GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

International Relations

India's Look East Policy

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:Dr. Aruna Kumar Malik MOHIT KUMAR SINGH (13A070)ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAWGUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY Vth SEMESTER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sr. No. Context Page No.

1. ABSTRACT 2

2. INTRODUCTION 3

3. REASONS FOR INDIA TO LOOK EAST 5

4. WHY LOOK EAST POLICY IS SO IMPORTANT? 8

5. KEY RELATIONSHIPS IN ASIA 10

6. EVALUATING MODI’S LOOK EAST POLICY 18

7. PM ON LOOK-EAST POLICY 20

8. OBSTACLES TO REALISING THESE AMBITIONS 22

9. CONCLUSION 23

10. BIBLIOGRAPHY 24

1

ABSTRACT

The Look East policy has appeared as an important foreign policy initiative of

India in the post-Cold War period. It was propelled in 1991 by the Narasimha

Rao government with the objective of developing political contacts, growing

economic integration and creating security cooperation with countries of

Southeast Asia. The policy manifests a shift in India’s perception of the world,

with the strategic and economic significance of Southeast Asia to India’s national

interests being recognized. The second phase, which commenced in 2003,

extends the attention of the Look East policy from Australia to East Asia, with

(ASEAN) Association of Southeast Asian Nations as its core. The new phase thus

marks a shift in emphasis from trade to wider economic and security

cooperation and support, political partnerships, substantial physical connectivity

via road and rail links. In this article, the evolution of India’s Look East policy and

its recent approach are analyzed.

2

INTRODUCTION

India's Look East policy denotes its efforts to cultivate widespread economic and

strategic relations with the nations of Southeast Asia in order to strengthen its

standing as a regional power and a counterbalance to the strategic influence of the

Republic of China. Introduced in 1991, it marked a strategic shift in India’s

perspective of the world. It was developed and enacted during the régime of Prime

Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and carefully pursued by the successive administrations

of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh.1

The downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War and the

world order that preceded it. The subtleties post the era saw a swift global rebuilding.

United States of America became the most influential and powerful country in the

world and China arose as the face of the ‘East’, this once underdeveloped country was

on the path to become a global super power. In a world that was rapidly globalizing,

the ‘Look East Policy’ was a tweak in India’s foreign policy. It was formally hurled in

the 1990s by the Narasimha Rao-led government when India identified the change in

the a center or source of the world economic power from ‘west’ to ‘east’ as forced by

the evolving geo-politics and trends in the Asia-Pacific. The aim was to recuperate

political ties, forge regional security collaboration and develop economic links by

increasing integration with Southeast Asia.

The Look East policy is an attempt to hearth closer and deeper economic integration

with its eastern neighbors as a part of the new 'realpolitik' in evidence in India’s

foreign policy and the engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations

(ASEAN) is the recognition on the part of India’s elite of the strategic and economic

significance of the region towards the country’s national interests.

Under Narendra Modi, India has invested certain efforts in strengthening ties with the

East and Southeast Asian partners.  Under the new government in Delhi, India’s Look

1 Thongkholal Haokip, “India’s Look East Policy: Its Evolution and Approach,”South Asian Survey 18, no.2 (2011): 242.

3

East policy has morphed into a proactive 'Act East' policy, which foresees accelerated

across-the-board engagement in a vibrant Asia.

India is attempting to build concrete partnerships with key states in the Asia-Pacific,

with a particular focus on Japan, Vietnam, Australia and ASEAN.

4

REASONS FOR INDIA TO LOOK EAST

Need to counter China economically:

The open door policies of China, India’s neighbor, during the 1980s had seen the

spectacular rise of an emerging economic giant in Asia, in disparity with India’s own

Fabian socialist policies in India under Nehru’s rule .China vies with India in the

political, economic and military scope and most significantly, for economic influence

in the region of South East Asia. In brief, India need to adopt an economically

aggressive attitude to compete well with international arcade forces at work in the

region.

The former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that he hailed Foreign Direct

Investment (FDI) into India, which rakes in only a current US$3 billion as compared

to US$53 billion in FDI to China annually. India’s FDI hardly measures up to 6% of

its main rivals. Evidently, there is a need to seek new markets in order for India to

develop economically and to seek a noteworthy way of countering China’s own

economic policies.

