AQIS & ISIS approaches in India

Since its inception back in 2014, the terrorist group known as “al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent,” or AQIS for short, has been attempting to generate a strong support base in India. However, it has so far not been able to manage a significant foothold amongst the Muslim population in the country. Initially, it successfully managed to recruit a handful of Muslim youths from India’s Northern and Eastern regions, but these attempts have been halted thanks to Indian security agencies’ successes in suppressing fledgling AQIS modules throughout the nation. It is widely agreed upon that the formation of al-Qaeda and the rise of its first generation leaders was facilitated by American and Pakistani agencies acting against the Soviet forces that were stationed in Afghanistan; therefore, the footprints of ISI are still visible in the modus operandi of al-Qaeda cells that continue to operate across the world, especially within the Indian subcontinent. AQIS, which is effectively the branch of al-Qaeda acting within subcontinent, is no exception to this fact and continues to work upon the basic design that was developed by ISI decades back to train Afghan Mujahedeen.

ISIS is a far newer force than al-Qaeda on the Indian Subcontinent, but already it has had a large number of recruits arrested, of its recruiters deported, and a shocking number of cells busted. This article compares the approaches of both AQIS and ISIS towards India.

AQIS’ approach towards India is a rather conventional one, using conventional methods for recruitment, training, indoctrination and all of the other various aspects of a terrorist organization in pursuit of its insidious designs. However, AQIS has also tried to front itself as a tech-savvy group by its focus on its internet and social media presence. Otherwise, the group continues to follow conventional methods to address its core requirements such as the identification of potential recruits and the training and indoctrination of its cadres. All members of the AQIS cell busted by Delhi police in December 2015 were recruited through human networks that were personally maintained by the AQIS leader Asim Umar, a native of the Sambhal district of the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh who has since retreated to Pakistan to participate in a so called Holy Jihad. Some members of another AQIS cell who were busted in 2015 in Hyderabad were also personally recruited by Human network of AQIS that is active in various parts of India.

Methods and Strategies AQIS also shows traditional methods for radicalizing its members. In addition to various works of literature and other pamphlets that attempt to justify Jihad against non-believers, such as those written by AQIS leader Asim Umar, the organization also uses a 15 day training course to assist in the further indoctrination of its members and to create a religious orthodoxy within its Pakistani madarsas.

criticalthreats.org, AQIS leadership, 2015

AQIS also shows traditional methods for radicalizing its members. In addition to various works of literature and other pamphlets that attempt to justify Jihad against non-believers, such as those written by AQIS leader Asim Umar, the organization also uses a 15 day training course to assist in the further indoctrination of its members and to create a religious orthodoxy within its Pakistani madarsas, institutions dedicated to the study of Islamic law, and where Indian recruits are taken to for further radicalization. However, AQIS leadership apparently finds it very expensive and risky to shift newly recruited members from India to PAKAF region, indicated by its attempts to set up a radicalization facility within Indian territories. To accomplish this, the organization has been trying to recruit low level religious preachers from various parts of India, specifically within Delhi, Hyderabad and the western territories.

As the main objective of AQIS is to sow chaos within India, its basic strategy essentially involves recruiting Indian Muslim youth, training them in facilities outside of their home country, and sending them back to India to execute terror plans. This is assisted by their use of the internet and social media in aspects such as communication between members and leadership as well as to help spread ideological propaganda. However, AQIS distinctly refrains from activities such as online recruitment and training.

In strong contrast to their older counterpart, ISIS has resorted to all sorts of unconventional methods to assist the expansion of its activities in India. ISIS is more than willing to use both online and offline techniques in all of its activities, including the recruitment and training of Indian Muslims, in procuring supplies, and in spreading its propaganda.

The arrests of Afsha Zabeen in Hyderabad, Abdullah Hadi and Abdul Rehman Al Enezi among other examples suggest that in order to improve its recruitment activities in India, ISIS has focused mainly on nonresident Indian nationals living in the gulf region as these individuals were easier to contact and recruit without the involvement of the Indian authorities.

India is also a vital source of supplies and logistical support for ISIS. According to a report published by Conflict Armament Research (CAR,) at least seven Indian companies were discovered to be instrumental to ISIS’s activities in logistical procurement.

The arrest of Mehndi Masroor Biswas, a technocrat associated with a US multinational in India, further highlights the focus ISIS has on India for its propaganda activities.

Islamic Extremism in South-East Asia

However, nations such as the USA, Russia and France have increased their military pressure againt ISIS, the terrorist organization has dramatically altered its strategies in India.

After the ISIS cell led by Muhammad Iliyas Yazdani in the south Indian city of Hyderabad was busted, authorities discovered that ISIS had begun influencing Indian youth to perform acts of terror on more local level, explaining why the number of Indian youths attempting to reach Iraq and Syria had gone down significantly from before. However, ISIS’s reach over the youths of India continues to expand.

AQIS continues to use traditional methods for identifying and approaching possible Indian recruits through its human networks, utilizing ‘man to man’ approaches to radicalize and motivate youths to join their frontlines. In contrast, ISIS depends almost entirely on social media to identify, select, recruit and train Indian Muslim youth.

AQIS uses the internet mainly to communicate with its cadres as well as to project its thoughts by issuing its reactions on various issues via internet and social media channels such as Telegram, Twitter etc. Still, AQIS has so far restrained from making use of internet technology for operational purposes such as training and the real time management of resources and man power through the internet or social media. Unlike a terrorist organization like Indian Mujahideen, AQIS has so far been unable or unwilling to use the internet as a way to directly generate terror. Therefore, it is clear that AQIS has strict guidelines for the use of internet technology and social media platforms for its members in India.

In regards to internet usage, ISIS is slightly different from AQIS. The organization has not only been successful in making optimum use of internet technology on various platforms but evidence shows that ISIS has been using internet technology to train recruits and in its attempts to coordinate lone wolf attacks.

Minsk Revisited

The appointment of Ambassador Kurt Volker as special envoy for Ukraine signals a renewed interest in Ukraine-related diplomacy in Washington. It is a good time to revisit the troubled Minsk diplomatic process, and to contemplate possible steps toward resolving the conflict necessitates the need to reflect upon on what has gone wrong over the past two years.

An international collision over Ukraine began in early 2014, driven by incompatible aspirations on the part of the involved countries. Ukraine sought to protect its sovereignty and to draw closer to the EU and NATO. Russia was trying to halt the eastward spread of Western security structures and to retain political leverage over Ukraine. France and Germany were eager to see European security restored and to contain what they perceived as Russian aggression. As with

France and Germany, the U.S. construed Russian activities in Ukraine as a violation of the liberal international order and a threat to European security. Joint EU/U.S. sanctions were imposed to redress this violation. The Western powers agreed with Ukraine that sovereignty was at the core of the crisis, whereas Russia put stability and its own security at the center of the crisis.

