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More on Aristotelian Epagoge

T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN

During the last two decades there has been growing interest in Aristotle's doctrine and use of dialectical, non-demonstrative forms of argument. One

of the results is that his concept of epagoge or induction has received

renewed attention in scholarly literature. I am thinking of the monograph by Kurt v. Fritz from 19641 and two articles in Phronesis, one by Walter Hess ( 1 970)2 and one fairly recent by D. W. Hamlyn ( 1 976)3. Much may be learnt from reading these works, as well as what has proved a natural

starting-point for modern research into the topic, viz. Ross' discussions in

his Aristotle4 and his edition of the Analytics5. In this paper I wish to add

only one substantial point that concerns the interpretation of Prior Ana-

lytics II 23 (section III). The remaining sections serve mainly to establish

the proper context for that point, section I by considering the various senses

of epagoge and the corresponding verb epagein in Aristotle, section II by

trying to find the proper place for nous or reason in connection with

epagoge, and section IV by glancing rapidly at the notorious final chapter of the Posterior Analytics. In much of what I say in these sections I am

particularly indebted in one way or another to Hamlyn's paper, but do not in general mark where I follow or reject his interpretations.

I

What is the sense of epagein and epagoge in Aristotle? He uses the terms in

various contexts and with various complements: is it possible to bring these

uses into some kind of order? I suggest the following schema:

(1) 'leading another person towards something with the aim and con-

sequence that he acquires insight into it'.

(2) 'leading another person towards something katholou or universal with the aim and consequence that he acquires insight into it'.

(3) 'leading another person, by pointing to particular cases, towards

something katholou with the aim and consequence that he acquires insight into it'.

(4) 'pointing to particular cases with the aim and consequence that another person is led towards insight into something katholou'. 1

(5) 'moving towards insight into something katholou by being aware of

particular cases'.

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(6) 'being aware of particular cases with the consequence that one

acquires insight into something katholou'. I

Three remarks will make clear the point of this schema.

First, unlike other critics who have attempted to schematise Aristotle's

use of epagein and epagoge I am not concerned to distinguish senses of the

concrete terms epagein and epagoge. For instance, I am not suggesting that in a given passage the sense of the term epagein is, e.g., that of item (4). Rather what I am talking about is the general idea of the practice of

epagoge that is being expressed in any given passage by means of those terms and their complements and their contextual implications.

Secondly, the schema is a logical reconstruction in the sense that it is tied to individual passages at certain crucial points, in particular with regard to

items (1), (4) and (6), but that the other items need not be tied to any specific passage for the schema to be illuminating. In fact they are, but that is an additional bonus, not a necessary condition for the schema to serve its

purpose.

Thirdly, I am not concerned to distinguish sharply the six items as

expressing six different types of epagoge. This is partly because it is often difficult to decide whether a given passage belongs under one item or

another, but much more importantly because the whole point of construing the schema is to bring out the essential connection that I take to exist between all Aristotelian applications of epagein and epagoge by making the

step from one usage to another appear natural and intelligible. In the schema as given the development from (1) to (6) is as follows. The difference between (1) and (2) is that in (1) what the person is led to

see may be any intelligible point, while in (2) it is restricted to being a universal point. The difference between (2) and (3) is that in (3) the means

by which the person is led to see the universal point is mentioned. The

difference between (3) and (4) is that (4) reverses the emphasis on means and end. (5) and (6) are related to each other as are (3) and (4), but differ from (3) and (4) in that while these are working with two participants to the

process, (5) and (6) concern cases where there is one participant only. The

step from (3)-(4) to (5)-(6) should cause no surprise: the origin of Aris- totelian logic in the dialectical situation is well known (Ernst Kapp and

others). Thus there is an intelligible development from (1) to (6). On the other

hand, some steps from one item to another are more marked than others.

(2), (3) and (4) go closely together and so do (5) and (6). The steps from (1) to (2), then, and from (4) to (5) are more marked.

I now consider the textual basis for the individual items.

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I start from (1). I then consider (2)-(4), starting from (4), which marks the

position that is furthest removed from (1). Finally I consider (5) and (6),

starting again from the position that is furthest removed from the earlier items.

( I ). epagein is used in this way in Posterior A nalytics I 1, 71 a 21 and 24;

epagoge is used in the same way in Prior Analytics II 21, 67 a 23, in both cases in connection with the problem about knowledge raised in Plato's Meno. Ross, v. Fritz and Hamlyn6 connect the use of epagein and epagoge in these passages with 'application of general principles to cases' and hence more or less directly with 'deduction'. It is not clear that this is what is meant.

In the passage from the Posterior A nalytics Aristotle is operating with

three pieces of knowledge that together form a first-figure syllogism: (A) 'that every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles', (B) 'that this

figure in the semicircle is a triangle' and (C) 'that this figure in the semicircle has its angles equal to two right angles'. The point he is trying to make is that if one knows (A) in advance one may come to see (B) at the same time as one is being led by epagoge to see (C). For this to make any sense the idea must be that one comes to see (C) in other ways than by deducing it from (A) and (B). Deduction is involved in the whole situation as described by Aristotle, viz. (instant) deduction of (B) from (A) and (C), when (C) has become known in other ways, but this piece of deduction has no direct connection with the piece of epagoge that is involved7.