An emerging middle class:

America invented the idea of outsourcing, substantially the exploitation of foreign

labor with basic amount of control but nevertheless, governed by motivation for

profit. A US software engineer earns US$75,000 per year as compared to his Indian

counterpart, who earns US$20,000 per year in India. 60% of India’s one billion

population is below the age of 30, meaning that a vast number of educated and

talented people formed a huge manpower pool waiting to be tapped. Globalization

and the Western media have also brought about influences in Western tastes and a

materialistic lifestyle in a growing middle class in India2.

2 India's Look East Policy: Prospects and Challenges for Northeast India-3, accessed electronically http://haokip.bandamp.com/blog/17831.html , on February 23, 2009.

5

A world wealth report in June 2004 by US brokerage firm Merill Lynch, revealed that

India has 61,000 millionaires, in US $. However, the average Indian earns just

US$1.60 per day. Materialism has led to a disturbing trend in mercenary pursuit of

wealth at the expense of traditional, conservative social values. In a local crackdown

in New Delhi, nearly 300 women from middle class background were arrested for

prostitution. Thus, India seeks new markets to export its restless workforce. An

ignoring of changing trends however, could well lead to serious social problems for

the government of India. 3

Containment from West and Central Asia:

India’s long disagreement with Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir region has

caused long standing aggressive bilateral ties between these two states. China, as

Pakistan’s ally and supporter and a budding economic rival, would sensibly trail

policies that either not promotes India or which hinder India’s economic progress and

interests. Although India also retains business interests and provides foreign labour to

the Middle East, geo political instability and the continuous threat of terrorism meant

that there could be no serious responsibility of worthwhile financial investment in

Middle Eastern countries.

As a consequence, India remains edged in and severed from mainstream Asian affairs

on whichever the western or northern direction. The only lingering alternative of

potential development and progress is to look eastwards towards the South East Asian

region.

Response of South East Asia and how it regards India:

In a speech made at Harvard University, Former Indian External Affairs Minister

Yashwant Sinha pointed out that previously, India’s engagement with South East Asia

was based on an uncompromising perception of Asian brotherhood, a shared colonial

history and cultural ties. However, present regional dynamics dictate that the progress

3 Mishra, N. (2007), ―The Push and Pull of Globalisation: How the Global Economy Makes Migrant Workers Vulnerable to Exploitation‖, http://www.solidaritycenter. org/files/pubs_policybrief_migration.pdf (last accessed on September 10, 2015)

6

of South East Asia is also motivated just as much by trade, investment and

production. The truth is that Asia’s other large regional player, China, has much better

pre-set circumstances conducive for economic investments and developments

attractive to South East Asian investors. This includes a larger, educated and cultured

work force in measurable terms, cheaper material resources in plenty and relatively

stables authority free from any noteworthy external or internal security threat. The

simple fact of consumer behaviour settling towards a better choice in terms of cost

and quality ensures that South East Asia turns first to China for trade and investment

rather than other countries. However, one major flaw exists for China. Its long history

of socialist rule results in a firmly controlled state with little room for political

maneuvering or reform. This means that China is a state that plays by its own rules

and is not answerable to non-state players like foreign investors.

India, in contrast, having less to offer in tangible terms like manpower costs and

resource abundance, however, enjoys the reputation of being a democracy which

respects consumer rights and international law governing trade and foreign

investments. Also, India’s long standing recognition of English as the official

language breaks down language and cultural barriers in trade communications, and in

theory, accelerates business procedures. This is the advantage that India’s Look East

Policy has over China, and should be exploited to the full to gain an edge.4

4 Sushil Khanna, “Economic Opportunities or Continuing Stagnation” Gateway to the East: a symposium on Northeast India and the Look East Policy, Seminar, June 2005.

7

WHY LOOK EAST POLICY IS SO IMPORTANT?

“India has two main reasons for this project, one to connect with ASEAN and one to

compete with China,” said Kim, a long-term observer of IndoBurma relations and

author of “Unfair Deal”.

