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Little Egg Harbor TownshipRichard Buzby, Chief, Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey, Police Department

LittleEggHarbor(LEH)isabayfrontcom-munity that connects with the Atlantic

Ocean in the Little EggHarbor Inlet. NotsincethefamousMarchStormof1962hadthis area suffered anything like what wastocome in2011and2012.Hurricane Irenemade landfall in the township in 2011butwas, inmanyways, as counter-productive

intheresponseexperienceaspectasitwasotherwise. For example, the mandatoryevacuations directions were heeded bymost,butintheendwerebasicallynotnec-essaryforthe“flop”theeventturnedouttobe.Insomeways,however,adverseaspectsofthateventturnedouttohaveabeneficialeffect on our preparedness for Sandy. Forexample,weconsideredtheresponsebytheAmerican Red Cross (ARC) to Irene sub-standard,but, in the interimbetween thenand Hurricane Sandy, we had substantialinteractionwith them, and this interaction

Hurricane Sandy devastated communities throughout New Jersey, with much of the most devastating destruction occurring in coastal communi-

ties. In Ocean County alone, 40,000 buildings were damaged by the storm’s winds and floodwaters, and the county suffered nearly half the damage recorded throughout New Jersey, according to the Federal Emergency Man-agement Agency.

The local law enforcement response from agencies throughout the state to this natural disaster and its aftereffects was nothing short of heroic. While it is not possible to recount all of their stories, a few examples of their efforts, and the collective efforts of local law enforcement leaders through the agency of their State Police Chiefs Association, will give just a small but representative example of the work done to safeguard the public by local law enforcement during this unprecedented event in New Jersey.

Law Enforcement’s Response to Natural Disasters

turnedouttobeverypositiveinpreparingfor, and responding to, Sandy.The lack ofeffectivecommunicationsalsobecamequiteevidentduring Irene,andafledgling localattempttousesocialmediainemergencieswasborn.

Lead-up to the EventAsweon theEastCoast anxiously fol-

lowedthewell-documentedlead-uptothearrivalofSandy,landfallsomewhereinourarea became a certainty, and preparationsbegan—slowlyatfirstandtheninahurriedmanner.HavinglearnedfromIrene,wehadallresponseorganizationspreparereadinessTO&Es (tables of organization and equip-ment)forthoseorganizations.Thursdayofthat week,ARC shelter supplies began toflowin,whichallowedustostandupshel-ter operations by Sunday afternoon. Ourpersonnel were directed to get plenty ofsleepandtoarrangetheiraffairssothattheywouldbeavailableastheeventdeveloped.

The EvacuationOurareaisinterspersedwithhighlands

andlowlands,sowehavelearnedbyexpe-rience that evacuation orders are difficulttoconstructtoaddresstheneedsintended.By October 27, 2012, wewere conductingvoluntary evacuations of waterfront areasand directing residents to relocate move-ableassetstohigherground.Sincewewereveryconsciousoftheramificationsofshel-teringhugenumbersofevacuees,alloftheevacuation orders directed people to seekshelterwithfriendsandfamilyinlandwhenpossible. By October 28, all likely stormtracksputusdirectly inSandy’spath,and we issued mandatory evacuation ordersfor all waterfronts, and voluntary ordersforamuch larger section.Our shelterhadbeenopenedthepriorevening,anditwasapparent,duetotheearlyindicators,thatwewouldbehostingarelativelylargenumberofresidents.Callsforadditionalassetswereconstant due to perceived need and thelocalemergencyoperatingcenterandemer-gencyresourceswerestoodupand,bythen, wereona24-houradayand7-dayaweekbasis. By that evening, all low-lying areaswere directed tomandatorily evacuate by6:00a.m.onOctober29.

Solutions to communication problemsexperiencedinIrenehelpedusgreatlyinourresponsetoSandy.Wehadlearnedtomakemoreeffectiveuseofsocialmedia,includingseveralInternetwebsites,theNixlesystem,andothersystemssuchasGlobalConnectthrough our school districts.All in all,wesent out muchmore than 50 communica-tionsinvolvingstormpreparation,responseandremediation.Wealsotookadvantageofthe localTVnetworkunder the control ofoneof our school systems, and evenusedtemporary digital sign trailers to get outthese criticalmessages during that period.

