in Taoist thought. 16 Leibniz (to Bouvet?), in R. F.Merkel, Leibniz und China (Berlin: Walter de Gruyther,

The problem arises when one considers that Ricci's conclusions are far more valid, though not necessarily totally solla if limited to the pre-Confucian-in opposition to including both the pre-Confucian and Confucian--classical texts. On the other hand, Longobardi's seem also validly drawn if limited to the Neo- Confucian commentaries. Where then does this leave Leibniz, who considers both groups of texts, though with definite emphasis upon the commentaries, and yet arrives at a conclusion which seems justified only for the earlier texts? Was Leibniz in error or was his conception of God at variance with that of the Jesuits whose position he supported?

The Jesuits had, as stated, themselves been accused of being unduly influenced by British and French deism, but the influence was probably incorporated more into the methods of the Jesuits than into their conception of God, which seems to have remained rather orthodoxly theistic. Leibniz's system seems to exhibit a movement toward a less theistic conception in which God tends to become a creator of the world who has arranged things on mechanical principles which relate to the whole, of which they are a part, on an organic basis. Because of the organic element, the world becomes more than an unwinding clock, that is, more than a world which is able to be reduced totally to a series of discrete elements, individually and separately responding to one another. Rather, these elements are interrelated in a whole which points toward a plan Divinely in- spired. Gone is the conception of an intervening God as Father to whom one may appeal in prayer. However, the superficial similarity to the deist conception of a nonintervening God must be tempered by considering the greater com- plexities of Leibniz's system. In considering Leibniz's failure to emphasize the differences between his conception of God and the more anthropomorphic-theistic conception of the Jesuits-and most of the rest of European Christian- ity-one might ask whether Leibniz was again allowing a basic dissimilarity to pass for the sake of the higher goal of ecumenicalism.

In addition to the questions over the translation of shang-ti and whether Christians should be permitted to participate in the Chinese ancestor cere-monies, a debate evolved about the term li and its relationship to Christian theology. Since the term did not become greatly significant in Confucianism until the rise of the Sung dynasty (960-1280), li would not present a semantic

1952), p. 27; quoted and translated in Philip P. Wiener, "G. W. F. Leibniz On Philo- sophical Synthesis," Philosofihy East and West 12, no. 2 (Oct. 1%2), 200. (This writer was unable to secure the Merkel text and consequently cannot unambiguously cite the specific Leibniz correspondence involved.) 1%Most modern scholars have treated Confucius as agnostic; however, the opposing view deserves consideration. For the latter, see Herrlee G. Creel, "Was Confucius Agnostic?", T'oung Pao XXIX, no. 1-3 (1932), 55-99.

problem to those Jesuits who stressed the classical texts. However, interest in the term was not limited to men like Longobardi, for Leibniz, who tended to support the opposition position, also found the term of key importance to the point of stressing its equation with his own conception of God.

Leibniz, however, evidences certain misconceptions in regard to the relationship between li and ch'i. There is, to begin with, what appears to be another misleading treatment of chronology. In his discussion of li and ch'i, he refers to "the ancient writers of China."17 If Leibniz is consistent with previous usage, the reference to "ancient" would be to those Chinese thinkers of the time of Confucius or earlier. If so, a misplacement is involved in that even though Confucius's contemporaries and near-contemporaries-though not Confucius himself-may have employed the term li, it had few metaphysical connotations during the late Chou. Such connotations were to await development by certain Neo-Taoists and Chinese Buddhists.ls But perhaps more telling was the absence of a li-ch'i relationship until its development in the eleventh and twelfth centuries by Ch'eng Hao, and particularly, Ch'eng Yi (1033-1108) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200).

In addition to the chronological problem there is a more basic misconception in the relationship between li and ch'i. Leibniz states that ". . . the ancient writers of China attributed to Li, or the first principle, the very existence of Ch'i, or matter. . . ."lo In this statement and in the context of the passage, Leibniz implies a mind-matter dualism quite familiar to Western thought. But a mind-matter characterization does not accurately describe the li-ch'i relationship. First of all, ch'i is not simply matter, but is more akin to ether or the conception of breath contained in the Greek pneiinza, particularly as applied by the Leibniz misconstrues it when he attempts to distinguish li from ch'i by stating: "Now it is not possible to comprehend that L i is a purely passive, brutal, universally indifferent, and lawless concept as is matter."21 Ch'i is not "purely passive," nor is it simply an amalgam of the opposing categories of matter and energy, though it does resolve characteristics of both into the single element of fineiima or the breath which infuses all aspects of the world associated with life or motion. By referring to ch'i as lawless, and,

