o

2 Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance

GARY MARKS

LIESBETHOOGTIE

Centratiæd authority has given way to new forms of governing.! Formal authority has been

dispersed ûorn cenûal statos both up to zupranational institutions and down to regional ad local

governments. A recent survey finds that sixty-tlrree af seventy*five developing comties hafiB

besn rmdergoing some decenFalization of authority (Garman et al- 2001.: 205). A detaild idcx

drawn up by the authors of this paper finds that no EU country became more cenffalized since

1980, while half have decentralized authority to a regional tier of government (Hooghe and

Marts 200D, The 1980s and 1990s bave also spsnthe crÊation of a large number of transn*ional

regimes, some of which exercise real supranational authority. At the same time, public/private

nçwo*fpf diverse kinds have multiplied from the local to the international level-

The diffir$n'of authority in ncw political forms has led to a prcfusion of now term$: mutti-lcvel

gov€f,nance, multi-tiered governance, polycentric govemance, rnulti-perspectival govemfitce,

frmctbnal, overlapping competing jurisdictions (FO(}.I), fragmegration (or spheres of audrority),

ad cmsortb and condominio, to name but a few. Tbc evolution of similar ideas in diftrcnt

end p.l5

1 5

fields can be explained partly as diffirsion from two literaturcs-fficralism and publie policy. But

wo suspect that this conæptual invention has indopndent soïrtss. Iû this chapter, we do not

summarize the particularities of the concepts that have been put forsar{ nor do we do justice to

the intellectual history of the field. Instead we mine the rclevant literatures for some conceptu*l

benchmarks in order to facilitate empirical anslysis.

These literatures agree &at the dispersion of govwnance âcnt$s multiple jurisdictions is both

more efficient than, and normatively superior to, central state monopoty (Matts and Hooghe

M). They claim that govemance must operale at multiple scales in order to cryture variations

in the tcrritorial reach of policy cnteffilities. Because extsrûalitics arising from the provision oZ

public goods vary immensety*fr,om planet-wide in the case of Slobûl warming to local in the

case of most city servicas---{o strould the scale of governance. To fu*rnaliæ externalities,

governâncc must bÊ muhi-lsvel- This is thc corc ffgumçnt for muhi-lçvel govemance, brt there

are several oûrer perceived bmefits. For example, more decentralized jurisdictions can beftêr

reflect heterogeneity of preferenc€s among citizens.S Multiple jurisdictions can facilitate credibte

polisy commihents (Pollack 1997; Majone 1290. Multiple jurisdictions allorv for jurisdictional

competition (Weingast 1.995; Frcy and Eichenberger !929). And they facilitate innovation and

experimentation (Gray 1919.

However, beyond the presumption tlrat governance has becomæ (and should be) multi-

jurisdictional, there is no agreement about how muhi-levcl govenrance should h organized. We

detect two contrasting visions-

Ths first concsives of dispersion of ardhority to jtrisdictions at a limitEd numbcr of lpvels. These

jurisdictions-international, national, regional, meso, local---are general-purpose. That is to say,

they bundle together muttiple functions, including a rânge of policy responsibilities, and in many

instanceq a court sy$t€m and representæive insiûûbns, The membcrship boundries of such

jurisdictions do not intersect This is the case for jurisdictions at any ono level, and it is the case

for jurisdictiors âsross levels. In this form of governance, every cittznn is located in a Russian

Dolt sct of nested jurisdictions, whsre tbcre is one asd mly one rclwant jurisdiction d any

particuts territorial scale. Territorial jurisdictions are intended to h, and usually are, stable for

several_ decades or mone, though the allocæion of policy courpetencies across levels is flexible.t'e s"coùd

"igb of governæ is distinct$ di:Ferent h conccivcs of spcializedjurisdictions that

fr Errnph, provi& a particular local service, sotve a

end p.16

L

L

16

Table 2.1. Types of multÈ-level governarce

Type I

General-purpose j urisdictions

Non-intersecting memberships

Typr tr

Task-spec ific j urisdictions

Intersecting memberships

Jurisdictions at a limited number of levelsNo limit to the number ofjurisdictional levels

Svstem-wide arch itectue Flexible design

commoil pool resource problem, select a product standard, monitor water quality in a particulr

river, or adjudicate international trade disputes. The number of such jurisdictions is potentially

huge, and the scales ai which they operate vary finely. And therç is no great fixig in their

existence. They tend to be lean and flexible-+hey come and go as demands for governance

change.

Table 2.1 summarizes thesc visions of governance as logically consisûent ideal-types. The firg

two afiributes in Table 2.1 describe variation among individual jurisdictions, while the remainder

describe systemic properties. We call these types simply Type I and Type II to avoid burdening

readers withyet more jargon in an already jargon-laden field-!

Type I Multi-level Governanee

The intellectual foundation for Type I multi-level governarice is federalisnl whish is concerned

with power sharing among governments operating at just a few levels. Federalism is chiefty

concerned with the relationship between central government and a tier of non-intersecting

subnational governments. The unit of analysis is the individual government rather dtân gte

individual policy. In the words of 'Wallace

Oates, dean of fiscal federalism, 'the traditional theory

of fiscal federalism lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of functions to

different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these

functions' (Oates 1999: I121). The framewod{ is system-wide; the functions are bundled; and fhe

levels of government are multiple but limited in number.4 Type I multi-level governance shares

these bgsic charactsristics, but is not confined to national states- We discuss these characteristics. ] !