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Ourcommunityrespondedvery favorablyto all of these measures. We have had asteadystreamofcomplimentarystatementsduetotheseimprovements.

BytheearlyhoursofOctober29,itwasapparenttomethattherewerealargenum-berofresidentswhoabsolutelyintendedtoshelterinplace.Thislargenumber,Ibelieve,wasduetothemandatoryevacuation/non-eventthatIrenehadturnedouttobe.Itwasequallyapparent that,with themagnitudeof this event, these people faced extremedangeriftheyremainedinplace.Althoughwehadfiretrucksandpolicecarsusingloudspeakersinallevacuationareas,I immedi-atelyputinurgentcallsforallsupportthatcouldbemusteredforalargerdoor-to-dooreffort.OceanCounty authorities sent us avery large contingent of Prosecutor’s andSheriff’s Office personnel, andwe formedintoteamsoffourandreachedvirtuallyallareasofconcern,workingintotheeveninguntilthefloodhadrisentothepointwhereeventhelargestvehiclescouldnotfunctionand people were literally being swept offtheirfeetbythefrigidwatersandbytherag-ingstormconditions.

Thedecision towage theseefforts longafter conditions becamemarginalwas dif-ficultbut, I stronglybelieve, correct.Thereisnoquestion,havingseenwhatIdidafterthis, that hundreds of additional peopleweresavedbystayinginthisfightaslongaswedid.Intheendourpeoplewerereducedtorequestingthatresidentswhorefusedtheorder write their social security numbers ontheirarmsinindelibleink,sothattheirbodies could be identified in the event oftheir death. This sobering thought aloneconvincedmanytocomplywiththeevacu-ationorder.

The Agonizing DecisionOn October 28, we had a meeting

with the leadershipofall localemergencyresponseassets.AsinIrene,Itoldthemthatthesituationwasoneofthemostdirethatwehadever facedandthatatsomepointadecisionmayhavetobemadethatcouldcostsomepeoplewhohadrefusedtheorderto evacuate their lives. Thatdecisionwas,simplyput,whenwasthevalueofcontin-ued emergency responses outweighed bythedangertothefirstrespondersandoth-ers. I told them that Iwould fully consultwith their leaders about this critical issue,butintheendthedecisionwouldbeminealone. The gravity of this situation hadbeen somewhat lost on me in HurricaneIrene, because it, fortunately, never cameto pass in that event. Suchwould not bethe case in Sandy.Asfirst responders,weareconditionedthatwegonomatterwhatthe circumstances. Although we were alladmonished by the “tombstone courage”doctrine during our training this remainsa collectivemind-set thathaskilledmany

of our colleagues, and constantly threat-ens to kill still more. We need look only attheselflessactionsofthosemanyheroesof the9/11attacks torealizewewouldhavedoneexactlythesamehadwebeeninthesamesituation.

As conditions deteriorated further onOctober29,responsefunctionsbecamerap-idlyuntenable.Forexample,severalhomeson one street caught fire, one igniting theotherinsuccession.Ourfirefighters,atfirst,valiantlyattemptedtosuppresstheseusingportable pumps out of small boats. Thefruitlessnessanddangerofthiseffortsoonbecameapparent,andtheyhadtoabandonit.Theproblemsencounteredintheevacua-tionwereoutlinedfurther,and,astheeve-ningprogressed,Iwasforcedtoeventuallystopallresponseintheareasmostaffected.Predictably, requests for emergency assis-tancecontinuedtocomefromthenowpan-ickednon-evacuees,and,foratime,Icouldnotallowourfirstresponderstogo.Weallwanted to, but seeing the by-now ragingstormsurgewatersblockingthesestreets,Isimplycouldnotallowit.Thishadadevas-tatingeffectonusall,andsomepeopleemo-tionallycollapsedandhadtoberelieved.