17 Leibniz to Nicholas Remond, 27 March 1716,quoted and trans. in Lach, "Leibniz and China," p. 450. 1sThese developers of li include Neo-Taoists such as Wang Pi (226-49)and Kuo Hsiang (d. 312) and Buddhists such as Chih Tun (314-66), Hui-yiian (334-416), Seng-chao (384-414),Tao-sheng (d. 434) and Fa-tsang (643-712). 19 Leibniz to Remond, 27 March 1716, in Lach, "Leibniz and China," p. 450. 20 I am indebted for the suggestion to render ch'i as the stoic 'pnerima' to Professor Nathan Sivin. In addition, Professor Peter A. Boodberg has proposed rendering ch'i with breath-like implications. For a description of pnerima see S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959),p. 22 passim. 21 Leibniz to Remond, 27 March 1716, in Lach, "Leibniz and China," p. 450.

by contrast, li as law, Leibniz seems to come closer to accuracy. By rendering li as "first principle," Leibniz seems to have been one of the first employers of a translation in which knowledgeable sinologists have followed.

However, while roughly equivalent, the translation "principle" is misleading in part because of the extensive application this term has received in the West, to the point that its meaning has become ambiguous. In contrast, the early Chinese application of li was not ambiguous. One etymology of the term in- volves a sense of 'patterning'. Another related etymology which the Sung (i.e., Neo-Confucian school associated with Chu Hsi) scholars adopted analyzes the character in terms of yii' as a semantic and l ig as both phonetic and semantic. The latter has implications of 'inner,' as in 12% "clothing," while the yii refers to jade. Juxtaposed into the single character of lid, they supposedly represent the inside of jade in the sense of natural grain within jade, or a system of veins, or venation. Jade, which was a term applied to a wide variety of stone in ancient China, was a highly valued substance, and knowledge of how to cut jade, that is, the ascertaining of the venation in order to make an effective break, became rather important. A Han dynasty juxtaposition of li with wen throws additional light on the meaning of li in that while wen referred to surface markings, hence surface structure, and by extension, superstnicture, li by contrast would imply inner structure or inf ras t r~c ture .~~ While any given thing could be analyzed in terms of its infrastructure, so too can the term be extended to the universe at large. The sense of infrastructure associated with the idea of patterning becomes a great deal more meaningful when juxtaposed with pnecma or ch'i. The latter, which is chaotic, as Leibniz accurately detected, is organized according to the patterns of infrastructure implied in li. In such a relationship, ch'i and li are complementary to one another and their existence is mutually dependent upon one another. Yet, while the two in one sense have coequal status, in its Neo-Confucian treatment li acquires an element of priority which Leibniz seems also to have recognized.

An explanation of this priority is a rather difficult problem and perhaps a less than totally resolved problem even in Chu Hsi's synthesis. Certainly it is a question which troubled Chu Hsi's disciples, as the following quotation from the Hsing-li ta chuan, a work introduced to Europe via Fr. Longobardi's commentaries in Traite sur Quelques Points de la Religion des Chinois, attests:

Someone asked, Does li [the organizing principle(^)^^] exist first or does ch'i [pneiima]7 (Chu Hsi) answered: The organizing principle has never in the

22 The "superstructure-infrastructure" rendering of wen-li is derived from Professor Boodberg. 23 The translation of li as "organizing principle(s)" is my derivati~n from Needham'$ "principle of organization." (See Needham 11, 472 f.) The transformation of 'organization' from a noun to the participle 'organizing' was made in order to give a more balanced emphasis to the active, as opposed to static, aspect of li.

past been far separated from pneuma. Certainly the organizing principle is before form and pneuma is after form. Everything (Both?) emerges as either before or after form. How then can one speak of lacking a first and a last (i.e. lacking temporal sequence) ? If the organizing principle lacked form, the pneuma would seek out its existence in the dregs (i.e. chaos). The organizing principle and pneuma basically lack a 'before' and 'after' of which one can speak. But if one insists on inferring that which was previous, then we must say that first there existed this organizing principle. But the organizing principle may also not be divided so as to act as one thing. Accordingly it is located in the midst of (this) pneurna. If the situation lacks this pneuma, then this organizing principle lacks a place in which it is suspended. Pneuma consequently acts as metal, wood, water and fire (i.e. four of the five elements of nature). The organizing principle acts as humanity, group loyalty, ritual and wisdom (i.e. modes of behavior) .24

