leibniz's idealism and husserl's monadology - michael kook shim

LEIBNIZS IDEALISM AND HUSSERLS MONADOLOGY

A Dissertation Presented

by

Michael Kook Shim

To

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment o f the

Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctorate o f Philosophy

in

Philosophy

State University of New York

at Stony Brook

May, 2003

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State University of New York at Stony Brook

The Graduate School

Michael Shim

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Ph.D. degree, hereby recommend acceptance of the dissertation.

(Dissertation Co-Director)Donn Welton ProfesssorDepartment of Philosophy

(y 'i'i / T*) v 'C iManfred Baum (Dissertation Co-Director) ProfessorDepartment of Philosophy Bergische Universitat Wuppertal, Germany

(Chairperson of Committee) Jeffery Edwards Associate Professor Department of Philosophy

Robert Crease ProfessorDepartment of Philosophy

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School.

The Graduate School

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Leibnizs Idealism and Husserls Monadology

by

Michael Kook Shim

Ph.D. in Philosophy

State University o f New York

At Stony Brook

2003

The dissertation deals with the historical and philosophical relationship between Leibniz and Husserl. The historical focus concerns Husserls own interpretation and understanding of Leibniz as inferred from his logical writings, as well as his appropriation o f the Leibnizian locutions, monad and monadology. The philosophical concern deals with the relationship between epistemology and phenomenology.

In the first portion o f the paper, I address the problems of Leibnizs conceptualism. Towards remedying some of the well-known problems with his conceptual metaphysics, I refer to his largely neglected (in Anglo-American scholarship) writings in epistemology and the philosophy o f mind. I contend Leibniz does provide a theory of non-conceptual content to compensate for some o f the pitfalls o f his conceptualism.

In the second portion o f the paper, I argue for the claim that Husserls own works in philosophical logic and epistemology may be characterized as Leibnizian. I provide historical documentation in support of my view that Husserl enjoyed, in fact, a fairly sophisticated familiarity with Leibnizs metaphysics, which he relied upon in the development o f what he calls formal ontology. I then provide an explanation o f the development o f phenomenology as the discipline concerned primarily with taking care of the sort of non-conceptual content indicated by the limits o f Leibnizs metaphysics. In this light, I go on to provide an explanation o f Husserls own phenomenological monadology.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction. 1I. LEIBNIZ CONCEPTUAL METAPHYSICS 9

1. The Complete Concept 91.1. Propositional Subj ect 101.2. Individuation 171.3. Identity 211.4. Concept and Actuality 28

2. Compossibility and Existence 312.1. Essence and Existence 322.2. Relations 39

3. From Concept to Monad 443.1. Concepts and Forces 463.2. Illusory Dialectic o f Forces 513.3. Monad 58

II. CONCEPT AND ESSENCE 634. Leibniz Idealism 63

4.1. Apperception 654.2. Conceptualism 704.3. Essence and Exigency 774.4. Exigency and Existence 834.5. Confusion and Sensation 85

5. From Concepts to Content 905.1. Concepts 925.2. Essence 1015.3. Evidenz 1145.4. Noesis and Noema 1225.5. Hyletic Data 1305.6. From Ego to Monad 133

III. MONADOLOGY 1386. Body and Unity 138

6.1. Ontological Simplicity of the Monad 1396.2. Unity 1416.3. Monadic Embodiment and Substantial Chain 147

7. Monadic Embodiment 1527.1. Towards a Phenomenological Monadology 1537.2. The Dual-Aspect View 1567.3. The Functional Roles of the I-Can 1617.4. Constitutive Circuit 1667.5. The Objective Self 1737.6. 77ze Concrete Ego Taken In Full Concreteness 1757 .7 .1 and Mine 176

Conclusion. 181Bibliography. 188

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Introduction.In the tradition o f Husserl scholarship, there have been numerous works that deal

with the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and its perceived historical predecessors. The motivation behind such works ranges from the pedagogical to the systematic. By juxtaposing Husserl beside better known historical figures, more recognizably philosophical framework allows for contrasts that can help illuminate aspects o f Husserlian phenomenology as directed towards particular epistemological, ontological or methodological aims established in advance by the classical authors at issue. Systematically viewed, such contrasts aid us in better appreciating the critical force o f phenomenology by allowing us to articulate arguments otherwise barely discernible in Husserls own writings. In his numerous allusions to, and in lectures as well as critical remarks on philosophical precedents, such an historical approach is one encouraged by Husserl himself.1

In this exegetical tradition, the focus has rested on three figures from the early modem era: namely, Descartes, Hume and Kant. The appeal o f Descartes2 is the most obvious. As the discoverer of the modem conception o f subjectivity and consciousness along strict methodological prescriptions and epistemological criteria, Cartesianism readily lends itself to invocation for not only clarifying but, to a large extent, justifying the execution o f the methodological cornerstone of Husserlian phenomenology: the so- called epoche. As the culmination o f British empiricism, and the primary philosophical reference o f late 19th and early 20th century scientific positivism, Hume serves as a kind of muster for descriptive accounts of the emergence and development o f cognitively high-grade concepts in raw sensational experiences. But the greatest historical temptation has been and remains the founder o f transcendental philosophy, the way out of both Cartesian dualism and Humean skepticism: Kant.3

Not only does Husserl especially later in his career, in moments that can only be described as betraying a sharp anxiety o f influence frequently invoke Kant, but his very terminological choices resonate the Kantian vocabulary, encouraging the view that historically Husserl may best be appreciated as a kind o f latter-day Kantian. However, upon closer inspection, even Husserls uses o f Kantian-sounding terms like Anschauung, Apperzeption, Begriff, Erfahrung, transzendentale Subjektivitat, etc., tend to suggest that either Husserl was an especially bad reader o f Kant or he should not be considered especially Kantian at all. For example, all levels (from the empirical to the eidetic) o f Anschauung for Husserl are conceptually saturated precisely in opposition to Kants definition o f that term. For Husserl, Apperzeption need have nothing to do with self-consciousness. Begriff, for Husserl, is inextricably tied up with Wesen or Essenz. Erfahrung is an intentional derivative o f what Husserl considers the more fundamental Erlebnis. Since Husserl denies himself anything constructive like the transcendental deduction, what he means by transzendentale Subjektivitat can enjoy little clarification by recourse to Kants conception.

1 Until the publication of Einfuhrung in die Philosophie, volume 35 of the Husserliana, the two volumes of Erste Philosophie remain exemplary of this encouragement.2 For a recent book-length historical study, see: P.S. Mcdonald, Descartes and Husserl.3 There have been numerous comparative studies o f Kant and Husserl, but the standard remains Iso Kerns Husserl und Kant.

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In the following, I would like to try out a different historical venue. Instead of ancestrally framing Husserlian phenomenology in the context o f Cartesian apodiciticity, Humean psychologism or Kantian transcendental philosophy, I would like to review various aspects o f Husserlian phenomenology in light o f Leibniz philosophy. At face value, since Leibniz has been traditionally viewed as the wildest o f speculative metaphysicians and a gross conceptual reductionist to boot, such historical recourse may appear anathema to anything like the phenomenological project. After all, Husserlian phenomenology has been at the vanguard of the critical dismissal of traditional metaphysics that largely characterizes 20th century philosophy. Moreover, the orientation o f phenomenology around the description o f self-evident experiences must be considered diametrically opposed to the sort o f overwhelming conceptualism of Leibniz logically- rooted metaphysics. Yet, not only does Husserl often invoke Leibniz in glowing terms, and develop his theory of the concrete ego and intersubjectivity in the language of Leibniz monadology, but there is also well-documented evidence o f H usserls deep and sophisticated familiarity with Leibniz philosophy as a whole.

In his report delivered at the 1966 International Leibniz Congress, H.L. van Breda notes three distinct phases of Leibniz influence on the development o f Husserls phenomenology. The first period (1887-1897) is concentrated on Leibniz conception of logic and mathesis universalis. The second period (1897-1905) is oriented around Leibniz Nouveaux essais, which, van Breda claims, may have served as counter-weight to Husserls preoccupation with the empiricists during this period. I n fact, van Breda goes so far as to suggest that Husserls study of the New Essays could have very well been the birth-hour for his own philosophy of reflection.4 Finally, between 1910 and 1925, Husserls interest in Leibniz is focussed on the Monadology, guiding Husserls own monadological reconception o f the concrete ego and the development o f his theory o f intersubjectivity. And, in a letter to Dietrich Mahnke, Husserl even baldly refers to himself as a Leibnizian.5 The point o f my project is to figure out what this allegiance to Leibniz m ay h ave m eant t o H usserl, a nd m ay mean f or h ow w e s hould u nderstand Husserlian phenomenology.

