bound for the golden mountain: the social organization of chinese alien smuggling

Crime, Law & Social Change 25: 1-16, 1996. 1 (~) 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Bound for the Golden Mountain: The social organization o f

Chinese alien smuggl ing *

SHELDON X. ZHANG 1 and MARK S. GAYLORD 2 I California State University, San Marcos; 2 City University ofHong Kong

Abstract. This paper describes and analyzes the structural and operational features of Chinese alien smuggling. Interviews with aliens, smugglers and law enforcement officials in China, Hong Kong and the U.S. reveal this activity to be a complex process comprising a number of distinct operational stages. Our data suggest Chinese alien smuggling groups vary in their level of organization but most are best understood as task forces, or small groups of people assembled to perform a particular piece of work. These task forces are typically linked to international social networks characterized by overlapping, dyadic relationships; a high level of role differentiation; and a limited degree of hierarchy. Such groups are highly responsive to changing socio-legal and market constraints.

In troduct ion

Chinese alien smuggl ing is not a new phenomenon, but the involvement of organized c r ime groups in the large-scale transport o f such cargo is a relatively recent development . Est imates of the number of Chinese annually smuggled into the U.S. vary, but officials o f the U.S. Immigra t ion and Natural izat ion Service (INS) put the current figure at around 100,000.1 It has been est imated that more than ha l f a mill ion Chinese have been smuggled into the U.S. since 1984 alone. 2

Unl ike other forms o f organized crime, such as gambl ing and drug trafficking, Chinese alien smuggl ing has received scant attention f rom social sc ien t i s t s ) In large part, this is due to the formidable cultural and language barriers that make access to this topic difficult i f not impossible for mos t Western criminologists . Thus mos t o f what passes for conventional w i sdom about the activity derives not f rom academic research but f rom the media. Never theless , nearly everyone who has investigated Chinese alien smuggling,

* The study was supported in part by a grant from California State University. The authors are grateful to John Galliher for his comments and suggestions, and would like to thank Jorge Guzman and Darwin Chen of the U.S. INS for their assistance with the project. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Miami, 1994.

2 SHELDON X. ZHANG AND MARK S. GAYLORD

including journalists, law enforcement officials and social scientists, agrees that the level of planning and investment required to transport hundreds of thousands of people from China to various countries throughout the world suggests it to be a major industry.

One aspect of this phenomenon is the growing globalization of these crime groups, which have greatly expanded their international networks of way- stations and are now capable of transporting vast numbers of illegal aliens to North America, Europe and the former Soviet Union. China's Public Security Bureau estimates there are half a million Chinese nationals in such places as Bangkok, Moscow and Ho Chi Minh City waiting to complete their journeys. To reach their destinations, complicated routes have been developed linking dozens of countries including the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Romania, Bulgaria and Brazil. 4

The globalization of Chinese alien smuggling, together with the increased involvement of ethnic Chinese in the international drug trade, signal an increased level of organization among Chinese crime groups, which have historically focused on extortion, prostitution and gambling within their own communities. Growing evidence suggests Chinese crime groups have been quick to adapt to the world's fast-changing economic and political environment, while law enforcement organizations at all levels and in all countries appear ill-equipped and poorly prepared to meet these challenges. Field research on Chinese alien smuggling, therefore, would seem to be a necessary first step in the development of effective counter-measures dealing with this activity.

In this article, we shall explore the meaning of organized crime, especially as it applies to Chinese crime groups; analyze the structural and operational features of Chinese alien smuggling; and offer some final observations on its current status.

Methods

This study is based primarily on fieldwork. Sheldon X. Zhang conducted interviews with informants, principally smugglers and illegal aliens and their families, in China and the U.S. All interviews followed a consistent protocol and centered on the question of how smugglers organize and conduct their activities. Additional interviews were conducted with law enforcement officials in the U.S., China and Hong Kong, and with journalists in Hong Kong and the U.S. Other data sources included U.S. government documents, and news reports, feature articles and editorials published in Hong Kong, China and the U.S.