India’s relationship with Burma is also largely based on a need to counter China’s

influence in theregion. China has recently become Burma’s second largest foreign

investor and has built its own port in Kyaukphyu, just 40km or so from Sittwe. This

Kaladan Project has secured India’s Northeastern province with a lifeline for opening

up trade and transport to the rest of ASEAN and the world. Once completed, bilateral

trade will manifold. Moreover, the overall development of India’s Northeast region,

and particularly land-locked states like Mizoram, will be greatly increased. Bilateral

trade meetings were held between Burmese trade and investment delegates and trade

ministers from the four Northeastern Indian states in midSeptember 2010 in an

attempt to strengthen border trade.

The Kaladan Project will likely open up the economic geography of the region,

potentially connecting to the Asia highway in the future, which will open up

international trade routes. Feeling threatened by the way in which China is

strengthening its position in both South and Southeast Asia, India has recently

decided to change the basis of its Look East policy in order to counterbalance the

Chinese rise in the region. According to today’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

“India’s Look East Policy is not merely an external economic policy; it is also a

strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global

economy. Most of all it is about reaching out to our civilization neighbors in

Southeast Asia and East Asia”.5

The new version of India’s Look East policy has the idea of counterbalancing China

as its implicit core, as it explicitly refers to the way in which New Delhi should

strengthen its relations with neighboring countries today reckoning China as an

5 Rajiv Sikri’s lecture ‘Northeast India and India's Look East Policy’, in CENISEAS Forum ‘Towards a New Asia: Transnationalism and Northeast India.

8

important partner. With the aim of destabilizing China’s position in these countries,

India is developing a new strategy oriented at stressing geographical proximity as well

as economic development to convince nations such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan,

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, but also Vietnam, Myanmar and other Southeast Asian

nations that New Delhi can “offer them more” than a distant country like China. India

thinks that its functional relations with Asian countries could be reinforced by

commonality of affinity of cultures, balancing with diplomacy China’s military

superiority and economic advantage.

Today, although economic cooperation between India and China is growing, the

strategic competition and rivalry between the two is also sharpening. Feeling more

and more threatened by China, during the last few months India has drastically

changed its regional strategy with the aim of better consolidate its own regional

alliances.6

6 Dong, Zhang. 2006. ‘India Looks East: Strategies and Impact’, AUSAID Working Paper, September, accessed from http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Documents/india_east.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2015).

9

KEY RELATIONSHIPS IN ASIA

It is clear that the 'Modi Government' must pursue a stable environment in its

neighborhood before it can seek to expand its influence further afield. India will

attempt to maintain positive relations with its neighbors, although not at the expense

of national security. However, the 'Modi Government’s' ambition of pursuing a larger

international role for India, and the greater long-term economic and strategic

prospective of engagement with East and Southeast Asia, will necessitate the

prioritization of India’s relations with this region over its traditional emphasis on

West Asia. How will this affect India’s key relationships in Asia?

China

India’s increased engagement with the region is driven by the impact of China’s rise

on both its bilateral relationship and the broader evolving security dynamics of the

Indo-Pacific. China’s presence in the Indian Ocean has increased significantly in

recent years, made easier by its relationships with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives,

and others. China has a legitimate interest in protecting its trading and energy

lifelines, with 70 per cent of its oil supply and almost 80 per cent of its total trade

being shipped through the Indian Ocean region7.

According to Indian Home Ministry figures, the number of alleged Chinese border

transgressions doubled from 2011 to 2012, and, in August 2014, was on track to

exceed the levels of previous years.8 India’s focus on building economic and security

relations with key partners in East and Southeast Asia can be seen to be part of an

external balancing strategy in response to these concerns.

While India and China remain strategic rivals, India's "Look East" policy has

included significant rapprochement with China. Since 1993, India began holding

high-level talks with Chinese leaders and established confidence building measures In

2006, China and India opened the Nathu La pass for cross-border trade for the first 7 Mohan Malik, “The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain” in Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from China, India and the United States, ed. Mohan Malik. (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 15, 17.8 Alyssa Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages to India,” Forbes, 17 September 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/alyssaayres/2014/09/17/chinas-mixedmessages-to-india/.

10

time since the 1962 war. On 21 November 2006 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh and the Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a 10-point joint declaration to

improve ties and resolve long-standing conflicts.9 Trade between China and India

increases by 50% each year, and it reached the $60 billion target set for 2010 by both

Indian and Chinese governments and industrial leaders. However, China's close

relations with Pakistan, skepticism about India's annexation of Sikkim and Chinese

assertion over Arunachal Pradesh have threatened the improvement in bilateral

relations. India's providing asylum to the political-cum-spiritual leader, the 14th Dalai

Lama also causes some friction in bilateral ties.