The most obvious aspect of Husserls Leibnizian allegiance comes across in his logical writings, typified by the following from 60 of the Prologomena, where Husserl writes: Among the great philosophers, to whom the conception o f logic presented here recurs... we stand relatively closest to [Leibniz]. Yet, it is in Formal and Transcendental Logic, the presentation o f his more mature views on logical issues, that Husserls Leibnizianism is most clearly evident. The key is to focus on what Husserl from t his p eriod c alls formal o ntology, and t o i nterpret f ormal o ntology i n t erms o f Husserls theory of concepts. The second aspect o f Husserls Leibnizian allegiance is to be discerned in Husserls adaptation of Leibniz language o f the monadology. The purpose o f my project is to clarify both these aspects and figure out whether there is an inherent connection between these two aspects o f Husserls Leibnizianism. To this end, I propose the following three theses on Husserl:

(HI) In his logical writings Husserl endorses an especially stringent form of non- foundational conceptualist epistemology that is, among the philosophical precedents with which Husserl was most familiar, closest in design and purpose to that o f Leibniz. As

4 H.L. van Breda. Leibniz EinfluB auf das Denken Husserls, 142.5 As reported by Cristin and Sakai in their Einfuhrung to Phanomenologie und Leibniz.

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opposed to the sort o f Brentanian psychologism characteristic o f his Philosophie der Arithmetik, the mature Husserl conceives o f knowledge and truth along the principles of identity and non-contradiction centered on the propositional form. In this light, I propose to ascribe to Husserl three correlated philosophical positions that amount to what I will call the no windows-clause. First, in his epistemology Husserl promotes a kind o f eliminativist theory o f reference. For Husserl an object devoid o f predicate-concepts is a formally empty Etwas uberhaupt,' which is epistemologically irrelevant though intentionally responsive. Otherwise, a true proposition does not causally relate to a reference but relate rationally to other true propositions. Second, Husserls theory o f truth may be characterized as a coherentism. Because Husserl denies direct causal contact between thoughts and things, the truth of a proposition is guaranteed not by the object itse lf b u t b y consistency with o ther p ropositions articulated o f the same object. Third, because like in Leibniz, such a theory o f truth is sufficient only for probable truth, the epistemic strength o f such truth per coherence is left in contrast to demonstrative truths o f formal ontology, synthetic but a priori truths o f so-called regional ontologies (of nature, geometry, lived body and consciousness), as well as reflexively self- evident or apodictic propositions pertaining to immanent noetic, hyletic and noematic data. And, like in Leibniz, the veridical brakes of coherence are to be found in assent from cognitively compatible interlocutors. This latter search for veridical brakes, I will go on to argue, is the origin of Husserls concerns with the issue of intersubj ectivity.

(H2) Based on my review in (HI), I go onto characterize the emergence o f Husserlian phenomenology as motivated by the inadequacies o f conceptualist epistemology. In this sense, as Husserl himself frequently claims, phenomenology is a critical enterprise. But critical in this sense does not amount to a rejection. The point I try to make in (HI) is that Husserl fully embraces conceptualism in his theories of (empirical) knowledge and truth. When, in moments o f almost dogmatic rational optimism, Husserl talks about the contact b etween Vemunft and Wirklichkeit, the negotiation o f that contact is an entirely conceptual affair. For Husserl, a scientific theory evolves towards a complete or adequate account o f actuality by little more than internal coherence between quantitatively ever-increasing number o f propositions that make up the theory. However, concepts alone are o f course proverbially empty: they do not suffice for the provision o f material content. Phenomenology is the attempt to make intelligible by eidetic description what Husserl calls pre-predicative or, as I prefer, extra-conceptual experience. Consequently, Husserl needs to draw a sharp distinction between concepts and what he calls essences.

Viewed in this way, we can feel immediately the stress to which French phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and Derrida have been most sensitive. In fact, I think the evolution o f Husserlian phenomenology from a static phase to a genetic and, later, generative phases may be read as a story o f Husserls attempt to deal with this stress. The stress can be summarized briefly as follows: since what can count as intelligible or epistemologically relevant must be conceptually saturated, how can Husserl claim to make intelligible what is stipulated to be extra-conceptual? Critically viewed in Heideggerian language, we might say Husserls epoche enables him to say what he must incessantly deny. Or, as Derrida has put it, Husserl seems to wind up having to write under erasure.

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In static phenomenology, it is customary to speak of Husserls formalization of the extra-conceptual. Husserl treats as serving conceptual roles what are, o f themselves, not conceptual at all. On my reading, Husserls formalization follows from a two-fold strategy. First, the eidetic singularity of intentionality is made intelligible by articulation into its abstract moments. Despite his incessant talk o f intentionality, Husserl r arely t alks a bout i ntentionality a s s uch. Instead, h e p refers t o t alk a bout t he various abstract moments o f intentionality: e.g., ego, cogito, cogitationes, cogitata, noesis, hyle, noema, etc. I think this tendency to avoid dealing with intentionality as such should not be construed an oversight but, to his credit, as Husserls observation of systematic consistency. Based on the strength o f his own arguments, I want to say that for Husserl there is nothing like a concept of intentionality as such. Unlike empirical, regional and categorical concepts (for example, respectively, yellow, scalene triangle, unity), there is no discrepancy between an eidetic instance o f intentionality and its essence. And thats because there is no general concept that may be satisfied by eidetic variation. Whenever I am in an intentional state (i.e., whenever I am conscious at all) Ive exhausted the essence o f intentionality. Further, unlike the concepts of empirical, regional and categorical judgments, there is no normative force to intentionality. One cannot be accused of doing intentionality wrong. Insofar as I m conscious at all, I do it right every time. In contrast, despite the concrete eidetic singularity o f each intentional act each unique like a droplet o f water or, more famously, a snowflakethe moments o f intentionality may be abstracted and generalized. But when thus generalized, as I will argue, we wind up back to the business o f concepts. It is precisely because o f these abstractable conceptual moments of intentionality that the talk of intentionality may be made intelligible at all.

Second, another singular and conceptually incorrigible element is what Husserl calls hyletic data. Why hyletic data may be construed singular and extra-conceptual may be illustrated as follows. Lets imagine a color-spectrum invert who is conceptually normal. For the invert, what would appear to a hyletically normal person as red appears as green. However, because he is conceptually normal, when he sees green he applies concepts associated with red and conversely; thus, he would be as successful w ith color concepts as any hyletically normal p erson. S hould a hyletically normal person be able to get into the inverts head, the hyletic norm can tell the invert that hes doing it wrong. But of course one cant get into another persons head. Consequently, not only is the invert incorrigible, but we couldnt even diagnose the invert as somehow defective or abnormal. Nevertheless, we can conceive o f such abnormality. Such singular, private and conceptually incorrigible elements o f experience are what Husserl calls hyletic data. In turn, Husserl proposes to formalize hyletic data with a functionalist account. In themselves, hyletic data are meaningless or epistemologically irrelevant, but they are as Husserl calls itthe stu ff with which we constitute the (noematic) meaning of (empirical) objects.

(H3) Though epistemologically irrelevant, singular acts o f intentionality and hyletic stu ff are of course, in a sort o f ontological sense, everything. It is, what Merleau-Ponty calls the primordial silence o f being: silent, because, as such, conceptually inarticulable. In the 1920s, Husserl adopts Leibniz language of monadology to talk about what he calls the concrete ego in its full concreteness. As I understand it, Husserls use o f the term monad is his attempt both to compensate for

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the formal emptiness o f conceptually reducible abstract moments o f otherwise singular intentional acts, as well as to reintegrate the conceptually irreducible content o f hyletic data. Thus viewed, Husserls monad does capture everything but then winds up risking intelligibility. Aside from the effect of desperate hand waving through what Maurice Natanson calls the phenomenologists infinite task of nominalist descriptions, the stress o f having to articulate by means o f concepts under erasure is simply exacerbated. To mitigate this risk, I think it helpful to examine Husserls monadology with recourse to the motivation o f Leibniz original formulation.

To fully appreciate the two aspects of Husserls Leibnizianism, I begin by providing a global synopsis o f Leibniz metaphysics. My reconstruction is extensive because o f t he e normous i nfluence exerted o n 2 0th c entury Leibniz s cholarship b y t he groundbreaking works o f Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat. Due to this influence, their common view may be considered the standard position and can be summarized neatly by Couturats claim that Leibnizs metaphysics rests solely upon the principles of his Logic, and proceeds entirely from them.6 The upshot of this position is that Leibniz is not entitled to draw any distinction between causes and reasons and, correlatively, between will and understanding, and things or substances and their complete concepts, etc. Now, both Russell and Couturat promote a critical interpretation: they do not say Leibniz himself did not observe the related set o f distinctions, only that these distinctions do not make any sense given the strength o f Leibniz arguments. As Benson Mates correctly points out,7 regardless o f whether or not he is entitled to them, Leibniz definitely wanted to maintain the relevant distinctions.