CHINESE ALIEN SMUGGLING 3

In general, we found government documents and news reports to be frag- mentary and often misleading. Our interviews, however, provided a detailed picture of the social organization of Chinese alien smuggling. Nevertheless, we wish to make it clear that the information we received from some of our informants was obtained without their knowledge of our intentions. We are aware of the limitations of such interviews, which are perhaps more common among journalists than academics and therefore caution the reader to be aware of possible biases in our findings.

What is organized crime?

Organized crime is arguably the least understood of all types of crime today. 5 One school of thought believes organized crime comprises modem, corporate- like groups that are bureaucratically structured and governed by a national commission. 6 Like their upperworld counterparts, these groups seek to monopolize their industries by expanding in size and forming large cartels of national and even international scope. 7 According to this school, the structure of so-called "crime families" resembles that of formal organizations: there is a clear division of labor and chain of command; tasks and responsibilities are assigned according to members' skills and abilities; rules and regulations govern members' activities; promotion is based on merit and membership is restricted. Thus, it is claimed, crime families operate as their legitimate counterparts in terms of leadership, management and professionalism. 8

The other major school of thought argues that organized crime is made up of small, fragmented and ephemeral enterprises involved in illegal activities connected with the management and coordination of racketeering (organized extortion) and the vices. 9 This definition suggests flexible and adaptive networks that can readily expand and contract to deal with the vagaries of an uncertain environment.I~ A number of such-minded researchers have focused on the entrepreneurial nature of organized crime. Their studies describe tran- sitory alliances of risk takers who seize opportunities to make large profits on their investments. 11 Apart from a relatively small core group, most associates are brought in as needed to provide special services. 12 These crime groups more closely resemble a task force than an organization, and members are united by a shared interest in making money, rather than by a common heritage, kinship or desire to build and maintain a corporate-like business enterprise.

Thus it is clear that the two major schools of thought on the nature of organized crime describe realities that stand virtually at opposite ends of a continuum.


Chinese organized crime

Traditionally, Chinese organized crime has been described as historically rooted, embedded within tightly knit and reclusive ethnic communities, international, highly organized and willing to use violence to solve conflictsJ 3 A number of studies have focused on the Triads in Hong Kong and the Tongs in U.S. Chinatowns. 14 These studies claim Chinese crime groups such as the 14K, Sun Yee On, United Bamboo, Flying Dragons and Fuk Ching have formed a highly organized criminal underworld that preys on the silent and frightened Chinese masses. Other criminologists, however, question this description, particularly in relation to international drug trafficking. Dobinson, 15 for example, contends that the degree of organization of these groups has been greatly exaggerated. In this view, most Chinese drug traf- tickers are entrepreneurs who operate within flexible, adaptive networks that expand and contract in response to changing levels of opportunity and risk.

Law enforcement officials are, like criminologists, divided in their views of Chinese organized crime. Many U.S. officials, for example, view Chinese crime groups as similar to the Sicilian Mafia, whereas a number of police and customs officials in Hong Kong and other Asian cities view Triads as highly fractious and unstable organizations. According to senior Hong Kong police officials whom we interviewed, most investigations have failed to link international drug traffickers to Triad or other Chinese crime groups in the British colony.

In our opinion, neither the traditional model nor its alternative provide a viable framework for analyzing Chinese crime groups. Field research suggests these groups cannot be so easily classified. In our experience, Chinese crime groups range along a "continuum of organization". 16 As Bar low 17 has noted, there are degrees of organization. As pertaining to Chinese alien smuggling, the availability of both legal and illegal means of immigration to the U.S. and the strong market demand of would-be immigrants militate against the monopolization of this criminal activity, thus making it possible for a variety of groups to compete for market share. The concept of a continuum of organization allows us to examine and interpret Chinese alien smuggling from a broad perspective that encompasses a range of organization. We suggest there is considerable variation among Chinese crime groups: some are highly organized with extensive international connections, while others are loosely structured open systems. Some groups exhibit mixed characteristics.