Chinese commentators have been critical of India's Look East policy. A People's

Daily editorial opined that the Look East policy was "born out of [the] failure" of

India's trying to play the Soviet Union and the United States against each other for its

own benefit during the Cold War, and that trying to do the same with China and Japan

by strengthening its ties with the latter would also fail.10

Indian public opinion on China is somewhat conflicted. While 83 per cent of Indians

believe that China will front a security threat to India in the next ten years, 63 per cent

would like to see relationships with China become sounder in this same time frame.11

This strain already informs India’s China policy, and the relationship has long

improved along two distinct economic and security tracks. Notwithstanding criticism

of the previous government’s handling of relations with China, this pattern can be

anticipated to continue under a Modi-led government.

Prime Minister Modi has argued for a stronger approach to China, and publicly

criticized China’s “expansionist attitude” at a rally in the disputed territory of

Arunachal Pradesh during his campaign.12 This sentiment was echoed during Modi’s

September 2014 visit to Japan, where he remarked obliquely upon “an 18th-century 9 http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/21jintao6.htm10 http://en.people.cn/90002/96417/7179404.html11 Rory Medcalf, India Poll 2013, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013)12 Press Trust of India (PTI), “Can't Allow China to Dominate India, We Need to Take Ourselves Seriously: Modi,” Indian Express, 19 October 2013, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/cant-allow-china-to-dominate-india-weneed-to-take-ourselves seriously-modi/1184413/0 and Victor Mallet, “Modi Hits Out at Chinese Expansionism,” Financial Times, 24 February 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/65df3de0-9d1f-11e3-83c5-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2xhy9U600.

11

expansionist mind-set: encroaching on another country, intruding in others’ waters,

invading other countries and seizing territory.” This sentiment has had some of degree

policy impact; Sushma Swaraj has made it clear on multiple occasions that India’s

endorsement of the One China policy is contingent on China’s affirmation of a ‘One

India policy’ recognizing Indian sensitivities on Arunachal Pradesh.13 While the Modi

Government is likely to be more strident than the UPA Government on China,

especially in its oratory, it will remain a pragmatist on the relationship, and will be

careful to balance this sentiment with the economic benefits of India’s relationship

with China.

China does not favour a strong Indian presence and influence in Southeast Asia.

China is aware of the various cultural and spiritual ties that India shares with

Southeast Asia, which could naturally attract the two regions to come closer. China

knows that India is the only country that could possibly challenge its ascendancy and

potential hegemony in Asia, and therefore it makes sense for China to try hard to keep

India under pressure. Traditionally, China has been very dismissive of India, which it

treats as a mere South Asian player. However, over the last decade or so, the Chinese

have been somewhat puzzled and intrigued by the steady rate of India’s economic

growth and its political stability. So they have no option but to take India more

seriously.

Japan

India’s relations with Japan are likely to be the most strongly affected by Modi’s

election. As the most advanced Asian naval power, and as a potential source of

considerable investment and technological assistance, Japan offers significant

partnership opportunities as India deepens relations with East Asia. Japan and India

are still relatively minor economic partners, with a bilateral trade volume of only

$US16 billion in 2013-14, and almost $US2 billion in investment in 2013. In an

important convergence of developmental and strategic objectives, the Japan

International Cooperation Agency was, in November 2014, awarded a contract to

build approximately 2000km of strategic roads along India’s disputed border with

13 Indrani Bagchi, “India Talks Tough on One-China Policy, Says Reaffirm OneIndia Policy First,” Times of India, 9 September 2014,

12

China.14 While economic ties between the two are still somewhat immature, Japan is

the source of sizable official development assistance, particularly on the

infrastructural projects such as the Delhi-Mumbai and Chennai-Bangalore Industrial

Corridor.

However, it is the strategic probability of the relationship that is most significant.