ShelteringAssetshadbeenmarshaledattheshelter

forfourdayspriortoopening.TheARC,onthis occasion, sent very competent people,and,forthemostpart,therewereenoughofthem.Whatwedidnothave,wemadeupforbyusingourownhighlytrainedCivilianEmergency Response Team (CERT) mem-bersandaverydedicatedstaffoflocalvol-unteers.Wewere,again,ablyassistedwithsecurity concerns by themen andwomenoftheOceanCountySheriff’sDepartment,andthefacilityitselfwassuperblycleanedandmaintainedbythestaffofthePinelandsRegional School District. Their warehousebecame our warehouse and the resupplyeffortswentverywell.Significantdonationsofgoodsweremadebyoneofourlocalmar-kets,whichhadlostpower,andinanotherpartoftownanotherbecameafueldepotforourlocalfirecompanies,whentheirregularsourcebecameinundated.Ourlocalsuper-market andmany local stores and restau-rants also contributed greatly during thisperiodoflocalscarcity,furtherhelpingwithfeedingthepopulationofnotonlytheshel-ter,butlocalnowindigentpeopleaswell.

At its peak our shelter housed almost800evacuees.This facilityoperated in twolocationsforoveramonth;manyresidentstraveling to their destroyed homes in thedaytimeandshelteringthereatnight.Manychallengesandissues(suchascrime,conflict,andthefearofasituationalmostbeyondthehuman experience)were encountered, buteachwasovercomeinturnthroughamag-nificent collaborative effort and the sheergritofthepeoplehelping.

Return to the Front Thehoursthatwecouldnotrespondin

theaffectedareasseemedendlesstous.Mythoughtsreturned,againandagain,tothoseinneedofourhelp.Irepeatedlycheckedonreadinessofassetsandtheconditionsthere.Atabout2:40a.m.onOctober30,itappearedthatthewatershaddroppedsomewhatandthe fury of the stormhad abated to someextent. I asked my public works superin-tendent if he thought thatwe couldmakeit to the victims in high-wheeled loaders.Hesaidthatitwasiffy,butyes,wemight.Iorderedthatthesevehicles,alongwithtwo5 ton trucks and crews that had recentlyarrived from theNJNational Guard, pro-ceed to embarkationpoints at the headofthefloodwaters.

As much as we wanted to return toaction,anoddthinghappenedatthatpoint.Ilookedupintothefacesoftherescuersonthese huge vehicles and it occurred tomethatImaywellbesendingthosebravesoulsto theirdeaths. It isone thing toriskyourownsafety,butquiteanothertosendothersintoadangersomanifest.Aswillingastheyweretogo,Ithoughtofhavingtotelltheirfamilies that my decision had killed theirspouse, mother, or dad. Conditions werestill less thanmarginal, and I believe thatthis is themoment thatone feels themostisolatedasaleader.I,frankly,brieflyprayedforwisdom,and,asIlookedup,Isawaveryfaintlightflashingaboutamileawayoverthefloodwaters.Mythird-generationpolicegutthentookoverandoffwewent.

We immediately secured the flashlightvictim,whowasminutesawayfromdeathfromhypothermia.Hehadventuredoutintothe storm to get help for his handicappedbrothertrappedinanearbyhouse.Bothfor-tunatelysurvived,andIwaspleasedtolatermeetwiththem,safeandsoundinourshel-ter.Dozensofothervictimsweresimilarlyrescued,eachhaving theirownharrowingtaleofsurvival.Wewereparticularlygrati-fiedthatnoseriousinjuriesoffirstrespond-erswerenotedasaresultoftheseHerculeanefforts.

We worked all through the night and,asdawnbroke,westoodinabayfrontareathatlookedlikeascenefromtheapocalypse.Iwasgladatthatpointmostvictimswerenotabletoseewhatwewereseeing,asweknewthenthatweneededtopreparethosepeople to facewhat remained.Wedidnotknowitthen,butsome4,000homes,nearlyhalfofthoseinLittleEggHarbor,hadbeendamagedbyfloodwaters.

