berti, enrico_ancient greek dialectic as expression of freedom of thought and speech_jhi, 39,...

8/9/2019 Berti, Enrico_Ancient Greek Dialectic as Expression of Freedom of Thought and Speech_JHI, 39, 3_1978_347-370

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Ancient Greek Dialectic as Expression of Freedom of Thought and SpeechAuthor(s): Enrico BertiSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1978), pp. 347-370Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709382 .Accessed: 23/02/2015 13:59

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348 ENRICO BERTI

freedom for Hegel means essentially self-consciousness, thought aboutthought, autonomy of the spirit confronted by nature,4 which ends byconferring a very general and almost tautological meaning on the rela-tion between philosophy's birth and the existence of freedom.

A more specific form of such a relation is assumed instead, and thisis the thesis I propose to illustrate, if by freedom we understand thatparticular form of freedom realized in a democratic constitution, andmore precisely, the form realized in the Athenian democracy of the fifthcentury B.C.; and by philosophy we understand that particular philoso-phy developed by the Sophists, Socrates, and the Socratics, includingamong the latter Plato and Aristotle, that is, a philosophy of a type notnaturalistic nor religious, but dialectical. That which agrees, in myopinion, with the establishing of a determinate relationship betweenpolitical freedom and philosophy, in the sense indicated, is preciselythat aspect of political freedom which is the freedom of thought andexpression, that is, what the Athenians called the equal right of speechin the public assembly (isegoria) and which had as its growth or, accord-ing to other opinions, its degeneration, in the faculty of saying anythingwhatsoever (parresia).

That freedom of speech was an essential aspect of Athenian democ-racy is amply attested above all by its supporters, e.g., Herodotus whoclaimed that the equal right of speech is the principal element of equalityof all citizens before the law (isonomia), which is the essence of thedemocratic regime.5 But it is also attested by its critics, e.g., Isocrateswho condemned this freedom by saying that equal rights had degeneratedinto verbal license (parresia),6 and by Plato, according to whom Athenswas the city in which free speech (exousia tou legein) was greater than

in all Greece, to the extent that Athens could be called the city in lovewith speech (philologos) or the city of many speeches (polylogos).7

Now, exactly the possibility of using this free speech, guaranteed bythe democratic regime, the possibility of influencing the government ofthe city by holding debates in the assembly and persuading other citizensto approve or reject specific proposed laws, created in fifth-centuryAthens that extraordinary demand for teachers in the arts of effectivespeech, that is, in rhetoric, from which the Sophist movement came to

ing change that has had scarcely any applications later on, even in modern democ-racies themselves exempt from slavery.

4 Hegel, op cit. and Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte,III, 527.

5 Herodotus V 78.6 Isocrates, Areopagiticos 20.7 Plato, Gorgias 461e; Laws 1 641e. On freedom in Greece, cf. also M. Pohlenz,

Griechische Freiheit (Heidelberg, 1955); D. Nestle, Eleutheria (Tiibingen, 1967),

and M. van Straaten, What did the Greeks mean by liberty? , Theta-Pi, 1 (1972),105-27.


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GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 349

life.8 In this sense there exists a precise connection between freedomof speech and that certain type of philosophy known as Sophistical. Sucha connection holds not only for the Sophists, but also runs into, thanksto the particular technique of discussions elaborated by the Sophistsand transmitted exactly with the name of dialectic, to philosopherssuch as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, viz., the major figures of Greekphilosophy.

Naturally I do not intend to maintain that a philosophical andcultural movement as complex as that of the Sophists, or also a succes-sion of philosophies as profound as those of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotleshould be derived entirely from the freedom of speech allowed byAthenian democracy. It is well known that the major Sophists had theirown particular conception of arete or human excellence. (It consisted,for example, for Protagoras in political virtue, that is, in the art of beinga good citizen, for Gorgias in rhetoric, that is, in the art of knowinghow to talk persuasively on any topic; for others in other virtues.) Allthese conceptions were associated with the idea that such a virtue wasteachable; hence the Sophists qualified themselves as essentially teachersof virtue, or of wisdom, and this idea was the chief motive that deter-mined the rise and expansion of their movement.9 All the more reasonwhy the same should hold for Socrates, for Plato, and for Aristotle.To limit ourselves only to the first, the only one of the three who wasthe contemporary of the first and most important generation of Sophists;we know that Socrates' philosophy arose from aspiring to a type of aretewhich, though also teachable, for him as it was for the Sophists, hadnothing to do with rhetoric or with freedom of speech and democracy,to certain aspects of which he was directly opposed.10

Nevertheless it seems to me undeniable that the freedom of speechassured by Athenian democracy was one of the causes which contributedto the rise of such philosophies. This holds true in both a negative andpositive sense. Freedom, in fact, insofar as it consists in the absenceof impediments or of external limitations, cannot by itself be the positivecause, that is, the sufficient cause determining an act. It is only a neces-

8Suffice to cite the classical work of H. Gomperz, Sophistic und Rhetoric

(Leipzig,1912).

9 For an adequate illustration of the conception of arete among the Sophists,cf. W. Jaeger, Paideia (2nd ed., Oxford, New York, 1945), vol. I, Bk. II, ch.III. For a recent reconstruction of the cultural background of the origins of the

Sophist movement, cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cam-bridge, 1969), vol. III, which considers H. Gomperz' thesis exaggerated when itclaims that the whole teaching of the Sophists is resumed in the art of rhetoric,though he recognizes nevertheless that this was a fundamental aspect of their

teaching (20, 24).10 Also for the Socratic conception of arete and for its analogies and differences

with respect to that of the Sophists, see also Jaeger, Paideia (New York, 1943),vol. II, Bk. III, Ch. II.




