cottingham a brute to the brutes - descartes' treatment of animals

8/9/2019 Cottingham A Brute to the Brutes - Descartes' Treatment of Animals

1/10

Royal nstitute of Philosophy

'A Brute to the Brutes?': Descartes' Treatment of AnimalsAuthor(s): John CottinghamSource: Philosophy, Vol. 53, No. 206 (Oct., 1978), pp. 551-559Published by: Cambridge University Presson behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749880.

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2/10

'A Brute otheBrutes?':

Descartes'

Treatment f

Animals

JOHN COTTINGHAM

I

To be able to believe that a

dog with a

brokenpaw is not really n

pain

when it

whimpers

s a

quite

extraordinarychievement

ven for a philo-

sopher.

Yet

according

to

the

standard

nterpretation,his

is just what

Descartes

did

believe. He

held,

we

are

informed, he

'monstrous' hesis

that animals are without

eeling

r

awareness

f

any

kind'.1

The

standard

view

has

been reiterated

n

a recent

collectionon animal

rights,

which

casts

Descartes

as

the villainof

the

piece

forhis

alleged

view that

nimals

merely

ehave

as

if they

feel

pain

when

they re, say,

kicked r

stabbed'.2

The basis forthis widelyaccepted interpretations Descartes' famous

doctrine

of

the 'animal machine'

('bete-machine');

doctrine

that

one

critic ondemns

s 'a

grim

foretaste

f a

mechanically

minded

age' which

'brutally

iolates he

old

kindly ellowship

f

iving hings'.3

But if we look at what

Descartes

actually ays

about animals

t is

by

no means clear

that

he

holds the monstrous

view

which

all

the com-

mentators

ttribute

o

him.

In

fact the traditional

rubric

Descartes'

doctrine

fthe

bete-machine'

s

vague

and

ambiguous;

t

needs

to

be broken

down

into

a

number

of

distinct

propositions

f

we are to sort out

what

Descartes said, and what he is implicitly ommitted o, fromwhat he

neither

aid

nor

mplied.

Consider,

hen,

he

following

ssertions:

(i)

Animals re machines

(2)

Animals

re automata

(3)

Animals

o

not

hink

(4)

Animalshave

no

language

(5)

Animalshave

no

self-consciousness

(6) Animalshaveno consciousness

(7)

Animals

re

totally

without

eeling

1

N. Kemp Smith,

New Studies n the Philosophyf

Descartes London:

Macmillan,952), I36

and

40.

2

T. Regan nd

P.

Singereds),

Animal

ights

nd Human

Obligations

Engle-

wood Cliffs, J:

Prentice all,

976),

4.

3A. Boyce Gibson,

The

Philosophy

f DescartesLondon: Methuen,932),

2I4.

Philosophy3

I978

55I

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3/10

Discussion

Proposition 7) is the monstrous hesis'withwhich Descartes s so often

credited.

shall

argue

thatDescartes

held

theses

i)

to

(5),

but

that here

s

no

evidence

that he held

(7),

and even

some

positive evidence that

he

regarded

7)

as

false; however,

uzziness

bout

6)

and its

distinction rom

(5)

(together

with certain

general

features

f his

metaphysics)

aid him

open

to be

interpreted

s

committed

o

(7).

II

Thesis

(i)

is

not

explicitly

sserted

by Descartes in this

form,but

he

commits

himself o

it

in

so

many

words n the famous

passage

on

animals

in Part V

of the

Discourse,

where he

says

the

body may

be

regarded

'comme ne

machine

ui,

ayant

ete

faite

des mains e

Dieu, est

ncomparable-

ment

mieux

rdonnee..

qu'aucune

de celles .

