chisom v. roemer, 501 u.s. 380 (1991)

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Filed: 1991-06-20Precedential Status: PrecedentialCitations: 501 U.S. 380, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 115 L. Ed. 2d 348, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3627Docket: 90-757Supreme Court Database id: 1990-111

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  • 501 U.S. 380111 S.Ct. 2354

    115 L.Ed.2d 348

    Ronald CHISOM, et al., Petitioners,v.

    Charles E. ROEMER, Governor of Louisiana, et al. UNITEDSTATES, Petitioner, v. Charles E. ROEMER, Governor of

    Louisiana, et al.Nos. 90-757 and 90-1032.

    Argued April 12, 1991.Decided June 20, 1991.

    SyllabusThe Louisiana Supreme Court consists of seven members, two of whomare elected at-large from one multimember district, with the remainderelected from single-member districts. Petitioners in No. 90-757 represent aclass of black registered voters in Orleans Parish, which is the largest ofthe four parishes in the multimember district and contains about half ofthe district's registered voters. Although more than one-half of OrleansParish's registered voters are black, over three-fourths of the voters in theother three parishes are white. Petitioners filed an action in the DistrictCourt against respondents, the Governor and state officials, alleging thatthe method of electing justices from their district impermissibly dilutesminority voting strength in violation of, inter alia, 2 of the VotingRights Act of 1965. As amended in 1982, 2(a) prohibits the impositionof a voting qualification or prerequisite or standard, practice, or procedurethat "results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on accountof race or color," and 2(b) states that the test for determining the legalityof such a practice is whether, "based on the totality of circumstances,"minority voters "have less opportunity than other members of theelectorate to participate in the political process and to elect representativesof their choice." (Emphasis added.) The United States, petitioner in No.90-1032, subsequently intervened to support petitioners' claims, and theDistrict Court ultimately ruled against petitioners on the merits. However,the Court of Appeals finally remanded the case with directions to dismissthe complaint in light of its earlier en banc decision in League of United

  • Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620(LULAC), that judicial elections are not covered under 2 of the Act asamended. There, the court distinguished between claims involving theopportunity to participate in the political process and claims involving theopportunity to elect representatives of minority voters' choice, holding that 2 applied to judicial elections with respect to claims in the first category,but that because judges are not "representatives," the use of that termexcludes judicial elections from claims in the second category.Held: Judicial elections are covered by 2 as amended. Pp. 391-404.(a) As originally enacted, 2 was coextensive with the FifteenthAmendment, and it is undisputed that it applied to judicial elections. The1982 amendment expanded 2's protection by adopting a results test, thuseliminating the requirement that proof of discriminatory intent isnecessary to prove a 2 violation, and by adding 2(b), which providesguidance about how to apply that test. Had Congress also intended toexclude judicial elections, it would have made its intent explicit in thestatute or identified or mentioned it in the amendment's unusuallyextensive legislative history. Pp. 391-396.(b) The results test is applicable to all 2 claims. The statutory text andthis Court's cases foreclose LULAC reading of 2. If the word"representatives" placed a limit on 2's coverage for judicial elections, itwould exclude all claims involving such elections, for the statute requiresthat all claims must allege an abridgement of the opportunity both toparticipate in the political process and to elect representatives of one'schoice. Thus, rather than creating two separate and distinct rights, thestatute identifies two inextricably linked elements of a plaintiff's burden ofproof. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37L.Ed.2d 314. Pp. 396-398.(c) The word "representatives" describes the winners of representative,popular elections, including elected judges. Although LULAC correctlynoted that judges need not be elected, when they are, it seems bothreasonable and realistic to characterize the winners as representatives ofthe districts in which they reside and run. The legislative history providesno support for the arguments that the term "representatives" includes onlylegislative and executive officials or that Congress would have chosen theword "candidates" had it intended to apply the vote dilution prohibition tojudicial elections. Pp. 398-401.(d) Adopting respondents' view of coverage would lead to the anomalous

