contrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation

Focus Article

Contrasting frames in policydebates on climate changeadaptationArt Dewulf∗

The process by which issues, decisions, or events acquire different meanings fromdifferent perspectives has been studied as framing. In policy debates about climatechange adaptation, framing the adaptation issue is a challenge with potentially far-reaching implications for the shape and success of adaptation projects. From theavailable literature on how the meaning of climate change adaptation is constructedand debated, three key dimensions of frame differences were identified: (1) thetension between adaptation and mitigation as two contrasting but interrelatedperspectives on climate change; (2) the contrast between framing climate changeadaptation as a tame technical problem, and framing climate change as a wickedproblem of governance; and (3) the framing of climate change adaptation as asecurity issue, contrasting state security frames with human security frames. Itis argued that the study of how climate change adaptation gets framed could beenriched by connecting these dimensions more closely with the following themesin framing research: (1) how decision-making biases that to framing issues asstructured technical problems; (2) the process of scale framing by which issues aresituated at a particular scale level; and (3) the challenge of dealing with the varietyof frames in adaptation processes. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How to cite this article:WIREs Clim Change 2013, 4:321–330. doi: 10.1002/wcc.227

INTRODUCTION

Adapting to the current and expected impacts ofclimate change has gained currency as a policy

issue at different levels of governance.1 Adaptationto climate change is a relatively young domain ofpolicy and practice, and debates on how to understandand shape climate change adaptation are on-goingamong experts, journalists, civil society organizations,and policy makers. These debates address issueslike disaster insurance, global adaptation funding,national adaptation plans or cost-benefit analyses,and reveal diverging ways of framing what climatechange adaptation is really about. According tothe Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution,2

∗Correspondence to: [email protected]

Public Administration and Policy Group, Wageningen University,Wageningen, The Netherlands

Conflict of interest: The author has declared no conflicts of interestfor this article.

framing the adaptation issue is ‘perhaps the mostchallenging aspect of building adaptive capacity’,because adaptation is hard to frame and easily framed‘wrongly, incompletely, or not at all’. Efforts todefine successful adaptation among experts using theDelphi technique resulted in the following definition:‘any adjustment that reduces the risks associatedwith climate change, or vulnerability to climatechange impacts, to a predetermined level, withoutcompromising economic, social, and environmentalsustainability’.3 This definition captures importantaspects of climate change adaptation but, as anydefinition, does not preclude a continuing struggle inpolicy debates about how climate change adaptationshould be framed. These frame differences haveimplications for what counts as reasonable adaptationpolicy, as I will argue below. In this review, I will firstdiscuss the importance of framing in policy debates,then discuss key dimensions of frame differences fromexisting studies on how the meaning of climate changeadaptation is constructed and debated, and finally

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point out where research on adaptation frames couldbenefit from connecting more closely with establishedand emerging themes in framing research. Althoughthe focus of this article is on how experts, journalists,civil society organizations, and policy makers framethe specific policy issue of climate change adaptation,I will start by reviewing some general notions onframing that will inform the discussion of the framingdimensions.

FRAMING

The process by which issues, decisions, or eventsacquire different meanings from different perspectiveshas been studied as framing in a variety of socialscience disciplines, including communication science,social psychology, sociology, public administration,and political science.4–9 By highlighting certainaspects of the situation at the expense of others,by drawing different boundaries around the issue andby putting forward different elements as the core ofthe issue, people from different backgrounds constructframes about policy issues that may differ considerablyfrom how others frame the issues.

Why would frames be important for climatechange adaptation? Should not we focus rather onactions? To address this issue, it is important topoint out that framing not only relates to actionbut also is in itself a form of action in a specificcontext, for example, in a multilateral negotiation,in communicating the policy recommendations of aresearch report, in a parliamentary hearing or in amediatized debate between civil society organizationsand government agencies. Framing is not withoutconsequences. A particular way of framing does notdetermine what happens next, but whoever is ableto set the terms of the debate steers the debate in acertain direction. The framing of the questions fed intocommissions or working groups, for example, boundsthe range of resulting policy recommendations.10

Frames can be understood as strong and genericstorylines that guide both analysis and action inpractical situations. They allow policy makers to‘make a graceful normative leap from is to ought’,11

because different frames point toward differentresponses or action strategies.1,12 For example, ina comparative study of nine regional climate changepolicy responses, it appeared that:

‘The situations in which system stresses weredefined as narrow, technical problems with short-term horizons, governance structures were top-down,did little to link actors at different scales, maskedsystem feedbacks, and did not provide incentive orstructure to promote learning. In contrast, in the two

examples where the issue was framed in a broadermanner, policy implementation tended to enhancecharacteristics that supported the ability to manageresilience, including flexibility and learning.’12

Framing has been shown to affect people’sdecision preferences, particularly under conditionsof uncertainty.13,14 Decision problems that areformulated in different ways, for example, in termsof gains versus losses, trigger different preferenceseven if the underlying decision problem remains thesame in terms of probabilities and expected outcomes.This happens through the setting of anchors, thatis, points of reference against which alternatives areevaluated (e.g., a short- or a long-term horizon).In analogy with Chong and Druckman’s5 (p. 104)example, when people are asked whether they wouldfavor a particular case of dike enlargement, one canexpect a much higher percentage of positive answers ifthe question was prefaced with ‘Given the importanceof long-term flood safety’, compared to the preface‘Given the importance of the rights of the currentproperty owners that would have to move’.

This susceptibility of people, including policymakers, experts, and citizens, to the way issues areframed creates the possibility for strategic framing.15

Through highlighting positive versus negative aspectsof the situation, through setting reference points, orthrough including and excluding particular aspectsin a communicative act, one can try to influenceframes that others will rely on for taking decisions.Framing can thus be used as a strategy to reachcommunicational or political goals. When moreactors are trying to influence a policy debatethrough framing, frame contests11,16 may be theresult, in which frames and counter-frames areconstructed, promoted, or undermined.17 Throughframing, implicitly or explicitly, particular interestsare advocated or undermined, power positions aremaintained or challenged and particular actors areincluded or excluded from policy debates.18

A series of decisions need to be taken inany process of climate change adaptation. If wetake adaptation to consist of the three key phasesof understanding, planning, and managing,19 thenframing is a crucial process not only in theunderstanding phase, but also in the planning andmanaging phases. When we consider the subprocessesin each of the phases, the relevance of framing in eachthese can be illustrated:

• Understanding

• Problem detection and initial framing (e.g.,framing whether there is at all a problem to beaddressed).

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WIREs Climate Change Contrasting frames on climate change adaptation

• Information gathering and use (e.g., framingwhat available information means).

• Problem definition (e.g., reaching agreementon the problem framing).

• Planning and decision-making

• Developing options (e.g., framing the range ornature of options to be considered).

• Option assessment (e.g., framing of the kindof expertise that is required).

• Selection of options (e.g., framing uncertaintyabout unintended consequences).

• Managing the problem

• Implementation (e.g., how do affected actorsframe the adaptation option).

• Monitoring (e.g., framing the monitoringrequirements).

• Evaluation (e.g., framing the goals ofevaluation).

From generic models of policy development, weknow that in the agenda setting phase of the policycycle, framing is a crucial process steering the directionof policy change (or stability).20,21 The specific frameor policy image of an issue that makes it to the topof the agenda, will direct the kind of policy changethat can take place. In the particular case of crisissituations, which seems highly relevant for climatechange adaptation, framing what the crisis is aboutintervenes in determining what will count as a propercrisis response.16 In sum, how frames play out inpolicy debates has potentially important implicationsfor decision-making, science–policy relations, andpolicy change.

FRAMING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATECHANGE

In reviewing the literature on how the meaning ofclimate change adaptation is constructed in policydebates, I have inevitably made certain choices.The focus was on adaptation (including impactsand vulnerability), so I did not include studies onmitigation, except where the framing of adaptationwas studied in relation to the framing of mitigation.The interdisciplinary research database Scopus(www.scopus.com) and the Google Books searchengine (books.google.com) were used to systematicallysearch for peer-reviewed publications on adaptation to

climate change in which different frames or discourseswere identified. Excluded were studies that focusedon individual perceptions of climate change, whereindividual citizens are studied at the receiving end of(media) communications on climate change. Rather,I searched for research where actors are studied asactively shaping or using particular frames aboutclimate change adaptation in policy-relevant debates.All the publications that have been used for the revieware mentioned in the reference list.