.

inventees

ar

les

hommes'.4

Thesis

(i)

in

factforms

art

of

Descartes'

general

cientific

mechanism',

and, roughly

ranslated,

means that all

animal

behaviour s

subsumable

under

physiological

aws, which,

for

Descartes,

are

ultimately erivable

frommathematical rinciples.Essentially,when Descartes says that all

the

motions of

animals

originate

from the

corporeal

and

mechanical

principle',5

e is

concerned o

promulgate scientific nimal

physiology

which seeks

explanations

n

terms of

efficient ather

han final

causes.6

Now

fromnone of all

this does it

follow

hatwhen

Descartes calls

some-

thing

'mechanism'

or

'machine' he

is

automatically

uling

out the

pre-

sence

of

sensations

or

feelings;

Boyce

Gibson's

claim

that

Descartes

'uses the term

mechanism] xplicitly

o

exclude

. . .

feeling'

s

not

sup-

ported

by any

evidence.7

n

fact

t is

important

o

notice

that the human

body is, forDescartes,a machine n exactly he same senseas theanimal

body:

'God made our

body

like a

machine,

nd he

wanted t to

function

like

a universal

nstrument,

hich would

always

operate

n

the same

way

in

accordance

with its

own

laws'.8 The

phrase

bete-machine'

an thus

be

rather

misleading,

ince the

mechanical

physiology

escartes

has

in

mind

operates

qually

n

the case of homo

apiens.

Of

course t is

true

that

in

the

human,

but

not

the

animal,

case

there

s

the extra

dimension f a

4AT VI

56; HR I

i

i6

(referenceso

AT'

areto volume

nd page

number f

Ch.Adam

nd

P.

Tanneryeds),Oeuvres

e

Descartes

Paris:Cerf,

897-19I3);

HR stands orE. S. Haldane and G. T. R. Ross,ThePhilosophical orks f

Descartes

Cambridge:

ambridge

niversityress,

epr.

969)).

5

Letter

o

More of

5

February

649:

AT

V

276;

K

243 ('K' stands

orA.

Kenny,

escartes'

hilosophicaletters

Oxford:

Clarendon,970)).

6

Principles,, 28 (AT VIII

I5;

HR

I

230).

See further

T V

I58 and J. G.

Cottingham,

escartes'

onversationith

Burman

Oxford:

Clarendon,976),

85f.

7

Nordoes

Gibson ite

ny; p.Cit.,

2II.

8

AT V

I63/4;

cf.

Cottingham,

p. cit., 9.

552



4/10

Discussion

'soul' (I shall come back to this); but this is a separate point.To deny

that X has a soul

is a

separate

claim from he claim

that

X's

movements

can

be

explained

by

mechanical

rinciples,

nd is not

trictly

ntailed

by

it.

Proposition

2)

is

impliedfrequently y

Descartes,

nd s

stated

xplicitly

in a letter o

More of 5 February 649:

it

seems reasonable ince art

copies nature,

nd

men can make various

automatawhich move without

hought,

hat nature hould

produce

its

own

automata much more

splendid

than the artificial

nes. These

natural utomata re the animals.9

It

is

Descartes' use of the term automaton'more

than

any

other

that

has

led critics to

convict

him of

holding the

monstrous

hesis

(thus,

Kemp Smith

speaks

of

the Cartesian

view that animals are 'mere auto-

mata

...

incapable

of

experiencing

he

feelings

of

well-being or the

reverse,hunger

or thirst

..

').10 But the inference rom x is an

auto-

maton' o X is incapableoffeeling' s a

mistaken ne. Webster's

dictionary

gives

the

primarymeaning

of

'automaton' as simply a machine

that s

relatively elf-operating'; nd neitherthis nor the subsidiarymeaning

('creature who acts

in a

mechanical

fashion') automatically mplies

the

absence

of

feeling.11

ven

today, hen,

o

regard

otal

nsensibility

s

part

of

the

meaning

f

automaton'

would

seem

to

be

an

error;

and

this

seems

to have been

even more true

in

the seventeenth entury,where

auto-

maton'

