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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 24, Number 3, July 1986,pp. 343-357 (Article)

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Leibniz's Doctrine of the Striving Possibles

C H R I S T O P H E R S H I E L D S

LEIBNIZ'S DOCTRINE OF THE STRIVING POSSIBLES, t h a t all t r u e possibilities de- m a n d existence and will exist if not prevented, strikes the modem reader as perplexing, if not perverse. Nonetheless, Leibniz invokes the doctrine of the striving possibles frequently and in key passages. He regards it as directly relevant to the creation of the actual world, * the contingency of the actual world,* the compossibility of substances, s and indeed, to God's existence. ~ The doctrine of the striving possibles, however, seems plainly inconsistent with a number of Leibnizian principles. For example, Leibniz maintains that God freely chooses to create the maximal compossible set of potential sub- stances. Also, Leibniz subscribes to the Aristotelian principle that only an actually exisdng being can cause a potentially exisdng being to exist in actu- ality; if possibles demand and become actual without the agency of some actual being, Leibniz seems to have flatly contradicted himself. It is certainly a challenge to attempt to render Leibniz consistent. But it is a rewarding task, for in the process of deciding whether or not Leibniz is consistent, one begins to unravel a supremely subtle metaphysical system, a system in which the doctrine of the striving possibles plays a central role. In the final analysis, Leibniz does not need to be rendered consistent so much as understood.

I . T H E FIGURATIVE VIEW

David Blumenfeld's "Leibniz's Theory of the Striving Possibles ''5 is easily the best discussion of some of the problems revolving around Leibniz's doctrine.

i See Leroy, E. Loemker, ed., Philosophical Papers and Letters (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel Publishing Co., 1969), 648.

' See Loemker, 488. See Loemker, 158.

4 See Loemker, 167. David Blumenfeld, "Leibniz's Theory of the Striving Possibles," Studia Leibnitiana 0973):

163-77, reprinted in R. S. Woolhouse, Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, 77-99. All references are to the latter pagination.

[343]

344 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 24:3 JULY 1986

Blumenfeld attacks these problems directly and advances a clear, intelligent, and initially persuasive solution. Accordingly, his view deserves careful con- sideration. Though in the final analysis I disagree with Blumenfeld's main solution, I find a great many of his suggestions quite insightful.

Blumenfeld begins by citing some of the important evidence for Leib- niz's doctrine of the striving possibles. The first comes from one of our most important sources for Leibniz's views on creation and the theory of the striving possibles, On the Ultimate Origin of Things: "We ought first to recognize that from the very fact that something exists rather than noth- ing, there is in possible t h i n g s . . , a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence: in a word, that essence tends of itself towards existence. Whence it further follows that all possible t h i n g s . . . tend by equal right towards existence, according to their quantity of es- sence or reality, or according to the degree of perfection which they con- tain . . . . Hence it is most clearly understood that among the infinite combi- nations of possibles and possible series, that one actually exists by which the most of essence or of possibility is brought into existence. ''6 In addition to this, Blumenfeld also cites the following passages: "Everything possible de- mands that it should exist, and hence wilt exist unless something else pre- vents it, which also demands that it should exist and is incompatible with the former; and hence it follows that that combination of things always exists by which the greatest possible number of things exists . . . . And hence it is obvious that things exist in the most perfect way. ''7 "And as possibility is the principle of essence, so perfection or degree of essence (through which the greatest number is at the same dme possible) is the principle of existence. ''s

Based upon these passages, Blumenfeld correcdy ascribes six theses to Leibniz: 9 (1) all possibles tend toward existence (each "has an impetus to exist"); (2) this impetus is direcdy proportionate to the degree of perfection in the possible; (3) all possible worlds contend with one another for actual existence; (4) there is a unique compossible set which has the greatest thrust; (5) the inevitable result of this struggle is that the best possible world (the maximal set of compossibles which exhibits the highest degree of order with the greatest variety) realizes itself; and (6) without (1)-(5), there would be no actual world. In addition to these six theses, Blumenfeld notes tht Leibniz

e C.J. Gerhardt. Die phil~ophi~chen SchrifWn urn G.W. ~ (Berlin: Wiedmann, t 875-9o), 7: 3o3--08; Cf. Loemker, 487 .

Gerhardt, 7: 194. 8 Gerhardt, 7 : 3 0 5 . g (1)-(6) are paraphm~. See Blumenfeld, 77"

DOCTRINE OF THE STRIVING POSSIBLES 345

conceives o f the r ea lm o f the possibles as existing in the mind of God, TM and admits this as a background condi t ion to ( I ) - (6) .

