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Atomic Maverick: Romania'snegotiations for nuclear technology,1964–1970Eliza Gheorghe aa Department of Politics and International Relations , University ofOxford , Oxford , UKPublished online: 22 Apr 2013.

To cite this article: Eliza Gheorghe (2013) Atomic Maverick: Romania's negotiations for nucleartechnology, 1964–1970, Cold War History, 13:3, 373-392, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2013.776542

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Atomic Maverick: Romania’snegotiations for nuclear technology,

1964–1970Eliza Gheorghe

Department of Politics and International Relations, Universityof Oxford, Oxford, UK

Romania’s courting of Western nuclear suppliers started during the JohnsonPresidency. Based on multi-archival research, this article argues that Romania’s

turn to the West stemmed fromMoscow’s reluctance to share its nuclear advanceswith Bucharest. It examines the strategy Romania employed to win over the

United States, namely acting as a messenger between Hanoi and Washington inthe Vietnam War. This article shows that Soviet pressures turned Bucharest, atleast temporarily, away from Western suppliers. This research adds to our

understanding of Romania’s political manoeuvring in the 1960s while alsothrowing light on the Washington’s and Moscow’s stances on proliferation.

Introduction

Romania’s nuclear acquisition strategy is an integral but understudied dimension of itsforeign policy.1 Bucharest’s quest for nuclear technology turned an otherwise minor

power into an international actor. Its negotiations for nuclear technology anchored

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

Eliza Gheorghe is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford, Department ofPolitics and International Relations. She is a graduate scholar at St Catherine’s College, University of

Oxford. She specialises in Cold War history, nuclear proliferation, intelligence history, and security studies.Email: eliza.gheorghe@politics.ox.ac.uk

1 For general accounts of Romania’s foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s, see: Deletant, ‘Tauntingthe Bear’, 495-507; Dragomir, ‘The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania during the second detente’,

111-134; Harrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians; 231-420; Linden, Communist Statesand International Change; Munteanu, ‘Communication Breakdown?’, 615-631; Munteanu, ‘When the

Levee Breaks,’ 43-61; Socor, ‘The Limits of National Independence in the Soviet Bloc’, 701-732;

Tismaneanu, Stalinism, 187-233.

Cold War History, 2013

Vol. 13, No. 3, 373–392, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2013.776542

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Romania into the arena of global politics, thus underlining the significance of nuclear

proliferation for Cold War international history. The aim of this article is to show,

using recently declassified documents from archives in Romania, the United States,

Canada, the United Kingdom, and France, how the communist leadership managed to

persuade its international partners to grant Romania dual-use nuclear technology.

Romania provides a telling example of how politics, to paraphrase Francis J. Gavin,

affects the spread of nuclear technology.2

In 1948, one year before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) instituted

an embargo on Western sensitive technologies to Eastern Europe,3 two special envoys,

named ‘Catuneanu’ and ‘Ionescu,’ had requested radioisotopes (radioactive cobalt)

from the United States’ Oak Ridge Isotopes Division for medical purposes. The US

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) rejected the 1948 request,4 but thirty years later, as a

result of Bucharest’s tireless political efforts, Romaniawas able to acquire the licenses for

a heavy water plant, a 14 MW TRIGA II research reactor and hot cells for plutonium

reprocessing.5 The United States continued to supply Romania with highly enriched

uranium (93% enrichment) for the TRIGA II reactor until the second half of the 1980s,

even after Nicolae Ceaus�escu, the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party

publicly declared that he possessed the ability to developnuclear weapons.6 Throughout

this period, the US Department of Energy provided Romania with 38 kg of highly

enriched uranium (HEU), a quantity that the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) deems sufficient for producing a nuclear bomb.7 Romania was, therefore, the

only country in the Soviet bloc with Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) nuclear

energy technology and Western plutonium reprocessing technology.8

2 Gavin, ‘Politics, History and the Ivory Tower’, 583.3 Schmid, ‘Nuclear Colonization’, 130.4 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division [LOC MSS], Vannevar Bush Papers, Folder: Carnegie

Institution of Washington, Box 21, ‘Letter from Robert Tumbleson to George T. Rose’, 30 June 1948.5 TRIGA is an acronym of Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics. LOC MSS, Glenn Seaborg

Papers, Folder: Romania, Box 736, ‘Agenda’, 30 September – 2 October 1969. International Atomic Energy

Agency [IAEA], Agreement concerning the Agency’s Assistance to Romania, December 1983, INFCIRC 307,available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc307.pdf; Hymans,

‘Assessing North Korean Intentions and Capacities’, 275-276.6 NARA, AAD, RG 59, CFPF, Telegram from Henry Kissinger to the US Embassy in Ottawa, 3 February

1976; Open Society Archive, Socor, Soviet-Romanian Programs, 18 November 1985.7Matthew Kroenig notes that the IAEA estimates that 8 kg of plutonium and 25 kg of weapons-grade

highly enriched uranium are sufficient for the construction of a nuclear device; Kroenig, Exporting theBomb, 11-12.

8 CANDU stands for Canada Deuterium Uranium, a type of pressurised heavy water reactor which usesdeuterium-oxide (heavy water) asmoderator and natural uranium fuel. This type of reactor was developed in

the 1950s and 1960s by the Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL) in partnership with the Hydro-ElectricPower Commission of Ontario, Canadian General Electric and a variety of other companies. Prior to its

nuclear deal with Romania, Canada supplied Pakistan and Indiawith reactor under aid commitments to thesecountries, and made unsuccessful bids to Finland and Argentina. Bratt, ‘CANDU’, 1; National Archives of

Canada [NCA], Record Group [RG] 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 2, ‘Memorandum from J.Warren to Jean-Luc

Pepin’, 12 November 1968.

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This article is the first account of Romania’s nuclear technology acquisitiontechniques, arguing that in its nuclear negotiations with the US in the late

1960s, Romania made itself politically relevant by developing the role of a ‘maverick’9

and occasionally that of intermediary in international conflicts. An example of this is

Romania’s mediation efforts in the Vietnam War. In his recent monograph on theVietnam War, James Hershberg points out that Romania’s mediation was an attempt

to improve its ties with the West and Washington specifically, for political andeconomic reasons.10 This article shows that Romania reaped rewards beyond the

realms of politics and economics: through politics, Bucharest achieved remarkablesuccesses in the nuclear arena as well. Analysing Romania’s nuclear cooperation withthe Western bloc through the lens of nuclear proliferation politics helps elucidate

Romania’s Cold War ‘independent foreign policy’ as well as East–West tradedynamics more generally.