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sary condition, that is, without it no such action would be possible. Nowif, as we shall soon see, dialectic - and hence the philosophy of the

Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to the extent that they are

dialectical - presupposes the confrontation of opposing opinions, andif such confrontation is possible only where opposing opinions are freelyexpressed, we may then say that freedom of expression is the necessarycondition for the rise of dialectic and of all those philosophies that havea non-intuitive character, that is, a character neither revealed norinspired, but argumentative and hence dialectical.

Moreover, freedom of speech was the cause if not of the rise, at leastof the spread of rhetoric, of dialectic, and of the philosophy connected

with the latter in a positive sense too. It is generally recognized in factthat democracy in Athens created the need for citizens to learn the artof argumentation in order to win in the political discussions which tookplace in the Assembly. Now the Sophists at first, and the other philoso-phers later, came exactly to satisfy this need, and it is in this sense thatwe may say that democracy and the freedom of speech connected withit encouraged the development of rhetoric and dialectic.

However, before going into illustrations of this connection, it is

necessary to clear the ground of an objection that comes spontaneouslyconcerning the good relations between Athenian democracy and philoso-phy. In fact, Athens, and particularly democratic Athens, was the onlycity of ancient Greece that persecuted philosophers, putting them ontrial in a series of cases for impiety, culminating sometimes in sentencesof death or exile, in which cases the right to profess and express theiropinions freely was denied. The most famous victims of such trials were(1) Anaxagoras - who was tried according to some, about 432 B.C.,

according to others, two or three years later,12 hat is, during or immedi-

1 Sharing this opinion, Guthrie has also declared (op. cit., 19, 179): TheSophists were not the pioneers of rhetoric, but they were certainly ready to stepin and supply the demand for it which accompanied the development of personalfreedom all over Greece. Furthermore, as is noted by the same author (179, n.1), the only ones who have been indicated as the inventors of rhetoric-namely,the Sicilian Corax (according to Aristotle) and his pupil Tisias (according toPlato)--are said by Aristotle to have written the first treatises on this art after

the expulsion of tyrants from Sicily, that is, after the instauration of democracyand free speech (Aristotle, apud Cicero, Brutus xii, 46).

12 The date 432 B.C. is indicated-on the basis of Diodorus, xii, 38ff. andPlutarch, Pericles 82, who placed in this year the decree against impiety submittedby the soothsayer Diopitus-by E. Derenne, Les proces d'impiete intentes auxphilosophes a Athenes au Vme et au I Vme sicles avant J. C. (Liege & Paris, 1930),13-41. On the other hand, E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley& Los Angeles, 1951; Italian transl. [Florence, 1959], 230) tends to place thaidecree and hence the trial of Anaxagoras in 430, considering the trial as a result

of the emotions experienced in Athens during the pestilence, taken to be a sign ofdivine anger.




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ately after the rule of his friend Pericles - for having asserted thatthe sun was an incandescent stone larger than the Peloponnesus, andthat the moon was an earth; he was condemned to exile from Athens orperhaps directly given the death penalty; (2) Protagoras, who was tried(according to some between 416 and 415 B.C., according to others,earlier13) or having declared that it is impossible to know whether orno the gods exist, and he too was probably condemned to exile or todeath14; (3)Diagoras who was tried afterwards for having denied theexistence of the gods and for having performed deeds against theirworship, was forced also to leave Athens; (4) Socrates, tried on thecharge of having corrupted the youth and for having introduced newgods, was condemned to death in 399; (5) Aristotle, tried in 323, on thecharge of having deified Hermias, and compelled to leave Athens; andfinally, others like Theophrastus, Stilpo, the Megarian, Theodorus ofCyrene. Athens' persecution of philosophy may be said to have reachedits culmination in 306 with the famous edict, an act that was submittedby a certain Sophocles, which prohibited philosophers in general fromkeeping a school within the confines of the city.

However, before declaring that Athens denied philosophers freedom

of thought and expression, we need to understand the reasons for theso-called persecutions and consider their actual extension. Accordingto traditional opinion, professed by many who have always believedin freedom of thought and speech guaranteed by Athenian democracyto intellectuals, the laws which condemned impiety were voted becauseimpiety, due to the particular character of the ancient Greek religion,was considered harmful for the state and therefore for democracy itself.Greek religion, in fact, being free from dogmas and priests, was essen-

tially a product of a cult which considered itself as obligated to the godsin exchange for their protection of the State. Consequently, whoeverattacked religion or acted against the cult was regarded as if he hadattacked the country, that is, he was a sort of traitor. We need toconsider, furthermore, that, on the whole, trials for impiety were some-what rare on account of the particular legislation which did not providea public inquisition but only an accusation initiated by private persons(a propos of such persons, it is necessary besides to observe that theyoften acted for political or personal ends rather than religious ones).Moreover, people in effect were punished not for impious or atheistic

13The date 416-415 B.C. is indicated by Derenne, op. cit., 51-52, but is

incompatible with the presumed death of Protagoras in 420, cf. Guthrie, op, cit.,262.

14 Cf. Derenne, op. cit., 52-55 and Guthrie, op. cit., 263, who refer to the fact,on the basis of ancient testimony, that Protagoras probably died as a result of the

sinking of the ship on which he left Athens, following his condemnation. Guthrie,

however, like J. Burnet before him (Greek Philosophy, 1: Thales to Plato[London, 1914], 111 f.) considers this story dubious.




