9

Ethnomethodology

Paul ten Have

Ethnomethodological studies seek to treat practical activities, practical circumstances, and practical socio-logical reasoning as topics of empirical studies, and by paying to the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention usually accorded extraordinary events, seek to learn about them as phenomena in their own right.

(Garfinkel, 1967: 1)

Ethnomethodology's standing task is to examine social facts, just in every and any actual case asking for each thing, what makes it accountably just what that social fact is?

(Garfinkel, 2002: 251)

Within the large and heterogeneous family of qualitative social science approaches, 'ethno-methodology' (EM) is a rather strange cousin. While most qualitative researchers try to describe and explain a form of social life as experienced by its participants, ethnomethodolo-gists propose to study the ways in which collec-tivity members create and maintain a sense of order and intelligibility in social life. In this chapter, I will offer a selective summary account of the emergence, character and development of ethnomethodology as a unique 'alternate socio-logy'. After an introductory sketch, I will expli-cate some of ethnomethodology's core notions. The problem of studying common-sense prac-tices will be the theme of my discussion of the ways in which ethnomethodological studies are done, through 'breaching experiments', particu-lar kinds of field studies and the ubiquitous use of audio or video recordings. The chapter ends with some reflections on ways in which ethno-methodology might be combined with or applied to different perspectives on social life, including practical ones.

HAROlD GARFINKEl

Ethnomethodology emerged as a distinctive per-spective and style of social research in the teach-ings and publications of one man, Harold Garfinkel. From a varied set of 'sources of inspi-ration', including on the one hand most promi~ nently his teacher and PhD supervisor Talcott Parsons, and on other the phenomenological philosophies of Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch and Edmund Husserl, he has forged a new vision of what social inquiry could be. Taking off from Parsons's synthesization of various classical tradi-tions of sociological theorizing, these have been in a way 'turned on their heads' in ethnomethodol-ogy. For the Durkheimian strand in classical soci-ology, and social research more generally, the ultimate goal is to investigate 'social facts', and their determinants, where 'social facts' have the twin characteristic of being both 'external' and 'constraining' to the actions of individuals. In ethnomethodology, on the other hand - to adapt a phrase from Melvin Pollner (1974) - 'facts are treated as accomplishments', that is, they are seen as being produced in and through members' prac-tical activities. While classical (Durkheimian) sociology is in the business of explaining social facts, the effort of ethnomethodology is directed towards an explication of their constitution. In Harold Garfinkel's recent book (2002), this inter-est is presented as a kind of exhumation of a neglected aspect of Durkheim's sociological per-spective. In relation to the interests of most quali-tative researchers, who want to know the world as participants see it, ethnomethodologists prefer to study how, by the use of which procedures and methods, any particular 'world' is produced and perceived.

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Doing ethnomethodological studies requires a deep familiarity with the world that is being stud-ied, while at the same time being able to distance oneself from its ordinariness, in order to see how it is methodically constituted. Common-sense practices are hard to 'see', because they are so self-evident for their practitioners. One strategy that Garfinkel used to break the spell of ordinari-ness was to breach the expectancies on which such practices are based. But while these 'breaching experiments' became quite famous or rather infamous, Garfinkel has not limited his efforts to such tricks. The most common way to do ethnomethodological research is to observe naturally occurring situations as closely as poss-ible, which often involves the use of audio or video recordings, but may also depend on quite ordinary ethnographic research practices. There is, however, a marked preference for situations in which ordinary sense-making practices in one way or another seem to run into difficulties, which makes them more amenable for study.

Ethnomethodology's relationship with its 'mother discipline' sociology, and by extension to all 'social science', is rather complex. Both share a deep interest in problems of social order and try to elucidate the organization of social life in all its manifestations. But their general approach is very different. This difference should not in the first place be seen as one of 'research methods', as ordinarily conceived, but as one of analytic inter-ests, problematics or conception. Rather than focusing on issues like the choice between quali-tative and quantitative research, the problem is one of research purpose, or the functions that various methods and results have in the argumen-tation of a research project. Indeed, the observa-tion that ethnomethodological inquiries have a 'qualitative' character does not produce, by itself, a commonality of analytic interests with other kinds of qualitative social research. The purpose of this chapter is to explicate ethnomethodology's interests and problems as these are implicated in its research practices. Before I turn to a discussion of specific practices and examples, however, it may be useful to try to elucidate some of ethno-methodology's core notions, which are often expressed in a rather specific jargon. I

CORE NOTIONS

These core notions include member and member-ship, accomplishment, accounts, accountability and accounting practices, indexicality, indexical expressions, glossing practices and reflexivity. A

quote like the following, from the first page of ethnomethodology's foundational book, Harold Garfinkel's Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967), already contains most of these jargon terms.

Ethnomethodological studies analyze evcryday activitics as mcmbers' methods for making those same activities v i si b Iy -rational-and-rcportab I e -fo r-all-practic al-purposes, i.e., 'accountable', as organizations of com-monplace everyday activities. Thc reflexivity of that phenomenon is a singular feature of practical actions, of practical circumstances, of common sense knowledge of social structures, and of practical sociological rea-soning. By permitting us to locate and examine their occurrence the reflcxivity of that phenomenon estab-lishes their study. (Garfinke\, 1967: vii)

The first sentence quoted specifies the special interest of ethnomethodological studies in the ways in which practical actors demonstrate in the way they do things what they are doing. That is, they somehow provide for the intelligibility of their actions in the very design and execution of those actions. One could say that actors give a 'running commentary' on their actions, if one accepts that this may be non-verbal and if one also accepts that the commentary and the action that is commented on are inseparable. It is this latter feature that Garfinkel points at in the second sentence about 'reflexivity': the accounts refer back to the actions of which they are a part. And finally, because, and in the way they are made intelligible, these practices can be studied.