However, I think both Russell and Couturat wind up with a somewhat exaggerated logical reductionist interpretation. On point of historical accuracy, Russells virulent suppression o f Leibniz concerns with epistemology and the philosophy o f mind is especially egregious. According to Russell, the esoteric or genuine Leibniz is the author o f the Discourse on Metaphysics', that is, the Leibniz o f the so-called middle period. On Russells view, works like the Theodicy, the Nouveaux essais, as well as the Monadology are all exoteric works o f a courtier designed to win favors, as Russell puts it, especially from princesses. Given the fact that the Theodicy was found offensive by most o f Leibniz contemporaries, if it were to be construed a work o f a politician, we would have to conclude that Leibniz was not much o f a politician at all. The fact that the Nouveaux essais was never published should also give us pause from thinking it a work o f political winks and nudges.

On my interpretation, especially the Nouveaux essais (and other texts from this period) must be considered central to any adequate understanding o f Leibniz philosophy as a whole. In my view, Leibniz general metaphysics or ontologythe theory of possible beings as such cannot be understood without Leibniz special metaphysics, or natural theology and pneumatology. Thats because Leibniz ontology would be formally empty of material content. And there is simply no other text by Leibniz than the Nouveaux essais that provides a thoroughgoing discussion o f the issues o f special metaphysics. In this light, I want to argue, not only was Leibniz entitled to the relevant distinctionsbetween cause and reason, will and understanding and, above all, between

6 Couturat. Logique de Leibnizi, x.7 Mates. Leibniz, 50.

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things and conceptsbut was compelled to maintain them. In support o f my argument, I offer the following three theses on Leibniz:

(LI) Empirical concepts definitive of the individual identity o f any substance enjoy meaning only relative to the complete concept o f that substance. When we say o f Alexander that he is a king, the generality o f the concept king can be illuminated by its applicability to other individuals of which that predicative may be true. For example, Solomon is a king. But precisely because o f this generality, Leibniz in the Discourse calls such predicatives accidental, meaning thereby that they do not suffice for individuation. But later in the Discourse, Leibniz writes: some may ask, from whence it is that this man would assuredly sin? The answer is easy, since otherwise he would not be this man. For God sees at all times that there would be a certain Judas, whose concept or idea of whom God has, contains this future free act (G IV 455). Despite their generality, the removal o f just one accidental predicative from the complete concept o f an individual substance can disrupt the identity o f that substance. Consequently, Leibniz winds up denying the reality o f accidental predicates: forLeibniz, all truly ascribable predicates are essential. I argue in Chapters 1 and 2 that this position, dubbed super-essentialism by Fabrizio Mondadori, entails what I call hypernominalism. On my hyper-nominalist interpretation, all empirical concepts for Leibniz are singular and not general. If the concept king can truly be ascribed to Alexander, then the very meaning of this concept would be relative to the complete concept unique to Alexander. And in terms of empirical concepts, I fully endorse Russells thesis: remove the empirical predicates true o f a substance then we wind up with no individual substance.

However, Leibniz retains the generality o f both categorical and, for the lack o f a better term, what may be described as pneumatological concepts. Thus Leibniz can say things like All substances possess... categorical concepts like unity, individuality, but also pneumatological-concepts like perception and appetition, etc. Because of this diversity in scope between singular (empirical) concepts and general concepts, we may speak of a diversity in levels between empirical propositions and metaphysical propositions in Leibniz. Based on this diversity, I want to say that Leibniz talk of complete concepts pertains only to empirical concepts combined in the individuation of singular substances. In contrast, categorical and pneumatological concepts pertain to substances in general. Thus, against Russell: take away the complete concept o f a substance and you still have something left, only that its no longer individuating. In Chapter 3, I argue for a closer examination o f Leibniz epistemology and philosophy of mind to best understand such general, metaphysical concepts pertinent to all substances.

(L2) In Chapter 4, I go on to discuss Leibniz idealism. I begin by quickly dispatching attempts to reconcile the Leibnizian kind o f idealism with the phenomenal sort promoted by Berkeley. Since for Leibniz there are abstract ideas and concepts somehow more real than sensational appearances, Leibniz could not have viewed phenomena as epistemologically and ontologically fundamental. On the other hand, Leibniz also cannot be considered a strictly conceptual idealist and, thus, a kind of forerunner to Hegel either. Instead, even at the most basic level, Leibniz must admit as de facto irreducible non-conceptual elements. I argue that such concern with the extra- conceptual can be best gleaned in Leibniz talk of primitive truths offa c t such as ones own existence, that one enjoys various thoughts and phenomena, ones own power, etc.

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The point I want to make is that such measures are Leibniz attempts to compensate for the formal emptiness of his otherwise strict conceptualism. In Chapter 5, I gear my discussion o f (HI) to let Husserl critically clarify the limits o f such conceptualism and to open up the discussion o f what may be considered extra-conceptual.

(L3) When the term monad is first introduced in 1695, Leibniz characterizes it as the unity of simple, ideal and soul-like substance (which is how the monad is generally understood) with primitive passive power or materia prima. In Chapter 6 I tackle recent discussions of this aspect in Leibniz metaphysics. Against the grain, I argue for the shift o f focus from trying to come up with reasonable ontological explanations of this characterization o f the Leibnizian monad to an epistemological explanation. Because Leibniz claims that the body is the source o f all confused sensations, yet that we can know with certainty that we undergo confusion, it seems to me Leibniz winds up having to claim that we can know with certainty that we have a body. What we cannot know with equal epistemological strength is that the body we subjectively and irreducibly experience is that body we objectively perceive. Thereby, I propose a kind of dual-aspect view interpretation of the Leibnizian monad: from my subjective perspective, I not only enjoy the exercise o f activity but suffer the consequences o f passivity as well. And, insofar as I am a finite creature, this dual-aspect experience of presumably the same substance is inevitable and, therefore, as certain as any tmth o f fact can be. What I want to say is that, in his own uses o f the term monad, Husserl may have been the first to see this dual-aspect view of the monad at work in Leibniz original formulation.

Accordingly, Husserls Leibnizian allegiance may be spelled out as follows. In his formal ontology, Husserl embraces the epistemological consequences o f Leibnizian conceptualism. The limitations o f such conceptualism in dealing with singularity and hyletic data motivate the phenomenological reduction. Under the reduction, it becomes possible to restore and reform Leibniz talk of spontaneity in terms of constitution. Epistemological activism is articulated by analyzing the role o f concepts in the constitution of meaning. Husserls maintenance o f intentional diversity at every step o f analysis helps him avoid the collapse o f concepts and objects, while the abstractable conceptual moments o f intentionality allows him a certain latitude o f generality. Intelligibility or intellectual shareability is thereby preserved in the phenomenological analysis o f consciousness. In a sense, we may think o f phenomenology as the project o f reintegrating concerns with subjective or mental concerns into the conceptual scheme of objective scientific discourse without, however, risking naturalism or material reductionism. A t the same time, rather than claim some Aufhebung or reconciliation between concepts and the extra-conceptual on the basis o f such reintegration, by allowing intentionality its eidetic singularity and admitting the passive meaninglessness of hyletic data, Husserl retains the extra-conceptual. This segregation without reconciliation, precisely like in Leibniz, is articulated as the inevitable unity from the first-person perspective of conceptual distinctness and sensational confusion, o f activity and passivity, o f the constituting lived body and the constituted corporeal entity. And, exactly following Leibniz, Husserl calls this epistemological diversity unified in the first person perspective the monad. In this light, as the concrete ego in its full concreteness, the monad may be viewed as the integrated system of general concepts,

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the eidetic singularity of their application in intentional acts o f constitution, and the lived body as the source of hyletic data.

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1. The Complete ConceptBroadly speaking, there have been three dominant strategies in the 20th century

for interpreting Leibniz metaphysics. The most influential approach in the Anglo- American world remains the logical-reductionist strategy as promulgated by Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat at the turn of the century. According to this model, Leibniz metaphysics may be more or less reduced as a consequence o f Leibniz subject-predicate logic. The other two approaches may both be traced to Ernst Cassirers Leibniz System in seiner wissenschaftlichen Grundlage, a work contemporary with Russells and Couturats. Especially strong in France as represented, for example, by Martialt Guerault, Michel Serres and, more recently, Gilles Deleuze has been the emphasis on Leibniz dynamics. Under this strategy one points out that Leibniz himself thought of his restoration and reformation of the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms with recourse to physical forces; and, therefore, that Leibniz substance metaphysics may to a great extent be extracted from his dynamics. The third approach is to place emphasis on Leibniz doctrine o f the Ego, which grounds Leibniz very conception o f substance on his epistemological and psychological conceptions of the self.