. !rn turn. ir,

end p.l7

1 7

General-pwVose jwisdictions. kcision-making pow€rs are dispersed across jurisdictions, but

bundled in a small number of packagw. Fed€ralisÉs and students of intergovernmental relations

ttmd to emphasiæ tre costs of dæomposing auÉtrity, This comern is cspeclally strong in Ermp€

where local governmant u$ally exercis€s 'a wi& sprtrd of frmctions, rsfbcting tIre conc$ of

generel-purpose local authmities exercising comprehensive care fç their cmmunities' (Norton

!99r:22).Non-intersecting memfurships- Type I jurisdictims are chairacterizrd by non-inærsecting

memberships.! frlemterslip is usually tsrittrial, as in nati@al states, regional, and local

governnrenso tnrt it cæ alp b cmrmal æ in mocidiæal politiæÉ $rnh jruisdictiurs æe

d€fircd by durable mmber$ips thd & d int€rst at any particulæ lovel- Moreover, the

memberships of jmisdictims d higfuer md lower tiers do not intersect. This extends the

W€qhalietr principl€ of exchsivity bts th€ fuestic æn (Cafo*aso 20fr): l0; spç also

Krasner f999). Tb same principl€ is pr€s€ût in tfte international aren4 where the United Natiom,

the Wodd Trade Organization (W"fO), and tlre European Union €flcornpass national sates:

T kÊy ry$emie characteristis of Type I multi.levcl gowmaw aæ ep follo. qrs:

Limited nanfur ofjtisdictional levels. Typo I multi-level gCIvçmano€ organizss jurisdictions at

just a few levçls. Among studenb of intergovernmental relntions, it is common to distinguish a

local, an intermedid€, ad a cçnfal level altbugh, in præbc, thc numbcr of levels verb$.

Accordiûg to thç European NUTS {Nomenclafire d€s Unite's Statistiques Tenitoriales)

classificatiorU they vary betrveen *rc€ in the ca.se of Ltxembourg and six for Finhn{ Crreece"

PortugaL and ôe Ulritd King&n T d csurt is on tt-rç bigh sidÊ; is ssæ corr+Ekst nd all

NUTS tias corespdto governrnental orgaûizations. Forexample, upon enfy

end p.l8

\

O

l 8

in tlre European Union, the Swedish government created eight larger regions (;trol*|)aÈ

NUTS 2\evelto facilitaæ the implementation of EU cohesion policy- Howevu, ttc* æ$

shtistical constucts {Hoogbe and }v{arts 200.D-

Syster*wide, durable arehileehrre. One does not arrive at geneial-purlx)ss, næirogi3, d

nesfed jurisdictions by aeeident Systemic institutional choice is writen all over Tlpc I --

level govemance. In modem democraci€ËL Type I jrnisdictions usualty adopt ûc t*s fifs

structrne of an elected legislature, an executive (wiû a professional civil service! ml I crt

sysæm. As one moves fiom smallerto largerjurisdictions, the institrSions become me dfu*

bgt thc hsic sûrrcture is similar. Though the instiûrtions of ths Gernan H€ral gontrmÉt rG

frr more complex than those of a French town, they rçsemble each other more thm Û€y do fu

Type II ffr:tngements described below.

Type I jgrisdictions arc durable. Jurisdictional rpforur--that is' crËding aboliSing or radi:ally

adjusting new jrnisdictions-is costly and unusual. Change norrrally consists of reallocding

policy fundions across existing levels of goverrance. The instifttions respoasible for govanmce

are *icky, and they tend to outlivp the conditions ttat bmught *rcm into bing.

Type I multi-level govemanc€ is not limited to federalism and intergovernmental relations- It

capûj1.es a notion of governance c'onmon among EU scholars. Elsewhere, we have d€scribed ûê

rcûrganiution of autbority in ûrc European Union as 'a polity-creating proccss in {'hiÉ atlhtrity

and policy- making influence are shared across multiple levels of government--srbn*kml,

ndioml" and suprarational. White ndional govemments [remain] formidable participa*s in EU

polrcy making conhol has slipped away from therr' {Hoogfue ând tdâ*s 2001: 2)- Albcrb

Sbragia observes that, 'The decision-making process evolving in the Community gives a key role

to governments--national government at tho moment, and subnational governm3nt

imeasingly in selcctpd affnas' (Sbragia 1992: 2S9). gurrypean inægration ard regimalizatim are

viewed as complementary processes in which cenfal state authonity is dispersed above and below

the national state (Scharpf 1988. 1994: Sbragia 1993; Jeffery 1996; Marks et al' 1996: L€ Galè)s

a116 t-eqgesne 1993 Bache 199û; Bombsrg and Pctersm 199[; Keating ].99,û; Kdrler-Koch t99E;