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opinions but for their propaganda. For this reason, the atheists whowere actually persecuted were very few in proportion to the greatnumbers of atheists who were in Athens at that time. It may be said,therefore, that, in fact, in Athens there existed a noteworthy freedomof thought, in any case very superior to what existed in all the otherGreek cities; and if Athens were the only city that condemned philoso-phers for impiety, this happened because it was the only city in whichthere existed philosophers free to speak. In Sparta, in fact, and in othercities, philosophers were not even admitted.15

According to a more recent view, however, trials for offenses to

religion, which were in Athens notoriously charged against intellectuals,struck not only at acts contrary to worship but actually at opinions them-selves, and were manifestations of a reaction against the so-called

enlightenment of the fifth century B.C. The reaction emerged duringthe last decade of that century through the influence of the soothsayerpriests who felt their prestige diminished, or more probably through thepsychosis caused by the Peloponnesian war tending to overstate thesolidarity of the polis with its gods, or finally through the degenerationof the enlightenment itself which in some disciples of the great Sophistshad led to justifying any arbitrary opinion whatsover.'6

In any case, even if this second explanation is accepted, whichhowever holds exclusively for trials occurring at the end of the fifthcentury, it must be admitted that the frequency of repressive inter-ventions reveals a constant tendency of the philosophers to take positionscounter to the most widespread views, which would not be possiblewithout a certain customary attitude to free speech that should beguaranteed by the particular form of Athenian government, at least in

the beginning. Moreover, the fact that the philosophers were the victimsand not the advocates of such interventions aimed at limiting free speechconfirms the connection existing between the type of philosophy professedby them and freedom of speech.

2. The birth of dialectic: Zeno of Elea, Protagoras, and Socrates.-In order to illustrate the connection of philosophy with free speech,practised in democratic Athens, it is necessary to examine the particularactivity of dialectic associated with philosophy or included in it or

identical with it. The term, that is, the adjective dialectic by meansof which a determinate activity or art or person practising it is described,is mentioned for the first time by Plato, but what we indicate as dialecticwas previously born surely in the fifth century B.C.17 The same Plato,

15 Derenne, 247 67; Finley, 29 85ff.16Cf. Dodds, 229-34. Guthrie (32-40) also maintains for such reasons as the

Sophists' foreign origin and easy economic fortune why the Athenian people lookedupon them unfavorably.

17 On the history of the term dialectic see L. Sichirollo, Dialegesthai-Dialektik.Von Homer bis Aristoteles (Hildesheim, 1966), 18-33.




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goras' time, others practised this same method within the sphere of thedialogue form, for example, Thucydides, the Sophist Antiphon, and aswe shall see, Socrates. It is even probable that such a procedure refersagain to those whom Plato and Aristotle considered the founders ofrhetoric, namely, the rhetoricians Tisias and Corax.22

Undoubtedly dialectic arose in close association with rhetoric, whichProtagoras taught as an instrument for acquiring skill in the governmentof the city, that is, in the political art, evidently successful in persuadingcitizens in the assembly.23 The difference between rhetoric and dialecticis perhaps indicated by the distinction between long argument (macro-logia) and short argument (micrologia), in both of which Protagoraswas said to have been skillful24; the short argument in fact consistsin interrogating and responding in a clenched dialogue.25 But it seemsthat Protagoras insisted in a particular way on the opposition betweenthe theses confronting each other in the dialogue. In fact, one of hismost famous works was entitled Antilogies, that is, exactly opposingarguments; whence the beginning of a literary tradition out of whichcame the work Dissoi logoi, i.e., double statements in the sense ofopposites.26 Now the opposition of arguments presupposes the existence

of conflicting opinions, and the possibility as well as necessity that theybe expressed, which assumes exactly freedom of thought and expression.

For this reason Protagoras' position is characterized in a quite dis-tinctive manner with respect to the position held by other Sophists,contemporary with him, and by other philosophers subsequent to him.In fact, Protagoras had a very high esteem of opinion (doxa) to whichhe always attributed a positive value. His well-known declaration that

all opinions are true 27 s a direct consequence of the other still more

famous affirmation according to which man is the measure of allthings. 28 This doctrine has a meaning which today we would callprofoundly democratic insofar as it acknowledges in all humans a certaindegree of wisdom, in particular political wisdom, that is, the capacityto judge about matters of common interest.29 Protagoras himself bestowed

22 Cf. Guthrie, 179-82.23 Plato, Protagoras 318c-319a. The political aspect of Greek dialectic has

been well-emphasized by E. Weil, Pensee dialectique et politique, Revue deMetaphysique et de Morale, 60(1955), 1-25.

24 Plato, Protagoras, 335b-e.25 Ibid., 329b.26 Ryle, 44-55; Sichirollo, 34-60.27 Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 166d ff.28 Diels-Kranz, 80 B 1.29 Protagoras' position here coincides with that of Pericles who in his famous

speech, reported by Thucydides, stated that only a few are able to govern but all

are able to judge how they are governed. Cf. Karl R. Popper, The Open Societyand Its Enemies (5th ed., London, 1969), I, 186.




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an explicitly political dimension, in a precisely democratic sense, on hisaffirmation, maintaining - if what Plato refers to him is true - that

whatever seems just and beautiful to each city is such for that city so

long as it deems it so. 30We ought not believe that this position was generally held by all

Sophists, because Protagoras was probably the only Sophist orientedpolitically in a democratic direction.31 And if it might be said in generalthat Athenian democracy, assuring freedom of speech, made possiblethe emergence of dialectic as a practical activity on a large scale andwas adopted by Sophists in their theorizing; we should add that in Prota-

goras not only did dialectic presuppose the possibility of free speech but

his democratic conception of dialectic amounts to constituting the bestjustification of this very freedom of speech. Since, in fact, all have thecapacity to judge political matters, it is right to extend to all the right tospeak.32 The condemnation of that right, therefore, that is, the prohibi-tion of freedom of speech imposed by democratic Athens on the philoso-pher, is all the more paradoxical insofar as he more than any otherdefended democracy and freedom of speech.

Nevertheless Protagoras' democratic idea of opposing opinions en-

tailed a serious inconvenience for his dialectic: if, in fact, all opinionsare true, then also opinions that contradict each other will be equallytrue. Actually, according to the testimony of Plato and Aristotle,Protagoras had denied the principle of noncontradiction.33 But, if thatprinciple is denied, it is no longer possible to refute any thesis, sincerefuting means showing the opposite thesis is false insofar as it is a contra-dictory one, i.e., it is in conflict with the principle of non-contradiction;thus the peculiar characteristic of dialectic, since the time of Zeno, of

being a method of refutation, is lost. It should follow, therefore, that ifProtagoras discovered the value of opinions for dialectic and hence forfreedom of speech, a thing neglected by Zeno, then Protagoras in histurn neglected the value for dialectic of the principle of non-contradictionand hence of refutation.