In the passage from the Prior Analytics Aristotle is, more implicitly, working with the same three pieces of knowledge. Here his point is that

knowledge (episteme) of something, e.g. of this particular figure, may be

acquired instantly when one comes to see some other thing about that

figure. Thus suppose one knows in advance, (A), that every triangle has its

angles equal to two right angles. Then if one comes to see, (B), that this

figure is a triangle - and this is what one comes to see by epagoge: one is

led, in whatever ways, to see it - one instantly acquires knowledge of the

figure, viz. comes to see, (C), that it has its angles equal to two right angles - and this is done by a kind of recognition or 'd6nouement' (anagnorisis). What the latter means is presumably that (C) is seen by subsumption of (B) under (A), which was already known, i.e. by incorporating this figure under what is already known, (A), as a result of seeing, (B), that it is a triangle. That is, (C) becomes known by deduction from (A) and (B) - but what was learnt by epagoge was not (C), but (B); hence the passage does not imply that learning by epagoge is learning by deduction.

Nothing, then, seems implied in the use of epagoge and epagein in these

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passages besides the simple idea of being led to see some particular point'. In the group of (2)-(4), (4) seems to be the idea that is being expressed at

Topics I 18, 108 b 10- 1 1 : "by means of particular epagoge concerned with similar cases we claim to lead forward the universal" (Tf1 9XOtCFTOt I«I TWV 6poimv r6 The idea of pointing to

particular cases is contained in "by means of particular epagoge" (Tf1 XaO' ËX<XOT<X and it is clear from the context that this act is performed with the aim and consequence that another person is led towards insight into something katholou. The same idea seems expressed in Sophistici Elenchi 15, 174 a 37.

As for (2) and (3) Topics VIII 1, 156 a 4-5 is relevant: "leading on from

particulars to the universal" (... EirayovTa ... aiio TJov EXOLCFTOV Eiri, T6

Once again it seems clear from the context that we should understand 'another person' as complement (grammatical object) to

"leading on" in a 4, and that the act of epagoge is performed with the aim and consequence that this person is led towards insight into the katholou that is mentioned. More difficult is the question as to the

significance of the mention of the particulars. Either we say that the phrase "from particulars" (&IT6 TWV Exa6TOV) serves to indicate the way in which the person is led towards universal insight - if so, we will make the

passage belong under (3); or we say that the phrase merely serves to

indicate (for contextual reasons which do not so much concern the idea of

epagoge that is being expressed) what may already seem implied in (2), viz. that the starting-point for the movement towards universal insight is,

evidently, particulars. Be that as it may, the question whether our pasage is best seen to belong under (2) or (3) can hardly be answered, and for reasons

already given we need not try to answer it. By itself and however inter-

preted Topics VIII 1, 156 a 4-5 is sufficient to validate our filling in the gap between (1) and (4) with (2) and (3).

In the group of (5) and (6), (6) seems to be the idea that is being expressed at Posterior Analytics II 19, 100 b 4, on which see below section IV.

If (6) is a properly Aristotelian idea it seems admissible to claim that (5) is contained in the classic definition of epagoge in Topics I 12, 105 a 13-14:

"epagoge is the march (ephodos) from particulars to the universal". This

claim involves interpreting the mention of the particulars in the definition

as indicating the way or means by which insight into the universal is

acquired (cf. my remarks on Topics VIII 1, 156 a 4-5), but that, after all, seems plausible: epagoge is the movement towards insight into the uni-

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versal that 'starts from' particulars in the sense that it occurs as a result of attending to particulars.

Thus the individual items of the schema seem to be vouched for by different Aristotelian passages. Whether the schema is also adequate in the sense that it captures everything that goes into the Aristotelian concept of

epagoge is something I shall come back to. At present I wish to spell out two implications of the schema on the

assumption that it is adequate. First, if the schema is adequate the Aristotelian concept of epagoge will

be an essentially unified one. That this is so may be seen in the following

way. (1), which is pre-technical, may be left on one side. Equally the

difference between, on the one hand, (5)-(6) and, on the other, (2)-(4) is

inessential: whether a person's moving towards insight into something katholou or his attending to particular cases with that consequence, is induced by somebody else or not makes no difference to the basic idea. The

important point to note, then, is that the reversal of emphasis that takes

place between (2)-(3) and (4) does not touch the essentially unitary con-

ception behind (2)-(4). Compare the relation between (2), (3) and (4) to that between, e.g., (21) 'building a house', (31) 'building a house by placing stones here, a door there etc.', and (41) 'placing stones here, a door there etc. with the aim and consequence that a house is built'. That there is no contrast between (2l)-(41) seems immediately clear (however we are to

explicate their relationship): likewise (2)-(4) may be said to exhibit an

essentially unified conception of epagoge. If, on this background, we wish to formulate the root idea of Aristotelian

epagoge in its full, technical sense (where 'full' and 'technical' are intended to allow us to leave out of account (2) and (1) respectively), we should come out with something like 'attending to particular cases with the consequence that insight into some universal point is acquired' or 'acquiring insight into

some universal point as a consequence of attending to particular cases'.

