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¡'J4 HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVB RBSBARCH

6 •

Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research

EGON G. GUBA

YVONNA S. LINCOLN

In Conclusion

The researcher-as-bricoleur cannot afford to be a stranger to any of theparadigms discussed in this part of the Handbook. He or she must understandthe basic ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of

each, and be able to engage them in dialogue (Guba, 1990). The differencesbetween paradigms have significant and important implications at the practical, everyday, empiricallev eL A resolution of paradigm differences, Guba and

Lincoln cogently note in Chapter 6, is most likely to occur "i f and whenproponents of these several [paradigms] come togethe r to discuss their differences, not to argue the sanctity of their views."

References

Burawoy, M. (1992). The exten ded caSe method. In M.

Burawoy. A. Burton, A. A. Ferguson, K. J. Fox, J.

Gamson, N. Gartrell, L. Hurst, C. Kurzman, L.

Salzinger. J. Scbiffman, & S. Vi (Eds.), Ethnogra

phy unbound: Power and resistance in the modern

metropolis (pp. 271-290). Berkeley: Uníversity of

California Press.Carspecken, P. F., & Apple, M. (1992). Critical re

search: Theory, methodOlogy, and practice. In M.

D. LeCompte, W. L. Millroy, & J. Preíssle (&Is.),

The handbook of qualitative research in educa/ion

(pp. 507-554). New York: AcadelnÍc Press.Clough. P. T. (1993a). On .lhe brink of deconstructíng

sociology: A critical reading of Dorothy Smith's

standpoint epistemology. Sociological Quarterly,

34,169-182.

Clough, P. T. (l993b). Response to Smith. Sociological

Quarlerly, 34, 193-194.Collíns, P. H. (1990). Blackfeminisl /hought: Knowl

eelge, consciousness and the politics of empower

menl. New York: Routledge.Collins, P. H. (1992). Transforming the inner circle:

Dorothy Smith's challenge to socíological tbeory.Sociological Theory, 10, 73-80.

Franklin, S., Lury, C., & Stacey, J. (1991). FelnÍnismand cultural studies: Pasts, presents, and futures.Media, Culture & Society, 13, 171-192.

Giroux, H. (1992). Border crossings: Cultural workers

and the polities o/ education. New York: Routledge.Grossberg, L. (1989). The formations of cultural stud

ies: An American in Birmingham. Strategies, 2,114-149.

Grossberg, L. (1992). We golta get out of thi .. place:

Popular conservatism and postmodern culture.

New York: Routledge.

Guba, E. G. (1990). The alternative paradigm dialog. InE. G. Guba (Ed.), The paradigm dialog (pp. 1730). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hall, S. (1992). Cultural studies and its theoreticallegacies. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, & P. A.

Treichler (Eds.), Cultural studies (pp. 277-294).New York: Routledge.

Mortis, M. (1988). Henry Parkes Motel. Cultural Stud

íes, 2, 1047.

Nelson, C., & Grossberg, L. (Eds.). (l988). Marxismand the interpretation o/ culture. Urbana: University of IlIinois Press.

Reinharz, S. (1992). Feminist methads in' social re-

search. New York: Oxford University Press.Roman, L. G. (1992). Tbe political significance of olher

ways oí narraling ethnography: A feminis! materialistapproach. In M. D. LeCompte, W. L. Millroy,& J. Preíssle (Eds.), The handbook of qualitative

research in educarion (pp. 555-594). New York:Academic Press.

Smith, D. E. (1992). Sociology from women's experience: A reaffirmation. Sociological Theory, 10,

88-98.Smith, D. E. (1993). High noon in Textland: A critique

of Clough. Sociological Quarterly, 34, 183-192.West, C. (1989). The American eva.<ion of phi/osophy.

Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.West, C. (1990). The new cultural polítics oí difference.In R. Fergason, M. Geverr, T. T. Minh-ha, & C.West (Eds.). Out rhere: Marginalization and con

temporary cultures (pp. 19-36). Cambridge: MIT

Press.Wolf, M. (992). A thrice-told tale: Feminism, post

modernism, and e/hnographic responsibility. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

IN this chapter we analyze four paradigms thatcurrently are competing, or have until recently competed, for acceptance as the paradigm of choice ininforrning and guiding inquiry, especially qualitativeinquiry: positivism, postpositivism, critical theoryand related ideological positions, and construclivism. We aeknowledge at once our own commitmentto conslructivism (which we earlier called "naturalistic inquiry"; Lineoln & Guba, 1985); Ihe readermay wish to take that faet into accounl in judgingIhe appropriateness and usefulness of our analysis.

Although the title of this volume, Handbook o[

Qualitative Research, implies that the term qualitative is an umbrella term superior to Ihe lerm para-

digm (and, indeed, Ihat usage is not uncommon), itis our position that it is a term Ihat ought to bereserved for a description of types of methods. From

our perspective, bothqua!itative and quantitativemethods may be u ~ . \ L ! l P p r o p r l a ~ l y wilh añy re:.

seárch jiaradljin:-QueJitions of melhod are s e c o n ~ dary to questions -of-paradigm,. ' i ! ' . ~ c h we deliñe as

basic be lief system or worldview tllálgliiill!:Hneinvestrg¡¡tlíf;'-ñot onWiñCl'roreen'f metliod buf in·óntOlogica1lylltídlipísteffiórogrcaIlYfuñdamentalways.

It is certairíly-ilíe 'case'ffiárintéresfln áliéñil¡i:rveparadigms has be en stimulated by a growing dissat

case for a renewed interest in qualitalive approaches,it became clear Ihat Ihe metaphysical assumptionsundergirding the conventional paradigm (the "received view") musl be seriously questioned. ThusIhe emphasis of this chapter is on paradigms, theirassumplions, and the implicalions of Ihose assumplions for a variety of research issues, not on therelative utility of qualilative versus quantitativemethods. Nevertheless, as discussions of paradigms/methods over Ihe past decade have often begun with a consideralion of problems associatedwilh overquantification, we will also begin Ihere,shifting only later lo our predominant interes!.

The Quantitative/Qualitative Distinclion

Historically, there has been a heavy emphasison quantification in science. Mathematics is oftentermed the "queen of sciences," and those seiences, such as physicsand chemistry, that lendthemselves especially well to quantificalion aregene rally known as "hard." Less quantifiable are

isfaelion wilh !he patent overemphasis on quantita nas, such as biology (although that is rapidlyN· 'DEN '1:;1--) o(¿ Y. (....'}l GeL J..) (-e.oU..) (.-(G,,",,) ~ k tive melhods. But as efforts were made lo build a changing) and particularly the social sciences, are

AUTHORS' NOTE: We are grateful to Henry Giroux and Robert Stake for their very helpful critiques of an earlicr~ í 2 w ~ . ~ e v - . d ~ k . - ~ : : draft of tbis chapter.-

J05



106

referred to as "50ft," less with pejorative intent

than to signal their (putative) imprecision and

Iack of dependability. Scientific maturity is combelieved t&emerge as the degree of quan

found within a given field increases.

