By Lindsey Alberty, Megan Paparella, Breonna Studer, Brittany Workman

Psychological Factor: Greed

Though combatants often cite response to a grievance as the primary cause of strife, researchers report that proxies for greed are far more predictive of aggressive behavior1. In fact, both survivors and perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide acknowledge the role of greed in the killings5. In fact, the strongest predictors of violence include the following1,8:

•Primary goods exports are positively correlated with violence due to the fact that exports provide a revenue stream that can be easily captured. •Household income, including measures of size of rented land, off-farm income, and gross household income are positively correlated with violence because one fights to protect their property and gain additional property when possible.•Years of education in the adult male population is negatively correlated with violence because the more education one has, the greater the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict.

Interdisciplinary Analysis

Social scientists often attempt to isolate a single variable as the root cause of violence. This approach is limiting, however, because it fails to account for the interdisciplinary relationship among multiple factors. The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 is a striking example of the way in which social science disciplines such as economics, psychology, and sociology all play a role. This event demonstrates the importance of examining several factors in the study of genocide.

Rwanda, in the midst of a power struggle precipitated by Belgian colonization, was divided into two main groups, the Hutus and Tutsis. As turmoil between the two ethnic groups escalated, many Tutsis fled the country for fear of their lives.

The decreasing population, combined with a drought, caused a steep decline in the prices of Rwanda’s principle exports. As this trend continued, the country descended into an economic crisis. The fragile economic status further perpetuated the ever-present rift between the two groups.

This chaos allowed citizens to act out in ways that typically would not be permissible. The conflict between the two ethnic groups contributed to violence driven by revenge, while the deteriorating economic situation led to violence sparked by greed.

Therefore, the study of these interrelated factors and their contribution to the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 illustrates the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach.

Economic Factor: Gross Domestic Product

As the social science that studies the resources used to satisfy human wants or needs, economics plays a large part in determining people’s actions. One of Rwanda’s primary resources is coffee, also the main export, and when the price of coffee dropped by 50% in 1989, the nation’s economic environment quickly began to deteriorate9, as did the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures the total value of goods and services produced in a given year. As GDP dropped, so too did the standard of living. Thus, income decreased, poverty increased, and supply of basic needs fell, causing frustration and conflict. The nation was in turmoil due to the fragile economic base and the severely impoverished population. It was this economic desperation that turned the Rwandans into killers2.

Freschi, L. (2011, January 25). Cool maps: Measuring growth from outer space. Retrieved from http://aidwatchers.com/2011/01/cool-maps-measuring-growth-from-outer-space/

Psychological Factor: Revenge

•1884 Germany gained indirect control of Rwanda’s structural and political systems5

•1918 Upon Germany’s defeat, Belgium gained control and designated Tutsis as the dominant ethnicity•1957 In response to the Tutsi movement for independence, Belgium replaced the Tutsi government with Parmehutu, a party committed to the emancipation of Hutus7, thus reversing the roles of the Hutus and Tutsis

“…Revenge is inherent in the very nature of war itself6,” which became evident during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 in which everyone was a victim of revenge. The decades long power struggle between the Hutus and the Tutsis laid the groundwork for a revenge-fueled genocide. Upon gaining power, the formerly-oppressed Hutus released their pent up anger as they began to act out against the Tutsis. In response to the genocide against them, the Tutsis, driven by revenge, began to rebel against the Hutus. Thus, the need for revenge fueled both parties to the genocide.

Sociological Factor: Ethnicity

No distinctions were drawn between the Hutus and Tutsis prior to Belgian colonization and the introduction of ethnic ideologies. With the delineation of these ethnic groups, however, societal cleavages began to appear. Despite the fact that the genocide was conducted along ethnic lines, it is important to remember that “…genocide in Rwanda was caused not by ethnic conflict as such…but by a series of state responses to a deeper structural crisis3.” As a result of the ethnic distinctions and the resulting genocide, modern Rwanda is a bi-polar society comprised of approximately 84% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 2% Twa.4 As evidenced by the proportion of Hutus and Tutsis, the genocide has had a long-term impact on Rwanda.

(2206, October). Physical Anthropology. Retrieved from http://thephora.net/forum/showthread.php?t=14930

References1Berdal, M., & Malone, D. M. (Eds.). (2000). Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars.

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.2Boudreaux, K. (2009). Land conflict and genocide in Rwanda. The Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development,1(3), 61-71.3Hintjens, H. M. (1999). Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The Journal of Modern African

Studies, 37(2), 241-286.4Ingelaere, B. (2010). Peasants, power and ethnicity: A bottom-up perspective on Rwanda’s political

transition. African Affairs, 109(435), 273-292.5Jones, A. (2011). Genocide: A comprehensive introduction (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.6Laughlin, J. (2010). The Rwandan genocide: Revenge tragedy. Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=21361 7Verwimp, P. (2004). Death and survival during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Population Studies,

58(2), 233-245. 8Verwimp, P. (2005). Economic profile of peasant perpetrators of genocide: Micro-level evidence from Rwanda. Journal of Developmental Economics, 77(2), 297-323.9Thomas, C., & Wilkin, P. (1999). Globalization, human security, and the African experience.

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.