This leads directly to the second implication of the schema that deserves to be made explicit. If the schema is adequate, clearly Aristotelian epagoge will be different from the modern concept of induction: while this concept includes the idea of an inference from particular to universal and hence

raises the question of the validity of the inductive procedure, there is no

trace of these ideas in the schema as given. Acquiring insight into some

universal point as a consequence of attending to particular cases is dif-

ferent from inferring that point from the particulars. In fact nothing is

either stated or implied in the root idea of epagoge that has been suggested

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as to how it comes to pass that the univeral point is seen from attending to

particulars, much less that it happens by inference. But then, is the schema adequate? Does it capture everything that goes

into Aristotle's concept of epagoge? Ross would deny that this is so. In his

analysis of the various uses of epagoge and epagein9 he contrasts two usages that he finds reflected in the relevant passages, one ('adducing of in-

stances') which is equivalent to the idea expressed in my item (4) and, with the usual slight modification when going from (2)-(4) to (5)-(6), in (6), and another ('passage from instances to a universal conclusion') which is based on the texts from which I take (3) and (5). Where I find no contrast between the two sets of passages, Ross does. The reason for this is, I believe, quite

simply that Ross reads into the texts that yield my items (3) and (5) the

modern concept of induction. Thus in his 'passage from instances to a

universal conclusion' he would stress the word 'conclusion', witness his talk of "drawing of a universal conclusion " (p. 482, my emphases) or "reasoning to a general conclusion from premisses singular in form" (p. 547, my emphases) and his statement that the aim of the citation of individual

examples is "to prove a general conclusion" (p. 482, my emphasis). That is, both the idea of an inference and the connected question of the validity of the inference form part of Ross' 'passage from instances to a universal

conclusion'. But then Ross must find a contrast between the texts he takes to yield his 'passage' and those that yield his 'adducing of instances'. For if

the latter usage is in fact equivalent to the idea contained in my items (4) and (6), then, since the idea of inferring the universal from the particulars plays no role in these items, the two usages detected by Ross must be

contrasted.

But then, is Ross in fact right in detecting a usage that incorporates the idea of inferring? Is he right in contrasting the two usages? And con-

sequently, since my schema operates with no such contrast, would he be

right in denying my schema to be adequate? The only way in which Ross might prove his point would be by in-

troducing passages that unmistakably work with epagoge as a type of

inference. And this, I contend, cannot be done: there are no such passages. The only passage, viz. Prior Analytics II 23, that might seem to work with

epagoge in that way should, as I shall try to show, be interpreted differently. But then, if in fact there are no passages that prove the idea of inference to

be part of at least one usage of Aristotelian epagoge, for methodological reasons it is more correct to interpret the texts that yield Ross' 'passage from instances to a universal conclusion' in such a way that they are not

taken to introduce an idea of epagein and epagoge that contrasts with the

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one that is found in the texts that lie behind Ross' 'adducing of instances' and my items (4) and (6). It is simpler, and hence for methodological reasons preferable, to find the same basic idea expressed in both sets of

passages and hence to opt for my items (3) and (5) instead of Ross' 'passage' as being the ones that express the idea of epagoge in those passages that do not fall under (4) and (6).

My argument here is purely based on a point of methodology. We start, a priori, from the assumption that the various passages that contain the idea of epagoge reflect a unified conception of that notion. We then ascer- tain that no passage contains an idea of epagoge that must be seen to contrast with the one we have initially established. And we then conclude that in fact no passage contains an idea of epagoge that does contrast with the one we have initially established, and hence that our a priori assumption is a fact.

I take it, then, that my schema is adequate; that Aristotle has a unified

conception of epagoge; and that the idea of inference plays no role in that

conception. If this is correct one can understand why the question of the validity of a

given piece of epagoge never arises for Aristotle. There is epagoge when in a debate you make somebody accept some universal point on the basis of a review of particular cases, whether this point be true or false, and there is

epagoge when you make somebody see a mathematical truth. Equally, whether you point to one particular case or to many or to all (where that is

possible) is quite unimportant: Aristotle does not distinguish between those modern forms of induction ('perfect', 'intuitive' and the like), quite simply because his concept of epagoge only contains the minimal content that is common to most modern types of induction, viz. coming to see some

universal point as a consequence of attending to particular cases.

II

We have seen that a person's attending to particular cases is only epagoge if as a consequence he comes to see some universal point, but that the

concept of epagoge implies nothing as to how the universal point comes to be seen as a consequence of the person's attending to particular cases. Does

Aristotle say anything about the latter question? What, according to him, will explain that in one case attending to particular cases leads to seeing a

universal point, while in another case it does not? The answer, I suggest, is nous or reason.

By nous I do not mean, obviously, the state of mind (hexis) that consists

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in true knowledge of principles that cannot be deduced from anything else, which is the sense of nous that is being expressed in Posterior Analytics II

19, 100 b 5-17 and Nicomachean Ethics VI vi, 1141 a 3 and 7 (cf. VI ii, 1139 b 13 and iii, 1139 b 15). Nor, more importantly, do I mean by nous a

capacity that guarantees the truth of whatever universal point it helps a man to grasp. Nous in the sense in which I wish to introduce it is not a

faculty that makes good for the notorious frailty of induction by securing the truth of a given universal proposition, the truth of which cannot be

adequately secured by inspection of particular cases alone. What I mean by nous is something much humbler: a generalising capacity or ability that is

responsible for the fact that a universal point, something, that is, which

goes beyond what is grasped in sense-perception, may come to be present to the mind - whether this point be true or false. Nous, then, is the psychic power that Aristotle discusses in his Psychology (De A nima III 4ff) after his

inquiry into sense-perception and phantasia or 'imaging'. That this fairly trivial point is correct cannot, I believe, be seriously

doubted by anyone familiar with Aristotle's thought. Nevertheless, for the fun of delving into the intricacies of Aristotle's text, I shall briefly discuss a