Socrates was the one who knew how to bring together the two require-ments of dialectic, namely, the value of opinions and of the principleof non-contradiction. As he appears in the early Platonic dialogues and

in the testimony of Xenophon and Aristotle, Socrates practised themethod of discussion by questions and answers.34 In this respect, as wehave noticed several times, Socrates was bound to appear in the eyes

30 Plato, Theaetetus 167a. 31 Cf. Finley, op. cit., 28.32 Ibid.33 Plato, Euthymedus, 236b-c; Artistotle, Metaphysics IV 4, 1007b 18-23.

34 That dialectic was also practised by the historical Socrates, and not solelyby the Socrates described by Plato, is established by the exact testimony of

Aristotle; he attributes to Socrates not only the use of inductive arguments (Meta-physics XIII 4, 1078b27-28) as a type of dialectical argument (cf. Topics I 12,




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of Athenians as not very different from the Sophists, and the proof isseen in the caricature of him drawn by Aristophanes' Clouds. The onlyappreciable external difference consisted in the fact that the Sophistshad themselves been paid for their teaching, but not Socrates. For therest he practiced the same method as that of the Sophists.35 On the otherhand, in the version of it given by Plato, the dialectical method practicedby Socrates achieves its technical perfection, shaping itself as puttingto work a whole series of logical procedures, among which the mostimportant is exactly the refutation (elenchos) or demonstration of theindefensibility of a specific opinion through the deduction from it ofconsequences contradicting itself or other opinions also professed bythe interlocutor.36

The original contribution brought by Socrates to Greek dialecticconsists in the different attitude he assumed towards Protagoras withrespect to opinion. For Protagoras in fact, as we have seen, all opinionsare true and it is the task of dialectic to make one or the other of themprevail, performing a work of positive persuasion analogous to what isproperly rhetoric. For Socrates, on the contrary, all opinions are assuch false, or better, may be true as well as false, that is to say, they lack

the character of necessary truth that belongs only to science (episteme)and consequently also, if by chance opinions are true, they are equallyinadequate.37 The task of dialectic, however, is not to serve an opinionby persuading an interlocutor of its truth, but on the contrary to serveknowledge by showing the interlocutor the inadequacy of the opinionshe professes, refuting them, or better, refuting their apparent certainty,their pretension of validity as knowledge, and thus bringing out therequirement of genuine knowledge.38 In this fashion Socratic dialectic

emancipates itself definitively from rhetoric and assumes an essentially

105 a 10-19), but also confirms the character of true dialectic as questioning with-out presumptuousness, by recalling the fact that Socrates questioned and declaredhis ignorance (Sophistici Elenchi, 34, 183 b 1-8).

35 Cf. Plato, Apology 19 a-d, recalling the very old charge against Socratesof inquiring into things below the earth and in the sky, trying to make theweaker argument appear the stronger, and teaching all this to others.

36 The best illustration of the Socratic dialectical procedure has been furnishedby R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953). For a philosophicalevaluation of this procedure in Socrates, cf. B. Weldenfels, Das Sokratische Fragen(Meisenheim a.G., 1961), and F. Chiereghin, Storiciti e originarieta nell'ideaplatonica (Padua, 1963).

37 In this regard, cf. Plato's entire Theaetetus. On account of its negative con-clusion, it has all the air of expounding Socrates' thought rather than Plato's,also because Plato's thought is expounded in the dialogues that follow, namely theSophist and the Statesman, to which the Theaetetus serves as an introduction.From this point of view the encounter between Socrates and Protagoras is also

significant.38 Cf. Chiereghin, op. cit., 41-92.




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to use Popper's phrase, that though Socrates was a critic of democracy,he expressed his criticism in a way that we would today define as demo-cratic, that is, by accepting the fundamental rules of democracy itself,namely, the free confrontation of opinions and hence the free exerciseof thought and speech. Of freedom of expression, we should rather saythat Socrates was not only a supporter but a downright martyr, becausehe testified with his life for the right of every person to profess his thoughtfreely, even when it led him to oppose authority and the constitutedpower.44

3. Dialectic as science in Plato. - With Plato we are in the presenceof the positive development of the Socratic conception of dialectic which

leads to the complete identification of dialectic with knowledge (episteme).Such an identification is in the beginning only asserted, and in a mannerfirst implicit and then explicit, while in the sequel it is given a founda-tion, and is finally actualized. In order to illustrate the Platonicconception of dialectic, as we would any other aspect of Plato's thought,it is necessary obviously to refer not to his early dialogues, which accord-ing to the most accredited interpretation express Socrates' position andare therefore called Socratic, but rather go to the dialogues of Plato's

riper, later years.45So far as dialectic is concerned, it takes on a central importance in

the Republic. A first hint of it is to be had actually in the Meno, in whichPlato declares that answering in a dialectical manner consists not onlyin answering with truth but also, and above all, in formulating the properreply by using terms to which the questioner admits he agrees.46 Buthere Plato is still tied to the Socratic model, in which dialectic has arelation with knowledge insofar as it must tell the truth, but what counts

more is agreement (homologia) with the interlocutor reached throughthe dialogue. In the Republic, on the other hand, dialectic appears essen-tially characterized by its coincidence with knowledge, that is, it isdirectly identified with the fourth segment of the line which representsthe different grades of knowing, that is, with the only true science,namely, intellectual understanding noesis), which, in differentiation romsuch pseudo-sciences as mathematics, is not confined to hypotheses, butrises above them by means of ideas to a non-hypothetical principle, the

idea of the Good, for the purpose of explaining the preceding hypotheses,

44Popper, 194, 306-13. On Socrates' political position, cf. the excellentstatus quaestionis produced by Guthrie, 410-15.