probably arriedno more

than its

strictGreek

meaning

of

'self-

moving hing'.Thus

Leibniz, defending

is claim

that

we

possess

freedom

of

spontaneity'peaks

of

the human oul as 'a

kindof

spiritual utomaton',

meaning

no more than that

its action-generatingmpulses arise

solely

ab interno, nd produce their effectswithoutthe interventionf any

external

ause.12 What

fascinatedDescartes'

generation

bout machines

ranging

rom

locks o the

elaborately

ontrived

moving

tatues o be found

in some of

the royal

fountainswas

simply

this:

the

complex sequences

of movements

which

to

primitiveor

medieval)

man

might

have

appeared

as

certain

proof

of

some

kind of innermotive force'

or

'spirit',

ould all

be

explained quite

simplyby

reference

o

internalmechanical tructure-

cogs,

levers and the like

(Descartes

mentions s an

example

a

statue

of

9

'deinde quia rationiconsentaneumvidetur,cum ars sit naturae imitatrix,

possintque homines varia fabricare

utomata,

n

quibus

sine

ulla

cogitatione

est

motus, ut

natura etiam sua

automata,

sed artefactis

onge

praestantiora,

nempe bruta

omnia, producat'

(AT

V

277;

K

244.)

This is a

development

of

material

found

n

Discourse, art

V

(loc.

cit.).

10

Op.

Cit-, I35-

11

Webster's eventh

New

Collegiate

Dictionary

Springfield,

Mass:

Merriam,

I963).

12

Theodicy,

, 52.

553



5/10

Discussion

Neptune whichwould threatenwith his trident he approaching nlooker

who

had

unwittingly tepped on a

button).13The point

Descartes is

concerned

o makeover nd

over gain

aboutthebehaviour f natural uto-

mata' like

dogs

and

monkeys

s

that the mere complexity

f theirmove-

ments

s

no

more a bar to

explanation

n terms f nnermechanical truc-

ture

than

is the

case with the responses of the trident-brandishing

'Neptune'.14

III

So

far

then,

I maintain

that Descartes'

characterization f animals as

'machines' and

'automata' is of itself quite insufficient

o allow us to

conclude

thathe

thinks

hat

nimals

ack feelings.When

we

get

on to

the

remaining ropositions

n our

list,

hings re not

so

simple.

It is,

Descartes asserts,

n

principle possible to

mistake

a

cleverly

contrived

rtificial

utomaton or

an animal.

But we

could

never mistake

an automaton,

however

ngenious,

for a man. Why

not?

Because, says

Descartes, an automatoncould never talk: it could 'never arrange ts

speech

in

various

ways

in

order to reply appropriately

o

everything

that

could

be

said in its

presence'.15

This

for

Descartes

indicates the

crucial difference

etween

nimals

and

man-they

do not think.Animals

do not

penser

r

cogitare; hey

re not

endowed

with mind

mens, sprit);

they

ack

reason

(raison); they

do not have

a rational oul

(adie

raisonn-

able).16

Descartes

s

thus explicitly

ommitted o

thesis

3),

and

holds,moreover,

that it

is

entailed by (or

at least

strongly

videnced

by17)

thesis

(W).

Descartes was ofcourseaware thatparrots an be made to 'talk'and that

dogs

make

noises which

might

be analogousto speech;

but he has

strong

and,

since

Chomsky's updating

of

them, widely

admired

arguments

against

construing

uch utterances

s

genuine speech.

The

talking

of

13

Traite de L'Homme, AT XI

130-I32.

Cf. E. Gilson,

ReneiDescartesiscours

de

la

MethodeParis: Vrin,925), 420ff.

14

Descartes compares the plants

in

this connection, que [la nature] remplit

d'une infinite e petits conduits imperceptiblesa la vue': letterto Reneri of

April I638 (AT

II

40; K

54).

15

Discourse,oc. cit.

16

Ibid. Cf. letterto More

of

5 February

I649:

'loquela

unicum est

cogita-

tionis

n

corpore

atentis

ignum

certum'

AT

V

278;

K

245).