Chinese illegal aliens

Until recently, Chinese alien smuggling, particularly to the U.S., was a rare event. But beginning with Deng Xiaoping's opening of China to trade in the


1980s, alien smuggling boomed. China's ongoing transition from a command economy to one that is market oriented has been dramatically successful, but increased productivity has displaced millions of workers. 18 Conservative estimates indicate that 260 million of China's nearly 900 million peasants, the world's largest rural population, are no longer needed on farms. 19 As many as 100 million of these redundant workers are on the road in search of jobs in towns and cities. Officially called liudong renkou, or "floating population", they comprise one of the largest peacetime migrations in history. 2~ In the coastal provinces, farm jobs that remain are being filled by desperate- ly poor peasants from China's interior, willing to work for next to nothing. The pressure of unemployment and personal debt, combined with abuse from venal officials, makes daily life increasingly difficult for growing numbers of Chinese. el Besides economic change, there have been political factors affect- ing the increase in alien smuggling as well. Following the Chinese government's violent suppression in 1989 of the student-led Democracy Movement, alien smuggling has flourished as never before.

Chinese alien smuggling is different from illegal migrations elsewhere in the world. For one thing, the INS estimates that more than 90% of Chinese aliens in the U.S. have come from Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian province, and its three adjacent counties. Such a large number of illegal aliens from such a geographically concentrated area is unprecedented in U.S. immigration history. Second, the most active smugglers are Taiwanese nationals. Despite the political tension between Beijing and Taipei, the Taiwanese were among the first and most aggressive investors in China during the 1980s. They nat- urally gravitated to their ancestral province of Fujian where they speak the same dialects and often have relatives. Thus it was only natural for Taiwanese smugglers to gravitate to Fuzhou and its environs to establish contacts and recruit clients. 22 Third, almost all Chinese aliens have relatives or friends in the U.S. who are willing to help finance either part or all of the expense of their journey. Indeed, as will be explained later, without such connections, alien smugglers are reluctant to accept a client unless the entire cost of the journey can be paid in full before embarkation. On the demand side, without a relative or friend in the U.S., few Chinese are willing to spend so much money to venture into the unknown.

An obvious question one might ask is, Why are most Chinese illegal aliens Fujianese? Why are they not, for example, Cantonese or Shanghainese? At least two factors have contributed to the exodus from Fujian. First, Fujian has a long history of sea-based smuggling, secret societies and out-migration. These traditions date to the 17th century when the Fujianese rebelled against the political domination of Manchurian rulers from the North who had overthrown the Ming rulers in 1644 and formed the Ching Dynasty. These troubles resulted


in massive emigration to Taiwan, Southeast Asia and, later, the Western hemisphere. In the U.S. today there are many Fujianese living in New York, Los Angeles and other major cities. Second, for young and restless Fujianese peasants, life in China offers meagre prospects. The push-and-pull factors in migration are often economic, and the China-U.S. relation may be seen, as Skeldon 23 has pointed out in relation to China-Hong Kong, as a case of rural-to-urban migration remarkable only because it takes place across a national boundary. A sense of economic marginality has compelled many young people to seek a better life in the "golden mountain", as the Chinese call the U.S. Their motives are summarized in the response of a 19-year-old informant from Fuzhou:

I was really bored in China. I couldn't get into college and that meant I had few opportunities to get a decent job. After I graduated from high school I stayed home most of the time. I ate four or five meals and took two naps every day. Many of my friends were like me. Coming to America is the best thing that has happened to me. Here I work hard and make a lot of money.

The operational features of Chinese alien smuggling

To understand Chinese alien smuggling, it is helpful to think of it as a business enterprise comprising a number of distinct operational stages. These include 1) establishing contacts, 2) screening clients, 3) preparing travel documents, 4) training clients for travel, 5) receiving and forwarding clients, and 6) collecting final payment.

Establishing contacts Smugglers, most of whom are Taiwanese, rarely recruit clients directly; their presence among the local population would most likely draw attention from Public Security Bureau officials. In most cases, therefore, the smugglers' local contacts, commonly called "snakeheads", act as booking agents for them. A snakehead's task basically involves organizing clients into small, highly-mobile groups; collecting deposits from them; and arranging copies of residence registration cards and passport photos for travel document prepa- ration.