45 A thorough picture of the results of researches on the chronological orderof the Platonic dialogues is given by W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford,1951), 1-10. The result is that the following dialogues may be considered withcertainty to belong to the maturity and late years of Plato: Symposium, Phaedo,Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias,

Philebus, Laws, and also Epistle VII.46 Plato, Meno 75d.




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obtained result, which is not assured simply by coherence since thismight also belong to a false proposition. A hint of the true way toguarantee this truth is perhaps contained again in the Republic wherePlato asserts that dialectic reaches the first principle by passing throughrefutations of all kinds (did pdnton elenchon diexion) and by strivingto argue not according to opinion but according to reality (me katddoxan alla kat' ousian).52 This leads us to suppose that the propositionassumed as the principal one, in distinction from all others, is the onewhich resists refutation, and in order to discover which it is, needs exactlyto submit all others to continual refutation.

But the clear explanation and definitive acquisition of the procedureconstituting dialectic, with which to attain the non-hypothetical principle,can be found, in my opinion, in the dialogue Parmenides; it is, there-fore, far from being merely a game or logical exercise as some havemaintained, and comes to be the most important of Plato's dialecticaldialogues. In it the dialectical procedure is no longer identified with themethod of Socrates but with that of Zeno of Elea, or better still, with asynthesis of both, consisting of the application to intelligible realities,i.e., to universals discovered by Socrates, of the method of disproofdiscovered by Zeno and applied by him only to sensory reality or par-ticulars. This revival of the Zenonian idea of refutation which is distin-guished from the Sophistic one by virtue of the sharp demarcation be-tween knowledge and opinion, explains the scientific or logical charac-ter of Platonic dialectic and its thorough devaluation of opinion: it willalso entail, as we shall soon see, a rather hostile position taken againstfreedom of speech. Plato's method consists in not limiting itself tosubmitting a single hypothesis to refutation by deducing from it all the

consequences and examining whether they are self-contradictory orinconsistent with other assumed propositions, but - and this is thedecisive turn - in submitting to refutation also the hypothesis oppositeto the one assumed.53 If in fact the two opposed hypotheses are reallymutually contradictory, and one denies what the other affirms, the refuta-tion of one necessarily implies the truth of the other, a truth which isnot simply one of internal coherence or non-contradictoriness, but is anincontrovertible or irrefutable truth, obtained precisely by means of

refutation. In this manner dialectic leads to results rigorously scientific,

41-56, who, however, with equally good reason do not maintain that the positiveattainment of the non-hypothetical first principle is sufficiently explained.

52 Plato, Republic VII, 534 b, c. This passage renders totally inacceptable thesuppositions of many like Robinson, 172-77, who maintain that the guaranteeof the actual knowledge of the first principle is given, according to Plato, by asort of intuition; Robinson's interpretation has been subjected to a convincingcriticism

by Sayre, 51-54.53 Plato, Parmenides, 135e-136e.




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that is to say, coinciding fully with knowledge; rather knowledge itselfis characterized by its dialectical nature, i.e., by the incontrovertibleresult obtained by refutation.54

This same conception of dialectic, which is in profound continuitywith the Socratic method of refutation and constitutes its perfection, soto speak, is also found in the Sophist in which dialogue Sophistic isidentified in the last analysis with the art of refuting, with the clearexplanation that this art is, however, a noble Sophistic, which is exactlydialectic.55 But in this dialogue there is also present another conceptionof dialectic, showing itself already in the Phaedrus, namely, its identifica-ton with the putting together (synagoge) of many particular cases in

a single universal case (the Idea) and the division (diairesis) of thisuniversal into other universals, less extensive and more specific, containedin it.56 In fact, in the Sophist also, dialectic is identified with the art ofuniting and dividing ideas (genera and species) in the most correct way,viz., one which corresponds with reality.57 Whoever knows how to doit, evidently, possesses the knowledge of all things; this conception ofdialectic, therefore, is the consequence of its identification with knowl-edge, already affirmed in the Republic. The ultimate perfection of this

view of dialectic is achieved by Plato in the Philebus, in which it is madeclear that dialectic should bring together and divide, and determineexactly the number of ideas (genera and species) contained in a moreuniversal idea.58

-4 This characteristic of the methodology in the Parmenides has not hithertobeen adequately emphasized; on this matter, however, see my article Struttura esignificato del Parmenide di Platone, Giornale di Metafisica, 26(1971), 487-527

(reprintedin Studi aristotelici

[L'Aquila, 1975], 297-327).It must be

said,how-

ever, that though the theory of the dialectical procedure in the Parmenides is veryclearly presented, the results obtained by its application are anything but clearand undisputed, which explains the variety of interpretations the dialogue hasreceived. They range from the neoplatonic type of versions which acceptthe validity of all the hypotheses formulated on the One-cf. J. Wahl, Etude surle Parmenide de Platon (Paris, 1926); M. Wundt, Plato Parmenides (Stuttgart,1935); W. F. Lynch, An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through theParmenides (Georgetown University Press, 1959)-to those maintaining, on the

contrary, that the hypotheses are all invalid, and therefore tend to consider the

dialogue as an empty exercise of mental gymnastics or simply as a game-cf. A. E.Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work (London, 1924); Ross, op. cit., 82-99;Robinson, op. cit., 223-80. The most convincing interpretation, which distinguishesthe valid from the self-contradictory invalid hypotheses, seems to me to be byF. M. Cornford, Parmenides Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides (London, 1939).

55 Plato, Sophist 229e-231a. Of particular interest in this passage is the mannerin which Plato formulates the contradiction to which the adversary's position isreduced (230b), which is the same formulation that Aristotle was to give in his

Metaphysics, Bk. IV, in discussing the principle of non-contradiction.