The AftermathVictims were quite understandably

desperate for information. Theywere alsomorethananxioustoreturntotheirhomessotheycouldsurveythedamageandstarttheinsuranceclaimsprocess.Herewasoneof those timeswhere the balance between

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publicsafetyand justifiablepersonal inter-estcomeintoconflict.Asitwere,weallowedvictims to return to the less affected areasmuchsoonerthansomeotherareas.Icannotsaythatkeepingvictimsoutofdangerwaswithoutcontinuousdifficultyorconflict.Arational, neighborhood-by-neighborhoodevaluationseemedtoworkbestforus.Someareaswereclearlysocompromised,andsodangerous, that we were forced to keepthose closed for extendedperiods becauseof the danger and adverse effect on clear-ingoperations that thepresenceofvictimswouldcause.

Thenatureandamountofstormdebriswas incalculable. Homeswere in lagoons;boats, sheds and vehicles in streets; trees,poles,andutilitylineseverywhere;andsitu-ations too bizarre to describe.Weworkedwithourpublicworkstobegintheclearingprocess.Oursuperintendentwasverypro-activeandhadcontractsinplaceandequip-mentstagedtobeginquickly.Morethan425tonsperdaywerehauledduringpeakperi-odsand,assoonaswebegan,itwasappar-entthathaulingallthedebrisimmediatelyto the final depositorywas untenable andthesearchforasolutionbegan.

Asbadasalltheotherissuesappeareditsoonoccurredtousthatperhapsthegreat-est danger we faced was a lack of hope.Victimsliterallywerewalkingaroundtheirareas with a vacant, distant look on theirfaces that resembled those of war evacu-ees.As hard as itwas for us (manywerealsovictimsofSandy),wetalkedaboutthisapathyanddecidedthatwehadtoappear confident that better times were coming.This ismore difficult than it seems. I hada number of conversations with my col-leagues in other towns who were havingsimilar problems, andwe all realized thattheworstthingwecoulddo,asleaders,wastoletthefolkswewereresponsibleforseeuscrack.ThatplacedatremendousonusonusthatIdon’tknowyetifwehavefullyrecov-eredfrom.

I must say that it is my sincere beliefthatnoleaderhaseverhadamorediverse,gritty,tenacious,brave,andtalentedcollec-tiveorganizationsouniquelyfittedforsuchataskatsuchatime.Noonepersonshouldtakecreditforsuchathing,butmerelybowhisorherheadandthankGodforalwaysbeingintherightplaceattherighttime.

Brick TownshipNils R. Bergquist, Chief, Brick Township, New Jersey, Police Department

In addition to having the honor of beingChiefoftheBrickTownshipPoliceDepart-ment, I also serve as themunicipal Emer-gency Management Coordinator. Ourresponse to Hurricane Sandy started sev-

eralyearsagowiththedrillsandexerciseswehaveconductedinconjunctionwiththepolicedepartment,thefireservice,andourpaidandvolunteerEMS.

MostnotablewasOperationSurf’sUp,conducted 14monthsprior to Sandy. Thiswasalarge-scaleexercisethatincludedtheNew Jersey statewide EmergencyMedicalService Task Force, and theMCRU (MassCausalityResponseUnit),a$300,000vehicleprocuredthroughagrant.OperationSurf’sUpalsoinvolvedtheOceanMedicalCenterandapproximately50volunteers,with theNew Jersey National Guard utilizing twoBlackHawkHelicopterssimulatingevacu-ations fromhospitals thatwereovercapac-ityasaresultofaCategoryFiveHurricanehittingtheOceanandMonmouthCountiesvicinity.During thatdrill,we table toppedour Emergency Operation Center opera-tionsaswellastheinteractionswithawidevarietyofemergencyresponseagencies.

As Sandy approached, we opened ourEmergency Operation Center on Sundaynight,hoursbeforethestormhitonOctober30.Wehadpulledourresourcesoffthebar-rierislandtheafternoonofOctober29—theweatherconditionshaddeterioratedtothepoint that itwas not safe to stay. Prior toleaving, our personnelwent door to door,hitting every residence on the island, andidentified approximately 20 people whowere staying behind. When we marchedin thereonWednesday,we foundout thatinfactthereweremorethan60peoplewhohadstayedbehind.