Snakeheads at the grassroots level make the initial contact and then forward the names of potential clients to those at higher levels. There are a number of ways in which snakeheads and clients can establish contact, but it is usually the client who takes the initiative. Contacts are almost always made through one's social network, often among one's relatives. Most snakeheads work at the lower levels of this referral system with at best only a limited access to,


and knowledge of, the actual smuggling operations. Among those snakeheads whom we interviewed in Fuzhou, few were privy to the details of specific smuggling operations, and even fewer indicated they worked directly with contacts in the U.S.

While agreements are merely verbal, they are almost always honored. There are at least two reasons for this. First, most of those involved are either relatives or close friends, thus making it difficult for clients to breach an agreement. In this context, close personal ties usually insure compliance given the social and moral bonds among those involved; simply put, clients dare not breach their promise. Second, in those rare instances in which personal ties are insufficient to insure compliance, snakeheads can turn to street gangs to enforce agreements. The implied threat that such gangs pose to one's family or business is usually sufficient to compel payment.

Screening clients Recruiting clients is not difficult. Fujianese youth are eager to go to the U.S. where they believe there is plenty of money to be gained. And from their perspective they are right. By washing dishes in a Chinatown restaurant an illegal alien can easily earn $ 1,000 a month, which is more than the average yearly income in China. Given the vast disparity in per capita income between China and the U.S., the temptation to migrate is powerful. Thus there are always many more people who want to go to the U.S. than the smugglers can accommodate. Screening clients, therefore, is an important stage of the smuggling process.

Since all such agreements are unenforceable in court, snakeheads and smugglers seek to guarantee that final payment will be made once the client arrives in the U.S. Payment plans typically involve:

- an initial payment to cover the cost of producing travel documents; - a second payment, due before departure, to cover travel expenses, and

- a final payment due upon arrival in the U.S.

It is only after the final payment has been received that a smuggling group realizes a profit. (Snakeheads do not collect their share of the money until after clients have reached the U.S. and contacted their family in Fujian to inform them of their safe arrival.)

Since most clients are contacted initially by snakeheads at the grassroots, who in turn refer to higher-level snakeheads, it is the latter who ultimately bear the onus for delivery of the final payment. Thus higher-level snakeheads need to have confidence in their lower-level associates' judgment of a client's creditworthiness. The most favored clients are those whose families have sufficient funds in China to make full payment. Riskier are those clients whose families can afford only a token first payment but who promise that


their relatives in the U.S. will pay the balance. In such cases, snakeheads must rely on their judgment of the client's family. Somewhat to our surprise, we did not encounter one instance of a breached contract, although in a few cases final payment was somewhat delayed.

Preparing travel documents Chinese citizens must possess three documents in order to leave China legally: a passport, a visa issued by the country of destination, and an exit permit issued by the Public Security Bureau. The ability to obtain authentic travel documents distinguishes well-connected smuggling groups from amateurish ones.

Due to Fujian's notoriety in relation to alien smuggling, Beijing has ordered the provincial government to stop issuing passports to most private citizens. For a while, smugglers who used fishing boats or freighters to transport their clients to the U.S. dispensed with travel documents altogether since the routes were mostly by sea. But now few smugglers use ships to ferry aliens directly to the US. because of the well publicized interdictions by the U.S. Coast Guard. In China, forged travel documents, especially visas, are commonplace. Modem technology has improved the quality of fake documents to the point where it is increasingly difficult to recognize them without careful forensic analysis. Yet the risk of detection by U.S. and other immigration officials remains high, and the more frequent detection of fake documents at major airports has pushed smugglers in their efforts to obtain authentic ones.