Ansell 2frX): Bôrzel and Risse 2000; Burgess 2000; Bôræl 200D. Few observers expect the

orrtcoqp to be as neat and order$ as a corventional federation- Yet even fewer beliwe that theth*l

p$*r will rescmblo an Escher-like polrty charadzed by Mtorially variable,

firnctionalty specific, overlapping non-hierarchical networks. Governments, according to

Sbragia, .will continue to be central âctors' because 'the t€ritôrial claims that national

goyerûments rçpresert.., ar€ exceedingly shong. It is nsarly impossible ûo overestimatp the

l 9

limportance of national boundaries as key organizers of political power and economic wealth inthe European Community' (sbragsa 1992:274,289;' see also Peters and pierre A00o).Type t multi-level governalreÊ dominatff thinking in interaational rehtions among those

describing the modification-*Sut noû elimination--of the Westphalian state (Caporaso 2000).These scholars do not deny that transndional movements, public-private partlrershipg and

corpordions play important roles in international regimes, brf they highligût thÊ gyins powcr of

national states. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue thaf 'Contrary to some prophetic views,

the nation staûÊ is not about to be replaced as the primary instrument of domestic and global

govÊma$c€. ... Instea4 we believe that fu ndim rÉate is being suplæsntcd by oÉher açtors-private and third sector ... in a more complex geogr4plry' {Keohane md Nye 20ÆCI: l2).

Type II Multi-level Govenance

An atternativc form of multi-level gwernæce is æ in uùich jurisdictious are aligned noû on just

a few levels, but operate d mrmerous territorial scales; in which juridictions are task-specific

rather than general-purpose; md qùse jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than

durabls. This conæp&m is pedominant amilg ræochssicat political pconomists and public

choice theorists, but it also summarizæs the ideas of scveral scholars of federalism. localgovernmen! international relations, and European studies.

Tas*-specificiwiilictians. In Type II multi-lcvel govemance, multiplo, indepdent jurisdictions

fulfill distinct functions- '[E]ach citizen ... is served not by'"the" governmen! but by a variety of

diferent public service industries .... lVe can then think of the public sector as being composed

of nrany ptôlic scrvicc fudustries inctuding thc poliæ industry" tlæ fire indusry, tfte

welfare indusry, the heahh services industry, the hansportation industry, and so on'(Oshom and

Ostrom 1999: EE-9). In Swiberlan{ where Type tr multi-level govenranco is quiæ common3t

the local level, thesc jurisdictiors are a6ty calld Zwec*verb@

associations (Frey and Eichenberger f999).

Inrersecting memberships- 'There is generalty nG rÊa$o{r why the smallerjurisdictions should beneat$ contained within thc borde-rs of the larger ones. On the contraqr, borders will be crosse{ad jurisdictioûs will pftly overlap- Thc oonestsd," hieirrchical struchrre of ths nation state has noobvio{ts æmic r*ionale and is oppæed by econonnie forces' (Casella and \[teingast l9g5: l3].Frey' and Eichenberger coined the acronym FOCJ for this form of govenrance (tg9g).'Pot''ceticity' was initialty used to desc*ibe metropolihn govÊrnânc€ in the Unitcd States,rTÛùicb b+,his*dcatly been more fragmented than in Ermpellt ir no* apptied by Elinor andViffit Ctstrom as a ge,neric term for the coexi$ence of 'many centçrs of decision*making thatare famalty ind€eend€nt of each other'(Ostrom et al. 196l: S3l). Philippe Schmitter uses theterm 'cmdminio' to &seribe 'dispersed overlapping domains' having 'incongnrentmemberships' thd 'ast autonomously to solve commod problems and produce different publicgoods'(1996: 136)-end p20

\

o

20

Type II multi-levcl govema$ce has the following key systemic characteristics:

Many jwisdictional levels.Typ€ II multi-level governance is organized across a large nrù d

levels. tnstead of conceiving authority in neatty defieed tocal rcgional national' d irercid

layers, pubtic choice stu&lts argue that each public good or service should be provËed by ûÊ

jurisdiction that effectively internalizes its benefits and costs. The resuh is jurisdictions at diverse

scales--something akin to a marble cake. Students of Type II multiJevel goYsmtmce getr€taÛy

speak of 'rnulti' of 'poly' cenffi governânoe' which, they feel' have less of ring of hierrchy to

them than the terms multilevel or mult-tiered govenrance.

Some scholæs çonceivc of Type II multi-level governance in tlre intemational arena. A sritic of

the traditional statist view of governance describes this pmcess as 'fragmegratipll'-a neologism

suggesting,

the simultaneity and interaction of the fragmenting and integratiog dynamics drat are giving rise

to new spheres of arlhority and transforming the old spheres. It is also a label that suggests the

absence of clear-cut distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs' that local problems can

becomç transnational in scop even as global challenges çan have reprcussions for

neighbourhoods. (Ro'ænau 1?97: 38)

In this conception, there is no up or down, no lower or higher, no dominant class of actor; rather'

a wide range of public and private actors who eolhborate and compete in shifting coalitions' Tbe

outcore i5 akin ûo EscHs famous litograph of incoagruously descending and ascending stepe-