One should also note the use of the notion 'members' in the first sentence of the quotation. Ethnomethodology is not interested in 'individu-als' as such, but in the competences involved in being a bona-fide member of a collectivity. As Garfinkel writes in a note:

I use the term 'competence' to mean the claim that a col\ectivity member is entitled to exercise that hc is capable of managing his everyday affairs without inter-fcrcnce. That members can take such claims for granted I rcfer to by spcaking of a person as a 'bona-fide' col\cctivity member .... The terms 'col\ectivity' and 'col\ectivity mcmber' are intended in strict accord with Talcott Parsons' usage in The Social System . ... (Garfinkel, 1967: 57, note 8)

In their 1970 essay, Garfinkel and Sacks (p. 342) write in a similar way that: 'The notion of member is the heart of the matter. We do not use the term to refer to a person. It refers instead to mastery of natural language .... '

The stress on the properti.es and usage of 'natural language' in this quotation is related to an early preoccupation ofGarfinkel with 'indexical expressions'. These are expressions whose sense

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depends on the local circumstances in which they are uttered and/or those to which they apply. Expressions like 'you' or 'yesterday' are obvious examples. But, if you think of it, on all occa-sions, all expressions (and actions) are in fact indexical. Early in the Studies, Garfinkel writes about 'the unsatisfied programmatic distinction between and substitutability of objective for indexical expressions' (Garfinkel, 1967: 4-7). In all areas of social life, especially the more formal ones, an enormous effort is made to use objective statements that have a general validity, indepen-dent of particular communicative situations. But, Garfinkel maintains, particular conditions of intelligibility are always implicated. Contrary to the generally adhered-to a programme of 'objec-tivism', Garfinkel seems to suggest that indexi-cality could be seen as a generally available resource for achieving understanding:

The properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions are ordered properties. These consist of organi-zationally demonstrable sense, or facticity, or methodic use, or agreement among 'cultural colleagues'. Their ordered properties consist of organizationally demon-strable rational properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions. Those ordered properties are ongoing achievements of the concerted commonplace activities of investigators. The demonstrable rationality of index-ical expressions and indexical actions retains over the course of its managed production by members the char-acter of ordinary, familiar, routinized practical circum-stances .... I use the term 'ethnomethodology' to refer to the investigation of the rational properties of indexi-cal expressions and other practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday life. (Garfinkel, 1967: 11)

And in Garfinkel and Sacks's collaborative essay, a similar mission statement can be found:

The interests of ethnomethodological research are directed to provide, through detailed analyses, that account-able phenomena are through and through prac-tical accomplishments. We shall speak of 'the work' of that accomplishment in order to gain the emphasis for it of an ongoing course of action. The work is done as assemblages of practices whereby speakers in the situ-ated particulars of speech mean something different from what they can say injust so many words, that is, as 'glossing practices'. (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 342)

In other words, ethnomethodological studies are focused on explicating the continuous and endless 'work' by which members of society constitute the intelligibility of the activities that make up that society. Or, to quote one ofthe more concise defi-nitions of ethnomethodology, the interest is in how actions and accounts are constituted in

relation to each other: 'Ethnomethodology can be described briefly as a way to investigate the genealogical relationship between social practices and accounts ofthose practices' (Lynch, 1993: 1).

Since the publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology in 1967, ethnomethodology has developed in various ways, one of the most important being the emergence of conversation analysis (CA) as a related-as-well-as-separate discipline. CA is related to ethnomethodology in its stress on the local achievement of order by the use of socially organized procedures, most notably sequential organization, which can be seen as one of the major ways in which 'indexi-cal expressions' gain their local intelligibility (cf. Maynard and Clayman, 1991; Clayman and Maynard, 1995).

While the core of ethnomethodological preoc-cupations has stayed the same, a range of new concepts and new fields of application have emerged. Some of Garfinkel' s early writings could be read as suggesting that ethnomethodol-ogy would be in the business of formulating gen-eral rules, statements, practices or procedures used in the constitution of local social orders. The later work, however, clearly stresses the idea that those practices, etc., are too intimately tied to the occasions at which they are being used to be discussed 'independently' of them (Garfinkel, 1991, 1996, 2002). This has been especially clear in ethnomethodological studies of a range of complicated professional activities, as in studies of research laboratories (Lynch, 1985, and many other publications), mathematical proofing (Livingston, 1986) and piano improvisation (Sudnow, 1978,2001). The general idea is that conventional studies of various specialized kind of work miss the essential 'what' ofthose activi-ties in favour of traditional sociological features such as 'professionaIization', 'status considera-tions', 'lines of communication', etc. Garfinkel has suggested that in order to be able to study the specifics - the 'quiddity' or 'just whatness' - that make up a particular profession, an investigator should develop a rather deep competence in that type of work. This has been called the 'unique adequacy requirement of methods' (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992; Garfinkel, 2002). StilI later Garfinkel dropped the term 'quiddity' or 'just whatness' in favour of 'haecceity' or 'just this-ness', presumably in order to avoid suggestions of a stable 'core' that would define a particular' practice (Garfinkel, 1991, 2002). Whatever the fancy terms, the urge is still to study the rational, in the sense of reasonable, properties of indexi-cal expressions and indexical actions. The mission of recent ethnomethodology has been

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formulated as one of , re specification' of the classic concepts of Western science and philosophy, such as 'order', 'logic', 'rationality', 'action', etc., as members' practices (cf. Garfinkel, 1991, 1996; Lynch, 1993; Lynch and Bogen, 1996). In other words, the grand themes of our intellectual culture are taken up in a fresh way as embodied in local, situated and intelligible practices (Button, 1991).

STUDYING COMMON-SENSE PRACTICES

For ethnomethodology, common-sense practices are the topic of study, but those practices are also, unavoidably, relied on by the researcher her- or himself. Without the use of common-sense, its object of study would be simply unavailable, because it is constituted by the application of common-sense methods. So the problem for ethnomethodology is how common-sense practices and common-sense knowledge can lose their status as an unexamined 'resource', in order to become a 'topic' for analysis. Don Zimmerman and Melvin Pollner (1971) have stated the issues in the following terms:

In contrast to the perennial argument that sociology belabors the obvious, we propose that sociology has yet to treat the obvious as a phenomenon. We argue that the world of everyday life, while furnishing sociology with its favored topics of inquiry, is seldom a topic in its own right. Instead, the familiar, common-sense world, shared by the sociologist and his subjects alike, is employed as an unexplicated resource for contemporary sociological investigations.