After months of fierce debate and an inability for the involved states to reach a resolution, Minsk diplomacy ran from the fall of 2014 to February 2015. It established a diplomatic framework for ending the violence and achieving a political settlement. According to “Minsk,” which is shorthand for multiple agreements, the first step was a ceasefire in the Donbas. Then, elections were to be prepared under ODIHR supervision and the border was to be sealed as complimentary processes, thus restoring Ukrainian sovereignty. All of this was supposed to occur by December 2015.

This deadline has long passed, and Minsk not been implemented. It may be that Minsk has satisfied the minimum requirements for each of the interested parties. It has minimized the fighting in the Donbas, granting not full sovereignty for Ukraine but a degree of sovereignty comparable to what Ukraine possessed in autumn 2014. For France and Germany, European security in the East is still an elusive ideal; nevertheless, the fighting that had been unbridled in early 2014 has been (imperfectly) contained. Likewise, for Washington, Minsk’s value resides in having forestalled the worst-case scenarios, such as the conflict spreading throughout Europe. Fashioning Minsk made Moscow integral to Ukraine-related diplomacy. Ukraine in 2017 is very far from joining NATO, and no closer from joining the EU. The decentralization to which Kyiv committed itself in Minsk promises Russian political leverage in the future.

Minsk has not been useless. Yet the long-term failure to implement Minsk is debilitating for Ukraine, Russia, Europe and the U.S. The perpetuation of war on Ukrainian soil is a terrible burden on the Ukrainian economy and politics. Turmoil in the Donbas means that Europe must contend with security problems in the East in addition to the threats it faces in the South. NATO’s eastern flank is a new and costly budgetary priority. U.S.-Russian relations have been poisoned by the protracted conflict over Ukraine, and this poison risks becoming the prelude to direct conflict between Russia and the U.S., most likely in the event of an accident in the vicinity of the Baltic states or Kaliningrad oblast’. If Minsk ever fails definitively, it will have global rather than regional consequences. Minsk itself has suffered from three problems since 2014: ceasefire, sequence and deadline.

The ceasefire never took root. The line of conflict has witnessed violations from both sides, with the majority coming from the separatists, according to OSCE reports. Without a ceasefire, each side has had an incentive not to move forward with the other provisions laid out in Minsk, the demilitarization of the Donbas, or a political settlement.

Igor Ivanov: Russia, Ukraine and the Future of Europe

The diplomacy around “February Minsk” — February 2015 — entailed a meeting of Presidents Putin, Poroshenko, Hollande, and Chancellor Merkel. Their meeting went on late into the night. The result was a poorly written and poorly conceptualized document that has yielded two irreconcilable notions of sequence. The “Russian notion” presumes a ceasefire followed by a political settlement, after which the border will be sealed. The “Ukrainian notion” also begins with a ceasefire, but it posits a sealed border as the precondition for a political settlement. Since 2015, this disagreement over Minsk sequencing has been intractable, and both sides can point to the same clauses in Minsk in support of their preferred interpretation.

Finally, the December 2015 deadline embedded in Minsk was too ambitious, and once it passed there was decreasing pressure on all sides to risk diplomatic progress. To embark on a political settlement is an enormous risk for Kyiv, and decentralization as stipulated in Minsk is politically unpopular across Ukraine. The separatists will presumably have to give up power peacefully and trust, after two years of fighting, that Kyiv will grant them the amnesty decreed in Minsk. To seal the border is a risk for Russia, for it will shift control of the entire situation back to Kyiv. A dysfunctional status quo can appear preferable to the hard task of acting on this status quo.

Diplomatic initiative should be invested immediately in reformulating Minsk. This initiative should begin below and progress to the ministerial level. Its goal should be the preparation of points on which the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and France, as well as the German Chancellor, can agree upon. Whether or not the “Normandy format” (Ukraine-Russia-France-Germany) is preserved, the American president should participate in an eventual meeting at which a new Minsk would be ratified and shared with the public. It is crucial that Ukraine, Russia, Germany, France and the United States all be committed to this recalibrated Minsk agreement or Minsk II.

Minsk II will need to lay out a rigorous ceasefire plan. In a chaotic area filled with paramilitary units, stopping the fighting will not be easy. Many local actors profit from the current situation, and it will take a powerful display of outside force to reach a genuine ceasefire. The UN could be a vehicle for the provision of peacekeeping troops who would be granted the necessary authority and firepower to impose a lasting peace and to ensure that the silenced weapons are withdrawn far behind the line of contact.

A credible ceasefire is the precondition for a political process, and Minsk II should establish a lucid sequence for this political process. The elements of the process are all present in Minsk: amnesty for the separatists, elections under Ukrainian law and ODIHR supervision, sealing the border, special status for the Donbas — i.e. those areas currently referred to as the DNR and the LNR. Rather than working through the thorny question of sequence at the end of the diplomatic process, at the presidential level, this is should be elaborated before the Presidents and Chancellor meet. Once the involved parties agree on a sequence, their agreement must be captured in clear prose and translated into a working document that is not susceptible to multiple interpretations. This document could then be endorsed at the highest levels.

Ian Kearns: Ukraine and Syria – How Far Will We Go?

A new deadline should be set. It cannot be too distant or too immediate. A few months is too short, a few years too long. Instead of a single deadline, it may be better to disaggregate the final deadline, beginning with the ceasefire and continuing with the moveable pieces of the political process. It would also make sense to combine the deadline with incentives for compliance and penalties for failing to adhere to it. If there is no penalty for missing the deadline, as was the case with Minsk, the forces that serve the status quo will conspire to ensure that Minsk II “fails” in the same way Minsk did, as far as its December 2015 deadline was concerned. The past two years demonstrate that a resolution to the crisis is immensely difficult. Only with concentrated and sustained effort will any progress be made.

Minsk is not simply a Russia-U.S. problem. Indeed, the U.S. was not a signatory to Minsk, and Washington might be tempted to declare Minsk a European diplomatic process, for Europeans to manage as best they can. In addition, Russia-U.S. relations have not improved since the election of Donald Trump, and the domestic political climate, in the U.S., is not conducive to creative diplomacy in Europe or anywhere else: a cloud of scandal, intimately tied to Russia, hangs over the country. It would, however, be shortsighted to sacrifice diplomacy for scandal and to allow the churn of domestic politics to set the goals of foreign policy. Unresolved, the conflict over Ukraine will continue to pull Washington and Moscow toward conflict. A diplomatic resolution, which can only be realized if Minsk is revisited and redesigned, is in the national interest of the United States, of Ukraine, of Russia and of Europe.