Ftexible design- Type tr jurisdicÉiom are inænded to respond flexibly to changing eitiæo

preferences *O n ""rional

requirements. The idea is rooted in Charles Tiebout's argument that

mobility of citizens âmong multiple competing jurisdictions provides a functional equivalent to

market competitioa {1956;: In a subsequent utti"i", Vincsnt Ostrom et at' (196D descfibe a polity

io .trfri"f, gro,rp, "f "iti""*

band together in 'collective consumption *tt' to procure public

goods. lniiviauat citizens can join oi l.ar* particular collective consumption rmits' and the

rmits can acquire "

p"Uii" g*d"io orr" of several alternative ways-for example'.by producing it

themselves, hiring paraæ-pood,.crrs, subsidizing local community groups, or joining up with

other jurisdictisrs iô;on1 et al, 196l: Osrom and Osfom 1999: for an assessment of the

literatrne see Oortdin! et at. tgg$. A defiûing characteristic of polycentril goÏemanc€ is 'the

c(xrc.,,rence of -otlipi "pp"G-iii.s

by which participants can forge or dissolve links among

differcnt coltective Ltitio' (Mccinûis 1999: 6)' t" his advocacy of FOCJ' Frey and

Eichenberger emphasize a simitar jurisdictional flexibitity: 'FOCJ ..- are flexible units which âre

estabtished when needed .- tA"dl FOCJ are discontinued when their services âre no longer

"il;&; .".tciti** *i "o*-*ities

cxit and the tax base shrinks' (1999: 18)- 'FocJ are

; tJffi;,,jr*, i vary rhe size of prblic jurisdictions in order to minimize spillovers- A

"n-g" in size is, therefore, a norrral occurrencej {Frey and Eichenberger !Y: aD' Under Type

II multilevel governanc", iti" ""p."ity

to take collectve decisions, and make them stick" is

dp-21

2 l

diftsd among a wide varbty of dors- As Elinor Ostrrom ard Jamcs Walker put it,

the choice that citizsns fac,e is not bdryeen an imperfect market, on the one hân4 and an all-

powerful, all-knowing and public-intsssû-s€çki$g ittsfifttioûr ort dF oûFr. The choicc is, raûrer,

from among an arrây of institutions---all of which are subject to weaknesses and &ilures --..

These include families aad clans, neighborhood associations, communal organizations, trade

associations, buyem and producerys' cooperdives, Iocal vohmtæy associatio*r* ard cluk, specinl

districts, international regimeq public-service industriss, arbitration and mediation associations,

and charitable organizations. (Ostrom and \ilalker 1997:36)

Type II muhi-level gor.Ërnaûse ccmprises dispersed self-nrle s$ tte part of diverse vohmtary

groups. Collective action problems are dsalt with in hetercgeneous arenâs mobilized by many

kinds of groups.! Sweral writers point out that Type II multilevel governance resembles pre-

modern govçrnal$e. JCIlut Ruggie idç*$ifi€s cunmonalitics be*wæll curterr-rporry arrd medisyel'multiperspectival' governance @uggie f993). Students of polycentric governancs trace the

prevalence of special disfricts and other forms of polycenbic govemance in the United States

back to the conception of fedcralisn anchored in &s US consÊihÉion (fuon Ug$- Analysts of

multi-centned govenrance in Europe fmd inspiration in pre-modem tlroories of federalism. The

father of societal federalism, Johannes Althusius, formulated his ideas against Jean Bodin's

unitary concesion of tlrp stats (Elsuilr 19$7; Hueglin 1-9999; Ekucr and Kincaid ?W; Nic$laidis

200D.Læatitg Type I Multi-level Govenence

Type I multi-level govelnônce predominatee in cçnventionâl territorlrl govemment up to ttæ

national level- While me,asures of deccntralizati+lln vary, cross-national anatyses reveal a robust

trend towards gtrçater decentralization since the end of tlre Second lVorld War. DecentafuzSan

has bem prticular$ impressive in Etnope, but it hss p€rsr€ded *re &veloping wsld as well

{Bird and Vaillancourf 1998; Mamr l999r. Data on taxation and spe,rding confinrr this.

Government Finsrce Stæistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shorv that the share of

srbnaioal e4dihue in total governmeut expmditura has rise*r ÊoÉ 2! pcr sent irr 1978 to

over 32 F mt by 1995. Fiscel &centralization has been most pronounced in $pain aad Latin

Ary Sodden 200$. The samç trend appears when cne examines policy making. VernorlTtcùcr1ç9 hæ tnccd tb extent to which sertral gover$mfft can ovsride decisions of

sbnrlnd gowtrm€nts- The proportion of countries in which cenhal governments have this

fçod porw€r bas &reased from 79 per cent in 1975 to 40 pr cent in 1995 (Henderson roD-Tbcre b bætr r sæep ris€ in political dceentr*lizaticn.

dp22

L

I

'r",

Thirty p€r cont of local govenrmelrts were directly elected in 1970; E6 per c€tt re €

elected in 1999. The proportion of regional governments thât are electpd has increeoedh2lr