couple of passages that tend to support it: Posterior Analytics I 31 and

Nicomachean Ethics VI xi, 1143 a 35-b5. In Posterior A nalytics I 31 Aristotle wishes to show that it is impossible to

possess knowledge of something (epistasthai) as a result of perception alone. The reason is that you cannot be said to know something unless you possess general knowledge, knowledge of some universal connection, and

although sense perception is in some way directed towards something katholou, this is not the relevant sense of to katholou, which is that of `what holds in every case' (87 b 31) and 'what is always and everywhere' (87 b 32). That knowledge of something presupposes knowledge of this kind of universal and cannot therefore be obtained by sense-perception alone is then shown, in the first part of the chapter (87 b 28-88 a 8), by means of

examples. In the second part of the chapter (88 a 9-17) Aristotle proceeds to show

that nevertheless in some cases one may acquire 'demonstrative' knowl-

edge directly as a result of perception. "For with some things, if we could

see them we would no longer seek for them, not because we would possess

knowledge by seeing, but because we would know the universal as a result

of seeing - for instance if we saw the glass to be perforated and light

coming through, it would also be clear (to us) why it burns, from seeing

separately in the case of each piece of glass, but at the same time (viz. as any

single seeing) grasping (noesai) that it is in that way with every piece."

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The idea is clear. One does not, in the imagined case, see the reason why the glass burns, one sees that the given piece of glass is perforated and at the same time understands or grasps (noesai) that all glasses as perforated and hence will allow light to come through. And by understanding this universal fact one eo ipso knows why the glass burns, since, as is clearly presupposed in the chapter as a whole (and cf. 88 a 1-2 and 5-6), knowing the relevant universal proposition is knowing why.l° What is special about the imagined case is, then, that since one can see with one's eyes the fact that explains the phenomenon to be explained and (we must add) since the

explanation is so obvious that even a single (imagined) glance at a piece of

glass is sufficient to make one grasp the universal fact, a single case of

perception will make one come to possess truly demonstrative and ex-

planatory knowledge of the phenomenon to be explained - but only via the noetic grasp of the universal connection.

If we now turn back to the examples Aristotle has provided earlier in the

chapter it is noteworthy that one of these (given in 87 b 39-88 a 5) resembles the example of the burning-glass with regard to the fact that in both cases one is thought to be able directly to see the fact that explains the phe- nomenon to be explained. Thus in the example of 87 b 39-88 a 5 the idea is that if we were on the moon, we should be able to see the earth screening, which is the fact that accounts for an eclipse. But here Aristotle's point is that even though we should see this fact, nevertheless we would not know the reason why 'our' moon is eclipsed, since we would not possess the universal fact that whenever and only when the earth is screening is the moon eclipsed. True enough, we would perceive that the moon is eclipsed and we would see the earth screening, but precisely because perception does not grasp a universal fact we would not possess knowledge of the

eclipse. But Aristotle goes on like this: "However, from observing this often

happening, we might have hunted down the universal and might then

possess a demonstration; for from several particulars the universal be- comes clear". As Ross sees (note ad loc.), Aristotle is here clearly, if only implicitly, talking of epagoge and the idea evidently is that repeated observations of eclipse and screening by the earth might have made us see the universal connection between the two and hence might have made us come to possess explanatory knowledge of eclipses. But now, if we ask what word Aristotle might have used instead of 'hunting down' (thereusai) to

express our imagined grasp of the universal connection between eclipse and screening, it seems impossible, in view of the close similarity of the two

examples, to doubt that that word is the one that was used in the example of the burning-glass, viz. noesai (grasping). If so, it is the generalising ability

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of nous that is responsible for our coming to entertain that universal

proposition. Obviously the passage does not say so, but can it really be

doubted? Now the second passage: Nicomachean Ethics VI xi, 1143 a 35-b 5. Nous

is of the ultimates (ta eschata) in both directions, viz. of the 'first' terms

(protoi horoi) and the 'last' ones (eschatoi), the former in connection with

demonstrations (proper), the latter in connection with practical (presum- ably :) 'demonstrations'.

In the two lines that conclude the piece Aristotle explains why, in con- nection with practical demonstrations, nous is of the 'last thing' (to es-

chaton) and that which admits of being otherwise (to endechomenon sc. all5s echein) and that which belongs to the second premiss (tes heteras

protaseos). These lines are notoriously difficult, but fortunately I am in a

position to sidestep what is perhaps the biggest difficulty, viz. that of

deciding what it is about these 'last things' that is grasped by nous. Suffice it to say that nous is said to be concerned with the 'last things'.

Why? "The reason is that they (i.e. the 'last things'll are starting-points for that-for-the-sake-of-which" (1143 b 4). That is, nous is of the 'last

things' because it is from these that that-for-the-sake-of-which comes into

being. In this it is already implied that nous is of the 'last things' in the

practical case, not because these things must be grasped by some faculty or

other and that for whatever reasons nous seems a proper candidate, but

because they serve as starting-points for that-for-the-sake-of-which. But

then, of course, one wishes to know more about the latter thing, and the next sentence provides a clue: "For universals come into being from

particulars" (1143 b 4-5). This sentence is best seen as providing a reason

why what was stated in the first sentence is true. That is, the 'last things' form a starting-point for that-for-the-sake-of-which because universals come into being from particulars. If so, that-for-the-sake-of-which is

something universal and the 'last things' that are grasped by nous in the

practical case are particulars. The third and final sentence runs: "Of these, then, one must have perception, and this perception is nous" ( 1143 b 5). The word 'these' in this sentence is best taken to refer back to the 'last

things' (hautai) of the first sentence, whereby the second sentence becomes

parenthetical. So: Because (cf. b 5 oun) the 'last things' are the starting- points for that-for-the-sake-of-which, therefore one must have perception of these things, and this perception is nous. Now this will make sense only on the assumption that the question that lies behind the passage as a whole

is that of how one comes to possess knowledge ofthat-for-the-sake-of-which and the argument of the passage may therefore be reconstructed as follows.