Wehadlearnedseveralyearsagoduringoneofourmajorsnowstormstodecentral-izeourresources.Puttingthosehardlearnedlessons to work during Sandy, we set upfour task forces—one at each of the fourfirehousesinourtownship.Eachtaskforceconsisted of a police component; an EMScomponent(eitherpaidorvolunteer);afirecomponent (all volunteer); and a Depart-ment of PublicWorks (DPW) component,which, in this case, consisted of a dumptruck,atrailerwithaloaderorbackhoeonit,manpower, chain saws, andhand tools.These teamswere dispatched to calls as aunifiedtaskforce,withtheDPWcomponentgoing outwith the emergency responderstoclearroadwaysusingchainssawsorthebackhoes. Also, by utilizing unified com-mand in the incident command system,eachtaskforcecouldoperateautonomouslyif they lost communicationswith the inci-dentcommanderwhowasstationedatthefrontdeskatpoliceheadquarters.

TheEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC)wasalsosituatedintheTownshipMunicipalBuildinginalargeconferenceroom.Inaddi-tiontopoliceandemergencymanagement,theMunicipalUtilitiesAuthoritywasrepre-sentedaround the clock,aswas theDPW.ThePurchasingDepartment servedasourlogisticsection.TheBoardofEducationwas

representedmost of the time, because wewere utilizing their facilities for shelter, aswell as their buses for transportation. Theshelterandevacuationannexwasstaffedbypolicepersonnelduringtheentireoperation.

We disseminated information before,during, and for months after the stormthrough different social media outlets, aswellasthetraditionalmediaoutlets.

Additionally,weestablishedacallcenterfor informational purposes only. The callcenter was staffed around the clock withnon-policepersonnel (mostly fromtheTaxOffice and Recreation Department), whoreallywentaboveandbeyond.Mostofthemwereworkingwelloutsideoftheircomfortzones,neverhavinghadtodealwiththesetypes of problems on the phone. Predict-ablythenumberofcallswehadwerenearlyoverwhelmingattimes.

During the first 36 hours of the storm,noonewenthome.Policeandcivilianper-sonnelslept ineitheroneof thefirehousesor in thedepartments trainingroomwhenrelieved during that time. We went fromcalltocalltocall.Tendaysinwehaddealtwith approximately 1,300 fire calls. Whenwefinallystartedrotatingsomepeopleouttogetsomerest-andstartedgettingintoamanagement routine, the National Guardarrived.Atonepointwehad200NationalGuardtroopsintown.Thesetroopsgreatlyhelpedusdoourjob,assistingwithevery-thingfrominitiallyhelpingwithsearchandrescue to staffing the evacuation centers,and, then later, to manning entry controlpointstoalloftheeffectedneighborhoods.

WealsoutilizedourCommunityEmer-gencyResponseTeam,andtheydidevery-thing during the storm from helping toanswer thephonesand feeding the troopsandourpersonneltodistributingwaterandiceandothersuppliestoourresidentsinthedaysfollowingthestorm.

Asthestormraged,floodingpreventedus from getting out to our barrier island.One hundred seven homes burned downontheisland.Wetriedgettingteamsouttotheisland,butsubstantialfloodingmadeitimpossible to get there.Webecame awarethat there were many rumors spreadingthroughoutthecommunity,whichwespentasignificantamountoftimequelling.Atonepointwereceivedacall fromtheRegionalOperationsandIntelligenceCenteraskingifweinfacthad31bodiesfloatingintheBar-negatBay.Fortunatelythiswasnotremotelytrue.Wedidhoweverhaveonefatalitydur-ingthestorma56-year-oldmaledrownedinhishomethatwasfloodedwithmorethanfourfeetofwater.

Trying to get some situational aware-ness on the barrier island was difficult.Wehadtroublefindingahelicopter toget upandsendusbackvideo.Wewentout-side of channels and made direct contactwith StationDelaware Bay (United States

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Coast Guard), and they diverted one oftheirhelicoptersoverourareaandsentussomevideojustbeforesunset,whichgaveusanideaofwhatweweredealingwithontheisland.