55 per cent in the same psriod (Henderson 2@. Rsdden 2@)3

In Europe, Type I muhi-level gov€nranoe has bo€n pressed forward by ûc sinb

empowerment of supranational and subnationat institutions (Keating and Hoogle f995l AEI é

al. 1997; Bomterg and Pete-rson l=99Ê; Goldsnrith and Klausen 1997; Kohlcr-Koch !92!I Ar

index summarizing the formal authority of regions, speoial territorial autmomy for mincitieq fu

6e of regions in central governmen! and whetâer the regional government is eHe4 rerrcels e

deep and broad reallocation of authority ftom seutral states to regions in tbs puroeeo t ûho

(Ilooghe and Marfts 2Q01: appendix 2). The greatrst changes have been in Fmnce, Italy' Spain'

and Belgium, but no EU country has become more centralized since 1950. This index does É

caÉre deeentralizati,on to local governmæt. Local emporvenrrent has been Pstidsty

in northern Europe, afthough rec€nt local government refonns in several sortrùera

European coufiries have begun to narrow the gap (Page and Goldsmith 1987: John 200D-

Subnational dispersion of authority follows the logic of Type l---{rot Type tr' Tb overall

structurc inthe Eunopean Union is relatively simple, even elegant There arcfew rdlurhân mty

tiers. The territorial scalæ of government aeross the EU range between three and six- This is a Êr

cry from the near infinite jurisdictionat dispersion eonceived in Typc II multi-level governare-

Once one reaches beyood the national state into the international ar€na one finds very liftle Type

I multi-level governaac*-with one major exception: the European Union. The European Unim

bundles togeûrer pollcy competoncies that in other parts of the world are handled by mwoug

overlapping and functional$ specific jurisdictions- Most EU policieq with the major excedons

of monetary policy and border controls, have a single unitiedjurisdic'tion. G

Horvever, so*ne salient features of EU architcctne are consistÊtlt with Type tr muhi-level

governanoe: variable territorial jurisdictions as a result of treaty derogations; distinct governance

systems or .pillarc' for different policies; the multiplication of independent European agencies;

and the fl€xibility clause of the AmsteFdarn and Nice Treaties specifoing thc condirtims undcr

uùich a subset of member states can engÊge in greater integration. As Richard Balme and Didier

,,Chata{,pt point ou! 'the competencies of the European Union in different se€tors (environmeut'

agricudïie, comptition -..) are very different ".. Ëven in the sarrc pollcy area thç decision rules

are vsriable and ad hoc'

end p.23

23

(Balme and Chabaæt 2A02: 44)- Philippe Schmiter r€gards these characteristics as defining

features of the Europæn polity: 'Tbe core of the emerging Euro-potity's novelty lies in thegrowing dissociation b*wesn territorbl consispreiæ ad ftrwtional corupetenuies' ($chmitter

2000: 15).

Locating Type II Multi-lwd Govenrnce

Typ II multi-level govËnlarce tsds to bc euHdcd in lepl Èarncwo*s &tsrmirËd by Type Ijurisdictions. The result is a large number of relatively self-coataind fimctionatly differentiated

Type n jwisdictions alongside a smaller number of general-purpose, rûsted Type I jurisdictions-

The NrtionrUlnt*raationd Frontier

îype II multi-level gov€rnance is ubiquitous in efforts to internatize transnational spillovers in

the absence of authoritative coordination. Most target specific pôllcy problems mnging from

ozone layu protectiæ, to sbiprne,nt of bazarfurs wastc, to migratory spccis. Ta*-specificity is a

conmon feature of interrrational regimes.

Type n jurisdictions at the nationaUinternational frontier are more fluid thaa Type I jurisdietions.

A count of intemtional gorerrunental organizations shows steep gprÀ,th over thc pc$ tralf

centu4r, but also sizcable fluctntion- For uampl€, of 1063 organiz*iors existing in 1981, onty

723 survived a decade lrter, while an additional 400 or so sams into being (Shanks et al. 1996:

143). The mortality rate for internstioilâl governmental argÊnizatioçl$ is estinratcd to bc fivc ti*rcs

higher tlran for Type I organizations, such as Anærican fedêial bweaucmcies (Kaufuan 1976.

cited in Shanks et al- 1996: 594).

lVhile public-çrivate parûrerships are found in Type I jrri$dictioûsL Srey are mre cosson in

Type II.s The role of public-private parfirershrps in th€ intsnational arena is contesÉed. In sorne

cass, private actors negotiate on an equal basis with governmental actors, or bypass states

altogetlrer @osenau 1997. and Chs$çr 3, in this volume; Hocking !9S Yourg lS9). Howwero

many Type tr transnational jurisdictions coordinato gor'€,înmentsdlot private parties, or they

op€n up prblic decision making to private ac{ors to different degrees. Tanja Bôrzel and Thsnas

Risse distinguish frve types of prblic-privae partuerships. In the first typÊ, pfivûE groups tre

merely cmsûted r co@d by public adom- This is xhs case for fhÊ IVTO, ûc IMF, and the

Wtrtd Bânk all of which have recently reached out to civil society representatives (Otsrien et al.!' gip)-.Yf sêcond form includes prival€ âctors as negotiating partners nCIrt to public actors, as in