At several points in the Cold War diplomats found ways of moving closer to order and stability, against the odds. It is in that spirit that a new wave of multilateral diplomacy should be attempted today.

What Does the Future Hold? Reflections Regarding the Hamburg Meeting

The “Southern Deal” Between Moscow and Washington: A Duel of Diplomacies

The beginning of July was marked by the first personal meeting between Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, and Donald Trump, President of the USA, in Hamburg. The event had been awaited not only in our countries, but all around the world, drawing in a wide international response. Thus far, passions have been running high.

The first response regarding the Hamburg meeting in the USA, where the relations with Russia due to various reasons have become the most pressing of issues within the domestic policy debate, was moderately negative, as expected. It is no easy to find an American politician nowadays who would provide unequivocal support towards cooperation with our country. Unfortunately, such a situation is likely to preserve in the foreseeable future, as it reflects the persistent sentiment that the majority in both houses of the U.S. Congress, and among American political elites in general, hold.

In Russia, the mere fact of holding the meeting was perceived differently. Our commentators have long been waiting for good news from the American front, and such an enthusiastically overestimated reaction to the outcomes of the summit also has its own explanation. Despite the long-repeated bravura statements that Russia lives in an isolated fashion, not bothering with American sanctions, and life develops according to its own laws, with the state rigidly dictating its own rules. In the era of globalization, no matter how it is treated, the United States and Russia are becoming more interdependent and intertwined, and no state is able to resist this process. Moreover, such interdependence will only increase the ensuing consequences for all participants of the world politics, including our country. Therefore, ignoring the importance of restoring normal relations with the United States for our country would be, at the least, unreasonable.

Leaving aside the first and, at times, very emotional comments on the outcomes of the meeting between President Putin and President Trump, one can conclude that the meeting will undoubtedly become a political asset to both presidents. This is the case when, with good reason, it is appropriate to say that it is a win-win situation for both sides, and no one has lost.

Firstly, it is important that such a meeting took place at all. This event in itself has strong, positive implications for the future of Russia-U.S. relations. It is only regrettable that it had not happened before the heat of anti-Russian passions in Washington reached the present levels. Now, it is important, despite everything, to consolidate the practice of holding such meetings regularly, since the very act of holding them brings a huge positive potential for the development of Russia-U.S. relations.

The meeting of the presidents of Russia and the United States formally opened the door for contact at the level of administration offices of the two countries. In addition to regular negotiations involving foreign ministers, it is urgent to restore contacts through other ministries and agencies. The Russian side, in my opinion, should not be afraid to initiate such contacts when it is justified: in this case, any delays will be a detriment to our progress in establishing and maintaining relations. Moreover, after the meeting of the presidents, one should not be afraid that some steps towards restoring relations with Washington may be classically critiqued as «unpatriotic». Today, conversely, «unpatriotic» actions would be the ones aimed at further inflaming tensions between our countries. This tension is increasingly contrary to Russia's interests, creating additional difficulties for both domestic and foreign affairs.

Additionally, reaching agreements on the interaction between Russia and the United States in Syria is extremely important. Such cooperation through diplomacy, military action, and special services, if they gain the appropriate momentum, may eventually become a key factor in the resolution of the Syrian conflict as a whole. Equally important is the restoration of trust between our countries in order to jointly react to universal security threats. We must realize that confidence does not grow from unilateral action. Rather, it is shaped through joint efforts to solve specific problems. This was the case during the Cold War. So it was during the period of detente. Thus, it must also be the case in the 21st century. Relations between Russia and the United States at present stage are a key factor in restoring manageability of international affairs, uniting the efforts of the international community to counter modern threats and challenges. Subsequently, the Syrian agreements might become the starting point for the beginning of this complex but essential process.

Breaking the U.S.-Russia Impasse: Keeping the Door Open to Dialogue

In that perspective it is also important to consider the agreement on the establishment of a dialogue on crisis resolution in Ukraine. The Ukrainian crisis has long outgrown the borders of this country, having turned into a serious international problem. If we do not work multilaterally to formulate ways to resolve the crisis, the situation in the entire Euro-Atlantic region will be complicated and strained, and not doing so would also hamper the implementation of important large-scale economic, as well as security, projects in the region. As time has shown, it is nearly impossible to solve this task without direct participation of the USA. Should the efforts of Russia, the leading European countries, and the United States be combined, the chances of success will increase significantly.

The presidents also have touched upon the critical issues involving cyberspace. It is not surprising that this topic of the meeting prompted widespread criticism in the U.S., given that the criticism of the legitimacy of the Trump Administration is mostly centered on issues of cyberspace and cybersecurity. Yet, this criticism should not stop meaningful negotiation. We remember the years of the Cold War, when the USSR and the United States were actively modernizing their nuclear capabilities, but at the same time were successfully negotiating the reduction of nuclear arms and improved control over them. Today, cyber weapons are becoming even more dangerous than nuclear weapons for the security of our countries. To postpone the beginning of a dialogue on this issue would mean to expose the growing threat to our own security and international security in general. Russia and the United States will still have to talk about cyberthreats, including threats to nuclear armament. The sooner such dialogue begins, the more likely these issues will be addressed and resolved successfully.

On the example of relations between Russia and the United States, one can find a confirmation of the old truth: relations are easy to destroy, but very difficult to restore. Another truth that must be addressed is this: no matter how difficult the task is, no one will solve it but us. A big burden of problems has accumulated between our countries. Some of them can be solved quickly if proper attention on either side is devoted to them, and some will have to be passed on to future generations. However, it is not confrontation, but cooperation that determines long-term strategic interests of Russia and the United States. The image of the two presidents shaking hands at Hamburg is a resounding symbol of this commitment to cooperation.

We are witnessing a general trend towards the militarization of cyberspace, and nuclear weapons are no exception. What will happen to strategic stability should cyber weapons be employed? Are nuclear weapons capable of deterring cyber warfare?

Formalization of the Threat

Several events took place in 2016 which allow us to speak about the new status of cyberspace from the standpoint of military planning and combat actions. For example, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared cyberspace a bona fide operational domain, adding that a cyber-attack on a NATO member could trigger Article 5 [1] of the Alliance’s Charter. The 2017 United States federal budget calls for elevating United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) from a subdivision under the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to a full-fledged combatant command. USCYBERCOM Commander Admiral Michael S. Rogers continues to double as director of the National Security Agency, even though an active discussion continues as to the possibility of separating these two structures.