Going on the market

The foundations for Romania’s nuclear program were set with the help of the SovietUnion. In the 1950s, Moscow was often ambivalent about sharing its technological

discoveries in the field of nuclear energy with its satellites. Bucharest, however,pressed for nuclear technology on the basis of bloc and ideological solidarity. Sonja

Schmid defines this technique as an alternation of ‘invoking Soviet “generosity” anddeploring Soviet “exploitation”.’11 As a result, in 1955 Romania obtained important

facilities that formed the backbone of its nuclear program, such as the VVER-2000 kWfission nuclear research reactor installed at Magurele, south of Bucharest, and a12.5MeV cyclotron.12 Around these facilities, the Romanians established the scientific

community that provided support to the political leadership on matters related toboth the civilian and the military programs.13 On the policy side, the State Committee

for Nuclear Energy, headed by Gheorghe Gaston Marin between 1955 and 1966,

9 The label ‘maverick’, which numerous policy-makers in the US used to describe Ceaus�escu, referredprimarily to his propensity to follow his own line in foreign affairs, which meant that Romania would

occasionally be at odds with the Soviet Union on international issues. This US perception emerged in thefirst half of the 1960s, but was accentuated by the Romanian reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

CREST, CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030017-8, Rumania: The Maverick Satellite, October 1968.10 Hershberg, Marigold, 639.11 Schmid, ‘Nuclear Colonization’, 128.12 Yanqiong and Jifeng, ‘Analysis of Soviet Technology Transfer’, 75; Izvestia, 2 August 1957.13 For example, in the 1950s, the Institute of Atomic Physics (IFA) established in 1956 in Magurele, and

led by Dr Horia Hulubei (a member of the Romanian Academy), was at the core of the Romanian nuclear

program. Other entities were added to this institutional infrastructure, such as the Stable Isotopes Instituteestablished in Cluj-Napoca in 1970 (as a regional branch of IFA), as well as the Institute for Nuclear

Technologies in Pites�ti, created in 1971 and renamed the Institute for Nuclear Energy Reactors in 1977.Purica, ‘Ionel I. Purica’, 9-10; National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives [CNSAS],

D13490/5, ‘List of Organizations and Positions of Special Importance for Maintaining Secrecy within the

Nuclear Program’, [undated, 1972], 26-27.

Cold War History 375

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coordinated the technical aspects of the nuclear program with the broader objectives

of the Romanian government.14 The most important political decisions rested with

Nicolae Ceaus�escu. However, in Ceaus�escu’s early years at the helm of power, the

course of nuclear negotiations was shaped by more senior leaders, like Prime Minister

Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who ensured a certain degree of continuity between Gheorghe

Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceaus�escu.15

Not only did Moscow help Bucharest launch their nuclear research program, but it

also whetted the Romanians’ appetite for nuclear weapons. In January 1962, the Soviet

leadership agreed to supply Romania with nuclear-tipped missiles, but it changed its

mind after the Cuban Missile Crisis episode.16 The Romanians kept prodding Moscow

to deliver the weapons, but the Soviets did not budge. For instance, during a meeting

on 7 September 1966 with Arvid I. Pel’she, Nicolae Ceaus�escu, the recently elected

Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU,

complained that the Soviets were ‘too secretive about things: energy plants, missiles,

the A-bomb!’17 Moreover, the Soviets were reluctant to share even their civilian

nuclear technology with the Romanians. Ceaus�escu pointed out the practices of

Western countries with which Romania was entering into negotiations for nuclear

technology, such as West Germany, France, Italy, or the United Kingdom: their

technology, once on the market, was no longer a secret. Ceaus�escu was willing to pay

for Soviet patents at the price charged on the global market.18 The USSR repeatedly

delayed the delivery of equipment and technology but never cancelled its 1955 nuclear

cooperation agreement with Romania, permanently keeping the actual creation of a

VVER-440 MW plant on the Olt River on the back-burner. Until 1989, the only

employees of the Olt nuclear plant were a director, an accountant, and a secretary.19

The strategy of ‘postponement without abrogation’ offered the Soviets a solid shield

against possible accusations of breaching the core principles of socialist

internationalism.20

Meanwhile, Western countries took Romania’s interest in their nuclear technology

as a manifestation of Bucharest’s independent, ‘maverick’ foreign policy. By the 1960s,

14 Gheorghe Gaston Marin was not only a prominent politician both under Gheorghiu-Dej and

Ceaus�escu, but he was also an engineer by training, having studied in Grenoble. He was occasionally atodds with the other top decision-makers, such as Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer and First Deputy

Prime Minister Alexandru Bırladeanu. Marin, In serviciul Romaniei lui Gheorghiu-Dej, 14.15 National Central Historical Archives [ANIC], Central Committee of the Romanian Communist

Party [CC RCP], Foreign Relations Section [FRS], 14/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between theRomanian Communist Party delegation, formed of Nicolae Ceaus�escu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Paul

Niculescu-Mizil, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union delegation, formed of Leonid Brezhnev,Alexei Kosygin, Yuri Andropov, Andrei Gromyko’, 17-18 March 1967, 66.

16 Opris�, Romania and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 514.17 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 113/1966, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and Arvid

Ianovich Pel’she’, 7 September 1966, 12.18 Idem.19 Purica, ‘Ionel I. Purica’, 11; Sobell, The Red Market, 150.20 Schmid, ‘Nuclear Colonization’, 128.

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Bucharest’s dissatisfaction with Moscow’s orders gave hope to the West that the

socialist bloc could be weakened through a ‘divide et impera’ tactic.21 In particular, the

US policy of differentiation stemmed from the hope that Romania would become the

‘enemy of the enemy’ vis-a-vis Moscow. Washington’s policy of rewarding states which

adopted an independent line in regards to Moscow influenced Bucharest’s nuclear

efforts significantly.

Moscow imposed one condition on the RCP with respect to Romania’s bourgeoning

economic relations with capitalist countries. This was, as Stalin had put it as early as

1946, “do not sell your soul to the Devil”, i.e. fend off any Western attempts to impose

political conditions in exchange for commercial ties, technology transfers, or loans.22

Despite the risks of Western interference in the internal affairs of its satellites, Moscow

greatly valued the political, strategic, and economic benefits that the socialist bloc could

extract from these ties to Western Europe. In 1966, Leonid Brezhnev, the Secretary

General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, agreed with Ceaus�escu that De

Gaulle’s position towards NATO and the US should be encouraged, since it would

weaken American influence in Europe and thus be beneficial to the socialist bloc.23

What exactly did Romania want from these international nuclear suppliers it was

courting? Bucharest preferred a natural uranium reactor, which the French and

Canadians used, while the Soviets, the US, and the UK offered an enriched uranium

plant.24 The Romanian preference for natural uranium reactors reflects both

Ceaus�escu’s desire to keep the nuclear option on the table and the economic logic of

his advisers. The economic rationale was based on the fact that a heavy water reactor,

using natural uranium, meant that Bucharest would not need supplies guaranteed by

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), since Romania had its own uranium

21NARA, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files [SNF], Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US 1964, ‘Memorandum

from Griffith Johnson, William Tyler to the Under Secretary’, June [unspecified] 1964; Foreign Relations ofthe United States [FRUS] Vol. XVII, ‘Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania’,

16 May 1966, 414-416.22 Stalin’s warning referred to American loans and technology. He advised the Romanian leadership to

take the loans if the Americans were offering, but he asked Gheorghiu-Dej not to allow the Americans “toimpose conditions on you, to damage your sovereignty.” ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, 28/1946, ‘Minutes of

the meeting between the leadership of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Soviet Union,[represented] by Joseph Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgy Malenkov, and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and

Teohari Georgescu’, 2-3 April 1946, 1-16. Later on, the same demand was made by Nikita Khrushchev,Stalin’s successor to the helm of Soviet power. ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, 28/1964, ‘Minutes of the

meeting of the Permanent Presidium of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party’, 1964, 75,quoted in Țaranu, Romania ın Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc, 180; ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 1/1965,

‘Minutes of the meeting between Romanian Ambassador Mihail Ros�ianu and Soviet Ambassador Denisov’,23 April 1965, 4.