In dealing with Chu Hsi's metaphysics, it is deceptively easy for the Western mind to lose sight of the behavioral aspects within Chu Hsi's system. Social philosophy in the Western tradition has commonly been treated separately from metaphysics. In addition, the KO-zvui ("investigation of things") emphasis in Chu Hsi's thought lends itself to misinterpreting "things" as objects rather than social phenomena when in fact "things" refers to both. Just as li would apply to a given bamboo plant, so too would it apply to social relations. As it becomes absurd to treat any standard of social relations with excessive rigidity, the li of behavior would be somewhat fluid, perhaps with the same fluidity which made the bamboo such a favorite metaphor among eleventh and twelfth century Chinese. And yet, though fluid, the li loses none of its value as a constant ordering principle which stabilizes both nature and society; that is, the inherently chaotic ch'i is li-ed. Interpreted in this light, li emerges as the continuation of a Chinese tradition which employs metaphysical concepts for the purpose of ordering society. What distinguishes li from previous terms in this tradition such as t'ien mingj ("Heavenly Decree") or Taok ("the Way") is its relatively greater degree of metaphysical elaboration and the unique historical circum- stances in which it was applied.

In terms of li and the natural world, might the priority lie within the thinking mind and not within nature itself? To understand li, one must consider its particular-universal aspect. In this, there is the li (designated in the lower case) of any given particular which relates to the L i (upper case) of the supreme form which embraces all particulars. For example, just as any pear has its own infrastructure, so too does that single pear relate to the infrastructure of the entire universe which created it, enables it to exist, and even now-for the cycle is never arrested-is reabsorbing it. One might view the situation in terms of patterns of ch'i which on one hand exist in every entity, and on the other hand, may be combined not merely as one gigantic grouping of disparate

24 Hsing-li fa ch'iian zhuv 1415, chap. 26:337.

12 Mungello

patterns, but rather as a grouping of interrelated patterns which form an organic whole, namely, the universe or reality.

Especially in view of the particular li-universal Li aspect, it seems clear that li is a metaphysical principle and that the thinking mind of men would contain li which would relate to the Li of the universe in the same way that the li of a given bamboo or social situation would relate to the universal L iZ5 Therefore, it would seem that the concept of li pervades both the thinking mind and the natural world. (Confucian thought had traditionally considered reality to lie within the natural world, not beyond it.) Li would consequently transcend any attempt to separate the thinking mind from ultimate reality or to distinguish between a Kantian phenomenal and noumenal realm. One comes into contact with Li by embracing reality, not by merely perceiving li through the filters of the mind.

But there is a tension in Chu Hsi's treatment of li. The development within li of a tendency toward priority created a tension between itself and the traditional type of Chinese thought variously described as 'coordinative', 'asso-ciative', or ' cor re la t i~e ' .~~ Perhaps the most common example in this type of thinking is the yang-yin relationship. Both yang and yin are different but complementary and of equal thrust-hence the prefix 'co-'; forces which are both necessary to the whole. Hellmut Wilhelm has contrasted Chinese coordinative thinking with European 'subordinative' thought in which the analytic tool of causation arranged all by subsuming effect to cause. In correlative thought the universe consists of patterns which relate to one another not on the basis of an externally induced stimulus, but rather out of an internal nature which is what it is because of the relational position and function it occupies in the total universe.27 In addition, this coordinative type of thought is somewhat reflected in Chinese parallel prose style which originated at the beginning of the Han dynasty (ca. 220 B.c.) .28

The coordinative forms of thinking are also reflected in the evolution of li and the complementary pairs-one hesitates to say 'dualisms' because of the antagonism implied in such Western dualisms as 'good and evil' or 'spirit and matterJ-which combined Li with another term. During the Han dynasty, as

25 For further elaboration, one might compare the li-Li relationship to the process by which the rhythm of any given thing relates to the supreme rhythm of the t'ai chi as manifested in early Neo-Confucianism and wen-jen aesthetic theory. See my "Neo-Confucianism and wen-jen Aesthetic Theory," Philosophy East and Wes t 19, no. 4 (Oct. 1969), 368-383. 25The descriptive terms 'coordinative,' 'associative,' and 'correlative' originate from modern scholars such as Eberhard, Granet, Jablonski, Needham, and H. Wilhelm. See Needham 11, 279 f. 27 Needham 11, 280-281. 28 E. R. Hughes, "Epistemological Methods in Chinese Philosophy," in The Chinese Mind, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), pp. 88-92.

previously noted, wen as 'superstructure' was paired with li as 'infrastructure'. Certain Chinese Buddhists, specifically Fa-tsang, complemented shih as 'phe-nomenon' with li as ' noumen~n ' .~~ But in neither case did li assume a role dominant over the other element in the pair. However, with the Sung Neo- Confucian complementary pair of chJias 'pneiima' and li as 'organizing princi- p l e ( ~ ) ' there emerged a slightly antagonistic tendency. While ch'i and li are on one hand correlative and equal in importance, priority, and other aspects, li on the other hand also assumes the role of priority in a logical or rational sense. In terms of the coordinative context in which li had previously evolved, the tendency to cite li as prior seems to contain a contradiction to the coordinative pattern of thinking in that priority implies subordination and a causative force as opposed to complementarity and reciprocity. The tension which re- sulted is clearly reflected in the repeated questions on the nature of the priority of li over ch'i put to Chu Hsi by his disciples.