û3 Trdæk hlsfuss Dialogue, which brings togottrer business srd govornment

Êom both sides of the Atlantic. Public actors may also delegate functions toprivde

\

l'

24

actors, as is the case for many standardizationffiies, for example, the Commitroc fu Eæ

Normalization (CEN). A fourth form authorizes self-regulation among firns in the ùùr d

hierarchy (e,g. fte lvorld Busincss council for sustainable Developmcnt)- Th3 ftd t'"c d

publiclrivate partnership is one in which private actors predominate and in which ûs rok of

goverrment is restricæd to adopting Tnst-hæ, privatety negotiated regimes' An enample is tb

reguldioa of domain names oa tlrc Intprnet. Bôrzçl and Rissc condude 6d '[P]ri\rde r€gfoG

appÊar to be confined to one issue-area: international political €coûomy- In all other t€as' strlEs

seem reluctant to prwide private âctors with truE govemâûce authority outside their cmtrol'

(ftitrzel ard Rrss€ 2002: 5). At tre nationaUintsrnatimÊl ftstticr, Typ II multidwel govçmflrcs

tends to predominate. The European union, which is mainly a Type I jurisdiction, is an cxcÊÉim

t6at proves the rule. It is extreme$ difficult to tie national staûes into authoritative transocional

jurisdictions ûrat are general-purpose, rather dran &signod ar',ound particular policy Ft3blEms'

Type tr jurisdictions are instrumental arrangements that do not directly challenge state authority,

nor do thery demand a shong sense of identity on the part of their membens- Most srccessful

international regimes focus on pâreûo oSimality and avoid erylicit rcdisfibution- As we discrlss

below, this is both a virtue and a limitation of Type II multi-level governance'

Cross-border Regions

Type II jurisdictions are colnmon in cross-bordcr regions, especially in North America ild

Westem Europe. Ad hæ,problem{riven jurisdictions in the form of inter regional commissions'

task forceg and inær-city agencies have mushroomed over the past throe decades' In the Upper

Rhine Valley, f,or ererrple, frc Swiss can'fons of Basel-Land and Bascl-Sd' fu Frd

departnent Haut Rhin, and the German region Baden have created a web of trans-ndional

jurisdictions! involving meetingS of regional governm€nt teaderg a regional council."of

parliunentary rcpr€sentativcs, a coafsf€ficç of city tnayofs, boilds of rregional plærs'

associations of local authorities, agrioultural associations, chambers of commerce' coop€ration

projects among universities, joint research projects on regional glimat€ change and

bioûecbnology, teactrer exehange prcgrammes, and school parftrerstrips {weyand 1996; Perl{ttânn

1gg9). Dense cross-border cooperation has also emerged along the Californim/Mexican border

and the*US/Canadian border (Blâûer 2001).tbo".rrrà*"

arrngÊmrnts Srat $raddls rgtiffiat bordcrs are usualty fitrtionatly spscifi*, md

overlap with existinJ j*irOi"ti*r in order to sotve particular collective action problems- Such

jurisdictions opera1gïfthin Typ I architeeture- eæper*ion is difficult when regions and local

âuoo*itio in iitrerent countries have dissimilar competenciçs or resources. This has conssained

æ of the Comrnission's best-kaown progrffsrnes, Inærreg; wtrich eirîc to facilitaæ iaærrsgional

netrvorks along the European union's internal and external borders

end p.25

25

(Per{<mann 199D. Contrasting Ty?e I erchitectnres in Europe ad the United Stfltes help explainwhy cross-border cooperation has evolved ditrerentb @latter 2001). Joachim Blatrer notes thnt inEurope, cross-border arrangements sbw a t€rderçy to evobye in a Type I dirçction--undsr theinfluence of relatively Fesollrttrich, general-purpose hcal and regional governments. In contrast,cross-border coop€ration in North America has remained task-specific, territorially overlappingan.d dominsted by noogovernrncntal actors, alrd thuç courpleins*ts uncoo{dù151e4 rckivclyrcsource.poor, Typ I governments (Blatter 2O0 D.Locel Level

Type II muhi-lwel governânçË is wideryread d the local level- Iû Switzûrtand, Frey andEichenberger identified six types of FOCJ tùat complement or compete with general-purposelocal governments. Âceording to the authors' calculations, in lgg4,lZB Type tr assæiationsprovided specialized senrices such as loeal schooling; çl€cEisity, sr strect ligbting ir &e castqrof Znrich alone (Frey and Eichenberger 1999: 49*53)- The closest fimctional equivalent in rheUnited States consists of 'special districts', wilich, as in Switzedan{ have intersecting territorialboundaries and perform spcific tasks. $piat distri* govÈrnense is perticubrty dçnse inmetropolitan areas: in 1992, the metnopolitan area of tlouston hfld 665 spæial districts, Denver358, and Chicago 35? {Foster 1997: 122). Overall, the number of special districts has risentlreefold from 12,340 in 1952 to 35,356 in 2002. Ninety-one pçr cÊnt cf thes€ disûict$ perfornr asingle function concerned with natural res(xrcss, fne protectiorq water suppty, housing;sewenage' cemeteries, libraries, parks and recreatio4 highways, hospitals, airports, electric poweror ga$ suppty, or public transit. Thesç fig,rrw do not include several intersÊate spcial di*icts,such as the New York and New Jersey Port Authority; nor do they include irxiependent schooldistricts, of which there were over 13,500 in 2002 (US Bureau of the Census l9g9.2W\FoEer1997: l-22). Type II multi-level governance at the local level is rnæ corurnon in $witzrrlandand the United States thân in Europe, though 'partnership betlveen a whob variety of serviceproviders and levels of flocal] government is the normal practice in most West Ersopeancourtriss' (Bdley l99l : 225|.