That this is the case is hardly surprising. The

"received view" of science (positivism, transformed

over the course of this century into postpositivism; see below) focuses on efforts to verífy (posi

tivism) or falsify (postpositivism) a priori hy

potheses, most usefully stated as mathematical

(quantitative) propositions or propositions that

can be easi1y convert ed into precise mathematical

formulas expressing functional relationships. For

mulaic precision has enormous utílity when the

aim of scicnce is the prediction and control of

natural phenomena. Further, there is already avail

able a powerful aITayof statistical and mathemati

cal models. Finally, there exists a widespread

conviction that only.quantitative data are ulti

valid, or of high quality (Sechrest, 1992).

Stuart Mili (1843/1906) is sald to have been

the first to urge social scientists to emulate theirolder, "harder" cousins, promising that ifhis advice

were followed, rapid maturation of these fields, as

wel! as their emancipation from th e philosophical

and theological strictures that limited them, would

fol!ow. Social scientists took this counsel to heart

(probably to a degree that would greatly surpriseMill if he were alive today) for other reasons as well.

They were the "new kids on the block"; if quantifi

cation could lead to the fulfillment of Mili' s prom

ise, status and political leverage would ac:crue that

would enormously profit the new practitioners. ]mi

tation might thus lead both to greater acceptance and

to more valid knowledge.

Critiques of the Received View

In recent years, however, strong counterpressures

against quantification have emerged. Two critiques,

one internal to the conventional paradigm (that is,

in terms of those metaphysical assumptioris thatdefine the nature of positivist inquiry) and one ex

temal to it (that is, in terms of those assumptions

defining altemative paradigms), have been mounted

that seem not only to warrant a reconsideration of

the utility of qualitative data but to question the very

assumptions on which the putative superiority of

quantification has been based.

]nternal (Intraparadigm) Critiques

A variety of implicit problems have surfaced to

chaIlenge conventional wisdom; several of these are

described below.

MAJOR PARADlGMS AN D PERSPECTIVES

COn/ext stripping. Precise quantitative approaches

that focus on selected subsets of variables neces

sari1y "strip" from consideration, through appropriate controls or randomization, other variables

that exist in the context that might, if allowed to

exert their effects, great1y alter findings. Further,

such exclusionary designs, while increasing the

theoretical rigor of a study, detract from its relevanee, that is, its applicability or generalizability,

because their outcomes can be properiy applied

only in other similarly truncated or contextually

stripped situations (another laboratory, for exam

pIe). Qualitative data, it is argued, can redress thatimbalance by providing contextual information.

Exclusion ofmeaning and purpose. Human be

havior, unlike that of physical objects, cannot be

understood without reference to the meanings andpurposes attached by human actors to their activi

ties. Qualitative data, it is asserted, can provide

rich insight into human behavior.

Disjunction of grand theories with local con/ex/s: The e/ic/emic dilemma. The etic (outsider)

theory brought to bear on an inquiry by an inves

tigator (or the hypotheses proposed to be tested)

may have little or no meaning within the emie

(insider) view of studied individuals, groups, so

cieties. or cultures. Qualitative data, it is affirmed,are useful for uncovering emic views; theories, to

be valid, should be qualitatively grounded (Glaser

& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Such

grounding is particularly crucial in view of the

mounting criticism of social science as failing to

pro vide adequat e accounts of nonrnainstream lives

(the "other") or to provide the material for a

criticism of our own Westem culture (Marcus &

Fischer, 1986).

lnapplicability of general dala /0 individualcases. This problem is sometimes described as the

nomothetididiographic disjunction. Generaliza

tions, although perhaps statistically meaningful,

have no applicability in the individual case (the

fact. say. that 80% of individuals presenting givensymptoms have lung cancer is at best incomplete

evidence that a particular patient presenting withsuch symptoms has lung cancer). Qualitative data,

it is held, can help to avoid such ambiguities.

Exclusion of he discovery dimension in inquiry.Conventional emphasis on the verificalion of spe

cific, a priori hypotheses glosses over the source of

those hypotheses. usually arrived at by what is com

monly termed the discovery process. In the received

view only empiricaI inquiry deserves to be called

"science." Quantitative normative methodology isthus privileged over the insights of creative and

divergent thinkers. The cal! for qualitative inputs

is ex pected to redress this imbalance.

Compe/ing P ~ r a d i g m s in Qualita/ive Research

External (Extraparadigm) Critiques

The intraparadigm problems noted aboye offer

a weighty challenge 10 conventional methodol

ogy, but could tie eliminated, or at least amelio

rated, by greater use of qualitative data. Many

critics of the received view are content to stop at

that point; hence many of the calls fm more qualitative ínputs have been Hmited to this methods

level accommodation. But an even weightier chal

lenge has been mounted by critics who have

proposed alterna/ive paradigms that involve notonly qualification of approaches but fu ndamental

adjustments in the basic assumptions that guide

inquiry altogether. Their rejection of the received

view can be justified on a number of grounds

(Bernstein, 1988; Guba, 1990; Hesse, 1980; Lin

coln & Guba, 1985; Reason & Rowan, 1981), but

chief among them are the following. 1

The theory-ladenness of faets. Conventional

approaches to research involving the verification

or falsification of hypotheses assume the inde

pendence of theoretical and observational lan

guages. If an inquiry is to b e objective, hypotheses

must be stated in ways that are independent of the

way in which the facts needed to test them are

collected. But it now seems established beyond ob

jection that theories and facts are quite in/e rdependen/-that is, that facts are facts only within sorne

theoretical frarnework. Thus a fundamental assump

tion of the received view is exposed as dubious. Ifhypotheses and observations are not independent,

"facts" can be viewed only through a theoretical

"window" and objectivity is undennined.

The underdetermination of theory. This prob

lem is also known as the problem of induction.

Not only are facts determined by the theory win

dow through which on e looks for them, but dif

ferent theory windows might be equally well sup

ported by the same set of "facts." Although it may

be possible. given a coherent theory, to derive by

deduction what facts ought to exist, it is never

possible, given a coherent set of facts. to arrive

by induction at a single, ineluctable theory. ]n

deed, it is this difficulty that led philosophers

such as Popper (1968) to reject the notion of

theory verifica/ion in favor of the notion of theory

falsifica/ion. Whereas a million white swans can

never establish, with complete confidence, the

proposition that all swans are white, one black

swan can completely falsify it. The historieal po

sition of science that it can, by its methods, ulti

mately converge on the "real" truth is thus brought

sharply into question.