23 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 5/1966, ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Permanent Presidium of the CentralCommittee [CC] of RCP’, 19 January 1966, 13; ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 72/1966, ‘Minutes of the meeting

between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and Leonid Brezhnev’, 11 May 1966, 23-25.24 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs [AFMAE], Eastern Europe, Romania, Folder 208,

‘Memorandum from Jean-Louis Pons, French Ambassador to Bucharest, to Maurice Couve de Murville,

Minister of Foreign Affairs’, 8 December 1966.

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deposits.25 On the security side, the natural uranium design appealed to Ceaus�escusince the IAEA safeguards system did not extend to heavy water plants at that time,

creating less foreign interference in Romanian’s nuclear program.26

‘Shopping around’

Between 1963 and 1968, Romania engaged in a flurry of negotiations for nucleartechnology from both East andWest, without making a firm commitment to any of the

potential partners. This phase, which the Canadians called Romania’s ‘shoppingaround,’ caused confusion inWestern capitals, as no one could tellwhat Bucharest’s next

step would be.27 The US and the UKwere its first stop. In late 1963, Sterling Cole, thenthe head of the IAEA, paid a visit to Romania. Gheorghe GastonMarin, the President ofRomania’s State Committee for Nuclear Energy, approached Cole about the possibility

of purchasing a 300 MW atomic power reactor from the United States, worth $75million.28 InApril 1964, after having left the IAEAand having discussed it privately with

Atomic EnergyCommissionChairmanDr. Glenn Seaborg29 andwith somemembers ofthe Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, Cole brought the matter to the

Department of State.30 Then, on 5May, the Romanians approached the Britishwith thesame request. The assessment of the Atomic Energy Commission Director of

International Affairs, who reported this development to the Department of State,stressed that ‘there would be a significant advantage to the United States if we permittedthe export of a US power reactor to a Soviet bloc country through the IAEA. Among

other factors, such a stepwould bolster considerably the prestige of the IAEA andwouldprovide an opportunity for the application of international safeguards in the Soviet

bloc’.31 Decisionmakers inWashington also feared the Romaniansmight opt for Britishtechnology if they did not get what they wanted from American nuclear suppliers.32

25 NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 1, ‘Telegram from G.T. Leaist to R.C. Wallace’, 19 January 1967;

LOC MSS, Glenn Seaborg Papers, Romania File, Box 736, ‘Minutes of the meeting with AmbassadorCorneliu Bogdan’, 11 April 1968.

26 NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 1, ‘Memorandum from G.M. Schuthe to F.M. Wanklyn’, 26 June1967.

27 NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 1, ‘Memorandum from Belgrade to the Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs’, 27 September 1966.

28 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum of conversation [memcon]between Sterling Cole and Llewellyn E. Thompson’, 6 April 1964.

29 Dr Glenn T. Seaborg, the co-discoverer of plutonium, for which he received the Nobel Prize inChemistry in 1951, was the chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission from 1961 until 1971.

Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, 497.30 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memcon between Sterling Cole and

Llewellyn E. Thompson’, 6 April 1964.31 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum for Charles W. Thomas from

A.A. Weils’, 5 May 1964.32 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum from Thomas C. Mann to Mr

George Ball’, 8 June 1964; NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum from

Griffith Johnson, William Tyler to the Under Secretary’, June [unspecified] 1964.

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To expedite the process, the RWP sent a delegation toWashington. On 18May 1964,

Gaston Marin visited the US to talk to Averell Harriman, who had played a significant

role in the post-World War II settlement regarding Romania.33 Gaston Marin touched

on the issue of Romanian–Soviet nuclear cooperation, rightly thinking that the US

would be worried about shipments of Romanian uranium to the USSR. He pointed

out that Romania had uranium which it preferred to put into ‘generating electric

power rather than in fissionable material’.34 Some members of the Johnson

administration took this statement at face value. The political implications of

Romania’s position on nuclear energy, especially in relation to the Soviet Union, gave

the State Department a good reason to support a nuclear deal with Romania: ‘The

Rumanians had been pursuing a policy of greater and greater independence from the

Soviet Union and of liberalization of her internal situation. She had been moving

toward closer relationships with the West and had demonstrated a desire to improve

relationships with the United States’.35 The view that Romania should be granted

nuclear technology for its independent foreign policy resonated well at the highest

level of the DOS, and with none other than Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Rusk’s support seems to have stemmed more from his conviction that Romania

was ‘different’ from other East European countries, rather than from informed

consultation with other American decision-makers. Rusk rejected evidence that

contradicted his assessment of Romania’s position on key international issues,

although his knowledge was rather limited.36 In April 1965, on the occasion of an

internal debate among top US officials on whether to transfer sensitive technology to

the Romanians, Rusk argued for ‘a policy of differentiation,’ similar to the US policy

toward Yugoslavia and Poland. He believed that Ceaus�escu’s ascent to power marked a

watershed in the history of Romanian communism, which could take Romania closer

to the West. On 11 August 1965, Rusk took the Romanian request to the Oval Office,

despite opposition from the State Department’s European specialists, who suggested

that the nuclear reactor purchase offer from the Romanians be shelved.37 With the

President briefed on the issue and with CoCom agreeing to sympathetically consider

requests for exceptions to the embargo on power reactors provided that IAEA

safeguards would apply, Romania’s efforts to obtain American nuclear technology

were now gaining momentum. The remaining obstacles the Americans envisaged

included public pressure, in the form of picketing, which could force private firms like

33 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 98/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and AverellHarriman’, 28 November 1967, 1-2.

34 FRUS, XVII, ‘Memcon between Gheorghe Gaston Marin and Averell Harriman’, 18 May 1964, 392.35 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum from John Trevithick for the

file’, 15 July 1964.36 FRUS, XVII, ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the Export Control Review Board’, 1 April 1965, 405-413.37 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum from Anthony M. Solomon

to Thomas C. Mann, Nuclear Reactor for Rumania’, 6 August 1965; NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder:

AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum from Thomas C. Mann to the President of the United States’, 11 August

1965.