The National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 proposes an even more radical step: introducing the position of Chief Information Warfare Officer within the Pentagon. This new presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed position would report directly to the Secretary of Defence, and would assume responsibility for all matters related to the information domain of the Department of Defence, including cybersecurity and cyber warfare, space and space launch systems, and electronic warfare.

The military doctrine of the Russian Federation also notes that “exerting simultaneous pressure on the enemy throughout the enemy’s territory in the global information space, airspace and outer space, on land and sea” is a characteristic feature of modern military conflicts.

China’s International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace stresses that “the tendency of militarization and deterrence build-up in cyberspace is not conducive to international security and strategic mutual trust.” This, however, does not at all imply that China is not building its own offensive cyber potential.

We may therefore say that an understanding is crystallizing on the significance of cyber threats in the modern world from a military planning perspective.

A Cyber-Attack on Nuclear Potential NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared cyberspace a bona fide operational domain, adding that a cyber-attack on a NATO member could trigger Article 5.

This problem is particularly acute when it comes to nuclear weapons, especially when we are talking about the arsenals of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States. It is in this field that a false signal, or a total absence of signals, could move troops to launch nuclear weapons delivery systems against preselected targets. The situation is further complicated by the continuing development of information and communication technology, and armed forces obviously cannot remain uninvolved in this process.

A vivid example of a dangerous situation similar to a cyber-attack was the incident at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming in the autumn of 2010, when 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles were temporarily taken offline simultaneously. There is still no trustworthy information available from open sources as to what caused the malfunction.

A decapitation strike could be mounted using any means, including cyber weapons.

The problem of the vulnerability of nuclear weapons command and control systems to intruders is exacerbated by the high alert status of strategic nuclear forces. A decapitation strike could be

mounted using any means, including cyber weapons. At the same time, the perception of the risks connected with a potential enemy mounting a cyber-attack leads to improvements in the resistance of strategic nuclear forces command and control networks to unlawful interference, irrespective of sources, which is generally conducive to maintaining strategic stability.

An intriguing feature of cyber weapons that makes them somewhat similar to nuclear weapons is that the delivery system and the payload are separate: one and the same product can be used to infiltrate either spyware or malware specifically designed to intercept the control of weapon systems or disable command and control networks.

A similar problem could emerge in connection with third nuclear powers placing their non-strategic nuclear systems on high alert. For these countries, their nuclear weapons are of extremely high value, and the threat of losing them through command chain malfunctions is unacceptable. To prevent this scenario, the authority to use nuclear weapons could be delegated to lower echelons of command (in connection with the threat of a decapitation strike), which would further complicate the overall situation: a false command, or a false perception of the operational environment by a commanding officer thus authorized, is fraught with nuclear escalation, and increasing the number of such officers obviously leads to a proportional increase in the threat of nuclear escalation.

A relatively new threat directly related to day-to-day operations of nuclear-capable forces has to do with the proliferation of various simulators and simulated electronic launch solutions for training purposes. The information systems that support training and combat operations are separated, so the possibility of turning a simulated event into an actual launch of a nuclear-tipped missile with the help of a cyber-attack remains in the domain of science fiction. However, even an attempt to interfere with a simulator could be construed as an attack on the country’s nuclear forces, and the appropriate countermeasures could be employed.

NATO’s Cyber Defense Evolution

An intriguing feature of cyber weapons that makes them somewhat similar to nuclear weapons is that the delivery system and the payload are separate: one and the same product can be used to infiltrate either spyware or malware specifically designed to intercept the control of weapon systems or disable command and control networks. This creates a certain decision-making bracket for both the attacker and the defender: following the successful infiltration of a relatively harmful payload into the defender’s networks, the attacker might attempt to replace it with a strike payload should tensions between the parties escalate. At the same time, the defender might detect the original attack in time and, having no trustworthy information as to the attacker’s intent, may choose to deliver a retaliatory or second strike, and not just in cyberspace. We are talking about the networks that are directly related to nuclear weapons and to the country’s survival (as per the modern approach to defining the role of nuclear weapons).

The possible emergence of automated retaliatory strike systems triggered by cyber-attacks poses a separate threat, although any protection against an attack in cyberspace is, by default, of an active nature.

In addition, in the past, the Pentagon confirmed its readiness to deliver pre-launch cyber-attacks on enemy missiles as part of its missile defence programme. The inclusion of cyber weapons in the missile defence programme is an even greater blow to strategic stability.

Cui Prodest? The exclusive use of domestically developed software and hardware that is incompatible with international standards could help reduce the cyber threat to nuclear weapons.

Attribution is the key problem of any of the aforementioned cyber-attack scenarios.

Cyber weapons are also characterized by a fairly low entry threshold: they may be used by an individual, a superpower, or anyone in between (down to a third-world schoolkid hired by proxies in the interest of one of the leading world powers).

It would be advisable to single out the four key categories of actors operating on the borderline between cyberspace and nuclear weapons: governments, proxies, private entities (including commercial entities and terrorist groups) and “lone wolves.” On the one hand, governments command the greatest potential, while on the other, they are, in the nuclear weapons context, the key potential victims. Countries may use proxies in their confrontations with other countries. Private entities may use cyber weapons to blackmail nuclear powers, or they may offer their services to provide protection against cyber-attacks. Lone wolves may pursue a variety of self-interests, from the desire to cash in on their skills by demonstrating them in the most spectacular way, to ideological and emotional motives.

Global Development and Nuclear Weapons

It should be noted that a single actor may employ differing approaches to combat operations in cyberspace, including with regard to the acceptability of using proxies, advertising their own potential, commenting on offensive or defensive operations, and assessing the seriousness of cyber incidents (and being prepared to offer diligent assistance in investigations into such incidents).

At the same time, there already exists a fairly evolved black market for cyber weapons, one that is virtually impossible to control using traditional methods. Anyone can purchase commercial off-the-shelf samples, the application of which could also serve the interest of government actors.

The theatre of cyber operations is thus extremely convoluted and requires the utmost caution from participants in the international system of political and military relations.

Providing Security It has become commonplace in both Russia and the United States to mock the low-tech data storage devices used by the strategic nuclear forces on a daily bases. However, this approach is perhaps among the most effective ways of protecting critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks. Furthermore, the exclusive use of domestically developed software and hardware that is incompatible with international standards could help reduce the cyber threat to nuclear weapons.

This would allow all the parties involved to speak the same language, thus improving the effectiveness of dialogue.