Given that there are multiple theoreticalapproaches to framing8,22 and to discourse,23,24 therelation between the theoretical concepts of framesand discourses is a complicated and contentious one.In general, discourse tends to be used as a moreencompassing and abstract concept (as a repertoireof ideas and categories reproduced in a set ofpractices) and frame as a more specific concept (asa particular way of constructing the meaning ofsomething), but there is a large gray area wherethe concepts are used interchangeably. Therefore Ihave also included discourse research when differentdiscourses are identified that shape the meaning ofclimate change adaptation in policy debates.

The review is structured in three sections, eachof which addresses a key dimension in the plethoraof different frames used to make sense of climatechange adaptation. These dimensions were obtainedby extracting the different frames or discoursesreported on in each of the reviewed studies, andby interpreting the differences between them interms of bipolar dimensions. These dimensions werethen clustered into the three key dimensions. Thesedimensions capture significant and recurring contrastsbetween the studied frames, but cannot cover all thenuances in how people make sense of climate changeadaptation. The first dimension addresses the tensionbetween adaptation and mitigation, as two contrastingbut interrelated perspectives on climate change. Thesecond dimension addresses the tension betweenframing climate change adaptation as a tame technicalproblem that can be solved by experts, and framingclimate change as a wicked problem of governance,where uncertainties, institutions, and equity need tobe taken into account. The third dimension addressesframings of climate change adaptation as a securityissue, contrasting state security frames with humansecurity frames. Whenever possible the implicationsof the identified frames for policy debates on climatechange adaptation are discussed, by spelling out the‘normative leaps’ implied in the frames. By doing so,the relevance of the identified frames for legitimizingor delegitimizing ideas, actors and proposals in policydebates can be shown.



Framing Climate Change as an Issue ofMitigation and/or Adaptation?Historically, mitigation and adaptation have beenframed by scientists and policy makers as two differentapproaches to deal with the same problem: climatechange.25–31 From the point of view of mitigation, theproblem is framed as human-induced climate changethrough greenhouse gas emissions. From the pointof view of adaptation, the problem is framed asclimate change impacts on vulnerable environmentsor social groups. These problem framings and actionstrategies can be seen as complementary. Some evenclaim that ‘for decades, the options available to dealwith climate change have been clear: We can actto mitigate the future effects of climate change byaddressing the factors that cause changes in climate,and we can adapt to changes in climate by addressingthe factors that make society and the environmentvulnerable to the effects of climate’.26 Mitigationhas also been called the best adaptation strategy.32

However, mitigation and adaptation have entertaineda tense relation through their links with differentsectors, policy arrangements, international bodies,and scientific research communities.

The implications of framing climate change asan emissions problem versus an impacts problemare potentially far-reaching. With climate changeas an emissions problem, the solution is to reducegreenhouse gas emissions, turning the climate changeproblem largely into an energy problem, and pointingtoward solutions such as reduced or more efficientenergy use and more sustainable energy production.More recently forestry issues and mechanisms likeREDD+33 have been added to the mitigationrepertoire. The frame of climate neutrality is linked tothis focus on emissions, and is used to qualify activitiesthat do not provoke a net increase in greenhouse gasemissions. Even if very local interventions are framedas part of the solution (e.g., using energy-saving lightbulbs or not using a car for short distances), there isone global parameter for the problem, which providesclarity and seems to put all global citizens at the samelevel.

With climate change framed as an adaptationproblem, the solution is to deal with climate impacts,especially in vulnerable environments, sectors, andsocieties. Impacts such as changes in rainfall patterns,extreme weather events, floods, droughts, and sealevel rise turn the climate change problem to a largeextent into a hydrological issue, for which watermanagement strategies are needed. This emphasisis somewhat less pronounced than in the case ofmitigation as an energy problem because of themultiple and regionally differentiated climate impacts

on, for example, water, agriculture, or biodiversity.The frame of climate proofing becomes the crucialone here—Are environments, societies, and humanactivities able to cope with climate impacts?