Again, China’s aggressiveness in the East China Sea and along the Ladakh border has

created a further impetus for closer India-Japan ties. The absence of historical

baggage and mutual appreciation of each other’s importance in Asia’s rapidly

changing geo-political situation has, in recent years, induced India to prioritize

relations with Japan. Under the former government, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo

Abe was the Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day Parade in January 2014.15 And Abe

has long been a advocate of closer India-Japan ties, arguing for the creation of a

Japan-and India-led ‘broader Asia’ during his last term as Prime Minister.16 However

the test of this trust will be the extent to which India and Japan commit to assisting

each other in the event of a crisis.

Under Modi, India’s relationship with Japan will gain the additional drive brought

about by his close personal relationship with Abe. Their like-mindedness has already

borne results with the inauguration of a new Special Strategic and Global Partnership

during the Prime Misnister's September visit to Japan last year, his first outside of

India’s immediate region. The partnership arises from the two countries’ “convergent

global interests, critical maritime interconnection and growing international

responsibilities” and Japan’s place “at the heart of India's Look East Policy.”17

However, the inability to conclude a civil-nuclear deal during Modi’s recent visit to

14 Rohinee Singh, “Japan Gets Contract to Build Strategeic [sic] Roads on IndoChina Border,” DNA India, 3 November 201415 Danielle Rajendram, “India-Japan Ties in the Face of a Rising China,” China India Brief #20, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 28 January 2014, http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publication/china-india-brief/china-india-brief-20.16 Shinzo Abe, “Confluence of the Two Seas,” (speech, Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August 2007).17 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Tokyo Declaration for India - Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, 1 September 2014, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/23965/Tokyo+Declaration+for+India++Japan+Special+Strate gic+and+Global+Partnership

13

Japan demonstrated that advancement in the relationship will not be driven solely by

the political will of the two leaders.

ASEAN

While ASEAN has been at the heart of India’s Look East Policy since its inception,

Modi’s announcement of the 'Act East' Policy during the 2014 India-ASEAN Summit

reinforces the importance of the organization to India’s engagement with countries to

its East. China’s firm stance on disputed territories has given India the opportunity to

enhance its strategic presence in Southeast Asia, and ASEAN states are gradually

looking to India to play a balancing role in the region. Sushma Swaraj gave

manifestation to this sentiment at the 12th India ASEAN meeting in Nay Pyi Taw

saying: “The ASEAN-India strategic partnership owes its strength to the fact that our

‘Look East’ to ASEAN meets your ‘Look West’ towards India.”18

However, India’s recent economic drop combined with the policy paralysis that

afflicted the UPA Government in its final years, means that India will need to work

intensely hard to convince ASEAN that it is serious about becoming a reliable partner

with an expanded security profile in the region. India and ASEAN raised their

relationship to the level of a strategic partnership in 2012. The Indian Navy has thus

far played a vital role in deepening India’s security partnerships with ASEAN states,

through joint patrols, bilateral exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;

and multilateral engagement, including the two-yearly MILAN exercises at Port Blair

since 1995.19 While India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command presents a natural base

for India to project power through the Malacca Strait into the waters of East Asia, the

Indian Navy has also begun a significant rebalancing of its fleet from its Western to

Eastern Naval Command, which is now the larger fleet in terms of major warships.

On the political level, Modi’s government has continued its commitment to the

previous government’s pledge to open a new diplomatic mission to ASEAN in 2014,

as well as potentially seconding an officer to the ASEAN Secretariat.

18 Sushma Swaraj, “Opening Remarks by External Affairs Minister at 12th India ASEAN Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw,” (speech, India-ASEAN meeting, Nay Pyi Taw, 9 August 2014).19 David Brewster, “India’s Defence Strategy and the India-ASEAN Relationship,”in India-ASEAN Defence Relations, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das (Singapore: S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013), 128.

14

In August 2014, Sushma Swaraj announced India’s objective to begin drafting its

next India-ASEAN action plan, with an importance on increasing connectivity in the

region to boost trade and people-to-people links. In terms of connectivity, economic

infrastructure development in India’s Northeastern states will be crucial. As the only

overland connection to mainland Southeast Asia, the strategic utility of these states

has become even more salient since Myanmar began greater global engagement.

Australia

Australia also has the potential to play a significant role in India’s eastward shift in

focus. Australia-India relations have, in recent years, suffered from inattention,

although they have been on an upward trajectory since the low point of the 2009-2010

attacks on Indian students in Australia. With new leaders in both Australia and India,

there is fresh potential to reinvigorate ties between the two Indian Ocean democracies.