  • result that a State covered by 5 of the Act would be precluded fromimplementing a new voting procedure having discriminatory effects withrespect to judicial elections, Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct.2096, --- L.Ed.2d ----, but a similarly discriminatory system already inplace could not be challenged under 2. Pp. 401-402.(e) That the one-person, one-vote rule is inapplicable to judicial elections,Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S.Ct. 904, 34 L.Ed.2d 679, does notmean that judicial elections are entirely immune from vote dilutionclaims. Wells rejected a constitutional claim and, thus, has no relevance toa correct interpretation of this statute, which was enacted to provideadditional protection for voting rights not adequately protected by theConstitution itself. Cf. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-183, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1559-1565, 64 L.Ed.2d 119. Pp. 402-403.917 F.2d 187 (C.A.5, 1990), reversed and remanded.STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., andKENNEDY, J., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr, Washington, D.C., for petitioner U.S.Pamela S. Karlan, Charlottesville, Va., for petitioners Ronald Chisom, etal.Robert G. Pugh, Shreveport, La., for respondents.Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

    1 The preamble to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 establishes that the centralpurpose of the Act is "[t]o enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitutionof the United States."1 The Fifteenth Amendment provides:

    2 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied orabridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, orprevious condition of servitude." U.S. Const., Amdt. 15, 1.

    3 In 1982, Congress amended 2 of the Voting Rights Act2 to make clear thatcertain practices and procedures that result in the denial or abridgement of theright to vote are forbidden even though the absence of proof of discriminatory

  • intent protects them from constitutional challenge. The question presented bythis case is whether this "results test" protects the right to vote in state judicialelections. We hold that the coverage provided by the 1982 amendment iscoextensive with the coverage provided by the Act prior to 1982 and thatjudicial elections are embraced within that coverage.

    4 * Petitioners in No. 90-757 represent a class of approximately 135,000 blackregistered voters in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. App. 6-7, 13. They brought thisaction against the Governor and other state officials (respondents) to challengethe method of electing justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court from the NewOrleans area. The United States, petitioner in No. 90-1032, intervened tosupport the claims advanced by the plaintiff class.

    5 The Louisiana Supreme Court consists of seven justices,3 five of whom areelected from five single-member Supreme Court Districts, and two of whom areelected from one multi-member Supreme Court District.4 Each of the sevenmembers of the court must be a resident of the district from which he or she iselected and must have resided there for at least two years prior to election. App.to Pet. for Cert. 7a. Each of the justices on the Louisiana Supreme Court servesa term of 10 years.5 The one multimember district, the First Supreme CourtDistrict, consists of the parishes of Orleans, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, andJefferson.6 Orleans Parish contains about half of the population of the FirstSupreme Court District and about half of the registered voters in that district.Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1057 (CA5 1988). More than one-half ofthe registered voters of Orleans Parish are black, whereas more than three-fourths of the registered voters in the other three parishes are white. App. 8.

    6 Petitioners allege that "the present method of electing two Justices to theLouisiana Supreme Court at-large from the New Orleans area impermissiblydilutes minority voting strength" in violation of 2 of the Voting Rights Act.Id., at 9. Furthermore, petitioners claimed in the courts below that the currentelectoral system within the First Supreme Court District violates the Fourteenthand Fifteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution because the purpose andeffect of this election practice "is to dilute, minimize, and cancel the votingstrength" of black voters in Orleans Parish. Ibid. Petitioners seek a remedy thatwould divide the First District into two districts, one for Orleans Parish and thesecond for the other three parishes. If this remedy were adopted, the sevenmembers of the Louisiana Supreme Court would each represent a separatesingle-member judicial district, and each of the two new districts would haveapproximately the same population. Id., at 8. According to petitioners, the newOrleans Parish district would also have a majority black population andmajority black voter registration. Id., at 8, 47.

  • 7 The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint.Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F.Supp. 183 (ED La.1987). It held that theconstitutional claims were insufficient because the complaint did notadequately allege a specific intent to discriminate. Id., at 18