Historically, the focus on mitigation hascreated policy instruments that are biased againstadaptation.27 Tensions between mitigation andadaptation in the climate governance domain werefueled by fears that investing in adaptation wouldundermine commitment to mitigation. Climate changeimpacts have mostly been framed as local orregional problems and so are adaptation strategies.Accordingly, global policy arrangements to addressadaptation have been developing more slowly thanfor mitigation,34 but are starting to take shape(e.g., the global Adaptation Fund). Although bothmitigation and adaptation perspectives are takenseriously nowadays and their linkages are explored,the tension has not disappeared altogether. Forexample, in a study on policy discourses onmitigation and adaptation in the Congo basin forests,overall the mitigation discourse seemed to be thestronger one,29 and was supported mainly by timbercompanies and some government agencies. Actorslike intergovernmental organizations and civil societyorganizations put more emphasis on the discourse ofintegrating adaptation and mitigation.

Framing Climate Change Adaptation as aTame Technical Problem Versus a WickedGovernance ProblemVarious scholars have signaled a fault line in theways climate change adaptation is framed between atechnoscientific framing of climate change adaptationversus a sociopolitical framing of the issue.35–41 I try tocapture this as the distinction between framing climatechange adaptation as a ‘tame’ technical problemversus a ‘wicked’ problem of governance.42 Whilethe technoscientific perspective focuses on aspects likedecision trees, impact assessments and technologicalsolutions, the sociopolitical perspective directs theattention toward the high stakes, uncertainties,communication strategies, power relations, and equityissues related to climate change adaptation.

The starting point for distinguishing these twoframings is often a critique of the limitations of techno-scientific approaches to climate change adaptation.The lack of attention for equity issues (e.g., equitableaccess to water in view of climate change) in scientificmodels and technological solutions has been a recur-rent critique.31,38,43 The search for technological fixesthat allow business-as-usual to continue has also beenquestioned, for example, in a study of the desalin-ization project at the United States–Mexico border



that would increase reliance on carbon-intensive tech-nology and exacerbate existing social inequalities.36

Through these critiques vulnerability and adapta-tion are portrayed as inherently political and moralproblems,37,44 rather than tame technical problems.

Several authors have explicitly identified framesthat contrast with the technoscientific framing ofclimate change adaptation and have analyzed howthese play out in adaptation debates. The distinc-tion between scientific, economic, and communica-tive rationalities that originates in environmentalplanning,45 has also been applied to local levelclimate change adaptation in Norway.46 The com-bination of these rationalities results in three dif-ferent discourses, carried by different actors: (1) ascientific–economic discourse, carried by the insur-ance industry, in which scientific rationality lies insupporting economic processes, pointing toward akey role for insurance schemes in adaptation; (2) aneconomic–communicative discourse, carried by theNorwegian environmental authorities, in which eco-nomic expertise is combined with the rights of peopleto become involved in decision-making that affectstheir livelihood and quality of life, pointing towardaddressing economic vulnerabilities of communities;and (3) a scientific–communicative discourse, carriedby civil protection actors, where a pluralistic view onknowledge gives voice to scientific expertise and cit-izen’s knowledge claims, pointing toward lay–expertinteraction in the face of adaptation uncertainties. Thedifferences between the discourses and their implica-tions for the adaptation agenda show how the scien-tific framing of climate change adaptation as a tametechnical problem gets problematized by includingeconomic and communicative aspects. The additionof elements like decision-making, livelihoods, stake-holder participation, and uncertainties portrays adap-tation as a challenging, if not wicked governance issue.

A similar argument has been made about differ-ent interpretations of vulnerability,40 based on a casestudy in Mozambique. Outcome vulnerability is linkedto a scientific framing of climate change, throughwhich vulnerability is understood as the measurablenegative outcome of climate change on a particularexposure unit. This framing is embedded in insti-tutions like the UNFCCC, IPCC, and internationalglobal research programs. Contextual vulnerability,however, is linked to a human security framing ofclimate change, in which vulnerability is considered tobe influenced by a broad range of dynamic contextualconditions, including biophysical, social, economic,political, institutional, and technological structuresand processes. The contextual vulnerability frame ismore prevalent in the domain of NGOs, development

practitioners, and social movements. Each framinginfluences the questions asked, the knowledge pro-duced, and the adaptation policies and responses thatare prioritized: ‘The dominance of the scientific fram-ing of climate change has meant that the scope of adap-tation policies has been interpreted quite narrowly’.40

Based on a more recent study of adaptation innatural resource management in Lesotho,35 a distinc-tion has also been made between a decision-analyticframing of climate vulnerability and adaptation,which favors projects focusing on technologicalsolutions and reducing projected impacts, and aninstitutional-analytic framing, which tends to produceprojects that more explicitly include uncertaintiesand governance issues. While the decision-analyticframing reduces climate change adaptation to a tametechnical decision problem, the institutional-analyticframing acknowledges institutional barriers to adap-tation, situated knowledge and governance issuesat multiple levels of collective action. Both framesoriginate in the international discourse on climateadaptation and are imported to the national and locallevel in Lesotho through the links that national andlocal actors have with the international level.