Sociological inquiry is addressed to phenomena rec-ognized and described in common-sense ways (by reliance on the unanalyzed properties of natural lan-guage), while at the same time such common-sense recognitions and descriptions are pressed into service as fundamentally unquestioned resources for analyzing the phenomena thus made available for study. Thus, con-temporary sociology is characterized by a confounding of topic and resource. (Zimmerman and Pollner, 1971: 80-1)

It is a double-faced problem: on the one hand a problem of minimizing the unexamined use of common sense, and on the other that of maximiz-ing its examinability. This double-sided problem seems to be in principle unsolvable; one is bound to lose either the resource or the topic. So what one has to do is to find practical solutions, which are unavoidably compromises. In an earlier pub-lication (ten Have, 1990), I have suggested a rough typology for these practical solutions.

The first type is especially prominent in Garfinkel's early work (1967). This strategy con-sists of the close study of sense-making activities in situations where they are especially prominent. Such situations are those in which sharp discrep-ancies, between on the one hand existing expec-tations and/or competences, and on the other practical behavioural and/or interpretative tasks, necessitate extraordinary sense-making efforts by members. Such situations may occur naturally -as in the case of a 'transsexual' studied by Garfinkel (1967: 116--85) - or they may be created on purpose, as in the so-called 'breaching' experiments (Garfinkel, 1967: 35-103; also Garfinkel, 2002, on 'tutorial problems').

In order to escape some of the practical and ethical problems generated by such experiments, a different strategy was developed, in which researchers study their own sense-making work by putting themselves in some kind of extraordi-nary situation. This may be a situation where routine sense-making procedures are bound to fail, or where one has to master a difficult and unknown task, or where one is instructed by a setting's members to see the world in a way that is natural for them but not for oneself. Mehan and Wood (1975: 225-38) use the expression 'becoming the phenomenon', while Schwartz and Jacobs (1979: 247--65) recommend strate-gies like becoming The Stranger or The Novice. These strategies can be considered variations on the theme that by 'becoming a member', the researcher can gain a more intimate access to the intricacies of 'being a member' than by other investigative means. Out of many possible exam-ples I would like to mention David Sudnow's (1978, 2001) study oflearning to play improvised jazz at the piano, and Lawrence Wieder's (1974) study of his being instructed in the use of 'the Convict Code' as a general interpretative and explanatory device in a half-way house for paroled addicts.

While, in these cases, a researcher's own experiences play an important role, in others ethnomethodologists have used more or less ordinary ethnographic fieldwork practices. They have been closely observing situated activities in their natural settings and discussing them with the seasoned practitioners, in order to study the competences involved in the routine perfor-mance of these activities. To further this close study, or to be able to study these activities after the fact, recording equipment is often used, but researchers may also rely on. traditional note-taking in order to produce their data. Early exam-ples of this kind of study can be found in Garfinkel's (1967) work on juries and coroners, Sudnow's (1967) study of hospital procedures

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concerning death and dying, and Zimmerman' s (1969) study of case-workers in a welfare agency.

In an increasing number of ethnomethodologi-cal projects, and in all those belonging to ethno-methodology's close relative conversation analysis (CA), research materials are collected by mechanically recording interactional prac-tices using audio or video equipment. These recordings are then studied directly, but they are also transcribed in a way that limits the use of common-sense procedures to hearing what is being said and noting how is has been said. These transcriptions have a double function: they are used to locate particular phenomena, and they can furthermore be shown to others, or quoted in publications, to support analytic claims made about the recorded practices. Working with recordings and transcripts in CA is discussed in Anssi Perakyla's contribution to this volume (Chapter 11) (see also Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; ten Have, 1999a). The study by Michael Lynch and David Bogen (1996) of the Iran-Contra hearings, to be discussed later, is an example of a non-CA ethnomethodological study based on broadcast video recordings.

In specific projects, these practices may be combined in various ways. Wieder's (1974) study, here cited as exemplifying the second strategy, can also be seen as an example of the third, as his analysis of his own learning of and being instructed in 'seeing' the world of the half-way house in terms of 'the code' is embedded in general ethnographic descriptions. And while CA studies used to rely almost exclusively on recordings and transcripts, in more recent years such analyses are increasingly embedded in and inspired by more ethnographically informed understandings, especially in so-called 'work-place studies' focused on technologically com-plex environments (cf. Button, 1993; Heath and Luff, 2000; Luff et aI., 2000, for examples).

The general idea lying behind these research practices is thus to evade as far as possible the unthinking and unnoticed use of common sense that seems to be inherent in empirical research practices in the social sciences at large. The ethnomethodological critique of these practices comes down to the objection that in so doing one studies idealized and decontextualized 'recon-structions' of social life, made by the research subjects and/or the researcher, instead of that life in its own situated particulars. For that reason, those analyses are called 'constructive' (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). So ethnographers may be said to study their pwn field notes as an unexamined resource for their study of a com-munity's life. Or researchers using interviews study the responses they have recorded as an

unexarnined resource for their study of 'underlying' opinions and unobserved activities. In both cases, the situated 'production' of those materi-als is not given systematic attention in its own right. The theoretical objects of such studies tend to be either individuals or collectivities. In con-trast to such a 'methodological individualism' or 'collectivism', ethnomethodology and CA prefer a position that is closer to what Karin Knorr-Cetina (1981, 1988: 22) has called 'methodologi-cal situationalism'. She has formulated this position in terms ofthe then current micro/macro and agency/structure debates: 'I shall call methodological situationalism the principle which demands that descriptively adequate accounts of large-scale social phenomena be grounded in statements about actual social behaviour in concrete situations' (1988: 22).