Type II special districts are generally embedded in Type I tocal governmen! but ths way thisïrorts varks- Tb€re is æ generat blueprint. The legal conter* is dccisive fortbs densrty otsfoiatrlisuiceç,in û€ Unitod Staæs. A tally of district-ensbling laws in California in the éarry tlfos!onicd,#!try ry{* enabling 55 varietiæ of special disicts for 30 govcmment fimsrig*(Fæer 1997:- ll). No less than 200 pages of the most recont US Censusk Governmenr weredaded to'a summaryfucri$ion'of local govffnmcntvariatio*racrsss US $atss (US Buæau ofùe C€nsrs 1999: 73--277). Some districts ôe creatsd by state legislatures, others are set up byûE G ffiË cotmti€s w mrmicipalities, whilç othcrs æe initided by a citizea petition. $Écialdislrb mry be govemedd p26

f,

o

26

by appointed or elected boords; for some elected boards, only property owmls rlb' lb

residents can vote. Some special districts levy taxes or fees, while others do rct fbe gpoÉqtd

scopc varies ftrom intcrst*p, to regional and submuni"tpul' but ths majority of speciel di$bæ

smallerthan the county *d overlapwith other læal govemments (Foster 1997: 9-15)- Tb td

is a baroque ptchwork ofType ffjurisdictions overtryinga nested pattem of Type ljudsdicrin'

Type II muhilevel govËrnrurpÊ may also appÊr uihqç local cçûrmunities arc M wiù l€l

commgn pool resOurce problems, that is, where scâtrse, re*ewable resources-ftF e)r*rple' e

water basin, a lake, ao irrigAtion system' fishing grûmds, fore$s, hunting grouds' or omp6a

meû&ws-ruË subjwt to daplatiul bccausç it is difficult to restrid æcsss- As Elins Osnrm hæ

argue4 diversity of ecological systems is an important sonroe of multi-level govenrance (fum

and Janssen i44gt- Around the world, communities have developed task-specific govenlsose

structnps, oftexr sclÊgpncrafe4 Ûo copÊ wie bcalty spocific çonumn pol rçsolltc ppbl€ms

(Ostrom 1990: also Keohane and Ostrom 199$.

Bisses of Mnlti-Iovel Govertrncc

Thc fpes of governaaco tlut rre outlinc in this ghâptcr ûaæe bsic political choicæ- Typc I ad

Typo tr multi-level govemance are not merely different ways of doing the same thing- Thir

contrasting instiutional arrangements give rise to æntrasting virtues and vices. We lig these in

TzblaZ2"and describe ftem below.

Biâses of Type r Multi.l'evel Govermence

Inrrinsic commwrity.Type I jurisdictions express citizens' identities with a particular community'

Intrinsb conrmunities rrercsent€d h TypÊ I jurisdi{tions are oftcn bas€d in national' rEgiooâl'

and/or local identity, br$ th€y may also reflect religion, bibe, or ethnicity- Such jurisdictiotts

satisry a preference for collective self-governmenf a god that is independent of citizens'

pneftrences fa effici*my or for any particular policy ou$uL

Tnble 2r. Bias€s of Type I rnd Type II multi-level governance

Type I Typetr

Intrinsic cmmunityE:rfinsic comrnunity

Voice o Exit

Conftict\rticulation Confl ict 6v6idance

endp27

27

Yoice- Type I multi'level governaæ is bits€d ûowârds voice, tlnt is, political deliberation in

conventional liberal democratc institutiotrs. Type I jurisdictions are determined in a deliberative

multi-issue process in which co*flicts ar hi$ly strucûsçd and artiuulded. Rules nbcut rules

{Komptenz-Kompetew) are decided consciously, collectively, ard comprehensively. Conversety,

barriers to cxit are relatively high- Exit in a Type I world usualty rn€ans nroving from one

locality, region, or corurtry to arrotrs. Wtræ jrrisdictions are designd arcund rcligiou or $uupmemborship, exit demands that one change o'ne's identity.