Money and guanxi (connections) allow major smugglers to obtain authentic documents. When obtaining passports in Fujian Province became all but impossible except for those with impeccable guanxi, smugglers simply trav- eled to neighboring provinces such as Guangdong or Zhejian and bought them. Other smugglers have purchased stolen passports from other countries and required their clients to assume a different national identity. As for visas, capable smugglers can obtain authentic ones, while others rely on forgeries. A counterfeit visa, in practice usually an official stamp ("chop") in a passport, is more likely to pass Chinese immigration inspection than a forged passport. Further, illegal aliens know that once they touch U.S. soil they cannot be deported without a formal hearing. Nonetheless, for smugglers using complicated travel routes, the initial visa is usually for a Third World country such as Honduras or Panama where authentic visas are not difficult to obtain.

According to one of our informants, his smuggler was quite resourceful: not only did she obtain authentic Chinese passports and U.S. visas for her clients, but she also flew them directly from Hong Kong to New York:

We paid $ 3,000 for our visas and were told they were authentic B-2 visas that could be changed to another status once we got to the U.S. Our


passports also cost $ 3,000, but they were also real, even though they were issued from Guangdong Province. But who cares: The INS doesn't care who issued the passport as long as it is authentic. These days few would risk their money on fake documents.

With regard to exit permits, a smuggler can either purchase them from a cor- rupt official in the Public Security Bureau or pay a contact to escort his clients through Immigration. However, when a passport is bought in a province other than the one named in the applicant's residence registration card, it becomes more difficult to obtain an exit permit. (Under the Household Registration Regulations of 1958, every Chinese citizen is registered as a member of a hukou, a household. Persons who move illegally cannot register as residents and are thus denied access to legal employment and state facilities.)

Training clients for travel Prior to departure, all clients receive training to prepare them to handle situations that might occur during the trip. One of our informants from Fuzhou described such training:

During our stay in Guangzhou we had two days of training and a series of mock interviews. We rehearsed answers to questions a suspicious INS officer might ask at the airport. I gained a lot of confidence through this training and was prepared to deal with any problems that might come up.

Those carrying authentic documents are given intensive training to prepare them to answer questions from immigration officials regarding, for example, the purpose of their visit to the U.S., where they intend to stay, who they plan to see and so on. Should they be interrogated, clients are taught to say they had applied for and obtained all documents themselves. To make their "trip" to the U.S. look credible our informants often carried thousands of U.S. dollars and, always, a round-trip ticket.

Those with forged documents (or without documents of any kind, as in the case of boat people) are taught not to admit having come to the U.S. in order to earn a better living. Instead, they are taught to ask for political asylum. Following the suppression of the Democracy Movement, for example, Chinese aliens began to claim they had suffered political persecution as a justification for seeking political asylum in the U.S. Currently, China's one- child policy, with its frequent resort to forced abortion, is the most frequently cited reason. Under current U.S. law all asylum seekers entering U.S. territory are entitled to a hearing before a federal judge, a process that can take more than a year to complete.


Receiving and forwarding clients Whether traveling individually or in groups, Chinese aliens are not always escorted. Yet at each rendezvous there will always be someone waiting to take them to a way-station. Most journeys involve several rendezvous, each contracted out to local associates. Except for boat people, few smugglers transport clients in large numbers or assign members to escort them for an entire trip. Such caution and attention to detail suggests a high level of thought and planning. As one informant described:

We left Fuzhou for Guangzhou (in China), then on to Hong Kong. After we arrived in Hong Kong half of us flew to New York and the rest to Los Angeles. At every stop we were met by someone who would tell us what to do and where to go next. When we were in Guangzhou we had to be careful not to congregate and we pretended we were traveling alone. I heard stories that some smugglers were not careful and their clients were caught by the Public Security Bureau because they checked into a hotel at the same time, ate together, and even ordered food of the same price, just like a tour group.

Collecting final payment" News reports have described Chinatown street gangs using violence to extract final payment from recalcitrant clients, but our findings suggest violence typically occurs only when street gangs are themselves directly involved in the smuggling business. 24 Not coincidentally, street gangs have been associated with a number of ventures involving boat people, whom our informants consider to be high-risk clients. By contrast, our informants described their operations as small-scale (rarely exceeding 15 people per trip) and limited to carefully screened individuals.