BREACHING EXPERIMENTS

The aspect of Garfinkel's work that originally was most surprising to outsiders was his use of experimental demonstrations in which covert expectations were 'breached'. Of course people were familiar with a range of experimental set-ups in social psychology, which often involved quite elaborate deceptions, but these were based on a strictly defined cause-and-effect model, and used elaborate 'controls' and quantitative meth-ods to produce reliable results. In contrast to these, the design of Garfinkel's experiments was 'loose' and their effects were not discussed in terms of causes and effects. Furthermore, only some of them were done in a laboratory setting, while many were 'field experiments' given as assignments to his students. And while Garfinkel used the expression 'experiment' and 'experi-menter' in his reports, he also stresses their special character as follows:

A word of reservation. Despite their procedural empha-sis, my studies are not properly speaking experimental. They are demonstrations designed, in Herbert Spiegelberg's phrase, as 'aids to a sluggish imagina-tion'. I have found that they produce reflections through which the strangeness of an obstinately familiar world can be detected. (Garfinkel, 1967: 38)

So in terms of their function, these arrangements were 'pedagogical demonstrations', and as such they are part of a larger collection of often inge-nious, surprising and at times humorous instructions. The ultimate 'target' of these demonstrations was always the 'incompleteness' of efforts at literal description of real-worldly events or elaborate instructions for action within the world, and

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thereby of the inevitable 'work' involved in their everyday use. A few examples may clarify how these demonstrations were designed and with what effect.

In the first chapter of his Studies, Garfinkel reports on a study of coding practices (pp. 18-24). Two graduate students had to code the contents of clinic folders in terms of a coding sheet designed as part of a study of selection criteria and patient careers. It soon became clear that the coders, in order to code the folder contents to their satisfaction as adequate descriptions of what happened in the clinic, constantly used informal knowledge of clinic procedures. In other words, the instructions contained in the coding sheets were by themselves insufficient to perform the coding task. Coders had to rely on additional reasonings that Garfinkel glosses as 'ad hoc considerations', which include 'such considerations as, "et cetera", "unless", "let it pass", and "factum valet" (i.e., an action that is otherwise prohibited by a rule is counted correct once it is done)' (pp. 20-1).

In another student assignment, he asked them to write up at the left of a sheet of paper a con-versation in which they had participated, adding in a separate column to the right 'what they and their partners understood that they were talking about' (p. 38). He quotes one example and dis-cusses it at some length in two different chapters (pp. 24-31, 38--42):

Students filled out the left side of the sheet quickly and easily, but found the right side incomparably more dif-ficult. When the assignment was made, many asked how much I wanted them to write. As I progressively imposed accuracy, clarity, and distinctness, the task became increasingly laborious. Finally, when I required that they assume I would know what they had actually talked about only from reading literally what they wrote literally, they gave up with the complaint that the task was impossible. (Garfinkel, 1967: 26)

Both parties to a conversation used and relied on a presupposedly common body of knowledge to 'hear' what was said as making sense, using the progression of successively produced items as 'documents' to be elaborated in a process of discovering what was meant, as an underlying 'pattem'.2

The anticipation that persons will understand, the occa-sionality of expressions, the specific vagueness of ref-erences, the retrospective-prospective sense ofa present occurrencc, waiting for something later in order to see what was meant before, are sanctioned properties of common discourse. (Garfinkel, 1967: 41)

Many of the breaching experiments can be seen as further elaborations of this theme of the

'incompleteness' of literal descriptions and instructions, and the unavoidable use of ad hoc considerations relying on available informal knowledge. Students were, for instance, 'instructed to engage an acquaintance or a friend in an ordi-nary conversation and, without indicating that what the experimenter was asking was in any way unusual, to insist that the person clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks' (p. 42). Here is one of the examples quoted by Garfinkel:

The subject was telling the experimenter, a member of the subject's car pool, about having had a flat tire while going to work the previous day.

(S) I had a flat tire. (E) What do you mean, you had a flat tire?

She appeared momentarily stunned. Then she answered in a hostile way: 'What do you mean, "What do you mean?" A flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant. Nothing special. What a crazy question!' (Garfinkel, 1967: 42)

What was generally observed in these and other breaching experiments was that the 'victims' - as Garfinkel calls them - first tried to 'normalize' the situation, and when this was unsuccessful, reacted with 'astonishment, bewilderment, shock, anxiety, embarrassment, and anger'.

While most of these demonstrations were field experiments with student experimenters, a few were done in a laboratory setting with similar results. In one set-up, subjects were instructed to ask questions about some personal problem in yes/no format and - after they received an answer - record their comments and interpreta-tions, before asking a next question. In fact the choice of an answer as 'yes' or 'no' was based on a table of random numbers. The subjects did not know this and were most of the time able to hear the 'yes' or 'no' as a sensible answer to their question. Garfinkel used this experiment as a demonstration of 'the documentary method of interpretation', which is not so much a specific 'method' of 'interpretative sociology' as one unavoidably used in everyday life as well as in all kinds of sociological inquiry (Garfinkel, 1967: 76--103):

The method consists of treating an actual appearance as 'the document of', as 'pointing to', as 'standing on behalf of' a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 'what is known' about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other. (Garfinkel, 1967: 78)

Taken as a whole, Garfinkel's 'breaching experi-ments' were explicative devices, pedagogical

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tricks or tutorials clarifying and demonstrating conceptual issues, rather than research projects as ordinarily perceived. In later periods he has continued to use these and similar devices, but I will not take these up now (cf. Garfinkel, 2002). Such experiments and demonstrations have not become stock-in-trade ways of doing ethno-methodological studies, although in some respects they have influenced the ways in which ethnomethodologists choose research settings and approaches, for instance by investigating settings or experiences in which sense-making was, for some 'natural' reason, especially acute (cf., for instance, Lynch, 1985; Pollner, 1987; Maynard, 1996).

BECOMING A MEMBER

As noted before, breaching expectancies is not the only possibility to make common-sense prac-tices 'visible'. One can observe situations in which such practices are particularly acute for others or for oneself. By placing oneself in a situation in which one encounters particular sense-making difficulties, or by entering such situations for other motives, or even by a whim of fate, one can study how one deals with that situation, as well as how others react to it. In this section, I will discuss some examples of such strategies, both published and unpublished.