Australia and India have a bilateral trading volume of almost $US10 billion, although

the relationship has declined by almost 20 per cent in the last year. A recent visit to

Australia by Prime Minister Modi showed that he and Prime Minister Abbott are well

aware of the opportunities in the relationship, and early signs point to a greater

prioritisation of Australia in Indian foreign policy calculations. The beginning of the

Modi Government’s term has witnessed an unprecedented level of engagement

between the two Indian Ocean democracies, in both bilateral and multilateral

contexts.20

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was the first foreign leader to visit India

since the Modi Government’s inauguration, marking the first time the two leaders had

met. The visit’s highest profile outcome was the conclusion of an Australia-India civil

nuclear cooperation agreement, pending final arrangements on safeguards. Aside from

the economic benefits of nuclear commerce between the two states, the conclusion of

the deal has removed a major source of mistrust from the relationship, signalling that

Australia considers India a responsible nuclear power. Modi reciprocated in

November with a full bilateral visit after the G20 Leaders’ Summit, the first by any

20 Danielle Rajendram, “Collaborating across the Indian Ocean,” Pragati, 14 September 2014, http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2014/09/collaborating-acrossthe-india-ocean/

15

Indian Prime Minister in nearly three decades. In an address to the Australian

Parliament, Modi outlined his view of Australia “as a major partner in every area of

our national priority,” noting that “Australia will no longer be at the periphery, but at

the centre of India’s vision.21

Vietnam

Vietnam’s increasingly tense relationship with China and its geostrategic position in

Indochina and the South China Sea makes Vietnam a natural partner for India to

balance against China in its own neighborhood. The Modi government has devoted

considerable diplomatic effort to enhancing ties with Vietnam, having sent External

Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and President Pranab Mukherjee to Vietnam and

receiving Vietnamese prime minister Dung in Delhi.

China is suspicious of India’s growing partnership with Vietnam, not least because of

its potential to draw India into the South China Sea through oil-block exploration and

investment. India has also expressed its support for freedom of navigation in the

South China Sea, signaled its commitment to Vietnam’s security, extended a $100

million export line of credit and hinted that New Delhi and Hanoi were discussing a

proposal to supply BrahMos anti-ship missiles to Vietnam. Given that India and

Vietnam both use similar Russian defense platforms, there is much potential for joint

training and technology transfer between the two.

It is clear that India is investing a significant amount of effort in these partnerships,

with a view to consolidating its position in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course, India’s

ability to realize its Asia-Pacific ambitions will be dependent on a number of external

and internal conditions, including the stability of its neighborhood and its relationship

with Pakistan, the security situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of allied

forces and India’s own domestic economic and political situation.22

21 Prime Minister of Australia the Hon Tony Abbott, MP, “Joint Statement with Prime Minister Modi, New Delhi, India,” https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09- 05/joint-statement-prime-minister-modi-new-delhi-india.22 Carl Thayer, “How India-Vietnam Strategic Ties are Mutually Beneficial,” TheDiplomat, 3 December 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/how-india-vietnamstrategic-ties-are-mutually-beneficial/

16

The economic relationship between India and Vietnam is fairly minor, ranking only

29th among India’s top bilateral trading partners. That said, in the past five years,

trade between India and Vietnam has more than tripled.

17

EVALUATING MODI’S LOOK EAST POLICY

India has been pursuing closer engagement with the Asia-Pacific for over two decades

now. In order to be transformative, however, the Modi Government must look beyond

what has already been pledged to pursue serious and deep strategic partnerships

throughout the region. This seriousness would be gauged through a number of

indicators. On the political level, there would need to be greater engagement with East

and Southeast Asian partners, and greater diplomatic resourcing throughout the

region. There would also need to be more active involvement in relevant multilateral

institutions, such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC, to

which India has applied for membership. On the economic front, it can be expected

that India’s trade engagement with existing East and Southeast Asian partners will

continue. But the extent to which India is willing to liberalize its domestic restrictions

to allow greater levels of foreign investment will be a clearer indication of India’s

commitment to strengthening relations with the Asia Pacific particularly with regard

to Japan. Finally, a key indicator will be enhanced defence cooperation and

assistance, including joint exercises, defence transfers, and financial or technological

assistance. Conclusion on the sale of advanced weaponry to the region, and naval

cooperation, particularly in trilateral arrangements, will be of particular significance.