56 Plato, Phaedrus 265d-266d.57 Plato, Sophist 253d, e. 58 Plato, Philebus 16c-6.




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famous statement in the Seventh Epistle, which if not by Plato surelyreflects a Platonic thought, according to which only after living togetherfor some time can a few friends, engaged in continuous discussions,discover and know the truth.65

In conclusion, however, it can be stated, that Plato in one respectoffers us an unprecedented valuation of dialectic, because he arrivesat its identification with the supreme science itself, namely, philosophy;but, on the other hand, he does restrict its exercise to philosophers alone,detaching it from and even setting it against freedom of expression, thataspect of democracy without which dialectic itself could not even arise.Freedom of expression, primarily the obligation to take a stand, to opposeand to refute, are in effect essential for the philosopher; the latter actually,insofar as he is a dialectician, in order to arrive at truth, needs to cometo account with an adversary, with opposition, with refutation. Under thisaspect the Platonic valuation of dialectic may also be considered as avaluation only within a limited circle of contrast and confrontationbetween opposing views.

4. Scientific and non-scientific dialectic in Aristotle. - With Aris-totle, Plato's pupil and ultimate representative of classical Greek

philosophy, which ended its cycle contemporaneously with freedom,that is, with the political independence and internal democracy of theGreek city-state, dialectic also arrives at its most complete developmentwhich is at the time a recapitulation of the most important of thepreceding stages.

In fact, Aristotle resumes above all the conception of dialectic thathad been inaugurated by Protagoras and which placed the dialecticalactivity essentially in the domain of opinions. In the treatise devoted

to this argument, generally constituting the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi,which Aristotle vaunted as the first works of their kind ever to have beenwritten,66 he declared he was furnishing a method with which to argueabout any problem whatsoever - hence not exclusively philosophicalproblems-taking up noteworthy opinions (endoxa) either for thepurpose of refuting a thesis unfolded by discussing the side taken by aquestioner, or to defend the side displayed by the respondent.67 Thetaking up of noteworthy opinions is what exactly distinguishes dialectical

argumentation whether of the scientific kind, properly called demonstra-tion, or of the eristic or sophistic kind; and noteworthy opinions weremeant to be opinions held by all, either by the majority of people or bythe learned; and among the latter either by all or by the majority orby the most well known and esteemed. Scientific demonstration, on theother hand, does not start from opinions, but from true and appropriate

65 Plato, Epistle VII, 341d-342a.66

Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi 34, 183b 16-184b7.67 Aristotle, Topics I 1, 100al-20; cf. also Sophistici Elenchi 34, 183a37-b15.




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principles, that is, from statements that should be true and self-evident,whereas eristic argumentation starts from premises that are only inappearance noteworthy, but in reality are not.68

With that Aristotle firmly established dialectic in the field of humanopinions, that is, in genuine opinion that is not science and not even analtogether arbitrary and subjective point of view, but is a position thatmust be taken into consideration because and only because it is actuallyprofessed by a certain number of persons.69 It is the same conceptionthat we have met in Protagoras with the sole difference that in Aristotledialectic is removed from forms of degeneration in the eristic sense(with the aim of prevailing in discussions by unfair means) which after

Protagoras it has experienced in the works of minor Sophists. On thebasis of this conception not only those who know and even those whoonly desire to know, but all men can be dialecticians. In fact, even onewho does not know a scientific subject is capable of putting to the testanother person, . . . thus everybody, including a person lacking compe-tence can exercise in some way dialectic and the art of putting a thesisto the test. The only difference between the common man and the trueand genuine dialectician rests on the fact that the former employs without

method the same activity that the latter exercises with argumentativeability.70

Accompanying this revaluation of common opinion, which for Aris-totle is not opposed to science, but is rather the place from which knowl-

edge draws its material,7' is a natural revaluation of rhetoric derivedby Aristotle from the positions of Protagoras. In fact, for Aristotlerhetoric is the counterpart antistrophos) of dialectic since both dealwith matters which in a certain way it is appropriate for all to know,

and do not belong to any special science, all participating in bothin a certain way, because all persons strive to put to the test or tosupport a particular thesis, or to defend themselves and to accuseothers.72 And, as in Protagoras, also in Aristotle, dialectic and rhetoricfind their most natural terrain of application in political life, wheredemocracy accepts the free confrontation of opinions: rhetoric in fact,says Aristotle, is like an offshoot of dialectic and of the treatment con-

cerning peoples' customs which is rightly called politics.73

68 Aristotle, Topics I 1, 100a27-O1 al.69 On this distinctive character of Aristotelian dialectic Sichirollo's Giusti-

ficazioni della dialletica in Aristotele, Studi Urbinati, 37 (1963), 65-114 and

279-313, has rightly insisted.70 Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi XI, 172a23-36.71 On the value of opinion in Aristotle, see L. M. Regis, L'opinion selon

Aristotle (Paris & Ottawa, 1935).72 Aristotle, Rhetoric I 1, 1354al-6. On the revaluation of rhetoric in Aristotle,

cf. C. A. Viano, Aristotele e la redenzione della retorica, Rivista di filosofia, 58

(1967), 371-425. 73Aristotle, Rhetoric I 2, 1356a25-26.