One possible way to reduce the threat of a nuclear conflict as a result of erroneous assessments of the enemy’s intentions is to use tried and tested approaches to resolving differences between nations, such as hotlines. A set of intergovernmental agreements signed between the United States and Russia in June 2013 called for the launch of a communications hotline that would be used to share information in case of cyber incidents. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this system is questionable. For example, following its alleged “interference in the U.S. electoral system,” Russia received a request via the hotline just one week before the presidential election, and provided an exhaustive reply, but this exchange seems to have done nothing to influence the situation. Curiously, the national nuclear risk reduction centres of both countries were also at some point planned to be used for the purpose, but the official web page of the Russian centre contains no information to that effect.

In May 2015, Russia and China signed a bilateral agreement on international information security. The document has a very indirect relation to the military aspect of the topic, but on the whole it provides the framework for joint activities aimed at addressing global cybersecurity problems.

In the autumn of that same year, China signed an agreement on cybersecurity with the United States. That document is primarily focused on fighting industrial espionage.

NTI Paper “Rising Nuclear Dangers: Steps to Reduce Risks in the Euro-Atlantic Region”

On the other hand, it is quite possible that the existing interaction formats will be broadened in the future. The first step towards including the cybersecurity topic in the dialogue on strategic stability might come in the form of a relevant section to be added to the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which the permanent members of the UN Security Council agreed to finalize during the Washington conference on September 15, 2016. This would allow all the parties involved to speak the same language, thus improving the effectiveness of dialogue.

Also worth mentioning is the initiative voiced by former United States National Security Council Cybersecurity Director Richard Clarke, who called for an international treaty that would accomplish the following:

• Ban cyber-attacks on certain facilities (including components of nuclear weapons infrastructure);

• Require signatory nations to pass laws enforcing such norms; • Enable the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on violator states, as it did in the

past with violators of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

To some extent, this initiative is similar to the Russian approach to the possibility of creating a universal international regime that would govern the activities of states in the global information space, including the need for developing and adopting a code of responsible behaviour for states.

The existence of cyber weapons, combat operations in cyberspace, attempts by government and non-government actors to gain an advantage over potential enemies by causing damage to their nuclear weapons or creating a situation conducive to their erroneous use are all facts of life. The existing cyber threats could be used as an argument in campaigns for universal nuclear disarmament; however, a world without nuclear weapons but with all the current discords would hardly prove to be any more safe and stable. A less ambitious goal might be to reduce the nuclear weapons alert status, but this could reduce the deterrent factor, ultimately resulting in the destruction of strategic stability.

The existence of cyber weapons, combat operations in cyberspace, attempts by government and non-government actors to gain an advantage over potential enemies by causing damage to their nuclear weapons or creating a situation conducive to their erroneous use are all facts of life.

The most promising solution would be for all the parties involved at the national and supranational level (and possibly leading companies specializing in information technology and cybersecurity) to work in concert towards the formation of a general understanding of the emerging cyberspace landscape from a military standpoint. Such an approach would help identify the best ways to reduce the threat of involuntary use of nuclear weapons, while maintaining their deterrent characteristics. Simultaneously, special attention should be paid to protecting nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure against cyber threats, including by way of minimizing their footprint in cyberspace.

Curiously, on June 30, 2017 researchers with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence noted that WannaCry and NotPetya do not warrant the invocation of Article 5.

Regional Dimension

Implications of the Rising Terrorist Attacks in Egypt

Writer : Dr. Shady Abdelwhab

Friday, July 21, 2017

Tensions have risen between the Quartet countries and Qatar over stopping the latter’s support for terrorism, which has been one of the 13 demands Kuwait has presented to Qatar on behalf of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt. In order to shed light on the rationale of those demands, this article will present the three main terrorist organizations operating in Egypt, and the reasons for the terrorist attacks’ escalation including Qatari links to such organizations. This article will further explore the Egyptian counter-terrorism efforts.

First: Terrorist Organizations Operating in Egypt

Threats of terrorism in Egypt emanates from three main terrorist organizations, namely ISIS affiliate Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province), Hasm Movement, and ISIS affiliated groups operating in Upper Egypt. Those organizations are independently structured, yet they cooperate on tactical and logistical levels. The three groups share a common aim, which is attempting to topple the Egyptian regime. The following section will analyze the structural form of the three terrorist organizations:

1- ISIS affiliate Wilayat Sinai: Wilayat Sinai’s origins could be traced back to “Ansar Bait al-Maqdis” (ABM), which pledged allegiance to ISIS’ leader, Abu Bakr al-Boughdadi in November 2014. Wilayat Sinai grew out of groups of Bedouins and salafi-oriented outsiders, who had fled from mainland Egypt to Sinai. ([1])

The group focuses on targeting military personnel in Sinai and Coptic Christians across the various governorates. Their latest attack occurred on April 9, 2017 targeted two churches in Alexandria and Tanta governorates using improvised explosive devices (IED), killing 45 people. The ISIS affiliate aims at dividing and destabilizing the Egyptian society through inflaming sectarian strife.

There are two indicators revealing cooperation between Wilayat Sinai, or in its previous form as ABM, and the Muslim Brotherhood. ([2]) First, the ISIS’ affiliate attacks against the Egyptian army multiplied after the ouster of the Egyptian former president Mohamed Morsi. Before ABM pledged their allegiance to ISIS, they were recognized in July 2012 for their

attacks on the gas pipelines connecting Egypt, Jordan and Israel. However, couple of months after the overthrow of Morsi, they escalated their attacks against Egyptian military and security personnel in Sinai. ([3])

There is a second indication of strong cooperation between Palestinian Brotherhood offshoot, Hamas, and Wilayat Sinai. That is evident through the participation of former Hamas members in the latter’s latest attack on July 7, 2017 killing at least 23 Egyptian soldiers. ([4])

2- Hasm Movement: The Muslim Brotherhood terrorist attacks against the Egyptian government in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s are well documented. After the ouster of Morsi, such assaults remerged. Despite claims that their leaders called for “peaceful protests,” some of its “young members have attacked private property, government targets, and participated in a fair share of violence against Coptic Christians.”([5]) Furthermore, Mohammed al-Baltagy, a prominent leader of the Brotherhood, during the Rabaa Mosque protest, said that the terrorist attacks will continue until Morsi returns back to power.([6]) In this context, Hasm, which is believed to be a splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood, announced its establishment on July 2016. Hasm was involved in various terrorist attacks, the most prominent of which are the failed attempt on August 2016 to assassinate the former Grand Mufti of Egypt, Ali Gomaa. Another attack by Hasm took place on November 4, 2016 targeting Judge Ahmed Aboul Fotouh, one of the three judges involved in the trial of Morsi. ([7]) Its operations focused on dense urban areas outside Sinai. It is noteworthy to pinpoint that the group employs more sophisticated militant tactics such as Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), ([8]) and surveillance techniques. In May 2017, the Egyptian authorities managed to identify and arrest the group leaders responsible for the recruitment, training and financing, as well as the planning and implementation of terror. ([9]) Despite this crackdown, the group continued to conduct retaliatory terrorist attacks. The random and violent patters of those attacks can be attributed to the decentralized structure of the group, and the fact that many other terrorist organizations, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, may have merged with Hasm like lewaa al-thawra.