17

Descartes at one point observesthat quamvis ... pro

demonstrato

abeam,

probari non posse aliquam esse in brutis cogitationem,

non

ideo

puto posse

demonstrari ullam esse, quia

mens humana illorum corda

non

pervadit' AT

V

276-277; K 244).

554



6/10

Discussion

parrots s dismissed because it is not 'relevantto the

topic';18

but the

most

mportant

oint

Descartes has to make

s that

he utterances f

dogs,

cats,

etc., are never,to

use the Chomskian

phrase, stimulus-free';

hey

are always,

ays

Descartes, geared

to and

elicitedby a particular

natural

impulse'.'9

I shall come back to

these arguments,

ut first

n obvious

objection

must

be faced. n admitting

hatDescartes

held thesis

3)

(that nimals

do

not

think), have

I not thereby

conceded

that he must have

held the

'monstrous

hesis'

7)

(that

animals

do not

feel)?

For does not Descartes'

special sense of 'think' cogitare, enser) ncludefeelings nd sensations?

Well, it

is certainly rue that Descartes

deliberately xtended

he normal

use of

cogitatio'

r

pense'e'.

n answer o a

misunderstanding

f Mersenne

(that

f man was

purely

res cogitans' e

must

ack will), Descartes stated

that willing

was

a

fafon

de

penser;

he further

xplains that la pensee

includes 'non seulement

es

meditations

t

les

volontes' but 'toutes

les

operations

e l'dme'.20

This

is

generally

aken

to include sensations

nd

feelings-indeed, seeing

and

hearing

re

explicitly

ncluded

by

Descartes

in

the ist

of

operations

e l'dme'

ust

mentioned.

Further nalysishowevermakes t clearthat he matters not as straight-

forward

s

this,

and that translators

who render cogitatio'

r

'pensee'

s

simply

experience'

are moving

much too swiftly.21

When discussing

whether

video

ergo

um'

might

not

do as well as

'cogito rgo um',

Des-

cartes says

that

I

see'

is

ambiguous.

f

understood

de

visione' t is not

a

good

premise

or

nferring

ne's

existence

ut

funderstood

concerning

he

actual

ense

or

awareness

f

eeing' de pso ense

ive

onscientia

idendi)

t

s

quite certain,

ince

t is in

this case

referred

o the

mind which

alone feels

or

thinks

t sees

(quae

sola

sentit

ive

cogitat

e

videre).22

rom this we can

see that t is misleading o say,tout ourt, hatcogitatioincludes' sensa-

tions

and

feelings.

The

only

sense

in

which a

sensation

ike

seeing

is

a

true

cogitatio

s

the sense

in

which

it

may

involve the reflective

mental

awareness

whichDescartes alls

onscientia-theelf-conscious

pprehension

of the

mind that t

is aware of

seeing.23

The

upshot

s that Descartes'

assertion

f

proposition

3)

(that

animals

18

To Newcastle,

3

November

646

(AT

IV

574; K

zo6).

19

To

More, oc.

cit.; to Newcastle,

oc.

cit.;

and

N. Chomsky:

anguagend

Mind NewYork: Harcourt race World,

968),

Ch. I.

20

To Mersenne,

ay

i637

(AT

I

366;

K

32);

and to

Renari, pril

638

(AT

II

36;

K 51). Cf.

A. Kenny,

escartes

New York:

RandomHouse, 968),

68ff.

21

Cf. E.

Anscombe

nd P. Geach,

Descartes'

hilosophical

ritings

London:

Nelson,

969),

xlviif.,nd

my

Descartes

n Thought',

hil.Quarterly,

uly978.

22

Principles,

,

9

(AT

VIII

7/8;HR I

z22).

23

Conscientia

s defined n the Conversation

ithBurman:

conscium

sse

est .. cogitare

t reflectere

upra uam

cogitationem'

AT

V

I49; Cottingham,

op.

cit.,

and 6i).

555



7/10

Discussion

do not think)need not commithim to denying ny feeling r sensation

to animals-for example

a level of feelingor sensation

that falls short

of reflective ental

wareness.