We were not able to make it onto theislanduntildaybreakWednesdaymorning.ThroughoutthedayandintoThursdaytheonlywaytogetaroundontheislandwasonfootorbyoff-roadfour-wheeldrivequads.This was the case until the state Depart-mentofTransportation came in anddid awonderfuljobcleaningupthestreets,asdidtheDPW,whichenabledustogetourinfra-structurebackupandrunning.

The damage, destruction and dangerwere not confined to the island. On themainland, Brick Township has 52 milesof waterfront property, the most in NewJersey.Approximately10,000of thoseresi-dences were affected by flooding in onewayoranother.

Onthemainlandweencounteredboats,debris,andhousessweptoverfromthebar-rier island throughout our neighborhoods,whichmadeitverydifficulttohandlecallsortoevengetaroundtown.Weimmediatelyset up entry control points at all of thoseneighborhoodstopreventlooting.I’mgladto saywewere successful in safeguardingour residents’property in theaftermathofthestorm.Lookingatourpropertycrimesinthetwoweeksbeforethestormandthetwoweeks following the storm,we found thattherewassubstantiallylesspropertycrimeafter the storm then therewas in the twoweeksprior.Onlyoneincidentoccurredinthattwo-tothree-weekperiod.

Immediately after the storm, the NewJersey Emergency Medical Task Force setupfacilitiesinaparkinglotdirectlyadjacentto theOceanMedicalCenter.Thiswasthesameparking lot that theyutilizedduringOperationSurf’sUp. In fact, the tentpegsthat they used for the tentswent into thesameholesthattheyused14monthsearlierduringthedrill.

In addition to significant and extendedpower outages, one of the major issueswe confronted involvedmajor traffic jamsand associated traffic problems. We triedblockingintersectionswithcones,tapeandmovablebarricades,noneofwhichprovedsuccessful;peoplewouldsimplymovethemand leave the barricades in themiddle ofthehighway.So,atsomeofthelessimpor-tant intersections, we put school buses inbetween the JerseyBarriers to channel thetraffictoanotherintersection.

Fortunatelywewereabletofindapar-tial solution,with the assistance of one ofour National Guard troops, an electricianincivilian life.Wemanagedtogetgenera-torsbywayoftheRegionalOperationsandIntelligence Center, and the guardsman/electricianwentoutwithabout15genera-tors,openedupthetrafficcontrolboxesat

keyintersections,hookedupthegeneratorstothosetrafficlights,andwethensetupafuel schedule. For the next twoweeks theNationalGuardmanagedthosegenerators,keeping the traffic lights operational, andtheintersectionsupandrunning.

Wehaddeclaredalocalstateofemergencypriortothestormwithamandatoryevacua-tionofthebarrierislandandarecommenda-tiontoevacuateinlandcoastalareas.Afterthestorm,wequicklyenhancedthelocalStateofEmergency to keep the island off-limits fornearlyaweek,untilwewereabletomakeitsafeforpeopletoreturn.Atfirst,weescortedrepresentativesfromeachneighborhood,andthen later we brought people out street bystreetinbusesandallowedthemtogoinand outof theirhouses tosecure theirvaluablesandtomakeasmanytripsduringthatdayonthebusaspossible.Wehadgriefcounselorsonallofthebusesandthetruckonthefirsttrip. The local VFW post suspended all oftheir normal operations, and we used thatsiteasaforwardoperatingpostforalloftherepopulation efforts. Then, eventually, weslowly liftedtherestrictionstoallowpeoplebackontheislandastheinfrastructurecamebackonline.Thestormhadcausedallwater,naturalgas,sewer,andelectricalservicestobecompletelydisrupted.

Asof thiswriting,we still havea localState of Emergency in effect, prohibiting

peoplewhoarenotresidentsorcontractorsfrombeingonthesidestreetsoftheisland.Noaccesstothebeachisallowedtopreventlooting.A curfew from 1900 to 0500 is ineffect,andwehaveNewJerseyStatePolicetroopers supplementing our patrols outthereaswell.