In recent years, it is clear that India’s engagement with East and Southeast Asia has

been driven primarily by the challenge of responding to China.

As such, the kind of regional relationships pursued by the Government will be

affected by the way China’s ties with India and its other neighbors continue to

develop. Should China persist with its current accelerated rate of incursions along

India’s disputed border, or should China’s presence in the Indian Ocean acquire a

significant military dimension, India is likely to pursue a deeper relationship with

critical partners such as Japan, Vietnam, Australia, ASEAN, and Indonesia. Similarly,

should China’s assertive behaviour in maritime territorial disputes in Asia continue to

be regionally destabilizing, it can be expected that states in East and Southeast Asia

will look more seriously towards India to assume an influential role in the region’s

security architecture.

18

India’s evolving relationship with the United States will also influence its engagement

with East and Southeast Asia, given the continuation of America’s critical role and its

stake in the region’s security. The United States has for some time expressed a desire

for an enhanced global role for India.

Thus far, the Modi Government appears serious about developing a more substantial

partnership with the United States, as demonstrated by the breadth of Modi’s first visit

to the United States in October 2014 and the invitation for President Obama to visit

India as Chief Guest for Republic Day in January 2015. In all this, access to advanced

US military technology is likely to be a key objective for India.

19

PM ON LOOK-EAST POLICY

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Thursday told world leaders that his government

accorded high priority to turn India’s erstwhile “Look East” policy into an “Act East”

policy.

“Since entering office six months ago, my government has moved with a great sense

of priority and speed to turn our ’Look East Policy’ into ‘Act East Policy’,” Mr. Modi

said in his address to the East Asia Summit in the Myanmarese capital Nay Pyi Taw.

“The East Asia Summit is an important pillar of this policy,” he said.

“Look East” was introduced in the early 1990s when the Congress party’s PV

Narasimha Rao was prime minister. It was endorsed by former prime ministers Atal

Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh.

Mr. Modi said the initiatives taken by the East Asia Summit in disaster preparedness

and response are truly commendable.

“No other forum brings together such a large collective weight of global population,

youth, economy and military strength. Nor is any other forum so critical for peace,

stability and prosperity in Asia-Pacific and the world,” he said.

In recognition of the centrality of the institution, at this year’s India-ASEAN summit

Modi announced that India’s long-standing Look East Policy would be upgraded to

“Act East.” This is more than just a rebrand and signals India’s willingness to play a

more active role in the region.23

Under Modi, India has invested particular effort in strengthening ties with its East and

Southeast Asian partners.  Under the new leadership in Delhi, India’s Look East

policy has morphed into a proactive Act East policy, which envisages accelerated

across-the-board engagement between the two growth poles of a vibrant Asia. This

has been reflected in a spate of two-way visits in the first few months of the Modi

government. President Pranab Mukherjee went on a landmark visit to Vietnam in

September, followed by the visit of Vietnam’s prime minister to New Delhi in

23http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/look-east-policy-now-turned-into-act-east-policy-modi/article6595186.ece

20

October. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj chose Myanmar as one of her first

few foreign destinations abroad in August, and met a spectrum of ministers from

ASEAN countries as well as East Asian countries. She has already visited Vietnam

and Singapore and looks set to travel to most of other ASEAN countries in the months

ahead. During her visit to Singapore, India’s foreign minister articulated the need for

an Act East policy forcefully: "Look East is no longer adequate; now we need Act

East policy.”

21

OBSTACLES TO REALISING THESE AMBITIONS

India’s engagement with East and Southeast Asia will, to some extent, is contingent

on the regional situation in South Asia. Indian public opinion reveals that Pakistan is

still perceived to present the greatest threat to Indian security in the next ten years,

with Pakistani-launched terrorism the primary reason for this level of threat

perception. This is particularly salient in light of Al Qaeda’s announcement of a new

South Asia ‘branch’ in September 2014 and wider concerns about a potential South

Asia dimension to the rise of Islamic State. Should relations with Pakistan

substantially deteriorate, or a major Pakistan-backed terror attack occur on Indian soil,

it should be expected that India’s primary international focus will revert swiftly to its

own neighborhood. Destabilization in the countries to India’s west could also impact

on India’s pursuit of its interests in East Asia. As 68 per cent of India’s imported oil

and $US30 billion of remittances come from millions of Indian workers in the Persian

Gulf, the Middle East will continue to be of significance to India.24

The power vacuum and resultant instability that may follow the US withdrawal from

Afghanistan also has the potential to shift much Indian attention from east to west.