Eventually one faces the question of (a) whether Chu Hsi's system is totally coherent and any contradiction stems from our own-not Chu Hsi's-failure to comprehend, or (b) whether there is a tension which Chu Hsi was unable to resolve. Several Western interpretations have treated the li and ch'i of Chu Hsi's system as dualistic with the antagonism implied by that.30 But if we do treat li and ch'i as on the one hand complementary or, to use a recent interpretation, as a c o n t i n ~ u m , ~ ~ we are faced on the other hand with Chu Hsi's emphasis upon the priority of li over ch'i. The result is two divergent tendencies. Do we explain the divergency by saying that while Chu Hsi could resolve the contradiction in his own mind, his disciples and the modern student cannot? O r do we say that Chu Hsi's apparent failure to clarify for his own disciples the nature of li's priority over ch'i reflects a lack of complete clarity in his own mind ? To choose the latter would hardly make Chu Hsi the first thinker whose system contained an unresolved tension.

To summarize, in Chu Hsi's treatment, li pervades both the thinking mind and the natural world. This is the level in which li and ch'i are inseparable and

20 Fa-tsang, Chin shih tzu chang [Essay on the Golden Lion], Taisho no. 1880. 30A recent interpretation by Mokusen Miyuki has attempted to overcome the dualism and resolve any contradictions between li and ch'i. The study postulates three possible relationships: (a) with li as prior to ch'i, (b) with ch'i as prior to li, and (c) with li and ch'i combined into the continuum li-ch'i. Briefly, Miyuki proceeds to reject (a) and (b) for being, unlike (c) , unable to explain all aspects of Chu Hsi's system. The problem with Miyuki's treatment lies in a misplaced emphasis, in that he treats Chu Hsi's tendency to cast ch'i as prior to li as having equal emphasis with the tendency to cast li as prior to chY In effect, Miyuki treats the two tendencies as canceling out one another. His logic seems reasonable until one considers the texts involved and the far greater emphasis which Chu Hsi placed upon the priority of li over ch'i. See Mokusen Miyuki, An Analysis of Buddhist Influence on the Formation of the Sung Confucian Concept of li-ch'i (ph.D. diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1965). 31 See Mokusen Miyuki, 60 ff.

co-equal. However, Chu Hsi, somewl~at hesitantly, postulates another level in which li is prior to ch'i. In this level, li seems essentially to be a mental concept and, as was not the case in the previous level, outside of the natural world. Perhaps Chu Hsi hesitated at this point because he wondered whether the locus of reality was really so totally identifiable with the natural world as had been maintained. Could it be that li as a mental concept was opening the door to another level of reality which the Confucian tradition, prior to Buddhism, had consistently refused to enter? Could this be part of what the tension in Chu Hsi's thought indicates ?

PARALLELS

A. Leibniz's God and the Neo-Confucian li. Leibniz appears to grasp the particular-universal aspect of li and to manifest it by means of distinct projections of his own system into his interpretation of Chinese These projections may partially account for both his correct and erroneous interpretations in that, whether accurate or inaccurate, one can usually find an element paralleling Leibniz's interpretations of the Chinese in his own system. If he is primarily projecting his own system into his conception of Chinese thought, then Needham's contention that Leibniz was influenced by the Chinese would be measurably d imin i~hed .~~

As an example of this projection, one might take the parallel in the relationship of particular li to the universal L i and compare it to Leibniz's Monadology in which "spirits" (i.e., souls raised to the rank of reason) go beyond merely mirroring the image of the universe, to which souls are limited, to mirror the images of the Deity. In such a way each spirit represents a small deity possess- ing its own sphere; that is, each spirit represents a lesser duplicate of the supreme Deity.84 Yet each spirit is connected with the supreme Deity just as the li of the particulars both duplicate and connect with the L i of the cosmos. In short, Leibniz has supplanted a Christian view which saw the supreme force of the universe as in part anthropomorphically cast after the image of man, that is, patriarchal, with both benevolence and wrath, and certainly a force who interferes in human activities on the basis of a response which is basically human, even though human writ tremendously large. In contrast, Leibniz discards the anthropomorphic-theistic image to present a supreme force which