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done in judicial controversies80; r those statements in De Caelo aboutthe necessity of passing in review the opinions of others, because thedemonstration of a thesis is equivalent to the refutation of the oppositethesis.81

This second use of dialectic in Aristotle has long been misunderstoodby interpreters on account of the presupposition that the only logicadmitted by Aristotle was the narrowly demonstrative one theoreticallyexpounded in the Posterior Analytics, and therefore that any non-demonstrative argument would be automatically irrelevant to scientificknowledge.82 Only recently has it been seen that in Aristotle there existsalso a dialectic which is useful for science inasmuch as it is capableof preparing the road for the discovery of the principles of scientificknowledge, that is, a dialectic, shall we be permitted to say, of Socratictype.83

Finally, in Aristotle there exists also a third use of dialectic whichis not explicitly conceptualized, but is often practised; it has like thepreceding one a reference to science, in particular to that science suigeneris which is First Philosophy, the science of being qua being. How-ever, it deals with a more intrinsic matter in the sense that here dialectic

does not function any longer as a preliminary introduction, or pro-paedeutic, to true and primary knowledge, but constitutes its effectivemethod, its logical structure. This most well-known and most typicaluse of dialectic is the defense of the principle of non-contradiction,contained in the fourth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In it a true andgenuine demonstration is actually worked out, and therefore moveseffectively into the domain of knowledge; but the procedure employedis dialectic, because the demonstration consists in the refutation of the

denial of the principle of non-contradiction, i.e., of a thesis expressedby an absolutely indispensable questioner who is asked to take a standand in confronting it the inquiry is conducted exactly as in dialecticaldiscussion.84 This form of argument, different from what occurred in the

OIbid., III 1, 995a24-b4.81 De Caelo I, 10, 179a6-12.82 Sharing this opinion were, e.g., E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II,

2 (Leipzig, 19234), 242-45; H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, II, I(Tiibingen, 1900), 29; 0. Hamelin, Le systeme d'Aristote (Paris, 1920), 229; L.Robin, Aristote (Paris, 1944), 41-44.

83Cf. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et methode chez Aristote (Paris, 1939); E.Weil, La place de la logique dans la pensee aristotelicienne, Revue de me'ta-physique et de morale, 56 (1951), 283-315; P. Wilpert, Aristoteles und dieDialektik, Kant-Studien, 48 (1956-1957), 247-57; L. Lugarini, Dialettica efilosofia in Aristotele, II pensiero, 4 (1959), 48-69; W. Wieland, Das Problemder Prinzipienforschung und die aristotelische Physik, Kant-Studien, 52 (1960-1961), 206-19; G.L.E. Owen, 4 4Lo-vat r& OatvrLEva, Aristote et les problemes de

methode (Louvain-Paris, 1961), 83-103.84 Metaphysics IV 4, 1006all-26.




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preceding use of dialectic, does not precede that intuition of the principlebut follows it: all actually intuit the principle of non-contradiction, tothat extent it is true that all use it, but only the first philosopher, theone who investigates being as being, is able to discuss whether it is trueor false, and only this discussion furnishes the scientific demonstrationof the principle.85 Other examples of this use of dialectic could bedisplayed by the defense of philosophy contained in the Protrepticus,86or by the demonstration of the necessity of an unmoved mover in thetwelfth book of the Metaphysics, in which Aristotle also establishes athesis through the refutation of the contrary thesis.87

This third use of dialectic resumes in every respect the processconceptualized and realized by Plato in the Parmenides and may beconsidered, therefore, among the Aristotelian acquisitions of dialecticderived from Plato. It is evidently not within the reach of everyone butonly of the philosopher in the narrow sense, that is, the philosopher whoby virtue of his inquiring into being as such, has to question any certitudewhatever and adopts an integral and purely problematic attitude.

Another aspect of this third use of dialectic, also found in Plato,but understanding dialectic as classification of ideas rather than as

refutation, is the treatment that Aristotle achieves in various places ofhis Metaphysics and to which it may be said, this whole work is dedi-cated, viz., the nature of being qua being, and of its meanings - that isto say, the categories - of its attributes per se and of their opposites(one-many, identity-diversity), and of their many meanings (equal-unequal, similar-dissimilar), and other such questions.88 According toAristotle, the specific task of the first philosopher is to treat the ques-tions with which the dialecticians were previously occupied, namely,Plato and the other members of the Academy. The only difference, heemphasizes, between the method practised by the Platonists and themethod adopted by the first philosopher, that is by himself, is theconnection, established by the latter, between those concepts and sub-stances, namely, the consideration of them not as an independent reality

85Ibid., 3, 1005a19-b27. On the dialectical nature of this reasoning, see my

essay,L'unita del

saperein

Aristotele (Padova, 1965), and the article, II principiodi non contraddizione come criterio supremo di significanza nella Metafisicaaristotelica, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rendiconti della classe di scienzemorali, storiche e filologiche, serie VIII, 21 (1966), 224-52 (reprinted in Studiaristotelici, 61-88).

86Aristotle, Protrepticus, fr. 2 Ross. Cf. E. Berti, Aristotele. Esortazione allafilosofia (Padova, 1967), 45-47.

87 Metaphysics XII 6, Cf. E. Berti, La struttura logica della dimostrazionedell'atto puro in Aristotele, Scritti in onore di Carlo Giacon (Padova, 1972). 41-62

(reprintedin Studi

aristotelici, 143-57).88 See esp. Books IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and X of the Metaphysics.




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hypostatized and reified in the mode of Platonic ideas, but rather aspredicates or attributes of substance.89

None of the scholars of Aristotle's writings, so far as I know, hasuntil now paid enough attention to this metaphysical use of dialecticin Aristotle. If anyone, indeed, has affirmed the dialectic character ofAristotle's Metaphysics, he has still understood that character in anegative sense, as an expression of a lack of a scientific standard andhence lack of truth, as a failure, a checkmate.9 On the contrary, forAristotle the dialectical character of first philosophy is the expressionof a type of science which is different from that of the particular sciences,but no less rigorous on that account, and even more rigorous from a cer-tain viewpoint insofar as it is free from undemonstrated presuppositions.