Even so, and despite ties with Israel, which Modi seems keen to enhance, West Asia

is not likely to grow as a priority for India it the same way as the Asia-Pacific. In any

case, Modi’s advocacy of a “Look East, Link West” policy suggests that his broader

foreign policy vision is connected to success in both spheres.

24 Malik, “The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain”; Alyssa Ayres, “India’s Stakes in the Middle East,” Forbes, 26 February 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/alyssaayres/2014/02/26/indias-stakes-in-the-middleeast/.

22

CONCLUSION

In its first months since assuming office, the Modi Government has signalled its

intention to pursue serious engagement with the AsiaPacific and prioritise high-level

interactions with China, ASEAN, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan, and Australia. Modi’s

overwhelming electoral victory has not only afforded his government the opportunity

to pursue a serious strategy in the Asia-Pacific, but has enhanced the perception of

India as an attractive security partner in the region. Deeper engagement with the

region will align with Modi’s intentions to Indian economic growth and carve out a

more prominent global role for India.

In addition, prioritising relations with India’s East and Southeast Asian partners will

fulfil India’s broader strategic objectives of balancing against China’s increasing

presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s assertive stance in its border dispute with India

and maritime territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific is increasing the relevance of a

stronger Indian presence in the region. If it is able to carefully manage Chinese

sensitivities, cautious Indian engagement has the potential to act as a stabilising force

in the region.

India’s Look East Policy has over the last two decades strengthened its economic,

political, security, and civilization links with the rest of Asia. To cope with the global

financial turmoil, India however should become even more persistent and proficient in

deepening its linkages with the rest of Asia, while strengthening its capacities to meet

its developmental challenges.

To accomplish this task, India will need to develop far greater expertise in geo-

economics, an area that has not received the requisite attention. India should also

consider establishing a well funded, resources, think-tank for researching, debating,

communicating, and influencing foreign policy issues and options. This will also

enable India to better communicate its intentions to rest of the world, including its

partners in Asia. Thus, the success of the policy depends on the commitment of the

23

Indian government to implement the proposed plans and projects under the policy and

to give role for the Northeastern states in this policy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Referred

Yadav, R. and Dhanda, S. (2009). India's foreign policy. Delhi: Shipra

Publications.

Zajaczkowski, J., Schottli, J. and Thapa, M. (n.d.). India in the contemporary

world.

Yu, G. (1977). Intra-Asian international relations. Boulder, Colo.: Westview

Press.

Haokip, T. (n.d.). India's Look East Policy and the Northeast.

Ram, A. (2012). Two decades of India's look East policy. New Delhi: Indian

Council of World Affairs.

Websites Referred –

Forbes.com, (2015). Forbes Welcome. [online] Available at:

http://www.forbes.com/sites/alyssaayres/2014/02/26/indias-stakes-in-the-

middleeast/ [Accessed 19 Sep. 2015].

The Hindu, (2014). ‘Look East’ policy now turned into ‘Act East’ policy:

Modi. [online] Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/look-

east-policy-now-turned-into-act-east-policy-modi/article6595186.ece

[Accessed 19 Sep. 2015].

Ausaid.gov.au, (2015). Australia's aid program - Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade. [online] Available at:

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Documents/india_east.pdf (accessed on

17 September 2015). [Accessed 19 Sep. 2015].

24

Rediff.com, (2015). India-China relations: Ten-pronged strategy. [online]

Available at: http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/21jintao6.htm [Accessed

19 Sep. 2015].

En.people.cn, (2015). [online] Available at:

http://en.people.cn/90002/96417/7179404.html [Accessed 19 Sep. 2015].

Mea.gov.in, (2015). Sorry for the inconvenience.. [online] Available at:

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/23965/Tokyo+Declaration

+for+India++Japan+Special+Strate gic+and+Global+Partnership [Accessed

19 Sep. 2015].

25