Confiict çticalûion Bundling issues in a limited number of jurisdictions facilitates party

comp€tition ard the articuhion of dimensiorrs thd strushre politi"al cs*estdion, firsû snd

forerrost a leftfrigbt dimension tapping greater versus less government regulatiur of market

outcomes ild, in mary communities, a nelv politics dimensioû tapping communal,

enviroffttental, and culûral issrrçs- This prcnroûe* meaningfrrl chaicc f-or citizrns. Typ I muhi-

level governance is well suited to deal with zero-sum issues; that is, disrribtrtional bargaining,

beeause it facilitates logrolling and cross-issue trading. And because barriers to cxit are high, it is

also well suited to pmvi& non-qcludable public godds-

Bfus€s of Typ* IIMnlti-level Governence

Extrinsic commwûty- Type tr jurisdictions are instrumental ârrângements. They wlve ad hæ

coordiûatiûn problems âmong individuals sharing the same geographical or ftmstioilEl spæe-

Individuals relate to jurisdictions as members of flui{ iûttrsoctiûg communities-*for example, as

professionals, women, parents, homeownerso naûre lovers, sports fans, shoppers, and so forth-

Exit. Typ II multi'level govemârçe is biassd to$nards exit. Vohmary membcrship allaws

citizenq or thc collectiye units of which thoy are members, to exit jurisdictions when these no

longer serve their needs. To the extent that they facilitate entry and exit, Type tr jurisdictigrs

approximate markets. Jurisdictions may be createq dËlÊtp{ or djn*ed Ërrough int€r-

judsdicrional competition for citizens' participation cr dues- Constitutional engineering is,

tùerefore, a spontaneous process rather tàan a colleetive enterprise. Voice is seeondary. The

narrou. focus of Type II jruisdictions corlserrates tlre costs of libeml denocrdis in*itutiorys

wiûin snrall constitrrencies. Deliberdion is focused oa the production of a particular public good

raùer Sq or broader value choices.g't.rfl;a'gvoiæ*"- gy Oæoryrposlng decisio* meking irtoFrisdictionsnith lfuited e|Écrnahties,

Tpe II multilevel govemanc€ insulates dæisian making

eod pJt

t

28

J

fr,om o{h€r, poffftidly coffiadic*ory, issrrcs- This jurisdictional &agmentdion raiscs fu b h

articulating i&ological cmftict, but it concentrates the mind on improving effrciæy u-

exising jurididional bqrds. Type tr jurisdictions aæ well suited for &cisists cbæ{trbd ty

a search for Paretoofimality.

Type I and Type II mutti-level governance are not ju* different means to the sare eod- They

embody contrasting visisrs of collective dæision m*ing. Typ I jwisdietiæ are sited o

political deliberatioNt about basic value choices in a society: who gsts uùat" wh€n, md how.

Because Type I mufti-level govemânco bundles decision making in a limited number of

jrnisdictions at a few levclg it reaps ecslro{nic$ oJ scâle in trærslating citiæn prefere'nces into

policy- Type I jurisdictions are at tho heart of democratic elections, Frty systemq legislatues,

and executives. Type I jurisdictions sustain a class of professional politicians who mediate citizen

prrferences into law.

Type tr jurisdictions, in confas! emphasize problem solving. How can citizens obûain ptblic

goods that they are unable to create individualty? What are trc most efficient means to public

endsJ How een Elarkct efficieney, basÊd or cons tnËr choice and competition among pdwers'

be trailstat€d into thc provision of public goods? The assumption undertying Type II juridic*itxts

is that ercternalities among jurisdictions are sufficiently limited to sustain comparhentalized

decision making.

Conclusioa

How should multi-level governanc€ be organizrd? lVho should be ineluded in a jurisdictioa ad

wbat should ttrat juri$di€tion do? Whât criteria arç mlevant to thesÊ ctroices" std whd ae tùc

implications of such choices?

The main benef* of mutti-level governance lies in its scale flexibility. Multi-level govcrrânseÊ

allows jrnisdictions to be custmrdesi$ed in Ésporrs€ to extsnalitieg ecææies of scale,

ecological niches, and preferences. Both Type I and Type II multi-level governance delivcr scale

flexibility. But they do so in contrasting ways. Type I multi-level governance does so by creating

gencral-purpose jurisdictions wit*r $on-iutersectfuIg membrehipc. Jwisdictions d lrows tisrs arc

nested n€dty into higher ones. Type II multi-lcvel governance, by contras{ consists of spocial-

purposê jrryisdictions that tailor membership, mles of opÊration, and functions to a particularn a l

policy probtqnç"

Each type has distinctive virtues. Type I multi-level governance is ricnted to intrinsic

communities and to their demands for self-ruIe. It is predisposed to the articulation and resolution

of conflict, including çonflict on redistributivc issuec. Tyf tr jurisdiction$ arç well suitcd to

achieve Paretooptimality when redistribution is not salient. Yd dsspite these differences----or

t

29

more accuretely, because of thæTlpe I and Type tr multi-level govenrâûce arËeomplementary.

As tâe European Union sryûds to fu €s ad b€cæ yet more divcrse, presnrres forjurisdictional flexibility will intensis- Will it be possiblc to sû,etch a Type I jurisdiction over aEuropean Union of twenty-five countries? WiII there be morp v$iable geomery-in our t€ia$,Type tr muhi-levcl governanco-in tk Euopam Unim? Thæe qucstim$ take us kyond thescope of this chapero but the ponc$ual framework preseirted here 4pçrys to be relevant to theirresolution-

endp30

ttl

30