B lumenfe ld focuses on the a p p a r e n t inconsistency between the doctr ine o f the str iving possibles and the f ree creation o f the actual world. Leibniz vociferously mainta ins that God freely chose to actualize the maximal set o f compossible potent ia l substances. Yet the doctr ine o f the striving possibles explains the existence of actual substances in te rms o f their own exigency. Ei ther the best possible world exists as a result o f its own internal striving to exist, o r God, an external force, c rea ted it. T h e two explanations of the existence o f the actual world a p p e a r mutual ly exclusive. Hence, if Leibniz is commi t t ed to both, he is internally inconsistent.

Some c o m m e n t a t o r s on Leibniz, Lovejoy in particular, 1' agree that these two explanat ions o f the world's existence are incompatible. Hence, they re- ga rd Leibniz as embrac ing an inconsistency and as a Spinozistic necessitar- Jan. I f the possibles do have an intrinsic drive toward existence, and do not r equ i re any extrinsic causal agent , G o d and creat ion are r ende red irrele- v a n t ? ' I f one subscribes to the doc t r ine of striving possibles, the maximal set o f compossibles exists o f its own impetus . Hence , God 's free choice, and ipso facto cont ingency for the actual world, are no longer applicable.

Th is r a the r un fo r tuna t e in te rpre ta t ion of Leibniz results, according to Blumenfe ld , f r o m adop t ing a literal r a the r than figurative r ende r ing o f the doc t r ine o f the str iving possibles. H e himsel f follows Rescher in adopt ing a f igurative in terpre ta t ion . ~s I t is not as if the striving possibles really tend toward existence, or really exist if u n i m p e d e d . Rather , Leibniz is simply speak- ing metaphor ica l ly in saying that essence tends toward existence. T o say that potent ia l substances d e m a n d to exist is to say that certain substances a p p e a r at tractive to God. T h a t is, each possible world expresses a "degree of attrac-

'~ Blumenfeld, 79. ,1 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1936), chap. 5; reprinted in Harry Frankfurt, I2ibniz: A Colltction of Critical Essays (New York: Anchor, 1972), 281-334. All references are to the latter pagination.

~" See Lovejoy, 320. ~s Nicholas Rescher, The Philosophy of Leibniz (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Humanities Press,

1967) ~9-3o: Anyone adopting a literal interpretation "misconceives the issue badly, for it is only because God has chosen to subscribe to the standard of perfection in selecting a possible world for actualization that possible substances come to have a (figurative) 'claim' to existence. The relationship between 'quantity of essence' or 'perfection' on the one hand and claim or conatm to existence on the other is not a logical linkage at all--a thesis which would reduce Leibniz's system into a Spinozistic necessitarianisrn---but a connection mediated by a free will on the part of God." Rescher repeats this view in Leibniz: An Introduaion to his Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 33, and in "Leibniz on Creation and the Evaluation of Possible Worlds," Leibniz's Metaphysics of Nature (Dodrecht and Boston: D.Reidel Publishing Co., t981 ), 3"

346 J O U R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF.PHILOSOPHY 24:3 JULY 1986

t iveness . . , to the divine will." The maximal compossible set presents itself to God as the best possible world; God, in accordance with his free choice to sub- scribe to the Principle of Perfection (viz. God's free decision to realize as much perfection as possible) chooses to actualize it. On Blumenfeld's figurative reading, the maximal compossible set does not literally strive for existence. It simply, as it were, calls God's attention to itself, inasmuch as it contains the highest degree of perfection, and hence attractiveness to the divine will.

There are at least two advantages to the figurative reading, as Blumen- feld notes. First, while it would not be surprising that Leibniz occasionally contradicts himself given the sheer volume of his writings, it would be odd for him to fail to notice a tension between the doctrine of the striving possibles and God's free creation. For Leibniz quite regularly mentions the two theories in tandem. For example, in the Principles of Nature and Grace, Leibniz claims: "It follows from the supreme perfection of God that he has chosen the best possible plan in producing the universe, a plan which com- bines the greatest variety together with the greatest order . . . . For as all possible things have a claim to existence in God's understanding in propor- tion to their perfections, the result of all these claims must be the most perfect actual world which is possible. Without this it would be impossible to give a reason why things have gone as they have rather than otherwise. TM

Blumenfeld suggests that unless we are to regard Leibniz as utterly inept, we should not regard him as overlooking the obvious contradiction given rise by this passage, that is, the contradiction which follows from understanding the doctrine of the striving possibles literally. Hence, it is most charitable to regard the doctrine of the striving possibles figuratively. Second, the figura- tive reading provides a method for resolving the apparent conflict between the doctrine of the striving possibles and God's role in creation. On the figurative reading, the maximal compossible set presents itself to God as the best possible world. God, in accordance with his choice to subscribe to the Principle of Perfection, actualizes this set. Thus, on the figurative reading, the doctrine of the striving possibles is intelligible and God has a role in creation. Moreover, though this is not mentioned by Blumenfeld, on the figurative reading there is no discord between the doctrine of the striving possibles and Leibniz's claim that only an actually existing being can actualize a potentially existing being. Hence, the figurative reading is a good deal more attractive than the literal reading; the latter ascribes internal inconsis- tencies to Leibniz while the former interprets him as both consistent and interesting.