The value-ladenness of ac/s. Just as theories

and facts are no t independent, neither are values

and facts. Indeed, it can be argued that theories

107 '

are themse)ves value statements. Thus putative

"facts" are viewed not only through a theory win

dow but through a value window as well. The valuefree posture of the rece/ved view is compromised.

The in/eraetive nature of the inquirer-inquired¡nto dyad. The received view of science piclures

the inquirer as standing behind a one-way mirror,

viewing natural phenomena as they happen and

recording them objectively. The inquiier (when

using proper methodology) does not influence the

phenomena or vice versa. But evidence such asthe Heisenberg uncertainty principie and the Bohr

complementarity principie have shattered that ideal

in the hard scíences (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); even

greater skepticism must exist for the social sci

ences. ]ndeed, the notion that findíngs are created

through the interaction of inquirer and phenorne

non (which, in the social sciences, is usual

pie) is oflen a more plausible descriptíon

inquiry process than is the notion that findings are

discovered through objective observation "as they

really are, and as they really work."

The intraparadigm critiques, although expos

ing many inherent problems in the received view

and, indeed, proposing sorne useful responses to

them, are nevertheless of much less interest-<lr

weight-than the extraparadigm critiques, whichraise problems of such consequence that the re

ceived view is being widely questioned. Several

alternative paradigms have been proposcd. sorneof which rest on quite unconventional assump

tions. It is useful, therefore, to inquire about the

nature of paradigms and what it is that distin

guishes one inquiry paradigm from another.1 ·/1 .,'

"\. tTbe Nature of Paradigms

VeJ.-r. "1 ,-{,.'

Paradigms as Basic Belief Systems {¡'v1 .....,LBased on Ontological, Epistemological, .r::¡/and Methodological Assumptions

A paradigm may be viewed as a set oY basicbeliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates

or first principIes. ]t represents a worldview that

defines, for i15 holder, the nature of the "world,"

the individu al' s place in it, and the range of pos

sible relationships to that world and its parts, as,

for example. cosmologies and theologiesdo.2 The

beliefs are basic in the sense that they must be

accepted simply on faith (however well argued);

there is no way to establish their ultimate truth

fulness. lf there were, the phílosophical debates

reflected in these pages would have been resolved

millennia ago.



109O8

Inquiry paradigms define for inquirers what it

is they are about, and what falls within and out.

side the limíts of legitimate inquiry. The basicbeliefs that define inquiry paradigms can be sumomarizéd by the responses given by proponents of

any given paradigm to three fundamental quesIions, which are interconnected in such a way thatthe answer given to any one question, taken in anyorder, constrains how the others may be answered.We have selected an order that we believe reflectsa logical (if not necessary) primacy:

l. The ontological queslion. Wbat is the formand nature of reality and, therefore, wbat isthere that can be known about it? For example,if a "real" world is assumed, then what can beknown about it is "how things really are" and"how things really work." Then only thosequestions that relate to matters of"real" existoence and "real" aetion are admissible; otherquestions, sueh as those coneeming matters of

aestheticor moral significance, fall outside the

realm oí legitimate scientific inquiry.

2. The epistefn{)logical queslion. Wbat is the

nature of the relationship between the knoweror would·be knower and wbat can be known?

Tbe answer Ihal can be given to this queslion is conslrained by the answer alreadygiven lO lhe ontological question; that is, notjusI any relationship can now be postulated.So if, for example, a "real" reality is assumed, tben the posture of the knower mustbe one of objecti ve detaehment or valuefreedom in order to be able to discover"how

tbings really are" and "how things reallywork." (Conversely, assumption of an ob

jectivist posture implies the existence of a"real" world to be objective about.)

3. The melhodological queslion. How can theinquirer (would-be knower) go about findingout w batever he or she believes can be known?Agaln, the answer lbat can be given to this

question is constrained by answers alreadygiven lo the firsttwo questions; Ihat is,nOI jusIany methodology is appropriate. For example,a "real" reality pursued by an "objective" inquirer manda es control of possible confounding faclOrs, wbether the methods are qualitalive (say, observational) or quantitative (say,analysis of covariance). (Conversely, selectionof a manipulative methodology-the experiment, say-implies the ability to be objectiveand a real world to be objective about.) Tbemethodological question cannot be reduced to

MAJOR PARADIGMS AN D PERSPECTIVES

a question of methods; methods must be titted to a predetermined methodology.

These three questions serve as the major fociaround wbicb we will analyze each of the four

paradigms lO be considered.

Paradigms as Human Construclions

We bave already noted that paradigms, as setsof basic beliefs, are not open to proof in anyconventional sense; tbere ís no way to elevate one

over another on tbe basis of ultimate, founda.

Iional critería. (We should note, however, thattbat state of affairs does not doom us to a radicalrelativist posture; see Guba, 1992.) In our opín·

ion, any given paradigm represenls simply the

most informed and sophisticated view that íls

proponents have been able to devise, given theway tbey have cbosen to respond to tbe threedefíníng questions. And, we argue, tbe seIS of

answers given are in all cases human construc-lions; that is, they are all inventions of the human

mínd and bence subject to human error. No construction is or can be íncontrovertibly right; advocates of any particular construction must relyon persuasivenessand ufility rather than proof narguing theír posilíon.

What is true of paradigms ís true of our analysesas welL Everything that we shall say subsequentlyis also a human constructíon: ours. The reader cannot be compelled to accept our analyses, or our

argumenlS, on the basís of incontestable logic or

indisputable evidence; we can only hope to be persuasive and to demonstrate the utilíty ofour positionfor, sayo the public policy arena (Guba & Lincoln,1989; House, 1977). We do ask the reader to suspend his or her disbelief until our argument is complete and can be judged as a whole.

The Basic Beliefs of Receivedand Alternative Inquiry Paradigms

We begin our analysis with descriptions of theresponses that we believe proponents of eachparadigm would make to the three questions out·

Iined aboye. Tbese responses (as constructed byus) are displayed in Table 6.1, whicb consists of

three rows corresponding to the ontological, epistemological, and metbodological questions, andfour columns corresponding to the four paradigmsto be discussed. The term positivism denotes the"received view" that has dominaled the formal

díscourse in the physical and social sciences forsorne 400 years. wbereas postpositivism repre-