To start, I will present some reflections on a learning task, recognizing species of birds by their songs and calls. As part of our membership we know that life forms are being differentiated in multi-layered systems of classification. Plants are seen as basically different from animal forms, mammals as different from birds and insects, etc. Depending on the circumstances of our upbringing and our personal interests, we may learn to make some finer distinctions. At the age of ten, for instance, I could distinguish a number of common bird species, say Merel (Blackbird), Ekster (Magpie), Koolmees (Great Tit), Roodborst (Robin), Huismus (House Sparrow), Vink (Chaffinch), and even some less common ones like Goudvink (Bullfinch), which happened to visit our garden at times. I acquired most of this knowledge by looking at the birds and having their names mentioned to me by others. I learned to distinguish the species by sight, acquiring the ability to connect properties of form, colour and behaviour to names. Gradually, I also learned to recognize birds by their songs. The Blackbird was probably among the earliest to be known in this way, as he sang from our rooftop in spring. Seeing a bird you

know by sight sing his song is one method of building a repertoire of recognizable bird songs. Over the years I was able to enlarge my reper-toire by a variety of means, including having a song I heard 'named' for me by a co-listener, consulting descriptions in field guides and com-paring what I had heard outdoors to a specimen song recorded on tape or CD.3

According to my experience, the main diffi-culty in this learning process is to remember the details of what you hear, in order to be able to connect those with a name, on the spot or later. For colours we have names, forms can be described and behaviours characterized, but sounds are more difficult to 'catch'. There are, of course, easy cases, as the Koekoek (Cuckoo) who was given his name after his call, a so-called onomatopoeia. There are a number of ono-matopoetic bird names, as for instance - in Dutch - Grutto, Tureluur, Kieviet, Kauw and Karekiet. Often the recognizability of the ono-matopoeia in the field is not an easy matter. It may take repeated 'connection work' before the sound of, say, the Black-tailed Godwit (Limosa limosa) is effectively recognized as Grutto. What you do is 'sing' (in your mind) what you hear in the field or on the record, using the Dutch pro-nunciation of i grutto i grutto i grutto. So in a way you have to learn to hear the sound pro-duced by the bird as ifit was 'instructed' by the description. In field guides more complicated renderings are given, for instance rieta-rieta-rieta, and gr-wieto (Peterson et aI., 1984). Such renderings could be called 'transcriptions' and they are often given in combination with ordi-nary descriptions (cf. Jefferson, 1985). Here is an example for the song of the Kleine Karekiet (Reed Warbler):

'babbelend' in laag tempo, bestaand uit nerveuze, 2-4 keer herhaalde noten (onomatopoetisch), af en toe onderbroken door imitaties of fiuittonen, trett trett trett TIRri TIRri truu truu TIe tre tre wi-wuu-wu tre tre truu truu TIRri TIRri . .. , Tempo af en toe hoger, maar nooit met crescendo van Rietzanger. ['babbling' at a slow tempo, consisting of nervous, 2-4 times repeated notes (onomatopoeic), now and then interrupted by imitations or whistlings, trett trett trett TIRri TIRri truu truu TIe tre tre wi-wuu-wu tre tre truu truu TIRri TIRri . ... Tempo now and then higher, but never in crescendo like Sedge Warbler.] (Mullamey et al., 2000: 296)

Apart from such published transcriptions and" descriptions, birders use a variety of informal tricks to assist their connection work. For instance, two small birds that inhabit the same types of environments and that also sing during the winter, when most others are elsewhere or silent, are the Roodborst (Robin) and the

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Winterkoning (Wren). The song of the Robin can be described as 'pearling', and a memory-aid for the Wren is to pronounce the Dutch name in the following way: winterrrrrrrrrrrrrkoning, with the repeated rrr's representing the rattle-like part that Wrens produced in the middle of their song. So when I hear a 'small' bird in wintertime, I try to fit these two tricks on the sound and make my decision whether it is a Robin or a Wren that I am hearing. Birders exchange such tricks among themselves. The Grasmus (Whitethroat, literally 'Grass-sparrow'), for instance, is informally called Krasmus ('scratch-sparrow'), after his 'scratchy' song. Once birders have acquired a more solid kind of knowledge of a particular bird's song, they do not need these tricks any more. Experienced birders do what might be called a Gestalt recognition: they will need only a small fragment of a song to recognize the bird that produced it, mostly on the basis of the tone-quality of what they hear, together with contex-tual knowledge of which birds sing where and when. Having that ability for a substantial number of birds is a mark of expert membership. Instead of just enjoying the singing of birds in spring, they hear an ecological soundscape, a natural order.

In this project - and in two others (ten Have, 1999b, 2000), which space considerations forbid me to discuss at any length - I have been using my own experiences to gain access to some rather different kinds of membership compe-tences, in order to be able to study 'from the inside' what is involved in being a birder (or a reader/writer, or a chatter). I did not study myself as an individual, but as a member. It is hard to differentiate, in such projects, the aspects of par-ticipation and observation. I would say that here, as in some other ethnomethodological studies in which the researcher relied, at least in part, on 'becoming a member', the conventional label 'participant observation' gains a new signifi-cance. To substantiate this point, I will now dis-cuss two episodes from studies by David Goode, in which 'becoming a member' played a crucial part within an overall 'observational' study.

As part of his graduate work, Goode studied children born deaf and blind, who were also retarded and without formal language, due to a rubella infection during pregnancy. This specifi-cally involved the in-depth study of two such children, one hospitalized in a state institution and another living with her parents (Goode, 1994). An important overall theme of these explorations is the continuously emerging obser-vation that the assessment of the capabilities of these children was dependent on the character, format and frequency of the assessor's interaction

with them. In the state hospital, Goode observed that the assessments made by various specialized clinicians were markedly different from those by members of the 'direct-care' staff. The first saw the children only incidentally, for brief periods, and in terms of their practical-professional frameworks, such as medical or educational tests, while the second had to deal with the children every day in a variety of practical con-texts. When Goode started to communicate his observation-based ideas that these children might have their own perspective on things and were even 'smart' in their own ways, the very possi-bility of the children having such capacities tended to be denied by the clinicians and accepted by the direct-care staff. He therefore planned to undertake an intensive study of one child's 'world' through a period of frequent and intense interactions. Most of these interactions with 'Christina' had a playful character in that he could more and more leave his normal seeing/hearing self-evident presuppositions behind and let the child initiate a variety of forms of play. This involved, for instance, the bracket-ing ofthe usual functions of various objects, such as musical instruments, to see her use of those object as sensible-for-her, in terms of her percep-tual possibilities. In other words, he had to dis-card a remedial attitude that was so natural for all able seers/hearers when confronted with seem-ingly bizarre behaviours, since this led inevitably to the application of 'fault-finding procedures'. Here is what he did:

I decided to mimic her actions in order to gain more direct access to what such activities were providing her. I used wax ear stops (placed more securely in the left ear, since Chris has a 'better' right ear than left ear) and gauzed my left eye with a single layer of lightweight gauze to simulate the scar tissue that covers Chris's left eye. I began to imitate Chris's behaviors .... While the procedure had its obvious inadequacies with respect to my gaining access to Chris's experience of these activi-ties, I did learn a number of interesting things in this way. (Goode, 1994: 33-4)

In this way he could, for instance, understand that she would get some auditory or visual stimu-lations by moving parts of her body rhythmically in certain positions vis-it-vis particular sources of sound or light. In fact, a lot of her bizarre move-ments appeared to be 'rational' as effective means of self-stimulation in terms of her particu-lar sensory restrictions. By way of this partial imitation of her conditions. and action, Goode was able to gain at least a sense of the signifi-cance in her own terms of these acts. A major overall condition for these possibilities, however, was that he was free from custodial or pedagogical

ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 147

obligations and therefore free to play with her, allowing her to show him how she was striving for at least some 'primitive' gratifications. By becoming a 'superplaymate' to her, he was able to 'meet her' in ways that staff members could only rarely achieve.

I have tried, in these vignettes of 'becoming a member', to demonstrate some of the benefits for ethnomethodological research of combining researcher practice and observation. It provides a kind of intimate access to the experience that does not seem to be available by other means such as detached observation. In the next section I will deal with some examples of studies in which researcher involvement is less prominent.

USING AUDIONIDEO RECORDS

As noted, the use of audio and/or video record-ings, and transcriptions made after such record-ings, is an essential part of the canonical practice of conversation analysis. And although CA prac-tices have been criticized at times by eth-nomethodologists (cf. Bogen, 1999: 83-120), the use of recordings and transcripts has also become prominent in those parts of ethno-methodology that are closer to Garfinkel's core conceptions. As an illustration, I will discuss some aspects of a study by Michael Lynch and David Bogen, The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text, and Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings (1996), in which they use a variety of materials, including prominently public television broad-cast recordings. The authors investigate some of the ways in which 'history' is 'produced', by inspecting various scenes from the 1987 hearing by the US Joint House-Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaragua Opposition. I will discuss just two issues that are raised in this rich study. The first is the epistemological status of the television records and the second the application of the 'respecification' strategy.

In the introduction they write that their aim is to describe 'the production of history' , and not to 'deconstruct' it. In fact, a major phenomenon in those hearings was the pervasiveness of ' de con-struction' as a practical activity, as each party tried to undermine the accounts provided by the other. Therefore, 'deconstruction does not iden-tify our own methodological agenda, but instead it is a perspicuous feature of the struggle we describe'. And they cont~nue:

We shall assume an ability to describe and exhibit rec-ognizable features of the video text we have chosen to

examine. In this effort we shall inevitably engage in constructive (i.e., productive) practices, such as using the video text as a proxy for the live performances of interrogators and witncsses, and selcctively using writ-tcn transcripts to exhibit recurrent discursive actions. (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 14)

In other words, they rely on their own ordinary members' competences as any (informed) viewerlhearer of the tapes would, and they con-cede that their own use of tapes and documents inevitably also involves 'constructive' work, which might be criticized as well by others:

Although it is commonplace in the social sciences to lay out a set of methodological procedures that provide rea-sonable foundations for the selection and interpretation of data, in this study we trust that readers will be able to discern our methods by reference to what we say about the subject matter. Our methods are organized around, and take many of their initiatives from, the complexity and circumstances of the case at hand. (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 15)

So again, they present their own, ethnomethod-ological work on the data as 'ordinary' and intel-ligible to 'any member'. And then they construct a contrast between this ordinary way of knowing with what are presented as ideals in conventional social science:

Although it is fashionable to attribute latent episte-mologies to a text or practice being analyzed, ethno-methodology's approach to practical action and practical reasoning is more in line with the Aristotelian concept of 'phronesis'. Unlike episteme - the geomet-rical method of deducing proofs from axioms - phron-esis takes its departure from the conventional recognizability of a perspicuous case. The presumption is that a community of readers will grasp enough of the details in question, with no need to justify such under-standing on ultimate grounds, so that relevant maxims and precedents can be brought to bear on the case and extended to others like it. The failure of such a method to live up to the universal standards of procedvre and proof associated with Euclidean geometry carries no necessary stigma. Indeed, it can be argued that science and mathematics do not fully exemplify episteme, and that at the moment of their production all inquiries involve an effort to come to terms with relevant circumstances. (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 15)

In effect, then, the authors offer a contrast between 'ordinary' understanding practices and 'formal' idealizations concerning proper ways of knowing, which are ascribed to mathematics and the sciences, although they suggest that even inquiries that fall under the latter auspices in actual fact also require 'ordinary' practices of understanding (cf. Lynch, 1985, 1993; Livingston, 1986). So, rather than claiming adherence to a set

148 ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS

of fonnal principles, they, as ethnomethodologists, refer to their co-membership of a 'community of readers' as a good enough basis for the intelligi-bility of their research materials as well as their own elaborations of those materials:

Ethnomethodology makes a topic of cases under inquiry in law, medicine, science, and daily life. This does not necessarily place the cthnomethodologist at a metaphysi-calor epistemological advantage vis-a-vis the practical actions studied, since any analysis of such actions is itself responsible for coming to terms with the circum-stantially specific and immanently recognizable features of the case before it. (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 15)

They are not after some sort of 'deeper' under-standing of what happened and they do not try to replace one or another theory of meaning with their own. And neither are they trying to evaluate the truth value of one or another version of 'what happened':