24 Blumenfeld cites part of the passage cited here, as well as Loemker, 648 and Gerhardt, 7: 3o9-31o.

D O C T R I N E OF T H E S T R I V I N G P O S S I B L E S 347

Even so, there are compelling reasons for regarding Leibniz as advancing the doctrine of striving possibles quite literally. Indeed, when properly under- stood there is no inconsistency between the doctrine of striving possibles and other Leibnizian doctrines. I shall substantiate these claims only after con- sidering a final feature of Blumenfekt's argument. For, once we are clear about the problem in the last of Biumenfeld's arguments, we shall be pre- pared to understand why we need not and should adopt a figurative reading.

After discussing whether Leibniz actually defines 'existent' in terms ofcom- possibility, Blumenfeld turns to an attack on the literal interpretation of the doctrine of striving possibles. He presents "what must be regarded as the most serious difficulty for the literalist or necessitarian interpretation. '''~ Given the six theses which characterize the doctrine of the striving possibles (plus the background consideration), it should be the case, according to the literalist that (5) turns out to be necessary. For if one is a literalist, and hence a necessi- tartan, the actual world is necessary, and so (5) should be necessary on the basis of (t)-(4). If thesis (5) asserts that the maximally perfect world exists necessarily, then it does not follow from theses (a)-(4). Recall thesis (2): the impetus of a possible is directly proportionate to the amount of perfection that possible contains. Hence, if something exists necessarily, it must have enough impetus (viz. perfection) to secure its existence as necessary.

But, as Leibniz frequently maintains, only God's essence contains exis- tence; hence, only God has enough impetus (viz. perfection) to exist neces- sarily. No possible world is absolutely perfect. Even the best possible world is imperfect in some regard? 6 That is, Leibniz accepts a Limitation Principle. Now, (1)-(4), taken together with the Limitation Principle, do not entail the necessary existence of the actual world, i.e., that (5) is necessary. For (2) establishes that only a possible world with absolute impetus to exist does exist absolutely, or necessarily? v Thus, if one is to avoid attributing a non sequitur to Leibniz, one must accept the figurative reading or reject the Limitation Principle. As Blumenfeld proceeds to demonstrate, rejecting the Limitation Principle is not possible within a Leibnizian framework.

2. PROBLEMS FOR THE FIGURATIVE VIEW I should begin by admitting that I am one of those who, according to Re- scher, misconceive the issue badly. It seems to me that Leibniz does intend the doctrine of the striving possibles to be understood literally: each of the

~ See B l u m e n f e l d , 85. in See Loemke r , 647 , # 4 ~ - 4 5 . ,7 B l u m e n f e l d does not supply a reason for suppos ing that absolute existence implies neces-

sary existence. P r e suma b l y he is war ran ted in m a k i n g this inference on the basis o f passages like Loemker , 158.

348 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 4 : 3 JULY 1986 many times he advances the theory, he states it flatly, directly, and without qualification. We need to examine why Leibniz maintains this doctrine, not merely note that he does and at tempt to rescue him from its alleged unto- ward consequences. Once we unders tand Leibniz's reason for adopt ing this doctrine, its peculiarity diminishes.

Inasmuch as I shall be advancing a literalist interpretation, it is incum- bent upon me to respond to Blumenfeld 's argument. There is, I believe, a fatal flaw in his reasoning. T h e structure of Blumenfeld's argument , in its simplest form, is this:

~. The literalist interpretat ion implies necessitarianism. 2. But if the actual world is necessary, (5), unders tood as a necessary truth,

should follow necessarily f rom (1)-(4) and the background consideration. 3. (5) does not follow necessarily f rom 0) - (4 ) and the background

consideration. 4. Therefore , we either reject the necessitarian interpretation, and hence

the literalist interpretat ion o f the striving possibles, or attribute a non sequitur to Leibniz.

5. We should not attribute a non sequitur to Leibniz unless we must; and we need not since we have a plausible alternative which makes the argu- ment sound.