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In order to acquire knowledge of that-for-the-sake-of-which, which is

something universal, one must, since the universal comes to be present from the particular, have a sense of the 'last things', which are the relevant

particulars, and since the result (viz. that-for-the-sake-of-which) is some-

thing universal, this sense (aisthesis) is nous. This can only mean one thing: that nous is the name of the faculty that

explains our ability to come to entertain some universal proposition. By

having particulars presented to us (whatever, in the practical case, these

particulars are taken to be) we come to possess knowledge of that-for-the-

sake-of-which, which is something universal, and the faculty that explains that we may in this way grasp a universal fact is nous.

On the basis of these two passages I conclude that Aristotelian epagoge is

'intuitive induction', but only in the sense that follows from the restricted role that has been assigned to nous. Nous is not a faculty that guarantees the

truth of a universal proposition that is grasped on the basis of inspection of

particular cases, it is only a faculty that makes possible that grasp, whether the result be true or false.

But now, can we say that on the basis of only two passages I have made

probable the truth of my suggestion that Aristotelian epagoge is intuitive

induction in the sense stipulated? Of course not. Nevertheless I claim it to be true and if the reader is not prepared to accept my point, he must

produce counter-examples (enstasis, cf. Topics 157 a 34-35). I shall now try to show that the idea of claiming some point to be

universally true on the basis of only a few examples that I have just made

use of in the preceding paragraph is itself one that forms part of the

Aristotelian concept of epagoge.

III

Prior A nalytics II 23

It is normally held that in this chapter Aristotle is talking of 'perfect induction' and analysing that species of induction in such a way that it

comes out as a proof or valid argument. But then, it is asked, how does that

view of induction go with his normal view, if "in most cases he evidently thinks of the argument as a dialectical argument, in which knowledge about the particulars tends to produce the corresponding belief about the

universal, without producing certainty"12? And, in the context of this

paper, if I claim there to be no other form of epagoge in Aristotle than the

one that consists in attending to particular cases with the consequence that

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some general point is seen (for which nous considered as a generalising capacity is responsible), what do I have to say about Prior Analytics II 23?

What Aristotle sets out to do in the chapter is to 'reduce' the dialectical

argument of epagoge to the syllogistic schemata of the Prior Analytics, and

the question to be answered is how this reduction should be understood. He starts (68 b 15) by saying that epagoge or to be more precise (kai) the

syllogism that depends on epagoge consists in showing (in syllogistic ter-

minology) by means of C that A belongs to B. "For that is the way we

practise epagogai" (68 b 18). His example is this: A is 'long lived', B is

'gall-less', C is (the group of) long-lived species. So far there is no problem: by epagoge, i.e. by inspection of long-lived species, we may in fact show that 'long-lived' belongs to 'gall-less'. (That Aristotle is talking of species raises no problem: inspection of species consists in inspection of the in-

dividuals that fall under those species.) Aristotle continues (68 b 21), in my very free paraphrase: "It follows (cf.

b 21 1 d%) from the way we set up our example, more precisely: from the fact that C is the group of species that are long-lived (A), that A belongs to all C." Very well, we say, but our goal is to show that A belongs to B: how can we do that? "It is also the case (cf. b 22 alla kai) that B belongs to all C." All

right, but how can we know? Of course only by inspecting all C's. Very well, but how does the fact of B's belonging to all C's help us towards our goal? "Now look, if (cf. b 23 ei oun) C is convertible with B, i.e. if B does not go

beyond C, then with logical necessity A will belong to B. "Logical necessity? Yes, for there exists a rule of inference (see 68 a 21-25) that (68 b

25-27:) if A and B belong to the same thing (C) and C is convertible with either A or B (here: B), then the other initial predicate (here: A) belongs to that (here: B) which is convertible with C."

Pausing here for a moment, we may note that the 'epagogic' syllogism that shows by means ofc that A belongs to B with logical necessity may be

constructed if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) It must be true to say that B

belongs to all C, and (2) it must be true to say that C is convertible with B

or, in other words, that B does not go beyond C. In order to be certain that

these conditions are in fact fulfilled one must know all C's and all in-

dividuals (or species) that belong under B (call them D). Aristotle himself

notes that one must know all C's: 68 b 27-29. He does not explicitly say that

one must know all D's, but one can see why: his example is after all

concerned with C's only (cf. 68 b 17-18). But then one would like to ask: is it Aristotle's doctrine that in order to be

able to practise epagoge one must inspect all C's, in order to make sure that

condition (1) is fulfilled, and all D's, in order to make sure that condition

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(2) is fulfilled? No, that cannot be his point. But doesn't Aristotle say that

all C's and D's must be inspected (although he is only explicit about the

C's)? The answer is again negative: PriorAnalytics II 23 says nothing about

what one must actually do in order to be able to practise epagoge properly. The aim of the chapter is a quite different one: it is to bring out what is

implied in asserting a universal proposition on the basis of attending to a

few particular cases. The point Aristotle wishes to make is, I suggest, that

when, on the basis of attending to particular cases, we assert some universal

connection to hold, we claim that, in Aristotle's terms, ( I ) B belongs to all

C, i.e. belongs to all individuals past, present and future, that are A - and

of course without attempting to fulfil the impossible task of making sure

that this claim holds true (that Aristotle was aware of the impossibility of

this task seems indicated by Posterior Analytics I 1, 71 a 30-b 5). Similarly we claim (2) that C is convertible with B - and of course without attempt-

ing to prove the truth of this claim by inspecting all D's past, present and future.