T'Competing Paradigms in Qualilalive Resllarch

TABLE 6.1 Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Altemative Inquiry Paradigms

ltem Positivism Postpositivism Critical Theory et al. Constructivism

Ontology naive realísm critical realísm historical realism relativism-local and"real" reality bul "real" realíty but only virtual reality shaped. specific constructedapprehendable imperfectly and by social, politíeal, realities

probabilis tícally cultural, economic,apprebendable elhnic, and gender

values; cryslaIlizedover time

--------------------------------------------Epislemo]ogy dualistl objectivis t; modified dualist l transactíonalJ transaclionallfindings true objectivisl; crilical subjectívisl; valuc subjectivist; created

traditioolcommuni ty; mediated findings findingsfindings probablytrue

Melhodology experímentalJ modified experi· dialogic/dialec lical hermeneuticalJdialeclicalmanipulalive; mental/manipulalive;veríficalÍon of crílical multiplism;hypotheses; chiefly falsificatíon of

quanlilative hypotheses; may

melhods include qualitativ emethods

sents efforls of Ihe past few decades to respond in

a Iimited way (that is, while remaining withinessentially tbe same set oí basic beliefs) to themosl problemalic Crilicisms oí positivismo The

term critical theory is (for us) a blanket termdenoting a sel of several a1temative paradígms,ínc!udíng additionally (but not Iimited to) neoMarxism, feminism, materialism, and participa·

tory inquiry. Indeed, critical theory may itself

usefully be divided into three substrands: poststructuralism, postmodernism, and a blending of

these Iwo. Whalever their differences, Ihe common breakaway assumption of all tbese varianl.

is that of the value-determined nature of inquiry

an epistemological difference. Our grouping of

Ibese positlons into a single category is a judg

ment call; we will not try lo do justice to theindividual poinl. of view. The term constructiv-ism denotes an aJternative paradigm wbose breakaway assumplion is Ihe move from ontologicalrealism lo onlological relativism. These positionswill become clear in tbe subsequent exposition.

Two important caveats need to be mentioned.First, altbougb we are inclined to believe Ihat theparadigms we are about lo describe can havemeaning even in the realm of tbe physical sciences, we will not defend that beliefhere. Aecordingly, our subsequent comments sbould be understood to be Iimited to tbe social scíences only.Second, we nole Ibat except for positivism, the

paradigms discussed are all still in formative stages;no final agreements have bren reached even among

tbeir proponents about tbeir definitions. mean·

ings, or implicatlons. Thus ou r discussion sbouldbe considered tentative and subject to further revigion and reformulation.

We will first look down the coJumns of Table

6.1 to iIlustrate the positions of each paradigm

with respect to Ihe three questions. f ollowing witha look across rows to compare and contrasl thepositions of the paradigms.3 Limitations of space

make it impossible for us to develop our assertions in any depth. Tbe reader will be able to findother evidence. pro and con, in other chapter. of

this volume. particularly in Chapters 7-11.

Intraparadigm Analyses(Columns of Table 6.1)

Column 1: Positivism

Ontology: realism (commonly called "naive realism"). An apprehendable reality is assumed loexist, driven by immutable naturallaws and mechanisms. Knowledge of the "way things are" is con·

ventionally summarized in the form of time· andcontext-free generalizations, sorne of which take

tbe form of cause-effect laws. Research can, in

principIe, converge on the "true" slale of affairs.The basic posture of the paradigm is argued to be

both reductionist and deterministic (Hesse. 1980).



110 II I

Epistemology: Dualistand objectivist.The investigator and the investigated "object" are assumed tobe independent entitíes, and the investigator to becapableof studying the object without influencing itor being influenced by it. When influence in eitherdirection (threats to validity) is recognized, or evensuspected, various strategies are followed to reduceor eliminate it. lnquiry takes place as through aonc-way mirror. Values and biaSes are preventedfrom influencing outcomes, so long as the prescribed procedures are rigorously followed. Repli

cable findings are, in faet, "true."

Methodology: Experimental and manipulative.

Questions andJor hypotheses are stated in propositional form and subjected to empirica) test toverify them; possible confounding conditions mustbe carefully controlled (manipulated) to preventoutcomes from being improperly influenced.

Column 2: Postpositivism

Ontology: Critical realismo Reality is assumed to

exist but to be only imperfectly apprehendable because ofbasically flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature of

phenomena. The ontology is labeled as critical realism (Cook & Campbell, 1979) because of the pos

ture of proponents that claims about reality must besubjected to tbe widest possible critical examinationlO faeilítate apprehendíng reality as c10sely as possible (but never perfectly).

Epistemology: Modified dualist/objectivist. Dualism ís largely abandoned as nOI possible to maintaín, but objectivity remains a "regulatory ideal";special emphasis is placed on external "guardians" of objectivity such as critical traditions (Dothe findings "fit" witb preexisting knowledge?) andthe critical community (such as editors, referees,and professional peers). Replicated findings areprobably true (but always subject to falsification).

Methodology: Modified experimental/manipu-lotive. Emphasis is placed on "critical multiplism"

(a refurbished version of triangulation) as a wayof falsifying (rather than verifying) hypotheses.The methodology aíms 10 redress sorne of theproblems noted aboye (intraparadigm critiques)by doing inquiry in more natural s ettings, collecting more situational information, and reintroducing discovery as an elemenl in inquiry, and, in thesocial sciences particularly, soliciting emic viewpoints to assist in determíning the meanings andpurposes that people ascribe to their actions, aswell as to contri bu e to "grounded theory" (Glaser& Strauss, 1967; SlrausS&:c"óf6íñ;l':l90). Allthese aíms are accomplished largely Ihrough theincreased utilization of qualitative techniques.

MAJOR PARADIGMS AN D PERSPECTlVES

Column 3: Critical Theoryand Related Ideological Positions

Ontology: Historical realismo A reality is assumed to be apprehendable that was once plastic,but thal was, over lime, shaped by a congeries of

social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, andgender factors, and then crystallized (reified) intoa series of structures that are now (inappropriately) taken as "rea!," that is, natural and immutableo For all practical purposes the structures are

"real," a virtual or historical reality.

Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist.

The investigator and tbe invesligated object areassumed to be inleraetively linked, with the values of the investigator (and of situated "others")inevitably influencing the inquiry. Findings aretherefore value medíated. Note that Ihis p o s t u r ~

~ ¡ ; t i v e l y c h a l l e n g ~ ~ . . t r r u ! i l i Q ! ! ! í d l S t i n c t i o n b e ~ \ \ I ~ l l Q . n t o l o g y . J l J l d e ¡ : ú J ¡ ~ ~ ; w h a ~ ~ c a ñ b e f ; I ! Q W . J l . ine,!I!i9.ªWyjntertwjned wílli t ~ i Q ! i : r -!S!!.on b ~ _ a particular investig.ª\.Qr,.-lI1ldJ¡p < ! ~ r ~ 9 J $ O I & P : Tfleaash ed line separating tneonlological and epistemological rowsof Table 6.1 is intended to reflect this fusiono

Methodology: Dialogic and díalectica/. The transactional nature of inquiry requires a dialogue be

tween the investigator and the subjects of theinquiry; Ihat dialogue must be diale ctical in natureto transform ignorance and misapprehensions (accepting historieally medialed structures as immutable) into more informed consciousness (seeinghow the structures might be ehanged and comprehending Ihe actions required to effect change), or,as Giroux (1988) puts it, "as transformative intellectuals, ' .. lo uncover and excavate those formsof historical and subjugated knowledges that pointto experiences of suffering, conflict, and colIective struggle; . . . to link the nolion of historicalunderstanding to elements of critique and hope"(p. 213). Transformational inquirers demonstrate"transformational leadership" (Burns, 1978).