6. Therefore , we should reject necessitarianism, and hence the literalist interpretat ion o f the doctr ine o f the striving possibles.

The flaw should be evident. T h e a rgument works only if the first premise is true. In addition, premise (3), Blumenfeld's main contribution, contradicts (i), his unsuppor ted assumption. It is clear that (3) is true and was recog- nized as such by Leibniz. Consequently, it is open to Leibniz to reject (1) as being false, as he in fact does.

First o f all, Blumenfe ld himself gives no reason to believe that the first premise is true. When he advances the argument , he simply uses the terms interchangeably: "We come now to what must be regarded as the most serious difficulty for the literalist or necessitarian interpretation." Further, he says, " . . . the most crucial question [is] whether or not thesis (5) should be unders tood to mean that the most perfect universe exists of necessity. The l i t e ra l i s t . . , maintains that it should be so understood . . . . " What Blu- menfeld has here is a most effective a rgument against Lovejoy, who does maintain that Leibniz advances the doctrine of the striving possibles as a literal doctrine and that this commits him to necessitarianism. But this argu- ment does not scathe one who maintains that Leibniz advances the doctrine literally, but that this does not commit him to Spinozistic necessitarianism.

Now, it is not as if Blumenfe ld makes a simple oversight. As far as one

D O C T R I N E OF T H E S T R I V I N G P O S S I B L E S 3 4 9

can tell, he takes it as a given that the literalist interpretation implies necessi- tarianism. Blumenfeld would not be the first commentator to do so. He cites Russell and Rescher favorably when each advances the view that the literalist interpretation commits Lcibniz to necessitarianism. Rescher takes this to show that the literalist reading must be false, while Russell concludes that Leibniz is a closet necessitarian. But I cannot see that any of these views is correct. Leibniz repeatedly claims that possible substances exist necessarily if, and only if, existence is contained in their complete individual concepts (i.e. existence belongs to their essence). Only God enjoys this position. Leibniz explicitly denies existence to the essences of all substances except God? s The striving possibles tend toward existence, but not all of them exist. Only the maximal compossible set exists: "The actual universe is a collection of all possibles which exist, i.e. those which form the richest composite. ' '9

It will be objected immediately that it is not open to anyone to deny that a literalist interpretation implies necessitarianism. That is, if Leibniz really believes that the maximal compossible set strives for existence and will exist if unimpeded, then he must secretly believe that existence belongs to its essence. It is surely not enough to assert that this is the case (which is what Russell and Rescher seem to do). Indeed, as I conceive a Leibniz's project, he is attempting to demonstrate that certain substances strive for and obtain existence without having existence as part of their essence. That is just to say, Leibniz is trying to account for the contingency of the actual world in terms of the doctrine of the striving possibles.

Before spelling this out, I would like to advance two further objections to the figurative interpretation advanced by Blumenfeld. The first is not a definitive objection, but nonetheless, should not be overlooked. Leibniz re- peatedly invokes the doctrine of the striving possibles, and advances it as if h e meant it quite literally. Though he is quite capable of using metaphors and speaking hyperbolically, what is the evidence that he is doing so here? There is no textual evidence for such a claim; Rescher and Blumenfeld have been compelled to reinterpret Leibniz's doctrine on a principle of charity. That is a fair enough principle of exegesis and criticism, but their position would be considerably stronger if they were able to produce some passage which gives an indication that Leibniz did not mean the doctrine literally. As things are, Leibniz simply says:

Everything possible demands that it should exist, and hence will exist unless some- thing prevents it. "~

~s See Loemker, 2o3: "I use the term 'contingent ' , as do others, for that whose essence does not involve existence."

~9 Loemker, 662. �9 o Loemker, 487.

35 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 24:3 JULY 1986

[T]here is in possible things, a certain exigency of existence, tl To exist is nothing other than to be harmonious; the mark of existence is organized sensation. 2s (The best possible world) will exist unless something prevents it? s And just as we see liquids spontaneously collect in spherical drops, so in the nature of the universe the most capacious (max/me cain.x) exists. ~4

These passages come f r o m d i f fe ren t per iods in Leibniz's philosophical devel- opmen t . In each, Leibniz s imply states or suggests the doctr ine o f the striv- ing possibles quite literally wi thout embel l ishment . We migh t do well to see if we can make sense o f the doct r ine as stated by Leibniz.

These citations do not p rove that Leibniz intends the doctr ine o f the striving possibles to be u n d e r s t o o d literally; they do, however, s t rongly sug- gest it. T h e r e is one f u r t h e r passage which seems to require that we unde r - stand the doct r ine literally. Leibniz 's definit ion o f existence seems to be incontrovert ible evidence that he does mainta in the doctr ine o f the striving possibles quite earnestly. An existent thing is "that which is compat ible with more things than any o the r which is incompat ible with it." This most assur- edly is o f fe red as a def in t ion o f existence.