82 Leibniz seems to reflect his comprehension of the li-Li aspect when he states: "He [Chu Hsi] seems to indicate that the particular Li [i.e., li] is an emanation from the great Li [i.e., Li] . . ." R. F. Merkel, 451, quoted and trans. in Wiener, p. 201. 88 See Needham 11, 496-505. 84G. W. F. von Leibniz, The Monadology (1714), trans. George Montgomery with revisions by Albert R. Chandler, in The Rationalists (Garden City, N.Y.: Dolphin Books, n.d.), p. 469, #83.

is first of all mechanical in that the universe operates by processes which have a mathematical regularity. However, Leibniz does not stop here, as Descartes and, in a different way, Spinoza did, but goes on to transcend the mechanical basis by combining what would be individual and unrelated mechanical processes through the medium of an all-embracing scheme. In the case of Leibniz, the scheme is provided through the Divine plan implied in his conception of a preestablished harmony. In the case of Chu Hsi, the scheme is provided by the universal Li which embraces all the particular li. In both cases a given entity, whether represented as a monad or a particular li, acts not simply in mechanical response to an external stimulation, but out of an inner prompting. The prompting is dictated by a nature which both connects with and reflects the whole of which it is a part. Consequently, the resulting system assumes a united viability symptomatic of an organism; hence the term 'organi~ism'.~s

B. Leibniz's binary system and the I Ching. Leibniz's treatment of the I Ching presents an instance of where the projection of his own system may actually be an overprojection that leads to a nonexistent parallel. Leibniz's introduction to the I Ching came through his correspondence with the Jesuit Bouvet, which was carried on between 1697 and 1707, though there is some disagreement over exactly when Leibniz learned of the I Ching. Hellmut Wilhelm contends that it was not until Leibniz sent an explanation of his binary mathematics to Bouvet on 15 February 1701 that the direct link with the I Ching was made by Bouvet, who soon thereafter detected correspondences between LeibnizJs binary system and the hexagram progression, particularly in that of the Former Heaven order hsien-t'ien tzu-hsii' (see diagram) attributed to Fu Hsi. In a letter dated November, 1701, Bouvet communicated his discovery to Leibniz, along with the Former Heaven and another hexagram order.38 Consequently,

3 5 Another parallel in Leibniz's treatment of Neo-Confucian China might be found in the similarities in historical setting and motivation out of which both Chu Hsi and Leibniz worked. Leibniz was born two years before the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) brought to an end the Thirty Years War. For the Chinese counterpart, one might read eleventh century factiousness in the midst of intense concern and debate over finances, bandits, rebellion, and, eventually, barbarian invasion which led to the abdication in 1127 of northern China by the Sung royal house. Into such contentious climates Leibniz and Chu Hsi were born and matured as minor, sometimes unemployed officials in search of a healing medium of cultural unity. Perhaps part of their solutions is reflected in the tendencies toward stability found in both systems. The deemphasis of the I Ching as a philosophic, as opposed to divination text, and the revival of the Mencian position on the inherent tendencies of human nature toward goodness, along with the tendency to emphasize the prior and stable aspect of the concept li, may be indicative of the trend toward stability on the Chinese end of things. The stable elements on Leibniz's end are discussed within the text of the paper. 38 Needham maintains that the letter which Wilhelm holds was dated 15 February 1701 was actually dated April of that year. See Needham 11, 341 and Hellmut Wilhelm, "Leibniz and the I-Ching:," Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis in Sinis (1948)' pp, 1 4

16 Mungello

The Former Heaven hexagram order

Leibniz became convinced that the hexagram progression found in this classic originated in Fu Hsi as a binary system-precisely the type of system Leibniz had discovered several years earlier in his experimentation with numbers. To Leibniz the discovery represented (a) confirmation at the other end of the world for his own work in the binary system and (b) a further basis on which to build a natural religion foundation of understanding among different peoples.

Actually, one wonders if Bouvet's contact with Leibniz and his binary system could have shaped the Figurist position, which seems to have blossomed in the first and second decades of the eighteenth century. As an active proponent of the Figurist wing of the dominant Jesuit position on the Rites, Bouvet stressed the importance of Fu Hsi's contribution not only to the Chinese, but to all of mankind. If Leibniz's binary mathematics could provide confirmation for the

207-209. (This rather inaccessible paper seems to provide the basis for much of what Needham maintains on the subject.) See also Lach, "Leibniz and Chi," p. 444.

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universality of Fu Hsi's natural religion teachings, then the Jesuit tendency toward a looser interpretation of doctrine might be vindicated in the eyes of critics in both China and Europe.