Hurricane Sandy, New Jersey’s Cop 2 Cop and the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of PoliceCherie Castellano CSW LPC AAETS, Program Director, Cop 2 Cop

Cop2Copisthefirstprogramofitskindinthecountry,enactedintolawtofocus

on suicide prevention and mental healthsupportforlawenforcementofficers.Afteraseriesofpolicesuicides(1996-1998),commu-nityleadersinNewJerseybelievedthatlawenforcement professionals needed a con-fidential, safeoutletwhere they could talktopeerswhocouldunderstand,offersup-port,andnotbejudgmental.In1999,abillwassignedintolawcreatingtheCop2Copprogram.ThehotlinebeganacceptingcallsinNovember2000.Cop2Copisaprogram

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108 THE POLICE CHIEF/AUGUST 2013 http://www.policechiefmagazine.org

fundedthroughanappropriationfromtheAttorneyGeneral’sOfficetoourNewJerseyDivisionofHumanServicesannually.

Afteroveradecadeofserviceandover30,000contacts,Cop2Cophasbeeniden-tified as a national best practice in peersupport by the Department of Defense’sCenters of Excellence. Cop 2 Cop is theconfidential hotline for New Jersey LawEnforcement Officers offering 24-hour/7-day a week help from colleagues whounderstandandcanoffersupporttohan-dletheirimmediateneeds.TheCop2Cophotline, 1-866-COP-2-COP, is staffed byCop2Coppeercounselorswhoareretiredofficers,somewhoarelicensedclinicians,and specially trainedMentalHealth pro-fessionals offering Cop 2 Cop peer sup-port,telephoneassessments,referralstoapolice network of providers, and criticalincidentstressmanagementservices.IthasbeenidentifiedasamodelforoveradozenprogramssuchasVet2Vet,Mom2Mom,andevenanationalmilitarypeerhelplineentitled Vets4Warriors serving the entireU.S.military.

Manmadedisastersandnaturaldisastershavedifferentkindsoftraumaticimpactonpoliceofficersinrescueandrecoveryroles.With a manmade or terrorist disaster like9/11,althoughthedevastationwasunimag-inable,itwasinatargetedlocationandhadagroupofterroriststodirectangertowards.Inanaturaldisaster,MotherNature,ortheignorant civilian who refused to evacuateandisnowforcingyouasanofficertoriskyour life and theirs, is the problem alongwith the potential of widespread destruc-tion,perhapsevenreachingyoursafehaven,yourhome.

Hurricane Katrina had a tremendousimpactontheNewOrleansPoliceDepart-ment (NOPD) several years ago.After thestorm, New Orleans lost two officers tosuicideandtheSouthernLawEnforcementFoundation asked our Cop 2 Cop teamto respond for support. After our experi-ence from supporting officers involved intheeventsof9/11,webelievedCop2Copcould handle any disaster response. Wewerewrong.

InNewOrleans,wefoundofficerswhohadlosttheirhomes,hadinjuryandharmwithintheirownfamilies,andremainedattheirpostsrescuingothers.Themedianevercoveredthestoriesofofficerswhosufferedfrom dehydration while manning boatswithbottledwaterbecausetheychosenottotakeasipofwaterthatcouldbeofferedtoacivilianinneed.Thoseofficerswereheroic,andthestormbroughtoutthebestinthem.Unfortunately,whatwelearnedafterseveralyearsfromastudydonebytheCDC(Cen-tersforDiseaseControl)aftertheyexaminedsymptoms of PTSD (post traumatic stressdisorder) and relateddisorders among theNOPDwhowereinvolvedintherescueand

recoveryisthat,ofthe912officerssurveyed,almost45percentreportedsymptomsasso-ciatedwithPTSDordepression.Riskfactorsinclude recovery of bodies, crowd control,assault, and injury to family members.Depressivesymptomswereassociatedwithrare family contact, uninhabitable homes,isolation fromotherofficers in theNOPD,assault, and injury to a family member.The conclusion was that police personnelreportedsymptomsofPTSDanddepressionassociatedwithwork-relatedandpersonalfactorsfollowingHurricaneKatrina.