Blumenfe ld , fol lowing Curley, has a t t e m p t e d to explain this definit ion in te rms o f the context in which it occurs. I mysel f cannot see how the context helps their case; indeed, it seems to h inde r any figurative in terpre ta t ion of the doct r ine o f the s t r iving poss ib les . In the passage in which the definit ion is advanced, Leibniz is o f f e r ing key definitions and explanat ions of pr imit ive terms. I t is here, m o r e t han anywhere , that he wants to be as crystal clear and precise as possible abou t the meanings o f the te rms he uses. One would expect h im to qualify this defini t ion in some way if he did not mainta in it in a literal sense, in o r d e r tha t his readers not be misled. As things are, he does not. '5

Moreover , even if we allow that Leibniz advances this definition some-

"' Loemker, 79 I. "" Loemker, 158. �9 a Gerhardt, 7: 194. �9 4 See Gerhardt, 7: 29o, #so. These passages could be multiplied. Cf. Loemker, 157, G.

Grua, Textes intdits d'apres manasc~.s de la Bibliotl~que provimiale de Hanovre (Paris: Bibl. de phil. contemp., z948), 303, and G. H. R. Parkinson, Le/bn/z Ph//~oph/ca/ Wr/t/ngs (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Litdefield, 1975) z39-4o where Leibniz claims: "For just as all things that are possible with equal right tend towards existence in proportion to their reality, so in the same way all weights with equal right tend towards descent in proportion to their gravity; and just as in the latter case there results motion involving the greatest possible descent of the heavy bodies, so in the former case there results a world involving the greatest production of things that are possible."

"s We see Leibniz defining his terms over and over again in his correspondence, particu- larly in response to criticism. See Loemker, ~o3, and 661 in Leibniz's letter to Louis Bourguet.

DOCTRINE OF THE STRIVING POSSIBLES 351

what tentatively, an explanation of its being advanced at all is still required f rom those maintaining a figurative interpretation. Blumenfeld's account of this definition is this. A problem for the figurative interpretation is that Leibniz actually seems to define existence in terms of maximal compossibil- ity. But that definition is somewhat tentative; Leibniz is simply trying it on for size. Hence, it need not create any problems for the figurative interpre- tation. I cannot see this. The fact that Leibniz even considers advancing this definition is enough to demonstra te how seriously, and literally, he main- tains the doctrine o f the striving possibles? ~

3" LEIBNIZ 'S MOTIVATION

It is easy enough to suppose that Leibniz advances the doctrine of the striv- ing possibles as a literal doctrine. It is a good deal more difficult to deter- mine if the literal interpretat ion is actually consistent with the creation and contingent existence of the actual world. As I have mentioned abovc, Leib- niz's official doctrine is that only substances whose essences contain existence exist necessarily. The problem, then, is to see if Leibniz is able to character- ize contingent but actual substances without allowing their essences to con- tain existence. Perhaps the best way to determine whether or not Leibniz is successful is to see why he maintains the doctrine of the striving possibles. Tha t is, we must examine the role of this doctrine in his metaphysical schema.

The most concise and explicit explanation of the importance of the doc- trine can be found in Leibniz's A Resume of Metaphysics. This short work, as Parkinson ~7 points out, is something of a summary of On the Ultimate Origin of Things. At least one thing becomes clear in the Resume: Leibniz does not merely assert that possibles have an exigency for existence. He views it as a natural consequence of a number of principles in his metaphysical system.

�9 s Blumenfeld maintains: "Once we abandon the view that Leibniz gave a true definition of existence, various words and phrases that seemed to require a necessitarian interpretation now appear more or less neutral" (85). As I argue below, the issue of necessarianism is not involved here at all.

�9 7 Parkinson, a45; Gerhardt, 7: 289. In this section 1 provide a number of very specific reasons why Leibniz maintains the doctrine of the striving possibles. In addition, there seem to be a number of general teleological motivations. In this respect, Leibniz is not alone in mainta- ing the doctrine. Aquinas, for example, believes that all possibles strive for existence (De Veritate, p. 21, art. 2, reply). Aquinas often claims that Aristotle holds it as well (citing such passages as Phys. I 9, x99a22), though it is not clear that what Aristode says entails or even suggests the doctrine. The general teleological motivations for the doctrine constitute another discussion. The present points are just that Leibniz is not alone in maintaining the doctrine (and hence, is not as peculiar as some commentators suppose), and that maintaining the doctrine poses no special threat to the contingency of the actual world. Also irrelevant to my present concern is Leibniz's position on modal realism; he can maintain the doctrine of the striving possibles without ipsofacto commiting himself to some version of modal realism.