3- ISIS cells in Upper Egypt:

More recently, Egypt has witnessed terrorist attacks that emanate from ISIS affiliated groups that were based in Libya and returned to Upper Egypt to carry on terrorist attacks. This could be attributed to several factors. Most importantly, the collapse of the Libyan state along with subsequent outflow of arms and jihadists that have had a profound effect on communities in the Western Desert. In addition, Egypt's border with Libya that is largely unguarded. Also, it could be attributed to Egypt rising role in appeasing Eastern Libya.

The first eminent threat was when ISIS beheaded 21 Egyptian Christians working in Libya on February 2015. Almost a year later, on January 2016, ISIS Libyan militants started operating in Egypt attacked a checkpoint near Kharga Oasis, in western desert that killing 10 police officers. Those militants have attempted to use the same tactics that has used in Sinai, including a focus on soft targets, as well as targeting Copts. ([10])

Second: Causes for Rising terrorist Threats:

1- The Qatari meddling in Egypt’s internal affairs: The role played by some countries in supporting Terrorist organization was highlighted by the recent rift between Qatar and the Arab Quartet countries. The crisis revealed the

mounting Qatari support to terrorist organizations and more specifically backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Moreover, 26 out of the Quartet countries’ list of 59 designated terrorists are Egyptians based in Qatar. Some of them are members of the Muslim Brotherhood, whom are given powerful media platform to criticize the Egyptian government and president, Abdel Fatah Sisi. ([11]) One must note that Al-Jazeera never considered Hasm a terrorist organization. It refers to the group as a militant organization, and sometimes it refers that the Egyptian authorities consider the group a terrorist organization. ([12]) Furthermore, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian Islamic theologian and the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood based in Doha, accused the Egyptians rejecting the rule of Morsi as Khawarij (infidels). He incited the Muslim Brotherhood protesters through the screen of Al-Jazeera channel, calling for the return of Morsi to power. He even called for international intervention to bring Morsi back to power. ([13]) However, the Egyptian government accused Qatar of supporting Egyptian terrorist groups, after December 2016 assaults targeting St. Mark's Coptic Orthodox Cathedral. In an official statement, the interior minister revealed that the terrorist cell responsible for the attack, was led by Mohab Mostafa El-Sayed Kassem, who travelled to Qatar in 2015 and met with leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who convinced him to carry out terrorist attacks in Egypt. Upon returning to Egypt, Kassem followed their orders and traveled to North Sinai, where he members of ABM who provided him with training. ([14]) This reveals the links between Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS in Sinai, as well as, the Qatari based terrorists.

2- The rising threat of returned foreign fighters: Egypt, like many European countries face the challenge of the returned foreign fighters, who fought within the ranks of ISIS in Iraq, Syria and Libya, after the radical organization retreated from various territories. It is estimated that the numbers of foreign militants range from hundreds to possibly thousands. These fighters have acquired extensive knowledge and expertise to use sophisticated weapons, as well as, evade security procedures. ([15]) It is believed that the militants who carried out the recent Minya attack have been trained by an ISIS affiliated group. ([16])

3- Joining of former Hamas members to ISIS: There has been ongoing accusations to Hamas by the Egyptian authorities that the group is involved in supporting ISIS in Egypt. In 2016, news circulated revealing that dozens of the Iz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ members, and Hamas’ commando wing have defected and Joined ISIS in Sinai. The well-trained defectors, included those skilled at operating anti-tank missiles and bomb-making, have helped sustain ISIS’ fight against Egyptian security forces. ([17])

As mentioned previously Hamas, is the Palestinian branch of Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian authorities have accused the Egyptian Muslim of collaboration with elements of Hamas and Hezbollah, who managed to enter Egypt through underground tunnels, to provoke chaos and sabotage, attacking the Egyptian regime and killing civilian demonstrators.([18])

Third: Egyptian Response:

Egypt tried to apply multi-pronged strategy to counter terrorist threats. These measures could be summarized as follows:

1- Seeking Tribal support:

Egypt resorted to ally with local armed forces comprised mainly of Sinai tribesmen operating in coordination with the Egyptian army that provides it with logistical support. These local force comprised mainly of parts of Tarabin and Sawarka tribe, one of the largest tribes in the Sinai. ([19]) The only drawback of this strategy is that certain subtribes of the Tarabin tribe are believed to be a safe-havens for ISIS. ([20]) Egypt has employed similar tactics in Western desert with local Bedouins, in order to monitor and track terrorist moves in these areas.

2- Military and Security measures: Egypt resorted to launching air strikes against militant bases in eastern Libya in response to attacks launched by ISIS groups, who resides there. The first air strike targeted ISIS militant camps, training sites and weaponry storage areas on February 2015, after the terrorist group beheaded 21 Egyptian Copts in Libya.([21]) The second strike focused on terrorist camps in Derna, eastern Libya, who have been implicated in attacking a group of Coptic Christians traveling to a monastery in southern Egypt on May 2017. Moreover, Egypt strengthen its security measures to protect its borders with Gaza. The Egyptian government destroyed many tunnels, and created a cordon sanitaire along its border with Gaza.([22]) Egyptian forces have reinforced their convoys and many of the checkpoints on the roads leading in and out of the northern Sinai towns of al-Arish, Hasna, and Sheikh Zuweid.([23]) Egypt declared the state of Emergency on April 2017, after the Palm Sunday bombings that killed 45 Christians in two Egyptian cities. ([24]) There has been a persistent criticism of Egypt for its heavy-handed security response to terrorist attacks, claiming that these tactics further complicated the problem. However, this argument fails to take in consideration how western governments utilized similar tactics to counter ISIS. France has declared the state of emergency. In addition, Germany is drafting a controversial law giving authorities the power to fingerprint kids as young as six and would give investigators the right to look at private messages. ([25])

3- Enhancing regional cooperation: The Egyptian government has collaborates intensively with Libya and, more recently, Hamas. The ideological affinity of the latter to Muslim Brotherhood does not prohibit Egypt from accepting the group’s recent rapprochement on a pragmatic basis. This is justified as Hamas is the entity responsible for securing the frontier with Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. ([26]) In return, Egypt offered to open the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza, and increase Egypt’s electricity supply. Moreover, Egypt have enhanced security cooperation with Khalifa Haftar, the commander of Libyan National Army in east Libya, in an attempt to control the borders, and combat terrorist organization endangering the national security of both countries.