In the following, I would like to promote the view that Leibniz had two metaphysical systems, which are logically independent o f one another though not mutually exclusive. My two system interpretation may be won by strengthening a set of distinctions that is all too frequently overlooked. Because Leibniz himself was messy and careless about these distinctions, accusing Leibniz o f having conflated the propositional subject, the complete concept and substance itself, remains a persistent temptation. Historically viewed, it is clear that Leibniz himself never intended such a conflation. But the problem is whether he is systematically entitled to maintain the distinctions he does indeed draw. I will argue that Leibniz is entitled to these distinctions, but only by paying the price of rejecting Leibniz intended derivation of substance metaphysics from his dynamics.

The first kind of metaphysics is metaphysics understood in the broad sense, which may be described as conceptualist. The scope o f Leibniz conceptualist metaphysics is open to the entire expanse of the realm of possibilities or Gods understanding. Conceptualist metaphysics is close to traditional metaphysics and, therefore, congenial to logical-reductionist interpretations. In (1.1), I will reconstruct Leibniz conceptualist metaphysics by beginning with Leibniz intensional interpretation of subject-predicate logic then proceeding to the determination of the best o f all possible worlds. In (2), I will show that, once the best o f all possible worlds is conceptually determined, the limitations of conceptualist metaphysics becomes increasingly more evident. Briefly put, conceptualist metaphysics may specify the formal conditions for the actualization o f the best of all possible worlds, but cannot furnish the substantial content o f that best o f all possible worlds. I propose to address these limitations by examining Leibniz deeply problematic predicative-use o f the term existence.

The second kind o f metaphysics is construed narrowly by restricting its scope to the actually existent best o f all possible worlds. This kind of metaphysics Leibniz in the Nouveaux essais callspneumatology, which embraces knowledge of God or natural theology, as well as knowledge o f souls and simple substances in general (NE 57, 329, 326). Pneumatology, as special metaphysics, is concerned not so much with the complete concept of substance but with substance itself. In (3), we will take a look at two

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candidates for pneumatology available in Leibniz. The first candidate is the derivation of metaphysical forces from dynamic forces. Leibniz ontological dynamics recommends itself by virtue of its logical dependence on conceptualist metaphysics. However, this derivation of substance from the behavior of physical forces will be revealed to rest on what I will call an illusory dialectic between two kinds o f forces stipulated in advance to be radically different from one another. On systematic grounds, therefore, ontological dynamics cannot be defended.

The second candidate is a pneumatology restricted to epistemology and philosophy o f mind. Pneumatology rests on the results o f reflective introspection by an Ego of itself; asserting, in turn, this reflective conception o f the Ego as the very model for substances in general. Pneumatology is logically independent o f conceptualist metaphysics. Consequently, proponents o f the logical-reductionist interpretation have shied away from epistemology and philosophy of mind in Leibniz as inconsistent with Leibniz subject-predicate logic. In my view, however, it is precisely this logical independence that recommends pneumatology as preferable to dynamics.

Scholastic m etaphysics adopted and elaborated upon a c onception o f s ubstance stemming from Aristotle. According to this picture, that which qualifies as substantial is what can serve as the proper subject of a categorical proposition. To serve as the proper subject o f a categorical proposition, substance must satisfy two conditions: (1) theconcepts of all the predicates truly ascribable to that substance must be contained in the concept of that substance; and, (2) that substance may not be represented as a predicate- term ascribable to another substance. In other words, substance is to be understood as self-sufficient. Like Spinoza, Leibniz takes up this traditional conception as the departure point for his metaphysics of substance.

Logically, however, any nominative term or noun may qualify as the subject of a proposition. For example, All gold is metal is logically a perfectly acceptable proposition. But the subject term (gold) o f this logically acceptable proposition would not accord with the above definition o f substance, since gold itself may count as the predicate term in another proposition and attributed to another subject term. Consequently, to be in accord with the above definition o f substance, one must also speak of kinds o f categorical proposition. The kind o f categorical proposition that best accords with the above definition of substance is the singular proposition, which are propositions involving individual nominative terms. In general, the best examples o f individual nominative terms are proper names like Alexander the Great, or indexicals like this or I.

Given Leibniz adherence to this definition o f substance, one must also decide on an appropriate logical interpretation of categorical propositions. Categorical propositions may be analyzed under an extensional interpretation or under an intensional interpretation. The extensional interpretation is most appropriate for dealing with the semantic scope o f terms involving universal and existential quantifiers. What is thus suggested is that the subject terms of extensional interpretation are generic and the quantity o f their instantiations is relevant. In turn, the concern with the quantity of instantiations suggests existential import. However, when dealing with singular propositions, the extensional approach is less informative since the semantic scope of an individual term should involve no more than 1 member. When dealing with the subject terms of singular propositions, the analysis o f the concept o f the term that has

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narrowed the semantic scope to a singular individual is preferable. Since, for Leibniz, the primary issue o f metaphysics is substance, and the definition o f substance he accepts accords best with the subject terms o f singular propositions, Leibniz prefers the intensional interpretation (1.11). However, in the following, we must keep in mind that the modem terms extensional and intensional were not available to Leibniz. Thus our u se o f t hese t wo t erms w ill b e 1 argely d etermined b y an exegetical reconstruction based on the distinction Leibniz nevertheless draws and the preference he thereby stakes.

Logically, intensional interpretations o f generic terms are o f course also permissible; but we must keep in mind Leibniz concern with the metaphysical relevance o f logical analyses. The concepts o f generic terms do not suffice for the specification of a singular individual. Such generic concepts, Leibniz occasionally describes as full; however, such generic concepts are not complete. Broadly speaking, what Leibniz calls complete concepts are concepts that include all the properties o f the propositional subject appropriate for qualification as substantial. Insofar as a substance is defined as a singular individual, it is appropriate in this sense to speak o f individuation (1.12). However, following for instance the Frege-Russell theory of description, we may speak of individuation under the extensional interpretation as well. In a true proposition, the extension of a descriptive phrase like the discoverer o f planetary orbit or the victor at Jena and defeated at Waterloo do specify a singular individual. But such extensional relevance would obtain if Leibniz only concern was with individuation. A common way of illustrating the limitations of the Frege-Russell descriptive model o f individuation is the introduction of modal considerations.

When modal considerations are introduced, the concept most successful for interworld individuation is the complete concept o f the subject-term (1.13). In order to illustrate the importance of considering the complete concept in his metaphysics of substance, Leibniz frequently speaks o f counterfactual worlds and substantial identity. In recent American scholarship, the tools o f modem modal logic and possible world metaphysics have been introduced to refine sharply the focus on this particular aspect of Leibniz philosophy. However, to say that Leibniz used modal means to illustrate complete concepts is one thing; but to claim that Leibniz was therefore committed to possible world metaphysics is quite another. Even the texts most frequently invoked by those who endorse this amplified modal interpretation suggest a mere heuristic and polemical use o f modal considerations while avoiding any decisive ontological commitments to possible worlds. A leading clue to the non-ontological orientation of Leibniz modal concerns is that Leibniz could not have been a realist about possible worlds. I will argue that only when an extensional view with existential import is introduced can Leibniz be considered a modal realist; since, however, Leibniz excludes the legitimacy of such a view in his metaphysics, modal realism cannot be entertained as a permissible exegetical option.

In (1.14), I will argue that in the greater context of Leibniz m etaphysics, modal considerations can be shown to play a relatively minor role. My approach stakes a sharp distinction between mere possibility and actuality. I argue that there are two levels of possibility in Leibniz metaphysics: i.e., a logical level o f possibility and an ontological level.1 T he e ntertainment o f t he 1 ogical 1 evel i s a n atural i nclination o f finite r ational

11


creatures that compensates for their epistemological limitations. However, when viewed under the principles of perfection and sufficient reasonwhen viewed speculatively, as it were, through the eyes o f Godmuch o f what may merely be logically possible must be considered, de facto, ontologically impossible.

1.1. Propositional SubjectIn logic, Leibniz prefers the intensional approach as opposed to the extensional.

Broadly put, the extensional approach is oriented around sets or classes, while the intensional approach is concerned with concepts. When dealing with class, semantic considerations are primary. The emphasis in the extensional approach is placed on the reference o f the terms, as well as the quantity o f referred objects subsumable under the classes o f the terms involved. In contrast, emphasis in the intensional approach is placed on predication of the subject and the sense of the terms involved.