(For more discussion of critical theory, see the

contri):¡utions in this volume by Olesen, Chapter9; Stanfield, Chapter 10; and Kincheloe&MeLaren,Chapter 8.)

Column 4: Constructivism

Ontology: Relativist. Realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mentalconstructions, socially and experientially based,local and specific in nature (although elementsare often shared among many índividuals andeven across cultures), and dependent for theirform and content on the individual persons or


groups holding the c o n s l r u c t i o n s . ~ C o n s t r u c t i o n s are ! 1 º - t I 1 ) J ? r ~ 9 r l e s s "true," in any ~ ~ s e n s e , hu t sjrn12ly more oi less informed am!lofsoj:ili.hticáted. Coñiliructions are alterable, as are their associated "realities." Thispo sili on should be'4is

-Uriguished from both nominalism and idealism(see Reese, 1980, for an explicalion of these sev

eral ideas).

Epístemology: Transactional and subjectivist.

The investigator and the object of investigation

are assumed to be interactively linked so that the"findings" are lite rally created as the investigation proceeds. The conventional distinction beIween ontology and epislemology disappears, asin the case of critical theory. Again, the dashedline of Table 6.1 reflects this fact.

Methodology: Hermeneutical and dialectical.The variable and personal (intramental) nature of

social construclions suggests thal individual constructions can be elicited and refined only throughinleraction between and among investigator andrespondents. These varying constructions are interpreted using conventional hermeneutical techniques, and are compared and contrasled througha dialectical interchange. The final aim is to distilla consensus construction that is more informedand sophisticated than any of the predecessor

constructions (including, of course, the etic construction of the investigator).

(For more about constructivism, see also Schwandt.

Chapter 7, this volume.)

Cross-Paradigm Analyses

(Rows of Table 6.1)

Having noted briefly the positions that proponents of each paradigm might take with res pect tothe three paradigm-defining questíons, it is usefulto look across rows to compare and contrast thosepositions among the several paradigms.

Ontulogy

Moving from left to right across Table 6.1, we

note the move from

1. positivism's position of naive realism, as

suming an objective external reality upon

which inquiry can converge; to

2. postpositivism' s critical realism, which still

assumes an objective reality bul grants that

it can be apprehended only imperfectly and

probabilistically; to

3. critical theory's historical realism, which

/' assumes an apprehendable reality consist

ing of historieally situated structures that

are, in the absence of nsight, as Iimiting and

confining as if they were real; to

4. constructivism's relativism, which assumes

multiple, apprehendable, and somelimes con

flicting social realilies thal are the products

of human intellects, but that may change astheir constructors become more informed

and sophisticated.

lt is the ontological position that most differentiatesconslructivism from the olher three paradígms.

Epistemology

We note the move from

L positivism's dualist, objectivist assumption

that enables the investigator to determine

"how things really are" and "how things

really work"; to

2. postpositivism's modified dualistlobjectivist

assumption that ít is possible to approximate

(but never fully know) reality; to

3. critical theory' s transactionalisubjectivist as

sumption that knowledge is value mediated

and hence value dependent; to

4. constructivism's somewhat similar but broader

transaetionallsubjectivist assumption that sees

knowledge as created in interaction among

investigator and respondents.

1t is their epistemological positions Ihat most differentiale critical theory and constructivism from

the other two paradigms.

Methodology

We note the move from

1. positivism's experimentallmanipulative meth

odology that focuses on verification of hy

potheses; to

2. postpositivism's modified experimental!

manípulative methodology invested in crilical

multiplism focusing on falsification of hy

potheses; lo

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MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES

TABLE 6.2 Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical issues

lssue Positivism Postposirivism Crilical Theory el al. Constructivism

Inquiry aim explanation: prediction and control critique and trans' understanding;formation; restitulion reconstructionand emancipation

Nature of verified hypotheses nonfalsified hypoth strueturallbistorieal individual reconstructionsknowledge established as faelS eses that are probable insights eoalescing atound

or laws faets or laws consensus

Knowledge accretion-"building doeks" adding to historieal revjsionism: more informed andaceumulation "edifice of knowledge"; generalizations generalization by sophistieatedand eause-effeet liakages similarity reconstructíons;

viearious experienee

Goodness or eonventional henehmarks of "rigor": historieal situatedness ; trustworthiness andqualíty eriteria inlemal and externa! validity, reliabílity, erosion of ignoranee authentieity

and objeetivily and misapprehensions;aetion stimulus

Values excluded-influenee denied incIuded-formative

Ethies extrinsie; ti1l toward deception intrinsje; moral tjlt intrinsk; process tUI

toward revelati on toward revelation;special problems

Voiee "disinlerested scientist" as informer of "transformative "passionate participant"decision makers, poliey makers. and change intellectual" as as faeilitator of multi

agents advocate and activist voiee reconstruelion

Trmning lechnícal and technical; quantitative resociaJization; qualitative and quantítative;quantitatíve ; and qualitati ve; history; vaJues of altruism and empowermenlsubstanti ve theories substantive theories

Accommodation commensurable incommensurable

Hegemony in CQntrol of publieation, funding, seeking reeognition and inputpromotion, and tenure

3. critical theory' S dialogic/dialectical melhodology aimcd at the reconslruclion of previously held constructions; to

4. constructivism's hermeneuticldialectic meth

odology aimed at the reconstructionof previously held constructions.

lmplications of

Each Paradigm's Position on Selected Practical Issues

(Rows of Table 6.2)

Differences in paradigm assumpt ions cannot bedismissed as mere "philosophical" differences;

implicitly or explicitly, these positions have important consequences for the practical conduct of

inquiry, as well as for the interpretation of findings and policy choices. We have elected to discoss these consequences for ten salient issues.

TIle entries in Table 6.2. which consists of fourcolumns corresponding to the four paradigms andten rows corresponding to the ten issues, summarize our interpretation of the major implications.The reader will note Ihat the firsl four issues(inquiry aim, nature of knowledge. knowledgeaccumulation, and quality criteria) are among thosedeemed especially important by positivists andpostpositivists; they are therefore Ihe issues on

which alternative paradigms are most frequentlyattacked. The fifth and sixth (values and ethics)are issues taken seriously by all paradigms, although conventional and emergent responses are


quite different. Finally, the last four issues (voice.training, accommodation, and hegemony) are thosedeemed especially important by alternative proponents; they represent areas on which the received view is considered particularly vulnerable.The entries in the tabie are based only in part on

positions, given that nol ail issues haveaddressed by all paradigms' proponents. In

sorne cases, therefore, we have supplied entriesthat we believe foilow logically from the basicmetaphysical (ontological, epistemological. andmethodologieal) postures of tbe paradigms. To

take one example, the issue of voice is rarelyaddressed directly by positivists or postpositivists,but we believe the entry "disinlerested scientist"is one that would be given by those proponentswere they to be challenged on this matter.