Notice, moreover,how the language

argument

fits

nto

all

this.

In

pointingout that animals have no genuine

language,

Descartes clearly

thinks

hat

he has a powerful ase

for

concluding

hat

they

do not think.

Yet

for

Descartes

to

regard hisargument'non

loquitur rgo

non

ogitat')24

as

having

uch

evident

force, think' cogitat)

here

must

evidently

e

used

in the fairly estrictive ense described above.

If Descartes were using

'cogitat'

in the allegedverywide sense, he would be offerings an argu-

mentof the form non oquitur rgonon entit'

he does not speak

therefore

does not feel). It is inconceivablethat

Descartes

could have

proudly

produced this rgument

o his correspondents

s

self-evidently

linching.

IV

Our

conclusion

so far is that neither

n

calling

animals

machines

or

automata,nor in denying heyhave thought

r language,does Descartes

commit

himself

o

the monstrous

hesis that they

have

no

feelings

or

sensations.

t is

nowtime o

ook at some

positive

vidence

hat

he actually

regarded he monstrous

hesis s false.

The strongest vidence,

which those who credit Descartes with

the

monstrous hesis seem strangely lind to, comes

from he famous etters

already

cited where Descartes denies speech

to

the

animals. Writing o

More,

Descartes

says thatthe sounds

made

by horses,dogs, etc.,

are not

genuine anguage,but areways of communicatingo us .

.

. theirnatural

impulses

of

anger,

fear,hunger nd so on'.25 Similarly,

Descartes wrote

to Newcastle

hat:

If

you teach

a magpie to say good-dayto its

mistresswhen

t

sees

her

coming,

ll

you

can

possiblyhave done

is to make

the

emitting f this

word

the

expression

f one of its feelings.

For instance t

will

be an

expression

f

the hope of eating,

f

you

have habitually iven t a tit-

bit when t

says

the word.

Similarly,

ll the

things

which

dogs, horses,

and

monkeys

re made to do are merely expressions

of

their

fear,

24

'He doesnot peak herefore

e does

not hink.' trictly,

he rgument ust

be of theform

he does not

speak nd has no

capacity

or anguage

cquisition,

thereforee does

not hink'; orDescartes

ays hat nfantshinkAT VII

246;

HR II

II 5)-though

onlyfter fashion

AT

V

149/50;

Cottingham,

).

25

'impetus uos naturales

t iras

metusfamem t similia

..

significant'

(AT

V

278;

K

244).

556



8/10

Discussion

their hope, or their oy; and consequently, heycan do these things

without ny

thought ..

26

'Impulses

of

anger,

fear, hunger'; 'expression

of

one

of

its

feelings';

'expressions

f

fear,hope

and

joy'.

These are

quite extraordinaryhrases

to use for a

man

who

is

supposed

to

believe

animals

are

'without

feeling

or

awareness

of any kind'.

Is

it

possible

that

Descartes

is

here speaking

loosely r metaphorically?

his seems

strange

n

letterswhich re

explicitly

and

painstakingly

evoted

to

clarifying

he Cartesian

position

on

animals.

If this were not enough, in the letter to More, Descartes specifically

separates cogitatio thought)

from

sensus

sensation),

and

states that he

denies

the

former,

ut

not

the

latter,

o animals:

I

should

like to stress

that

am

talking

f

thought,

ot

of

..

sensation;

for

. .

I

deny

ensation

to no animal,

n so

far

s it

depends

on a

bodilyorgan'.27

V

The last quotation mightmake a pleasingand neat vindication f Des-

cartes'

kindlyfellowship

with the

beasts:

he

denied

that

animals

think,

but not

that

they

feel.

But

philosophy

s seldom as

tidy

as

this, and we

must

conclude

by

discussing major difficulty

hich has

been

put off

until now.

The

difficulty,

n a

nutshell,

s

that

the

monstrous

hesis fits

in

with,

nd the

pleasing

vindication lashes

with,

Descartes'

dualism.