Employing the Former Heaven arrangement, Bouvet and Leibniz drew correspondences between its order and the binary progression by letting a divided line in the hexagram represent 0 and an undivided line represent 1. Conse-quently, a binary progression may be derived. For example, k'trnm EB , the first hexagram in the upper left-hand corner of the rectangular Former Heaven order would represent 0 in the denary system and 000 000in the binary system. -The second hexagram, Pon es , would be 1 and 000 001, respectively. (Bouvet and Leibniz diverged from the traditional transformation of the diagrams which alters from the bottom upward; for example, using the traditional transformation, 000-001 would be rendered as flrO - instead of Po.) The third hexagram, pP zz -=kttanq;010000and2would be , would be 3 and 000 011, and so on up to clz'ienr ,the sixty-fourth hexagram, which would be 63 in the denary progression and 111 111 in the binary.37

37Apparently out of the scientific stimulus he had received in his Paris and London visits (1672-76)' Leibniz developed his analysis of the binary or dyadic (i.e., base of 2) arithmetical progression and in 1679 presented his findings in a paper, "De Progressione Dyadica." In contrast to the binary base, Europeans had been employing a denary (i.e., base of 10) progression along with the 'place value' characteristic which they had learned in the sixteenth century from the Arabs who in turn traced it back to sixth century A.D. Hindus. Leibniz based his analysis upon the recognition that certain properties of numerical systems are common to all numbers and that, while 10 is the base most familiar to Europe, actually the selection of a base number is rather arbitrary and need not be 10, but could instead be 2 or 12 or any number.

'Place value' or 'value by position' would refer, for example, in the number 5620 to the first figure on the left as representing 103 (ten to the third power). (Ten is used since a denary system is involved.) Computed, 103 would be 10 X 10 X 10 = 1000 or a four digit number, i.e., the number of digits in 5620.

The diagrams found in the I Ching exhibit the same characteristic of 'place value! For instance, in a given hexagram, the top line might represent 25. Computed, 25 would be 2 X 2 x 2 X 2 X 2 =32, which when translated into the binary progression yields 100 000 or a six digit number, the total number of lines in the hexagram. The line down from the top of the hexagram might represent 24, which when computed would be 2 x 2 X 2~ 2 = 16, which when translated into the binary system equals 10000 or a five digit number, i.e., the number of lines remaining in the hexagram after the first line is subtracted. The bottom line in the hexagram might represent 20. When computed, 20 would yield 1 or a single digit number, which is what the place value of the bottom line could represent. Theoretically, one could also reverse this order and treat the bottom line of the hexagram as representing 25 and progressing up to the top line as 20. The order depends upon the direction in which one counts the lines of the hexagrams. While the traditional method followed the former order, Bouvet and Leibniz seem to have employed the latter.

For more complete explanations of the binary system and its applications to the hexagrams, see Arthur Waley, "Leibniz and Fu Hsi," Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies I1 (1921-23), 165-167; Needham 11, 340-345; and Lach, "Leibniz and China," pp. 444-446.

Actually, the correspondences which Bouvet perceived between Leibniz's binary system and the Former ~ e a b e n arrangement of the hexagrams are somewhat arbitrary. For example, the Former Heaven order permits several possible readings. The rectangular-shaped arrangement within the circle might be read (a) horizontally beginning with k'ztn from left to right and top to bottom, as Bouvet seems to have done, or (b) horizontally beginning with ch'ien from right to left and from bottom to top as Shao Yung '(1011-1077)' seems to have done. The circular order presents similar alternatives, with a binary progression made possible by moving counterclockwise from k'un at-the bottom up through kou" ,then leaving off and picking up with fu at the bottom and completing the circle by moving clockwise through ch'ien.

If one disregards the alternative methods of reading the hexagram order and the fact that the trigrams and hexagrams seem to have traditionally transformed in the reverse direction, that is, from the bottom upward, then the binary interpretation of Bouvet and Leibniz seems possible. This appears to have been what was done. The hexagrams, however, unlike Leibniz's binary system, offer little evidence of having been used in counting. Considering this, along with the probability that the Neo-Confucian Shao Yung, and not Fu Hsi, originated the Former Heaven order, the possibility of binary origins of the hexagrams is cast into considerable doubt. Furthermore, when one considers the other various arrangements of the hexagrams, including the famous order ascribed to King Wen (ca. 1150 B.c.), and their lesser adaptability to the binary progression, one is led toward the conclusion that Bouvet based his claim upon insufficient evidence and that Leibniz determined a similarity between East and West by unjustifiably projecting an element of his own system into the Chinese.

Leibniz was highly pleased that his discovery of the binary system should receive what seemed to be confirmation in the three thousand-plus year old arrangement of "this old Fohi (Fu Hsi)," as Leibniz called him.38 Again, Leibniz's joy was not simply that of intellectual understanding, but the joy of anticipating the potential unity for East and West which such a discovery might bring. In Leibniz's view, what he perceived as degeneration in the understanding of the binary nature of the hexagrams that had set in among Chinese since Fu Hsi's time did not negate the basis for unity. In his eyes, this medium of unity might be reactivated by a confirmation of the shared principles of natural religion such as the binary system confirmed to be existing in both Europe and China.