4- Pressuring Qatar: Egypt has responded to what it considers a Qatari meddling in its own affairs, and support of terrorist organizations by joining Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain in publishing a list of 12 entities and 59 individuals with alleged links to terror groups and Qatar. Also, Egypt asked UN Security Council to investigate Qatar for funding terror groups. ([27])

Egypt continues to face challenges in fighting various terrorist organizations, especially from ISIS affiliated groups, who is utilizing neighboring countries as a safe havens to reorganize and launch retaliating attacks. Despite remarkable success in conducting several preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations, it is expected that Egypt may still witness some attacks in the coming period. However, on the long run, with enhancing regional cooperation with Libya and Gaza, in fighting terrorism, as well as pressuring regional backers of terrorist organizations, terrorist organizations will be deemed to fail.

How did Iran Deal with ISIS’ Defeat in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s July 10, 2017, declaration of the liberation of Mosul City from ISIS has immediately produced repercussions within Iran. The development was especially significant given Iran’s keen interest in not separating this war from other regional issues of special importance for Tehran, including, primarily, its role in the Syrian conflict and its ongoing escalation with the U.S. The Iranian political and military establishments rushed to exploit the "victory" in Mosul to achieve

domestic political gains. This is reflected in the pre-existing conflict between the two institutions especially

with the victory of President Hassan Rouhani in the first round of presidential elections held in May 19, 2017,

on the conservative candidate supported by the Revolutionary Guard, Ebrahim Raisi. However, what stands out in this context is that Iran’s top leadership, represented by the supreme leader Ali

Khamenei, appeared to have given the green light for the escalation between both establishments over

claiming the biggest role in backing the Iraqi government troops and the Shiite militias to achieve victory over

ISIS. This can be explained by Iran’s interest in sending across direct messages to the powers involved in the

war against ISIS in northern Iraq as well as in Syria, i.e. United States, Russia as well as Iraqi political forces,

that Iran is a party that cannot be ignored in this war.

This coincided with Tehran’s deliberate effort to give special importance to Abadi’s visit to Mosul on July 20, as

well as his meeting with Khamenei and other Iranian officials, before he declared the liberation of Mosul.

Tehran’s aim was to give the impression that Iran has played a primary role in the victory, although the claim is

refuted by its ongoing support for terrorism. Ongoing Debate Soon after Abadi declared the liberation of Mosul, Major General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the

Qods Force, the IRGC’s branch for external operations -whose sudden involvement in the escalating spat

between Rouhani, on the one hand, and the conservative fundamentalists and the IRGC commanders came

as a surprise- rushed to reaffirm that the development in Mosul would not have been possible without the

Pasdaran’s role. Soleimani meant, particularly, Pasadaran's military and logistical support to the Iraqi

government forces and the Shiite militias, as well as their supervision of the battles with ISIS. This cannot be

separated from Pasdaran-affiliated media organizations’ interest in giving a special coverage to Soleimani’s

visit to areas captured by the Hashd al-Shaabi militia on Iraq’s border with Syria. On July 10, 2017, the same day Abadi announced the victory over ISIS in Mosul, Soleimani said that military

factories in Iran worked round the clock to provide military support to the Hashd al-Shaabi. President Rouhani

was quick to reply to Soleimani’s statement, and stressed that the Iranian government played the most

significant role in providing military support to Tehran’s allies outside Iran, and to the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq in

particular.

It is important to note that these statements refute the false claims which Iran continued to make since ISIS

took control of Mosul in June 2014, and even when the crisis in Syria broke out in March 2011. These Iranian

false claims are that Tehran's support for its allies is limited to providing advisors to forces involved in armed

battles. Moreover, the claims prove Iran’s continuous violation of international sanctions imposed against it, as

well as its inability to honor strict international commitments. However, this has not held Iran’s Pasdaran from

giving special importance to its role in the war on ISIS in Iraq, through which it apparently seeks to achieve the following two goals: The first goal is to emphasize that it is the role the Pasdaran (IRGC) plays outside Iran that represents the

mechanism through which Iran succeeded in enhancing its regional presence and strengthening its influence

in crisis-hit states, and not the policy pursued by President Rouhani. This policy is primarily based on the

nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the group of 5+1 of world powers on July 14, 2015. The aim is

to provide a response to the efforts being made by the government to promote the positive potential results

that the agreement can bring on both the domestic and international levels.

This was reflected in Soleimani’s statements in which he called for prioritizing arms over diplomacy saying,

“Sometimes we solve issues through diplomacy, which is good. But, some problems can not be solved through

diplomatic means.” The second goal is Iran’s attempt to export to the West a rhetoric that projects Tehran’s possible

transformation into a key party in the war against ISIS. The attempt aims to reduce pressures put on Iran

through escalating accusations of supporting terrorism. This became significant after the US Administration of

President Donald Trump labeled Iran as a major source of instability in the Middle East. To further emphasize its role in the war on terrorism, Iran sought, at the same time, to propose its

participation in the reconstruction of areas liberated from ISIS in Mosul. This was evidenced in statements by

Minister of Industry, Mine and Trade Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, in which he said, on July 15, 2017, that

Iran has a good experience in creating industrial zones and is ready to put this experience at the disposal of

Iraq. Challenges in Iraq Without a doubt, this cannot be excluded from Iran’s attempts to respond to recent calls from Iraqi political

figures to reduce Iran’s influence in Iraq. One such call came from Iraqi Vice President, Ayad Allawi who said,

on June 16, 2017, that Iran’s support for Shiite factions in Iraq obstructs the efforts being made to overcome

sectarian divisions ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Allawi’s statement coincided with protests

staged in late April by supporters of the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to condemn Iran’s presence in Iraq. The

protesters chanted the slogan “Iran go out”, indicating, perhaps, a significant forthcoming change to the

directions of Iran’s relationship with its allied Iraqi Shiite forces in Mosul post-ISIS defeat. Hence, it can be possibly argued that Iran, in the coming period, is likely to seek to rearrange the patterns of its alliances within Iraq in preparation for the upcoming political commitments, and the April 2018 parliamentary elections in particular. This also aims to accommodate new developments that will undoubtedly impact political balances of power in Iraq, including the Hashd al-Shaabi militia’s efforts to take up a role for itself in reconstruction in liberated areas. Moreover, the possibility that the

conflict between Iran and the United States would escalate is increasing, due to President Trump’s new approach which entails confronting Iranian influence in crisis-hit states. This was evidenced in the new sanctions imposed on July 17 by Washington against Iran over its military support to terrorist and armed organizations deploying in such states.