After all, one might also bring under the third use of dialectic theclassification of animals by genera and species, so frequently practisedby Aristotle in his biological treatises. That the biologist should be inpossession of a particular form of development (paideia), which consistsprecisely in dialectic, is stated in the famous prologue to De partibusanimalium.91 Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the classificatorymethod practised by Aristotle in his biological writings, chiefly in his

Historia animalium, is of Platonic origin,92 though in the De partibusanimalium he explicitly criticizes and proposes to modify Plato's criterionof classification.93

In general, therefore, it may be said that Aristotle revises either thepre-Platonic conception of dialectic as distinct from knowledge or thePlatonic conception of dialectic as knowledge. For Aristotle, however,only the first is the true and proper dialectic whereas the secondre-enters in the uses of dialectic as a function of a particular science

or of first philosophy. It might be said, therefore, that in his conceptionof dialectic Aristotle is connected above all to Protagoras and to Socrates

although he differs from Protagoras by affirming the principle of non-

89Metaphysics IV, 2, 1004a31-b26. Cf. my article, La riduzione dei contrariin Aristotele, Zetesis. Bijdragen . . . aangeboden aan Prof. Dr. Emile de Strijcker(Antwerpen-Utrecht, 1973), 122-46 (reprinted in Studi aristotelici, 209-31).

90Cf. P. Aubenque, Le probleme de l'etre chez Aristote (Paris, 1962). Icriticized Aubenque's thesis in my article, La dialettica in Aristotele, L'atlualitadella problematica aristotelica. Atti del convegno franco-italiano su Aristotele(Padova, 5-8aprile 1967) (Padova, 1972), 33-80 (reprinled in Studi aristotelici,109-33); but cf. the article, Dimostrazione e metafisica in Aristotele, Studiaristotelici (1962), 41-45.

91On the Parts of Animals I, 1, 639al-12, on which see P. Aubenque, Science,culture et dialectique chez Aristote, Association G. Bude, Actes du Congres deLyon (Paris, 1960).

92 Cf. H. J. Kraemer, Grundbegriffe Akademischer Dialektik in den biolo-gischen Schriften von Aristoteles und Theophrast, Rheinisches Museum, 111

(1968), 293-333.93 On the Parts of Animals I, 2-3.




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contradiction, and hence by distinguishing between true and falseopinions; he differs from Socrates by affirming the autonomy of dialecticdistinct from science.94 Indeed, this last character confers on dialectic,according to Aristotle, a dignity which it did not have so long as it wasconfounded with Sophistics or with science. Aristotle accordingly pro-fesses a conception of political life much more favorable than the Platonicone with respect to what we today would call democracy and whichhe calls simply a form of constitutional government (politeia), char-acterized by the equal right of any citizen to participate in the governingpower and by the abolition of excessive economic inequality.95 Conse-quently, Aristotle is more favorable than Plato to freedom of expression,the prohibiting of which he considers peculiar to tyranny.96 However,it would be erroneous to make of Aristotle a democrat and defender offreedom of expression in the manner of Protagoras; whereas, in fact,Protagoras, as we have seen, admits no other value than opinion - andPlato opposed him by not admitting any value other than knowledge -Aristotle admits at times the value of opinion in the field of controversialpolitical life, and at times the value of knowledge in the field of theknowable which is that of philosophy. In politics, therefore, Aristotleaffirms the necessity of a dialectic of opinion that is not philosophicaland is, so to speak, democratic, whereas in philosophy he practises adialectic of truth about which it makes no sense to talk of democracy oranti-democracy.

The common character of these conceptions of freedom of expressionin relation to dialectic is the fact that such freedom is, yes, amply justified,no longer, however, as the right of a private individual in the full realiza-tion of his or her personality, but as the contribution of the individualto the realization of the common good of a political or scientific nature.

Such is the reason why Hegel, having indeed recognized the Greeks'discovery of freedom, affirmed that for the Greeks only some men werefree, whereas in the Christian-Germanic world it was understood for thefirst time that all men are free as such97; however, by the term Christian-Germanic Hegel means to refer essentially to modern philosophy,actually to his own philosophy.

The reference to Hegel, and more particularly the fact that he con-sidered his own philosophy as the most thorough expression of the freedom

94 Cf. Metaphysics XIII, 4, 1078b23-30, where Aristotle asserts that dialecticin Socrates was not yet strong enough not to need the awareness of essence, thatis, of knowledge.

95 Cf. the definition of citizen in Aristotle's Politics, III, 1, 1275a22-23, and

III, 13, 1283b42-1284al; the description of politeia in Politics IV, chaps. 7-9 and11 and his characterization of a mode-rate constitution , i.e., with moderate pos-session of wealth (ibid., IV, 11).

96 Aristotle, Politics V, 11, 1313a39-b16.97 Cf. footnote 1, above.




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of spirit, and at the same time conceived his philosophy as dialectical,may suggest a final consideration about the difference between the rela-

tionship of dialectic to freedom established in ancient Greek philosophyto that established in modern philosophy, in particular the Hegelian. TheHegelian conception of dialectic may be considered in fact still alive,given that it has been resumed by Marx and in general by contemporaryMarxism. The difference is all the more sharply defined: whereas indeed,as we have seen, ancient dialectic consists in a confrontation of opposingopinions to be resolved by means of free discussion, and presupposes asa necessary condition freedom of thought and speech, modern dialectics,whether Hegelian or Marxian, consists in an opposition not of opinionsfreely expressed but of moments of reality, spiritual and material, pre-destined to be resolved by means of a necessary process of unification.In Hegel, actually, the terms of dialectical opposition are, for example,the family and civil society whose points of view and rights are neces-sarily absorbed in and superseded by the State.98 In Marx, the terms ofopposition are capital and labor, whose points of view are equallypredestined to unification and resolution in the classless society.99 Thepoint of view or opinion of the family and of civil society in Hegel,like the viewpoints of capital and labor in Marx, have no right to beexpressed through a free and honest discussion but in the name ofdialectics must be necessarily superseded and suppressed. For this reasonmodem Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, instead of presupposing andguaranteeing freedom of thought and expression, leads rather to thedestruction of that freedom.

University of Padua. (Translated by Philip P. Wiener.)

98 G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, ? 157.99K. Marx, Das Kapital, Book 1. ch. 24 (at the end).

berti, enrico_ancient greek dialectic as expression of freedom of thought and speech_jhi, 39,...

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