Leibniz felt that all relationships and elements in the universe could be derived from a Pythagorean-like method of mathematical values. By using the numbers 0 and 1, the bnly figures available in the binary system, it would be

38 Leibniz to Peter the Great, 1716, quoted and translated in Wiener, 202.

possible to generate all mathematical values, which would then be convertible into all values in the universe. ( In the most basic elements of the system, 0= the void and 1 =God.)

Leibniz's aim was to impress the Chinese, and particularly the K'ang-hsi Emperor (r. 1662-1723) with his and Bouvet's discoveries that China and Europe shared this binary system of progression, which for Leibniz had religious overtones. With this impression established, he would next attempt to convince the emperor that the essentials of Christianity and Chinese thought and religious practices are commonly held in both cultures in the form of the basic principles of natural religion. Such an aim was no wild speculation on Leibniz's part, for he was probably already informed of the interest K'ang-hsi had taken in European mathematics and of the Jesuits' ability in this area. (Within the decade, Bouvet would be assigned to tutor the emperor in geometry.) Therefore, Leibniz's attempt to reach the emperor through the universal language of mathematics reflects, as do so many of Leibniz's projects, a philosopher's aim based upon a diplomat's familiarity with the situation.

Leibniz's optimism toward the possibility of reaching K'ang-hsi through his binary discoveries is recorded in the following excerpt from a letter sent to Bouvet on 15 February 1701 :

The new numerical calculus that I have invented . . . gives an admirable repre- sentation (or model) of creation. . . . My principal aim is to furnish a new confirmation of the Christian Religion with respect to the sublime article of the Creation through a ground which will, in my opinion, carry great weight with the Chinese philosophers, and perhaps with the Emperor K'ang-hsi himself, for he loves and understands the science of numbers. Simply to say that all numbers are formed by the combinations of 1 with 0 binary system, and that the 0 is sufficient to diversify them, appears to be as to say that God created everything from nothing without using any primitive matter; and that there exists nothing more than these two first principles, God and Nothing: God of all things perfect, and the Non-being of the imperfections of things, devoid of essence.ss

It is worth noting that this letter was written before Leibniz had any knowledge of the correspondences between his binary progression and that of the hexagrams. The letter merely represents his introduction to Bouvet of his binary system along with his hopes for ecumenicalism that such a discovery might bring. By November 4 of the same year, Bouvet would respond with his discovery of the correspondences. In effect, Leibniz's conclusion (i.e., that a potential for world unity based upon the principle of natural religion was inherent in the nature of the world) derived from his mathematical and logical premises (i.e., that the binary system exists and that this system reflects the operations of the Creator and hence, the principles of natural religion) rather than from empirical observation of data (i.e., that the binary progression is

39 Leibniz to Bouvet, 15 February 1701, quoted and translated in Wiener, 199.

present in the I Ching hexagrams and therefore in China, hence, the system has a universal historical basis). Instead, the observation of data merely con- firms rather than acts as the basis for his conclusion.

One wonders how much of a pattern Leibniz's tendency toward projection of his own system might represent ? Was Leibniz's interpretation of China and the correspondences he found based more on the development of his own analysis in Europe (using certain abstract subject matter such as mathematics) and the projection of this analysis to the world and to China? Needham's thesis that Leibniz seems to have derived his organicism largely from Chu Hsi's Neo- Confucianism and to have thereby introduced it into Europe appears to contra- dict a 'projection' thesis. Needham seems to infer that Leibniz's interpretation of China was based more upon a study of China itself and a derivation of ideas therefrom, rather than upon a projection of his own system into China.

C. Nature and morality conjoined in the Monadology and li. To view another example of where the projection seems to lead to a valid parallel, one might consider the combination of nature and morality within li. The organizing of the pneiima is according to principles which accord not merely with natural, but also with ethical laws. The dual reference was taken by Chu Hsi from the Ch'eng brothers' distinction between so-yi-jant, or the reason why a thing is as it is, and so-tang-janu, or what a thing should be.40 The former refers to the productive aspect of li while the latter refers to the ethical aspect. The parallel in Leibniz's system is found in the Monadology's "moral world within a natural world."41 As such, the object of man's investigation is a world which God created and set before man and which operates on laws of both nature and morality that conjoin in such a way as to make them inseparable. I n short, one cannot consider the laws of nature apart from those of morality. In this, Leibniz strikes a note which has been operative in China since before Neo- Confucianism. Both systems would present an inherent opposition to the amoral type of propositions which certain seventeenth century thinkers such as Galileo were beginning to address to the universe, and which would later become associated with the type of question put forth by the scientific method.