352 J OURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 4 : 5 JULY I 9 8 6

The main points o f the beginning o f the work can be summarized as follows:

i. The re is some reason in Nature why something rather than nothing exists (91).

2. The need for such a reason is a consequence of the principle of suffi- cient reason (91).

3- This reason must be a real entity since it is a cause (92). ,s 4. This entity must be necessary, insofar as it contains its own cause (i.e.,

existence belongs to its essence) (92). 5- There is, therefore, a cause of existence over non-existence; the neces-

sary being is by-existing-a-maker (existent/fic/ans)'9(w 6. The cause which makes something exist, or (makes) possibilities de-

mand existence, also makes everything possible have an urge (conatus) to exist (95)-

7. Therefore , it can be said that everything possible is existence-desiring (existiturire) s~ (96).

The reason why (7) is said to follow from (1)-(6) is that the possibles are founded on the necessary being, namely God. Thus, Leibniz sees a direct connection between the principle o f sufficient reason, God's existence, and the doctrine o f the striving possibles.

What exactly is this connection? God is at least a necessary condition for all actual existence. God makes (fac/t) all possibles strive for existence (6). But why would God do this? Th e reason is clear: God subscribes to the principle o f sufficient reason. As Leibniz says, " . . . a reason for restricting it (i.e., the desire to exist) to certain possibles in the universe cannot be found (ratio restrictions is ad certa possibilia in universali repiriri non possit). ''3' As Leibniz often maintains against the Cartesians, God's will is independent o f his un- derstanding. God himself is not accountable for which possible worlds exist as possibilities; he merely makes it such that the best possible one does exist in actuality. This is just what Leibniz says here: God makes all possibles strive for existence (fac/t etiam ut omne possibile habeat conatum ad Existentiam.) 32 On account of God's agency, all possibles desire to exist (Omne possibile Existitur- ire)) s The possible world which actually does exist is the one with the highest

�9 s Notice that in #2 of this work Leibniz denies any meaningful distinction between causa- tion and explanation. In his view, what explains x is x's muse.

�9 9 Leibniz has here, apparently, coined a word from exist/re (to exist) and facere (to make). so This is another apparent coinage; Leibniz simply adds a desiderative ending to exist~re. s, Gerhardt, 7: 289. s. Ibid. ss Ibid.

D O C T R I N E OF THE S T R I V I N G POSSIBLES 3 5 3

degree of perfection, which is a function of the degree of reality each world contains. Hence, the maximal compossible set, the best possible world, exists in actuality.

Thus we see the centrality of Leibniz's doctrine of the striving possibles. It follows from: (1) the fact that some contingent substance exists, (2) God's necessary existence, and (3) God's free choice to subscribe to the principle of sufficient reason. Unless Leibniz maintains some one of these three doc- trines figuratively, he must maintain the doctrine of the striving possibles literally.

In the other direction, Leibniz infers a great deal of his metaphysical system from the doctrine of the striving possibles. If all possibles were corn- possible, all possibles would exist, s4 But they cannot all be compossible if there is to be contingency for the actual world, s5 Now, it follows from the fact that all possibles strive for existence that "there exists that series through which the greatest amount exists, or the greatest possible series. ''36 What does exist, then, is simply the maximal compossible set of striving possibles: "There exists therefore, that which is most perfect, since perfection is noth- ing other than the quantity of reality. ''s7 The existence of the actual world, according to Leibniz, is a direct result from: (x) the fact that all possibles strive for existence, (~) that there is a series through which the greatest amount of reality exists, or a maximal compossible set, and (3) degree of perfection is degree of reality, s8

Finally, we can now see why Leibniz often says that nothing is added to the complete individual concept of an existing individual, even though exis- tence does not belong to the essences of contingent substances. Existence, as Curley has suggested? 9 is simply a supervenient property. Leibniz says: "Ex- istence is conceived by us as having nothing in common with essence; but this cannot be so, since there must be more in the concept of a thing which exists than in that of one which does not exist, that is, existence must be a perfection, since all that is explicable in existence is being an ingredient of the most perfect series of things. ''4~ This passage occurs in a discussion of position, and Leibniz goes on to say, "In the same way we conceive position

See Gerhardt, 7: 289. ~5 See Leibniz's letter to Arnould, Parkinson, 59.