In view of the fact that so much social-scientific, liter-ary, and philosophical effort has been devoted to getting to the bottom of discourse, our aim of sticking to the surface of the text may strike some readers as curious. It is our view, however, that any deeper readings would have to ignore the complexity and texture of the surface events, and thus they would fail to explicate how an order of activities is achieved as a contingent, moment-by-moment production. (Lynch and Bogcn, 1996: 16)

What should again be evident in these remarks is that ethnomethodology takes a very special position vis-ft-vis common-sense knowledge and ways of knowing. These constitute an unavoid-ably used resource, but are also the topic of inquiry, to repeat what I have noted earlier refer-ring to Zimmennan and Pollner (1971). We can specify, moreover, two important consequences of this position. The first is that in the 'first phase' of their inquiries, ethnomethodologists' reliance on common-sense methods of knowing puts them in a relation of cultural colleagues with their readers, and therefore they do not need any special warrants for their claims to understanding their materials. The second, however, connected to the second phase of inquiry, necessitates that they take a distance vis-ft-vis the differential interests and disputes of common-sense life. So in the case of Lynch and Bogen, they are not in a position to take issue with the disputes they dis-cuss, but rather they study the ways in which these differences are 'produced' in the circum-stances in which they occur. The label used to point to this particular kind of distantiation is 'ethnomethodological indifference' (cf. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 345).

The subtitle of the book - Speech, Text, and Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings - already

suggests that the authors will discuss how the epistemological status of 'speech', 'text' and 'memory' are treated in the specific context of these events. The hearings themselves consist mainly of 'speech', especially interrogative questions and answers, but in the talking, the par-ticipants continuously refer to a variety of docu-ments. Some are shown, quoted or paraphrased in situ, others are referred to in a more indirect manner, especially those that had been shredded. In a chapter on 'The documentary method of interrogation', the authors refer to a dispute between Jacques Derrida and John Searle in which Derrida objects to Searle's stress on speech and its grounding in the intention of the speaker in the speech situation, while he makes the point:

that a linguistic fragment or text does not lose its intel-ligibility when divorced from its 'original' situation and authorship. Rather, it becomes an item in (and for) an indefinite series of original, yet intelligible, uses and readings. In this way Derrida argues that writing is autonomous from speech and that its intelligibility can-not be derived from the analysis of speech situations (ideal or otherwise) .... Without taking sides in the debate (and without going deeply into it), we figure that it alerts us to an interesting and taxing problem for par-ticipants at the Iran-Contra hearings. (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 206)

In their ensuing analysis, the authors discuss episodes in which the parties to the interrogation can be seen to 'enact' different positions in this debate, for instance when the interrogator requests confinnations for various details in a text written by the witness, while the latter sub-tly limits his confinnations to surface details of the text, ostensibly ignoring the fact that he him-self was its author. In this way, the strategy of the interrogator to have the witness reveal more than the text says, that is, to let him consult his memories regarding the 'original' situation, fails to have its intended effect. This is but one example out of many of the fruitfulness of the procedure called 'respecification', which they elaborate in the methodological appendix to their book (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 272-3).

By using records of 'naturally occurring' events, ethnomethodologists can concentrate their analytic attention on the methods that par-ticipants have actually used in bringing off these events. In so doing, they are able to exhume interactional details that demonstrably have played a role in the intera

ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 149

a non-participating 'onlooker'. In a way, then, records and transcripts are devices used to enhance the visibility of details in an 'unnatural' way. As such they are part and parcel of the inevitable (?) split between living a natural order and studying it.

CONFRONTATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

I hope that the preceding sections have been able to shed some light on ethnomethodology's ways of doing research in terms of its specific intellec-tual interests. In short, EM's 'methods' are designed to elucidate the ways in which members of society create and maintain an intel-ligible lived social order. What may be seen as an open question, however, is how relevant EM's methods and findings may be for researchers with different, let us say more con-ventional, interests.

One way to approach this question is to focus again on the issue of the 'missing what', the ethnomethodological critique of conventional social science approaches that implies that they gloss over the issue of what makes up the spe-cific character of some activity (Garfinkel, 1996). A conventional ethnography may tend to use an onlooker's perspective, which is informed by specifically sociological interests. For instance, William Foot Whyte, in his classic Street Corner Society, discusses the activity of bowling as a setting in which the informal hierar-chy of the Norton gang was maintained (Whyte, 1955: 14-25). In the methodological appendix published with the second edition, he remarks that at first he had not considered that the bowl-ing events had any importance for his research:

I had been looking upon Saturday night at the bowling alleys as simply recreation for myself and my friends. I found myself enjoying the bowling so much that now and then I felt a bit guilty about neglecting my research. I was bowling with the men in order to establish a social position that would enable me to interview them and observe important things. But what were these impor-tant things? (Whyte, 1955: 320)

In his main analysis, the activity of bowling is 'reduced', it might be said, to its 'social func-tion', in this case maintaining a local ranking system. In an ethnomethodologically informed ethnography, one might try to avoid such a reduction. One could choose to study how bowl-ing was done 'as bowling', 'as recreation', or whatever the local concept might be. Ethno-methodologists try to gain an inside understanding

of the activities of the members of the local culture. It should be noted, of course, that eth-nomethodology's conception of an 'inside understanding' refers to getting a procedural grip on the activities, while other qualitative researchers might want to understand the moti-vations or perspectives of the relevant actors.

The most frequently used social science strat-egy to collect data from which to gain an actor-oriented understanding is, of course, to interview people. In contrast to this, interviewing is rarely used as a major data source in ethnomethodology (and it is not mentioned in my overview thus far). This does not mean, of course, that ethno-methodologists do not talk to people or listen to what they have to say, but rather that their gen-eral preference for 'naturally occurring events' leads to an overall avoidance of researcher-pro-voked data, including answers to researchers' questions. When interviews are used at all, they tend to be 'situated' ones, that is, as ongoing talk in an observational situation, used as support for understanding what is going on. Interviews held separately from ongoing activities are indeed quite rare, but when they occur the analysis tends to focus on aspects of 'doing an interview' using concepts from membership categorization analysis (MCA) or conversation analysis (CA). The interest, then, is in 'glossing practices', 'accounting', question/answer sequences, etc., as situated activities.