The vast majority of smuggled aliens make final payment on arrival in the U.S. Those who do not, however, may be held hostage and even tortured until final payment is received. Although none of our informants had experienced this, they considered physical violence a not unreasonable consequence for non-payment. As one informant observed:

They (aliens) deserved the beating. We all know these smugglers are not good guys. You can't be soft (compassionate) in this business. How would you feel it someone defrauds you after all the work you've done for him? I know some people lied about their relatives' willingness to pay just to get on the boat; then they were beaten up when their relatives didn't come to get them. They were released only after their parents in China begged their U.S. relatives to help.


Most Chinese alien smuggling groups, however, typically do not have direct or extensive relations with Chinese street gangs. Such is the case with our informants. Yet one smuggler admitted:

Occasionally I will extract compliance from my clients by threatening to use gangs. If I suspect that someone might cheat me I'll tell him that if final payment is not delivered on arrival I'll have to call my friends in the "dark society". They (my clients) are new here (the U.S.) and can be easily fooled. I know people who have connections with gangs, but it's easier to get involved with them than it is to get rid of them. They are expensive to hire, and may even squeeze you out of business once you become entangled with them. They are also likely to attract attention from the police. Unless it's absolutely necessary, I won't touch gangs.

The structural features of Chinese alien smuggling

Our research suggests the existence of two major types of Chinese alien smuggling groups. The first, often with previous experience smuggling drags or other commodities, tend to be larger, better connected and more likely to engage in large-scale operations. As we have seen, however, the size of an operation does not necessarily equate with success. The many shiploads of Chinese aliens intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard in recent years, including the Golden Venture and Jin Yinn, demonstrate that large-scale operations often end in failure. These smuggling groups are deeply rooted in Chinese- American communities and have apparently forged alliances with ethnic Chinese crime groups in Hong Kong, Taiwan and other parts of the world. 25

Those within the second type of smuggling group are less committed to this line of work. All of them are involved in legitimate family businesses such as travel agencies and import/export companies. For them, alien smuggling is a sideline, or activity pursued in addition to their regular occupation. Moreover, since they are directly involved with only a few trusted associates, their activities are nearly invisible to outsiders. Except for core members, most relationships are temporary. Even among core members relationships tend to be episodic, falling dormant between operations. Although some of these groups eventually may evolve into more stable crime groups, most will not. One of our informants claimed she had a specific goal: to earn $1,000,000. Once that was achieved, she said, she would walk away from alien smuggling forever. "I love the money and the excitement but I don't want to push my luck. One day I may get caught and lose it all. That's why I only take cash and always invest (my profits) in my children's names."

As with legitimate business, however, the degree of organization largely reflects market demand, the scope of the operation and the history of the


group. Nevertheless, there seem to be a few characteristics that, to varying degrees, are common to all types of alien smuggling operations. These are role differentiation, limited hierarchy, restricted membership, dyadic communication and secrecy.

Role differentiation Chinese alien smuggling groups are characterized by a high degree of role differentiation. Those with well-established contacts in China's Public Secu- rity Bureau, for example, are recruited specifically to obtain passports; those with contacts in Immigration are recruited to accompany clients through ports of exit. These roles, which are clearly integral to an operation's success, are generally not interchangeable. Similarly, the acquisition of stolen passports and exit permits and the arrangement of domestic and international travel are carried out by people with special connections. Different roles are played by different people, and it is their specialized knowledge that legitimizes partic- ipants' continued involvement in the business. As one smuggler explained:

Why would you include people who are useless? The more people involved the less money for each one, and the more visible the operation becomes. You can't let too many people know what you are doing. On the other hand, you don't want to rely on one person for everything; he'll have too much control over the whole thing (the smuggling operation). And soon you'll be out of business. This is true in any business.

Although most smugglers try to develop multiple contacts for any given function, such relationships are difficult to establish and, once in place, are cultivated for as long as possible, for trust and confidence increase in measure with each successful operation.