See Gerhardt, 7 : ~ 9 ~ Whether or not Leibniz is justified in making his inference de- pends upon: ( l ) the identity of indiscernibles (in some formulation), and (a) the impossibility of there being two or more equally perfect compossible sets. This is, of course, the subject of another inquiry.

s7 Gerhardt, 7: 29o: "Ex~t/t ergo perfectissimum, cure nihil aliud sit quam quantita~ realitatis." ss See Leibniz's letter to Eckhard, Loemker, 177. s9 E. M. Curley, "The Root of Contingency," in Frankfurt, 86. 40 Parkinson, x34.

354 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 24:3 JULY ~986

as something extrinsic, which adds nothing to the thing posited. ''4~ Thus, existence does not belong in the essences of contingent individuals; nonethe- less, an individual exists in virtue of the compatibility of its essence with that of the greatest number of other individuals.

4. S T R I V I N G P O S S I B L E S , C O N T I N G E N C Y , AND C R E A T I O N

The claim that the doctrine of the striving possibles, interpreted literally, entails Spinozism conflates two related but logically distinct issues: the issue of contingency and the issue of God's status as a creator (by inferring that if possibles really do strive for existence, then God cannot mediate between the various possible striving worlds in creation). Accordingly, it will be useful to treat these issues separately. If it is true that Leibniz intends the doctrine of the striving possibles literally, how is there room for contingency? I cannot here undertake to defend Leibniz's account of contingency in any general way. But it is incumbent on me to show that no special problem about contingency arises from Leibniz's subscribing to the doctrine of the striving possibles interpreted literally.

On the view endorsed by Rescher and Blumenfeld, one accounts for the contingency of the actual world in terms of God's unnecessitated choice to subscribe to the Principle of Perfection. On the account I have proposed, God freely subscribes to the principle of Sufficient Reason, and, conse- quently endows all possible worlds with an exigency for existence. These two explanations are similar in that each accounts for contingency in terms of God's unnecessitated choice to subscribe to a principle which induces him to create the best of all possible worlds.

But, it might be objected, there is an important difference between these two accounts, and a difference which undermines a literal interpretation of the doctrine of the striving possibles. Leibniz repeatedly complains that the Cartesians fail to distinguish between God's intellect and will. According to Leibniz, the realm of possibles, qua possible, is independent of, or prior to, God's will; God does not decide which possible worlds are possible, But if possible worlds have a desire to exist just because of God's agency, then the divine will seems involved in determining the intrinsic properties of possible worlds. Hence, the independence, or priority, of the realm of the possibles is undermined. But on the figurative reading of Rescher and Blumenfeld, God does not make the possibles strive as such; rather, in virtue of his unnecessi- tated subscription to the Principle of Perfection, he actualizes the best. God's choosing to subscribe to this principle does not involve him in determining the intrinsic properties of the realm of the possibles, and so does not under-

4~ Ibid.

DOCTRINE OF THE STRIVING POSSIBLES 355

mine their independence from his will. Therefore, one might conclude in line with their argument, the figurative interpretation is superior to the literal interpretation: the latter, but not the former, is inconsistent with Leibniz's clear distinction between God's will and intellect.

This argument is unconvincing for two related reasons. First, when Leib- niz distinguishes between God's intellect and will, he is interested in main- taining that God does not determine what possibles worlds there are. God does not will that this or that world is possible. By endowing all possible worlds with an exigency for existence, however, God does not will that any given world is possible; on the contrary, he brings it about that one world, the best, is actual. Second, it is not clear that having an exigency for exis- tence counts as an intrinsic property of any given world. As we have seen, Leibniz argues that existence is a supervenient rather than intrisic property. Similarly, Leibniz may well believe that a conatus for existence is a super- venient rather than intrinsic property of a given world. Hence, the doctrine of the striving possibles, interpreted literally, does not undermine Leibniz's distinction between God's will and intellect. Therefore, it poses no special problem for contingency: interpreted literally or figuratively, the doctrine of the striving possibles does not require the necessary existence of the actual world as long as its existence is mediated by a free decision on the part of God.

But if God does endow all possible worlds with an exigency for existence, and the best world emerges as actual, can we still say that Leibniz's God is a creator? Leibniz's own discussion of God's role in creation is very slim. In- deed, he once says that though it is clear that all monads were created by God, "we cannot understand how this Was done. ''4" Nonetheless, he does hazard a suggestion from time to time. In particular, Leibniz sometimes says that "God has admitted [the actual world] into existence" (emphasis mine). 43 More importandy, he says quite explicitly in his Refutation of Spinoza, "It is true that we must not speak otherwise of things created than that they are permitted by the nature of God. TM So it seems that Leibniz envisages a rather passive role for God in the creation of the actual world.