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Westinghouse and General Electric to pull out of a deal with the Romanians. They also

feared competition from Western European countries.38

The Soviet Unionwas factored in as an obstacle, since it could prevent Romania from

importing Western technology. American policy-makers, however, quickly discarded

the possibility that Moscow would block a nuclear technology deal between Romania

andWestern suppliers. They dwelt a little longer on the potential benefitsMoscowcould

extract from a Romanian-Western deal, but not even those risks seemed to weigh too

heavily. The AEC officials showed little concern for a potential transfer of US

technology (a pressurised-water reactor) from Romania to the USSR, given that such

commercial technology was declassified and that Soviet pressurised-water reactors were

already operating. They placed their hopes in the reactor construction phase. Provided

the reactor was assembled and built by American specialists, then once sealed the

Romanians could not have access to the core because of irradiation dangers, and could

not, therefore, reverse-engineer the technology supplied by the US.39

A more serious danger resided in the dual-use of nuclear technology; the possibility

that Romania would divert its civilian program to military purposes. Surprisingly,

however, between 1964 and 1966, the security implications of such a transfer appear

only once in the internal deliberations of decision makers in Washington, despite the

fact that intelligence analysis pointed out that Romania had the capacity to ‘go

nuclear’.40 In August 1965, for the first time in the course of the negotiations, the

Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee pointed out that the US should elicit

an agreement from Romania that it would not manufacture nor accept a nuclear

weapon on its territory.41

Romania’s position towards nuclear weapons and proliferation was ambivalent at

best. On the one hand, it supported total disarmament, but on the other hand it

objected to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).42 The negotiations

on the international non-proliferation regime, in which Romania was actively trying

to prevent the creation of a ‘monopoly’ on nuclear weapons by nuclear powers,

raised a new raft of international diplomatic issues, most of which fall outside the

scope of the present article. However, there are a few points worth noting. The RCP’s

position on the spread of nuclear weapons was problematic for the Eastern bloc,

since Moscow and its junior allies were trying to put forward a common draft on the

38 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Chet

Holifield, John Conway, Anthony Solomon, Douglas MacArthur II, Gerald Tape, John Palfrey, CharlesThomas, John Hall, Myron Kratzer, Robert Slawson’, 30 August 1965.

39 Idem.40 R. Murray, ‘Problems of Nuclear Proliferation outside Europe’, December 7, 1964, DDRS, Doc. No.

CK3100281620, 1, quoted in Gavin, ‘Same As It Ever Was’, 17.41 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Chet

Holifield, John Conway, Anthony Solomon, Douglas MacArthur II, Gerald Tape, John Palfrey, CharlesThomas, John Hall, Myron Kratzer, Robert Slawson’, 30 August 1965.

42 ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, 30/1967, ‘Report on Romania’s Position on Nuclear Non-Proliferation,

in response to the Draft Treaty sent by the Soviet Union’, 4 March 1967, 8-26.

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NPT but were confronted with Bucharest’s obstinate opposition. Władysław

Gomułka, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, accused the

Romanians of ‘deliberately linking nuclear non-proliferation with proposals that they

knew would be unacceptable, i.e. “universal total disarmament”’43 so as to block the

NPT. Romania’s calls for total disarmament could be used as evidence to persuade

the West that the RCP was not a proliferation risk. Moreover, by refusing to toe the

Soviet line on the NPT, Romania could maintain its aura of ‘independence’.

The Romanians disclosed their actual reasons for opposing the NPT only to their

Soviet counterparts. Ion Gheorghe Maurer showed that by signing the NPT,

Romania would self-evidently tie its own hands, giving up the possibility to acquire a

nuclear weapon in the future.44 No Western document found so far notes that

Bucharest’s opposition to the NPT stemmed from its desire to keep the nuclear

military option open.Despite this slip, US legislation restricted nuclear trade with Romania on national

security grounds. The US Export Control Act of 1947 provided for the denial of a

license where ‘the President shall determine that such export makes a significant

contribution of the military and economic potential of such nation or nations which

would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States’.45

The main obstacle in this respect, as Ceaus�escu himself admitted, was Vietnam,46

because Romania supported the North Vietnamese with substantial political,

economic, and military assistance. In the political arena, the Romanians condemned

the US aggression against Vietnam in international forums such as the UN General

Assembly, organised rallies in Bucharest to protest against US bombings in Vietnam,

and tried to influence other countries to support North Vietnam’s position.47

Regarding economic aid, the RCP sent food, clothing, and strategic materials, like

gasoline and other petroleum products.48 The RCP provided hundreds of Vietnamese

engineers, workers, and students with training in Romania, covering all their

expenses.49 Romanian military aid to Vietnam included heavy weaponry such as

Soviet-made torpedoes, and logistical equipment, for example mobile power

generators.50 Propping up the North Vietnamese automatically put Romania on an

43 Selvage, The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 18.44 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 14/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between the Romanian Communist Party

delegation, formed of Nicolae Ceaus�escu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, and theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union delegation, formed of Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, Yuri

Andropov, Andrei Gromyko’, 17-18 March 1967, 66.45 FRUS, IX, ‘Report of the President’s Task Force on Foreign Economic Policy’, undated, 473.46 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 6/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and US

Ambassador Richard H Davis’, 31 January 1967, 5.47 ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, 188/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Romulus Ioan Budura and

Ho Tu Truc’, Top Secret, 21 December 1967, 40-50.48 FRUS, XVII, ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the Export Control Review Board’, 1 April 1965, 406.49 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 187/1966, ‘Note from the Foreign Relations Section’, 10 August 1966, 21-31.50 ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, 48/1967, ‘Note from the Ministry of the Armed Forces to Nicolae

Ceaus�escu’, No. 001060, Top Secret, 28 March 1967, 30-31.

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embargo list regarding transfers of sensitive technology, including nuclear reactors.With the Vietnam issue in the way, Romania had little chance of success in its pursuit

of Western nuclear technology. Bucharest nevertheless came up with an innovativeapproach: contributing to the resolution of the Vietnam War by mediating between

the Americans and the Vietnamese. The Romanians’ inventiveness helped themremain relevant in a context in which the ‘maverick’ image was no longer enough.

Peace for atoms

The Romanians sensed that the intermediary role they could play between the NorthVietnamese and the Americans might get them enough support from the US executivebranch to allow the Johnson administration to make an exception for Romania from

the provisions of the Export Control Act. However, Bucharest moved at a surprisinglyslow pace on this idea. The US had been probing Bucharest for clues on Vietnam since

the fall of 1965. On 14 October, Dean Rusk nudged his Romanian counterpart,Corneliu Manescu, towards the possibility of Romania mediating between the warring

parties of the Vietnam War: ‘if anyone is entitled to thinking of a role which couldpeacefully solve the Vietnamese issue, then Romania may come to mind’. Rusk asked

the Romanian government ‘not to be deaf to certain significant elements in theevolution of the situation and when it notices a key signal from the Vietnamese, not to

block it’.51 The Romanians refused to relay any messages. The RCP continued tosupply North Vietnam with aid, to the displeasure of the Johnson administration,which naturally avoided pushing the nuclear deal forward.52

Washington tried to convey its message through various other channels in WesternEurope and in the socialist camp. Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and to a small extent,

also Czechoslovakia, played an intermediary role in the Vietnam War, alongside theefforts of the Soviets, French, British, Canadians, and Italians.53 Bucharest’s slow

reaction reflected the state of uncertainty about its nuclear program. From late 1965 tolate 1966, Romania limited itself to applying pressure on the US to boost trade with

Romania and give the go-ahead for the transfer of nuclear technology, without takingany concrete actions to provide Washington with what it wanted. Although theAmericans made several attempts to use the Romanian channel to reach the

Vietnamese, the Romanians resisted.