Limited hierarchy Chinese alien smuggling groups are complex social networks comprising numerous, overlapping dyadic relationships. Some researchers have suggested Chinese crime groups are organized horizontally rather than vertically, but our research has found both forms of organization. 26 Every smuggling group has a small number of core members. According to our informants, core members are equal partners who share authority and profits alike. Each core member, in turn, has a small "staff" to help carry out specialized tasks. According to an INS official: "You have different 'bosses'. For example, you have the boss who controls the people (snakeheads) and the boss who controls the boats. Each boss contracts out his services to help bring aliens over (to the U.S.)." The greater experience of core members (the "bosses") increases their value, while those who provide lesser auxiliary functions (the "staff"),

CHINESE ALLEN SMUGGLING 13

such as messengers, couriers and drivers, have limited authority and receive limited rewards.

Restricted membership For safety's sake, membership is tightly restricted. Further, core members typically share a similar background. Once a core group is formed, recruitment of auxiliary members is largely dependent on the potential recruit's perceived affinity and ability to contribute to the smuggling group's operations.

The sharing of a common language and culture not only draws together people with similar beliefs, it also usually engenders greater levels of under- standing of goals and expectations. Yet none of our informants expressed a strong preference to work exclusively with Taiwanese or mainland Chinese smugglers, despite commonly acknowledged differences between these two communities stemming from more than 40 years of separation. The prevailing attitude is that alien smuggling is a business; the motive to make money is the shared goal that binds people together. When necessary, Chinese smugglers will even venture out of their own society to look for associates .27

Dyadic relationships and secrecy Dyadic relationships and secrecy are among the basic requirements for successful covert activity, legitimate or illegitimate. Initially, we assumed smugglers would be highly concemed to cover their trails in order to avoid detection by law enforcement officials. While this is undoubtedly the case, our research indicates that dyadic relationships and secrecy norms are adhered to mainly to protect business operations from potential competitors. Contacts are shielded, and communication is always one-on-one. As one of our informants stated:

In this business you have to be very careful. You have to protect yourself not so much from the police, but from those with whom you are doing business. Those snakeheads. . . All of them are sneaky and ready to stab you in the back. I use a different passport each trip (to China) to make it difficult for anyone to trace me. It's like a game. You can't let people know where you are and where you intend to stay. I have rarely stayed in the same hotel for two nights in a row. Once I am outside the U,S. I never call home; and I usually wait until I get to Hong Kong to schedule my meetings with my contacts in China through a rented mobile telephone. Sometimes I take a detour to Guangzhou or Shengzhen (cities near Hong Kong) to make calls from there.

The relative physical and cultural isolation of the Chinese community in the U.S. has led many smugglers to believe the chances of being apprehended by law enforcement officials are slim. Within their own community, however,


they face the danger of being forced out of business by their competitors. Thus secrecy norms and the avoidance of unnecessary entanglements with others in the business help to minimize risks.

Secrecy norms also apply to those who have been arrested. In the U.S. criminal justice system, silence confers obvious advantages to a guilty defendant. Beyond this truism, however, lies another compelling reason to keep one's mouth shut: according to INS officials, a number of deaths have occurred in the Chinese community as a result of suspicion that defendants have cooper- ated with government officials.

Conclusion

The structural and operational features of Chinese alien smuggling groups have served them well, as demonstrated by their obvious success in recent years. But our research also reveals that these groups are not invincible. We have found that communication breakdowns, rather than effective law enforcement, are the major reason why smuggling operations fail. The high value placed on dyadic relationships and secrecy means that the success of the entire operation depends, as in a chain reaction, on faithful performance at each stage. Several of our Chinese alien informants experienced delays, some as long as ten days, during which they did not know if or when they would be met and escorted to the next way-station. An INS official also described to us how a dozen Chinese aliens were once captured near the U.S.-Mexican border after a smuggler had failed to meet them as planned. After days without food or water, the exhausted aliens approached a roadside restaurant and begged for help. After rendering assistance, the owner then alerted the authorities. But it must be remembered that such breakdowns are the exception rather than the rule.