In addition, the combining of ethical with natural laws seems to engender the notion that since the given world of nature is viewed as ethical, therefore good, the harmonious continuity of such a world is equally good and its con- verse, discord, is evil.*= In such a context of harmony, where laws of nature simultaneously bear a moral force, any attempts to change such laws would interrupt this harmony along with violating both nature and moral i t~.~s Cer-

40 Cf. A. C. Graham, T w o Chinese Philosophers: Ch'eng Ming-tao and Ch'eng Yi-ch'uan (London: Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., 1958), p. 8 f.

41 Leibniz, The Monadology, pp. 469-470, #86. 42 Ibid. 43As used here, and in contrast to an earlier usage where nature was identified with

tainly such a conception would hardly condone revolution with its concomitant discord and proposed alterations to nature and morality. The historical reac- tions toward both systems tend to confirm these implications.

The solutions offered by Leibniz and Chu ~ s i toward ordering the social chaos of their respective ages consisted of an attempt to revise man's view of the world, rather than attempting to revise the world itself or man's manipula- tion of it. In addition, there may have been an identification of the desired goal, stability, with the method employed and the world view conceived. While change was accounted for in Leibniz's unfolding of the monads and in Chu Hsi's cyclical transformation of the li, in both cases it was also deemphasized or considered secondary to the essential nature of the supreme concept. For Leibniz, attempts to change the world were not only rendered futile by the preestablished harmony of things, but also misguided in that, given a true understanding of the nature of the world, one would find change undesirable. In addition, the monads do not interact, but merely seem to do so while actually playing out the dictates of their inherent nature. For Chu Hsi, ch'i is the medium of change which manifests the li as patterns; however, the change is cyclical and not evolutionary. The li themselves do not alter.

Coincident with the deemphasis of change is the deemphasis of the importance of time. For those intent on altering the world, time-whether quantita-tive or qualitative-is perhaps the essential tool. Hegel clearly offered a tool for change in his dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, and its significance was not lost on revolutionary-minded thinkers who followed. While Hegel wrote in the century after the death of Leibniz, the impetus for investing time with greater significance was beginning to build even in Leibniz's own time. While certainly aware of many of the changing currents about him, Leibniz attempted to offer a defense for a type of timelessness.

In China, the timelessness of Chu Hsi lasted far longer, though not so long as a creative stimulus to thought as part of the official government orthodoxy. When the Manchus came to power in 1644, their lack of security as a non- Chinese people and their need to obliterate-or perhaps more precisely, ele- vate-their barbarian heritage led them to embrace the Chinese orthodoxy and thereby probably to perpetuate its influence into the twentieth century, longer than probably would otherwise have been possible. The Jesuits, by being so closely associated with government circles, were in the midst of this rein- vigoration, which they conveyed to Europe and to Leibniz.

Viewed in terms of the foregoing presentation, the main basis of the valid-

ultimate reality in the Neo-Confucian view, "natural law" refers not to the way nature actually operates, but to the way man postulates it to operate. As such, a change would not refer to altering the way nature operates so much as altering man's conception of that operation.

22 Mungello

ity-and invalidity--of Leibniz's interpretation of Neo-Confucianism does not stem from the point of view of the student who investigates China with a minimal set of preconceptions. Rather, Leibniz's interpretation seems to have been prompted by a certain amount of historical coincidence : the relatively mature thought of Leibniz met Neo-Confucianism, mainly that of Chu Hsi, at a juncture provided around 1700 primarily by the European missionary effort. But the juncture did not make the interpretation possible by simply opening China to Leibniz's view. The Jesuits, through direct contact, seem to have actively forged several of the specific lines of interpretation which Leibniz followed by providing so complementary an interpretation of Neo-Confucianism that Leibniz was led to project many of his own ideas and apparently confirm a large number of them. Consequently, confirmation, not derivation, of his key principles seems to have been what Leibniz sought in China. And this coinci- dental juncture of history seems to have united with Leibniz's own acumen to have produced a surprising amount of validity in the attempt.

East and West seem to have met, then, briefly in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. However, even as they were meeting, the creative tide in China had long before repudiated the thought of Chu Hsi, while in Europe, the front of empirically minded thinkers associated with the Enlighten- ment began rejecting the tutor of Candide.

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Leibniz's Interpretation of Neo-ConfucianismDavid E. MungelloPhilosophy East and West, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Jan., 1971), pp. 3-22.Stable URL:


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1 Leibniz and ChinaDonald F. LachJournal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.Stable URL:

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5 The Chinese Studies of Andreas MüllerDonald F. LachJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 60, No. 4. (Dec., 1940), pp. 564-575.Stable URL:

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