Hurricane SandyWhen Hurricane Sandy hit, we were

fortunate to have experts in disaster andterrorism leading the state’smental healthsupport(NJDRCC)whoactivatedaspecial-ized team toensure special at-riskgroups,suchaspoliceofficers,couldgetimmediateaccesstosupport.Afterourresponsetoboththe events of 9/11 andHurricaneKatrina,wehaddevelopedlegislatedDisasterMen-talHealthPlansandSOPs(standardoperat-ingprocedures)touseourlessonslearned.A new helpline, a Hurricane Sandy sup-portlinecalledForYouNewJerseyFirstforfirstresponders(1-8664UN-J1ST)wentlivewithin24hoursoftheevent.InadditiontoourCop2Copstaff, theNewJerseyStatePolice deployed a disaster response team,which included Cop 2 Cop peers, to themostimpactedareas.

Apivotalshiftinconnectingthisimme-diate access and focused care to our firstresponderspost-HurricaneSandy is foundin the leadership of our law enforcement,specifically,ourNewJerseychiefsofpolice.The New Jersey Association of Chiefs ofPolice invited our team immediately afterthe storm to share our new program atthe statewide chiefsmeeting and dissemi-nated our material to ensure over 50,000law enforcement professionals could haveaccesstothisservice.OurNewJerseyFirstteampresentedtheprogramsandmetwithchiefs to discuss their needs following thepresentation.Onechiefwashighlighted inourpresentationashesetthetoneforcrisisleadershipandisindicativeoftheexcellenceinserviceintheGardenState.

That is where this story really beginswithonechiefandthePointPleasantBeachPoliceDepartment.Focusedontheirrescueandrecoveryefforts,theyfacedachallengeof a mandatory in-service training blockwithin a week after the storm. When theNJDCISR teamvisited theirdepartment toofferhelp,LieutenantJosephMichiganandChief Kevin O’Hara suggested a block oftimebechangedtobriefofficersabout thepotential challenges they may experiencerelated to Hurricane Sandy. Timing andgoodfortuneallowedagroupfromCop2CopachancetogetafirsthandlookatthePointPleasantBeachPoliceDepartment, a

smalldepartment thatwasalways lookingtolendahandtoothersinneed.

The briefing and support was wellreceived by the officers. In describing thedepartment reaction, Lieutenant Michiganexplained“Wereallygothithard,butIthinkourresponsewasproactive.”Thechiefwasenthusiastic aboutprovidingongoing sup-porttohisofficers.Thedepartmentisamixofyoungofficersandveteranofficers.Lieu-tenantMichigan believed itwas beneficialforeveryonetoheareachother’sreactionstowhattheysawanddidduringtheresponsetoSandy.“These ‘kids’experiencedatrag-edy that they had never seen before andhopefully never will again.” When askedabouthispersonalresilienceherepliedjok-ingly“Ijustgowiththeflow.Youcan’tdoanythingaboutsomethings.”Butheandhischief recognize thatyoucandowhat theyandtheirfellowofficersdid,whichwasusetheirresiliencetoguidetheirresponseandenlistimmediatesupport.

In 13major event responses andmorethan50visitstoimpactedareafirstresponderagencies,Cop2Cophashadmorethan440contactssincebeginningthisproject(fundedthroughtheNewJerseyDivisionofMentalHealthDisasterbranchwithaFEMAgrant)for first responders. The New Jersey Firstprogram culminated in May 2013 with atransitionofrequestsbeyondthatdatebeingmanaged as part of the everydaywork atCop2Cop.

HurricaneSandyandtheimpactontheNew Jersey law enforcement communityhasnotyetblownover.TheimpactofSandymaybe still felt a year away.However, insomesmalltown,withanothercommunityincrisis,aNewJerseypoliceofficerwillbequietly doingwhat he or she can to help,andsurprisingthosewhodon’tknowhowheroicNew Jersey’s law enforcement pro-fessionals trulyare.AndwhenCop2Copneeds assistance in getting connected tothosewhomostneedus,weknowwecanrelyonNewJersey’schiefsofpolice,andtheNew Jersey StateAssociation of Chiefs ofPolice,tohelpustolendahand. v

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Eyewitness Identification: What are the current practices?

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