The idea is quite simple. I inspect seven long-lived individuals, i.e. C's

that are A. I find that all of the seven individuals are gall-less (have B true of them). I then confidently assert that all gall-less animals are long-lived, i.e. that A is true of B. But then, what is implied in this assertion? Surely (1) that all long-lived individuals (C) are gall-less (B) and (2) that B does not go beyond C. In asserting on the basis of inspection of seven C's that B is A I

subscribe to the truth of the argument one gets by inserting A, B and C into

the argument-places of the rule of inference mentioned in 68 a 21-25 and b

25-27, and in order to subscribe to the truth of this argument I must claim

(1) that B is in fact true of all C's and (2) that B and C are in fact convertible. If this interpretation is correct, Aristotle is not talking, in Prior Analytics

II 23, about one species of induction, viz. perfect induction. Rather he is

talking about any kind of epagoge (from one particular case or more, to a dialectical 'truth' or to a mathematical one) and what he is wishing to bring out is what we imply when on the basis of attending to particular cases we assert a universal proposition.13

But then, is this actually what Aristotle wishes to say? What is the

argument that he is not talking of perfect induction?

First, and most weakly, there is the argument of onus of proof. If it creates

problems vis-a-vis Aristotle's doctrine and practice in other passages to see him as talking of perfect induction in this one, it is up to an adherent of that

interpretation to prove that it must be adopted. Secondly, and more powerfully, on the normal reading it seems impos-

sible to make the chapter itself cohere. For in that chapter Aristotle several

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times speaks as if the kind of epagoge he is talking about is the normal one, i.e. the one that is so often used or invoked in his writings. Thus in 68 b 18 he seems to be referring to the normal practice of epagoge ("for that is how we practice epagogai') and in b 30-37 he contrasts epagoge and demon- strative syllogism in his normal way, without even the slightest hint that he is talking of some special type of epagoge. If, then, one sticks to the claim that in the chapter as a whole he is talking of perfect induction as a special type of epagoge, then one must conclude either that the wording of b 30-37 is seriously misleading or that the chapter itself is incoherent. I decline to

accept either view. But now, if the proposed interpretation of Prior Analytics II 23 is correct,

there is absolutely no inconsistency between the doctrine of that chapter and the point I have made earlier that one necessary condition for the

practicability of epagoge is the presence of the generalising ability that is nous. For while there might be such a contrast if (a) nous were the ability that guarantees the truth of a universal proposition even in cases where the inductive basis for the assertion of that proposition does not warrant its truth and (b) if Prior Analytics II 23 contained a doctrine of a type of

induction, viz. perfect induction, where the inductive basis for the assertion of the universal proposition does warrant its truth, neither condition is fulfilled. Nous, as introduced by me in this context, is no such ability and

Prior A nalytics II 23 is not concerned with any such type of induction.

IV

Posterior A nalytics II 19.

The structure of the chapter is well known. In 99 b 17-18 Aristotle poses two

questions, (A) how principles become known and (B) what (the name of) the knowing state is. In the following 'aporematic' passage (99 b 20-34) he first (b 22-23 and 23-25) raises two sub-questions that concern the second

(B) of the two guiding questions and are answered, with that question, at the end of the chapter (100 b 5-17). He then introduces (b 25-26) and discusses (b 26-32) a third sub-question that bears on the former (A) of the two guiding questions, and provides an answer in 99 b 34-100 b 5. Let us consider this passage.

The guiding question is (A) how principles come to be known and the

sub-question (of 99 b 25-26) is whether the state of knowledge is innate - but unconscious (for clearly we are not aware of possessing it during the whole of our lives), or whether it is not innate but comes to be present. The

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sub-question contains a problem, since (as Aristotle argues in b 26-34) we wish to say neither that the knowledge is innate with the necessary con-

sequence that it is unconscious, nor that it comes to be present without some knowledge (in a wide sense: gnosis) being already there from which the knowledge in question may be seen to arise. This problem Aristotle next proceeds to solve, by pointing out (in b 34-35) that we do in fact

possess (as do all animals) a capacity (dynamis) for making judgments which on the one hand is innate and on the other hand satisfies the

requirement that it be not a fully developed state, which would necessitate

its being unconscious. This capacity is perception. The sub-question, then, is answered: what about the guiding one (A)?