Finally, I want to consider ways in which ethnomethodology can be 'applied' to practical matters. In a rare essay on this issue, James Heap (1990) takes off from the question why one should undertake any activity, including ethno-methodological (EM) inquiries. This fits into the more general question of how one should live. This is, of course, not a 'scientific' question but a moral one. 'However, [scientific] inquiry can deliver some of what we need to know in order to make reasoned judgements in particular situations about how to act to achieve some end' (p. 39). Therefore, a research enterprise like ethnomethodology might be useful in producing bits of knowledge that may help one in making choices among courses of action. Reflection on why someone should engage in such enterprises, then, requires reflection on the kind of knowl-edge that it might produce, what kind of 'news' it might deliver. He distinguishes 'two types of news': 'things are not as they appear' and 'X is organized this way'. An often used variant of the former type of warrant is 'others got it wr:ong as to how things are' (Heap, 1990: 42). In other words, there are two approaches to warranting ethnomethodological studies, one that Heap calls the 'critical news approach' and the other the

150 ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS

'positive news approach'. The first offers a sustained critique of conventional and estab-lished conceptions of the organization of social life and ofthe practical application of knowledge based on such conceptions. What is criticized are especially the individualistic, rationalistic and mentalistic modes of thinking that still dominate most of the human sciences and its practical applications (cf., for instance, Suchman, 1987; Coulter, 1989; Button, 1991, Button et aI., 1995).

Whether it is worthwhile to do ethnomethodo-logy depends on the value of the news it pro-duces for an audience, and here Heap differentiates between a professional EM audi-ence and a lay EM audience. What he calls 'straight-ahead EM' is done for a professional EM audience and studies things chosen for their contribution to the development of ethnomethod-ological knowledge. 'Applied EM', on the other hand, is done for, and reported to, persons or organizations that have a practical interest in the phenomena and activities being studied. Such studies 'may deliver news about the structures of phenomena, and especially about the conse-quences of those structures for realizing ends and objectives regarded as important outside of eth-nomethodology's analytic interests' (Heap, 1990: 44).

In other words, 'pure' EM is analytically moti-vated and can study any activity for what it can add to 'our knowledge of how social order is made possible'. 'Applied EM', on the other hand, is done in the hope that it can deliver some news about the organization of valued activities, which may help to generate ideas as to how things may be done differently. The contrast between 'pure' and 'applied' should not be over-drawn, however:

There is no reason why straight-ahead EM cannot be done in domains and on topics of importance to non-ethnomethodologists. To render such an EM effort applied, one simply has to draw out the implications, the values of the discovered formal structures of activi-ties or reasoning for those persons having a professional interest in the affairs studied. (Heap, 1990: 44)

What applied EM is all about, ultimately, is to study the local rationality of members' practices, i.e. why it makes sense, for participants, locally, in their practical context, to do things as they are done, even if this is at odds with how these prac-tices are planned, evaluated or accounted for 'elsewhere', 'in theory', or at higher hierarchical levels in an organization (cf. ten Have, 1999a: 184-201).

To cite just one example, in a recent paper Jack Whalen and Erik Vinkhuyzen (2000)

reported on a study of the work of call-takers in service centres for users' problems with docu-ment machines. Their detailed studies revealed, among other things, that the work could be done more efficiently when the database that the call-takers were expected to use was more flexible and when the workers were stimulated to become more knowledgeable about the machines and their problems. Findings and suggestions such as these received a mixed reaction, as the designers and managers working at a distance from the work-site were much more sceptical than the ones closer by. What this study seems to suggest is that ethnomethodology's slogan of 'eth-nomethodological indifference' may hide a deeper commitment to bring to light the often neglected local competences and local rational i-ties involved in concrete practices. In his 1967 book, Garfinkel already had these scornful expressions about people being depicted as a 'cultural dope' by sociologists: 'the man-in-the-sociologist's-society who produces the stable features of the society by acting in compliance with preestablished and legitimate alternatives of action that the common culture provides' (p. 68). And in an elaboration of the contrast between eth-nomethodology and what he now calls 'formal analysis', which is equivalent to what was earlier called 'constructive analysis', he writes in his new book: 'Ethnomethodology is not critical offormal analytic investigations. But neither is it the case that EM .,. has no concern with a remedial exper-tise and has nothing to promise or deliver. Ethnomethodology is applied Ethnomethodology. However, its remedial transactions are distinctive to EM expertise' (Garfinkel, 2002: 114).

Ethnomethodology is now presented as an 'alternate sociology', but its relation to 'formal analysis' is an asymmetrical one. That is, while ethnomethodology's approach can be used to study the practices of formal-analytic investiga-tions, it is not possible for a formal-analytic inquiry to uncover the work and phenomena of ethnomethodology's studies (cf. Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992; Garfinkel, 2002: 117).

To conclude, ethnomethodology offers a unique focus on the situated creation and mainte-nance of social orders. Its research practices mostly have an observational character, with a marked preference for situations in which such orders are in some way problematic for members, which may add to the visibility of order-creating practices. In so doing, ethno-methodological inquiries may be useful to elucidate their interactive and situated character, ordinarily often overlooked as well as taken for granted.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 151

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude for the remarks by Jaber F. Gubrium, Anssi PeriikyHi, and especially Douglas W. Maynard on an earlier version of this chapter.

NOTES

For more extended explieations, sec Heritage (1984) for a broad scholarly overview, Sharrock and Anderson (1986) for a concise and sharp discussion of basic issues, Maynard and Clayman (1991) for a con-sideration of both the unique characteristics as well as the diversity of ethnomethodology, Button (199 I) for a collection of essays dealing with ethnomethodologi-cal ways of treating some of the classic themes of the human sciences, and Lynch (1993) for pointed and polemical discussions confronting ethnomethodology and the sociology of scientific knowledge. The basic source remains Garfinkel (1967), especially the first three chapters. The new book by Garfinkel (2002) reached me after the present chapter was drafted. It has an extensive introduction by the editor, Ann Rawls, and will be the major source for years to come.

2 These terms are taken from Garfinkel's definition of 'the documentary method of interpretation', quoted later in this section.

3 Cf. Law and Lynch (1988) for a study of bird watching and the design of field guides as viewing instructions.

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