An immediately apparent difference between Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 is that whereas in the formercase it was possible to make a distinct entry for everycell, in the case of Table 6.2 there is considerableoverlap within rows. particularly for the positivistand postpositivist colurnns. Indeed, even for thoseissues in which the entrles in those two columns aredifferent, the differences appear to be minor. Incontrasto one may note the major differences foundbetween Ibese two paradigms and the criticallheoryand constructivist paradigms, which tend a1so todiffer among themselves.

We have formulated the issues as questions,which follow.

Row 1: What isthe aim or purpose of inquiry?

Positivism and postpositivism. For both theseparadigms the aim of inquiry is exp/anatíon (vonWright. 1971), ultimately enabling the predíction

and control of phenomena. whether physical or

human. As Hesse (1980) has suggested, the ultimatecriterion for progress in these paradigrns ís that the

of "scientists" to predict and controlimprove over time. The reductionism and

determinism implied by this position should be

noted. TIle inquirer is cast in the role of "expert," a

situation thal seems to award speeial, perhaps evenunmerited. privilege to the ínvestigator.

Critical theory. 1J!e aim of inquiry is the cri·lique and transformation of the socIal, pohhcaJ,

'culturaI,'eeonOmíc,eiliñ1C, and'geñdersti:uctllfes"that constfattt áñdexplOit h í f i ñ a ñ 1 d ñ ~ men! in eonfrontl1tlon, evén coriflict. T n é c r n e ~ri'on for progréss is tnat overiímé,Í'estrfútion aride'mancipatían sbouldoccúillnd persisto Advocacy'

a e t W i l l m ~ r e k ~ r c o ~ e e t s . : r ~ ~ j n c ¡ u i : e ¡ ' i i é . a S ~ llt"t!oterrole- '!ir ifI!fig.fi:anof l ! f . U I ~ l o r .J2..1!:F!y mg

• that the iii(jüTrer u n g ! l ! . ~ t 1 l l l 1 1 u . priori .Vf.hªt trliñS:'formations are n e e d e ~ : . l J , ~ we should note (hit

sorne of the more radical slances in the eri ticali stcamp hold that judgment about needed transformations should be reserved to those whose livesare most affected by transformations: the inquiryparticipants themselves (Uneoln, in press).

Constructivism. TIle aim of inquiry is under-

. tooding aOO¡:e.cQnstrnciionof ilie coñs1ñiCtioñsiliit¡¡eopIe (including theiñqUlfér)iñíiiruíylíOla,w.iruñgtoward"corisensus bu! stiTr open tó ti-ew iiiterpretá

. tioos asipJ.9:rJll!ltlOl)an4sophisticáiTóii'íiñprove. 'I'lfecriterion for progress is thai' overum'!,'evetyone

forrnulates more informed and sophisticated constructions and becomes more aware of the contentand meaning of competing constructions. Advocacyand activism are also key concepts is this view. Theinquireris cast in the role ofparticípant and facílitatorin this procesS. a positioo that sorne critics havefaulted on tbe grounds that it expands the ínquire:r' srole beyond reasonable expectations of expertise andcompetence (Carr & Kemrnis. 1986).

Row 2: What is the nature of knowledge'?

Positivism. Knowledge consists of verifíed hypotheses that can be accepted as facts or laws.

Pos/positivismo Knowledge consists of nonfalsified hypotheses that can be regarded as probablefacts or Jaws.

Critical theory. Knowledge consists of a seriesof structurallhistórical insights that wíll be trins:

"form¡:d as time·-passes.' T r ! ! ! l s f o t m a t ¡ o l í s " o ~ m when i¡moranee and misapprehensions

COTUilructivísm. Knowledge consists of thoseC O I . 1 ~ ~ ! V < < < t . i o n s . about"WfÍtcli fhere is relatívecon-~ at Íea'si"só"tñe"iñóvernent toward consensus) among those competent (and, in the case

of more arcane material, trusted) to interpret thesubstance of the construction. Multiple "knowl,

.illl¡es'':'cao

coexist when equally'compeienT(or

trusted) interp,reters q ¡ j - ª i i e ~ , . and/or c1epéndingon social. polítical, cultural; economic, ethnié,a,nd genderráctors tha(differentiate the interpret¡;u..Ihese constructions are subject to continuousrevision, with changes most Iikely to occur whenrelatively different constructions are brought intojuxtapositíon in a dialectical context.

Row 3: How does knowledge accumulate?

Positivism a nd postpositivism. Knowledge accumulates by a process of accretion. with eacb

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MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES

faet (or probable fact) serving as a kind of build ity (paralleling internal validity), transferabilitying block that, when placed into its proper niche, (paralleling external validíty), dependabiliJY.(paraladds lo the growing "cdifice of knowledge." Whcn leling relíability), and confirmability,(parallelingthe facts take the fonn of generalizations or cause objectivity)(Guba, 19i1l; Lincoln & Guba, 1985);cffect linkages, they may be used most efficientiy !l_nd the authellticity criteria of ! ~ r n e s s , Q . t \ t Q l Q i i -for prediction and control. Generalizations may ' - (enlarges personal constructions),then be made, with predictable confidence, to a educative authenticity (leads to improved underpopulation of settings. standingof constructions of others), catalytic authen

~ c l t t (stimulates to action), and ~ c t i c a l authenticityCritical t h e o r y . ~ ~ Q . a e _ < ! ~ not aecumu (empowers action) (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The

latein an . a l : > s o , ! \ J t ~ . s ~ e ! l § \ ! ; " g . ! l . b S : I , If.]i;o\\ítª1íiJ.- former set represents an early effort 10 resol ve the

changes through a dialectical process ofhistorical quality issue for constnlctivism; although theserev!s ion th1:!n01'!rtnííOl1sly ¿roaes' ignó¡'ance ana. criteria have been well r e c e i v e d , J h ( \ i ~ p ª r . \ i l l ~ l í ) l g l m ¡ s a p p r e h e n s l o n s ~ ilñd eÍllarges more inforI]:lI;d 10 positivist criteria, makes them·suspect. The

i ! } s i 1 t ~ ~ Generalization can occur when the mix latter set overlaps to sorne extent those of criticalof social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, theory but goes beyond them, particularly the twoand gender circumstances and values ls similar of ontological authenticity and educative authenacross settings. ticity. The issue of quality criteriajn constructiy

ism is neverthelessn()Lwelbesolved,and further

Constructivism. KnowledgeacC\lmlllates only in isñeede;f '

a relative sense through the formation of ever moreinfonned a'nd sÓjJhisticated constnlctlóm; vii

henneneuticalldialectical p r o C e s s ; ~ 5 ' ~ i Y m : g . c o n ~ Row 5: What is thestruc(il)ilS aléoroúgl/r1íílojuxtaposition. One im role of values in inquiry?portant mechanism foilfimstei' 9 ~ d g e fromone settlllg to another is the provision of vicárious Positivism and postpositivism. In both theseexperience, often supplied by.case study reports (see paradigms values are specífically excluded; in