Framing Climate Change Adaptation as anIssue of State Security Versus HumanSecurityThe framing of climate change adaptation as a securityissue43,47–50 can in itself be interpreted as a case ofsecuritization,51 that is, framing an issue as a matter ofsecurity in order to increase its priority on the politicalagenda, to silence critical voices or to legitimize drasticmeasures.

There appear to be important differences,however, in the framing of the level at which securityis to be understood and addressed. How the dangerassociated with climate change is interpreted affectswhich adaptation actions are taken.52 System-orientedunderstandings of security in terms of state securitycarry quite different implications than actor-orientedunderstandings in terms of human security. Theconcept of human security draws attention to thosewho are vulnerable and unable to cope with or adaptto changing conditions, and points attention towardfactors like social inequities, discriminatory policies,economic injustices, and unequal power relations.43

In the United Nations Security Council debateon climate change in 2007, a link was clearly madebetween international security issues, the impacts ofclimate change and the question of how to adapt.The debate was predominantly held in terms of envi-ronmental security, as in past international political



debates on climate change (e.g., in IPCC statements),and not so much in terms of environmental conflict.47

The environmental conflict discourse is emphasizingtraditional security concerns related to environmentalissues, and focuses on the risk of violent conflictbetween groups in society and between states asnatural resources degrade. The security of the stateplays a central role in this discourse, suggesting aprime role for the state in climate change adaptation.While the environmental conflict discourse can belinked to military security and the security of states,the environmental security discourse is closely linkedto human security. Environmental security discourseemphasizes the security implications of environmentaldegradation for all human beings and not justfor the state. Human security involves a broadrange of issues, including economic, food, health,environmental, personal, community, and politicalsecurity. Here longer-term strategies for combatingprocesses of environmental change are advocated.

However, the political implications of framingclimate change through the loaded language ofsecurity have not yet been fully examined.48 Anexample of this at the national level is the framing ofclimate change adaptation by the Dutch 2008 DeltaCommittee as an issue of national security, stressingextreme climate scenarios, danger, and the needfor top-down governmental interventions.53 Envi-ronmental security discourses in combination withthe UNFCCC goal of ‘avoiding dangerous climatechange’ have directed the attention toward threats toindividual livelihoods and sustainable development,and tend to stress the potential role of climate-relateddisasters. The policy implications of this way offraming climate change adaptation are directedtoward reducing exposure to hazards and mitigatingthe effects of dangerous climate change, often oper-ationalized as insurance-based adaptation strategies.In the context of global north–south relations, thesestrategies can be criticized as creating dependence ofdeveloping countries on industrialized countries inthe knowledge-intensive domain of risk assessmentmethods and catastrophe insurance techniques.48

DISCUSSION

The three key dimensions of difference in the framingof climate change adaptation discussed above provideimportant insights into the variety of frames throughwhich adaptation is made sense of, the policy debateswhere this variety plays out, and the policy implica-tions these frames carry. To some extent, these framingdimensions tie into frames and discourses apparentin broader debates about climate change9,18,54,55