This question is in fact, though not explicitly, answered in 99 b 36-100 b 3 where Aristotle shows, in four different ways (99 b 36-100 a 3, a 3-9,

12-13, 15-b 3 - the so-called 'genetic account'), how principles come to be known from perception. Hamlyn (pp. 175-180) objects to this interpre- tation of the point of the four passages that by itself what is described in them will never serve fully to explain how principles come to be known. This is surely correct, but it is not clear that Aristotle claims that much for his genetic account. In 100 a 13-14 he adds the important remark "and the soul is in fact such that it is capable of undergoing this". That is, the advance towards greater generality that has been metaphorically described in the third passage (100 a 12-13) is possible only because the soul is of a certain kind - and presumably the same goes for what is said in the other

three passages. We can see what this means if we recall the distinction Aristotle draws in Nicomachean Ethics II v between psychic abilities or

capacities (dynameis) on the one hand and states of mind (psychic hexeis) on the other. What is in a certain state is different from the state it is in.

Take for instance the term aisthesis or perception. In some passages aisthesis clearly denotes the faculty of perception, the ability that accounts for cases of perception. Thus, e.g., in our chapter of the Posterior Analytics (99 b 35). In other passages, however, the term denotes not the faculty of

perception but a given state or occurrence of perception. Thus, e.g., in 99 b 36. Now if we apply this distinction to the genetic account it seems clear that what Aristotle is talking about in these passages are states, not faculties. Thus mneme or memory ( 1 00 a 3) is a state of mind, not a faculty thereof, since, as is clear from the work On Memory (De Memoria 450 a

22-23), the faculty that is responsible for mneme is the faculty of phantasia or 'imaging' (in some places called to phantastikon). Again, the logos that is mentioned in 100 a 2 certainly is not 'rationality' but rather a 'rational account' or the insight that is expressed in such an account, precisely

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because it functions as a principle of art or science (technes arche kai

epistemes, 100 a 8). But then the point of 100 a 13-14, quoted above, must be that the advance from occurrences of perception via memory and

experience to the state of insight into the principles of art or science is

possible only because the soul has the corresponding abilities (dynameis cf.

dynasthai in 100 a 14). What these abilities are, is clear for perception and memory: they are the

faculty of perception and that faculty plus that of phantasia respectively. What it is for experience is more difficult, since the answer to be given depends on how one construes Aristotelian empeiria (experience). Without

going into that problem, let me just state my view that as described in Posterior Analytics II 19 and Metaphysics A I empeiria contains no uni- versal element (other than the one that goes with perception), but is closely connected with memory. It is a state of mind that at one moment connects the memory of a number of individual cases, e.g. that when Socrates suffered from that illness he was cured by that treatment; when Kallias suffered from that illness he was cured by that treatment; etc. If this is

correct, the ability that is responsible for Aristotelian empeiria will be, once

again, that of phantasia. Be that as it may: what, to proceed, is the faculty that accounts for logos? Only one answer seems possible: nous, reason,

rationality. If so, we may conclude that the point of the genetic account is to show how various states of mind come into being from perception, and that it is implied, and stated explicitly in 100 a 13-14, that these states come into

being only because the soul possesses the corresponding abilities: aisthesis,

phantasia and nous.

However, there is one more point to the genetic account, viz. that of

showing that the states of mind (at least those of empeiria and logos) come into being as a result of repeated cases of perception. Hence, if we go back to the two questions that guide lines 99 b 34-100 b 5, we may conclude that the sub-question is answered in 99 b 34-35, as we saw, and again in 100 a

10-11, while the guiding question (A) is answered by the genetic account:

principles come to be known when the soul advances from the state of

perception via those of memory and empeiria to that of logos, and there are two conditions on this, ( I) that the soul is such that it can advance in that

way, i.e. has the necessary abilities, and (2) that the soul undergoes repeated perception of the phenomenon into which rational insight is

eventually acquired. This brings us to the notorious lines 100 b 3-5: "Consequently it is clear

that we must come to know the primitives by epagoge; for perception instils the universal in this way". On the basis of what has been said of the

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immediately preceding passage (99 b 25-100 b 3) these lines may be given a

simple interpretation. In relation to the two questions that guide that

passage the point of the three lines is to spell out one element in the answer to the guiding question (A) that is contained in the genetic account. This element is the one about repetition (cf. (2) above) as a necessary condition for the advance towards knowledge of principles, and the way in which Aristotle emphasises that element is by bringing in the concept of epagoge. Thus considered the lines may be seen to contain the following argument. As described in the genetic account the universal comes into being from

perception as a result of epagoge (= repeated perceptions, where `repeated perceptions' are understood as repeated cases of attending to a perceptible fact); hence, <since principles are universal>, the principles become known as a result of epagoge (= repeated attention being given to the phe- nomenon whose principle one comes to know).

On this reading of the lines "in this way" (houto) of line 100 b 5 refers back to the mention of epagoge in 100 b 4. Hamlyn rejects this interpre- tation and thinks that "in this way" refers back to the genetic account as a whole (pp. 1 80- 1 8 1 ). I disagree for two reasons. First, it seems exceedingly difficult to make the lines contain an argument proper if "in this way" is not interpreted in the normal way, which is the one I have adopted. Secondly, Hamlyn's argument against that interpretation, viz. that per- ception could not be said to instil the universal by epagoge since perception already is of the univeral, will hardly do. It is of course quite true that, as we have seen earlier, Aristotelian perception is in some way of the universal, but this only means that there are two kinds of universal, the one that is

grasped in perception (however we are to understand that idea) and the other that is only grasped by animals that have abilities that go beyond that of perception alone. Evidently, it is the latter kind Aristotle is thinking of in 100 b 5.14

Finally, in 100 b 5-17, Aristotle answers the second guiding question (B) of the chapter by stating that the name of the knowing state is nous. This statement raises no problem for the interpretation that has been given of

Aristotle's answer to his first guiding question. On the contrary it is quite natural that, as aisthesis may denote both a faculty and a state, so nous, in addition to denoting the faculty that is responsible for the universal

principle's being seen as a result of 'epagogic' attention being given to

particular cases, is now stated to denote the state that obtains when the

principle is seen.