Stake, Chapter 14, this volume). deed, Ihe paradigm is claimed to be "value free"by virtue of its epistemological posture .valuesare seen as confounding variables thal cannot be

Row 4: What criteria are aJlowed a role in a pulatívely objective inquiryappropriate for judging the (even when objectivity is, in the case·of postpogoodness or quality of an inquiry? sitivism, but a regulatory ideal).

Positivism and postpositivism. The appropriate Critical theory and constructivism. In both thesecriteria are the conventional benchmarks of "rigor": paradigl1ls ~ y a l u e s . ha.ve.pr.tde . 2 f . 1 Ü ª t ¡ ~ ; t l l . e , j i : : A t ' e " internal validity (isomorphism of findings with seen as ineluctable in, Jlhaping (in the.case.,j)f

reality), external validity (generalizability), reli collstructivis!!l, cre¡¡tin,g) jnq¡¡inou! clllJll;s. Furability (in the sen se of stability), and objectivity Ihermore, even if it were possible, excluding val(distanced and neutral observer). These criteria ues would not be countenanced. To do so woulddepend on the realist ontological position; with be inimical to the interests of the powerless andout the assumption, isomorphism of findings with of"at-risk" audíences, whose original (emic) con

reality can have no meaning, sttict generalizabíl structions deserve equal consideralion with thoseity to a parent population is impossible, stability of other, more powerful audiences and of thecannot be assessed for inquiry into a phenomenon inquirer (etic). Constructivism, which sees the

if the phenomenon itself can change, and objec inquirer as orchestrator and facilitator of the inti vity cannot be achieved because there is nothing quiry process, is more líkely to stress this point

from which one can be "distant." than is critical theory, which tends to cast the

inquirer in a more authorilative role.Critical theory. -Ihe a p p r o p r i a t e ¡ ; : ¡ j ~ l i ª l l ! e his

t q r i c a l s i t \ l . ª ~ n e s s of lbe joqujO( (j.e., that ¡Úifesaccount of the social, political, cultural, economic, Row 6: What is theethnic, and gender antecedents of the studied situ place of ethics in inquiry?ation), ,the extent to which the inquiry acts lO erodeignorance and misap{lnih'énSlolis,an¡¡-¡iie extenfiO Positivism alld postpositivism. In both thesewhich it provides a stimulus ' t O i i é t i ó n ~ - i h a i T s , to the paradigms ethics is an important considerati on,

- 1 í ; ¡ ¡ J r s f o r n m t i o ñ - o f t h é - ~ x i s t i ñ g s¡¡:¡¡¿¡¡¡¡'e. and it is taken very seriously by inquirers, but it

is extrillsic to the inquiry process itself. HenceConstructivism. Two sets of criteria have been ethical behavior is formally policed by external

proposed: Ihe trustworthilless criteria of credibi.l- mechanisms, such as professional codes of con-


duct and human subjects committees. Further, thercalist ontology undergirding Ihese paradígms provides a tilt toward the use of deceplion, which, it

is argued in certain cases, is warranted to determine how "things really are and work" or for thesake of sorne "higher social good" or sorne "cIcarertrutlí" (Bok, 1978, 1982; Diener & Crandall, 1978).

Critical theory. Ethics i8 morelleliflyjrurim,ic

to this paradigm, a ~ . i _ ! ! I p J j e á O y i h e ¡ntent lo .erode

i'gnorancc::and misapprehensions, and loll!k!'<{ullaccount of values and historical situatedness in

t h e i n . 9 u . k ~ , " p i 2 c ~ . ! ' ~ . Tlius there is á mor31 tÚt thal

the inquirer be revelatory (in the rigorous meaning of "fully informed consent") rather tlían deceptive. Of course, these considerations do not

prevent unethical behavior, but they do providesorne process barriers that make it more difficult.

Constructivism. Ethics is intrinsic to Ihis paradigm also because of Ihe inclusion of paitiéipant

v,all1es in the inquiry (slarting with respondents'

existing constructions and working toward increased infonnation and sophistication in theirconstructions as well as in the inquirer' s construction). There is an incentive-a process titl- for

revelation; .hiding the inquirer's intent is destruc:

tíve of lheaim of uncovering andiniproving <;:"0117.·structlblrS. rn"li1I'ffitioñ-;!he herÍneneúticalZdialecfféa:ríñetliodology itself pro vides a strong but not

infallible safeguard against deception. However,

the close personal interactions required by Ihemethodology may produce special and ofien slickyproblems of confidentialily and anonymity, as

well as other interpersonal difficulties (Guba &Lincoln, 1989).

Row 7: Whal "voice" is mirroredin the inquirer's activities,especially Ihose directed at ehange7

Positivism and postpositivism. The inquirer' svoice is tlíat of the "disinterested scientist" infofming decision makers, poliey makees, and change

agenls, who independently use this scientific infurmation, at least in part, 10 form, explain, and

justify actions, policies, and change proposals.

Critical theory. Th,e inquirer's voice iSJhat nI.¡he "transformative illtellectual" (Giroux, 1988)

.;h o has eipaiided c o n s c i o u . ~ n e s s and sO ls in aposítion to confron! ignorance and misapprehensÍon·s. Change is facílitated as lndi viduals develop¡¡reater insight into Ihe existing state of affaies(the nature and extent of their exploilation) andare stimulated lo ael on it.

Constructivism. T ~ e i ' ! 9 . u . ! ! ~ r ' ! > . ~ ~ ~ . ! ! . i ! L 9 ' [ the "passionate parUci»ant" (Lincoln, 1991) ac

tively engaged in facilitatillg the "multi voice"reconstruction of his or her own construci!oñas

: w ~ n as those. of¡dl other participants .. J;::hange isfacilitaled as reeonstruclions are formed and individuals are stímulated to act on them.

Row 8: What are the implications of each paradigm for the training of novice inquirers?

Positivismo Novices are trained primaríly intechnical knowledge about measurement, design,and quantltative methods, with les s but substantial emphasls on formal theories of the phenornena in their substantive speciallies.