Causes and Implications of Russia’s Growing Military Power in Syria

The understandings reached in recent weeks between the United States and Russia have contributed to an expansion of the scope of ceasefire on different fronts in Syria. The level of these understandings would be escalated to include all Syria except for the combat zones of operations against ISIS in Raqqa in northeastern Syria and al-Nusra Front, now rebranded to become Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, in the Damascus suburb of al-Ghouta, in southwestern Syria. Presumably, these understandings should increase the possibility of formalizing security arrangements. These

arrangements include the shape and pattern of deployment and armament of involved forces in ceasefire

zones that require switching from offensive to defensive tactics imposed by monitoring troops. However, the

opposite appears to be happening where there are signs that Russia is pursuing diligent efforts to enhance its

military capabilities in Syria, whether generally through expanding its naval and air bases or tactical operations

on war fronts. This reveals that Russia does have a concrete future plan completely different from its previous

approaches that sought to gradually reduce its military presence in Syria in parallel with the political

developments in efforts being made to achieve a settlement to the crisis. However, this does not negate that a different regional role for Russia will be tied to another variable that is no

less important. This variable is related to the expansion of the US military presence in Syria due to the new

policy being pursued by the US Administration of President Donald Trump to address political and field

developments of this crisis. Concurrent Measures Russia is preparing for increasing its military presence in Syria through expanding, and enhancing the

capabilities of its air and naval bases in Tartous, Lattakia and Hmeymim on the Syrian coast within the

framework of agreements that were signed with the Bashar Assad regime earlier this year and were approved

last month with immediate effect. An analysis of the contents of these agreements reveals that Moscow is working towards establishing a long-

term presence for itself in Syria that may, according to some views, last up to fifty years. However, contrary to

what is stated in the agreements, the type and scale of armament at these military bases indicates that

Russia’s aim is to scale up its defensive and offensive capabilities in combat zones while also tightening its

military grip on Syria’s airspace. Moreover, the new agreements, in the sections dealing with Russian naval presence, allow for Russian military

deployments that exceed the requirements of local defense and are rather more suitable for regional defense.

Moreover, the development of bases in Tartous may require up to five years, according to estimates by

Russian experts. This means that the effort is not confined to an interim role for Russia in Syria, where Syria

does not only constitute an arena for military operations but also a launching pad for Moscow’s various future

role in the whole region. However, it is noteworthy in this context that Russia’s enhancing of its military presence in Syria coincides with

the growing rapprochement with the United States over Syria at this stage, which was reflected in their

successive agreements about the expansion of ceasefire and establishment of a sequence of truce

agreements, the last of which was signed for the cities of Homs and Idlib. The continuance of these understandings will be among the key topics for talks the first round of which was

held in Amman, Jordan during this month with the participation of nine armed Syrian opposition factions and in

the presence of US Special Envoy for Syria, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Ratney. Ten days

before the first round, understandings reached between the US and Russia resulted in a ceasefire in the

governorates of Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda. The ceasefire agreement provided for the deployment of a

contingent of Russian monitors to Daraa. However, there have been reports that the first batch of Russian

monitors dispatched to the governorate were more like military troops, something evidenced by their armament

and pattern of deployment. This means that Russia is possibly preparing to impose the understandings by

military force and not only monitor the implementation of the understandings. It is currently perceived that any understandings providing for a comprehensive ceasefire and imposing

calm in the northern, southern and southeastern sectors, between the Syrian regime and the opposition

factions under the sponsorship of the US and Russia, would represent strong support to the upcoming peace

talks in both Astana and Geneva. Practically, there will only remain combat zones such as the Damascus

suburb of al-Ghouta, where al-Nusra Front militants operate. The zone will be a key topic for upcoming US-

Russia talks where a military approach to dealing with it will be discussed. Long-term Goals Based on the above, Moscow appears to be seeking to pursue a strategy to expand its future presence in the

Syrian arena to counterweight U.S. presence at the U.S. outpost situated near the Syrian border town of al-

Tanf, its bases in Raqqa and the al-Shaddadi district, south of al-Hasakah. This indicates an ongoing US-

Russian arms race that is beyond the tactics of the current battles, even as an interim tactic is being pursued

currently to implement the provisions of understandings the two powers reached using force. For instance, Moscow made sure to demonstrate its new BMPT-72 tank support combat vehicle in the

presence of Bashar Assad at Hmeymim military base. Designed to launch attacks in urban warfare, the multi-

purpose vehicle is armed with two 30-mm 2A42 automatic cannons, four laser-guided Ataka-T anti-tank

missile systems and one heavy coaxial machine gun with a remote reloading mechanism. It is capable of

engaging with infantry vehicles, light armored vehicles, tanks and fortified firing positions. The high firepower of

the vehicle indicates that Russia is enhancing its attack capabilities for engaging in crucial battles and that its

potential working plan will not be confined to monitoring nor to an interim role in the foreseeable future. Regarding naval bases, and according to an agreement sealed recently, Russia will will be allowed to double

the number of warships in Syrian territorial waters. According to the TASS news agency, this expansion will

allow for up to 11 warships, including nuclear-powered ones, to be docked together, which is double the

current capacity of the Syrian military sea ports. If one of these ports can currently accommodate five naval

vessels, the current deepening and expanding work means that Russia will increase the number of such bases

in the post-civil war era, which shows that there is an anticipated regional role for this Russian presence in

Syria that goes beyond domestic boundaries. Possible Repercussions The US-Russia understandings pose questions about the roles of other parties to be involved in future

developments of the crisis, due, in particular, to implicit details that are likely to constitute significant future

indicators. These include, for instance, what Michael Ratney referred to, during the Amman meeting, as an

effective role for police forces in the future in Daraa Governorate. The role includes policing, maintaining

security and establishing suitable conditions for the return of Syrian refugees from Jordan, where Washington

would guarantee that the area would not be exposed to any bombardment or any type of offensives. Of course, making security arrangements in coordination between Russia and the Syrian opposition factions-

as reported by Jordanian newspapers about the Amman meeting, would reduce the role of sectarian militias in

the future, especially if local administration councils are formed for these areas, a step that appears to be

unwelcome by other powers such as Iran. The US-Russia movements could support the possibilities of a shift for Moscow and Washington from sharing areas of influence to sharing areas of deployment and military armament, while also re-engineering the role and tasks of local partners on the ground and within their own areas of deployment. This would eventually suggest that the Syrian crisis is heading for several developments that would significantly impact its potential trajectories in the coming period.