Take for instance the affirmative universal proposition, All gold is metal. Under the extensional approach, the proposition may be restated as: For all instances in the extension of gold, the instances also fall in the class o f metal. Viewed in this way, by semantic scope of the class of metal, the extension o f metal may be understood as a whole o f which the extension of gold would be a part. Accordingly, metal may be understood as a genus of which gold is a species. Indeed, it might even be argued that the introduction o f part-whole and species-genus distinctions is of relevance to the extensional approach precisely because o f this emphasis on the quantity, through the categorization, of referred objects.

Correlatively, the extensional approach is implicitly committed to the existence of the r eferred o bjects. Under t he e xtensional approach, s uggested i n t he statement All gold is metal is that instances of gold should exist. Otherwise, the very meaning of the proposition becomes controvertible. Such controvertibility is evident when limit cases, such as unicorn or present king o f France, are considered cases o f terms whose extensions are null. In other words, propositions under the extensional approach must always be regarded as existence claims.

On the other hand, the intensional approach would not be committed to the existence o f the referred object. For instance, a unicorn means a homed white horse, even if the extension of the term should be null. No realist theory o f reference, and an empiricist epistemology, would be warranted. Similarly, under the intensional approach, All gold is metal simply states that the concept o f gold involves the concept of metalregardless o f whether instances specified by that concept should exist. Under the intensional approach, propositions are the meanings of the terms, and not about the things to which the terms refer. According to G.H.R. Parkinson: Leibniz is proposing to treat all universal affirmative propositions... so that the truth o f any such proposition does not depend upon the existence of its subject (Parkinson: Leibniz, 18).

The logical consequences o f Leibniz intensional approach from Elementa calculi from 1679 is worth comprehensive examination. To begin with, a term (terminus) is

'As we will see in greater detail in the next chapter, this distinction we are drawing between two uses o f the term impossible is suggested by Leibniz himself as early as the De summa rerum period: Cf. AK VI iii 463 f.

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either the subject or the predicate of a categorical proposition. A categorical proposition is simply a proposition of the subject-predicate form. Traditionally, there are four kinds o f categorical proposition: universal affirmative, i.e., All A is b" or Vx Fx, universal negative (No A is b or Vx ~Fx), particular affirmative (Some A is b or 3x Fx) and particular negative (Some A is not b or 3x ~Fx). Leibniz later claims, since universal-affirmative and particular-negative contradict one another and the particular- affirmative contradicts the universal negative, negatives can be understood from the

-5 ,

positives and the other way around. Accordingly, Leibniz prefers dealing in most cases exclusively with affirmative propositions; assuming negative propositions can be understood simply by the contradiction of the affirmative propositions.

Leibniz further adds: the categorical is the basis o f the rest, and the modal, hypothetical, disjunctive, and all the others presuppose [supponunt] the categorical.4 Take for example a modal proposition such as All A is necessarily b. According to Leibniz, then, such a modal proposition presupposes the universal affirmative proposition All A is b, with the modal stipulation in all possible worlds constituting the difference. Granting conversio per accidens, what this entails is that the modal proposition in question would also presuppose the particular affirmative proposition, Some b is A. In general, this claim asserts a mainstay o f Leibniz logic: allpropositions are reducible to the subject-predicate form o f categorical propositions.

But 11 hink i t m ay s uccessfully b e argued t hat Leibniz p laces e specially strong emphasis on singular propositions, involving individual terms or what we prefer to call singular subjects. An example of an affirmative singular proposition is, Leibniz was German; an example of a negative singular proposition, Leibniz was not French. For now, I will devote the exposition exclusively to universal and particular categorical propositions.

Above all, what the intensional approach allows is the preservation o f the in-esse principle: i.e., that the concept o f the subject contains the concept o f the predicate (if veraciously ascribed to that subject). This is most evident in universal affirmative propositions. Under the extensional approach, All gold is metal requires subsumption of the subject term (gold) under the extension of the predicate term (metal). The class o f metal objects is the whole, of which the class of gold objects is a part. In contrast, Leibniz recurs to the intensional approach to reverse this order o f subsumption. Every true affirmative universal categorical proposition signifies nothing other than some connection between predicate and subject... namely it is said that the predicate that it is in the subject or is contained in the subject (my italics).5

2 OF 49/1: Terminus est sujectum vel praedicatum propositionis categoricae. Here, signum is to be understood as quantifiers. This is clear from the last sentence o f the next paragraph: Signi varietate accedente, ut vel universalis sit propositio et de omni subjecto intelligatur, vel particularis de quodam (Ibid./2)3 OF 52/8: Itaque patet ex affirmativis negativas intelligi posse et contra illas ex istis. For example: 3x ~Fx z> ~(Vx Fx) or, conversely, 3x Fx z> ~(Vx ~Fx).4 OF 49/2: est autem categorica caeterarum fundamentum et modales, hypotheticae, disjuntivae, aliaeque omnes categoricam supponunt.5 OF 51/7: Omnem propositionem veram categoricam

Accordingly, under the intensional approach, affirmative universal propositions express some subject-predicate relation o f either, respectively, whole-part or whole- whole. Under this approach, in All gold is metal, the term gold does not express a partbut, instead, the term gold expresses the whole; thereby the part-whole relation that would obtain under the extensional approach is reversed. Rather than say that all instances of gold belong under the extension of metal, we say that the concept o f gold includes the concept o f metal. Whole-whole relations, according to Leibniz, obtain in affirmative universal propositions expressing synonymous terms: e.g., All gold is metal melting a t 1 062 C . In this c ase, the concept o f gold contains the concept metal melting at 1062 C. However, since the concept metal melting at 1062 C specifies a natural k ind d e f acto coincident w ith the c oncept o f gold in the actual world, the concept o f metal melting at 1062 C also contains the concept o f gold. Leibniz proposes to address all such cases of co-extension in terms o f whole-whole conceptual relation. Notice, nevertheless, whether whole-part or whole-whole, we are permitted to speak o f a uni-directional containment: more specifically, always the containment by the subject o f the predicate.

However, Leibniz does note that particular affirmative propositions do not easily fit this picture o f subsumption. For instance, in Some metal is gold, the subject term cannot be considered the whole under the proposed analysis. Particular affirmative propositions, under the intensional approach, appear rather to express a part-whole relation between, respectively, subject and predicate. To accommodate this discrepancy, Leibniz proposes an epistemological distinction between absolute regard and a relative regard o f the concepts involved. Leibniz writes:

Nevertheless a distinction in containment is obtained between the subject o f a universal and a particular proposition. The subject o f a universal proposition regarded in itself and comprehended absolutely must contain the predicate, so the concept [notio] o f gold regarded in itself and absolutely comprehended involves the concept o f metal. That the concept of gold is the concept heaviest metal. But in affirmative particular propositions, it is sufficient that the thing follows i f some thing is added [to the subject]. But the concept o f metal absolutely regarded and in itself comprehended does not involve the concept o f gold; and then is something added involved, namely the particular sign... (my italics).6 The relative regard, accordingly, compels the preservation o f the grammatical

structure of an affirmative particular proposition. In an affirmative particular proposition like Some metal is gold, if the subject (metal) is nevertheless to be regarded as containing the concept o f the predicate term (gold); then some particular sign must be added. From paragraph (1), we know that such a signi.e., a quantifierby itself cannot qualify as a term. But such a sign added to a proper term may qualify an extensional part as an intensionally proper subject. In other words, the subject in Some metal is gold is to be seen as not merely metal but some metal, since the concept of

6 OF 51/7: Discrimen autem est in continendi modo inter subjectum propsositionis universalis and particularis. Nam subjectum prositionis universalis in se spectatum et absolute sumtum debet continere praedicatium, ita auri notio per se spectata et absolute sumta metalli notionem involvit. Nam notio auri est metallum ponderosissimum. . Sed notio metalli absolute spectata et in se sumta non involvit auri notionem; et ut involvat addendum est aliquid. Nempe signum particulare...