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V

To sum up, the doctrine of Posterior Analytics II 19 in no way contradicts the interpretation of epagoge that I have put forward. Epagoge is attending to particular cases with the consequence that a universal point is seen, for which the faculty of nous taken as a generalising ability is responsible, and Posterior Analytics II 19 can be seen more or less explicitly to say that much. Equally, the doctrine of Prior Analytics II 23 is perfectly consistent with this way of understanding epagoge. In Aristotle epagoge raises no

questions as to the certainty of the universal proposition that is asserted as a result of attending to particular cases. Hence he is not tempted to toy with the idea of an 'epagogic' inference (this much for Prior Analytics II 23), nor does he wish to introduce nous as an ability that guarantees the truth of the universal proposition (this much for one traditional interpretation of Pos- terior Analytics II 19). His epagoge is a simple notion that never betrays its connection with the dialectical situation, where its aim is to generate acceptance, and no more, of a universal proposition. It does not touch on the complicated question as to the certainty of that proposition. But as far as it goes, it has the advantage of being clear and having a point.15

University of Copenhagen

1 Kurt von Fritz, 'Die epagoge bei Aristoteles', SB d. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., Philos.-hist. Kl., Jg. 1964, H. 3, MJnchen ( 1 964). 2 Walter Hess, 'Erfahrung und Intuition bei Aristoteles', Phronesis 15 (1970) 48-82. 3 D. W. Hamlyn, 'Aristotelian Epagoge', Phronesis 21 (1976) 167-184. - Also relevant to the Aristotelian concept of epagoge, and most enjoyable too is L. A. Kosman, 'Under- standing, Explanation and Insight in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics ; in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (edd.), Exegesis and Argument, Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, (Phronesis, Suppl. vol. I Assen: Van Gorcum 1973) 374-392. 4 Sir David Ross, Aristotle, London (1923, 19495) pp. 38-41. 5 id., Aristotle's Prior and PosteriorAnalytlcs, Oxford (1949) pp. 47-51, 481-483. 6 Ross, Analytics, p. 47; v. Fritz, p. 23; Hamlyn, p. 170. 7 The fact that (B) is deduced from (A) and (C) accounts for 11 UVXXO-YLGR6v in 71 1 a 25. I paraphrase freely: 'Before the person has been led to see (C) or rather (since from knowing (A) in advance and having come to see (C) he will instantly deduce (B) and hence come to 'possess the syllogism' that proves (C) before he comes to possess the syllogism, his relation in terms of knowledge (episteme) to this figure in the semi-circle is as follows:

, 8 For a clear example of this use of epagein see Metaphysics A 8, 989 a 33. (I owe this reference to J. L. Ackrill.)

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9 Ross, A nalytics, pp. 47, 481-482. 'o In the passage translated I have employed Ross' text. Jonathan Barnes, in his 'Aristotle's Posterior A nalytics, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford ( 1 975 ) p. 47, reads xai. EL T6 instead ofxaiev TM and translates "even if seeing occurs separately for each <piece of

glass> while comprehending < grasps> at one time that it is thus in every case". But first, on this reading Aristotle does not explain why in the imagined case one may come to possess the universal explanation as a result of seeing, while on the preferred reading he does: one sees the relevant fact, and seeing is something that takes place separately for each

single piece of glass, and at the .same time as one sees (any single piece) one grasps the fact that it is in the same way with all pieces. Secondly, cannot mean 'at one time', since it

implies the existence of some other thing that is brought into relation with the event that is stated to occur &f.L0:, accordingly, means 'at the same time' as something else. li I take aù-ro:L in b4 to refer back to Tov ?9)(&TOV xav £v8Exoplvov in b3, not to Tiíç lTlp«s ?rpoTaoeWS. The feminine gender should be explained as a case of attraction caused by the

grammatical predicate lz Ross, A nalytics, p. 48.

For remarks about the special status of Prior A nalytics I I 23 that point in my direction, see J. M. le Bland, Logique et methode chez Aristote, Paris (1939) pp. 127-128 and W. Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik, G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht ( 1 962, 19702) p. 100. 14 This distinction between two kinds of katholou may be hinted at in the fourth passage of the genetic account (100 a 15-b 3): when there is perception and one of the indis-

tinguishables (the colour red or the thing man?) has taken a stand, there is a first katholou in the soul (l00 a 15-b I ); next a stand is made among these (sc. the first katholou things), and so on until the indivisibles and universals have come to a stand, e.g. (from perception of red or man as described in 100 a 15-b I to the grasp of) 'red' or 'man' (cf. b 2-3: TOLov8i,

and from 'red', 'blue' etc. man 'man', 'horse' etc. to 'colour' and 'animal' (cf. b 3: Ews and so forth (100 b 1-3).

I am grateful to J. L. Ackrill, Oxford, for valuable criticism of an earlier version of this

paper, and to the members of the Copenhagen Aristotelian group, for comments on the first version that helped to clarify a number of points.