As we know, GOd makes all possibilities have an impulse (conatus) toward existence, since he subscribes to the principle of sufficient reason. 45 That is just to say that GOd gives impetus toward existence to all possibilities in equal measure. God knows that the maximal set will express the greatest degree of

4, See Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, eds., New Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, a982), 443.

4s See Loemker, 582. See Refutation lnkdite de spinoza, edited by A. Foucher de Careil, (Paris, 1854 ), 2~.

43 See Gerhardt, 7:289 #5.

356 J O U R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 24:3 JULY t986 perfection, since as much reality as possibly can exist will exist, and perfec- tion is just the degree of reality. But God himself does not pick this particular potential Adam over some other potential Adam and then create him. Rather, the existent Adam, just as the possible but non-existent Adam, has an impetus to exist. But the existent Adam is a member of the maximally compossible set exhibiting the greatest degree of variety. This explains why the actual Adam exists: an existent is a being which is compatible with most others (Existens esse Ens quod plurimis compatibile est.) 46

But how, ultimately, is God the cause of the actual existence of one possi- ble world, and hence one Adam, over another? If all the complete individual Adams (though of course each must differ in some regard) 47 strive for existence which equal fervor, but only one actually exists on account of its degree of compossibility, it does not seem proper to say that GOd creates one particular Adam.

There are two ways to respond. First, GOd conceives of all possibles, so he is at least a necessary condition for the existence of any actual being. Further GOd himself endows the possibles with their exigency toward existence. God, an actual being, willingly subscribes to the principle of sufficient reason. I f he did not, he might, on a whim, have endowed only some portion of the possibles with an exigency toward existence. But given his free choice, and his decision to actualize potentialities, he endows all possibilities with an exigency toward existence. Thus, God does create the actual world, since: (1) the realm of the possibles is dependent on God, and (2) God makes them strive for existence. The existence of the actual world is contingent since God might not have chosen to subscribe to the principle of sufficient reason, or might not have decided to create any substances at all? 8

It is not as if the possibles, qua possibles, strive for existence by their own agency while God passively spectates, as Rescher, Russell, and Blumenfeld seem to suggest. Rather, all possibles strive for existence, quite literally, by the agency of GOd. Hence, there is no conflict between the Aristotelian principle that no potential being exists in except by the agency of

46 See L. Couturat, opuscu/ts etfragm*~ inkdits de Leibniz (Paris, a9o3), 376, #73. 47 Clearly Leibniz has a bit of a problem talking about the number of possible Adams since

each one is disdnct and there is no transworld identity. Nonetheless, he advances a precursor to a counterpart theory in his correspondence with Arnauld, where he refers to the various Adams sub ratione gen~ralitatis, Parkinson, 55-

48 In his correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz suggests that God has a choice to create or not to create substances (Parkinson, 59). It is a pressing, thought quite distinct, issue as to whether God can have free choices to create the world, subscribe to the principle of perfecdon, subscribe to the principle of sufficient reason, etc. I wish to point out, however, that my suggesdons for contingency here work just as well as Rescher's and Btumenfeld's suggestion that God freely subscribes to the principle of perfecdon. These issues must be resolved on independent grounds.

D O C T R I N E OF T H E S T R I V I N G P O S S I B L E S 357

some actual being and the doctrine of the striving possibles. Therefore, our original dichotomy, viz., that either the doctrine of the striving possibles is to be understood figuratively or God has no role in creation, dissolves. For possible worlds really do strive for existence, but only as a consquence of God's endowing them with an exigency for existence.

Alternatively, one can characterize God's role in creation in the following way. We have seen above 49 that Leibniz does not drive a wedge between causation and explanation as many contemporary philosophers are inclined to do. Thus, Leibniz is prepared to allow omissions to stand in causal relations. ~~ As the possibles, by God's agency, strive for existence, a certain maximal compossible set emerges. In accordance with his perfection, God does not prevent this set from existing, since he desires the greatest degree of perfection, which is a function of the amount of reality. Thus, God's permititng or "admitting" a certain possible world to exist in actuality is the proper explanation and cause of the universe. For the cause is nothing other than the real reason (Nihil aliud enim causa est, quam realis ratio). Thus, we see why Leibniz feels at his ease in claiming that God created the actual world even though it "is true that we must speak otherwise of things created than that they are permitted by the nature of God. TM

University of Arizona

49 See n. ~8 above. 50 See, for example , New Essays, 181. 5, I a m pleased to t h a n k Carl Ginet, Alan Wood, Michael Woods, and two a n o n y m o u s

referees for the Journal of the Histo~ of Philosophy for their c o m m e n t s on their draf ts o f this paper .