and sustainable development.56,57 Backstrand andLovbrand54 identified three different discourses onglobal environmental change: (1) green governmen-tality, emphasizing a global form of power tied tothe administrative state, with a strongly science-basedand centralized approach to stewardship of nature andcomprehensive management of its resources; (2) eco-logical modernization, emphasizing a market-baseddecentralized approach to environmental protection,to be achieved through regulation, technology, invest-ment and trade; and (3) civic environmentalism,emphasizing a multilateral, democratic, and bottom-up approach to environmental problem solving,through participation, partnerships, and, dependingon the strand, more or less radical economic reforms.Tensions between the green governmentality and eco-logical modernization discourses on the one hand,and the civic environmentalism discourse on the otherhand are recognizable in the technoscientific versussociopolitical contrast in climate change adaptationframes we identified. Similarly, the concept of weaksustainability ties in with technoscientific framingsof adaptation, while strong sustainability fits wellwith sociopolitical framing of adaptation.57 Althoughadaptation is framed less as an issue of market mech-anisms than mitigation, the ecological modernizationdiscourse is recognizable in the emerging emphasison insurance-based approaches to adaptation, linkedto security frames. The contrast between state secu-rity and human security frames on adaptation canbe tentatively linked with green governmentality andcivic environmentalism discourses, respectively, butamong the three identified framing dimensions thiscontrast seems to be most specific to adaptation andvulnerability debates.

Although interesting evidence and insights arebuilding up on the framing of climate changeadaptation, there is no abundance of studies on thetopic and much remains to be done. In my view,the study of how climate change adaptation getsframed could be extended and enriched by engagingwith established and emerging themes in the framingliterature.

Technocratic and Economic Bias in FramingClimate Change AdaptationFraming climate change adaptation as a tame technicalproblem rather than as a wicked governance problemcould result from recurring biases in how policy mak-ers deal with unstructured problems.42,58,59 A struc-tured problem is well defined, has clear boundariesand the knowledge needed to solve it can be specified.This kind of problem can be solved by standard-ized (quantitative) techniques and procedures, and be



administered by a single policy actor. An unstructuredproblem, however, is characterized by diffuse bound-aries, ambiguity about the facts, conflicting values,and controversy. Two pervasive biases in policy mak-ing have been identified, resulting in the containmentof unstructured problems at a structured level. Thefirst is the technocratic bias, by which policy problemsare framed as well-structured and susceptible to beresolved by the use of specialist knowledge and techni-cal expertise. This bias functions through distinguish-ing the relevant group of experts, who can relativelyeasily agree among themselves, from the large groupof nonexperts, who are not allowed to participate.The second is the economic bias, by which problemsare defined exclusively as matters of calculating costsand benefits. Here, rather than restricting participa-tion of nonexperts, the range of acceptable argumentsis restricted. Anything that cannot be translated inmonetary value is thus side-lined from the discussion.Because these biases involve framing unstructuredproblems as structured, they may effectively result in‘solving the wrong problem’. It would be worthwhileto investigate how these or other biases are at playin climate change adaptation processes and to whateffect. For example, does the inclusion of ‘nonexperts’in climate change adaptation processes counteract thetechnocratic bias? Do the human security-based fram-ings of adaptation work to counteract the economicbias, or can these also be translated in the economicvocabulary of costs, benefit, damage, and insurance?

Framing the Scale of the Climate ChangeAdaptation IssueA framing mechanism that seems highly relevant forboth the adaptation versus mitigation dimension andthe state security versus human security dimension isscale framing.60–62 Scale framing refers to the processof framing an issue at a certain scale and/or level.Examples of this are framing mitigation as a globalissue and adaptation as a local issue, or framing thesecurity implications of adaptation at the system level(linked to state security) versus at the actor level(linked to human security). Scale framing can be usedas a means of legitimizing inclusion and exclusion ofactors, proposals, and arguments in policy processes.Actors can behave strategically by framing the scaleof the problem such that they situate themselves at thecenter of power, such that they avoid responsibilityfor the problem or such that the problem gets scaledup or down.

Scale framing seems highly relevant for climatechange adaptation, because defining the scale levelat which it needs to be addressed is highly relevant

and tricky at the same time. The mere labeling offlood risk management as climate change adaptation,for example, introduces a different time scale forthe problem (from short and medium term to verylong term). In a country like the Netherlands, thisextended time scale in combination with dramaticpredictions about possible climate change impactshave been used as argumentative resources in pleasfor high yearly budget allocations for flood riskmanagement.53 While the framing of the spatial scaleof adaptation in the Dutch discussion revolves mainlyaround regional versus national, in the discussionsabout the Adaptation Fund63 the global scale ismuch more prominent. The financing mechanismfor the Adaptation Fund through a share ofproceeds on Clean Development Mechanism (CDMprojects effectively frames the adaptation issue atglobal and national scales, implying responsibility ofindustrialized countries toward developing countries.With ‘vulnerable communities’ as the main targetgroup for the Adaptation fund, however, the relationbetween this local scale frame and the global andnational scale frames is still under discussion.63