51 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 4/1965, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Emil Bodnaras� and the ChineseAmbassador to Bucharest, Liu Phan’, 28 October 1965, 227.

52 NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum from Anthony M. Solomonto Thomas C. Mann, Nuclear Reactor for Rumania’, 6 August 1965; NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder:

AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum from Thomas C. Mann to the President of the United States’, 11August1965; NARA, RG 59, SNF, Box 3069, Folder: AE 1-1 Rum-US, ‘Memorandum of Conversation between

Harry Jones, Price Longstreet, and Russell Arthur’, 19 January 1966.53 Nuti, ‘The Center-Left Government’, 259-278; Goscha and Vaısse, La guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe;

Hershberg, Marigold; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 96-107; Journoud, De Gaulle et le

Vietnam; Szoke, ‘Delusion or Reality?’, 119-180.

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In late 1966 and early 1967, a ‘mediator-in-denial’ phase ensued. The Romanians,

seeing that nuclear negotiations were not getting anywhere, started hinting to the

Americans that talks with the Vietnamese would start soon. However they insisted this

was their own assessment and that they were not acting as third-party mediators in the

conflict. Behind closed doors, the Romanians, taking cue from the Soviets,54 urged the

Vietnamese to adopt the strategy Moscow preferred too: negotiating while fighting.55

The Romanians stopped short of making their preference for negotiations public, as

they did not want to appear not to be supporting ‘the heroic struggle’ of the North

Vietnamese and encouraging capitulation, which is how some Eastern European

leaders, like Tito and Gomułka, were seen by the Vietnamese and the Chinese.56

The risks of hinting to the Americans that there was room for negotiations with

the Vietnamese were still considerable, as the leadership in Bucharest could be

accused of intervening in the internal affairs of the VWP, of misrepresenting their

position and ultimately, of selling them out. What was worse, the subtlety with which

the Romanians operated, which was meant to shield them from such accusations,

confused the Americans. On 22 October, just a few weeks after a high-level meeting

in Hanoi between the Romanian delegation led by Maurer and Pham Van Dong,

Manescu met with Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, who asked the

Romanian official ‘for an indication as to what North Vietnam would do in response

to a prior cessation of bombing by the US’, through ‘your good-offices’.57 On the

same day, the Italian Ambassador to Washington, D.C., Sergio Fenoaltea, told

Katzenbach that the Romanian Ambassador to Rome informed the Italians that ‘the

Romanian [government] had concluded that if the US were to suspend [the]

bombing of Vietnam, a concrete response from the North Vietnamese would not be

lacking’. This statement was too vague for the Americans, who, according to

Department of State records, ‘showed some scepticism’. Katzenbach insisted that the

54 Romania’s position on Vietnam evolved from numerous consultations with top Soviet decision-makers, who repeatedly urged the Romanians to assume the role of mediator between Washington and

Hanoi. ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 9/1965, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Emil Bodnaras� and Mikhail Suslov’,10 May 1965, 39-45; ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 72/1966, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu

and Leonid Brezhnev’, 10-13 May 1966, 157. In late 1967, Ceaus�escu admitted to Brezhnev that ‘ourposition on Vietnam is the same as yours.’ ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 101/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting

between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and Leonid Brezhnev’, 14-15 December 1966, 23.55 The CPSU leadership told the Vietnamese Workers’ Party delegation that “if necessary, negotiations

could be dragged on for a long time, meanwhile the Vietnamese could strengthen their position and exposethe Americans’ real intentions.” ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 118/1966, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae

Ceaus�escu and Soviet Ambassador A.V. Basov’, 19 September 1966, 1-7; ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 119/1966,‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and the Vietnamese delegation led by Le Thanh Nghi’,

21 September 1966, 13-17; ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 127/1966, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Ion GheorgheMaurer, and Paul Niculescu Mizil and Pham Van Dong’, 3-4 October 1966, 28-29.

56 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 127/1966, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Ion Gheorghe Maurer, and PaulNiculescu Mizil and Pham Van Dong’, 3-4 October 1966, 25.

57 USUN New York 1777 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 22 October 1966, Refs: USUN’s 1764 and

Deptel 69440, published in Herring, The Secret Diplomacy, 773-774.

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Romanians be pushed hard for more information and be made aware that this was

‘not a game’.58

The Romanians tried again on 23 January, when the US Ambassador to Bucharest

Richard Davis went for the annual bear hunt with Foreign Minister Manescu and Chivu

Stoica, who was the President of the State Council at the time. On the way back to

Bucharest, the twoRomanianofficials toldDavis that they ‘werenowgivinghim the ‘signal’

which the Americans had been waiting for from Hanoi’, but later on Manescu admitted

that he had no specific knowledge of this signal.59 It is possible that the Romanians acted

again without a mandate from the North Vietnamese, so as to win over the Americans.

Manescu’s exchange with Davis prompted a meeting between the American

Ambassador and Ceaus�escu on 31 January 1967, in which Davis sought to elucidate the

willingness of the Vietnamese to enter talks. The RCP Secretary General took the

opportunity to press for closer economic ties between the US and Romania, pointing

out that although the VietnamWar was an obstacle, Romaniawas working hard to solve

the conflict. He told the American Ambassador that Hanoi ‘does not wish to have

intermediaries but would like to talk directly with you’. Ceaus�escu applied the

‘mediator-in-denial’ approach: he agreed to relay the message that Washington wanted

to talk to the leadership in Hanoi, but then quickly added that doing so did not mean

that Romania wanted to be a mediator between Hanoi and Washington.60 Ceaus�escu

was reluctant to officially accept the role of mediator between the Americans and the

North Vietnamese because he did not have a mandate from the VWP and because he

feared the reaction of the Chinese. Contrary to the popular view that third-party

mediators are neutral and impartial, Ceaus�escu admitted that no intermediary gets

involved in negotiations without a vested interest.61

A meeting between the Romanian and Soviet leaderships in March 1967 sheds light on

the turning point in Romania’s efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear technology. The

Romanians made their nuclear intentions clearer than ever. Prime Minister Maurer told

Brezhnev that Romaniawould try tomake a nuclear bomb if it had the necessarymeans to

do so.62 Acquiring civilian capabilities was therefore the first step towards a military

program. Subsequently, the Romanian communist leadership set out on a more coherent

58 FRUS, IV, ‘Memcon between Acting Secretary (Under Secretary of State) Nicholas Katzenbach,Robert H. Miller, Viet-Nam Working Group and Italian Ambassador Sergio Finoaltea [sic]’, Washington,

22 October 1966, 767-769.59 Herring, The Secret Diplomacy, 775-777.60 Davis also asked Ceaus�escu to let Washington know what Hanoi would do if the US were to cease

bombings. Ceaus�escu replied that there cannot be any guarantees for a certain gesture from the North

Vietnamese if the US stopped the bombings. ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 6/1967, ‘Minutes of the meetingbetween Nicolae Ceaus�escu and US Ambassador Richard Davis’, 31 January 1967, 5, 10, 11, 12.