If substance

is

divided

exclusively

nd

exhaustively

nto

res cogitans

and res

extensa,

what

room s therefor nimal

sensations?

ince an animal

is not a res cogitans,

as no mind or

soul,

it

follows

hat t must

belong

wholly n the extendeddivisibleworld of ostlingCartesian hapes. And

this means

that what

we call

(and, evidemment,

escartes

himself alled)

'animal

hunger'

cannot be

anything

more

than

a

set

of

internal

muscle

contractions

eading

o

the

erking

f certain

imbs,

or

whatever. his then

must be

the authentic

Cartesian

position-a

position

summed

up when

Descartes quotes

with

approval

the

passage

in

Deuteronomy

which

says

26

'Si on apprenda

une

pie

a

dire

bonjour

a

sa

maitresse,

orsqu'elle a voit

arriver,e

ne

peut

etre

qu'en

faisant ue

la

prolation

e cette

arole

devienne

le mouvement

e quelqu'une

de

se

passions;

a savoir,

e sera un

mouvement

de 1'esperanceu'ellea demanger,i l'on a toujours ccoutume e lui donner

quelque

friandise

orsqu'elle 'a

dit;

ainsitoutes

es choses

u'on

fait

aire ux

chiens, ux

chevaux t aux singes

ne sont

ue

des

mouvements

e

leur

rainte,

de leur esperance

u

de

leur

oie,

en

sorte

u'ils

es

peuvent

aire ans

aucune

pensee'

AT IV

574;

K

207).

27

'velim

notari

me

loqui

de

cogitatione,

on de

vitavel sensu;

vitam nim

nulli

animali

enego, tpote uam

in

solo

cordis alore

onsistere

tatuo;

nec

denego

etiam

sensum

quatenus

b

organo

corporeo ependet'

AT

V

278;

K

245).

557



9/10

Discussion

that the soul of animals is simplytheirblood; or when he says that

animal

ife s

no more than

the heat of the

heart'.28

No doubt this

s

where

pure

Cartesian,

consistent

artesian,would

stop.

But we have

seen that

Descartes,

dualist or

no, undoubtedly

nd

explicitly

ttributes uch

feelings

s

anger, hope

and

joy

to

animals.

I

think he

only explanation

f this

is

that

Descartes,

either

nadvertently

or

wilfully,

ailedto eradicate certain

uzziness

rom

his

thinking

bout

consciousness

nd self-consciousness. o

say

that X

is

in

pain

(angry,

joyful)

s

certainly

o

attribute conscious

state

to

X;

but

this need

not

amountto the full-blooded eflective warenessof pain that s involved

in

the

term

ogitatio.

o be

dogmatic

or

moment, should

certainlyay

that

cats feel

pain,

but

not that

hey

have

the

kind of full

mental wareness

of

pain

that s

needed

for

t to count as a

cogitatioi.e. the sort

needed

to

support

the

premise

of a

cogito-typergument

patior

ergo

sum'-'I am

in

pain

therefore

am').

Descartes

s

certainly

ommitted o

thesis

5)

that nimals

do not

have

self-consciousness;

ut

when as

a result

he

con-

signs

nimals o the realm

of

res

extensa,

e

simply

oes not

seem to bother

that

terms ike

pain, anger,etc.,

which he

uses

of

animals,clearly mply

somedegreeofconscious thoughperhapsnot self-conscious') wareness.

VI

It is

important

o

notice,

n

conclusion,

hat this

strange

uzziness s not

simply

he result

of

a blind

spot

which Descartes

had

when

dealing

with

animals,

but

connects with

a

fundamental nd

unresolved

difficulty

n

Cartesian

metaphysics.

here

is a

fascinating hapter

n

Book

IV of the

Principles ealingwith human sensations sensus) nd feelings affectus).

When

we

hear a

piece

of

good news,

says Descartes,

we feel

spiritual

joy' (this

s

the

sortof

pura cogitatio hat,

presumably,

od

and the

angels

experience).