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metal absolutely regarded... does not involve the concept of gold. What the particular sign or the existential quantifier allows is the treatment o f the part (metal) as a wholetherewith narrowing the scope of the generic extension o f metal to a species of metal implicitly co-extensive with the extensional scope of the predicate term (i.e., gold); and, consequently, preserving the in-esse stipulation that the subject must contain the predicate. In this particular case, the intensional meaning of gold specifies the extensional scope to be narrowed by some metal. Thus in paragraph (18), Leibniz writes:

[I]n affirmative particular propositions it is not necessary that the predicate be in the subject as such and regarded absolutely to be in it, or that the concept o f the subject as such contains the concept o f the predicate, but it suffices that the predicate is contained in some species o f the subject or that the concept o f some exemplar or species o f the subject contain the notion o f the predicate; even if it be not be expressed what kind the species may be.7Viewed absolutely, however, the concept o f metal must be contained in the

concept of gold. Without a quantifier specifying a narrower semantic scope, the concept o f the genus metal is to be integrated into the concept of the species gold. Either way, the primary concern is the preservation of the in-esse principle. This primary concern may be seen more clearly once L eibniz coordinates the part-whole distinction with the distinction between, respectively, genus and species.

Above we noted that, under the extensional approach, part and whole may be coordinated respectively with species and genus. For example, under the extension of metal belong not only gold but also silver. The term metal signifies the extensional whole o f which both the classes of gold and silver are parts. If metal is then regarded as the genus, we can claim that gold and silver are species o f metal. However, under the intensional approach as endorsed by Leibniz, this intuitively straightforward coordination between part-whole on the one hand and species-genus on the other would not obtain:

Two terms containing each other but not coincident are commonly called genus and species. As component concepts or terms (as is viewed here by me), these differ as part and whole, so that the concept o f genus should be the part, concept o f species should be the whole [my italics], since [the latter] is composed of the genus and a differential [element]. For example, the concept o f gold and concept o f metal are distinguished [not respectively] as part and whole; for in the concept o f gold is contained the concept of metal and something besides, e.g., the concept o f the heaviest among metals. Thus, the concept o f gold is greater than the concept o f metal.8

7 OF 55/18: ... in Propositione affirmativa particulari non est necesse ut praedicatum in subjecto per se et absolute spectato insit seu ut notio subjecti per se praedicati notionem contineat, sed sufficit praedicatum in aliqua specie subjecti contineri seu notionem alicujus speciei subjecti continere notionem praedicati; licet qualisnam ea species sit, non exprimatur.8 OF 52-3/11: Duo Termini sese continentes nec tamen coincidentes vulgo appellantur Genus et Species. Quae quoad notiones seu terminos componentes (ut hoc loco a me spectantur) differunt ut pars et totum, ita ut generis notio sit pars, speciei notio sit totum: compoinitur enim ex genere et differentiae. Exempli causa Notio auri et notio metalli differunt ut pars et totum; nam in notione auri continetur notio metalli et aliquid praeterea, exempli causa ponderosissimi inter metalla. Itaque notio auri est major notione metalli.

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Accordingly, metal is indeed the genus o f which gold is a species. However, genus is coordinated with part and species with the whole. Leibniz explanation being that the concept o f the species contains the concept o f the genus and a differential element that distinguishes that particular species from all the other species o f the genus: i.e., what would distinguish gold from silver despite both belonging to the common genus metal. Extensionally viewed, the classes of both gold and silver belong within the extension of metal. Talk o f species as opposed to genus makes sense at all since the whole o f the genus (metal) is divided into parts that constitute the species. Instead, however, Leibniz incorporates the differential element into the concepts o f the species involvedthereby enhancing the concepts o f the species over against the concept of the genus. In paragraph (12), Leibniz concedes the strangeness o f his preferred approach, which seems to have appeared even to him as confusing.9 Regardless, Leibniz goes on to write:

In the School something else is said, regarding n o t the concepts but exemplars subsumed under universal concepts. Thus metal is said to be wider than gold, so that more species are contained than gold; if we seek to count the individuals of gold on the one hand and individuals o f metal on the other, there would be more o f the latter than the former, such that the former should be contained in the latter as the part o f a whole... However I preferred to regard universal notions or ideas and their compositions, 5 ince these do no t rely on the existence ofindividuals. Thus, I say that gold is greater than metal since more is required in the notion of gold than in metal, and it is more work that produces gold than just some metal (my italics).10As already noted, Leibniz prefers the intensional approach because it allows him

to avoid c ommitment to dealing w ith existential import as would b e implied b y the extensional approach.11 But why? Once again, we must emphasize Leibniz commitment to the in-esse principle, a commitment determined less by Leibniz logic and more by his metaphysics as we will see in greater detail in (1.14).

Let us take another look at the affirmative universal proposition All gold is metal under the extensional view. Within the extension o f metal belong various classes of metal. Disregarding metals other than gold, we isolate the class o f existent

9 Thus, at the end o f Elementa calculi, Leibniz expresses reservations of having introduced the genus- species distinction at all: OF 57.10 OF 53/12: In scholis aliter loquuntur, non notiones spectando, sed exempla notionibus universalibus subjecta. Itaque metallum dicunt esse latius auro, nam plures continet species quam aurum; et si individua auri ab una parte et individua metalli ab altera parte numerare vellemus, utique plura essent haec illis, imo ilia in his continerentur ut pars in toto... Vemm malui spectare notiones universales sive ideas earumque compositiones, quia ab individuorum existentia non pendent. Itaque dico aurum majus metallo, quia plura requiruntur ad notionem auri quam metalli, et majus opus est aurum producere quam metallum qualecunque...11 Robert Merrihew Adams writes: There are well-known difficulties in maintaining the validity o f thetraditional inferences in the square o f opposition [in the table o f categorical propositions], under anextensional interpretation, if the subject or the predicate concept (or one o f their complements) has anempty extension, because of the way in which the truth o f the propositions, extensionally interpreted,depends on the existence o f individuals satisfying (or not satisfying) the concepts. Leibniz could justify all the traditional inferences, under his intensional interpretation, without assuming anything about the actual existence of individuals, but assuming only that the subject and predicate concepts (and their complements) are consistent (and hence possibly exemplified) (Adams: Leibniz, 63).

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instances o f gold. We can then speak of various subordinate kinds o f exemplification: i.e., jewelry, paint, dust, nuggets, bars, etc. Isolating gold jewelry, we can speak of further exemplications: i.e., earrings, necklaces, bracelets, etc. This procedure ofisolation o f classes and specification o f relevant objects can be continued until we arrive at a particular piece o f gold necklace belonging to a particular individual, whom we will call John. Assuming John owns only one piece o f gold necklace, we can say that the class o f g old n ecklaces b elonging t o t his p articular Jo hn h as 1 m ember. R egardless, extensionally viewed, this 1 member class is itself a member among countless members o f objects subordinated under the extension o f metal. Intensionally viewed, however, the concept o f metal per se does not include the concept o f Johns 1 gold necklace. On the other hand, Johns 1 gold necklace includes in its concept not only the concept o f metal b ut t he c oncept o f gold a s w ell a s a 111 he d ifferential e lements t hat h ave narrowed its extension to 1 member. According to this proposed schema, we can say that the narrower the scope o f extension the greater the intension o f the concept and conversely.

Now Leibniz does not deny the validity o f extensional logic; Leibniz merely prefers the intensional approach.12 What we are suggesting is that Leibniz preference appears determined by his concern with substance metaphysics. Extensional logic can successfully specify the only member of an isolated class but restricts the discourse to quantity, unless recourse be taken to greater genera. Extensionally regarded, a unique class like Johns gold necklace expresses only a quantity. However, should recourse be taken to greater genera, then the membership would be less specific. For Leibniz, in other words, genera like metal are what he calls accidents or accidental properties which do not suffice for individuation. Since these genera do not suffice for individuation, such generic terms cannot qualify as substantial.

Recourse to conceptual discourse as provided by intensional logic, on the other hand, incorporates the differential elements o f specification as predicates into the concept of the subject. For instance, Johns gold necklace includes in its concept all the elements that distinguish it from other necklaces, other kinds o f gold, other kinds of metal, etc. While preserving this schema, we can of course increase the number of differential elements as well as the number o f diverse genera, thereby inversely and proportionally expanding the concept. If that concept can be augmented to the infinite, then that concept can qualify for candidacy as the concept o f an individual subject; i.e., that concept qualifies as the concept of a substance. The concept o f a substance, Leibniz calls the complete concept. Or, as Leibniz himself elsewhere puts it: I f that concept should be complete, or from it a reason can be given fo r all the predicates o f the same subject to which this concept may be attributed, such would be the concept o f an

1 Tindividual substance, and conversely.''

1.2. Individuation

12 OF 53/12: .. .hac quidem observatione adhibita, et characteribus accommodatis possent omnes regulae Logicae a nobis demonstrari alio nonnihil calculo quam hoc loco fiet; tantum quadam calculi nostri inversione.. .Nostrae itaque et scholarum phrases hoc loco non quidem contradicunt sibi, distinguendae sunt tamen diligenter. Caeterum in loquendi modis nihil a me sine quadam ratione atque utilitate innovari, patebit considerandi. The scholastic approach referred to is the extensional approach.13 OF 403: Si qua notio sit completa, seu talis ut ex ea ratio possit omnium praedicatorum ejusdem subjecti cui tribui potest haec notio, erit notio Substantiae individualis. et contra.