61 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 6/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and USAmbassador Richard Davis’, 31 January 1967, 11.

62 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 14/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between the Romanian Communist Partydelegation, formed of Nicolae Ceaus�escu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, and the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union delegation, formed of Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, Yuri

Andropov, Andrei Gromyko’, 17-18 March 1967, 66.

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path in its nuclear technology acquisition strategy. The meeting of the Executive

Committee of the RCP on 17 October established that the CANDU reactor was the

preferred technology and that talks with the Americans should continue with a view to

obtaining licenses for a facility that could produce the heavywater needed for the CANDU

reactor.63 At this stage, the technology the RCP wanted to buy from the Canadians was

completely at oddswith the state of developmentof theRomaniannuclear program,which

had no coherent financial planning, a weak technological base, and poor infrastructure.The preference for CANDU posed yet another difficulty: Washington still had to give

its authorisation for the transfer of heavy water production technology.64 Romania’s

support for the North Vietnamese remained the biggest obstacle for Bucharest’s efforts

to obtain Washington’s approval of the nuclear technology transfers from Canada and

from US companies, because of the Export Control Act. Therefore, as soon as the

Permanent Presidium of the RCP settled on CANDU, the communist leadership in

Bucharest left behind its prior reservations about not having a mandate from the North

Vietnamese and became involved in the mediation process, hoping that by solving it,

Romania would then receive the support it needed from Washington. On 25 October,

Maurer called in Davis, to discuss the Vietnam issue.65

A flurry of messages and high-level meetings ensued. According to George Herring,

Washington viewed the Romanian mediation as the most promising yet undertaken,

calling it PACKERS (for the American football team, the Green Bay Packers) because,

as the State Department’s executive secretary, Benjamin Read, commented, ‘it looked

like a winner’.66 The Johnson administration responded to Romania’s availability

to play the mediator role by dispatching Averell Harriman to Bucharest, where on

28 November he met with Maurer and Ceaus�escu. Ceaus�escu did not miss the

opportunity to point out the potential for economic cooperation between the two

countries and to re-state his position on tighter commercial ties, which included the

heavy water production facility deal.67 Although the Romanians initially brought no

63 ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, 147/1967, ‘Meeting of the Executive Committee of the RCP’, 31 October

1967, 35-40.64 Canadian records show that as early as January 1967 Canadian General Electric forwarded the

Romanian enquiry to the Canadian branch of the heavy water company Lummus, but thought it wasunlikely that the US parent of Lummus would pursue it. Later on, in March 1968, the Canadians expected

fierce opposition from other Western countries on the issue of the heavy water production technology thatRomania was requesting from Canada. The problem was that the government in Ottawa did not possess

exclusive control over said technology. NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 1, ‘Memorandum from G.T.Leaist to R.C. Wallace’, 19 January 1967; NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 1, ‘Report on nuclear power

– Romania’, 12 March 1968.65 Herring, The Secret Diplomacy, 780.66 Idem, 523.67 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 98/1967, ‘Minutes of conversation between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and Averell

Harriman, Bucharest’, 28 November 1967, 4; LOC MSS, Averell Harriman Papers, Box 498, ‘Minutes ofconversation between Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Averell Harriman’, 29 November 1967; Public Record

Office [PRO], FCO 15/546, ‘Telegram from the British Embassy in Bucharest about Mr Averell Harriman’s

visit to Bucharest’, 7 December 1967.

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new messages from the Vietnamese, they subsequently embarked on shuttle diplomacy

between Washington, Hanoi, Moscow, Beijing, and Bucharest. This December 1967 to

January 1968 peace initiative gave hope to the Americans that direct talks with Hanoi

would start soon.68

In addition to advancing their own interests, these mediation efforts allowed the

Romanians to make a valuable contribution to the Vietnamese cause. The political

leadership in Bucharest knew that while talking about peace negotiations, Hanoi

was preparing to deal a powerful blow to the US, which became known as the Tet

Offensive.69 Bucharest’s collusionwith Hanoi confirmsHerring’s intuition that ‘what the

United States viewed as themostpromising peace initiativemaywell have been the least’.70

Herring suggests that the PACKERS peace move was meant to lull the Americans into a

false sense of security and to increase internal and international pressures for negotiations

on the eve of the military blow to be delivered by the Tet offensive. The Romanians

knowingly facilitated the Vietnamese strategy of fighting while negotiating, allowing the

Vietnamese to get some small concessions, like the reduced bombing around Hanoi and

Haiphong when the Romanian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister George

Macovescu visited North Vietnam.71 The message the Romanians delivered from Hanoi

on 12 February represented a “very very flat turndown”72 for the Americans. A few

months after, theNorthVietnamese profusely thanked theRomanians for ‘their helpwith

the offensive’, adding that ‘diplomacy helped us achieve [military] victories faster’.73

Not knowing the whole story of Romania’s mediation efforts, the US duly rewarded

Bucharest. The pressure the Romanian communist leadership put on the US executive

branch, which had to persuade Congress and various other groups of the benefits that

such transfer of technology would bring to the United States, started to bear fruit.

On 27 March 1968, Myron B. Kratzer, Assistant General Manager for International

Activities with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), delivered a positive report on

the state of Romania’s nuclear program before the US House Committee on Foreign

Affairs.74 On 11 April 1968, the Romanian Ambassador to Washington DC, Corneliu

Bogdan, brought the nuclear issue into discussion with Department of State

representatives, placing the heavy water plant deal in the context of the Vietnam War:

68Herring, The Secret Diplomacy, 802-815.69 AMAE, Circular Telegrams 1968, Vol. 1, ‘Bulletin of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs No.

08/00227, sent to all Romanian missions abroad’, 10 January 1968, 37; ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 6/1968,‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and Hoang Tu’, 18 January 1968, 3.

70 Herring, The Secret Diplomacy, 523.71 AMAE, Vietnam File – Top Secret of Special Importance [SSID], ‘Minutes of the meeting between

George Macovescu and Richard Davis’, 0/000132, 24 February 1968, 7.72 Transcript, Benjamin H. Read Oral History, Interview II, 3/70, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy,

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, quoted in Herring, The Secret Diplomacy, 523.73 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 82/1968, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and Le Thanh

Nghi’, 11 June 1968, 2-11.74 Hearings on East-West Trade, 27 March 1968, 214-233.