The same, unfortunately, cannot be said about the efforts of U.S. law enforcement, for the government's unfocused policies have failed to make much headway against this criminal activity. According to some observers, U.S. law enforcement has set its sights too low and has failed to recognize that Chinese crime groups do not begin and end with street gangs and Tongs. Yet even when realistic policies are proposed they often fail to materialize, leaving investigators unable to tackle alien smuggling even at the lowest echelons. A case in point is the proposal introduced by U.S. President Clinton just two weeks after the Golden Venture had run aground in New York in June, 1993. The Clinton plan comprised three parts. First, legislation would be introduced that would increase the penalties for alien smuggling from two to at least ten years; allow prosecutors to use the same racketeering statutes that have been used against other organized crime groups; and make it easier


to repatriate illegal aliens. Second, the U.S. Coast Guard would interdict ships used for alien smuggling while they are on the high seas, that is waters outside the territorial limits o f any nation. Returning would-be aliens before they had landed would, it was suggested, deter others. Third, law enforcement efforts would be strengthened by expanding investigative efforts. In President Clinton's words: "We will go after smugglers and their operations at the source."

Yet nearly three years later, the President 's plan has come to nothing. While his 1994 omnibus crime bill was passed by the U.S. Congress, the anti-smuggling legislation he had called for was dropped. "We're fight back where we started," was the conclusion of Jack Shaw, the assistant INS com- missioner for investigations. "The smugglers are carrying out their activities with impunity. ''2s The combinat ion of strong demand and weak enforcement makes it highly unlikely that Chinese alien smuggling will subside in the near future.

Notes

1. Willard H. Myers, Transnational Ethnic Chinese Organized Crime: A Global Challenge to the Security of the United States. Testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, April 21, 1994.

2. Marlow Hood, "The Taiwan Connection," The Los Angeles Times Magazine, (Sunday, Home Edition), October 9, 1994.

3. Jon Vagg, "I'he Borders of Crime: Hong Kong-China Cross-Border Criminal Activity," British Journal of Criminology, 1992 (32: 3), 310-328; Jon Vagg, "Sometimes a Crime: Illegal Immigration and Hong Kong," Crime & Delinquency, 1993 (39: 3), 355-372.

4. Marlow Hood, 'q'he Taiwan Connections," The Los Angeles Times Magazine, (Sunday, Home Edition), October 9, 1994.

5. John E Galliher, Criminology: Human Rights, Criminal Law and Crime (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989).

6. Donald R. Cressey, Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

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Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983); Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: The Eco- nomics of the Visible Hand (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1983).

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16. Frank Hagan, "The Organized Crime Continuum: A Further Specification of a New Conceptual Model," Criminal Justice Review, 1983 (8), 52-57; Dwight C. Smith, Jr., "Paragons, Pariahs and Pirates: A Spectrum-Based Theory of Enterprise," Crime & Delin- quency, 1980 (26), 358-386.

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1994 (67: 3), 335-355. 19. Anthony Kuhn and Lincoln Kaye, "Bursting at the Seams," Far Eastern Economic Review,

March 10, 1994. 20. James Tyson and Ann Tyson, Chinese Awakenings: Life Stories from the Unofficial China

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). 21. Lincoln Kaye, "Disorder under Heaven," Far Eastern Economic Review," June 9, 1994. 22. Marlow Hood, "The Taiwan Connection," The Los Angeles Times Magazine (Sunday,

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5, 1994; Antoine So., "Triad Trade in Illegals Reaps $ 3,5 Billion," Hongkong Standard, May 8, 1995.

25. Chris Dobson, "Invisible Hand of Evil Empire," Sunday Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 1, 1994; South China Morning Post, "Illegal Trade Big Business for Crime Syndicates," July 6, 1994.

26. David L. Carter, "International Organized Crime: Emerging Trends in Entrepreneurial Crime," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Chicago, 1994; Ian Dobinson, "Pinning a Tail on the Dragon: The Chinese and the International Heroin Trade," Crime & Delinquency, 1993 (39: 3), 373-384.

27. Chris Dobson, "Invisible Hand of Evil Empire," Sunday Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 1, 1994.

28. Marlow Hood, "The Taiwan Connection," The Los Angeles Times Magazine Sunday, Home Edition), October 9, 1994.

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