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Concepts may be viewed epistemologically: we cognize objects, events, properties, etc. by using concepts. Logically viewed, concepts constitute the linguistic meaning o f terms, and make possible the determination of truth by the relation of these terms. Concepts are nothing more than the propositional content o f judgments bearing truth-value, as opposed to sentences that linguistically express concepts. According to Leibniz, propositions are either always o f the subject-predicate form or reducible to the subject-predicate form. Moreover, in a true proposition, the concept o f a subject must contain the concept o f the predicate. This is the in-esse principle, a cornerstone of Leibniz metaphysics.

In a proposition like Gold is metal, we say the concept o f the subject (gold) contains the concept o f the predicate (metal). However, gold is itself a generic term. Viewed extensionally, we may claim that the extension of gold includes all instances of gold, but can specify no particular instance o f gold. Nor, intensionally regarded, can the concept o f gold suffice to specify any individual entity either. Furthermore, the concept o f gold may be intensionally contained by a more specific concept, like gold necklace or Johns gold necklace, etc.

What then would qualify a concept adequate as a complete individual concept? An example Leibniz offers is the concept o f Alexander the Great (DM 8). Traditionally, one draws the distinction between accidental or chance properties and essential properties or properties whereby something is what it is.14 Leibniz restores this distinction while placing emphasis on essential properties. As we will see in the next chapter, however, Leibniz uses the term essential in two related but different senses. In the present Chapter, I will be concerned with just one use o f this term. According to Leibniz, an essential property is a predicate that can specify an individual in the actual world. An accidental property, on the other hand, is a generic term that does not individuate. Notice, nevertheless, that an essential property is capable o f specifying an individual in the actual world regardless o f whether viewed extensionally or intensionally. Yet, despite success in individuation (in the actual world), a single essential property is certainly not exhaustive o f the concept o f that entity thus individuated.

In the concept o f Alexander the Great is included the predicate o f being a king. In the extension of the genus king is, however, a plurality o f diverse individuals; thus, the predicate o f being a king does not suffice for individuation. In other words, the predicate of being a king like the predicates o f bom in 336 B.C. or being a Macedonian is an accidental property o f Alexander the Great. In contrast, the predicate of being the conqueror o f Darius and Poms does specify an individual. However, though Alexander the Great can thus be specified by the predicate conqueror of Darius and Poms, this essential property is o f course not exhaustive o f the concept of Alexander the Great; since Alexander the Great was more than just the conqueror of Darius and Poms. Once again we see the metaphysical limitations o f extensional logic.

Leibniz calls a complete concept the sum total o f predicates truly ascribable to a substance.15 Thus are included in the complete concept both essential and accidental

14 Cf. Woolhouse II/Mittelstrass, 58.15 OF 520: Notio completa seu perfecta substantiae singularis involvit omnia ejus praedicata praeterita, praesentia ac futura (original italics). Fabrizio Mondadori, however, disputes this formulation

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properties. Taken singly, as noted, the distinction between accidental and essential properties rests on individuation. Essential properties can specify an individual, but accidental properties cannot. Nevertheless, as suggested by C.D. Broad (Broad: Leibniz, 2 If.), a combination of accidental properties can specify an individual. For example, take the following three accidental properties: king, Macedonian and bom in 336 B.C. As accidental, none o f these properties alone would suffice for individuation.16 Moreover, these predicates are logically independent o f one another: i.e., the concept o f king includes the concept o f neither Macedonian nor bom in 336 B.C.17 All three properties taken together, however, do specify Alexander the Great. By virtue o f such specification, this combination o f accidental properties also contingently entails in the actual world all the other properties o f Alexander the Great. For example, if Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C., then also sired by Philip o f Macedonia, etc. Following C.D. Broad, any such set of accidental properties whose combination specifies an individual, we will call a nuclear sub-set o f the complete concept.

C.D. Broad then goes on to the following set of claims: (1) a nuclear sub-set would suffice to distinguish an individual, not only from every other actual individual, but also from every other possible individual; (2) a selection o f propositions which is non-nuclear may suffice to distinguish an actual individual from all other actual individuals, or to distinguish a possible individual from all other possible individuals which belong to the same possible world; and, (3) a non-nuclear set o f propositions does not entail all the other predicates which belong to the actual Adam, and it does not suffice to distinguish the actual Adam from all other possible individuals (Broad: Leibniz, 21). We will deal with these three claims individually.

(1) A nuclear sub-set o f properties, e.g., Macedonian king bom in 3 36 B .C., does specify an individual in the actual world, since under the extension o f things that are king, Macedonian and bom in 336 B.C. would be a single actual member. Thus this nuclear sub-set does distinguish the individual from every other actual individual.

(Woolhouse I/Mondadori, 257ff.). Invoking in favor of his interpretation Leibniz letter to the Landgrave o f Hessen from May 1686, where Leibniz says on na qua prendre ensemble tous les predicates primitifs pour former la notion complete dAdam suffisante pour rendre raison de tous les phenomenes appertenans a Adam, ( G I I44: my italics) Mondadori claims Leibniz definitely rejected the view that a complete concept is made up of all o f the properties possessed by the individual exemplifying it. Borrowing from Margaret Wilson, Mondadori prefers to equate complete concept with core set o f properties, meaning a cluster of properties which would suffice for the entailment o f all the other properties. However, Mondadoris orientation as we will shortly see is rooted in individuation under an implicitly extensional commitment. Notice, in the passage Mondadori cites, that Leibniz endorses the consideration o f the primitive predicates constitutive of the Wilsonian core set o f properties sufficient to deduce from it everything that is ever to happen to him. Thus Leibniz use o f complete concept here is relative to the desired function. However, absolutely regarded, all the predicates would be required to speak accurately o f a complete concept. Thus, in a marginal note in the July 1686 letter to Amauld, Leibniz adds: Notio plena comprehendit omnia predicata rei... fnotio] completa, omnia predicata subjecti. . (G I I49: my italics).16 It might be argued, however, that two o f these properties combined specifically, king bom in 336 B.C.does factually individuate. But such predication would be predicated on a specific ignorance o f the actual world, suppressing historically unrecorded instances o f kings contemporaneous with Alexander the Great, who may also have in fact been bom in 336 B.C. Instead, we are assuming total qua divine knowledge of actual states of affairs, leaving room for factually contemporaneous kings.17 The extension o f king would, of course, contain at least 1 member who fits the bill; but under extension, this 1 member could not be specified by king.

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However, it is not as clear whether such a nuclear sub-set distinguishes the individual from every other possible individual as well. Continuing with our example, in order for distinction from every other possible individual, it would have to be shown that no possible individual can be Macedonian king bom in 3 36 B .C. and no t e ntail a 111he other properties of Alexander the Great. But we can imagine a possible world in which the government o f Macedonia was a duarchy, whose two kings happen to have been bom in the same year, but only one as the sire of Philip. Given such a counter-factual scenario, our nuclear sub-set would suffice for specifying Alexander the Great in the actual world, but not in the given counter-factual world. To be fair, Broads argument follows from a normative criterion o f what he is calling a nuclear sub-set, such that should a set of properties not suffice for distinguishing an individual from every other possible individual, then that set cannot qualify as nuclear. However, under such unrestricted m odal d emands, i t w ould t hen b e d ifficult t o s ee h ow a nuclear s ub-set could be anything other than a complete concept.

(2) From above, if Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. cannot distinguish an individual from every other possible individual, then Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. cannot be considered nucleardespite its individuating success in the actual world. Thus, Broads claim that a selection o f propositions which is non-nuclear may suffice to distinguish an actual individual from all other actual individuals would hold for our example. However, it is again unclear how such a non-nuclear selection o f properties can then distinguish a possible individual from all other possible individuals which belong to the same possible world. In our duarchical Macedonia, the two possible individuals in the same possible world would not, in fact, be distinguished from one another by this non-nuclear selection. At this point, it may be argued that our Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. does not qualify as the sort o f non-nuclear selection of properties that Broad is talking about either. A further stipulation may be required, e.g., a sire o f Philip. However, given our example, Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. sired by Philip would then qualify as a nuclear sub-set. If further disqualified by Broads criterion as in (1); then, as in (1), it is unclear in the consideration o f possibility what the difference might be between a nuclear sub-set and a complete concept.