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‘he understood the problems caused by the current political situation in relation toViet-Nam, although he hoped that progress could be made’.75

Sealing the deal

The progress the Romanians were hoping for came with the help of Dean Rusk, who

on 24 April during a National Security Council meeting urged the other policy makerspresent to pass a West–East trade bill, giving as an example the opportunity which the

Romanian nuclear deal presented. He recounted how he had ‘sent over a package onthe Romanians’ desire to purchase a heavy water plant, with his recommendation that

the President approve it’.76 At the same time, Rusk also gave the green light to theCanadians on the transfer of heavy water production technology. At the end of April1968, Rusk told the newly-appointed Canadian State Secretary for External Affairs,

Mitchell Sharp, that the Americans ‘had been impressed by the way [the RomanianMinister of Foreign Affairs and President of the United Nations General Assembly]

Corneliu Manescu and his colleagues had carried out certain abortive explorationswith the North Vietnamese a short while ago. Rusk said the Romanians had played

their part with integrity. They had reported the negative as well as any positiveelements in the responses received from Hanoi’.77 Although Romania continued to

supply Vietnamwith economic and military aid, nuclear negotiations made significantadvances. The Romanians found out about Rusk’s endorsement, on the occasion of a

visit to American nuclear facilities, a few months afterwards. In June 1968, Dr DonaldHornig, the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology, invited a groupof Romanian scientists to visit the United States. The RCP accepted and on 18 June, a

Romanian delegation, led by Alexandru Bırladeanu, arrived in Washington.Bırladeanu talked with Rusk about nuclear technology, specifically the heavy water

plant Romania wanted to purchase from Lummus Company: ‘The Secretary [Rusk]said that the outlook for US authorization had improved. He said he had been

personally involved in this matter, as had President Johnson, and that the USGovernment favoured the sale on national policy grounds’.78 At the end of the visit,

representatives of the two governments signed a joint statement calling for increasedcooperation in science.79 It is unlikely that this change of heart would have occurred

75 FRUS, Vol. XVII, ‘Memcon between Corneliu Bogdan, John M. Leddy, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.’, 11 April

1968, 440.76 Texas Tech University, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Archive Research), Folder 13, Box 14,

‘Memorandum for the record: National Security Council Meeting of 24 April 1968 – Eastern Europe’, 26April 1968.

77 NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 2, ‘Telegram from Ritchie, Canadian Embassy in Washington,DC, to the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs’, 1 May 1968.

78 FRUS, Vol. XVII, ‘Memcon between Alexandru Bırladeanu, Corneliu Bogdan, Mihai Croitoru, DeanRusk, George R. Kaplan’, 9 July 1968, 446-448.

79 LOC MSS, Glenn Seaborg Papers, Romania File, Box 736, ‘Atoms in Action in Romania. A Staff

Guide, Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Technical Information’, 1969.

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had it not been for Romania’s involvement in the VietnamWar negotiations. The echo

of the enormous enthusiasm generated by the PACKERS channel allowed the

Romanians to draw increasingly nearer to the technology they sought.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 gave a boost to Romania’s

reputation as a ‘maverick’. Ceaus�escu’s disapproval of this move was music to the

ears of many Western leaders, although as the State Department noted, the

Romanian leader’s criticism subsided, while that of Tito continued unabated.80 For a

while, nuclear negotiations proceeded smoothly. In November 1968, AEC Chairman

Dr Glenn Seaborg invited the delegation from the Romanian State Committee for

Nuclear Energy, headed by Dr Horia Hulubei and accompanied by Dr Ionel Purica

and Marius Patras�cu, on a tour of nuclear installations in San Francisco, Chicago,

Boston, and Oak Ridge.81 The Romanian delegation was the first one to visit a major

nuclear laboratory in the United States.82 Seaborg and Hulubei signed a Nuclear

Cooperation Agreement providing for reciprocal exchanges of information regarding

the peaceful uses of atomic energy between the two countries.83 Ceaus�escu’s reaction

to the invasion of Czechoslovakia alone would not have resulted in the signing of

this nuclear cooperation agreement, as the decisive steps towards the agreement,

such as the preliminary visits and the Congressional testimony of the AEC officials,

had taken place before August 1968. Through the November 1968 agreement, the US

committed itself to giving Romania several pieces of equipment that can be defined

as sensitive nuclear technology, including a 14 MW TRIGA II research reactor,

a 60Co source of irradiation, 93% HEU, and training for Romanian nuclear

scientists.84

Richard Nixon’s ascent to power gave additional impetus to the nuclear

technology transfers between the US and Romania. As Francis J. Gavin shows,

‘neither Nixon nor [his National Security Adviser Henry A.] Kissinger thought

halting nuclear proliferation merited sacrificing other geopolitical goals’.85 Nixon’s

visit to Bucharest on 2 August 1969 marked a turning point in East–West relations,

as Romania became the first East European country visited by an American

president. However, it marked an even more important moment in US-Romania

nuclear cooperation dynamics.86 Until Nixon’s visit, the Romanians were more subtle

and discrete about the link between Vietnam and nuclear technology transfers.

80 FRUS, Vol. XIII, ‘Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’, 16 October 1968, 774-775.

81 Brookhaven National Laboratory, Bulletin Board, 1; LOC MSS, Glenn Seaborg Papers, Romania File,Box 736, [Untitled Document], 12 November 1968.

82 Purica, ‘Ionel I. Purica’, 10.83 LOC MSS, Glenn Seaborg Papers, Romania File, Box 736, [Untitled Document], 12 November 1968.84 LOCMSS, Glenn Seaborg Papers, Romania File, Box 736, ‘Agenda’, 30 September - 2 October 1969, 4.85 Gavin, ‘Nuclear Nixon’, 127.86 Nixon Presidential Materials [NPM], National Security Council [NSC] Country Files, Europe,

Romania, Vol. I-8/69, Box 702, ‘Intelligence Information Cable’, 17 July 1969.

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However, Ceaus�escu had no patience for diplomacy and beating around the bush, as

he himself often admitted.87 Cooperation on nuclear technology was the first topic

addressed by Ceaus�escu in his meeting with Nixon. The US President believed the

Romanians were a useful channel in negotiations with Hanoi and with Beijing88 and

therefore indulged the Romanians more than any other US president had. He

mentioned how Romania’s support for Vietnam represented one of the main reasons

for the delay with which bilateral economic relations were warming up. He did point

out however, that ending the war ‘on a fair basis’ would make possible the

transactions the Romanians were interested in, including the nuclear deal. He also

thanked Maurer for the role he played in 1967 in trying to open channels of

communications to resolve the Vietnam problem, adding that ‘the actions were

responsible and helpful’. After his visit, Nixon urged the Atomic Energy Commission

to approve Romania’s bid for the heavy water plant and sent his Science Advisor, Dr

Lee DuBridge, and AEC’s chairman, Dr Glenn Seaborg, to Bucharest to advance the

implementation of the Memorandum of Cooperation that had been signed in 1968.89

Nixon told Kissinger in a memorandum that such a visit ‘would be enormously

helpful in letting Ceaus�escu have some little goodies that he can tell his associates

about as to how dealing with the US really pays’.90 For the RCP General Secretary,

acquiring heavy water technology from the West was not ‘some little goodie’. He

could boast that he was the first East European leader to do so, which would, no

doubt, bolster his personal standing at home.

In spite of this major victory, Romania’s nuclear program did not move forward as

Western suppliers assumed. Their strategy of courting both Eastern and Western

nuclear suppliers backfired. A secret meeting from December 1967 came into play.