But when the news

s

graspedby

the

magination,

he animal

spirits'

flow

from

he brain to

the heart

muscles,

which n

turntransmit

more

(movements' o the

brain,

with

the

result

that

we

experience a

feeling

f

laetitia

animalis'.29 t is

evidentthat

Descartes is in a

philo-

sophical

mess here. One

might expect

that

oy

would be

regarded

s a

purely

mental tate and thus

confined

irmly

o

the

realm

of

res

cogitans.

But here s Descartesdistinguishingetween hepure intellectualppre-

hension

of

oyful news,

on

the

one

hand, and,

on

the

other,

feeling

f

joy.

This latter

s

the

bizarre

ntity

alled animal

oy', which s

somehow

bound

up

with

heartmuscles

and brain

commotions.The

choice of

the

phrase

laetitia animalis'here is no

accident.

Descartes

clearlywants to

28

To

Plempius,3

October

637 (AT

I

4I5;

K

37);

and to

More

(see note

5).

29

Principles,

V,

i90

(AT

VIII

3I7;

HR

1

290-291).

558



10/10

Discussion

say thatthe oy of dogs and cats is analysable nto ust such physiological

events.But what

he seems to forget

s

that

s a

strict

ualisthe should

not

be using heword laetitia' t

all in this ase. For a true

dualist, f omething

is 'laetitia' an

inescapably mental'predicate) t cannot

be animalis part

of res extensa);

nd conversely,f

t is

animalis

t

cannot

be laetitia.

The truth, erhaps,

s

that

Descartes

was nevercompletely omfortable

with

strict

dualism, however mphatically

e affirmedt.

As

the contor-

tions in the Sixth Meditation

show,feelings

r

sensationslike those of

hunger

r thirst) re an

insoluble

worry

orhim. We

do

not

merelynotice'

thatwe are npain,as a pilotobserves hathisship s damaged,we actually

feel

t;

and

this hows hat here

s

a

'conjunctio

t

quasipermixtio'30

etween

mind and body-a mysterious

intermingling'

f

what

are, remember,

logically

distinct

nd

incompatible

ubstances.

This

'substantialunion'

is the uncuttable

knot

n the centre

of

Cartesian

metaphysics. escartes

once

wroteto

a

correspondent

hat

f an

angel (a pure

res

cogitans)

were

in a human

body,

he would

not

feel

like

us;

he would

merely

bserve

he

changes

in his nervous

system.

This

shows,

Descartes

observed,

that

feelings

ike that

of

pain

are

not the

purae cogitationes

f

a

mind distinct

frombody,but rather re the confusedperceptionswhich resultfrom

real

union

withthe

body'.31

Feelings,

n other

words,

re an

inexplicable

result

of the animal

side of our

nature,

ur

mysteriousntermingling

ith

res

extensa.

f

this

s

what Descartes

says

about human

feelings,

t

is not

surprising

hat

he never

got

animal

feelingsproperly

orted

out. Strict

dualism

makes nonsense

of Descartes' common-sense attributionof

feelings

ike

hunger

o the

animals;

but

then

Descartes

s

unable to extract

from

dualism

any

clear account

of the

awkwardly

ndeniable

experience

of human

hunger.

At the end

of the

day,

Descartes

may

not have been

completely onsistent, ut at least he was not altogether eastlyto the

beasts.32

Universityf Reading

30AT

VII

8i;

HRI I92.

31

'sensus

oloris,

liosque

mnes,

on

sse

puras

ogitationes

entis

corpore

distinctas,

ed confusas

llius

realiter

nitae

perceptiones'

to Regius,

January

i642:

AT III

493;

K I27-I28).

32

I

am

indebted

o

Prof.

A.

G.

N.

Flew,

whose

questions

bout

Descartes'

position

timulated

e to pursue

his

ine

of

enquiry.

559

cottingham a brute to the brutes - descartes' treatment of animals

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