(3) If Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. is non-nuclear, then Broad would be wrong; since, this non-nuclear selection does in fact, by virtue o f individuation, entail all the o ther p roperties o f t he a ctual i ndividual t hus s pecified i n t he a ctual w orld. If o ur example should qualify as a nuclear sub-set, however, it would still not suffice for interworld individuation as required by Broads normative definition.

It appears Broad has confused entailment in the actual world with possible entailments in counter-factual worlds. Broads formulation o f the nuclear sub-set appears well-suited for individuation in the actual world by a cluster o f combined accidental properties. However, given Broads normative criteria, what would best function as a nuclear sub-set in trans-world individuation is a complete concept. For individuation in the actual world, all that is needed is either an essential property (e.g., conqueror o f Darius and Poms) or a variably individuating set o f accidental properties (e.g., Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C.). In contrast, for inter-world individuation, all the properties of the individual both accidental and essentialwould be required. For instance, though the property of being a king is accidental, it becomes essential for distinguishing the actual Alexander the Great from possible individuals who may to

20


varying degrees share with the actual Alexander the Great many o f the same properties. For two individuals sharing the exact same properties except the property o f being king (and all the properties logically entailed by the possession o f that accidental property), may be possible. The doctrine that maintains that the complete concept is essential for inter-world individuation has come to be known as super-essentialism.

1.3. IdentityIn Discourse 30, Leibniz somewhat lackadaisically notes: some may ask, from

whence is it that this man would assuredly sin? The answer is easy, since otherwise he would not be this man. For God sees at all times that there would be a certain Judas, whose concept or idea o f whom God has, contains this future free act (my translation and italics).18 The implication is super-essentialist. Were we to abstract from the concept o f Judas the subsidiary set of the property treachery and all properties entailed by this propertythen, according to Discourse 30, the identity o f Judas can no longer be preserved. Accordingly, every property in the concept o f Judas is essential to the identity of Judas. Switching to another of Leibniz examples, according to this position, should Adam not have sinned, such a counter-factual individual would not be Adam.

Yet, in Leibniz letter to Amauld from July 14, 1686, Leibniz appears to deviate somewhat from this super-essentialist position. In this letter, Leibniz speaks o f an infinity o f possible Adams (G II 54: my italic); adding that, in speaking o f a plurality of possible Adams, Leibniz means some possible individuals who all share a finite number of predicates (Ibid.) with the actual Adam. However, as merely purely possible substances, the concepts o f these possible individualsthe number o f whose predicates is finitewould not suffice for the determination o f an actual individual. In other words, the concepts o f possible individuals are not complete.19 As bearers o f incomplete concepts, such individuals have no other reality than that which they have in the divine understanding, and in the active power o f God.20 Nevertheless, Leibniz then goes on to claim, should we reject such entertainment of possibilitieswhich enter naturally into the mind (G II 55) we would be compelled to surrender contingency and freedom. In light o f Leibniz otherwise clearly super-essentialist position, what are we to make of such statements?

Among some more recent American scholars, this issue has received a great deal of attention. One notable approach to this issue, as represented by Fabrizio Mondadori, takes recourse to a variation of David K. Lewis counterpart theory.21 Roughly put, Lewis counterpart theory states that for any individual in this22 world there exists a

18 G IV 455: Mais dira quelque autre, dou vient que cet homme fera asseurement ce peche? La reponse est aisee, c est quautrement ce ne seroit pas cet homme. Car Dieu voit de tout temps quil y aura un certain Judas dont la notion ou idee que Dieu en a, contient cette action future libre.19 G II 54: Cela est vray, quelque nombre fini de predicats incapables de determiner tout le reste quon prenne, mais ce qui deterine un certain Adam doit enfermer absolument tous ses predicats, et c est cette notion complete qui determine rationem generalitatis ad individuum.20 Ibid.: ... quils nont point dautre realite, que celle quils ont dans lentendement divin, et dans la puissance active de Dieu.21 Cf. D.K. Lewis, Counter/actuals, pp. 85ff.22 As we will shortly see, no easy equivalence between this world and the actual world obtains for Lewis, since what would appear to us in this world as a merely possible world must be for Lewis just as actual or real as this world.

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similar individual in another world; thereby lending meaning to counterfactual modalizations. Intensionally interpreted using Leibnizian terminology, this inter-world similarity may be understood as significant sharing o f properties in the respective concepts o f two (or more) individualswhich may even include the sharing o f the same proper name to warrant closeness in identity; yet without their complete concepts being identical to one another. According to Mondadori, Leibniz was not only a super- essentialist, but also adopted a primitive version o f counter-part theory thus described above to make room for the entertainment o f possible individuals.

Mondadori begins by distinguishing between what he calls the variable sense of an individual substance and its constant sense (Woolhouse I/Mondadori, 23Iff.). For our purposes, I want to think of variable sense as meaning that subsidiary cluster of both essential properties (that singly can specify an individual in the actual world) and Broads nuclear sub-set o f combined accidental properties. Accordingly, extensionally viewed, the variable sense o f an individual substance is more than sufficient for the individuation o f an entity in the actual world. On the other hand, Mondadoris constant sense is interchangeable with what we have been calling the complete concept, which is sufficient for distinguishing an individual from all other possible individuals. I would like to further note that Mondadoris use of the Fregean term sense belies Mondadoris preference for the extensional approach. Thereby, Mondadori implies individuation of existents by an adequate description relative to the context o f either the actual world or possible worlds.

Stressing the significance of the theological profile in Leibniz consideration of concepts, Mondadori claims: he [Leibniz] seems to have held... that all o f a given individuals properties are essential to him (Ibid., 237). Though systematicallyas applied in the actual worldthe Frege-Russell descriptive model o f nominal individuation w ould hold for variable sense, Mondadori correctly notes that Leibniz always insists God cognizes individuals using their complete concepts23 (Ibid., 234ff). Nevertheless, since for actual world individuation the variable sense proves sufficient, the fact that Leibniz should thus insist on the relevance o f complete concepts warrants according to Mondadori an expansive examination of modal considerations. That is, the question should read: What suffices for individuation between not only different actual entities but between possible entities as well? The answer, contra Broads suggestion, is the complete concept.

Now, beforeproceeding, I want to note the difference between the extensional and intensional approaches, while keeping in mind that Leibniz preferred the intensional approach. Given existential import for affirmative universal propositions under the extensional approach, it may be said that the Frege-Russell model o f actual world individuation is extensionally applicable, but intensionally unimportant. The fact that a component (i.e., either an essential property or a nuclear sub-set) o f variable sense should successfully individuate is determined by the facts of the actual world, one of whose members just happen to fit in the extension thus specified. However, I believe Leibniz adherence to the intensional approach signals what he views as necessary for actualization. For Leibniz, in order to qualify for actualization, substance must possess a complete (and, a foritori, infinite) concept. In this sense super-essentialism follows from

23 E.g., FC 179ff., D M 8, etc., as we have abundantly dealt with in (1.2).

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Leibniz commitment to the intensional approach, preferred by virtue o f its metaphysical preservation of the in-esse principle; following thus far, however, without modal import. The fact that modal individuation should be consistent with this view is as a rider to Leibniz commitment to the intensional approach; and not, as Mondadori appears to believe, the other way around.

Nonetheless, based essentially on this systematic consistency, Mondadori imports Lewis counter-part theory as his main strategy for interpreting Leibniz metaphysics. Accordingly, Mondadori claims that whenever Leibniz speaks o f a plurality o f possible individuals (e.g., a plurality of possible Adams'), Leibniz is talking about inter-world counterparts. Given super-essentialist inter-world individuation, an alteration o f any single one o f an individuals properties would entail not only a different though similar individual, but a different though similar world24. Thus, strictly speaking in terms of identity, in a world where the said individual should not possess a property viewed under super-essentialism as essential for the constitution o f its identity, that individual would not exist (Ibid., 239). Instead, in the place of that individual would exist a similar but essentially different counterpart in an essentially different world. The point is, for Mondadori, the class described by the complete concept is required just because that would allow the only extension specific enough for picking ou t an existent i ndividual from possible worlds. In turn, this would then suggest that whatever description as comparably complex as such an extensional description would isolate an existent individual, whether in this world or otherwise. For Leibniz, however, inter-world individuation is merely a logical side-effectthough Leibniz probably found it a

0 Sfortuitous side-effect of his ontological commitments.The most general problem with Mondadoris above interpretation is its

implication that Leibniz was a realist about possible worldswhich was clearly not the case. For Leibniz, I will argue, since it is not permissible to adopt any version o f the counter-part theory without commitment to modal realism, Leibniz could not have endorsed even a primitive variant o f the counter-part

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