On 14–15 December 1967, as Macovescu was heading to Hanoi to deliver a message

from the US, Ceaus�escu went to Moscow to meet Leonid Brezhnev. On this occasion,

the General Secretary of the RCP requested, once again, a nuclear power plant from

the USSR. The Soviets readily agreed to provide Romania with this technology but

they reiterated the condition on which they previously insisted: that the Romanians

import the nuclear fuel from the USSR.91 The Soviet leadership sent a proposal to

Bucharest in a timely fashion, to which the Romanians replied at the end of April

87 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 6/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and US

Ambassador Richard Davis’, 31 January 1967, 5-10.88 NPM, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 454, Romania, ‘Background on Viet-Nam’, 10 July 1969;

NPM, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceaus�escu, Box 1023,‘Memcon between President Richard M. Nixon and President Nicolae Ceaus�escu’, 2 August 1969; NPM,

NSC Files, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceaus�escu, Box 1023, ‘Memconbetween President Richard M. Nixon and President Nicolae Ceaus�escu’, 3 August 1969.

89 LOC MSS, Glenn Seaborg Papers, Romania File, Box 736, ‘Memorandum from Julius H. Rubin toGlenn Seaborg’, 12 August 1969.

90 FRUS, XXIX, ‘Memorandum from President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger)’, 7 August 1969, 458.

91 ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 101/1967, ‘Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceaus�escu and Leonid

Brezhnev’, 15 December 1967, 62-63.

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196892, around the same time Rusk gave the green light for a nuclear deal withRomania. In 1970, Moscow capitalised on the political leverage inherent in its

nuclear cooperation agreement with Romania, checkmating the leadership inBucharest. On 20 May 1970, the USSR signed an agreement with Romania, setting

into stone the purchase of the 440 MW VVR plant on Olt River, with a deliverydeadline agreed for 1978.93 Talks with governments and private companies from the

Western bloc were thus brought to a halt. The communist leadership in Bucharestpretended that the reasons for which it stopped its negotiations with Western

suppliers were the losses incurred from floods that devastated Romania in thesummer of 1970.94 The British Ambassador to Bucharest dismissed the Romanians’justification right away. He told the Canadian ambassador to Belgrade, Bruce

Williams, who was also accredited to Bucharest, that ‘despite recent flood losses, they[the Romanians] can continue to service their convertible currency debts without

resorting to special measures’.95 Moreover, the Japanese Ambassador to Bucharestwent even further, telling Williams that the Romanian ‘decision against proceeding at

this time with their reactor program was the result of Soviet pressure’.96 TheCanadian Ambassador, a long-time supporter of the Canadian–Romanian nuclear

deal, ignored this.97 Williams kept endorsing the deal, which helped the Romanianssave face and maintain their ‘maverick’ aura.

Conclusion

In spite of Romania’s efforts to secure a deal by going on the market, capitalising onits ‘maverick’ image, and then using its middle-man position in the Vietnam War,

Soviet pressures upon Bucharest sometimes weighed more heavily than externaldiplomatic efforts and commercial ties with the West. Soviet interference delayed the

negotiations between Romania and Western suppliers of nuclear technology by atleast four years.98 It was not until 1973 that Bucharest resumed its pursuit ofsensitive nuclear technology from the West. When it did so, the international context

seemed even more favourable: Romania had boosted its profile by means of itsinvolvement in several other mediations, for example in the Sino–American

92 Idem, 77-84.93 ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, 44/1970, ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the Permanent Presidium of the

Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party’, 6 April 1970, 15; CNSAS, D13490/5, ‘Note

regarding some technical-economic aspects of building nuclear power plants in Romania’, 16 August 1973,120-125.

94 NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1636, 20-68-Ra Pt. 3, ‘Telegram from Industry, Trade and Commerce office inVienna to the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Ottawa’, 25 June 1970.

95 Idem.96 NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1636, 20-68-Ra Pt. 3, ‘Telegram from the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade to the

Canadian Ministry for External Affairs’, 30 September 1970.97 Idem.98 CNSAS, D13490/5, ‘Note regarding some technical-economic aspects of building nuclear power

plants in Romania’, 16 August 1973, 120-125.

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rapprochement and in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Even if these efforts bore no fruit,

Ceaus�escu managed to extract considerable benefits from the West, such as

advantageous financing arrangements for technology acquisition, nuclear equipment

included.99 Most important, after Ceaus�escu’s 1974 assertion that ‘no state need

refrain from a weapons acquisition’, US specialists concluded that ‘if Romania were

to opt to produce nuclear weapons, it can acquire the necessary knowhow and

material over a reasonably short span of years, from Western suppliers, such as the

Germans, British, or French, or even Chinese’.100 While aware of the possibility of

Romania going nuclear, the US decided to continue its assistance to Romania, so as

‘to promote [American] bilateral and regional interests’.101 Ceaus�escu played the

‘maverick’ card so skilfully that the US turned a blind eye to Romania’s blatantly

dangerous nuclear pursuits.During the Johnson Presidency, Bucharest erratically moved from one nuclear

supplier to another, not being sure whether it should go East or West. Romania’s forays

into Western markets were prompted by Moscow’s delays, hesitation, and sometimes

outright rejection. In the initial stage of flirting with the West, the communist

leadership in Bucharest capitalised more on the appearance of dissidence and

divergence from Moscow that this created. Realising that US legislation banned

sensitive technology transfers to countries supporting North Vietnam, including

Romania, the communist leadership in Bucharest got involved in the resolution of the

conflict as a third-party mediator. The Romanians took advantage of talks on Vietnam

to press Washington to strengthen economic ties with Romania, which would facilitate

the transfer of the desired nuclear technology. The strategy worked, primarily because

Western leaders sought to use Bucharest to advance their own economic and political

interests. However, with the CPSU applying pressure on the RCP to put cooperation

and coordination with the Eastern bloc back to the top of the agenda, Bucharest could

not immediately implement the agreements it secured with the West. The on-and-off

relationship with the Soviet Union caused significant delays in Bucharest’s nuclear

timetable, although it did not stop the transfer of technology fromWestern developed

countries to Romania. There were no perfect ‘mavericks’ and no air-tight blocs, which

meant that East–West relations, including Romania’s nuclear dealings with capitalist

countries, were in part driven by the West’s search for profits as well as political

advantage and in part by political and economic dynamics between Romania and the

Soviet Union.

99 FRUS, XXIX, ‘Memorandum from the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries

Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon’, 15 July 1969, 433-437.100 NARA, AAD, RG 59, CFPF, ‘Telegram from Secretary of State to the US Embassy in Ottawa’, 3

February 1976.101 Idem.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Roham Alvandi, Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Anne Deighton,Radu Dudau, Mauro Elli, Louise Fawcett, Francis Gavin, Adriana Gheorghe, Eugenia Gușilov, KaiHebel, Sven Holtsmark, Liviu Horovitz, Margaret MacMillan, Montgomery Meigs, Leopoldo Nuti,Sonja Schmid, Jennifer Sims, Liviu Tatu, and Liviu Țaranu for their support, and helpfulcomments on earlier drafts of this working paper. The research on which this paper is based wasfinanced by the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, the Graduate Scholarship at St Catherine’sCollege, the Jenkins Memorial Fund at the University of Oxford, the Rațiu Family FoundationFellowship, and the Leaders for Romania scholarship.

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