Postpositivism. Novices are trained in waysparalleling the positivist mode, but wilh the addition of qualitative methods, often for the purpose

of ameliorating the problems noted in the opening

paragraphs of Ihis chapter.

Critical theory and constructivism. Novices muslfiest be resocialized from their early and usuallyintense exposure 10 the received view of scieoce.That resocialízalion cannot be accomplislíed withoutthorough schooling in the poslures and tecbníquesof positivism and postpositivism. Studcnts must

come lo appreciale paradigm differences (summarizcd in Table 6.1) and, in that context, lO masterboth qualitative and quantitative metlíods. The

former are essential because of their role in car

rying out Ihe dialogic/dialectical or hermeneuticalldialectical methodologies; the ¡atter because theycan playa useful infonnational role in al! paradigms.They must a1so be helped to undeestand the social,political, cultural, econorruc, ethnic. and gender history and stnlcture that serve as the surround for theirinquiries, and to incorporate the values of altruismand empowennent in their work.

Row 9: Are Ihese paradigms necessarily in conflicl? Is il possible lo accommodate Ihese several views within a single conceptual framework?

Positivism alld postpositivism. Proponents of

tlíese two paradigms, given their foundalionalorientation, take the position llíat all paradigrnscan be accommodated-that is, that Ihere exists,or will be found to exist, some common raliona]structure to which aU questions of difference can

be referred for resolulion. The posture is reductionist and assumes the possibility of point-bypoint comparisons (commensurability), an issueabout which there continues 10 be a great deal of

disagreement.

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Critical theory an d construclivism..J;'roponents

. . 2 . ~ t w o , ' p ! ! r ¡ ¡ g ! g m s j . ? ~ n lIf[irmill.giheoasic1 ! l . : o m m e n s ~ ! l . t > i 1 ! ! y ' , ~ t t,/Ie" E _ ~ a d ~ t l m ~ ( a l t h o u g h they would agree that positlvism an dpostpositi v-

ism are commensurable, and would probably agreethat critical theory and constructivism are commensurable), The basic beliefs of the paradigmsare believed to be essentially contradictory. Forconstructivists, either there is a "real" reality orthere is nol (although one míght wish to resolvethis problem differently in consideríng the physical versus the human realms), and thus constructivism and positívísmlpostpositivism cannot belogically accommodated anymore than, say, theideas of f1at versus round earth can be logicallyaccommodated. For critical theorists and constructivists, inquiry is either value free or it is not;agaín. logical accommodation seems impossible.Realism and relativism, value freedom and valueboundedness, cannot coexist in any intemally consistent metaphysical system, which condition ofconsistency, it is stipulated, is essentially met byeach of the candidate paradigms. Resolution ofthis dilemma will necessarily await the emergence of a metaparadigm that renders the older,accommodated paradigms not less true, but simply irrelevant.

Row JO: Which of the

paradigms exercises hegemony overthe others? That is,which ís predominantly influential?

Positivism an d postpositivism. Proponents ofposilivism gained hegemony over the past severalcenturies as earlier Aristotelian and theologicalparadigms were abandoned. But the manlle ofhegemony has in recent decades gradually fallenon the shoulders of the postpositivists, the "natural" heirs of positivismo Postpositivists (and indeed many residual positivists) tend to controlpUblication outlets, funding sources, promotionand tenure mechanisms, dissertation committees,and other sources of power and influence. Theywere, at least until about 1980, the "in" group, andcontinue to represent the strongest voice in pro

fessional decision making.Critical theory an d constructivism, Proponents

of critical theory and constru,ctivism are stiU seeking recognition and avenues for input. Over thepast decade, it has become more and more possible for them to achieve acceptance, as attested byincreasing inclusion of relevant papers in journalsand professional meetings, the developrnent ofnew joumal outlets, the growing acceptability of"qualitative" dissertations. the inclusion of "qualifati ve" guidelines by sorne funding agencies andprograms, and the Iike. But in alllikelihood, criti-

MAJOR PARADIOMS AND PERSPECTIVES

cal theory and constructivisrn will continue toplay secondary, although important and progressively more influential, roles in the near future.

Couclusion

The metaphor of the "paradigm wars" describedby Gage (1989) is undoubtedly overdrawn. Describing Ibe discussions and altercations of thepast decade or two as wars paints the malter as

more confrontational than necessary. A resolution of paradigrn differences can occur only whena new paradigm emerges that is more inforrnedand sophisticated than any existing one. That is

most likely 10 occur if and when proponen!s ofthese several points of view come together 10

discuss their differences, not to argue the sanctityof Ibeir views. Continuing dialogue arnong paradigm proponents of all stripes will afford the bestavenue for moving toward a responsive and congenial relationship.

We hope Ibat in this chapter wehave ilIustratedthe need for such a discussion by clearly delineating the differences that currently exist, and byshowing that Ihose differences have significantimplications at the practical level. Paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain. oughtto go about the business of inquíry without beingclear about jusI what paradigm informs and guideshis or her approach.

Notes

l. Many of Ibe objections listed here were fIrsl enunciated by posítivisls Ihemselves; indeed, we míght argue Iba! the postpositivist position represenls an atlemptto transform positivism in ways Ihal take aeconnl of

Ibese same objeclions. The naive posítivisl pos lion ofIbe .ixll:enlh Ihrongh Ibe nineleenlb eenturies is nolonger held by anyone even casually acquainled withIbese problems. AlIhough we would concede Ibal IhepostpositivíSI position, as enuncÍated, for example, byDenÍ.

Phillips (1987, 1990a, 1990b), represenls a considerable improvemenl over cIassic positivism, il failslO make a elean break. It represenls a kind of "damage

eonlrol" ralher Ihan a reformulalion ofbasic principIes.The nolion Ibal Ibese problems required a paradigmshíft was poorly recogni:red until Ihe pnblícalion of

Thomas Kuhn's landmark work, The Structure of Sci

entific Revolutions (1962. 1970), and even Ihen proceeded bul slowly. Nevertheless. Ihe contributions ofpre-Kuhnian crilies should be reeognizedand applauded.

2. We are reminded by Robert Slake (personal communicalion, 1993) Ihal !he view of paradigms Ihal wepresenl here should nol "exclude a belief thal there are


worlds wilbin worIds, unending, each wlth ilS own

paradigms. Infinitesimals have Iheirown cosmologies."3. It i8 unlikely Ibal a praclitioner of any paradigm

would agree Ihal our summaries cIosely describe whathe or she Ihinks or does. Workaday scíen!ists rarelyhave either Ihe time or Ibe inclinalion to assess whalIhey do in philosophical lerms. We do contend, however, Ibal Ihese descriptíons are apt as broad brush

strokes. íf nOI always al Ibe individual leve!.

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