Dealing with Frame Differences in ClimateChange Adaptation ProcessesA generally relevant question is how to deal with thisvariety of frames in the numerous processes of climatechange adaptation on the ground. Fragmentation offrames can form a barrier for mutual understandingand can evolve into protracted controversies about‘what the issue is really about’,6 delaying or impedingeffective decision-making. On the other hand, theconnection of different frames into a jointly meaning-ful project can generate motivation and commitmentfor collective action. The friction generated by thevariety of ideas, worldviews and norms embedded indiverse frames also provides the potential for craftinginnovative solutions, granted that the participants areable to deal with this variety.64 When different actorsencounter each other in processes of climate changeadaptation, the frames they employ are primarily usedfor interacting and communicating with each other.8

In those interactions, they will have to deal in oneway or another with their mutual differences in howthey frame the issue of climate change adaptationin their particular context.65 From this perspective,it would be very worthwhile to investigate how thisvariety of frames affects climate change adaptationprocesses: which kind of frames becomes dominant;what strategies do actors use to include or excludeparticular frames from the discussion; what happensto the frames of vulnerable communities; and what theeffects are on climate change adaptation outcomes?



CONCLUSIONBecause framing affects information processing, steerspolicy debates, and directs decision-making processes,it is of key importance to understand the framingof climate change adaptation. From the availableliterature on how the meaning of climate changeadaptation is constructed and debated, three keydimensions of frame differences were identified. First,the framing of climate adaptation has often happenedin relation to, and sometimes in tension with, its eldersibling climate change mitigation. The predominantframing of climate change as an issue of greenhousegas emissions has delayed the development of globalpolicy instruments and arrangements for adaptation.Second, given the knowledge-intensive nature ofthe climate change adaptation issue, technoscientificframings of adaptation as a tame technical problemcontrast with sociopolitical framings of adaptation asa wicked governance problem, where uncertainties,institutions, and equity need to be taken intoaccount. Third, within the framing of climate changeadaptation as endangering our security, system-oriented framings of adaptation as an issue of statesecurity contrast with actor-oriented framings ofadaptation as an issue of human security, resultingin different adaptation approaches.

As argued above, the study of how climatechange adaptation gets framed could be enrichedby connecting these dimensions more closely withestablished and emerging themes in the framing litera-ture. First, the development of technoscientific versussociopolitical framings could be further clarified byinvestigating whether and how technocratic bias,economic bias, or other types of bias affect how theissue of climate change adaptation gets defined in thevariety of processes at different levels. Second, both

the adaptation versus mitigation framing dimensionand the state security versus human security framingdimension could be further explored in terms ofscale framing. Whether adaptation is framed as alocal, national, or global issue carries greatly differentimplications for who is considered responsible, who isincluded or excluded in adaptation processes, or howfunding needs to be organized. Third, more insightshould be gained as to how the variety of adaptationframes can be dealt with in the numerous climatechange adaptation processes, where the connectionor disconnection between the frames employed bythe involved actors can make or break an adaptationproject.

While the relatively young issue, policy domainand practice of climate change adaptation is takingshape, its meaning is constructed, debated, andcontested.66 Framing climate change adaptation canhappen unwittingly or purposefully, but it is neverneutral. There are two main traps to be avoided inframing adaptation. On the one hand, actors engagedin adaptation processes may get trapped in a particularway of framing the issues without being fully aware ofthis, only to discover later its limitations or unintendedconsequences in terms of legitimizing or delegitimizingparticular actions, including or excluding particularactors, or privileging certain outcomes. On the otherhand, actors may get trapped in a frame contest,11

where different actors strategically try to have theirframes prevail. This can result in policy controversies,intractable conflicts, or paralyzed decision-making,which can severely hamper the achievement ofadaptation outcomes. In any case, given the variety ofpossible ways to frame adaptation discussed above,reliance on a one-sided framing of the issue is unlikelyto bring adaptation processes to fruition.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Robbert Biesbroek for his feedback on an earlier draft of this paper, Irene Lorenzoni forthe helpful discussions about the scope of the article, and the anonymous reviewers for their useful commentsthat helped me to improve the quality of this article.

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contrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation

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